CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS
BETWEEN BRITAIN AND INDIA

The Transfer of Power 1942-7

Volume III Reassertion of authority, Gandhi's fast, and the succession to the Viceroyalty

21 September 1942–12 June 1943

Editor-in-Chief
NICHOLAS MANSERGH, M.A., D.Litt.
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
HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

The failure of the Cripps Mission was documented in the first volume in this series and the outbreak of the Quit India movement in the second. The third volume opens in the aftermath of the earlier phases of the Quit India movement, treats of its continuing manifestations and the official responses to them before focusing more sharply first upon the prospect, and then the reality, of Gandhi's fast. This was an event which even on the pages of official records possesses a compulsive human interest while at the same time retaining its status as an episode of high historical moment in the development of Anglo-Indian relations. Most of the material in this, as in the two previous volumes, has not been published or available for study hitherto. It includes official and personal correspondence between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy, extracts from the reports of Governors, and minutes of the War Cabinet. Of particular interest are the discussions on the choice of a new Viceroy culminating in Churchill's surprise decision to appoint Field Marshal Wavell.

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THE TRANSFER OF POWER
1942-7

[redacted]

PRIORITY. Cant. XXX. JAT.

10, Downing Street,
Whitehall.

Most Immediate.

11 - U.

~~PRIME MINISTER TO VICEROY.~~
PERSONAL AND MOST SECRET. from Prime Minister
FOR YOUR EYE ALONE.

326 Groups despatched 22.45 hrs. 9/6/43. -1-

1. Naturally I have been considering all these anxious months the question of your successor. I have never in my life had to solve a more puzzling appointment. I am loth to disturb the smooth-running poise of the War Cabinet. Eden, Lyttelton and Anderson can none of them be spared. I am sure that Sam Hoare would not be well received in an atmosphere which condemns so severely the Hoare - Laval pact and the Munich treaty. I could not have confidence in him. After many inquiries and cogitations I am inclined towards either (a) Sir Miles Lampson now Lord Killearn, or (b) Wavell.

2. It seems to me after reading your various messages that Wavell would be far the better man. We want younger men in the field but he has a great name, knows the situation on your Council, and has a much broader outlook than most soldiers.

Mr Churchill to Lord Linlithgow, 9 June 1943. Facsimile of the first two paragraphs of Document 767

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Master of St. John's College, Cambridge

Assistant Editor

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HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

1971

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Frontispiece

Mr Churchill to Lord Linlithgow, 9 June 1943. Facsimile of the first two paragraphs of Document 767.

Between pages 568 and 569

The Indian representatives at the War Cabinet in the garden of 10 Downing Street, 9 September 1942. (*Topix*)

The Viceroy's Executive Council, February 1943 (*Sir G. Laithwaite*)

The Aga Khan's Palace, Poona (*Photo Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India*)

From the *Daily Worker*, 25 May 1943 (*People's Press Printing Society Ltd.*)

MAP

At end of volume

India 1942–3

Foreword

On 9 March 1966 the Prime Minister, Mr Harold Wilson, announced in the House of Commons that the closed period for official records was to be reduced from fifty to thirty years. He stated that the Government also proposed that the range of Official Histories, which had hitherto been confined to the two great wars, should be extended to include selected periods or episodes of peacetime history and considered that there was scope for extending to other Oversea Departments the Foreign Office practice of publishing selected documents relating to external relations. The Prime Minister hoped that both of these subsidiary proposals, supplementing the reduction in the closed period to thirty years, would be acceptable in principle to the Opposition parties, who would be associated with their implementation.[1]

On 10 August 1966 the Prime Minister announced that a standing inter-party group of Privy Counsellors was to be appointed to consider all such proposals[2] and on 8 June 1967 that its members were, for the Government and to act as Chairman, the Right Hon. Patrick Gordon Walker, Minister without Portfolio; for the Official Opposition, the Right Hon. Sir Alec Douglas-Home; and for the Liberal Party, Lord Ogmore.[3]

A project to publish documents from the India Office Records had been under discussion for some years and on 30 June 1967 the Prime Minister, in replying to a written question in the House of Commons, announced that the first of the new series of selected documents to be published was to relate to the Transfer of Power in India. His statement was as follows:

> As I informed the House on the 9th of March, 1966, the Government have decided to extend to other Oversea Departments the Foreign Office practice of publishing selected documents concerned with our external relations, subject to inter-party agreement through the Group of Privy Counsellors whose composition I announced on the 8th of June. I am happy to inform the House that the Group have agreed that in view of the great interest now being shown in historical circles in the last days of British rule in India the first selection of documents to be published under the new arrangements should be documents from the India Office records on the Transfer of Power and the events leading up to it.
>
> The scheme will follow closely the lines of the Foreign Office series of *Documents on British Foreign Policy* from 1919 to 1939, and, as in that series, the editors will be independent historians who will be given unrestricted access to the records and freedom to select and edit documents for publication. Professor P. N. S. Mansergh, Smuts Professor of the History of the British

[1] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol 725, Written Answers to Questions, cols. 561–3.
[2] *Ibid.*, vol. 733, cols. 1706–7. [3] *Ibid.*, vol. 747, col. 1291.

Commonwealth at Cambridge, has expressed willingness to accept appointment as Editor-in-Chief, and the scheme will be in full operation by the end of the year.[4]

Mr E. W. R. Lumby was appointed Assistant Editor and took up his duties on 1 January 1968. The Editors were assisted in the first instance by Mr R. W. Mason, C.M.G., Director of Research, Librarian and Keeper of the Papers at the Foreign Office 1960–5, who had made a preliminary survey of the India Office papers relating to the 'Transfer of Power' theme by 1 January 1968 and who continued thereafter to make a first selection of the material to be considered for publication until his retirement in August 1970. The Editors would like to take this opportunity of placing on record their appreciation, firstly of the very important contribution which Mr Mason made to the launching of the Series by his assembling of the material from which the contents of the first three volumes and the early part of the fourth—down to October 1943—has been, or is to be, drawn, and secondly of much wise counsel, grounded in earlier Foreign Office experience, which he gave in discussions on questions of policy that needed to be decided in the initial stages of the enterprise.

Mr C. G. Costley-White, C.M.G., and Mr D. M. Blake both joined the Historical Section at the India Office Records in March 1968 and Dr L. J. Carter on Mr Mason's retirement in August 1970.

The Series will cover the period 1 January 1942 to 15 August 1947. The first volume carrying the sub-title *The Cripps Mission* and dealing with developments during the months January–April 1942 was published in 1970 and the second, with its sub-title of *Quit India* and carrying the documentary record forward from 30 April to 21 September 1942, in 1971.

The principles of selection, the arrangement of documents—which is in chronological order throughout in so far as that has been ascertainable—together with other details of presentation were explained in the Foreword to Volume I [pp. vi–x] and need not, therefore, be recapitulated here. In the light of longer editorial experience, however, three points, one of circumscribed textual interest and the others of wider significance, may perhaps be mentioned or, in the second and third cases, usefully elaborated.

The Editors, to deal with the first point, have been at pains to reproduce the texts of all documents exactly as they are set out and written on the files. They have, however, allowed themselves a limited discretion, of which the reader should be aware, in correcting punctuation and the spelling of words (including proper names) where there is an obvious typist's or printer's error.

The second and most substantial point relates to the private and secret weekly letters exchanged between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy, the character of which was described in the Foreword to Volume I [pp. vi–vii].

The correspondence collectively is of the highest importance but some of the individual letters in it are of very considerable length with many paragraphs either of peripheral interest or without relevance to the theme of this Series. Thus, to illustrate by examples drawn from this volume, the longest letter, in terms of paragraphs, written by the Viceroy to the Secretary of State is that of 1–2 November 1942, of which 30 of its 43 paragraphs are reprinted as Document No. 131. Two more from the Viceroy, namely those of 13–19 January and 10–17 May 1943 comprising respectively 36 and 35 paragraphs, are reproduced to the extent of 25 and 7 paragraphs each. [See Documents Nos. 347 and 699.] The Secretary of State in terms of paragraphs did not have occasion, as is understandable, to range over so many topics but nevertheless even in these terms his letters, for example those of 9–12 October and 16 December 1942 and 12–14 May 1943 numbering respectively 16, 15, and 24 paragraphs [Documents Nos. 84, 280, 701] are of considerable length, the more so since the Secretary of State's paragraphs tend to be generally longer than those of the Viceroy. In his case the numbers of paragraphs omitted are respectively 7, 8, and 4.

To have reproduced this correspondence in full would have resulted in volumes, the increased length of which would have little compensating advantage in terms of interest relevant to the Transfer of Power theme. Indeed, if anything, experience thus far in this regard has resulted in increased editorial rigour in selection. To use the proportionately most heavily cut of the documents mentioned above as an example, the twenty-eight omitted paragraphs of the Viceroy's letter of 10–17 May 1943 related respectively to reactions in England to certain executions for murder; the Government Whip's report on the Budget Session in the Assembly; correspondence about a possible extension of the jurisdiction of the Federal Court; notes printed in *The Times of India*; the case of an individual policeman in Bihar; views on the future industrial development of India reproduced elsewhere; the Viceroy's own visit to the Eastern Front and his impressions and personal encounters on it (6 paras.); the Queen's broadcast; honours and appointments (3 paras.); the Federal Court judgment invalidating Defence of India Rule 26; a brief reference to South Africa; the affairs of three Princely States (3 paras.); Indian representation on the War Graves Commission; retirement of a Provincial Chief Secretary; an American information document and American commercial interest in India (2 paras.); an appeal board to consider the cases of those invalided out of the I.C.S.; the war and the weather, one paragraph each. The Secretary of State in his correspondence not infrequently commented on topics ranging from the progress of the war on many fronts and speculation on the pattern of the post-war world to silk for use in parachutes and a recommendation for the Viceroy's morning exercises. The last was reprinted, the others excised.

[4] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 749, Written Answers to Questions, cols. 147–8.

Thirdly, parallel with the Secretary of State–Viceroy correspondence and forming collectively a far larger bulk of material and a necessary counterpart to it, is the correspondence between the Governors of the Provinces of British India and the Viceroy, the nature of which was also described in the Foreword to Volume I [pp. vi–vii]. The purposes of this correspondence, including the fortnightly reports of the Governors to the Viceroy which provided the central continuing focus to it, were explained by the Viceroy in two letters written in 1943.

The first, dated 27 January,[5] was to the acting Governor of Bihar and the relevant paragraphs read as follows:

2. You know the form of the ordinary fortnightly letters . . . I would only say that the fuller the information and the comment contained in these fortnightly letters the better, for it helps to keep me, and still more important since he is very much further away, the Secretary of State, in close personal touch with what is going on.

3. But apart from the regular fortnightly letters I hope you will write to me independently on any specific matter that may be of concern to you. I should also welcome reports of the impressions that you get as regards the services, morale, police organisation, and the like after you have settled in and as you tour round. You know that I have been much concerned about the Bihar position the difficulties of which from the Governor's point of view I of course fully recognise, and it will be of great interest and value to me to have your reactions, and also, where that may seem to you appropriate, your estimate of the more important personalities.

The second dated 24 April[6] was addressed to the incoming Governor of Bombay. Here, also, the relevant paragraphs would seem to merit quotation. They read:

2. You mention Lumley's periodic reports. The position on that is that all Governors send me a fortnightly report (usually about the 15th of each month) in which they comment at large on the situation in their provinces, and on any points of special interest in connection with it that strike them. This report, though it is personal in character and in its framing, is in the nature of an official report to the extent that it is repeated to the Secretary of State and that it is accompanied by a copy of the formal official report which the Chief Secretary in each province send[s] to the Home Department of the Government of India fortnightly. I quite realise that you are likely to want to go a little slow on this until you have found your feet. When you do feel able to start the regular series I need not say how welcome it will be to me, while I know its

value to Amery. Irwin,[7] I have no doubt, will be able to give you full details of the lines which were followed by Lumley (whose reports incidentally I always thought some of the best that I got from any Governor—they must have meant an immensity of trouble, and they were quite invaluable as keeping one in close touch with trends of opinion, &c., throughout the Presidency).

3. As we are on this matter of correspondence I would only add . . . that apart from the regular fortnightly reports, there is normally a pretty considerable flow of correspondence between the Governor and the Governor-General on [of?] a less formal and more personal character, on specific points or on the development of the political situation. I hope you will not hesitate to write to me about anything on which you may think I can be of the very slightest use. I should be only too glad, as I am sure you know, to give any help I possibly can.

It is self-evident from these accounts of the object of the correspondence between the Governors and the Viceroy first that it would be collectively on a very large scale and secondly that it would of necessity deal principally with matters of provincial as distinct from all-India importance. In conjunction these two factors have meant that, by contrast with the Secretary of State–Viceroy correspondence, the question posed in this case from the outset was not what to exclude but what to include. In seeking a satisfactory answer to it the principle which was adopted, and which continues to be applied, is that while in respect of excision or exclusion of correspondence, or any part of it, between Secretary of State and Viceroy irrelevance to the theme of the Series must be reasonably established, in respect of correspondence between the Viceroy and Governors, the onus of proof must lie the other way, i.e. in favour of inclusion. In the case of Governors' Reports the application of this principle may mean, for example, that long Reports may be omitted altogether and that in many cases only a very few paragraphs will be selected, for example, one and a half paragraphs from a Report of fourteen paragraphs dated 24 September 1942 from Bombay [Document No. 30] and one from a total of twelve in a Report from Bengal dated 6 November 1942 [Document No. 151]. Exclusion on this scale is not a reflection upon the historical significance, or the lack of it, in the correspondence between the Viceroy and the Governors but is the consequence of irrelevance, or marginal relevance, to the theme of this Series.

A certain difficulty of a particular kind may occasionally arise when an isolated sentence, or even part of a sentence, of historical interest occurs in a Governor's report, or other communication, which in no other respect qualifies

[5] MSS. EUR. F. 125/50. [6] MSS. EUR. F. 125/57.

[7] Secretary to the Governor of Bombay.

for reproduction. A good example is a phrase in an enclosure to a letter from Sir Henry Twynam to the Viceroy dated 6 June 1943[8] in which the Governor, seeking to refute statements made by Louis Fischer in a speech on Indian affairs at San Francisco on 23 February 1943, restates[9] explicitly that the Cripps offer was described by Gandhi as 'a post-dated cheque on a failing bank'—one of the few references in the documents to a much publicised comment, the authenticity of which has been debated. This sentence has not been reprinted and, while there can be no general rule on these matters, such, of necessity, must often be the case.

Finally it may be worth restating the purpose of the Series. It is to make available to scholars in convenient printed form the British historical records relating to the Transfer of Power in India.

N. MANSERGH

Historical Section
India Office Records
January 1971

[8] MSS. EUR. F. 125/64.

[9] See No. 229, where Sir H. Twynam had alluded in November 1942 to Gandhi's alleged use of the phrase, with the variant 'crashing' for 'failing'.

Introduction to Volume III

The first two volumes in the series of British Documents on the Transfer of Power covered a little less than nine months—1 January to 21 September 1942—between them. This comparatively short time-span is the result in some measure certainly of the way in which business was conducted but chiefly of the concentrated interest of the principal events which the two volumes recorded—the Cripps Mission in the first and the outbreak of the Quit India Movement in the second. The interest of this third volume, which runs from 21 September 1942 to 12 June 1943 and covers a period almost exactly equal to that of its two predecessors combined, is more dispersed.

The volume opens in the aftermath of the earlier phases of the Quit India Movement, treats of its continuing manifestations and the official responses to them before focusing more sharply first upon the prospect, and then the reality, of Gandhi's fast. This was an event which even on the pages of official records possesses a compulsive human interest while at the same time retaining its status as an episode of high historical moment in the development of Anglo-Indian relations. The Viceroy was resolute in his refusal to make concessions to end the fast and at its conclusion he was more than satisfied that his policy had been fully vindicated.

The need to arrange for the succession to the Viceroyalty at the close of Lord Linlithgow's twice extended period of office provides a personal interest rather different in kind. The volume opens with an appraisal by the Viceroy of those whose names had earlier been mentioned as 'possible' by the Secretary of State together with his opinion of the experience and capacity required for the post. The matter is pursued internittently during succeeding months, principally according to the time and inclination of the Prime Minister in whose hands the choice effectively rested. The documents reveal the closeness of his interest and the volume ends with the communication to the Viceroy of Churchill's decision to recommend Field Marshal Wavell for the appointment.

While the danger of a Japanese invasion of India was thought to have receded the progress of the war near India's frontiers remained a constant British preoccupation, to which was added growing anxiety about the possibility of food shortages, recognised to carry a potential threat of famine to large areas of the country.

In the Summary of Documents [pp. xxviii–lxxxv] those dealing with the central political developments in the relations between Britain and India during this period are for convenience grouped in the first three chapters. In the first chapter, on the later manifestations of the Quit India Movement and reactions to it, Churchill's reflections on the Indian scene are conveyed by one of the Indian representatives at the War Cabinet, Sir R. Mudaliar, in a colourful letter dated 21 September to the Viceroy's Private Secretary [No. 2];

Linlithgow's in a series of communications [Nos. 62–5, 70, and 75] dating from 3 to 7 October and intended chiefly to provide material for a forthcoming debate on India in Parliament. The War Cabinet discussed policy and arrangements for the debate on 6 October [No. 72]; the debate itself took place on 8 October; the Secretary of State sent an account of it to the Viceroy on 9 October [No. 84] and reactions to it and to the attitude taken by *The Times* are recorded in succeeding documents [e.g. Nos. 86–7, 90]. On 19 October the Secretary of State expressed his 'boredom' with demands for some initiative in India [No. 107] to break the constitutional deadlock by people who felt that 'somehow, somewhere, there is an "Open Sesame" that needs only to be spoken by you or me to create a united self-governing India throwing itself with undivided enthusiasm into the war'. He was convinced, for his part, that there could be no such solution unless there was some approach to agreement as to the future constitution and that therefore the only line of progress, 'slow though it may be, is to concentrate on anything that may help forward serious consideration of the future. In a measure the Cripps proposals did do that, and that is why Gandhi & Co. so fiercely resented them and staged their campaign whose whole object was to force an immediate solution in their favour.' But the Secretary of State's particular proposal to further this long-term aim, namely the formation of a small Committee of Indian members of the Executive Council to consider selecting a team of non-official investigators under an impartial Chairman and perhaps reinforced by United States and Swiss experts [No. 159] to study and to recommend ways and means for bringing such a constitution-making body into being, were uncompromisingly rejected by the Viceroy on the grounds that 'to attempt anything on these lines might very well result in the loss of my Government, or at any rate in the development inside it of cleavages so deep and so important, and of a distraction to its Members from their ordinary work . . . so great that the effect would be calamitous. There is nothing for it in this business but to go on stonewalling and expressing our readiness to play. . . . The fact is that there are here in this situation none of the materials for agreement or settlement' [No. 187; see also No. 188].

On 25 November the Viceroy in a letter to the Governor of Bombay [No. 218] confessed that he saw no signs whatever of progress—the parties had 'dug themselves in for good', with Jinnah continuing to consolidate and improve the Pakistan position, the Congress hoping 'that the Left Wing at home and in the United States, and possibly in China will succeed in getting them what they want' and moderate opinion continuing 'to count for as little as ever'. In such circumstances the possibility of a post-war settlement imposed by the British in the absence of Indian agreement was by no means to be excluded. Amery, for his part, though he continued to ventilate ideas for some form of constitutional enquiry, seems to have reached similar conclusions, writing on

27 November [No. 225] that 'for the near future—and that may extend for a good few years—we cannot well do more at the Centre than carry on and strengthen the existing form of Government'. He attached particular importance to emphasising the effectiveness and independence of the Executive Council in the ordinary conduct of its affairs and he also reflected that 'the best hope for India in the future may well lie in the Princes on the one side and the rising generation of Indian officers in the British Indian Army' on the other. The Secretary of State returned to the theme on 9 December [No. 264] saying that while 'obviously there is no room for any major constitutional changes' there was for 'development and consolidation of the present position' in which the growth of a feeling in India that the Executive Council was 'really effectively governing' would be 'all to the good'. On 28 December a memorandum [No. 298] containing a précis of earlier discussions in the Executive Council on the Indian constitutional position was circulated to the War Cabinet.

The policy of the long view on constitutional, with 'consolidation' on political, questions was under direct challenge in the succeeding period dominated by Gandhi's fast and the aftermath to it which constitute the second and third chapters. The possibility of such a fast had long been contemplated by the Government of India and the question of the policy to be adopted in that event had been reopened by the Governor of Bombay (in whose Province Gandhi was detained) in a letter to the Viceroy of 22 October 1942 [No. 111]. Neither the Governor nor the Viceroy thought that Gandhi was immediately intending a fast, and Lord Linlithgow had only recently telegraphed revised proposals on the subject to the Secretary of State [No. 289] when, on 31 December, Gandhi wrote to him [No. 305] protesting against Government statements suggesting that he was 'the *fons et origo* of all the evil imputed to the Congress' and adding that the period of six months he had given himself since his arrest was drawing to a close with the result that, unless he were convinced 'of my error or errors' he would use the remedy of fasting prescribed by the law of *Satyagraha*. On 4 January the Viceroy considered the implications of Gandhi's letter in a telegram [No. 312] to the Secretary of State who on the same day, and before hearing from the Viceroy, laid a Memorandum before the War Cabinet reviewing Government policy in the event of a fast [No. 314]. On 7 January the War Cabinet decided to maintain the principle that Gandhi should not be allowed to secure his release by threatening a fast [No. 323]. This conclusion was conveyed to the Viceroy by the Secretary of State on 8 January [Nos. 326 and 327] who responded on 11 January [No. 333] to say that if he were to continue to be responsible the Cabinet 'must be prepared to take my judgment as to best method of handling Gandhi.' On 12 January the Cabinet agreed [No. 338] not to interfere with the Viceroy's proposals both in respect of the reply to Gandhi, the terms of which had been much discussed between Delhi and London [Nos. 318–22], and of the action

to be taken should Gandhi fast. There was a further disagreement just before the fast began when the Viceroy persisted, in face of the War Cabinet's disapproval [No. 418] and a strongly worded plea from Churchill [No. 424], in the course of action recommended by his Council [No. 404], though he himself disagreed with it. Thereafter during the twenty-one days of Gandhi's fast, from 10 February to 3 March, there remained two principal protagonists—Gandhi and the Viceroy. But while Gandhi, isolated in the Aga Khan's Palace at Poona, was committed to a single course, the Viceroy at Delhi was still subject to pressures and comments from many quarters—from the Prime Minister [Nos. 463, 511, 538, 553] and from the Secretary of State [Nos. 439, 462, 474] in London; from the Governors of the Provinces of British India and especially of Bombay where Gandhi was interned [Nos. 434, 473, 516]; from the members of his Executive Council, especially the Indian members most of whom were under very considerable strain and three of whom resigned [Nos. 442, 453, 456, 460, 469, 481–2, 515]; from moderates who urged Gandhi's release [Nos. 491, 498, 506, 514, 529, 531]; and from President Roosevelt's Personal Representative, Mr William Phillips who, to the Viceroy's concern, appeared, until firmly discouraged, to be moving towards an intermediary rôle [Nos. 485–7, 489, 520].

The record of Gandhi's fast and its immediate aftermath, as set out from day to day, is so full that it may be read as historical narrative in documentary form. By reason of this an attempt to give a brief summary of the sequence of events and the interplay of opinion would be at once difficult and probably misplaced. The story, for all its diversity of interest and perspective, remains a unity. The reader, however, may like to be aware at the outset of certain decisions made in the selection of documents for reproduction.

The Viceroy twice circularised the Governors about the policies to be pursued in respect of Gandhi's fast. For reasons of space, the individual replies (with the three exceptions mentioned below) have been omitted, but the summary of them prepared for the War Cabinet is reproduced as No. 403. The full text of two replies [Nos. 393, 397] were before the Cabinet when they considered the question on 7 February [No. 418], and these have therefore been reprinted. The Governor of Bombay's reply [No. 382] to the first circular which, unlike those from the other Governors, the Viceroy saw fit to repeat to the Secretary of State in full has also been reprinted. Much the same principle has been adopted in respect of the daily medical bulletins on Gandhi during the period of his fast. With one exception [No. 465] they have been omitted though the essence of them, without the medical detail, is given in footnotes in so far as this is needed to elucidate references to them in the text of reprinted correspondence. On the other hand the full text of the note by the Surgeon-General of the Bombay Presidency on Gandhi's fast dated 5 March, i.e. two days after the fast ended, is reprinted as an enclosure to Document No. 568.

Particular attention may also be drawn first to the comprehensive report of the Governor of Bombay dated 4 March [No. 560] reviewing in near-retrospect the circumstances of the fast and the difficult political questions involved and second to the equally full retrospective review of the events surrounding the fast from 8 August 1942 when first it had to be considered as a likelihood, which the Viceroy sent to the Governor on 11 March [No. 577].

During the period which followed the fast the moderates continued their efforts to secure Gandhi's release, or at least to be allowed to see him in order to explore 'avenues for reconciliation' [Nos. 584, 591, 622]; but the Viceroy would make them no concession. In May Gandhi, responding to a public invitation from Jinnah to write to him, asked the Government of India to forward a letter to Jinnah suggesting that the two men should meet [No. 692]. The Viceroy was prepared to pass the letter on and face the possible consequences [Nos. 691, 702, and 713]; but he deferred to the War Cabinet's view that Gandhi should be kept strictly incommunicado [No. 716]. Meanwhile the growing strength of the Muslim League was shown by the formation of Ministries under League leadership in Bengal and the North-West Frontier Province.

The remaining chapters into which the Summary of Documents is divided, with one exception, call for little introductory comment. Chapter 4 brings together the papers relating to the appointment of Lord Linlithgow's successor; Chapter 5 those relating to India's representation at the War Cabinet, to membership of the Viceroy's Executive Council and the succession to Sir Maurice Gwyer as Chief Justice—a matter provoking more controversy than might have been expected; Chapter 6 those relating to the Indian states, many of whose Rulers were much concerned to clarify the nature of their relationship with the Paramount Power and to avoid the subjection of their States to a Congress-dominated Government of India in the event of a transfer of power; Chapter 7 those relating to the discussion of possible social and economic reforms which had been stimulated, or actively revived, by Sir Stafford Cripps on his return from India; Chapter 8 those relating to the interest of other members of the United Nations in the resolution of the Indian question and illustrating *inter alia* the continued sharpness of the Viceroy's reactions to any suggestion of United States or Chinese intervention in Indian affairs, and his preoccupation in consequence with the personality and the actual status of President Roosevelt's Personal Representative; Chapter 9 those relating to the application and possible reinterpretation in the light of changing conditions of the financial arrangements between Britain and India made at the outset of the war, with particular reference to the likely scale of India's accumulation of sterling balances; and Chapter 10 those relating to food supplies. It is this last which constitutes the exception and would seem to require some further comment.

The material on India's developing food crisis included in this volume falls into two principal categories. The first consists of documents, principally in the form of extracts from Governors' reports, indicating the extent and nature of the shortage in some provinces, with circular letters from the Viceroy to Governors [Nos. 386, 658], emphasising the need for Provincial governments to co-operate in the Government of India's food policy. The second category comprises communications between the Viceroy and the Secretary of State, including notably the Viceroy's over-all appreciation of 18 March [No. 599]. In conjunction the two categories record reactions to the crisis and the more important considerations that determined the policy of the two governments. Any full documentary exposition would of necessity require a much wider survey including competing claims from other stricken areas, the wartime demands on shipping and the priorities that had to be determined in respect of it, as well as all the detailed evidence of food shortage in India as set out most notably in a series of weekly telegrams instituted at the request of the India Office on 22 March (L/E/8/3307, tel. 5216) and continued down to the transfer of power and beyond. But such fuller exposition was felt to lie outside the scope of this Series.

By far the greater part of the hitherto unpublished documents included in this volume, as in its predecessors, are drawn either from the official archives of the India Office in the custody of the India Office Records or from the Linlithgow Collection in the India Office Library.

The documents reproduced from the India Office Records are from the following series:

L/E/8	Economic and Overseas Department Files
L/F/7	Financial Department Collections
L/I/1	Information Department Files
L/PO	Private Office Papers
L/P&J/7	Political Department Files
L/P&J/8	Political Department Collections
L/P&S/12	External Department Collections
L/P&S/13	Political Internal Department Files and Collections
L/WS/1	War Staff Files.

Every document in these series is referred to in the text by the appropriate series notation followed by the number assigned to the particular file, collection, or volume in which the document is filed or bound. Thus the notation L/P&J/8/600 refers to the six-hundredth file in the series called Political Department Collections. Each document in a file, collection, or volume is identified by a folio reference.

The Linlithgow Collection consists of the papers of the second Marquess of Linlithgow as Viceroy and Governor-General of India which the present

Marquess deposited on permanent loan in the India Office Library in 1964. The documents from this Collection which are published here are almost all drawn from the series of volumes of the Viceroy's correspondence. Each of these volumes is divided into two sections, the first containing correspondence (letters and telegrams) addressed to the Viceroy, the second, correspondence from him. Within each section, correspondence is, with some exceptions, in chronological sequence. Documents from the Linlithgow Collection are referred to in the present volume by the catalogue number of the Collection (*MSS. EUR. F. 125*), followed by the number of the relevant volume.

The Editors wish to thank the present Marquess of Linlithgow for permission to use the Linlithgow papers.

Some documents which are not in either of these archives have been obtained from elsewhere, notably the Cabinet Office.[1]

The most important categories of telegraphic communications between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy were classified in the following ways. One category of Private and Personal telegrams from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State carried the letter 'S', or 'S.C.' if the Viceroy was at Simla or in Camp, i.e. on tour. Another category consisted of 'U' telegrams, which were reserved for the most secret and personal matters, the letter 'U' indicating the nature of the telegram, irrespective of whether it did, or did not, carry a 'Secret' or 'Private and Personal' prefix. 'U' telegrams could be enciphered or deciphered only in the Private Offices of the Secretary of State or the Viceroy. Telegrams in the Superintendent series indicated to Superintendents of Telegraph branches that especial care should be taken to safeguard their security.

It was the practice of the Viceroy to comment in the margin of incoming letters from the Secretary of State or reports from the Governors of the Provinces of British India for the guidance of the Private Secretary to the Viceroy (P.S.V.) or occasionally, it would seem, for his personal satisfaction. These marginal comments are reproduced in italics so as to distinguish them from the main text.

In conclusion the Editors desire to acknowledge once again the friendly assistance and advice they have received from the officials at the India Office Library and Records, among whom they would like to mention the Librarian and Keeper of the Records, Mr S. C. Sutton, C.B.E., F.S.A., and the Deputy Librarian and Deputy Keeper, Miss Joan C. Lancaster, F.S.A.; from the Editors of the *Documents on British Foreign Policy*; and from the Historical Adviser to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr Rohan Butler, C.M.G.

N. MANSERGH
E. W. R. LUMBY

[1] A file (R/30/1/3) containing copies of these documents can be consulted in the India Office Records.

Abbreviations

A.G.	Adjutant-General
A.-I.C.C.	All-India Congress Committee
A.-I.R.	All-India Radio
A.O.C.-in-C.	Air Officer Commanding in Chief
A.P.I.	Associated Press of India
A.R.P.	Air Raid Precautions
B.B.C.	British Broadcasting Corporation
B.I.S.	British Information Services
B.O.R.	British Other Ranks
B.S.T.	British Summer Time
C. and M.	Civil and Military
C.D.	Civil Disobedience
C.I.D.	Criminal Investigation Department
C.I.G.S.	Chief of the Imperial General Staff
C.-in-C.	Commander-in-Chief
C.I.O.	Central Intelligence Officer
C.O.S.	Chiefs of Staff
C.P.	Central Provinces
D.I.B.	Director of the Intelligence Bureau (Home Department)
D.I.G.	Deputy Inspector General (of Police)
D.I.R.	Defence of India Rules
E.C.O.	European Commissioned Officer
F.M.	Field Marshal
F.O.	Foreign Office
G.H.Q.	General Headquarters
G.O.C.	General Officer Commanding
G. of I.	Government of India
H.E.	His Excellency
H.E.H.	His Exalted Highness
H.M.	His Majesty *or* Honourable Member
H.M.G.	His Majesty's Government
I.A.	Indian Army
I.B.	Intelligence Bureau
I.C.A.R.	Imperial Council of Agricultural Research
I.C.O.	Indian Commissioned Officer
I.C.S.	Indian Civil Service
I.G.P.	Inspector General of Prisons *or* Inspector General of Police
I.L.O.	International Labour Organisation
I.M .S.	Indian Medical Service
I.O.R.	Indian Other Ranks

I.P.	Indian Police
I.P.C.	Indian Penal Code
I.P.R.	Institute of Pacific Relations
I.S.T.	Indian Standard Time
K.C.S.I.	Knight Commander of the Star of India
L.C.J.	Lord Chief Justice
L. of C.	Lines of Communications
M.E.S.C.	Middle East Supply Centre
M.L.A.	Member of Legislative Assembly
M.O.I.	Ministry of Information
M.P.	Member of Parliament
N.C.O.	Non-commissioned Officer
N.-W.F.P.	North-West Frontier Province
O.S.S.	Office of Strategic Services (*later the Central Intelligence Agency*)
P.M.	Prime Minister
P.P.S.	Parliamentary Private Secretary
P.Q.	Parliamentary Question
P.S.V.	Private Secretary to the Viceroy
Q.M.G.	Quartermaster General
R.A.F.	Royal Air Force
S.B.	Special Branch
S.G.G.	Secretary to the Governor-General
S. of S. *or* S/S	Secretary of State
S.S.O.	*see* O.S.S.
U.K.	United Kingdom
U.P.	United Provinces
V.C.O.	Viceroy's Commissioned Officer
W.A.A.F.	Women's Auxiliary Air Force
W.R.N.S. (Wrens)	Women's Royal Naval Service

Principal Holders of Office

United Kingdom

WAR CABINET

Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury, Minister of Defence	Mr Winston S. Churchill
Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs	Mr Clement Attlee
Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons	Sir Stafford Cripps (until 22 November 1942)
Lord President of the Council	Sir John Anderson
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and (from 22 November 1942) Leader of the House of Commons	Mr Anthony Eden
Minister of Production	Mr Oliver Lyttelton
Minister of Labour and National Service	Mr Ernest Bevin
Secretary of State for the Home Department and Minister of Home Security	Mr Herbert Morrison (in War Cabinet from 22 November 1942)
Minister of State in the Middle East	Mr R. G. Casey

Viscount Halifax, British Ambassador to the United States from January 1941, remaining a Member of the War Cabinet.

OTHER MINISTERS MENTIONED IN THIS VOLUME

Secretary of State for Air	Sir Archibald Sinclair
Minister of Aircraft Production	Sir Stafford Cripps (from 22 November 1942)
Secretary of State for the Colonies	Viscount Cranborne Colonel Oliver Stanley (from 22 November 1942)
Minister of Economic Warfare	Earl of Selborne
Chancellor of the Exchequer	Sir Kingsley Wood
Secretary of State for India and for Burma	Mr L. S. Amery
Minister of Information	Mr Brendan Bracken
Lord Chancellor	Viscount Simon
Lord Privy Seal	Viscount Cranborne (from 22 November 1942)

President of the Board of Trade	Mr Hugh Dalton
Secretary of State for War	Sir James Grigg
Minister of War Transport	Lord Leathers
Minister Resident in West Africa	Viscount Swinton (appointed 8 June 1942)

INDIA OFFICE

Secretary of State	Mr L. S. Amery
Permanent Under-Secretary	Sir David Monteath
Parliamentary Under-Secretary	Duke of Devonshire
	Earl of Munster (from 2 January 1943)
Deputy Under-Secretary	Mr William Croft (*cr.* K.B.E. June 1943)
Assistant Under-Secretaries	Sir Leonard Wakely
	Mr P. J. Patrick
Private Secretary to Secretary of State	Mr F. F. Turnbull

INDIA

Viceroy, Governor-General, and Crown Representative	The Marquess of Linlithgow
Private Secretary to the Viceroy	Sir Gilbert Laithwaite
Reforms Commissioner	Mr V. P. Menon

EXECUTIVE COUNCIL (UNTIL 2 MAY 1943)

Commander-in-Chief	General Sir Archibald Wavell (Field Marshal from 1 January 1943)
Home	Sir Reginald Maxwell I.C.S.
Finance	Sir Jeremy Raisman I.C.S.
War Transport	Sir Edward Benthall
Posts and Air	Sir Mahomed Usman
Education, Health, and Lands	Sir Jogendra Singh
Commerce	Mr Nalini Sarker (resigned 17 February 1943)
Labour	Dr Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar
Law	Sir Sultan Ahmed
Indians Overseas	Dr Madhao Shrihari Aney (resigned 17 February 1943)
Information and Broadcasting	Vacant

Supply	Sir Homi Mody (resigned 17 February 1943)
Civil Defence	Sir J. P. Srivastava
Defence	Sir Firoz Khan Noon

Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar (who continued to be a Member of the Executive Council) and the Maharaja Jam Saheb of Nawanagar served as India's representatives at the War Cabinet. The latter returned to India in January 1943.

From 2 May 1943 the following changes were made:

Commerce, Food, and Industries and Civil Supplies	Sir M. Azizul Haque (assumed charge of office 3 May)
Law	Sir Asoka Kumar Roy (assumed charge of office 1 June)
Indians Overseas	Dr N. B. Khare (assumed charge of office 6 May)
Information and Broadcasting	Sir Sultan Ahmed
Supply	Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar (remained in London as one of India's representatives at War Cabinet until 27 July)

GOVERNORS OF PROVINCES

Madras	Capt. The Hon. Sir Arthur Hope
Bombay	Sir Roger Lumley
	Sir John Colville (from 24 March 1943)
Bengal	Lt.-Col. Sir John Herbert
United Provinces	Sir Maurice Hallett I.C.S.
Punjab	Sir Bertrand Glancy I.C.S.
Central Provinces and Berar	Sir Henry Twynam I.C.S.
Assam	Sir Andrew Clow I.C.S.
Bihar	Sir Thomas Stewart I.C.S.
	Mr Thomas Rutherford (*cr.* K.C.S.I. March 1943) (from 9 March 1943; acting from 3 February 1943)
North-West Frontier Province	Sir George Cunningham I.C.S.
Orissa	Sir William Hawthorne Lewis I.C.S.
Sind	Sir Hugh Dow I.C.S.

PRIME MINISTERS OF PROVINCES

Bengal	Mr A. K. Fazlul Huq (resigned 28 March 1943)
	Sir Nazimuddin (from 24 April 1943)
Punjab	Sir Sikander Hyat Khan (died 26 December 1942)
	Malik Khizar Hyat Khan (from 31 December 1942)
Assam	Sir Muhammad Saadulla
North-West Frontier Province	Sardar Muhammad Aurangzeb Khan (from 25 May 1943)
Orissa	Maharaja of Parlakimedi
Sind	Khan Bahadur Allah Bakhsh (until 10 October 1942)
	Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah (from 10 October 1942)

The remaining Provinces were administered by their Governors under Section 93 of the Government of India Act 1935.

Chronological Table of Principal Events

1942

September

23 Russians launch counter-offensive at Stalingrad

October

8 Commons debate on India

21 Rajagopalachari suggests plan for solution of the Indian deadlock

23 October–4 November Battle of Alamein

November

8 U.S. and British forces land in French North Africa

12 Germans launch new offensive against Stalingrad

Rajagopalachari has interview with Linlithgow and is refused permission to see Gandhi

12–15 Naval battle of Guadalcanal

13 British occupy Tobruk

22 Cripps leaves War Cabinet

29 Spens' appointment as next Chief Justice of India announced

December

8 Extension of Linlithgow's term as Viceroy announced

9 G. of I. request H.M.G. to supply India with additional 600,000 tons of wheat

11 Roosevelt announces Phillips' appointment as his personal representative in India

17 British occupy Maungdaw and Buthidaung in Arakan area of Burma

Germans evacuate El Agheila

20–8 Air raids on Calcutta

1943

January

12 Churchill leaves for Casablanca Conference (14–23 January) with Roosevelt

23 British occupy Tripoli

24 G. of I. announce new measures to deal with food situation

29 British enter Tunisia

February

2 Last German forces at Stalingrad capitulate

7 Japanese complete evacuation of Guadalcanal

8 Churchill returns to U.K.

10 Gandhi begins three weeks fast

17 Mody, Aney, and Sarker resign from Viceroy's Executive Council

19–20 All-Party Leaders' Conference at Delhi

March

3 Gandhi breaks his fast

7 Japanese launch counter-offensive in Arakan
Muslim League Council meets at Delhi

9–10 All-Party Leaders' Conference at Bombay

30 Commons debate on India

April

24–6 Muslim League Session at Delhi

May

3 Changes in Viceroy's Executive Council announced

4 Churchill leaves for Washington to attend 'Trident' Conference
Gandhi writes to Jinnah suggesting a meeting

9 British evacuate Buthidaung

13 Axis forces in Tunisia surrender

14 British evacuate Maungdaw

26 G. of I. announce decision not to deliver Gandhi's letter to Jinnah

28 Churchill arrives in North Africa

June

5 Churchill returns to U.K.

9 Churchill informs Linlithgow of his decision to appoint Wavell as next Viceroy

Summary of Documents

To assist readers who desire to follow the documentary record through on a particular subject, this Summary is divided into Chapters, each with a title indicating its principal contents. The first three Chapters deal chronologically with the general history of the period, the remainder with topics which can be conveniently classified separately.

CHAPTER I

'Quit India'—Later manifestations and reactions: 21 September to 31 December 1942

Name and number	*Date (September)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
2 Mudaliar to Laithwaite Letter	21	Reports arrival in London and doings thereafter, with enclosed account of talk by Churchill	1
6 Minute by Joyce	21	Public relations aspects of H.M.G.'s Indian policy	10
7 Minute by Patrick	22	Comments on No. 6	13
21 Minute by Monteath	24	Comments on Nos. 6 and 7	29
23 S. of S. to G. of I., Home Dept Tel. 16750	24	Refers to No. 747 in Vol. II and requests latest figures of casualties, derailments, arrests and detentions or convictions	31
24 War Cabinet W.M. (42) 129th Conclusions Minute 3	24	Parliament: Debate on India	31
30 Lumley to Linlithgow Report III, paras. I and XIV (in part)	24	Refers to No. 624 in Vol. II; general situation in the Presidency; effect of Churchill's statement of 10 September	40
32 Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 16828	25	Refers to his reply to Parliamentary Question on 11 September and requests material on disturbances for use in coming debate	42
35 Tyson to Herbert Letter	25	Encloses note of conversation with Birla	45
36 Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 16853	26	Refers to No. 777 in Vol. II, agrees to Menon's appointment but suggests it might be on officiating basis or for limited period	46
38 Gandhi to Secretary to Bombay Govt, Home Dept Letter	26	Declines to furnish list of inmates of Sevagram ashram with whom he wished to correspond on personal and domestic matters, as he was not allowed to refer to non-political matters mentioned in No. 638 of Vol. II	47
41 Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2920-S	27	Situation report, midday 26 September, covering period 20–6 September	52
43 Cunningham to Linlithgow Letter	28	Any serious disorder in the Province now unlikely; Abdul Ghaffar Khan and other Congress notables; bad prospects for a Muslim Ministry; feeling among Government servants	55

	Name and number	*Date (September–October)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
44	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 17020	29	Consults him on parliamentary question about Nehru	57
47	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 365-S.C.	30	Refers to No. 36 and gives further explanation of his reasons for appointing Menon	63
48	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 375-S.C.	30	Refers to No. 44 and agrees to proposed reply	63
49	Laithwaite to Secretaries to all Provincial Governors Letter F.-125/11/G.G/42	30	Encloses telegram from Linlithgow to Governors on arrangements should Gandhi fast	64
51	G. of I., Home Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 7812	2	Refers to No. 23 and gives figures requested	67
52	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 17195	2	Refers to No. 584 in Vol. II and invites comments on line proposed to be taken in Parliament if demand is made for closer association of popular opinion with Section 93 administrations	68
55	Linlithgow to Lumley Letter, para. 13	2–4	Forthcoming Commons debate; Churchill's statement of 10 September	72
57	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 406-S.C.	3	Refers to No. 32 and gives assessment of respective degrees of responsibility for disturbances attributable to Congress and others	75
58	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 407-S.C.	3	Refers to No. 57 and transmits (1) translation of revised Andhra Congress Committee circular (2) summary of A.-I.C.C.'s twelve-point programme	78
60	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 17254	3	Requests suggestions for reply to parliamentary questions on recent discussions with Indian leaders	81
62	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1, 2, 5, 16, 18, 19	3–5	Material for Commons debate; Indian interest in the future of Burma; Allah Bakhsh; Viceroy's Executive Council	82
63	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 414-S.C.	4	Summarises points suggested by Governors in connection with forthcoming Commons debate	88
64	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 415-S.C.	4	Refers to No. 63 and repeats telegrams from Hallett and Stewart in connection with Commons debate	90
65	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 416-S.C.	4	Refers to No. 52, summarises recent correspondence with Governors on non-official Advisers, confesses to open mind on the subject and suggests line to be taken in Commons	91
66	G. of I., Home Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 7894	5	Refers to No. 51 and gives details of sentences of whipping	95
69	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 2, 4, 6, 7	5	Churchill's attitude; Allah Bakhsh; political incident in the army	97
70	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 445-S.C.	6	Transmits, for use in connection with Commons debate, evidence that confidence	

	Name and number	Date (October)	Main subject or subjects	Page
70	(*cont.*)		of investing public in stability of Government was maintained in spite of the disturbances	100
71	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 449-S.C.	6	Refers to No. 60 and suggests replies to Parliamentary questions	101
72	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 132nd Conclusions Minute 1	6	Parliament (Debate on India)	103
74	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 467-S.C.	7	Situation report, midday 6 October, covering period 26 September–6 October	105
75	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 468-S.C.	7	Trusts he will endeavour in Commons debate to offset effect of *The Times* leader	105
81	Clow to Linlithgow Letter 60	7	Feeling among Indians in the services	111
83	Savarkar to Churchill Tel. (unnumbered)	9	Summarises 'national demand' framed by Mahasabha, claims support of other parties, and demands transfer of power	113
84	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1–4, 11–14	9–12	Commons debate on India; *The Times* and Mudaliar's suggestion of complete Indianisation of Executive Council; anti-British feeling among Indian officers; possibilities of Mudaliar succeeding Maxwell, of appointing Prime Minister from existing Executive Council membership and of establishing constitutional committee	114
86	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 2, 3, 6, 18–21	10	Refers to No. 753 in Vol. II; implications of discussions on War Financial Settlement for question of Indianisation of Executive Council; Horace Alexander; Commons debate; attitude of *The Times*; Allah Bakhsh	119
87	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 537-S.C.	11	Congratulations on his speech in Commons debate	124
88	Hope to Linlithgow Report 9 (extract)	11	Congress situation; anti-British attitude of 'semi-Congress' people; Rajagopalachari	125
90	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1224	13	Refers to No. 75; *The Times* leader of 6 October	126
91	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 17775	13	Asks for considered appreciation of extent to which Indians are being used by Japanese for pro-Axis propaganda and fifth-column activities; and of arrangements for scrutinising parties entering India from occupied Burma	127
94	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 467	14	Memorandum by Amery on connection of enemy agencies with the recent disturbances	128
95	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2991-S (incorporating 36-U)	15	Suggests reply be sent to Schuster's letter to *The Times* criticising leadership in India	129

	Name and number	*Date (October)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
97	Amery to Churchill Minute P. 57/42	15	Suggests line of reply to No. 83	132
98	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2997-S	16	Refers to No. 90; attitude of *The Times*; suggests trying to develop connection with *Telegraph*	133
101	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3003-S	17	Situation report covering period 6–15 October	134
103	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1, 3, 7	17	His forthcoming visits to Rawalpindi and Quetta; use of photographs of damage done during disturbances as propaganda; Usman's attitude to H.M.G.'s relations with critics of its Indian policy	135
107	Amery to Linlithgow Letter	19	His boredom with demands for some 'initiative'; idea of American academics making study of Indian problem; suggestion that a Committee of Executive Council should be appointed to consider possibility of creating an organisation of non-official political investigators, under impartial Chairman, to study constitutional problem; need to associate Princes with any such study	139
108	Laithwaite to Turnbull Tel. 13-Q.C.	21	Transmits message from Linlithgow to Devonshire congratulating him on speech in Lords debate	142
109	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1252	21	Jam Saheb's interview published in *Sunday Express* of 11 October	142
111	Lumley to Linlithgow Letter 294-H.E.	22	Refers to No. 49, urges him to reconsider decision not to release Gandhi should he fast, and discusses proposed arrangements if decision remains unaltered	143
113	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 18416	23	Thanks him for No. 65 and agrees that the question of non-official advisers might be allowed to rest	150
115	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 46-Q.C.	24	Asks for exact wording of his and Simon's statements referred to by telegram (*a*) repeated in No. 116	152
116	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 47-Q.C.	24	Refers to No. 115 and repeats telegrams from (*a*) some Council members complaining of statements by Amery and Simon, and (*b*) Noon dissociating Usman and himself from (*a*)	153
117	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 50-Q.C.	24	Gives appreciation on Japanese use of Indians as agents, etc. requested by No. 91	154
118	Maxwell to Laithwaite Letter	24	Refers to No. 81 and discusses attitude of Indian services and whether action is needed to reassure them, enclosing notes by Conran-Smith and Tottenham	156
119	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1262	25	Refers to Nos. 115 and 116 and transmits texts of his and Simon's statements	162

	Name and number	*Date (October–November)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
123	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3084–S	29	Refers to No. 119 and reports reactions to explanations	164
124	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3090–S	29	Attitude of *The Times*; possibility of building up *Telegraph*; attitude to be adopted to *The Times* correspondent	165
125	Ambedkar to Linlithgow Letter	29	Submits memorandum (not printed) on Scheduled Castes' grievances and their remedies	165
126	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3108–S	30	Situation report covering period 16–28 October	168
127	Savarkar to Linlithgow Letter	30	Outlines objectives of proposed Mahasabha deputation to America for which passports were required	169
128	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 3	30	Attitude of *The Times* and *Telegraph*	170
129	Linlithgow to Lumley Tel. 3111–S	31	Thanks for No. 111; policy should Gandhi fast	173
131	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 3–7, 10–20, 29, 37, 39, 40, 43	1–2	Refers to Nos. 40, 69, and 84; attitude of *The Times*; Executive Council's reactions to misreported statements of Amery and Simon; Rajagopalachari (paras. 7 and 37); question of allowing him, Mahasabha, or others to go to U.S. or U.K. to publicise their views; Mudaliar's remarks on Indianisation of Council and Linlithgow's doubts about Amery's reply; case against Indianisation; Amery's suggestions of converting Council more definitely into Cabinet and of creating a constitutional sub-committee; future policy in Indian Ocean; control of outgoing Press messages from India	175
132	Linlithgow to Provincial Governors Letter	2	Solicits their help in obtaining intelligence on part played by big business in disturbances; discusses motives and possibility of a big business link between Congress and Japan	190
133	Cripps to Amery Letter	2	Suggests inviting Rajagopalachari to U.K.	192
134	Amery to Halifax Letter	2	Suggests American university, or group of universities, might appoint Commission to study Indian problem	192
136	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1288	3	Refers to No. 124; attitude of *The Times* and *Telegraph* on Indian matters	194
137	Amery to Linlithgow Letter	3	Vernon Bartlett; *The Times* and *Telegraph*; Auchinleck; need for American and Swiss on constitutional commission suggested in No. 107	195
138	Amery to Linlithgow Letter	3	Cripps wishes to circulate to Cabinet enclosed memorandum by B.B.C. official	

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138	(*cont.*)		on Indian public opinion and ways of counteracting enemy propaganda	196
141	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 19118	4	Asks for suggestions as to replies (*a*) to P.Q. proposing that Rajagopalachari should be invited to visit U.K. and (*b*) to No. 133	202
143	Lumley to Linlithgow Letter 295–H.E.	4	Refers to No. 129, discusses policy should Gandhi fast, and describes his present state of health	204
144	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3156–S	5	Refers to No. 136; attitude of *The Times*	206
145	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1296	5	Notes that No. 141, together with reply, might have to be circulated and suggests that latter might suggest granting interview to Rajagopalachari	206
146	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3169–S	5	Rejects suggestion in No. 145	207
147	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3170–S	5	Refers to No. 141, opposes proposal to invite Rajagopalachari to visit U.K., and suggests reply to P.Q.	207
148	Gandhi to Linlithgow Letter	5	Asks him to convey congratulations as well as condolences to Halifax on heroic death of his son	209
149	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3174–S	6	Refers to No. 147 and suggests amendment to reply to P.Q.	209
150	Amery to Cripps Letter	6	Refers to No. 133 and rebuts suggestion that Rajagopalachari should be invited to London	210
151	Herbert to Linlithgow Report (extract)	6	Is apprehensive of increasing lack of support for Government	211
152	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3182–S	7	Repeats telegram from Hope reporting that Rajagopalachari did not intend to visit England at present	212
153	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 519	7	Memorandum by Amery on suggested invitation to Rajagopalachari to visit England	212
154	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3187–S	8	Situation report covering period 29 October–6 November	218
156	Cunningham to Linlithgow Report 21 (extract)	9	Arrest of Ghaffar Khan; decline in prestige of Congress; attitude of Khan Sahib; Red Shirts	222
157	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1–3, 8, 10, 11	9	Rajagopalachari; Sultan Ahmed believes leaders in recent disturbances unrepentant; possible good effect of North African victories on Indian situation; wartime appearance of Delhi; Bengal Government's handling of Midnapore cyclone disaster; Herbert's wish to urge inhabitants to evacuate Calcutta	223
159	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 19387	10	Suggests that American and possibly Swiss should participate in organisation proposed in No. 107	228

	Name and number	*Date (November)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
162	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3213–S	11	Rajagopalachari's discussions with Jinnah; Linlithgow will see him but will refuse permission for him to see Gandhi or Working Committee	230
163	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3214–S	11	Opposes suggestions in No. 159	231
164	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 19484	11	Refers to No. 149 and discusses reply to P.Q. on Rajagopalachari	232
165	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1, 2, 4, 5, 10	11	War situation; Cripps' suggestion of invitation to Rajagopalachari; possibility of filling all Governorships from outside ranks of I.C.S.; Lumley's criticism of proposed arrangements should Gandhi fast; proposal for Beverley Nichols to visit India and write series of articles	233
166	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3216–S	12	Refers to No. 164, and concurs in proposed reply; no details of Rajagopalachari's talks with Jinnah available; former has not applied for passport	236
167	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3228–S	12	Refers to No. 162, reports conversation with Rajagopalachari, assesses Jinnah's position, and reports Hope's conversation with former	237
168	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3233–S	12	Refers to No. 167; has issued communiqué following issue by Rajagopalachari of distorted version of their conversation	239
169	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 152nd Conclusions Minute 2	12	Reply to P.Q. on Rajagopalachari	240
171	Amery to Halifax Tel. 7019 via Foreign Office	13	Refers to No. 134; would be interested in his and Butler's views, but in light of Linlithgow's opposition no soundings should be made elsewhere	242
176	Glancy to Linlithgow Letter 417–F.L. (extract)	13	Improved relations between communities likely to be disturbed by Jinnah's forthcoming visit; Sikander's scheme for dismemberment of Province	248
178	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1–3	13	Jam Saheb and Mudaliar reasonably satisfied; Churchill's conduct of Government and attitude to Indian problem; question of setting up Commission to study Indian problem	250
180	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3255–S	14	Thanks for No. 170; Council support for decision to refuse Rajagopalachari's request; Jinnah's position	257
182	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 19665	14	Refers to No. 163; will not pursue suggestions in face of strong reaction expressed therein	260
185	Turnbull to Laithwaite Tel. 1334	15	Asks if Amery will receive any recommendation from Linlithgow on basis of No. 111	261

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187	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1, 2, 7–12, 14, 15, 21	16	Refers to No. 107; question of constitutional enquiry by Executive Council; Mudaliar; Rajagopalachari; Fazlul Huq; Parlakimedi; political incident in the army; Gandhi's letter to Halifax on death of his son	262
	Annex to No. 187		Report by reliable informant on Jinnah's views on Pakistan	268
188	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3267–S	17	Welcomes decision communicated by No. 182	270
191	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3273–S	17	Situation report covering period 7–16 November	275
194	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1–4	17	North African situation; India's position strengthened by allied successes; timing of Cripps Mission mistaken	278
195	Lumley to Linlithgow Report 114 (extract)	18	Disturbances; improved atmosphere owing to North African victories; Press reaction to refusal to allow Rajagopalachari to see Gandhi	280
203	Halifax to Amery Letter	20	Comments on suggestion conveyed in No. 134	287
204	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3312–S	21	Proposed visit of Zafrullah Khan to London	288
205	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1–3, 5, 8, 9	21	Rajagopalachari; Sapru's and Prasad's talk with Srivastava; Krishnamachari's views on political situation; attitude of Indian services; Ambedkar's memorandum on Scheduled Castes; Gwyer and succession to Chief Justiceship	289
209	Cunningham to Linlithgow Report 22	23	Little Red-Shirt or Congress activity; support for war in Peshawar and Mardan districts	293
211	Linlithgow to Glancy Letter (extract)	24	Refers to No. 176; problem of communal relations in Punjab	297
212	Linlithgow to Hallett Letter (extract)	24	Rajagopalachari	298
217	Linlithgow to Mudaliar Letter, paras. 3–6	25	Rajagopalachari	301
218	Linlithgow to Lumley Letter (extract)	25	Possibility that H.M.G. would have to impose post-war settlement in absence of agreement among the parties and remain in India to hold balance; Federation a possible solution	304
224	Lumley to Linlithgow Letter	27	Reports on general behaviour of detenus at Ahmednagar	309
225	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 2–5, 10, 11, and enclosure	27	Need to emphasise effectiveness and independence of G. of I.; Indianisation of Executive Council; no reason why Council should not discuss, or establish body to study, problem of future constitution; advantage of Council members publicly justifying their continuance in office: Rajagopalachari, Temple, and Garbett	311

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228	Glancy to Linlithgow Letter 419–F.L. (extract)	28	Deterioration in communal relations following Jinnah's tour in Punjab	319
229	Twynam to Linlithgow Report R.–127/G.C.P. (extract)	28	Improved military situation has removed sullen atmosphere; but unwisdom of putting excessive pressure on Indians to support war effort	320
232	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3372–S	29	Situation report covering period 17–28 November	323
233	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 3, 5, 13, 16–19	30	Sterling Balances; attitude of *The Times*; word of appreciation for landowners would be useful; Krishna Menon; Mahasabha's wish to counter Rajagopalachari's propaganda; absence of agreement between communities obstacle to constitutional progress	323
248	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 20805	4	Refers to No. 131, para. 6, and discusses reply to be made to Council's complaint that he had stated, without consulting them, that no further constitutional changes were intended	337
251	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 2–5, 9, 10	4	Idea that Auchinleck might chair a Committee to study question of future of Indian fighting services; future of Indian Air Force; Azizul Haque; Indian students in U.K.	340
263	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1, 3, 9	8	Refers to Nos. 137 and 138; is unimpressed by memorandum enclosed in No. 138; Auchinleck	352
264	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 2–4, 8–12	9–11	Need to emphasise effectiveness and independence of G. of I.; Indianisation of Executive Council; possibility of improving British–Indian relations through cultural contacts	354
270	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 21450	13	Refers to No. 271 and discusses proposal for joint declaration by British and U.S. on general colonial question	362
271	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 21406	13	Refers to No. 270 and transmits telegram from Churchill to Dominion Prime Ministers on proposal for joint declaration	363
277	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1, 5, 6, 11–13	15	Refers to Nos. 165 and 178; North African situation; question of filling non-Presidency Governorships from outside ranks of I.C.S.; Lumley's letter (No. 111) on policy should Gandhi fast; proposed visit of Beverley Nichols; no bad thing for Churchill to blow off steam; question of fact-finding commission on Indian problem; speech to Associated Chambers of Commerce at Calcutta	385
278	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3517–S	16	Situation report covering period 29 November–15 December	388

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280	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 5, 11, 13	16	Encloses memorandum by one of Bevin's trainees on his treatment by English people; political advantages in assisting Scheduled Castes; Labour party now pretty sound on India	389
281	Hope to Linlithgow Report 11, paras. 7, 8	17	State of public opinion; nature of eventual Congress régime	393
283	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 1	18	Linlithgow's speech at Calcutta; possible nature of eventual constitutional solution	395
289	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3566–S	22	Refers to Vol. II, No. 714, and in light of Nos. 111 and 143, now thinks that Gandhi must be released before his fast becomes fatal	403
291	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 2–4, 7, 8, 16, 17	22	Refers to No. 225; question of White Paper on functions of G. of I. and India Office; Indianisation; his opposition to associating Executive Council with preparatory work on constitutional problem; Zafrullah Khan; visit to Calcutta; speech at Calcutta and reaction to it	407
292	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3581–S	23	Thanks for his message on Calcutta speech	411
294	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 6	23	Encloses letter from Miss Harrison to Gandhi	412
296	Mira Ben to Linlithgow Letter	24	Asks him to publish enclosed correspondence with Gandhi in May 1942 on then expected Japanese invasion in order to refute allegations in British Press that Gandhi was pro-Japanese	416
298	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 593	28	Memorandum by Amery circulating précis of discussion in Executive Council on Indian constitutional position	423
299	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1–3, 10, 11, 13, 14	28	Refers to No. 251; Auchinleck; *Statesman* article giving Muslim point of view; Sikander Hyat Khan; Cripps Mission	429
301	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 2–9	29	Princes' role in helping to frame future constitution; possible nature of eventual solution; Mudaliar's activities at I.P.R. Conference; Azizul Haque	432
304	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 22572	31	Good wishes for 1943	439
306	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 6	31	Exchanges of Indian territory with France	440

CHAPTER 2

Gandhi's fast and reactions to it: 31 December 1942 to 3 March 1943

	Name and number	*Date (December–January)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
305	Gandhi to Linlithgow Letter	31	Protests against Government statements about him, distrusts newspaper reports of alleged Congress violence, and will have to fast unless he can be convinced of his error or errors	439
307	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 9–S.C.	1	Thanks for No. 304	442
308	Linlithgow to Churchill Tel. 11–S.C. via India Office	1	Refers to No. 310; future colonial policy	442
310	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 12–S.C.	2	Refers to Nos. 270 and 271; colonial policy	443
311	Twynam to Linlithgow Report 131–G.C.P. (extract)	3	Linlithgow's Calcutta speech and Satyamurti's request to write to Gandhi suggesting it offered suitable basis for settlement	448
312	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 14–S	4	Discusses implications of Gandhi's letter (No. 305)	449
314	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (43) 5	4	Memorandum by Amery on treatment of Gandhi should he fast	451
315	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 3, 4, 8, 10, 14	5	Question of publicising work of Executive Council and India Office; cultural contacts between Britain and India; Scheduled Castes	453
316	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1–6	5	Policy should Gandhi fast; Gandhi's letter (No. 305); colonial policy; future pattern of world trade and international relations	457
317	Bhandari to Iyengar Letter	5	Encloses notes by Kately on Gandhi's intentions	460
318	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 37–S	6	Refers to No. 312 and discusses reply to Gandhi's letter	461
319	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 38–S	6	Refers to No. 318 and transmits draft reply to Gandhi's letter	462
320	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 14	6	Discusses reply to Gandhi's letter and points out advantages of consulting Council	464
321	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 17	6	Refers to Nos. 318 and 319 and suggests amendments to draft reply to Gandhi's letter	465
322	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 47–S	7	Refers to No. 321 and discusses amendments to draft letter to Gandhi	466
323	War Cabinet W.M. (43) 4th Conclusions Minute 2	7	Decision to maintain principle that Gandhi should not be allowed to secure his release by threatening a fast	467
324	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 23	7	Asks him not to send proposed reply to Gandhi pending receipt of Cabinet view	469
325	Amery to Churchill Minute P. 2/43	8	Submits draft of No. 326	469

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326	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 27	8	Conveys War Cabinet Conclusions as in No. 323	470
327	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 28	8	Describes Cabinet discussion (No. 323) and suggests points which Linlithgow's reply to No. 326 should cover	470
328	Simon to Amery Letter	8	Encloses note to Churchill suggesting lines on which Linlithgow should reply to Gandhi's letter	471
329	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 29	8	Refers to No. 326 and conveys Simon's point in enclosure to No. 328	473
331	Linlithgow to Hope, Lumley, Hallett, Stewart, Twynam, and Cunningham Letter	8	Non-official advisers in Section 93 Provinces	478
333	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 80–S	11	Refers to No. 327 and urges that Cabinet should leave handling of Gandhi to him	482
334	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 81–S	11	Refers to No. 326 and adheres to original recommendations both on question of Gandhi's detention and on terms of reply to Gandhi's letter	482
335	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (43) 16	11	Memorandum by Amery on proposed reply to Gandhi and treatment if he undertakes a fast	485
336	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1–3, 5, 9	11	Reply to Gandhi's letter; Mira Ben's letter (No. 296); Bhansali's fast; Aney; selection of Khizar Hyat Khan as Prime Minister of Punjab; Ambedkar's memorandum on Scheduled Castes and Constituent Assembly	485
337	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1, 7, 9	11	Cabinet discussion on Gandhi; idea of enquiry into future of Indian army; colonial policy	489
338	War Cabinet W.M. (43) 7th Conclusions Minute 1	12	Agreement not to interfere with Linlithgow's proposals on either terms of reply to Gandhi or action should Gandhi fast	491
339	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 43	12	Refers to No. 334 and informs him of Cabinet Conclusion that he can send proposed reply to Gandhi	492
340	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 44	12	Refers to No. 334 and conveys War Cabinet Conclusion (as in No. 338, Minute 1) on Gandhi	493
342	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 101–S	13	Refers to No. 339; is glad Cabinet approval for policy towards Gandhi has been obtained	497
343	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 102–S	13	Refers to No. 340; is most grateful to War Cabinet	497
344	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 698	13	Discusses joint declaration with U.S. on colonial policy	497
345	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 699	13	Refers to No. 344 and transmits revised draft of joint declaration on colonial policy	498
346	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 700	13	Refers to Nos. 344 and 310; colonial policy	499

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347	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 5–8, 10–14, 17, 19, 22, 28, 33, 35, 36	13–19	Refers to No. 294; Gandhi's intentions; Bhansali's fast and Aney (paras. 6 and 35); conversation with Aney on future of Burma; elections to Provincial Councils; non-official advisers; quality of service personnel; *The Times*' failure to comment on his Calcutta speech; proposal to reserve proportion of vacancies in services for Scheduled Castes; Zafrullah Khan; problem of inflation; Turkish mission's friendly first reactions to Indian situation	500
348	Stewart to Linlithgow Letter 48–G.B.	14	Refers to No. 331 and repeats opposition to appointment of non-official advisers in Bihar	510
349	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1–3, 5, 7	15	War Cabinet discussion on policy towards Gandhi; Zafrullah Khan's speech at Government lunch; his views on Indianisation; enlargement of functions of Federal Court; idea of enquiry into future organisation of India's fighting services in context of new developments in techniques of warfare	510
351	Linlithgow to Wavell Letter	16	Amery's suggestion of an enquiry into future organisation of India's fighting services	516
353	Gandhi to Linlithgow Letter	19	Refers to Linlithgow's reply (see No. 340) to his letter (No. 305); will make ample amends if convinced of his errors or will make proposals if put among Congress Working Committee members	517
355	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1–5, 8	20–1	Conversations with Zafrullah Khan on constitutional problem and idea that he might bring together a group of men to work out a solution in advance	526
357	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1344	23	Numbers of persons in jail in connection with Congress movement	535
358	Linlithgow to Gandhi Letter	25	Refers to No. 353; insists that it is Congress and Gandhi who are on their justification; is willing to consider matter further if Gandhi wishes to repudiate 'Quit India' resolution and can give assurances for future	535
360	Wavell to Linlithgow Letter	25	Refers to No. 351; future of Indian Army	539
361	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 198–S	26	Refers to correspondence with Gandhi (Nos. 353 and 358) and discusses policy towards him	540
362	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 3–5, 7–13, 16, 17	26	Political situation and possible adoption of federal plan as interim solution; enquiry into future of Indian Army and importance of H.M.G. not entering into further commitments; Congress belief that Japanese might win; Fazlul Huq; thanks for No. 248; Executive Council's constitutional	

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362	(*cont.*)		discussions of previous year; *Dawn* on Bhansali's fast; possibility of Gandhi asking to see Working Committee; indemnity legislation; need to fasten responsibility for violent character of recent movement on Congress	541
363	Reed and Schuster to Amery Letter	27	Asks him to receive delegation of M.Ps and members of India Conciliation Group to discuss certain questions	548
365	Laithwaite to Joyce Tel. 227–S	28	Linlithgow thinks utmost propaganda use should be made of correspondence between Rajagopalachari and Gandhi published in Madras defamation case	553
367	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 104	28	Transmits his answer to P.Q. asking whether he would reconsider raising ban on contact between Congress leaders and non-Congress representatives	556
368	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 106	28	Announces circulation of Nos. 353, 358, and 361 to Cabinet for information, and discusses policy towards Gandhi	556
369	Gandhi to Linlithgow Letter	29	Thanks him warmly for No. 358, continues to believe that Government of India not Congress are responsible for violence, and announces 21 day fast unless he can be convinced to contrary	558
370	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1–3, 5–7	29	Refers to Nos. 315 and 336; Azizul Haque's scheme for selection of Indian students to attend British Universities; India's need for an executive independent of legislature; Gandhi; proposal for appeals to go to Federal Court instead of Privy Council	560
372	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 4–6, 8, 11, 15, 21, 22	30–1	Refers to Nos. 306 and 316; exchanges of Indian territory with France; Gandhi's latest letter (No. 369) and ideal line of reply to it; Bhansali's and Aney's proposed visit to Chimur (paras. 6 and 21); visit to Lucknow and visitors expected in Delhi; Begum Shah Nawaz on complaints by Indian soldiers at Aden and in Egypt	563
373	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 32–S.C.	1	Refers to No. 369 and discusses policy towards Gandhi	568
375	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 38–S.C.	2	Suggests delaying circulation of No. 373; in light of Hallett's opposition to Gandhi's release should he fast is again consulting Governors on this question	570
376	Lumley to Linlithgow Tel. (unnumbered)	2	Discusses arrangements for Gandhi's threatened fast	571
377	Linlithgow to Lumley Tel. 39–S.C.	2	Informs him of Hallett's opposition to Gandhi's release even at point of death and asks for his further comment	572

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378	Linlithgow to Provincial Governors Tel. 40–S.C.	2	Summarises recent correspondence with Gandhi and asks their views on policy should Gandhi fast	572
379	Linlithgow to Lumley Tel. 44–S.C.	2	Emphasises importance of preventing news of threatened fast getting out of Aga Khan's Palace	574
380	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 2030	2	Refers to No. 373 and asks whether disclosure to Council of correspondence with Gandhi will in itself necessitate publicity and, if so, whether correspondence should be published in full or in summary	575
381	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 277–S	3	Refers to No. 378, summarises Governors' replies, thinks eventual decision after Council discussion will be for release when in immediate danger of death, and discusses publicity	575
382	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 278–S	3	Repeats telegram from Lumley referring to No. 378 and favouring release of Gandhi within a day or two of commencement of fast	577
383	Linlithgow to Lumley Tel. 279–S	3	Refers to No. 376 and opposes allowing Gilder to act as Gandhi's doctor or releasing detenus to act as nurses	578
385	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 130	3	Asks to receive urgently material on Congress responsibility so that he will be ready to justify Government position publicly	579
387	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 287–S	4	Refers to No. 381; reports discussion in Council, who will probably decide in favour of release when danger point is reached, and summarises further Governors' replies to No. 378	582
388	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 288–S	4	Refers to No. 385; is doing his utmost to arrange completion of material	583
389	Linlithgow to Provincial Governors Tel. 294–S	4	Invites reactions to Council's suggestion that Gandhi should be released for period of his fast on understanding that he would return to detention on its completion	583
390	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 2141, para. 1	4	Refers to No. 381; welcomes proposal for reasoned statement by G. of I.	584
391	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 293–S	5	Explains Council's suggestion that Gandhi should be released for period of his fast	585
393	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 302–S	5	Repeats Lumley's reply to No. 389	586
394	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 303–S	5	Announces despatch of telegram giving text of his reply to Gandhi (No. 395)	587
395	Linlithgow to Gandhi Letter	5	Refers to No. 369, insists that Congress and Gandhi are responsible for campaign of violence, cannot accept that Government should allow revolutionary movements to take place unchallenged, regrets Gandhi's decision to fast, and hopes he will reconsider it	587

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396	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 305–S	5	Agrees with No. 390, para. 1	590
397	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 316–S	5	Repeats Hallett's reply to No. 389	590
398	War Cabinet W.M. (43) 24th Conclusions Minute 2	5	Decision on Council's proposal to release Gandhi during fast postponed pending receipt of Linlithgow's considered views and information whether matter fell within Governor-General's discretion or was for Governor-General in Council	591
400	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 2291	6	Refers to No. 396 and emphasises he must receive statement before morning of 8th	594
401	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 2298	6	Suggests that term 'fast' should be avoided and 'restricted diet' used instead	594
402	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (43) 52	6	Memorandum by Amery on constitutional position of Governor-General's Council in relation to decision regarding Gandhi	595
403	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (43) 57	6	Memorandum by Amery summarising views of Provincial Governors on alternative plans for dealing with Gandhi if he fasts	596
404	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 332–S	7	Refers to No. 391, announces that, after full consideration of Governors' views, Council unanimously adhere to proposal to release Gandhi, and discusses publicity arrangements	598
405	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 333–S	7	Does not regard decision reported by No. 404 as ideal but points out its advantages	599
406	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 334–S	7	Announces transmission of No. 407	600
407	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 335–S	7	Text of statement agreed by Council for issue should Gandhi fast	601
408	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 336–S	7	Refers to No. 400 and discusses Press arrangements regarding Gandhi's fast	603
409	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 339–S	7	Refers to No. 401; does not think term 'fast' can be avoided	604
410	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 342–S	7	Refers to No. 407 and transmits amendment and passage to be added should Gandhi reject offer of release during fast	604
411	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 344–S	7	Lists material to be published if Gandhi does not call off his fast	605
412	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 346–S	7	Transmits text of letter from Home Department to be delivered to Gandhi at 6 pm, 8 February	606
413	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 348–S	7	Press arrangements relating to Gandhi's fast	607
414	Linlithgow to Hallett, Hope, Rutherford, Twynam, Dow, and Cunningham Tel. 350–S	7	Announces Council's decision to adhere to proposal to release Gandhi and emphasises importance of preventing premature disclosure of news of fast	608

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415	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 352–S	7	Asks whether there are still any points requiring elucidation and explains that No. 414 and stiff tone of No. 395 are designed to reassure Governors and services	609
416	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 2358	7	Requests advice on correct interpretation of (*d*) in first para. of No. 391	610
417	Monteath to Laithwaite Tel. 144	7	Refers to No. 408 and proposes amendment to No. 407 to assist in handling of opinion in U.K. and U.S.	610
418	War Cabinet W.M. (43) 25th Conclusions Minute 1	7	(1) Request to Linlithgow to suspend action on proposal to release Gandhi during fast (2) Invitation to Anderson, Simon and Amery to draft telegram to Viceroy explaining War Cabinet's misgivings on proposal and asking for further expression of views	611
419	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 2360	7	Refers to Nos. 404, 405, and 407 and conveys War Cabinet's request (as in No. 418) to suspend action	613
420	Gandhi to Laithwaite Letter	7	Wishes whole correspondence with Linlithgow to be published	614
421	Gandhi to Linlithgow Letter	7	Refers to No. 395; repeats demand for convincing evidence of Congress responsibility for disturbances, and adheres to principle of non-violence and to decision to fast	614
422	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 2361	8	Refers to No. 419 and conveys War Cabinet's misgivings (as in No. 418) on proposal to release Gandhi during fast	617
423	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 3–U	8	Describes origin of No. 422 and assures him of his own all-out support of whichever course he now takes	618
424	Churchill to Linlithgow Tel. 50774 via War Office and Commander-in-Chief	8	Earnestly hopes he will weigh very carefully overwhelming opinion of War Cabinet and other Ministers concerned	619
425	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 359–S	8	Refers to No. 397; Gandhi would not accept conditions such as Hallett proposes and Council are clear they cannot be imposed	619
426	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 356–S	8	Trusts (*a*) Cabinet will believe he has done utmost to cover their points and that his considered judgment is that overruling of Council would be disastrous; (*b*) he can look for Cabinet support	620
427	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 362–S	8	Refers to No. 422 and replies to Cabinet's points; Council adhere to their proposal and propose, given time factor, to go ahead	620
428	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3–U	8	Refers to No. 423 and hopes No. 427 will satisfy critics	622

	Name and number	*Date (February)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
429	Laithwaite to Monteath Tel. 363-S	8	Refers to No. 417; Council agree to amendment	622
430	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 366-S	8	Refers to No. 413; arrangements for transmitting news of fast	622
431	Laithwaite to Irwin Tel. 369-S	8	Timetable for announcing commencement of fast	623
432	Linlithgow to Lumley Tel. 373-S	8	Arrangements should Gandhi decline offer of release during fast; possibility should he accept it of obtaining co-operation of Mrs Naidu or Lady Thackersey	624
433	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 374-S	8	Refers to No. 385 and transmits brief giving grounds for holding Congress responsible for disturbances	625
434	Twynam to Linlithgow Tel. 441-M.S.	8	Refers to No. 414 and suggests early release of communiqué in view of anticipated effect of Gandhi's release on services	629
437	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1–3, 5–13	8	Cabinet discussions on policy towards Gandhi; position of Scheduled Castes; enquiry into future of Indian Army; constitutional solution may depend on separation of powers; immediate progress lies in enhancing authority of present Executive; fully Indianised Executive would facilitate solution; need for definite policy for transition period	631
438	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 2–5, 7	8–9	Policy towards Gandhi and Cabinet's intervention; Zafrullah Khan; Council decision on receipt of Gandhi's reply (No. 440) not to release him during fast	637
439	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 5-U	9	Refers to No. 428; congratulations	641
440	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 383-S	9	Reports Gandhi's reply to No. 412 declining Government's offer and offering to postpone fast for 24 hours; interim account of Council's reactions	641
441	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 385-S	9	Transmits text of Home Department's reply to Gandhi's letter of 8 February (see No. 440)	643
442	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 386-S	9	Council have considered alternatives of (*a*) releasing Gandhi when in danger of death and (*b*) holding him, and have decided by a majority in favour of latter	643
443	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 387-S	9	Transmits amendments approved by Council to Nos. 407 and 410	645
444	Linlithgow to Provincial Governors Tel. 388-S	9	Describes latest developments regarding Gandhi's fast and discusses Press arrangements	645
445	Monteath to Laithwaite Tel. 155	9	Refers to No. 440 and suggests that Council have all but achieved their primary purpose of deflating Gandhi	647

	Name and number	*Date (February)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
446	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 398–S	10	Reports Irwin's delivery of No. 441, his subsequent conversation with Gandhi, and latter's general attitude	647
447	Laithwaite to Monteath Tel. 399–S	10	Linlithgow thinks No. 445 hits the bull; Gandhi is enjoying himself thoroughly	648
448	Lumley to Amery Tel. (unnumbered)	10	Notification that Gandhi had rejected Government's offer and had decided to fast in captivity	648
451	Linlithgow to Churchill Tel. 37868/C via Commander-in-Chief and War Office	10	Refers to No. 424 and reassures him as to policy towards Gandhi	650
453	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 4–U	11	Reports conversation with Aney on latter's wish to resign in face of Gandhi's fast; efforts to make Jogendra Singh and Sultan Ahmed resign	651
454	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 412–S	11	Correspondence transmitted in Nos. 412, 440 and 441 is to be published	652
456	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 5–U	11	Refers to No. 453 and reports further conversation with Aney on latter's wish to resign; Jogendra Singh will not resign	654
457	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 163	11	Requests further report mentioned in No. 453 in time for Cabinet tomorrow	655
458	S. of S. to G. of I., Home Dept Tel. 2634	11	Asks to be kept promptly informed of reactions and developments	655
459	Hasan to Laithwaite Letter 5454	11	Incorporates United Provinces Provincial Muslim League Council resolution of 7 February protesting at Linlithgow's Calcutta speech of 17 December	656
460	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 429–S	12	Has seen Sultan Ahmed, Sarker and Mody and judges there is not now much risk of resignations unless Gandhi's condition becomes critical	656
461	Amery to Churchill Minute P. 3/43	12	Reports that Gandhi business seems to have gone very satisfactorily so far	657
462	Amery to Linlithgow Letter	12–13	Cabinet and Commons reactions to policy towards Gandhi so far satisfactory; also satisfactory that resignations from Council, if they occur, will not be due to unjustifiable interference by H.M.G.; Auchinleck best man to conduct enquiry into future of Indian Army	658
463	Churchill to Linlithgow Tel. 52444 via War Office and Commander-in-Chief, para. 1	13	Does Gandhi have glucose in his water when fasting?	659
464	Azad to Linlithgow Letter	13	Refers to recently published correspondence between Linlithgow and Gandhi, denies Congress responsibility for violence, and points out that 'Quit India' resolution made it clear that a free India would align herself with United Nations	659

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465	G. of I., Home Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 1156	14	Bulletin on Gandhi's health on 13 February; policy regarding his visitors	664
466	G. of I., Home Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 1161	14	Transmits text of letter from Gandhi to Inspector-General of Prisons on question of visitors and of reply sent to Bombay Government	665
467	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 445-S	15	Muslim and Hindu reactions to Gandhi's fast	667
468	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 451-S	15	Reports decision to give Gandhi formal intimation about state of his health and to tell him he is unlikely to last more than a certain number of days	668
469	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 7-U	15	Position inside Council remains uneasy; some resignations likely if Gandhi is not released unconditionally	668
470	Linlithgow to Churchill Tel. 38548/C via Commander-in-Chief and War Office	15	Refers to No. 463, doubts whether Gandhi is taking glucose in his water, and discusses reactions to fast abroad and in India	669
471	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 2988	16	Question of observances and official statement in event of Gandhi's death	669
472	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 460-S	16	Result of debates in both Houses of Indian Legislature on Gandhi's fast very satisfactory; Jinnah has declined to attend proposed conference of prominent leaders	670
473	Lumley to Linlithgow Tel. (unnumbered)	16	Since Gandhi is now in danger of death, assesses local situation and urges that he should not be allowed to die in detention	671
474	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 180	16	Suggests that preferably Gilder should give Gandhi the medical opinion mentioned in No. 468	672
475	Rutherford to Linlithgow Letter 125-G.B. (extract)	16	Reactions to Gandhi's fast; Government arrangements in case of trouble; Chandreshvar Sinha on British failure to support middle classes and on National War Front's line on fast	672
476	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1-6, 8, 12, 15, 19	16	Refers to No. 355; reactions to Gandhi's fast; position in Council; Gandhi's intentions; Fazlul Huq's agreement without consultation with Herbert to an enquiry into alleged official excesses in Midnapore; Zafrullah Khan; impossible to employ Auchinleck to conduct enquiry into future of Indian Army; colonial policy; Sapru's disillusionment with Indianisation of Executive Council and Linlithgow's preference for retaining European element	674
477	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1-3, 6	16	Cabinet's attitude to Linlithgow's handling of Gandhi; future relations between India and Burma; Azizul Haque	679

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478	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 464–S	17	Proposal (mentioned in No. 468) to warn Gandhi about state of his health has been abandoned	681
479	Linlithgow to Provincial Governors Tel. 465–S	17	Gandhi's health approaching a crisis	682
480	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 470–S	17	Would see great difficulty in accepting Lumley's view in No. 473	682
481	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 8–U	17	Mody, Aney and Sarker have tendered their resignations which he intends to accept; Srivastava is wobbly	682
482	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 481–S	18	Prospects of retaining Srivastava, Sultan Ahmed and Jogendra Singh on Council; line to be taken with any deputation of moderates; capacity of Governors to contain reactions to Gandhi's death	683
483	Linlithgow to Lumley Tel. 482–S	18	Transmits and comments on text of telegram to Governors on policy in event of Gandhi's death	684
484	Linlithgow to Provincial Governors Tel. 484–S	18	Asks them to confirm that they can deal with any reactions to Gandhi's death affecting law and order	687
488	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 490–S	19	If Gandhi dies, Lumley will telegraph code-word 'extra'	691
490	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 497–S	19	Refers to No. 471, notes that No. 483 contains his view on observances in event of Gandhi's death, and discusses statement which Government might make	692
491	Lumley to Linlithgow Tel. (unnumbered)	19	Reports conversation with Purshottamdas Thakurdas and Amrit Thakur on latter's conversation with Gandhi	693
497	Simon to Amery Letter	19	Asks why doctors do not tell Gandhi that his fast has now reached capacity	697
498	Rajagopalachari to Laithwaite Letter	19	In view of alarming reports of Gandhi's condition sends advance copy of Enclosure 1 to No. 506 for immediate action	697
499	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 4	19–23	Attitude of *The Times*, *News Chronicle*, *Manchester Guardian*, and the Commons to Gandhi	698
503	Linlithgow to Provincial Governors Tel. 507–S	20	Points out that students would probably be most inflammatory element in situation discussed in No. 483	703
504	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 509–S	20	Comments on conference of moderate leaders and Rajagopalachari's speech to it	703
505	Linlithgow to Provincial Governors Tel. 511–S	20	Refers to No. 483; policy in event of Gandhi's death	704
506	Sapru to Laithwaite Letter	20	Encloses copy of resolution unanimously adopted by Leaders Conference urging Gandhi's immediate and unconditional release	705
507	Laithwaite to Sapru Letter	20	Reply to No. 506	706

	Name and number	*Date (February)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
508	Amery to Simon Letter	20	Explains reasons against giving Gandhi warning suggested in No. 497	707
511	Churchill to Linlithgow Tel. 54642 via War Office and Commander-in-Chief	21	Expresses confidence in Linlithgow's steadfast and unflinching action	711
512	Sapru and others to Churchill Tel. (unnumbered)	21	Deplores Linlithgow's rejection of Leaders Conference resolution, explains and repeats request for Gandhi's unconditional release, and asks that this cable be placed before Parliament	711
514	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 520–S	22	Trusts that any reply to telegram from Committee of Leaders Conference will make it plain that H.M.G. are in full accord with G. of I.'s decision not to release Gandhi unconditionally	713
515	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 523–S	22	Refers to No. 514 and in view of state of Gandhi's health asks for early reply; position of Srivastava, Sultan Ahmed, Ambedkar, and Jogendra Singh	713
516	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 524–S	22	Repeats message from Irwin conveying Alexander's proposal (which he has rejected) for persuading Gandhi to call off his fast	714
518	Herbert to Linlithgow Report (extract)	22	Reactions in Bengal to Gandhi's fast	716
519	Dow to Linlithgow Report 86–F.R. (extract)	22	Reactions in Sind to Gandhi's fast	717
521	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 530–S	23	Gandhi's seizure on 21 February; Mrs Naidu's commendation of his doctors	718
522	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 536–S	23	Gandhi's chances of survival; permission to see Gandhi granted to Rajagopalachari and Desai	719
523	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 3465	23	Announces despatch of No. 524	719
524	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 3466	23	Refers to No. 515 and transmits Churchill's reply to Sapru's telegram (see No. 506, note 2)	720
525	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 3490	23	Asks him to convey reply in No. 524 as being Churchill's reply to No. 512 just received	720
527	Lewis to Linlithgow Report 4 (extract)	23	Reactions in Orissa to Gandhi's fast	721
529	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 546–S	24	Refers to No. 522; Rajagopalachari's conversation with Laithwaite	723
530	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 549–S	24	Believes Gandhi will survive; Srivastava; reactions to Home Department's Congress complicity pamphlet; Gandhi reportedly lukewarm to Alexander's proposal	724
531	Chairman, Executive Committee, National Christian Council, to Linlithgow Tel. (unnumbered)	24	Appeal to Gandhi to abandon fast and to Government to release him	725

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533	Wavell to Linlithgow Letter	24	Effect on Indian Fighting Forces of Gandhi's fast and position in event of his death	726
534	Cunningham to Linlithgow Report 4 (extract)	24	Reactions in N.-W.F.P. to Gandhi's fast	728
535	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 561–S	25	Believes Gandhi will survive and that crisis on 21 February was deliberately arranged to coincide with Leaders Conference	728
536	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 562–S	25	Alexander reports Gandhi is confident he will survive	729
537	Linlithgow to Churchill Tel. 39775/C via Commander-in-Chief and War Office	25	Thanks for No. 511; feels Gandhi may well survive but is clear that come what may they must not give way	729
538	Churchill to Linlithgow Tel. 55547 via War Office and Commander-in-Chief	25	Cannot help feeling suspicious of *bona fides* of Gandhi's fast; it would be most valuable if any fraud could be exposed	730
542	Irwin to Laithwaite Letter	25	Encloses letter from Alexander to Lumley and note by Alexander on his talk with Gandhi	733
546	Linlithgow to Churchill Tel. via Commander-in-Chief and War Office	26	Believes Gandhi's physical condition and bulletins on his fast have been cooked to produce maximum effect on public opinion	737
548	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 5, 7–9	26	Zafrullah Khan and possibility of his forming a group of moderates to work out constitutional solution; Gandhi's fast and reactions in Commons	738
549	G. of I., Home Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 1624	27	Conditions of Gandhi's detention on completion of fast	742
553	Churchill to Linlithgow Tel. 56538 via War Office and Commander-in-Chief	28	Commends discreet use of weapon of ridicule, and Linlithgow's handling of Gandhi's fast	744
555	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1, 11, 12, 14–16	2	Gandhi's fast in retrospect; Assembly debate on Federation; Jagdish Prasad's views; Congress and big business	745
556	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1, 3, 9	2	Gandhi's fast in retrospect; Azizul Haque; publicity for case against Congress	751
557	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 599–S	3	Announces end of Gandhi's fast	753

CHAPTER 3

The situation following Gandhi's fast; Gandhi's letter to Jinnah: 3 March to 10 June 1943

	Name and number	*Date (March)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
559	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 235	3	Congratulates him on successful deflation of Gandhi	754
560	Lumley to Linlithgow Report 118, paras. 1–6	4	Gandhi's fast; lull in civil disobedience	754

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561	Hope to Linlithgow Letter 1.–1943 (extract)	4	Reactions in Madras to Gandhi's fast	762
562	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 621–S	5	Thanks for No. 559	763
563	Clow to Linlithgow Letter 18 (extract)	5	Reactions in Assam to Gandhi's fast	764
564	Rutherford to Linlithgow Letter 160–G.B. (extract)	5	Reactions in Bihar to Gandhi's fast	764
566	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 626–S	6	Repeats message from Lumley giving Candy's views on points arising from Gandhi's fast	767
568	Irwin to Laithwaite Letter	8	Encloses note by Candy on medical aspects of Gandhi's fast	769
569	Cunningham to Linlithgow Report 5 (extract)	8	Reactions in North-West Frontier Province to Gandhi's fast	772
570	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1, 2, 5, 8, 9, 12	8	Refers to Nos. 437 and 462; reactions in Britain to Gandhi's fast; *The Times*; Scheduled Castes; future constitutional position; future of French possessions in India	772
571	Hallett to Linlithgow Letter U.P. 180 (extract)	9	Reactions in U.P. and elsewhere to Gandhi's fast	777
572	Twynam to Linlithgow Letter R.–138–G.C.P. (extract)	9	Outcome of Gandhi's fast; Congress blunder in rejecting Cripps offer	779
573	Lumley to Linlithgow Letter 299–H.E.	10	Forwards notes on Patel supplied by an informant	780
576	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 4612	11	Requests material for India debate in House of Commons	784
577	Linlithgow to Lumley Letter	11	Refers to No. 560, reviews developments leading up to Gandhi's fast, and discusses the situation at the end of it	784
578	Mudaliar to Linlithgow Letter (extract)	11	Observations on Gandhi's fast	791
579	Amery to Linlithgow Letter	11	Forthcoming Commons debate	792
581	Lumley to Linlithgow Letter 300/H.E., para. 7 and PS.	12	Leaders Conference	793
582	Low to Laithwaite Letter	12	Discussions with participants in the Leaders Conference	798
583	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 687–S	13	Describes restricted composition of Leaders Conference and line he proposes to take if they ask him to receive a deputation	799
584	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 688–S	13	Transmits text of resolution passed at Leaders Conference	800
586	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 700–S	15	Transmits text of note by Maxwell dated 5 March on Congress record during war period for possible use in forthcoming debate	802
589	Linlithgow to Wavell Letter	15	Refers to No. 360 and encloses para. 9 of No. 437; enquiry into future of Indian Army	804

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590	Linlithgow to Lumley Letter, paras. 5, 6	15	Refers to No. 581; Leaders Conference; general political position	805
591	Munshi to Laithwaite Letter	15	Forwards letter from Sapru enclosing resolution adopted at Leaders Conference and suggesting Linlithgow might receive delegation to explain and discuss it	807
592	Glancy to Linlithgow Letter 442 (extract)	15	Reactions in Punjab to Gandhi's fast; law and order; relations between Khizar Hyat Khan and Jinnah	809
593	Lumley to Linlithgow Letter 301/H.E.	15	Continues No. 581; further impressions of Leaders Conference derived from conversations with Jayakar, McKenzie, and Munshi	810
595	Linlithgow to Provincial Governors Letter	16	Refers to No. 132, reiterates importance of investigating relationship between Congress and 'big business', and encloses memorandum by D.I.B. indicating some points requiring clarification	813
596	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1, 2, 12, 25, 26	16	Refers to Nos. 477 and 499; extension of Section 93 and postponement of Legislative Council elections; Bombay Leaders Conference; future relations between India and Burma; Khare's statement on Gandhi's fast and medical details relating thereto	817
597	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 728–S	18	Refers to Nos. 576 and 587 and supplies some of material requested for Commons debate	822
598	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 729–S	18	Transmits two points for possible use in debate	824
600	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 733–S	18	Refers to Nos. 591 and 601 and summarises article in *Dawn* on Leaders Conference and Gandhi	827
601	Laithwaite to Sapru Letter	18	Refers to Enclosures 1 and 2 to No. 591 and informs him of Linlithgow's willingness to receive deputation	828
602	Lumley to Linlithgow Report 119 (extract)	18–23	Reactions in Bombay to Gandhi's fast and to G. of I.'s pamphlet on Congress responsibility for disturbances; shift of Hindu opinion towards Pakistan	829
603	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 743–S	19	Refers to No. 576, para. 2, and supplies material for Commons debate	830
606	Gwyer to Linlithgow Letter (extract)	19	Extension of British Council activities to India and present bitter attitude of Indians towards British	838
609	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1–3, 6, 7, 12	23	Refers to Nos. 548 and 556; Gandhi; Leaders Conference; Lumley's departure a great loss; state of Indian opinion; Zafrullah Khan	840
610	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1, 2, 9, 11	23	Cripps Mission and disturbances not considered in connection with defeat in Burma; Churchill's failure to mention India	

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610	(*cont.*)		in recent broadcast; Holburn's messages to *The Times* on aftermath of Gandhi's fast; mechanical schemes for world reconstruction	843
612	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 795–S	25	Proposed deputation from Leaders Conference	847
614	Linlithgow to Clow Letter	25	Comments on suggestions made in No. 81	848
615	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 5683	26	Churchill has decided to wind up India debate; general line he will take	851
616	Amery to Linlithgow Letter	26	Churchill's decision to wind up India debate; Labour Party attitude; Press reaction to White Paper	851
617	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 820–S	27	Is glad at news contained in No. 615; country now very quiet; Usman's remarks (No. 618) in Council of State; Leaders Conference	852
618	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 821–S	27	Transmits text of Usman's remarks in Council of State	853
620	Linlithgow to Gwyer Letter (extract)	27	Refers to No. 606 and discusses degree of bitterness and disappointment in Indian political circles	855
622	Rajagopalachari to Laithwaite Letter	29	Encloses memorandum explaining what Leaders deputation proposes to say	856
623	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 845–S	29	Refers to No. 615 and discusses alternative line Churchill might take in debate and his own line with Leaders deputation	858
624	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 846–S	29	Refers to No. 623 and supports alternative line suggested for Churchill's statement	859
625	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 324	29	Churchill has decided to let Attlee wind up debate	860
626	Rajagopalachari to Laithwaite Letter	30	Protests at procedure apparently envisaged by Linlithgow for forthcoming meeting with Leaders deputation	860
627	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1–3, 19–21	30	Refers to No. 565; constitutional crisis in Bengal; forthcoming Commons debate; his formula for dealing with Leaders deputation; reactions of Indian services and others to recent strains; deterioration in outward appearance of Delhi	861
628	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 863–S	31	Congratulates him and Attlee on speeches in Commons debate	866
629	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 868–S	31	Transmits gist of No. 626 and of his reply	866
631	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 331	31	Commons practically unanimous in support of Government	868
632	Rajagopalachari to Laithwaite Letter	31	As Linlithgow has ruled out exchange of views at meeting with Leaders, thinks formal deputation unnecessary and encloses additional para. to be added to memorandum (enclosure to No. 622)	868

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633	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1–4	31	Churchill's decision not to wind up India debate; course of debate and his own speech	869
637	Linlithgow to Amery Letter	2	Commons debate; Leaders deputation; Bengal ministerial crisis	874
639	Hallett to Linlithgow Letter U.P.–182 (extract)	6	Public attitude to Gandhi's 'rebellion' and fast; Leaders; Commons debate	877
642	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 5, 8, 11, 13	8–13	Idea of a commission to investigate Indian problem and reaction of Indian opinion to it (paras. 5 and 11); Bengal ministerial crisis	879
644	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 9	9	Idea of Zafrullah Khan getting people together for serious constitutional study	885
649	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1–7, 16	15–16	Parliamentary debates and reactions; Congress; current public assessment of independence possibility; need for British self-confidence in Empire; Cripps; Bengal ministerial crisis	888
656	Glancy to Linlithgow Letter 444 (extract)	17	Reactions in Punjab to Gandhi's fast; Jinnah's reaction to Shaukat Hyat Khan's ministerial appointment; danger of rupture between Jinnah and Unionist Party	898
664	Linlithgow to Glancy Letter (extract)	22	Gandhi's intentions; Muslim League and Punjab	904
665	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 5, 11, 12	22	Medical aspects of Gandhi's fast; propaganda in U.K. on Indian situation and present state of public opinion	905
669	Unsigned note	undated	Proceedings of the All-India Muslim League at Delhi, 24–6 April 1943	918
678	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 3	29	Bengal ministerial crisis	931
681	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 7, 19, 20, 26	2–4	Refers to Nos. 610 and 644; Jinnah; assessment of present state of Muslim opinion; conversation with Khizar Hyat Khan on growing support for Pakistan and H.M.G.'s attitude to it; pro-Congress feeling among Hindu members of services	935
683	Liaquat Ali Khan to Laithwaite Letter 6737	4	Encloses Muslim League resolutions	943
685	Dow to Linlithgow Report 199–F.R. (extract)	5	Muslim League's position in Sind	946
686	Colville to Linlithgow Report 1 (extract)	6	General political situation	947
687	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1–3	6–7	National War Front; possibility of approaching constitutional problem through G. of I.'s reconstruction committees	947
688	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1117–S	7	Invites comment on proposal to extend existing Council of State and Legislative Assembly for a year	949

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690	Linlithgow to Provincial Governors Letter	7	Countermeasures against Indian National Army	951
691	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1127–S	8	Refers to No. 692; has instructed Home Department to pass on Gandhi's letter and will not object if Jinnah wishes to see Gandhi; asks him to telegraph any comment urgently	953
692	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1128–S	8	Refers to No. 691 and transmits text of Gandhi's letter of 4 May to Jinnah	953
693	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 481	8	No comment on No. 691; Linlithgow will no doubt consider effect in U.S. of conceding to Jinnah what he refused to Phillips	954
694	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 484	9	Asks that Gandhi's letter to Jinnah should be held up and discusses policy to be adopted	954
696	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1150–S	10	Refers to No. 694; Gandhi's letter has not yet been forwarded	959
699	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 2, 14, 17–19	10	Possible attempt by Nazimuddin to secure release of prisoners; Gandhi's letter to Jinnah; medical aspects of his fast; question of publishing in U.K. Home Department's pamphlets on Congress	961
701	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 5, 6, 8–10, 16–24	12–14	Refers to No. 681; policy regarding Gandhi's letter to Jinnah (paras. 5, 6, 16–23); strategic background to Cripps Mission; need for Indian executive representative of ability and character rather than of the parties; value of indirect election in India	963
702	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1159–S	13	Discusses policy to be adopted regarding Gandhi's letter to Jinnah and concludes that it should be delivered	970
703	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 10714	13	Refers to No. 702, enquires Linlithgow's intentions if Gandhi asks to see Working Committee, and points out difficulties that might then arise	976
704	Turnbull to Rowan Tel. Alcove 212 via Air Ministry	13	Reports delivery of Gandhi's letter held up pending Cabinet consideration	977
705	Amery to Attlee Letter	13	Encloses No. 702, requests early Cabinet meeting, and reports enquiry in No. 703	977
706	Laithwaite to Turnbull Tel. 1166–S	14	Linlithgow's suggested amendments to Coupland's book	978
707	Churchill to Attlee and Amery Tel. Pencil 86 via Air Ministry	14	Refers to No. 704 and opposes delivery of Gandhi's letter	978
708	Amery to Churchill Tel. Alcove 218	14	Summarises No. 702 and opposes delivery of letter	979
709	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (43) 203	14	Memorandum by Amery on Gandhi's request to see Jinnah	980
710	Gandhi to Samuel Letter	15	Protests at his speech in Lords Debate of 6 April	984
711	Linlithgow to Dow Letter (extract)	15	Increasing strength of Jinnah's position	990

	Name and number	*Date (May)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
712	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1180–S	16	Replies to No. 703	991
713	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1191–S	17	Refers to No. 712 and is confirmed in his opinion that letter should be delivered since its existence is known to Gandhi's entourage	991
714	Churchill to Amery Tel. Pencil 112 via Air Ministry	17	Agrees with view expressed in No. 708, para. 3, and does not see why withholding of letter need be made public at once	992
716	War Cabinet W.M. (43) 70th Conclusions Minute 3	18	Agreement that Linlithgow should be advised not to deliver Gandhi's letter and that G. of I. should publish statement explaining this action	994
717	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (43) 212	19	Note by Bridges circulating draft telegram from Amery to Linlithgow conveying War Cabinet Conclusions as in No. 716	995
718	War Cabinet W.M. (43) 71st Conclusions Minute 2	19	Approval of Annex to No. 717 subject to drafting amendments	996
719	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 11208	19	Refers to No. 702 and conveys War Cabinet Conclusions as in No. 718	996
720	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 531	19	Refers to No. 719, points out advantages of withholding Gandhi's letter, and discusses handling of Executive Council	997
721	Amery to Churchill Tel. Alcove 312 via Air Ministry	19	Refers to No. 714; Cabinet have decided against delivery of Gandhi's letter and that non-delivery should be made public	998
722	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1222–S	20	Refers to No. 720; acquiesces in Cabinet decision and invites comments on whether contents of letter should be made public	999
723	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1223–S	20	Refers to No. 719; implementation of Cabinet decision and question whether contents of letter should be made public	999
724	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 536	21	Refers to No. 722, suggests how decision not to deliver letter should be announced, opposes making its contents public, and discusses handling of Council	1001
725	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1241–S	23	Refers to No. 719, reports Council's decisions and thinks H.M.G. should make clear that they support G. of I.'s policy	1002
726	Churchill to Attlee and Amery Tel. Pencil 213 via Air Ministry	23	Refers to No. 721 and opposes justifying to public non-delivery of letter	1003
727	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 545	24	Congratulations on handling of Council	1004
728	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 547	24	Suggests inviting Jinnah to come and see him	1004
729	Amery to Churchill Tel. Alcove 378 via Air Ministry	24	Refers to No. 726, reports Council's decisions as in No. 725, transmits text of communiqué, and explains why Cabinet favoured making public non-delivery of letter	1005

	Name and number	*Date (May)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
730	Cunningham to Linlithgow Report 10 (extract)	24	Formation of Ministry in N.-W.F.P.	1006
731	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1–4, 10–14	24	Refers to No. 687; Gandhi's letter to Jinnah and importance of H.M.G. associating themselves with G. of I.'s decision to withhold it; Gandhi's letter to Samuel (No. 710); National War Front; little prospect of constitutional advance; possibility of borrowing army personnel to fill gaps in Services, especially in European element; danger of allowing policy regarding Services to outrun constitutional progress; proposal that British Council should operate in India	1006
732	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1256–S	25	Refers to No. 728 and thinks a move towards Jinnah would be a mistake	1012
734	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1, 2, 5	25	Gandhi's letter to Jinnah; Jinnah's truculence; Mudaliar's suggestion that Linlithgow might see Jinnah; danger that Jinnah might force introduction of Section 93 all over India	1013
735	Linlithgow to Provincial Governors Tel. 1260–S	26	Informs them of Gandhi's letter to Jinnah and of decision to withhold it, and invites telegraphic indications of reactions in their Provinces	1015
737	Dow to Linlithgow Tel. 238–C	28	Refers to No. 735; reactions in Sind to decision to withhold Gandhi's letter	1021
738	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 11973	28	Reactions of U.K. Press to decision to withhold Gandhi's letter	1021
739	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1283–S	29	Refers to No. 738; Jinnah's reply to Gandhi has produced a very satisfactory outcome to the situation	1022
741	Colville to Linlithgow Tel. 19–C	29	Refers to No. 735; reactions in Bombay to decision to withhold Gandhi's letter	1024
742	Cunningham to Linlithgow Tel. C.A.–40	29	Refers to No. 735; reactions in N.-W.F.P. to decision to withhold Gandhi's letter	1025
744	Glancy to Linlithgow Letter 451 (extract)	29	Attitude of Muslim League to Punjab Ministry; reactions to decision to withhold Gandhi's letter	1025
745	Stephenson to Abell Letter	29	Mrs Pandit and Mrs Gandhi have declined to comply with terms of order substituting house arrest for imprisonment and will therefore be returned to gaol	1026
746	Lewis to Linlithgow Tel. 112–S.G.C.	30	Refers to No. 735; reactions in Orissa to decision to withhold Gandhi's letter	1027
748	Glancy to Linlithgow Tel. 21–G	31	Refers to No. 735; reactions in Punjab to decision to withhold Gandhi's letter	1028
749	Hallett to Linlithgow Tel. G–335	31	Refers to No. 735; reactions in United Provinces to decision to withhold Gandhi's letter	1029
750	Hope to Linlithgow Tel. 41–M	31	Refers to No. 735; reactions in Madras to decision to withhold Gandhi's letter	1029

	Name and number	*Date (June)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
752	Amery to Churchill Tel. Alcove 450 via Air Ministry and C.-in-C., Mediterranean	1	Reactions in U.K. and U.S. to decision to withhold Gandhi's letter; Jinnah's statement	1031
753	Rutherford to Linlithgow Tel. 42	1	Refers to No. 735; reactions in Bihar to decision to withhold Gandhi's letter	1031
754	Clow to Linlithgow Tel. 259–C	1	Refers to No. 735; reactions in Assam to decision to withhold Gandhi's letter	1032
755	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1–4, 12	1	Refers to No. 701; satisfactory outcome to business of Gandhi's letter to Jinnah; Jinnah's statesmanship	1032
757	Twynam to Linlithgow Tel. (unnumbered)	2	Refers to No. 735; reactions in Central Provinces to decision to withhold Gandhi's letter	1037
758	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1, 2, 6	2	Satisfactory outcome to business of Gandhi's letter to Jinnah and reactions in U.K. and U.S.; pay of soldiers in India	1038
759	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1328–S	3	Transmits text of letter from Gandhi to Tottenham commenting on Government's decision not to forward his letter to Jinnah and requesting amendment of its communiqué	1040
760	Hallett to Linlithgow Letter U.P.–194	3	Corrects report in No. 749 that Khaliq-uz-zaman was critical of decision to withhold Gandhi's letter; Jinnah's general attitude	1042
762	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1–3, 5	6	Gandhi's latest correspondence with Home Department; moves to form ministries in Bihar, Central Provinces, and Bombay unlikely to come to anything	1044
769	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1–3, 6	10	Refers to No. 734; Gandhi's letter to Jinnah; Jinnah's general position; conversation with Nazimuddin	1052

CHAPTER 4

Succession to the Viceroyalty; military command structure in South-East Asia

	Name and number	*Date (September–October)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
1	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 35–U	21	Refers to No. 642 in Vol. II, states he is arranging to leave India in April 1943, and comments on Amery's suggestions for his successor	1
102	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 29–U	17	Cannot get Churchill to decide on successor to Viceroyalty	135
105	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 37–U	18	Begs him to continue persuading Churchill to decide on his successor	138
110	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 30–U	22	Refers to No. 105, has spoken again to Churchill, but fears there will be no announcement for 3 or 4 weeks	143

	Name and number	*Date (October–December)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
120	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 38–U	27	Thanks him for No. 110 and hopes he will get decision within 4 weeks	163
130	Hyderabad to Linlithgow Letter	1	Urges him to remain as Viceroy, but failing that, advocates appointment of Duke of Gloucester	173
131	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 36	1–2	Appointment of next P.S.V.	175
157	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 12	9	Comments on No. 130	223
172	Amery to Churchill Minute P. 59/42	13	Urges decision on succession to Viceroyalty and to Governorship of Bombay	242
174	Linlithgow to Hyderabad Letter	13	Thanks him for No. 130, has already indicated to H.M.G. his desire to be relieved, and doubts whether Gloucester could be spared	244
184	Churchill to Amery Minute	14	Refers to No. 172; will try to come to decision next week	261
190	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3270–S	17	Points out dangers of delaying decision	274
219	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 1	25	Hopes decision will be made soon; all sorts of suggestions have been made	306
221	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 32–U	27	Hopes to secure Colville for Bombay; is less hopeful of securing Cranborne for Viceroyalty	308
231	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 40–U	29	Approves of both names mentioned in No. 221	322
233	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 22	30	Japanese radio announcement on succession to Viceroyalty	323
234	Amery to Churchill Letter	1	Suggests himself, or failing that Lumley, as next Viceroy	327
235	Churchill to Amery Minute M. 566/2	1	Does not think Amery's suggestion can be entertained	329
236	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 34–U	2	Invites comments on Churchill's idea of Lampson for Viceroyalty	329
237	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 42–U	3	Refers to No. 236, opposes Lampson and supports Lumley for Viceroyalty, and offers to stay on until latter becomes available	329
238	Amery to Churchill Letter	3	Encloses Nos. 236 and 237 and discusses succession	330
245	Churchill to Linlithgow Tel. 35–U via India Office	3	Refers to No. 237 and asks if he would be willing to stay on for another 6 months	336
246	Linlithgow to Churchill Tel. 43–U via India Office	4	Refers to No. 245, is willing to stay on for another six months, and suggests announcement should say this extension is at special request of H.M.G.	336
250	Amery to Linlithgow Letter	4	Refers to No. 237, describes efforts to find successor, and asks if Linlithgow could sound Lumley without committing H.M.G.	339
252	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 37–U	5	No. 237 has disposed of 'Egyptian menace'	345

	Name and number	*Date (December–April)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
253	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 38–U	5	Refers to No. 246 and thanks him for self-sacrificing decision	345
255	Churchill to Linlithgow Tel. 39–U via India Office	5	Thanks him for decision to remain and states that announcement will include suggestions in No. 246	346
256	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 40–U	5	Refers to No. 255 and transmits text of announcement	347
259	Linlithgow to Churchill Tel. 3449–S via India Office	7	Thanks him for No. 255 and for terms of announcement	349
260	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3450–S	7	Thanks him for his good wishes and help	349
263	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 2	8	Decision to extend his term probably right in the circumstances	352
264	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 1	9	Press reaction to extension of Linlithgow's term; rumour that Sinclair had refused appointment	354
280	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 1	16	Press have given impression that Viceroyalty was hawked around, and refused by a number of persons	389
287	Amery to Linlithgow Letter	21	Refers to No. 255 and asks him to warn Lumley to return home by air in case he is chosen for Viceroyalty	401
294	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 1	23	Japanese radio announcement on succession to Viceroyalty	412
300	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 48–U	29	Refers to No. 250 and will sound Lumley when latter visits him on 8 January	432
315	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 2	Jan. 5	Rumour that Sinclair had been offered Viceroyalty and had refused	453
436	Linlithgow to Amery Letter	Feb. 8	Refers to No. 287; conversation with Lumley on possibility of his succeeding to Viceroyalty; qualifications needed for job	630
565	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1, 5	Mar. 5	Question of a post for Auchinleck; suggestion for establishment of new command for operations east of India; Churchill now unlikely to consider Lumley for Viceroyalty	765
570	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 6, 10	8	Lumley's prospects of succeeding to Viceroyalty; employment for Auchinleck	772
627	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 7	30	Emphasises need to appoint a man with considerable political experience and first-hand knowledge of the Cabinet	861
654	Amery to Churchill Letter	Apr. 16	Urges importance of reaching early decision on next Viceroy, stresses that India's remaining in Commonwealth may well depend on his personality, and considers merits of Eden, Hoare, Anderson, Attlee, Sinclair and Lumley	895
655	Amery to Eden Letter	16	Encloses copy of No. 654	897
665	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1, 2	22	Need for a C.-in-C., Asia, free of the duties of the C.-in-C., India	905

	Name and number	*Date (April–June)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
678	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 5, 6	29	Proposal for Viceroy to have Minister of State powers in S.E. Asia; command structure, S.E. Asia	931
682	Amery to Churchill Letter	4	Suggests Stuart as next Viceroy	943
687	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 7, 8	6	Has urged Churchill to separate S.E. Asia and India commands; Minister of State proposal	947
689	Amery to Linlithgow Letter	7	Eden at one stage seemed likely successor but not now; alternative candidates	949
695	Amery to Eden Letter	9	Urges him to agree to become the next Viceroy	955
697	Churchill to Eden Tel. (extract)	10	Prefers Lyttelton to Anderson as next Viceroy; contemplates transferring Defence portfolio from C.-in-C. to Viceroy	959
698	Turnbull to Clifford Letter	10	Encloses two telegrams referring to No. 697 for transmission to Churchill: (1) from Amery on succession to Viceroyalty, and position of C.-in-C., (2) from Eden on succession to Viceroyalty	959
699	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 16	10	Awaits news of discussions on command structure	961
701	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 7–9	12	Command structure; his paper on state of Indian Army	963
733	Amery to Churchill Letter	25	Encloses *Daily Worker* cartoon on succession to Viceroyalty, emphasises importance of selecting a man of undoubted quality, and appeals for early decision	1012
734	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 3, 4	25	Possible military appointments in S.E. Asia	1013
740	Churchill to Attlee Tel. Pencil 417 via C.-in-C., Mediterranean, and Air Ministry	29	Suggests Wavell should succeed Gowrie as Governor-General of Australia	1023
747	Attlee to Churchill Tel. Alcove 430 via Air Ministry and C.-in-C., Mediterranean	30	Refers to No. 740 and doubts advisability of sending Wavell to Australia	1028
751	Amery to Churchill Tel. Alcove 438 via Air Ministry and C.-in-C., Mediterranean	31	Refers to No. 740, discusses command structure, S.E. Asia, recommends Wavell as Supreme Commander or failing him Mountbatten, and welcomes intention to appoint Auchinleck as C.-in-C., India	1030
755	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 6, 11	1	Preference for triumvirate of service chiefs rather than single Supreme Commander to command in S.E. Asia	1032
758	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 3, 4	2	Advantages of a single Supreme Commander	1038
761	Churchill to Curtin Tel. Winch 10	4	Describes his ideas for remodelling S.E. Asia command structure and asks whether he would consider Wavell as successor to Gowrie	1044

	Name and number	*Date (June)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
763	Amery to Churchill Letter	8	States qualities which a new Viceroy must have, urges him to send Eden, and discusses other candidates	1046
764	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 3	8	Churchill's views on command structure influenced by a desire to dispense with Wavell	1048
767	Churchill to Linlithgow Tel. 11-U via India Office	9	Requests views on proposed appointment of Wavell as next Viceroy and Auchinleck as C.-in-C., India	1051
768	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 12-U	10	Comments on Churchill's decision to appoint Wavell	1051
769	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 4	10	Command structure, S.E. Asia	1052
770	Linlithgow to Churchill Tel. 11-U via India Office	12	Replies to No. 767	1054
771	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 12-U	12	Replies to No. 768	1055

CHAPTER 5

Representation of India at the War Cabinet; personnel of the Viceroy's Executive Council; succession to Chief Justiceship

	Name and number	*Date (September–November)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
2	Mudaliar to Laithwaite Letter	21	Reports arrival in London and doings thereafter, with enclosed account of talk by Churchill	1
33	Amery to Churchill Minute P. 54/42	25	Asks whether Mudaliar may be admitted to Cabinet discussions on social and economic reform	43
37	Minute by Churchill	26	Refers to No. 33 and sees no objection	47
40	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 12	26	Assessment of Mudaliar	49
53	Mudaliar to Linlithgow Letter (extract)	2	Describes discussions with Cripps and others on social and economic reform	69
84	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 3, 12, 15	9	Suggests Mudaliar might succeed Maxwell; is unlikely to secure a top-rank man as Gwyer's successor	114
86	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 1	10	Arrival of Mudaliar and Jam Saheb in London	119
131	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 22, 33–5	1	Succession to Gwyer; possibility of extending Maxwell's term as Home Member and preference for Usman rather than Mudaliar as his successor; possibility of appointing Hydari to Council	175
135	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1287	3	Refers to No. 84, para. 15, and announces Spens' willingness to accept appointment as Chief Justice	193

	Name and number	*Date* (*November*)	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
142	Linlithgow to Gwyer Letter	4	Informs him of proposed appointment of Spens	203
155	Gwyer to Linlithgow Letter	9	Refers to No. 142, confesses shock that new Chief Justice had been decided on without reference to G. of I., advocates appointing an Indian, and doubts adequacy of appointment proposed	219
157	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 9	9	Comments on No. 155, favours appointment of a man from home	223
160	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 19419	10	Enquires present position regarding vacancy of Information Member on Executive Council	229
175	Linlithgow to Gwyer Letter	13	Refers to No. 155, favours appointment of European, but will convey Gwyer's views on this as on other points to Amery	245
178	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1, 2	13	Jam Saheb and Mudaliar reasonably satisfied	250
179	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3245–S	14	Refers to No. 160; is temporarily discharging duties of Information Member himself in absence of suitable candidate	256
187	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 4–6	16	Comments on Gwyer's objections to appointment of Spens	262
192	Gwyer to Linlithgow Letter	17	Refers to No. 175, reiterates view that Spens had achieved insufficient prominence to make appointment of European rather than Indian palatable to Indian opinion, and discusses arrangements	275
193	Mudaliar to Linlithgow Letter (extract)	17	General impressions of War Cabinet and atmosphere that prevails there	277
196	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3289–S	19	Refers to No. 135, summarises correspondence with Gwyer on succession to Chief Justiceship, and states he will be guided by Amery and Simon	281
200	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3310–S	20	Acquiesces in Spens' appointment	285
201	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1362	20	Refers to No. 196, argues that Spens is best candidate available in U.K. and discusses date from which appointment should take effect	286
205	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 11	21	Thinks Gwyer's second letter more temperate than his first	289
206	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3324–S	22	Agrees to arrangements proposed in No. 201	292
208	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1368	23	Thanks for No. 206	293
217	Linlithgow to Mudaliar Letter, paras. 1, 2, 11–13	25	Congratulations on good relations established with War Cabinet	301
225	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 3	27	Would be inclined to follow up idea of Maxwell being succeeded by Usman (see No. 131, para. 34)	311

	Name and number	*Date (December–February)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
243	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3408–S	3	Jinnah's attitude to Indianisation of Council even if achieved by substitution of non-officials with service qualifications for officials	334
251	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 12–15	4	Comments on Gwyer's objections to appointment of Spens	340
263	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 8	8	Indian reactions to Spens' appointment	352
264	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 4	9	Would prefer to appoint Usman rather than prolong Maxwell; Jinnah's views should not be allowed to affect decision	354
268	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1447	12	Refers to No. 243, favours appointing Indian to succeed Maxwell despite Jinnah's attitude, discusses implications regarding Intelligence Bureau and handling of service cases, and thinks that Council may be only vehicle of constitutional progress	360
279	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3521–S	16	Will reply shortly to No. 268	388
280	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 12	16	Choice of Spens in no sense influenced by party political considerations	389
291	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 3	22	Will probably decide to make a change in Home Membership in the spring	407
299	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 6, 7	28	Azizul Haque; little notice taken in India of Spens' appointment	429
301	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 6, 8	29	Indianisation of Home Membership will give him a good defence against Commons' pressure for Indianisation of all posts; Azizul Haque	432
315	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 5, 6, 15	5	Is thinking of replacing Maxwell with Usman, Usman with Azizul Haque, and Azizul Haque with Singh Roy	453
337	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 3, 5	11	Jam Saheb's return; good relations established between Zafrullah Khan and Spens	489
347	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 21, 22, 29	13–19	Succession to Maxwell and consequent changes in office; Khare a possible candidate for Executive Council	500
349	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 4	15	Possibility of appointing Zafrullah Khan Indian representative at War Cabinet	510
371	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 249–S	30	Proposes to appoint Usman to succeed Maxwell, Azizul Haque to succeed Usman, and Singh Roy to succeed Azizul Haque	562
384	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 122	3	Refers to No. 371, thinks Cabinet approval must be obtained for decision to Indianise Home Membership and indicates points which Linlithgow's recommendation should cover	578
399	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 326–S	6	Would prefer to extend Maxwell's term if, as appears from No. 384, political pressure from home for Indianisation of Home Membership is not decisive	592

	Name and number	*Date (February–March)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
437	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 4	8	Comments on No. 399	631
438	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 1	8	Jam Saheb pleased with his stay in England	637
476	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 19	16	Gandhi's fast strengthens case for extending Maxwell's term and retaining European element on Council	674
477	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 3, 4	16	Crisis over Gandhi puts filling of Council vacancies into melting pot; Runganadhan possible candidate for High Commissioner-ship	679
496	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 192	19	Refers to No. 399 and asks for his considered judgment as to best course to adopt as regards Home Membership	696
499	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 5 and PS.	19–23	Is asking Cabinet to agree to Maxwell's extension; hopes he will be able to fill up other vacancies somehow	698
501	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 504–S	20	Refers to No. 496, favours extension for Maxwell, and discusses filling of other vacancies	701
502	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 505–S	20	Proposes that Maxwell be reappointed Home Member for a further period	702
509	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 9–U	21	Invites his reactions to a service appointment, possibly of a European, to one of Council vacancies; future employment of Jenkins	707
528	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (43) 81	23	Memorandum by Amery on Home Membership of Governor-General's Executive Council	722
532	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 6–U	24	Refers to No. 509 and has circulated No. 502 to Cabinet; discusses filling of other vacancies	725
541	War Cabinet W.M. (43) 35th Conclusions Minute 1	25	Agreement to some extension of Maxwell's term as Home Member subject to his fitness.	732
548	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1–4	26	Cabinet discussion on extension of Maxwell's term; suggestions for Council vacancies	738
550	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 215	27	Refers to No. 551, notes that report to Cabinet that Maxwell's health is failing was from Cripps, and asks whether it need be announced definitely that extension is for 12 months	743
551	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 3621	27	Refers to No. 502 and conveys War Cabinet Conclusion as in No. 541	743
555	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 2, 3	2	Maxwell perfectly fit to carry on and should be asked to continue for a full year; discusses possible candidates for Council vacancies	745
556	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 2, 3	2	High Commissionership; Azizul Haque	751

	Name and number	Date (March–April)	Main subject or subjects	Page
558	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 606–S	3	Refers to No. 551, reports on Maxwell's health, and discusses period of his extension	753
565	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 7, 8	5	Period of Maxwell's extension; suggestions for Council vacancies	765
570	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 3, 4	8	Maxwell; candidates for Council vacancies	772
585	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 692–S	13	Provisional proposals for filling Council vacancies	801
594	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 281	16	Discusses proposals in No. 585	812
596	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 6–9	16	Council vacancies; need to strengthen Commerce Department and reorganise Food Department	817
604	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 747–S	19	Refers to No. 594 and discusses revised scheme for filling Council vacancies and proposal to make Runganadhan High Commissioner	833
607	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 305	23	Agrees generally with proposals in No. 604	839
609	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 4, 5	23	Maxwell; Council vacancies	840
611	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 794–S	25	Refers to No. 607 and confirms proposals	846
613	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 310	25	Refers to No. 607; States' representative at War Cabinet	847
619	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 318	27	Refers to No. 611 and suggests weight falling on Azizul Haque may be too heavy and that Mudaliar may not wish to return to India	854
621	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 840–S	29	Replies to points raised by No. 619	855
627	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 10	30	Comments on suggestion in No. 565, para. 8	861
630	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 869–S	31	Sultan Ahmed has definitely declined War Cabinet post; Noon may well be best person to appoint instead	867
634	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 6217	1	Refers to No. 630 and regards Noon as very acceptable	872
638	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 4	5	Mudaliar apparently quite willing to return to India	876
641	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 934–S	8	Refers to No. 634, agrees that Noon should replace Mudaliar, and gives final proposals for filling Council vacancies	878
644	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 6	9	Indian representatives at proposed Imperial Conference	885
645	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 364	10–11	Agrees with proposal in No. 641	886
646	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 961–S	13	Reports Roy's acceptance of Law portfolio; Ahmed adequate in Defence	886
648	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 986–S	15	Reports Noon's refusal of position at War Cabinet and discusses consequences	887

	Name and number	*Date (April–June)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
649	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 11–13	15	Difficulty of finding Indians to serve abroad; administrative habits of Council members	888
651	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 64–S.C.	16	Noon still unwilling to serve at War Cabinet	894
653	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 391	16	Refers to No. 648; Indian representation at War Cabinet and Dominions Conference	895
657	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 395	18	Refers to Nos. 651 and 653 and discusses alterations to proposals for filling Council vacancies necessitated by Noon's refusal to serve at War Cabinet	899
666	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 109–S.C.	23	Noon now willing to go to London; intends to put issue to Council whether Indian representation at War Cabinet should be permanent or intermittent	907
670	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 429	27	Doubts whether it is worth sending any representative to War Cabinet until autumn	923
673	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1034–S	28	Council have postponed decision on War Cabinet representative	927
677	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1048–S	29	Transmits proposed text of communiqué announcing Council appointments	930
681	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 1–4, 17	2–4	His talk with Haque about running of his departments; Indian representation at War Cabinet and at possible Dominions Conference; Ramaswami Aiyar	935
701	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 2	12	Possibility of Dominions Conference seems to have faded	963
755	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 9	1	New Council is settling down well; Indian representation at War Cabinet	1032

CHAPTER 6

The Indian States

	Name and number	*Date (September–October)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
3	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 420	21	Memorandum by Cripps on Request by Chamber of Princes for Statement of Policy by H.M.G.	4
4	Notes by the India Office	undated	Notes on No. 3	6
18	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 428	23	Memorandum by Selborne on Request by Chamber of Princes for Statement of Policy by H.M.G.	26
24	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 129th Conclusions Minute 1	24	Invitation to Amery to draft statement on lines of Cabinet's discussion	31
50	Amery to Churchill Minute P. 55 (42)	1	Submits drafts of (*a*) proposed assurance to Chancellor of Chamber of Princes and (*b*) covering telegram to Linlithgow	66

	Name and number	*Date (October–December)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
62	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 7–9	3–5	Discussion with Maharaja of Patiala on lack of liaison with States during disturbances	82
67	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 446	5	Note by Bridges circulating No. 50 and Churchill's alternative draft of proposed assurance	95
72	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 132nd Conclusions Minute 2	6	Approval of Churchill's alternative draft subject to an amendment	103
79	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 17470	7	Refers to No. 629 in Vol. II and discusses reply to be made to No. 115 in Vol. II	109
80	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 17471	7	Transmits draft letter to Jam Saheb discussed in No. 79	110
96	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2986–P	15	Replies to No. 79	130
99	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 18121	16	Refers to No. 96 and asks which of alternatives (*a*) and (*b*) in its para. 9 he prefers	134
100	Monteath to Laithwaite Tel. 18122	16	Refers to No. 99 and suggests strong lead in favour of alternative (*a*) because of risks of ventilating question in Parliament	134
103	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 6	17	Refers to Nos. 99 and 100; does not see any alternative to general line advocated in No. 96	135
104	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3012–S	18	Continues No. 96 and makes clear that he would personally prefer alternative (*b*) in para. 9	137
112	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1259	23	Refers to Nos. 96 and 104 and continues discussion of reply to be made to Jam Saheb	148
131	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 42	1–2	Supply to States of information on events in British India	175
165	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 7, 8	11	Liaison between States and British India during disturbances; States' forces	233
178	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 2	13	Rôle Princes may play in finding a solution to Indian problem	250
187	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 13	16	Chhatari on Nizam of Hyderabad	262
189	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3268–S	17	Refers to No. 112; reply to Jam Saheb	271
225	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 1	27	His views on reply to Jam Saheb and belief in future importance of Princes	311
226	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1391	28	Refers to No. 189; reply to Jam Saheb	316
272	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3498–S	14	Refers to No. 226; reply to Jam Saheb	366
273	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3499–P	14	Refers to No. 79 and explains draft transmitted in No. 274	367
274	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3500–P	14	Refers to No. 273 and transmits text of draft reply to Jam Saheb	370

	Name and number	*Date (December–March)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
277	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 8, 9	15	Liaison between States and British India; States' forces	385
280	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 15	16	Reply to Jam Saheb	389
285	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1476	19	Refers to Nos. 273 and 274, concurs in draft reply, but suggests some drafting amendments	397
286	Chhatari to Lothian Letter 633-C.C.	20	Discusses future of Hyderabad and of its territories ceded or assigned in return for military guarantees from British Government; and looks forward to assertion of independent status	398
290	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 610	22	Memorandum by Amery on Indian States: Request by Chamber of Princes for a Statement of Policy by H.M.G.	405
291	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 1	22	Reply to Jam Saheb	407
301	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1–4	29	Talk with Jam Saheb on need for dealing with problem of smaller States; Princes' rôle in helping to frame future constitution; possible nature of eventual solution	432
303	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 174th Conclusions Minute 1	30	Authorisation for Linlithgow to arrange for reply to be made to Jam Saheb on lines of No. 274	437
306	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 1	31	Cabinet discussion on reply to Jam Saheb	440
309	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 64	Jan. 2	Refers to No. 273 and conveys Cabinet approval of draft reply to Jam Saheb (No. 274) subject to two amendments	442
313	Fitze to Lothian Letter F. 376-P/42	4	Refers to Vol. II, No. 692, and conveys reply to Hyderabad Government's representation regarding Cripps' statement of 28 April 1942	450
315	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 16, 20	5	Nizam's interest in poetry	453
316	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 8	5	Need to ensure fair distribution of food supplies between British India and States	457
341	Amery to Linlithgow Letter	12	Conversation with Jam Saheb on matters raised in official reply to No. 115 in Vol. II	493
347	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 18, 19, 30–2	18–19	Comments on No. 301, paras. 1–4; supply to States of information on events in British India; States' forces	500
355	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 6	20	Conversation with Pannikar	526
359	Lothian to Fitze Letter 3479-C-1	25	Comments on No. 286	537
372	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 13	30	Fair distribution of food between British India and States	563
610	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 6	Mar. 23	Employment of Europeans as Diwans	843

	Name and number	*Date (March–May)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
633	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 7, 8	31	Comments on No. 286	869
649	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 9	15	Refers to No. 633, paras. 7, 8; does not take possibility of one or more Indian States Unions seriously	888
680	Linlithgow to Amery Letter 14–H.E./43	30	Comments on No. 341	933
681	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 9	2–4	Employment of Europeans as Diwans	935
701	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 11	12	Comments on No. 681, para. 9, and believes Indian States may become increasingly 'British, and British India increasingly Indian'	963

CHAPTER 7

Discussion of social and economic reforms

	Name and number	*Date (September–October)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
5	Bevin to Amery Letter	21	Encloses censorship excerpt as evidence that U.S. would make industrialisation of India an important post-war objective, and urges British consideration of this matter	8
19	Amery to Cripps Letter	23	Refers to No. 678 in Vol. II and suggests meeting with Kingsley Wood, Bevin, and one or two of Amery's Advisers to discuss social and economic policy	27
33	Amery to Churchill Minute P. 54/42	25	Refers to No. 775 in Vol. II; will discuss social and economic reform as desired, bringing in one or two Advisers; asks whether Mudaliar may be admitted to Cabinet discussions on this subject	43
34	Minute by Spry	25	Urges that political and social approaches to Indian problem should be combined and reports on meeting of Chatham House Group	43
37	Minute by Churchill	26	Refers to No. 33 and sees no objection	47
45	Note by Cripps	29	Suggests time-table for implementing programme of social reform	57
46	Note of meeting at India Office	29	Discussion of Cripps' proposals on possibility of launching programme of social and economic reform	60
53	Mudaliar to Linlithgow Letter (extract)	2	Describes discussions on social and economic reform	69
54	Amery to Cripps Letter	2	Suggests next steps in considering question of social and economic reform, and stresses limitations on action in this field	71

	Name and number	*Date (October–March)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
61	Cripps to Amery Letter RSC: PH	3	Refers to No. 54 and agrees generally with procedure suggested	81
114	Amery to Cripps Letter	23	Discusses what can now be done on question of social and economic reform	150
128	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 2	30	Describes meeting on social and economic reform (No. 46), and summarises No. 114	170
161	Amery to Dalton Letter	Nov. 10	Draws attention to No. 5 and notes efforts to provide India with trained technicians	230
173	Dalton to Amery Letter	13	Agrees that points raised in No. 161 should be studied	244
210	Note of meeting	23–4	Discussion of memorandum prepared by one of Cripps' assistants	294
217	Linlithgow to Mudaliar Letter, para. 9	25	Has read No. 53 with great amusement	301
233	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 2	30	Mudaliar's amusing account of discussions on Cripps' proposals	323
251	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 6–8	Dec. 4	Describes course of discussions to date on social and economic reform	340
276	Cripps to Amery Letter	15	Encloses memorandum on 'a social and economic policy for India' and asks him to circulate it to Bevin and Kingsley Wood as basis for discussion at ministerial level	374
299	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 6–8	28	Comments on No. 251, paras. 6–8	429
356	Amery to Bevin Letter	Jan. 22	Encloses note commenting on enclosure to No. 276 and suggests that authorities in India should now be consulted	529
544	Bevin to Amery Letter	Feb. 26	Cripps and himself are unable to agree that action proposed by No. 356 is sufficient	735
545	Cripps to Amery Letter	26	Refers to No. 356, is disappointed that Amery is so pessimistic about possible action, and has suggested that Bevin should take matter up with Churchill	736
554	Amery to Bevin Letter	Mar. 1	Refers to No. 544 and maintains that Govt of India's views should be obtained on memorandum enclosed with No. 276 before it is submitted to Churchill	744
556	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 4, 5	2	Future industrial development in India; Cripps and Bevin again agitating to get Churchill's approval for programme of social regeneration	751
574	Amery to Linlithgow Letter	10	Encloses copy of notes enclosed with Nos. 276, 114, and 356, requests views and suggestions, and enquires how far further expert assistance is needed in formulating social and industrial policy	782
588	Bevin to Amery Letter	15	Refers to No. 554 and thinks an indication of Churchill's views should be obtained to give proposals greatest force possible when they are communicated to Linlithgow	804

	Name and number	Date (March–May)	Main subject or subjects	Page
605	Amery to Churchill Minute	19	Refers to Vol. II, No. 664, describes course of discussions on social and economic policy and, in view of Bevin's wishes, puts matter before him	836
608	Churchill to Amery Minute	23	Refers to No. 605; Cabinet should discuss	840
609	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 8, 9	23	Comments on No. 556, paras. 4, 5	840
640	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 350	7	Refers to No. 574; at Churchill's direction Cabinet are to consider matter further	878
643	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (43) 150	9	Memorandum by Amery on social and economic policy for India	882
659	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (43) 165	19	Memorandum by Kingsley Wood on social and economic policy for India	901
668	Jenkins to Laithwaite Letter 469–43/S	26	Encloses rough notes on a forward social programme for India	912
672	Hutton to Laithwaite Letter	27–28	Intends to bring subject of 'social reconstruction' before Reconstruction Committee of Council and encloses comments on enclosure to No. 276	924
681	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 31	2–4	Refers to Nos. 640, 668 and 672, and notes that shortage of personnel is going to be a particular problem	935

CHAPTER 8

United States, Chinese and Dominions concern with developments in India and British reactions to expressions of it; U.S. representation in India

	Name and number	Date (September)	Main subject or subjects	Page
6	Minute by Joyce	21	Public relations aspects of H.M.G.'s India policy	10
7	Minute by Patrick	22	Comments on No. 6	13
8	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2842–S	22	Refers to No. 774 in Vol. II and will try to send appreciation for Halifax in time for Cabinet	15
9	Linlithgow to Halifax Tel. 2843–S	22	Refers to No. 764 in Vol. II and gives appreciation of Indian situation	15
16	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1153	23	Refers to No. 724 in Vol. II; Eddy	25
20	Eden to Amery Letter	23	Suggests Roosevelt should be asked to appoint a distinguished career officer to reside in New Delhi	28
21	Minute by Monteath	24	Comments on Nos. 6 and 7	29
22	Note by Patrick (extract)	24	Note of discussion with members of Ministry of Information on American reactions to Indian developments	30

	Name and number	*Date (September–October)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
24	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 129th Conclusions Minute 4	24	Measures to counteract the adverse trend of American public opinion on India	31
29	Seymour to Laithwaite Tel. (unnumbered)	24	Reports Chiang Kai-shek's reception of Churchill's message (No. 637 in Vol. II); attitude of Chinese Press	40
31	Halifax to Linlithgow Tel. 20	25	Refers to No. 9 and describes what he is doing to explain British point of view on India	41
39	Chiang Kai-shek to Linlithgow Letter	26	Refers to No. 622 in Vol. II and explains his motives in suggesting that the Chinese Commissioner in India should interview the Congress leaders	48
42	Eden to Halifax Tel. 5890	28	Refers to No. 749 in Vol. II and asks him to urge U.S. Government to fill post of Commissioner at New Delhi as soon as possible	53
59	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1196	3	Refers to No. 749 in Vol. II, announces his forthcoming broadcast to U.S., and requests opinion on proposal that he should visit U.S.	80
62	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 3, 4	3–5	U.S. representation in India and Indian representation in U.S.; Chinese troops at Ramgarh	82
69	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 2, 3	5	Effect of Churchill's statement on America; Amery's suggested visit to U.S.	97
76	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 470–S.C.	7	Refers to No. 59 and reviews objections to visit by Amery to U.S., except perhaps in 1943 and for purpose of speaking on British war effort generally	106
77	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1207	7	Refers to No. 761 in Vol. II and urges that nomination of Phillips or Grew as U.S. Commissioner in India should be accepted	107
78	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1208	7	Repeats telegram from Halifax referring to No. 42 and reporting conversation with Welles on U.S. Commissioner in India	108
82	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1214	9	Refers to No. 76; has abandoned idea of visit to U.S.; will broadcast next week	113
85	Eden to Halifax Tel. 6169	10	Refers to No. 78; U.S. Commissioner in Delhi	118
86	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 8, 9, 16, 17	10	Eddy; Amery's suggested visit to U.S.; Chiang Kai-shek; U.S. representation in Delhi	119
89	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 543–S.C.	12	Refers to No. 77 and agrees to Phillips or Grew as U.S. Commissioner in Delhi	125
92	Halifax to Eden Tel. 5080	13	Proposes to take no further action on U.S. Commissioner in Delhi until *agrément* requested and hopes Linlithgow will not pursue objections to Phillips or Grew	127
93	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 571–S.C.	14	Refers to No. 85 and draws attention to No. 89	128

	Name and number	*Date (October–November)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
103	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 2	17	Parliamentary mission to China	135
106	Eden to Halifax Tel. 6339	19	Refers to No. 92 and informs him that Linlithgow agrees to either Phillips or Grew, inclining towards latter	138
134	Amery to Halifax Letter	2	Suggests American University, or group of Universities, might appoint Commission to study Indian problem	192
159	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 19387	10	Points out that Mudaliar's position in U.S. would be strengthened if he could say that present Executive Council was actively concerned with promoting constitutional studies, and suggests American and Swiss experts might participate in them	228
163	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3214–S	11	Opposes suggestions in No. 159 and urges H.M.G.'s opposition to any interference by U.S. or China in Indian problem should be impressed on Mudaliar	231
170	Amery to Halifax Tel. 19637	13	Appreciation of Rajagopalachari's proposals and of H.M.G.'s attitude to suggested discussions in London	241
171	Amery to Halifax Tel. 7019 via Foreign Office	13	Refers to No. 134; would be interested in his and Butler's views, but in light of Linlithgow's opposition no soundings should be made elsewhere	242
178	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 4	13	Encloses extract from Law's report on American opinion on the Empire and India	250
183	Halifax to Eden Tel. 5597	14	Refers to No. 106 and announces Phillips' appointment as U.S. representative in India	260
186	S. of S. to G. of I., External Affairs Dept Tel. 19780	16	Refers to No. 183 and asks them to telegraph to Washington (repeating to India Office) whether they agree to appointment	262
197	G. of I., External Affairs Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 9222	19	Refers to No. 183 and enquires as to Phillips' designation and date of arrival	282
198	Laithwaite to Sherwood Eddy Letter	19	Conveys Linlithgow's thanks for views expressed in Vol. II, No. 732	283
202	Eden to Halifax Tel. 7239	20	Refers to No. 197 and emphasises objection to Phillips' description as President's personal representative	287
203	Halifax to Amery Letter	20	Refers to Nos. 134 and 171 and will take no further action; importance of phrasing statements on Indian policy in a manner palatable to U.S. opinion	287
207	Halifax to Eden Tel. 5706	22	Refers to No. 197; Phillips will be appointed President's personal representative with rank of Ambassador	292

	Name and number	*Date (November–December)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
213	G. of I., External Affairs Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 597–G.C.	25	Refers to No. 207, trusts Halifax will be instructed to press point made in No. 202, and hopes Phillips will not receive Ambassadorial rank	298
214	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 596–S.C.	25	Refers to No. 213 and emphasises objection to Ambassadorial rank for Phillips	299
215	S. of S. to G. of I., External Affairs Dept Tel. 20334	25	Refers to No. 207 and suggests how to deal with speculation in India regarding mediation arising from Phillips' designation and rank	299
216	Halifax to Eden Tel. 5768	25	Refers to No. 202; Phillips' designation	300
219	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 2	25	Encloses note of talk with Phillips	306
220	G. of I., External Affairs Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 9459	27	Refers to No. 216 and discusses Phillips' designation, rank, precedence, and title	307
222	S. of S. to G. of I., External Affairs Dept Tel. 20402	27	Repeats telegram from Eden to Halifax on Press guidance on question of mediation by Phillips	308
223	Eden to Halifax Tel. 7396	27	Refers to No. 216; Phillips' designation, rank, and precedence	309
225	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 9	27	Chinese intentions with enclosure giving Zafrullah Khan's views	311
227	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 20448	28	Refers to No. 214; Phillips' rank and precedence	318
230	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3371–S	29	Refers to No. 227; Phillips' rank and accommodation	321
239	Halifax to Eden Tel. 5860	3	Transmits text of draft announcement of Phillips' appointment prepared by State Department as basis for discussion	331
240	Halifax to Eden Tel. 5861	3	Refers to No. 239 and explains that appointment of Phillips as President's personal representative will avoid risk of undesirable discussions in Senate; Under-Secretary of State will deal with mediation issue at Press conference	332
241	Halifax to Linlithgow Tel. 87003	3	Refers to No. 240 and commends Phillips	332
244	Roosevelt to Linlithgow Letter	3	Announces selection of Phillips to serve near G. of I. as his personal representative with rank of Ambassador	335
247	G. of I., External Affairs Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 9649	4	Refers to Nos. 239 and 240; dissatisfied with both Phillips' designation and text of announcement	337
249	S. of S. to G. of I., External Affairs Dept Tel. 20891	4	Refers to Washington telegrams, urges acceptance of Phillips as President's personal representative, is satisfied with proposed announcement subject to deletion of word 'diplomatic', and states that Phillips should be styled 'Honourable'	338

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251	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 11	4	Eddy	340
257	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3441-G	6	Refers to No. 247, accepts Phillips' designation as President's personal representative, but requests revision of draft announcement	347
258	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3442-G	6	Transmits revised draft of announcement referred to in No. 257	348
262	Eden to Halifax Tel. 7694	7	Refers to No. 257 and supports Linlithgow's requests	352
267	Halifax to G. of I. Tel. 326	11	Roosevelt's announcement of Phillips' appointment	359
277	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 14	15	Law's report on U.S. opinion	385
291	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 10	22	Is looking forward to seeing Phillips	407
294	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 2	23	Phillips' plans; his attitude appears sound	412
301	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 5, 7	29	Mudaliar's activities at I.P.R. Conference	432
306	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 4	31	His article for Empire Industries Association toned down by Eden for fear of offending Americans	440
336	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 4	11	First impressions of Phillips	485
337	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 2	11	Zafrullah Khan's views on Chinese intentions; Mudaliar's activities at I.P.R. Conference	489
347	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 2, 20	14–18	The wider Phillips' contacts are the better; I.P.R. Conference	500
352	Linlithgow to Roosevelt Letter	18	Acknowledges No. 244 and informs him of good impression Phillips has already made	517
354	Halifax to Eden Letter 35	20	Encloses report by Sansom on I.P.R. Conference	519
364	Linlithgow to Glancy Letter	27	Phillips, who is to visit Punjab, is tending to think that Indian problem can be solved by setting up provisional government at once and it would be helpful if he could be made to realise difficulties	551
365	Laithwaite to Joyce Tel. 227-S	28	Linlithgow thinks utmost propaganda use should be made of correspondence between Rajagopalachari and Gandhi published in Madras defamation case	553
366	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 232-S	28	Asks for Cabinet authority to disabuse Phillips of his belief that he was charged with a mission to promote a solution	554
370	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 4	29	Comments on No. 366	560
372	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 3, 10, 14	30	Comments on No. 306, paras. 4, 5, and wishes F.O. was less terrified of Americans;	

	Name and number	*Date (February)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
372	(*cont.*)		comments on No. 366; Begum Shah Nawaz's views on American statesmen and public opinion	563
374	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 114	1	Refers to No. 366 and feels Linlithgow can remove misapprehension far more tactfully on his own than by bringing in Cabinet	569
390	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 2141, para. 2	4	Emphasises importance of briefing Mudaliar and Bajpai regarding Gandhi's fast	584
392	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 300-S	5	Will deal with Phillips as suggested in No. 374	586
396	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 305-S	5	Agrees with No. 390, para. 2	590
417	Monteath to Laithwaite Tel. 144	7	Proposes amendment to G. of I.'s statement on Gandhi's fast to assist in handling of opinion in U.K. and U.S.	610
429	Laithwaite to Monteath Tel. 363-S	8	Refers to No. 417; Council agree to amendment	622
430	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 366-S	8	Arrangements for transmitting news of Gandhi's fast	622
435	Linlithgow to Phillips Letter 24-S	8	Tells him that Gandhi has postponed his fast for 24 hours and emphasises need for completest possible secrecy	629
438	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 8	8–9	Conversation with Phillips	637
449	Lumley to Linlithgow Tel. 648	10	It might be suggested to Phillips that he postpone visit to Bombay since it would coincide with Gandhi's fast and be interpreted as a mission to intervene	648
450	Attlee to Mackenzie King, Curtin, Fraser and Smuts Tel. Z. 16 via British High Commissioners	10	Describes developments regarding Gandhi and Government's policy towards his fast	649
452	Phillips to Linlithgow Letter	10	Thanks for keeping him so promptly informed	651
455	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 413-S	11	Refers to No. 392; has spoken to Phillips in sense of No. 374, refused his request to see Gandhi, and given him advance information of Gandhi's fast	652
463	Churchill to Linlithgow Tel. 52444 via War Office and Commander-in-Chief, para. 2	13	Disposition in U.S. seems to be to ridicule Gandhi's conduct	659
470	Linlithgow to Churchill Tel. 38548/C. via Commander-in-Chief and War Office, para. 2	15	Refers to No. 463, para. 2, and is delighted to hear it	669
476	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 7	16	Chinese visitors	674
477	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 6	16	Story of Chinese official refused accommodation and meal in Burma	679
485	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 487-S	19	Announces that Phillips has received a message regarding Gandhi's fast from	

	Name and number	Date (February)	Main subject or subjects	Page
485	(*cont.*)		Roosevelt and Hull; discusses the limits of Phillips' functions, and asks that these limits be made clear to U.S. Government	687
486	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 488–S	19	Reports conversation with Phillips on message from Roosevelt and Hull referred to in No. 485	689
487	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 489–S	19	Refers to No. 485; situation regarding Phillips is becoming intolerable	690
489	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 493–S	19	Has refused Phillips permission to say that he has seen Linlithgow to help meet pressure regarding Gandhi's fast from U.S. Press correspondents	691
492	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 190	19	Refers to Nos. 485–7 and draws attention to No. 493	693
493	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 191	19	Refers to No. 492 and repeats telegram from Halifax to Eden reporting conversation with Hull about Gandhi and U.S. attitude	694
494	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 3245	19	Refers to Nos. 489 and 495; Eden will take up matter during visit to Washington; Madame Chiang Kai-shek probably responsible for message to Phillips	695
495	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 3246	19	Refers to No. 494 and repeats telegram from Eden to Halifax	695
499	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1–3	19–23	Comments on Roosevelt's message to Phillips	698
500	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 503–S	20	Thanks for No. 494	701
510	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 3366	21	Repeats telegram from Halifax to Eden reporting conversation with Hull about Gandhi	709
513	Halifax to Eden Tel. 870	21	Refers to No. 510 and comments on Press reports of his conversation with Hull	712
517	Attlee to Mackenzie King, Curtin, Fraser and Smuts Tel. Z. No. 21 via British High Commissioners	22	Refers to No. 450 and describes developments regarding Gandhi's fast, Linlithgow's confidence that situation in event of Gandhi's death can be kept under control, and Halifax's conversations with Hull	715
520	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 527–S	23	Refers to No. 510, transmits text of note handed out to Press by Phillips, and notes latter has given interview to Mookerjee	718
526	Fraser to Attlee Tel. 52	23	Refers to No. 517 and thinks releasing Gandhi might be wiser course	721
536	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 562–S, para. 3	25	Is circulating suggestion, particularly among Americans, that Gandhi has been pulling their legs	729
539	Smuts to Attlee Tel. 287 via British High Commissioner in South Africa	25	Urges that Gandhi's death should be avoided by all means possible and suggests forcible feeding	730
540	Attlee to Fraser Tel. 42	25	Refers to No. 526 and explains reasons for not releasing Gandhi	730

	Name and number	*Date (February–April)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
543	Linlithgow to Bajpai and Agency-General, Chungking Tel. 568–S	26	Propaganda in event of Gandhi's survival	735
546	Linlithgow to Churchill Tel. via Commander-in-Chief and War Office	26	Is suggesting to certain American correspondents that they have had their legs pulled	737
547	Churchill to Smuts Tel. T. 228/3	26	Does not think Gandhi has slightest intention of dying	738
548	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 9	26	American reactions to fast and official intervention	738
552	Attlee to Smuts Tel. 325 via British High Commissioner in South Africa	27	Refers to No. 539, points out difficulties of adopting suggestion, and adds that in any case Gandhi is now in no danger	743
553	Churchill to Linlithgow Tel. 56538 via War Office and Commander-in-Chief	28	Commends spirit of No. 543 and discreet use of ridicule	744
555	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 5	2	Difficulties with Phillips; U.S. post-war intentions in India and large increase in Mission's staff	745
567	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 631–S	8	Assumes that his intention to refuse any request from Phillips to see Gandhi has Cabinet's approval	768
570	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 2	8	Cannot have any American or other interference in handling Indian problem	772
575	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 4564	11	Conveys Churchill's agreement to line proposed in No. 567 which will be reinforced by Eden during his visit to U.S.	783
579	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 2	11	Refers to No. 575	792
580	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 678–S	12	Thanks for No. 575	793
581	Lumley to Linlithgow Letter 300/H.E., paras. 1–6	12	Phillips' visit to Bombay	793
582	Low to Laithwaite Letter	12	Phillips' conference with Bombay editors	798
590	Linlithgow to Lumley Letter, paras. 1–4	15	Refers to No. 581 and discusses Phillips and question of U.S. intervention	805
596	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 3–5, 16	16	Refers to No. 499, paras. 1–3, and No. 575, and discusses Phillips' activities and position; comments on No. 477, para. 6	817
635	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 891–S	2	Asks him to approve his giving hint to Phillips that there must be a term to latter's receiving deputations from political bodies	872
636	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 892–S	2	Repeats telegram from Hope giving details of Phillips' interviews while in Madras	873
638	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 2, 3	5	Quite wrong for Phillips to receive deputations from Indian political parties	876
642	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 2	8	Phillips is returning home to 'report'	879

	Name and number	*Date (April–May)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
647	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 970–S	13	Refers to No. 635, requests very early reply, and reports meeting of Phillips with Jinnah	886
650	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 63–S.C.	16	Condemns reported remarks of Madame Chiang on freeing of Nehru and requests formal protest by British Ambassador at Chungking	893
652	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 384	16	Refers to No. 647; is consulting Eden on reply to No. 635	894
660	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 7892	20	Refers to No. 635 and gives guidance on how to handle Phillips	902
661	Eden to Halifax Tel. 2601	20	Asks him to telegraph urgently full text of Madame Chiang Kai-shek's remarks about India	903
662	Halifax to Eden Tel. 1846	20	Refers to No. 661 and transmits extracts from Associated Press account of Madame Chiang's remarks	903
663	Halifax to Eden Tel. 1847	20	Refers to No. 662; Madame Chiang's remarks	904
667	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 135–S.C.	26	Reports conversations with Phillips	908
671	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 430	27	Refers to No. 667, congratulates him on handling of conversations, and suggests he should telegraph to Halifax on handling of publicity aspects of Phillips' announcement of refusal of permission to see Gandhi	924
674	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 8459	28	Refers to No. 650 and draws attention to No. 675	927
675	Eden to Halifax Tel. 2816	29	Refers to Nos. 650 and 662 and outlines action he should take to counter Madame Chiang's statements	928
676	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1038–S	29	Replies to No. 660; Phillips	929
679	Seymour to Eden Tel. 480	30	Refers to No. 675 and discusses how best to curb Madame Chiang	933
681	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 6	2	Comments on conversations with Phillips (see No. 667) and assesses his capabilities and his attitude to Indian problem	935
684	Halifax to Amery Tel. 2101 via Foreign Office	5	Reports conversation with Roosevelt on Linlithgow's refusal to let Phillips see Gandhi, on possibility Gandhi might fast unto death, and on Madame Chiang	945
693	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 481	8	Linlithgow will no doubt consider effect in U.S. of giving Jinnah permission to see Gandhi when Phillips was refused it	954
699	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 15	10	Just as well that Phillips' arrival in Washington has coincided with Churchill's	961
700	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 10561	12	Refers to No. 674, and repeats telegram from Halifax reporting his conversation with Soong about Madame Chiang Kai-shek's remarks	963

	Name and number	*Date (May–June)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
701	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 3, 4, 21	12–14	Comments on No. 681, para. 6, No. 684, and No. 700; Willkie; reiterates opinion expressed in No. 693	963
715	Halifax to Amery Tel. 2312 via Foreign Office	17	Reports conversation with Phillips	992
726	Churchill to Attlee and Amery Tel. Pencil 213 via Air Ministry	23	Has had most depressing and unsatisfactory interview with Phillips, but believes Americans are far more concerned about conduct of Burma campaign than Indian politics	1003
743	Halifax to Amery Tel. 2472 via Foreign Office	29	Roosevelt says that Phillips will not be returning to India until something happens	1025
755	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 8, 10	1	Comments on No. 743 and on No. 701, para. 4	1032
756	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1311-S	2	Refers to No. 743 and will not be sorry if Phillips decides to stay at home	1037

CHAPTER 9

Reconsideration of the War Financial Settlement, 1940

	Name and number	*Date (September)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
10	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2847-S	22	Refers to No. 773 in Vol. II and describes Raisman's discussions with Councillors on War Financial Settlement and what he would tell Assembly	19
11	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2849-S	22	Refers to No. 10 and reports that Assembly would be debating adjournment motion that afternoon, and line Raisman would take in debate	20
12	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 422	22	Note by Churchill circulating revised draft of telegram to Linlithgow on War Financial Settlement (No. 769 in Vol. II)	20
13	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 424	22	Memorandum by Amery on Indian Sterling Balances	21
14	Amery to Kingsley Wood Letter	22	Urges acceptance of solution proposed in No. 13	24
15	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 2864-S	23	Refers to No. 11 and reports outcome of adjournment debate	25
17	Bridges to Turnbull Letter	23	Asks him to inform Amery of Churchill's decision that No. 13 should not be circulated to War Cabinet	26
24	War Cabinet W.M. (42) 129th Conclusions Minute 2	24	War Financial Settlement of 1940 and Indian Sterling Balances	31
25	Churchill to Linlithgow Tels. 1159-61 via India Office	24	Refers to Vol. II, Nos. 770 and 773, transmits texts of Annex to No. 778 and of No. 769 and explains his point of view on War Financial Settlement	36

	Name and number	*Date (September–December)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
26	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 16781	24	Conveys War Cabinet's Conclusions as at No. 24, Minute 2, para. (3), and requests views	37
27	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 16782	24–5	Conveys War Cabinet's Conclusions as at No. 24, Minute 2, para. (2)	38
28	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 28–U	24	Refers to No. 25 and further explains War Cabinet's decision	39
35	Tyson to Herbert Letter, para. 2	25	B. M. Birla's intentions regarding Indian Sterling Balances and attitude to revision of War Financial Settlement	45
40	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1–7	26	Cabinet discussions on War Financial Settlement	49
56	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 399–S.C.	3	Refers to No. 26, enlarges on dangers of communicating No. 27 to Council, and gives War Cabinet emphatic warning that this should not be done	73
68	War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 447	5	Memorandum by Amery circulating No. 56	97
69	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 1	5	Comments on No. 56 and describes how he intends to handle matter with Cabinet	97
73	Amery to Kingsley Wood Letter	6	Encloses copy of No. 56 and states action he is taking	104
86	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 2	10	Implications of discussions on War Financial Settlement for question of Indianisation of Executive Council	119
121	Amery to Kingsley Wood Letter	27	Encloses copy of No. 122 and asks for his comments before it is sent to Churchill	163
122	Amery to Churchill Minute P. 58/42	27	Kingsley Wood has agreed not to pursue question of Indian Sterling Balances for time being and therefore supposes it need not come before Cabinet again	164
128	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 1	30	Comments on telegram contained in No. 139	170
131	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 2	1	Comments on discussions on Sterling Balances	175
139	Kingsley Wood to Amery Letter	3	Discusses telegram to be sent to Linlithgow on Sterling Balances	200
140	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1295	4	Discusses line Raisman should take when question of Sterling Balances is again raised in Assembly	201
158	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3196–S	10	Refers to No. 140 and asks him to take action proposed in its para. 3	227
233	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 1	30	Executive Council and Legislative Assembly still have to discuss Sterling Balances	323
261	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3452–S	7	Continues No. 10 and reports Council's discussions on application of War Financial Settlement	349

CHAPTER 10

Food and price situation

	Name and number	*Date (October–December)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
128	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 6	30	Fisher's scheme for co-operative marketing	170
157	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 5	9	Has decided to set up a Food Department	223
177	Linlithgow to members of Executive Council Letter	13	Informs them of decision to set up Food Department and encloses advance copy of communiqué announcing this step	249
181	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 19636	14	Suggests measures for strengthening control of food supplies, including establishment of Food Department	259
187	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 3	16	Establishment of Food Department	262
199	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3306-G	20	Replies to No. 181 and discusses measures suggested therein	283
217	Linlithgow to Mudaliar Letter, paras. 7, 8	25	Establishment of Food Department	301
233	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 21	30	Is becoming very seriously disturbed about food situation	323
242	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3402-G	3	Serious deterioration in food situation may mean stopping all exports of foodgrains from India and asking for imports of wheat	333
254	Lumley to Linlithgow Report 115, para. 5	5	Food situation is his greatest anxiety	346
265	G. of I., Food Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 9796	9	Describes serious deterioration in food situation and requests additional 600,000 tons of wheat	357
266	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3475-S	10	Refers to No. 265; proposals therein have resulted from discussions in Council	359
269	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3495-S	13	Urges importance of India's having shipping for import of wheat and hopes Amery will convey to Cabinet his opinion of gravity of situation	361
275	S. of S. to G. of I., Food Dept Tel. 21551	15	Describes difficulties in meeting request made in No. 265, urges that measures for securing maximum food supplies should be set on foot at once, and asks questions on points of detail	372
280	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 10	16	Birla's scheme for cheap food shops and possibility of similar Government shops	389
281	Hope to Linlithgow Report 11, para. 3	17	Food situation in Madras is really serious	393
282	G. of I., Food Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 10045	18	Refers to No. 265 and repeats request for help in view of deteriorating crop position	394
284	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 613-S.C.	19	Requests help in obtaining loan of expert from Ministry of Food to advise on India's food situation	396

	Name and number	*Date (December–February)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
288	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3562–S	22	Transmits telegram from Lumley on food situation in Bombay and to Governor of Ceylon regretting that no assurance could be given of supplying rice to Ceylon	402
291	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 18	22	Continues to be greatly exercised about the food position	407
293	Lewis to Linlithgow Report 23 (extract)	23	High prices and short supplies	411
294	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 5	23	Repercussions of India's demand for additional food supplies	412
295	Stewart to Linlithgow Letter 960 G.B., para 5	23	Supply and price situation in Bihar	415
297	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 3599–S	26	Replies to points raised in No. 275	421
302	Lumley to Linlithgow Report 116, paras. 1, 2	30	Food crisis overshadows all other events	436
315	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 13	5	Refers to No. 280, para. 10, on Government grain shops; gravity of situation on military as well as civil side; need for expert from Ministry of Food; need for imports	453
316	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 8	5	Need to ensure fair distribution of food supplies between British India and States	457
330	Memorandum by Amery	?8	The Indian demand for imported food grains	473
332	G. of I., Food Dept, to S. of S. Tel. 217	10	Refers to Nos. 282 and 297, and asks for delivery of 200,000 tons of wheat before end of April and for immediate promise of a further 200,000 tons	479
336	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 6	11	Measures to deal with food crisis	485
337	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 8	11	Has obtained Vigor to help G. of I. with food question	489
338	War Cabinet W.M. (43) 7th Conclusions Minute 2	12	Invitation to Amery to ask Minister of State to send a Middle East food expert to India	491
347	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 4, 34	13–19	Wood's efforts to improve supplies from Punjab; thanks for No. 350; thinks food situation at this moment is most serious defence, as well as civil, problem	500
349	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 6	15	Lord President's Committee's meeting on Indian food question	510
350	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 1002	16	Conveys British Government's decision on Indian request for wheat supplies	514
362	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, paras. 2, 9	26	Decision to decontrol price of wheat; rice and labour for Ceylon	541
372	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 13	30	Comments on No. 316, para. 8; wheat prices are rising, but too early yet to judge effects of decontrol	563
386	Linlithgow to Provincial Governors Letter	3	Outlines food situation, describes cost at which H.M.G. have provided extra	

	Name and number	*Date (February–June)*	*Main subject or subjects*	*Page*
386	(*cont.*)		supplies, and urges extreme efforts to see that utmost is made of available production	580
476	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 14	16	Scheme for collecting wheat is going quite well	674
560	Lumley to Linlithgow Report 118, para. 7	Mar. 4	Rationing scheme to be introduced in Bombay City; situation is somewhat easier but further allotments of supplies are needed	754
587	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 4832	15	Requests material on food situation for forthcoming Commons debate	803
596	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 8	16	Wants to improve organisation of Food Department while responsibility for it is still in his hands	817
599	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 732–S	18	Refers to No. 587 and transmits appreciation of food situation	825
658	Linlithgow to Provincial Governors Letter	Apr. 18	Asks them to ensure their officers' co-operation in carrying out food distribution scheme	900
681	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 24	May 2–4	Wheat situation is now not too bad	935
736	Linlithgow to Amery Tel. 1268–S	27	Indian economic situation and urgent need for supplies of silver	1016
755	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 7	June 1	Problem of inflation and silver supplies	1032
758	Amery to Linlithgow Letter, para. 5	2	Fully shares his anxieties about inflation	1038
762	Linlithgow to Amery Letter, para. 6	6	Food position has again taken a turn for the worse	1044
765	Amery to Linlithgow Tel. 12878	8	Refers to No. 736 and informs him that Eden has sent urgent personal message to Halifax	1049
766	Herbert to Linlithgow Letter, paras. 1–4	8	Rice situation in Bengal	1049

1

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/PO/8/6: f 48

21 September 1942

35–U. Your private letter of August 27th.[1] I think Winston wise not to press me to go on after April. If we could foresee the end of the war by about June next it might be worth keeping me here till then. But I am sure I should be most unwise to undertake a further term up to April 1944. Nor do I feel I could face another complete hot weather in (omission) [?India]. So I am making my arrangements to leave India in April 1943. Omitting Anderson (whom you say?) cannot be spared, I place your possibles in following order of preference: Cranborne; Ormsby-Gore, Lumley, Sinclair. I do not know Asquith. Greene is Roman Catholic, which would hardly do with Hope and Herbert also of that Church's might. The more I see of this charge the more convinced I grow that it has come to be politician's job and political experience and capacity are most necessary.

[1] Vol. II, No. 642.

2

Sir A. R. Mudaliar to Sir G. Laithwaite

MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

CONFIDENTIAL LONDON, *21 September 1942*

My dear Laithwaite,

We arrived here on Tuesday, 9th September,[1] after a somewhat strenuous but on the whole pleasant and interesting journey. The arrangements from Cairo onwards particularly were very good, and we thanked the Foreign Secretary for all the help that we received from their good offices.

On Wednesday, the 10th,[2] we met the Prime Minister at 10, Downing Street, and immortalised ourselves by having our photos taken in the garden there. I am enclosing with this letter an account of the talk that Mr. Churchill gave us on that occasion, which you may find interesting. We attended the first War

[1] The date of arrival was Tuesday, 8 September.

[2] The date should be 9 September.

Cabinet meeting on Monday, the 14th, and I have sent a brief account[3] of the proceedings concerning India to His Excellency. I hope he will forgive the bad handwriting, and I hope to send future proceedings in type. We were received by His Majesty on Wednesday individually and I had the great privilege of having my insignia of K.C.S.I. presented by His Majesty. I reminded him that I had also the privilege of being Knighted by him in 1937. His Majesty talked about India and the troubles there, and I assured him that the affairs of India, internal and external, were in very safe hands, and that if His Excellency was willing to continue the best and safest course would be to request him to carry on for a further period. His Majesty said that he would consider the matter carefully, and that they will have to come to a decision within the next month or two. We had the same day a lunch given to us by His Majesty's Government, at which Mr. Amery presided and which several of the Cabinet Ministers and all the High Commissioners attended. Mr. Amery suddenly sprang a surprise on us by making a short speech, and both the Jam Saheb and I had to make short replies thereto. We attended the debate on India on the adjournment motion,[4] and also heard the Prime Minister's statement[5] about India. I personally think that it was satisfactory. At any rate, it was a relief to us after what we had heard on previous day, an account of which, as I stated, is enclosed. There were some home truths about Congress and we knew that it would create a furore in India from the Congress Press. The debate itself was not too bad, and we considered that Mr. Amery's speech, particularly the portion dealing with the political aspect of the question, very helpful and in a conciliatory tone.

We have been following the debates in the Legislative Assembly very closely. The remark that I did not much appreciate was that of Ambedkar, if he has been correctly reported here, that the House had become senile. The obvious answer would be that it is the Government that will not have a fresh election, but apart from that I think the President will take objection to such observations. I hope Ambedkar referred only to the senility of individual members. I am getting regularly the proceedings of Council through Spence, and I am also beginning to get departmental weekly summaries. Jenkins has sent a particularly good and helpful summary which will enable me to have the background of affairs there and to meet any points raised at the War Cabinet. I hope to write something about blitzed London to you when I have the time to go round and see the suburbs. At present we are kept fairly busy both with papers and with interviews with various Ministers.

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,

A. R. MUDALIAR

Most entertaining.

L.

Enclosure to No. 2

On Wednesday, 10th September, we were taken to 10, Downing Street by Mr. Amery to meet the Prime Minister. Mr. Churchill was in his office room with a cheroot in his mouth, and after we were introduced he took us to the garden to be photographed. As soon as we were photographed, while we were still standing in the garden, Mr. Amery asked the P.M. whether he had read the note that he had sent him for the statement which the P.M. was making the next day. Mr. Churchill turned round and said:

"I have read the note, but I am dashed if I am going to make any statement on those lines. If I have to make a statement I shall make it on my own lines. I think it is all wrong. What have we to be ashamed of in our Government of India? Why should we be apologetic or say that we are prepared to go out at the instance of some jackanapes? Let us tell them what we have done for India. For eighty years we have given it peace and internal security and prosperity such as has never been known in the history of that country for two thousand years, which country in the world can rival that period of peace and prosperity? The Americans had their civil war, China is torn to pieces, Russia had its revolutions, every European country has been scarred and marred by terrible conflicts, but, thanks to our rule in India, uninterrupted trade and peace and prosperity has prevailed. Look at the condition even now. An Indian maid with bangles on can travel from Travancore to Punjab all alone without fear of molestation. That is more than can be said in this country today, where our Wrens and Waafs cannot go two miles with the same feeling of safety. We have looked after all classes, and we have protected the interests of all sections, and I am not going to be a party to a policy of scuttle. I shall tell them that for the last 25 years the Conservative Party has gone on the wrong tracks, it has lost confidence in itself, and it has given way perpetually until the present state of affairs has come about. It is all wrong, thoroughly wrong. If we have ever to quit India, we shall quit it in a blaze of glory, and the chapter that shall be ended then will be the most glorious chapter of that country, not merely in relation to the past but equally in relation to the future, however distant that may be. That will be my statement on India tomorrow. No apology, no quitting, no idea of weakening or scuttling. What do we gain from India? We have lost our trade and all our contracts, we have less than 500 civilians in the whole of the service there, we have nothing to gain by our continuing in India, and there is only one thing we are doing, and we shall continue to do that, and that is to do our duty there, and we are prepared to do that at any cost."

[3] MSS. EUR. F. 125/130.
[4] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 383, 11 September 1942, cols. 552–630.
[5] *Ibid.*, 10 September 1942, cols. 302–5.

These were almost exactly the words that the Prime Minister used. The Jam Saheb and I were merely looking on, and nobody could utter a word during the course of this monologue, and with this he closed the conversation and we returned to the India Office. I was feeling none too happy, and wondered whether my career on the War Cabinet would not be closing even before it had started. Fortunately, while we were still talking with Mr. Amery, later in the evening a message came that P.M. wanted to see him and he went. The result was the statement which Mr. Churchill made on the following day in the House of Commons.

3

War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 420

L/P&S/13/998: f 248

INDIA

INDIAN STATES: REQUEST BY CHAMBER OF PRINCES FOR STATEMENT OF POLICY BY HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM BY THE LORD PRIVY SEAL

GWYDYR HOUSE, WHITEHALL, S.W.1, *21 September 1942*

In W.P. (42) 391[1] of the 4th September, 1942, the Secretary of State for India has indicated the line he proposes to take in replying to the request by the Indian Chamber of Princes for a statement of the policy of His Majesty's Government towards them.

2. I agree with the Secretary of State for India that it would be most inadvisable to make a public reply, but I am concerned to note that it is not considered possible to enjoin secrecy on the Princes in regard to the reply which is to be communicated to them privately. Both here and in America there is a widespread feeling, vague but none the less strong, that His Majesty's Government should open some kind of unspecified negotiations with the Indian parties, and particularly with Congress. If, as is contemplated in W.P. (42) 391, it becomes known to the public that His Majesty's Government have gone some way to meet a request by the Indian Princes for a further statement of policy on Indian constitutional development, it will not be generally appreciated that the reply consists mainly of an explanation of the reasons why no new statement of policy can be made; both here and in America it will be argued, with some appearance of truth, that for our own purposes we are encouraging reactionary elements while refusing to open negotiations with representatives of the Indian

peoples. Any further explanations given should be made on the basis that they are strictly confidential.

3. As regards the contents of the suggested reply, I have two comments to make:—

(i) I should very much regret any phrasing which might be construed into a modification of the policy as regards the development of representative institutions in the Indian States which I explained on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the House of Commons on the 28th April, 1942 (see W.P. (42) 391, paragraph 5 III).[2] The words I then used were agreed to beforehand by the Secretary of State for India. It is true that we cannot, consistently with our treaty obligations, *impose* democratic constitutions on the Indian States, but for their sakes as well as our own we ought to do all we can to encourage them towards democratic institutions. We are constantly stating that we are fighting for democracy which means a great deal more than administrative improvements.

(ii) I think it would be most unwise to encourage the idea of a separate Union of the Indian States (W.P. (42) 391, paragraph 5 IV).[3] The Draft Declaration does not of course deal with this point as it was concerned with British India alone so far as constitutional changes are concerned. A project with so many geographical difficulties is, however, quite unreal, and surely we do not wish to create another Pakistan problem merely to give the Indian Princes a pressure device against British India.

4. For my own part, I should feel inclined to tell the Princes that we cannot at the present time make any fresh statement of policy as regards the Indian States.

5. At the same time we should, in my opinion, pursue an active policy of persuasion towards the democratisation of the Indian States under constitutional Princes.

R. S. C.

[1] Vol. II, No. 691. [2] The reference should be to para. 3(II).
[3] The reference should be to para. 3(IV).

4

Notes by the India Office

L/P&S/13/998: ff 359–60a

Undated

NOTES ON SIR S. CRIPPS' MEMORANDUM[1]

Paragraph 2

Agreed. Please see Annexure E.,[2] paragraph 2. It is proposed to impress upon the Viceroy that this is to be a secret, not a public, communication. It does not in any case give any new "assurances", or constitute "negotiations". It is merely an explanation of why no assurances are necessary.

Paragraph 3 (i)

It is not correct to say that Sir S. Cripps' statement in the House was "agreed to beforehand". The Secretary of State wanted this passage left out, but Sir S. Cripps insisted that it should go in, and the Secretary of State reluctantly agreed, *subject* to the substitution of the word "representative" for "democratic". It was thus precisely on the basis of *not* saying more than we have said before that Secretary of State agreed.

It is in any case essential in present circumstances to avoid a change of policy to the detriment of the Princes. Nor is it possible to talk about "encouraging" but not "forcing" the Princes. The Parliamentary statement of 16th December, 1938[3] in reply to Sir J. Wardlaw Milne (copy attached) said "The Paramount Power will not obstruct proposals for constitutional advance initiated by Rulers. But His Majesty's Government have no intention of bringing any form of pressure to bear upon them to initiate constitutional changes." The fact is that advice and encouragement, if it is publicly given by a representative of the Paramount Power, is always read in India as meaning that something in the nature of an order or direction is being given.

Moreover, are we really concerned with democratising the States? It is necessary to be quite clear as to our relationship with the Rulers in this matter.

(1) The States are not British territory.

(2) They only differ from any foreign country by virtue of the fact (and its consequences) that we have treaties with their Rulers of an exclusive nature.

(3) The fact that under these treaties we are responsible for protecting the Rulers against attempts to overthrow them enables us to claim that we can intervene to the extent necessary to prevent a situation arising in which their rule is gravely menaced by insurrection—viz. we can and do intervene to prevent a system of rule liable to cause serious discontent among the State subjects.

(4) The extent to which we concern ourselves with the internal affairs of States necessarily varies in proportion to their size and importance, but in the case of the rank and file, whose Governments are less capable of withstanding subversive activity, this means that we can advocate, and if necessary insist upon, (a) the remedying of abuses, (b) the establishment of representative institutions for the purpose of making public opinion felt by the Ruler—so that he may know about, and remedy, grievances.

(5) This means in effect that we can properly concern ourselves only with a *minimum* of administrative reform. As a result of our insistence on this minimum it may well be that the reaction of public opinion within the State on the Ruler may result in further measures of administrative reform, and, *if the State subjects so desire*, of changes in the constitution—possibly in a democratic direction.

(6) But any changes beyond the minimum necessary to avoid insurrection are matters for the Ruler and people of the State, not for us. They are in fact in the same position as any foreign country, free to choose their own form of government without outside interference. This surely—not democracy as such—is what we are fighting for; we do not wish to *impose* forms of government, but to leave countries free to choose what suits them.

(7) This is precisely the policy we adopt towards the States. Our treaty obligations to protect the Rulers mean that we must interest ourselves to the extent of ensuring that popular opinion is not suppressed. For the rest, it is a question of self-determination, and we do not exert any pressure in either direction. Moreover it is with the Rulers that our treaties subsist, and it is our interest to ensure that they retain the power to implement their obligations.

(8) In point of fact many States have progressed in the last few years far beyond the minimum required as a result of our treaty obligations. In the more advanced States, the Budget is considered by a representative assembly, and non-official elected members are appointed Ministers. (See the brief note on P.Y. 1478/40[4] and the Mysore Reforms[5] at Flag A.) This is a natural growth, and we should be well advised to stick to our present policy of letting it continue naturally. In any case it would need a considered decision by His Majesty's Government to reverse that policy, and if the Lord Privy Seal really presses for such a change it will have to be taken by Cabinet, who are surely unlikely to agree at the present juncture.

[1] No. 3. [2] To No. 691 in Vol. II. [3] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 342, col. 2352.
[4] See L/P&S/13/993.
[5] This may refer to the summary of the Government of Mysore Act 1940 on pp. 11–12 of the enclosures to Sir K. Fitze's letter of 14 August 1941 to Mr Gibson. L/P&S/13/993.

Paragraph 3 (ii)

We do not want to *encourage* a separate States Union. But Sir S. Cripps himself told the Delegation of Princes on 2nd April[6] that he "did not see any fundamental impossibility" in this idea and that if the Scheme went through he would take up the point of a separate States Union when he got home. The idea is very much in the minds of the Princes and appears in the White Paper in their reply[7] to the Offer. It is no use our saying we won't consider it in any circumstances. Surely the best line is to get them off the idea in an indirect way, as the Viceroy suggests on p. 13, paragraph 8[8] of the Print.

[6] See Vol. I, No. 527, p. 648.
[7] Cmd. 6350, pp. 15–16; also reproduced as No. 591 in Vol. I.
[8] See Vol. II, No. 629, para. 8.

5

Mr Bevin to Mr Amery

L/E/8/2527: ff 270–1

MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND NATIONAL SERVICE, ST. JAMES'S SQUARE,
SECRET LONDON, S.W.1, *21 September 1942*

Dear Amery,

The enclosed Censorship Excerpt is of interest in connection with our recent conversation. I think that, as in the case of Russia after the last war, the United States will make the industrialisation of India and China an important objective after this one and that an effort will be made to lay a foundation for this through activities during the war.

I feel that much of our own thinking on post-war export trade is in terms of consumer goods and I doubt very much whether whole-hearted co-operation in the industrialisation of India is sufficiently in mind. In fact, there may well be opposition to it by those who look upon India only as a customer and think that assistance towards her industrialists would be harmful to this country's interests.

It is clear that it would be to our benefit for Indians of the type referred to in this excerpt to be trained in this country, and so be encouraged to look here for capital equipment for Indian enterprises in which they may later be employed. It is necessary, also, to encourage the greatest possible number of technicians to go to India and China in due course. As in the case of the youths we have trained here, it is necessary for us to take the initiative in order to secure good will in India.

Obviously without a great expansion of her industry and in the number of her industrial workers the standard of life in India cannot be substantially raised

and I hope you will agree that in the consideration of post-war trade this subject should be given a prominent place and that plans should be made accordingly and considered now.

Yours sincerely,
ERNEST BEVIN

Enclosure to No. 5

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM—

B. N. Gupta,
284 Fifth Avenue,
New York, N.Y.

TO—

Mr. Basheshar Nath Gupta,
C/o Messrs. Guptajee,
Connaught Place,
New Delhi, India

PROPOSED PLAN TO EDUCATE INDIA'S YOUTH

In a personal letter writer suggests to his brother that in order for him to know the American administration from the inside to read the last memorable speeches of Vice-President Wallace, Milo Perkins, Chief Director of the Board of Economic Warfare, and of Sumner Well[e]s in order to clarify what the American objectives in India are.

Writer states that Americans are determined to industrialize India, if British and Indian leaders will permit it. It is writer's intention to set up in India with Delhi as the centre a small, non-political organization to propagate ideas—that Americans are not "Greeks bearing gifts",[1] but very clean pioneering and reforming type of people. Writer wishes to further the education, particularly the technical education of the Indian youth, proposes doing this through Indian newspapers, direct letters to principals and head-masters of every college, high school and technical school in India, so that a selective machinery is set in motion provisionally for technical education by mail and subsequently for a preliminary technical training of selectees in India. Writer then proposes to bring selectees to U.S. for one or two year courses in various technical fields—state project might call for as many as 500 a month. The idea is to train teachers here, who upon return to India would start industrial departments for a specific type of work such as ship building, aeroplane assembly, machine shop operation, in their respective schools with the aid of American equipment. Writer states that there will be no transportation difficulties because these men will travel by boat across Arabian Sea, thence by motor car across Africa and then by boat in a convoy across the Atlantic. Writer states that he has been assured of reasonable financial assistance by authorities, with whom he is in touch. (This proposed project is similar to the Chinese Industrial Co-Operatives, known as Induscos.)

[1] See Virgil: *Æneid*, Bk ii, l. 49.

Writer proposed to set up a liaison-welfare organization so American personnel in India—both military and civilian can get communications and small packages from their homeland—proposed address is 222 Dunvegan Road, Toronto, Canada. Writer states that he has good connections with various steamship companies and ships' captains, and can organize effective parcel service, provided a trusted customs clearance broker can be appointed at Bombay & Calcutta.

6

Minute by Mr Joyce

L/P&J/8/515: ff 74–6

SECRET *21 September 1942*

Mr. Patrick

This note is written purely from what I might call the "public relations" angle of the Indian problem, and I apologise if it may seem to intrude into the realm of high policy.

The reactions in this country to the Prime Minister's statement[1] and to the debate in the House[2] show clearly that while there is full support for firm measures in dealing with the disturbances in India, public opinion is by no means unanimous in regarding H.M.G.'s attitude towards the immediate political problem as satisfactory. There is a broad recognition of the obstacles in the way of a settlement, and there is recognition of the extent to which blame attaches to the political parties in India, and especially to Gandhi and the leaders of Congress. But there is a feeling that we cannot afford to rest content on the reiteration of the Cripps long-term offer plus nothing more than a war policy of "The firm hand and no nonsense".

The line taken by Mr. Greenwood in the debate, following the official resolution[3] by the Labour Party, will undoubtedly lead to increased pressure on the Government from Left Wing quarters and the Left Wing press to take some further step to resolve the deadlock, or at any rate to create some machinery designed to make India (and the U.S.A.) begin to think that we really want agreement among Indians and that we are not content to rest, for the remainder of the war, on the failure of past attempts to secure the co-operation of Indian political parties. There is already evidence of this pressure, and it is true to say that in certain sections of the Right Wing press where there is editorial support for H.M.G.'s present policy, there are nevertheless serious doubts as to whether we can afford, in the long run, to do nothing more than deal firmly with the Congress movement.

The debate has already had the effect of stimulating the critics and sentimentalists in the U.S.A., and the attached cuttings from the *Sunday Times* of yesterday and the *News Chronicle* and *Daily Herald* of to-day, are worth studying in this connection. Attention is also invited to the attached Reuter message[4] sent to India from New York. In the light of the debate and of American reactions, the State Department will, I surmise, continue to be hesitant about giving us unqualified support for our policy, and it is reasonable to assume that Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese press will continue to press for negotiations with the Congress party. The net result in India itself is a conviction that there is a substantial body of opinion in England that is dissatisfied with our handling of the Indian situation—a body of opinion which India is convinced will be in a position, sooner or later, to force the hands of the British Government "to do something more". Quite what that something should be, nobody in this country or in America seems to know. But it seems reasonable to assume that we shall witness a continuance, and probably an intensification, of political agitation on the part of Indian political parties, with its repercussions on the prestige of the Government of India and especially of the Indian members of that government, on the war effort, and on opinion here and in the U.S.A.

India is not slow to make the deduction that for the sake of the maintenance of a national government in this country and a solid front in that government on the major issues of the war, certain members of the Cabinet must have stifled their inner feelings on the Indian problem, whether they look at it from the right or the left. India knows, too, that there is substantial disunity on India policy in the House of Commons, and the Indian political parties will continue to trade on this situation.

The immediate question with which it is desirable that we should deal in quite unmistakable terms in our publicity and propaganda, both here and in India and the U.S.A., is "What more, if anything, can be done by the British Government, in view of the fact that we cannot (*a*) go farther in regard to the post-war position than the broad lines of the Cripps preamble; (*b*) re-model the Constitution now, or (*c*) give up during the war our ultimate responsibilities for the internal security of India and of her defence?"

There is no prospect of the Indian leaders coming together on their own initiative, and, as far as one can see, no prospect of agreement amongst them

[1] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 383, 10 September 1942, cols. 302–5.

[2] *Ibid.*, 11 September 1942, cols. 552–630. [3] Of 12 August.

[4] This read: 'necessity for solution of India question is widely realised here. Feeling is often expressed another effort possibly by United Nations should be made create effective ally of India by agreement before it admitted force is only possibility. Spirit of approach should be as allies not captious critics because as *Christian Science Monitor* points out Britain "made altogether fair and statesmanlike offer to India in Cripps plan". It is felt here another attempt should be made bring greater independence to India by negotiation.' L/P&J/8/515: f 101.

even if they were to do so. But one day there will either have to be agreement or civil war, and it is a question whether it is possible for us to find some means of keeping the political pot nicely simmering, but not boiling over, while we get on with the real job of winning the war. Can we take some step which will do something to relieve us of the constant criticism that we are merely standing still and letting the situation drift?

In endeavouring to look at the problem from a public angle it seems to me, if I may say so, that there are two courses open to us:

(1) To take an absolutely firm line, on the authority of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State, that we have made our post-hostilities promise to India; that we have offered co-operation under the existing constitution to the Indian political parties; that we have no intention of initiating any further discussions or negotiations during the war; and that we shall carry out, during the war, our ultimate responsibilities for the internal security of India and of her defence without flinching or wavering. In other words, that we should give India, the U.S.A., and our own people, the clearest indication of a fixed determination, and disabuse, once and for all, those who have got it into their heads that we don't quite know our own mind.

It will be possible, on the basis of such a mandate, to build up with considerable effect a propaganda line that on the present wave of sentiment towards the Indian problem we were in danger of drifting towards an "Indian Munich", with all the disastrous consequences that would flow from it.

(2) To examine, while firmly adhering to the policy of crushing the Congress campaign and showing no mercy to the elements engaged in organising disturbances and sabotage, whether we could offer to India a plan to encourage the examination and discussion by representative Indians of the problem of India's future constitution. We might, and probably should, fail, in the first attempt at any rate, to get support in India for any such plan, but the very fact of an attempt being made might well have the effect here and in the U.S.A. of demonstrating that while there could be no constitutional upheaval during the war, we were anxious for the preparatory spade work for the post-war edifice to go ahead. As things are, the Indian constitutional baby spends most of its time yelling on our doorstep. Can we not find some way of making this difficult, if not impossible?

The elaboration of (2) is a matter for experts. But in searching for possible proposals the following might occur to the mind of the layman: (*a*) a Royal Commission on Indian self-government. The Chairman to be either Sir Maurice Gwyer or, say, a Canadian judge, and the membership proper to be

wholly Indian and representative of all the important political groups. The appointment of such a Commission would give an opportunity for a re-affirmation, in the King's name, of our policy.

(*b*) The setting up of a permanent Indian Reforms Commission, which would sift the demands of the various political groups and, by enquiry and discussion, assume the task, however impossible it might appear, of endeavouring to evolve some common denominator.

(*c*) The establishment of a small body of the best Constitutional talent available either in, or on behalf of, the Indian States and British India, to commence, here and now, the preparation of material and the formation of skeleton proposals which must, sooner or later, be got together, if a constitution-making body is to be set up.

These ideas may be quite outside the realm of practical policy, but it is perhaps worth while including them in a process of elimination if we wish to explore the possibility of easing the tension on the political issue.

A. H. J.

7

Minute by Mr Patrick

L/P&J/8/515: f 72

22 September 1942

Sir D. Monteath
Secretary of State

Publicity aspect of Prime Minister's statement on India

Mr. Joyce justly points out[1] that our publicity services urgently need new directives if they are effectively to handle criticism here, in U.S.A. and in India of our present policy in the light of the Prime Minister's statement. The Prime Minister's assurance that the main principles of the Cripps Declaration still stand is not good enough for the critics; they want to know what action H.M.G. and the Viceroy are prepared to take now to make these principles effective. Whatever may be the strength of the military position in India, they fear that the political atmosphere today is worse rather than better than it was last March for effective resistance to Japanese aggression. Americans profess unwillingness to see their troops used in India to maintain British power unsupported by popular goodwill. There and here there is a call for positive further action to implement if not to go beyond paragraph (*e*) of the Cripps Declaration and to substitute a provisional "national" executive of Indians

[1] No. 6.

independent, save for operational purposes, of Whitehall for the present Executive Council.

The forthcoming debate which will precede the October debate on the Amending Bill[2] affords an opportunity to state H.M.G.'s policy in fuller terms. Matters on which it would be desirable to have reached a decision are:—

(1) the demand for further negotiations with party leaders with a view to constituting a national executive;

(2) the question of the conditions on which Congress leaders might regain liberty;

(3) the action if any which could be taken now to secure collective planning of alternative means of assembling a representative constitution-making body on the termination of hostilities and of tentative proposals for that body's consideration;

(4) H.M.G.'s attitude towards mediation by an outside party to assist in securing a war-time and a long-term settlement.

Of these points I should imagine that the answer to (1) can only be that, without the co-operation of the leaders of the majority party, no advantage would be secured in replacing the present Executive by one selected from the minority parties, nor is there any indication of agreement among the leaders of these parties on a basis of co-operation.

As regards (2) I presume that the only answer can be that the Congress must call off the civil disobedience campaign, revoking all instructions to this end that they have issued, and must agree to acquiesce in if not co-operate with the war effort under British leadership.

As regards (4) the answer will depend on the conclusions of the War Cabinet on Lord Halifax's recent telegram.[3] But the Prime Minister in his telegram[4] to Chiang Kai-shek has stated his position in unmistakable terms.

Mr. Joyce has himself suggested various alternative forms in which H.M.G. might embody a new invitation to the political leaders on the lines of (3). I personally am a good deal attracted to the proposal at (*c*) in his note. I observe that the Viceroy is disposed to rule out the possibility of further dealings with the Working Committee for the period of the war. This of course would not apply in the improbable event of their acceptance of the terms suggested at (2) above. But, even if no Congress leader can be invited now to join a body such as Mr. Joyce envisages, its establishment might neither be impossible nor infructuous with such members as Mr. Rajagopalachari and representatives of the other main parties. This proof of our willingness to facilitate agreement on the preliminaries to the setting up of the constitution-making body would go some way towards affording publicity services, particularly Mr. Butler and Sir G. S. Bajpai, with an answer effective to critics.

When it is considered desirable to initiate preliminary soundings with the Viceroy before going to the War Cabinet on the line to be taken in debate perhaps this suggestion might be included.

P. J. P.

[2] In the event no debate was held before the October debate. See No. 24, Minute 3.
[3] Vol. II, No. 749. [4] Vol. II, No. 637.

8

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE *22 September 1942*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2842–S. Your private and personal telegram of 20th September, No. 1146.[1] I am most grateful for your support. I quite agree as to force[2] of points you raise. I will try to let you have my appreciation for Halifax in time for the Cabinet. But it needs careful drafting and is of much importance. I am quite clear that we must bring out the facts quite definitely for the F.O. and the Embassy.

[1] Vol. II, No. 774. [2] Deciphered as 'granting'.

9

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Viscount Halifax

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

MOST IMMEDIATE *22 September 1942*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2843–S. I have seen your telegram to Foreign Office of 18th September, No. 46699[1] and connected correspondence about American attitude towards Indian problems. I think you should have my personal appreciation of the situation as I now see it and of the answer to possible American pressure for the formation of a Government from representatives of the main political parties during the war.

2. Indian situation has changed completely since your time here. There is now no margin of bargaining; the concessions that matter for practical purposes that His Majesty's Government can make have been made. As a result the more

[1] This should read '4699' (Vol. II, No. 764).

important political parties have hardened immensely in their attitude towards one another. They all realise that any sign of reasonableness or readiness to compromise on a practical basis will now be taken as weakness by their political opponents here. Equally they all hope by being completely uncompromising, and by advertising their case in the United Kingdom and the U.S.A., to work upon public opinion in those countries to persuade His Majesty's Government to accept it. No party is prepared to compromise with the other, and the publicity of all[2] concentrates on ignoring the existence of rival claims, and the difficulty presented by those claims to His Majesty's Government. Again, principal parties are convinced that proportion of seats accepted by each in any *ad interim* administration will inevitably prejudice their prospects in any final settlement and are disposed therefore to fight, all out, at this stage for best possible position.

3. Our attitude is as before. We must keep the balance even; we must discharge our responsibilities to minorities, to the Princes, and to India as a whole. Subject to that our accepted policy is to see India achieve Dominion Status at the earliest date consistent with agreement between Indians themselves. The recent Cripps negotiations, the principle of which has just been reaffirmed by His Majesty's Government, are solid proof of our anxiety to see a settlement fair to all parties. Those negotiations represent an initiative taken by His Majesty's Government. They failed because they brought the Indian parties up against one another and against responsibility and because of the communal and party jealousies that make progress in this country so difficult. No party leader has been able to improve on them, or do more than demand a free hand for himself[3] with the backing of His Majesty's Government. The Muslims do not, I believe, whatever they may say, want any change. They will not agree to one save on terms which no self-respecting Hindu leader can accept, viz., Pakistan, and abandonment of the ideal of Indian unity. And as they represent 90 millions they are strong enough to block[4] one. The Hindus want Hindu domination backed by British bayonets. The Princes want no change. The moderate elements in this country (substantially Hindu) are excellent publicists but otherwise negligible. No Indian party had the political courage to accept the Cripps proposals, and none has been able to produce any workable alternative to them. Hindu opinion is substantially behind Congress, and Muslim opinion behind Jinnah; the claims of the communities[5] are irreconcilable and a solution can be imposed on either only if we are prepared to back one or the other in a subsequent civil war. Effect on war effort, on help to China, on use of this country as an operational base next year, need not be emphasised.

4. We must (and do) continue to explore,[6] whether through formal or informal channels the possibility of a workable adjustment. But I see little hope of one at the moment. The door remains, and will be kept, open. But we must

face the facts. Congress having made itself responsible for the present violent uprising is and must be for the present out of court, if only because its reinstatement and the opening of negotiations with it would so far shake the police, the army, and the people on the fence, always so numerous in this country, as to endanger the whole structure of law and order. With Congress for the time being out of court, the only important parties left in British India are the Muslim League and the Mahasabha. These are divided by the communal problem and the Muslim insistence on Pakistan. I see little if any prospect of either abating its claims. In other words there is no prospect of our being able to form a Government based on representation of important parties. And failing agreement between as a minimum the Mahasabha and the Muslim League there is no nucleus for a Government likely to command greater support than my present Executive. That body is as representative and experienced an Executive as is likely to be thrown up by this country. It represents Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Depressed Classes, Parsis, the Hindu Mahasabha and non-official Europeans. Omitting the Commander-in-Chief and myself it contains only two officials out of a total of 15.

5. We must moreover compare the strength on merits of our present position, with the situation in terms of interference with war effort which would arise in the event of country-wide communal collisions such as would certainly follow any attempt to form a Government on the basis either of the Muslim League alone or of the Mahasabha alone. Such a basis is impossible in terms of practical politics. The alternative of a coalition between the two, unrealisable as it is at the moment, would be shaky enough; and would be likely to weaken rather than strengthen war effort. We must face up to the fact that, whatever the critics may say, we cannot in fact get on unless there is some readiness[7] in India to accept responsibility and to work with other parties. That is absent at the moment. The trouble is not our reluctance to transfer power, but the difficulty of finding people ready to accept the transfer, and capable of discharging the obligations power involves.

6. Do not overlook the military aspect. The army has come through the recent trouble untouched and loyal. It has given us the fullest backing in the restoration of order. Its contentment remains of paramount importance in war effort, particularly at the present time. But the threat to that contentment of any kind of patched up but unsound constitutional settlement and the communal clash that would inevitably follow would be immediately disastrous in their effect upon the fighting value of the army. It would indeed be deeply

[2] L/P&S/12/2633: f 158 has 'leaving India' instead of 'of all'.
[3] *Ibid.* has 'Hindus' instead of 'himself'. [4] *Ibid.* has 'annoy' instead of 'block'.
[5] *Ibid.* has 'Committees' instead of 'the communities'.
[6] *Ibid.* has 'exploit' instead of 'explore'. [7] *Ibid.* has 'readjustment' instead of 'readiness'.

damaging to the allied war effort if anything of that sort were to be imposed upon us as a result of well-meant but ill-informed political pressure. That danger and the importance of the army's role are I am certain present to the President. But I gravely doubt whether they are sufficiently present to the general public in the United States or possibly even at Home. This is only one of the factors ignored by[8] public opinion outside India, and outside expert circles in England, which leads people to think this intractable problem simpler to handle and to solve than in fact it is.

7. I am the last to underestimate the political importance of the principal Indian parties: Congress, Muslim League, and to some extent the Mahasabha. I have had seven years of this business. During them I have done all I can to forward advance and to bring the Indian parties together. I have succeeded, much against their will, and without any result, in getting Gandhi and Jinnah into the same room. But none of this matters in the absence of the will to agree among Indians, and in the presence of mutually obstructive claims and ambitions, and the ever present hope in the mind of the Congress that skilful publicity, plausible argument, and a professed (but non-existent) reasonableness will, if properly played, result in His Majesty's Government being jockeyed into backing Congress and throwing over the Muslims, the Princes, and the Military classes. If we are no further forward than we are, it is because of the bitter jealousies that divide communities and their anxiety to manœuvre for position against the time when the transfer of control takes place. It is not because of any lack of anxiety on our part to see, or to facilitate, India's progress in the constitutional field.

8. Our business is to continue to strive to secure that progress, however little help we get from Indians themselves. But these are fences that cannot be rushed. We cannot allow ourselves to be jockeyed into taking them at someone else's pace. We must be prepared to stand firm against pressure whether from the United States or elsewhere to handle this business, so long as we are responsible for it, save in accordance with our own judgment. This is a matter which cannot be taken at the valuation of American pressmen principally interested in news, and we must look to you to fight our battle, counter misrepresentation and misunderstanding, and take the offensive rather than the defensive. If you want help you have, as you know, only to ask for it, and it can be provided in decisive quantity and quality. But the battle must be fought by the Embassy. And I am quite clear myself that if we were to hand over control of policy to the U.S.A., and to surrender our friends and supporters here in order to try (vainly) to placate an American opinion that does not understand this problem, the Americans, if they tried to take our place, would find themselves unpopular (that is already emerging as the Indian reaction to them) and unsuccessful in a far greater degree than has been our lot. So far as India's contribution to the war

is concerned infinitely greater harm will be done by undue tenderness for American opinion than by fighting a case which is in fact a good and strong one.

Repeated to Secretary of State.

[8] L/P&S/12/2633: f 158 has 'certainty (corrupt group)' instead of 'ignored by'.

10

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *22 September 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2847–S. In continuation of my private and personal telegram No. 2828–S[1] of 20th September. Yesterday afternoon (20th) Raisman met Sarker and Mody in informal conference. Benthall was also present. He gave them full explanation to remove their suspicion that we were pretending to maintain the Settlement whilst at the same time endeavouring to manipulate it to the detriment of India. Sarker and Mody required considerable reassurance on this point and are going into it more closely still with Coates. Sarker and Mody still desired more time to consider whole question but gave Raisman impression that their main concern was possible effect on public opinion of financial results rather than any desire to oppose his proposals. They agreed that he could make no statement in Assembly today (21st) in view of fact that Council had not yet accepted his proposals.

In Council meeting last night (20th) request for more time to consider the question was general and it was agreed to postpone it until second or third week in October. Meanwhile some members will seek further elucidation from Raisman.

No further mention of course was made of reservations by His Majesty's Government. In absence of such reservations there is ground for hope that Council will eventually support Raisman.

Raisman today (21st) is telling Assembly that he regrets he is not yet in a position to make any statement, as matters in issue are still under consideration of Government of India. To questions regarding cost of operations in Burma, Malaya, &c., he is replying that such expenditure is not charged to Indian revenues.

[1] Vol. II, No. 773.

11

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *22 September 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2849–S. In continuation of my telegram No. 2847–S of yesterday. Sterling balances. When Raisman in reply to question said that he was not in a position to make a statement and that matter was under consideration of Government he was asked whether Assembly would be given opportunity to express its view before decisions were taken. He declined to give such undertaking. Arising out of this reply adjournment motion was moved this morning, was ruled by President to be in order, and received the necessary support in the House. Motion will be debated at 3-30 this afternoon. Raisman will take general line that decisions within framework of existing Settlement would not be referred to Assembly even though such decisions involve large increase in defence expenditure, as proper time for debating such increases would be budget session. But if Government were to contemplate major departure from principles of existing Settlement they would consider whether Assembly should be given an opportunity of debating it apart from Budget discussions. This would of course not preclude publication of an earlier statement in general terms but without figures of estimated cost, to enable Members to consider its implications before actual presentation of Budget.

12

War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 422

L/PO/2/16: f 84

INDIAN STERLING BALANCES

NOTE BY THE PRIME MINISTER

10 DOWNING STREET, S.W.1, *22 September 1942*

With reference to W.P. (42) 421,[1] I circulate for consideration a revised draft of the proposed telegram to the Viceroy about the War Financial Settlement with India. New or amended passages are printed in italics.

W. S. C.

Annex to No. 12

DRAFT TELEGRAM FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA TO THE VICEROY

[*There follows the text of No. 769 in Vol. II.*]

[1] Vol. II, No. 778.

13

War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 424

L/PO/2/16: ff 85–90

India

Indian Sterling Balances

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, *22 September 1942*

On September 16th the War Cabinet decided[1] that, while the existing financial settlement with India should stand, the Government of India should be informed of the views of His Majesty's Government concerning the need for financial readjustment on a wider basis, and asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in consultation with the Lord Chancellor and myself, to draft a telegram to the Viceroy in that sense. The Viceroy, in view of impending questions in the Assembly resulting from public knowledge that Sir J. Raisman had had discussions with the Treasury, was pressing urgently[2] for a definite confirmation of the point as regards the existing agreement. I accordingly sent him an interim private and personal telegram giving the general sense of the Cabinet conclusion of 16th September and telling him that I hoped to let him have by the end of the week the formula in which the Cabinet reserved its right to reopen discussion on an eventual readjustment (Annex. A).[3]

The War Cabinet will realise that the position of the Viceroy in dealing with his Executive is one of extreme difficulty and grave responsibility. He has to judge how to handle them and what he can get them to agree to. It is essential therefore that he should have sufficient warning of any Cabinet communication which may have to come before the Executive and be given the opportunity to present his own view of the matter to the Cabinet before any irrevocable decision is taken. This is done through the medium of the Secretary of State's private and personal telegrams, which are kept on the Viceroy's own file, and are not part of any record available to the Government of India as such. That is

[1] Vol. II, No. 750. [2] Vol. II, Nos. 710 and 733. [3] Vol. II, No. 754.

the only way in which the Secretary of State can protect the Viceroy from being placed in an impossible position.

On September 18th I discussed the proposed draft communication with the Chancellor of the Exchequer who had received the Lord Chancellor's comments, and, very reluctantly, agreed to its going forward, if approved by the Prime Minister, and if the latter felt that it could go without further reference to the other members of the War Cabinet. The draft as so agreed with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Lord Chancellor is being circulated separately by the former.[4] I accordingly sent a further private and personal telegram (Annex. B)[5] to let the Viceroy know that I had reluctantly agreed to a draft which I would telegraph as soon as we had the Prime Minister's concurrence. I did not send the draft itself in case the Prime Minister wished to suggest further amendments.

On September 19th I received the Prime Minister's suggested amendments[6] and additions as well as his authority, if I and the Chancellor of the Exchequer agreed to his amendments, to let the draft go forward without further reference to the War Cabinet. This I was unable to do, as I could not accept the amended version without further Cabinet discussion.[7] At the same time I felt bound to let the Viceroy know what was in contemplation and accordingly telegraphed out the operative part of the Prime Minister's version in order to give him time for his comment before the Cabinet met to consider the matter further. In view of my previous reference to my reluctant agreement to the earlier draft, I made it clear that this did not extend to the draft as suggested by the Prime Minister (Annex. C).[8]

I have now received the Viceroy's reply (Annex. D).[9] I have, in view of its length, underlined a few of the most important passages.

From this it is clear, firstly, that it is extremely doubtful whether the Viceroy's Executive will be prepared to agree even to the tentative offer made by Sir J. Raisman to the Treasury in the nature of a slightly expanded interpretation of the existing settlement. From the Indian point of view the settlement has involved, and is likely in an increasing measure to involve a far greater burden of expenditure on India than was contemplated when it was framed.

Secondly, the Viceroy was from the first convinced that it was "quite impossible to tell Council in so many words that you (the Secretary of State) had accepted notice of reservation that His Majesty's Government might reopen discussions on eventual adjustment of whole situation even though presumably only after the war." The War Cabinet should notice that this was the conclusion arrived at by him, in consultation with Sir J. Raisman, on receipt of my first comparatively colourless indication of the War Cabinet's views and before seeing the much more drastic version now before the War Cabinet.

As regards the latter he is clear that if it is to be passed officially to the Government of India the "Council will reject it and if pressed . . . will resign". He is not

prepared even to "accept for record in my personal archives, and not for communication to my Council, a document or reservation of this character". As for the effect of pressing it he adds that "if the reservation were accepted by any government in India and communicated to the country, or if any suggestion were made that it was doubtful whether India would in due course have value for her sterling balances, the reaction on India's war effort could not fail to be disastrous".

The only course open to His Majesty's Government, in his opinion, is to bury the revised reservation in the Treasury records, after deleting the reference to "some earlier appropriate occasion" than the end of the war. So long as this is done he is apparently more or less indifferent as to the text of the reservation. What is quite clear is that he considers any kind of reservation at this moment disastrous, above all if it should suggest that the question should be reopened before the end of the war.

I am bound to say that I agree emphatically with the Viceroy's conclusion. What possible purpose can it serve at this moment to communicate such a reservation to the Viceroy's Council? In no event can it help the Exchequer during the war, so why take this fence before we come to it? It is at least conceivable, though unlikely, that in the after-war settlement we may be able to put forward a case for adjustment which the then Indian Government might consider. What is certain is that put forward now in argumentative and what Indians will undoubtedly regard as dictatorial terms, it is bound to bring about the resignation of the present Government of India. Are we, at this desperately critical moment in India, prepared to face that consequence, not on any real issue, such as the suppression of rebellion or the effective conduct of the war, but for no practical advantage whatever, on an issue on which every Indian and every Englishman in India, from the Viceroy downwards, would be against us?

Even if the reservation were framed so tactfully as to avert resignations—e.g. if it merely suggested that either side might wish to raise the matter for reconsideration at the end of the war—the fact of the reservation having been made would inevitably leak out and provide yet fresh fuel for Indian agitation in India and outside, thus adding to our political difficulties here and in America, as well as impeding India's war effort and making it far more difficult to raise the question later.

I would therefore urge the War Cabinet most earnestly to let this sleeping dog lie and to content itself with noting, in whatever terms it thinks suitable, but for its own record and not for communication to the Government of India, its reasoned arguments for reopening this question with the Government of India after the war. At the same time Sir Jeremy Raisman, who still has to satisfy the

[4] Vol. II, No. 778. [5] Vol. II, No. 767. [6] Vol. II, No. 769. [7] See Vol. II, No. 772.
[8] Vol. II, No. 770. [9] Vol. II, No. 773.

Indian Legislature, should be authorised to say that it is recognised by His Majesty's Government that while, owing to the changed conditions of the war since it was made, the Agreement has produced results foreseen by neither party, they see no purpose, in view of the further unforeseeable changes that may occur, in attempting to revise it during the war; but that they regard it—and do not doubt that the Government of India will also regard it—as open to either party to advocate adjustments in the light of the conditions obtaining at the end of the war.

L. S. A.

14

Mr Amery to Sir Kingsley Wood

L/PO/2/16: f 83

22 September 1942

My dear Kingsley,

I have tried in the Memorandum I am sending round to the Cabinet to go as far as I think we can go without upsetting the Viceroy's Executive, and I do hope you will see your way to accepting my solution, which is that we should keep any argumentative statement of the reasons for reopening for our own record, send no document of reservation to India at all, but authorise Raisman to say that while agreeing to the existing settlement we feel that in view of changes which have taken place and of even greater unforeseeable changes which may take place in the future, it would be open to both sides to advocate adjustment at the end of the war in the light of the situation then prevailing.

That protects us from any suggestion that we have not given notice and at the same time avoids starting an argument backwards and forwards between India and ourselves, with the resultant steady hardening of opinion in India in advance against any discussion after the war.

After all, what would have happened in the last war if we had, during the war, not only intimated to the American Government that we might wish to urge readjustment afterwards, but put in an argumentative document giving our reasons for having the debt scaled down? It would probably have stopped all further advances there and then. As it was, we did raise the matter afterwards and in fact ended by defaulting. But think of the effect on our credit at the time if we had indicated, with *ex parte* arguments, that we would presently default.

By the way, I am a little sorry that in the paper[1] you circulated you say of the draft telegram that it "has been agreed" by myself. That would imply that I was still in agreement with it on September 21st, which obviously I was not after receiving the Viceroy's telegram.[2] It would, I think, have been more correct to say "was agreed on the 18th".

I notice that to-day's City Article in the *News Chronicle* deals with the Indian surplus balances and ends on the following phrase:

"Let us extract this consolation from this change in the fortunes of India, namely that the country's large sterling claims represent a pent up demand for the products of our export industries."

Yours ever,

L. S. A.

[1] Vol. II, No. 778. [2] Vol. II, No. 773.

15

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *23 September 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2864–S. Continuation my telegram No. 2849–S[1] of yesterday. Sterling balances.

Debate on the adjournment took place. Main anxiety displayed by mover and his supporters was lest there should be any departure from existing settlement but there were also expressions of a desire to impose a limit[2] on our financial commitments even within existing settlement.

Raisman took line indicated in my telegram of yesterday which seemed to have reassuring effect in some quarters.

Motion was pressed to a division and was defeated.

[1] No. 11. [2] 'a limit' omitted in decipher.

16

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/5/41: f 26

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *23 September 1942, 9.50 am*

1153. Your telegram No. 2748–S,[1] September 10. Sherwood Eddy. You will have seen Washington telegram 4699[2] of Sept. 17 which was in reply to a telegram[3] from the F[oreign] O[ffice] sent on instructions of Prime Minister asking that Eddy's visit to India should be discouraged.[4]

[1] Vol. II, No. 724. [2] Vol. II, No. 764; the date should be 18 September. [3] Vol. II, No. 748.

[4] Lord Linlithgow acknowledged this telegram with thanks in his telegram 2911–S of 26 September. MSS. EUR. F. 125/23.

17

Sir E. Bridges to Mr Turnbull

L/PO/2/16: f 82

SECRET OFFICES OF THE WAR CABINET, S.W.I, *23 September 1942*

Dear Turnbull,

The further Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India on Indian Sterling Balances (W.P. (42) 424)[1] seemed to me to present certain rather special features, and I thought it right to send the Paper to the Prime Minister before releasing the Paper for circulation to the Ministers concerned.

The Prime Minister has written the following Minute on this Paper:—

"No circulation.
Read and discuss at Cabinet."

Would you be good enough to inform the Secretary of State accordingly?

Yours sincerely,

E. E. BRIDGES

[1] No. 13.

18

War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 428

L/P&S/13/998: f 244

INDIAN STATES: REQUEST BY CHAMBER OF PRINCES FOR STATEMENT OF POLICY BY HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM BY THE MINISTER OF ECONOMIC WARFARE

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE, *23 September 1942*

Great Britain's reputation as a loyal observer of treaties is our trump card in international affairs and its importance transcends even that of the Indian problem.

Not only the Princes, but also many other people in India and elsewhere are in genuine doubt whether we intend to implement our treaty obligations to the Rulers of the Indian States. The Lord Privy Seal's statement in the House of Commons complained of, would appear to be open to the misinterpretation which has been placed on it in some quarters, that we intend to bring pressure to expedite the constitutional development of the States.

In these circumstances it seems desirable that the Viceroy's reply to the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes should contain no qualification of our

treaty obligations and that it should be made public. The nettle has to be grasped sometime. It is better that there should be no misunderstanding of the fact that Britain intends to honour all her obligations to the Indian States, and that therefore, their participation in any Indian Union will have to be a genuinely voluntary one and not as a result of our coercion—direct or indirect.

S.

19

Mr Amery to Sir S. Cripps[1]

L/PO/3/3a: f 94

23 September 1942

My dear Cripps,

I have given a good deal of thought to the issues raised in the note which you sent to the Prime Minister on the 2nd September[2] and of which you let me have a copy, in which you made various suggestions for a new line of policy on social matters in India. I quite agree with you that the Prime Minister's suggestion that you and I and Bevin and Kingsley Wood should meet to discuss these questions is an excellent one, but I think it would be valuable if at any rate at the first meeting one or two of my Advisers were present, particularly Sir Atul Chatterjee, who has a very profound knowledge of labour and social legislation in India, and also, of course, of the work of the International Labour Office. Before we approach the Government of India I feel that we ought to form a clear idea of what has been done in recent years in India in these spheres, and get the advice of those who are conversant with Indian opinion on these subjects. I would suggest that we should have this meeting at the beginning of next week. Subject to Bevin's and Kingsley Wood's convenience, would 3 o'clock on Monday afternoon at this office be convenient for you?

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

[1] Mr Amery sent similar letters to Sir KingsleyWood and Mr Bevin. L/PO/3/3a: ff 95–6.
[2] Vol. II, No. 678.

20

Mr Eden to Mr Amery

L/P&S/12/2633: ff 146–7

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1, *23 September 1942*

Dear Leo,

[*Personal comments omitted*]. . . . There is now no doubt that the Indian political leaders are playing up to Americans their lack of confidence in our intentions as a means of pressure on the United States to intervene. I have naturally been considering what we can do about it all, and while the first thing which suggested itself to us was that our people in New Delhi might perhaps pay still more attention to getting the American officials at present there on to the right lines, I feel also that we must lose no time to secure the improvement of the American representation.

I think that at the moment we cannot do better than proceed with the suggestion which I put to you on August 22nd,[1] i.e. that we should make a spontaneous offer to President Roosevelt that he should send a man of real standing to reside in New Delhi, arranging it so that Halifax should be consulted in the selection. The Viceroy evidently wants something of the sort, and I think that he is wise in asking for a distinguished career officer of the Foreign Service, rather than a politician; I think also that we should support his recommendation that such a man be appointed to the vacant commissionership. But it would be essential that the representative should enjoy the intimate confidence of the Viceroy and Government of India; the most close and friendly relationship would be necessary to secure the most effective results. I suppose this would not be incompatible with the establishment of the representative in the rather limited position which the Viceroy outlines in his telegram 2814–S[2]; it is possible, of course, that the very considerable publicity which has now been given to the question might lead the President to the view that his representative should have a somewhat higher status than an Agent-General or Commissioner would, by virtue of his position, command.

The question is becoming very urgent; there are many indications that pressure is being put on Roosevelt to intervene in some way. The extent of this pressure is likely to vary with the success of the Government of India in keeping the country quiet, but it would almost certainly help Roosevelt to keep his own opinion steady if he were known to have at New Delhi an American who commanded general confidence. In order to counter stories that this man had come out to mediate it, I should consider a clear statement essential, preferably from the White House.

The work that Wendell Willkie has been doing in the Middle East, and the

language that he has been holding to the Persians and others in those parts, show that an American with the right point of view can give real help.

Yours ever,

ANTHONY EDEN

[1] Vol. II, No. 610. [2] Vol. II, No. 760.

21

Minute by Sir D. Monteath

L/P&J/8/515: f 73

24 September 1942

Secretary of State

Mr. Joyce apologises for approaching the matters of policy covered in his note[1] from the angle of public relations; but the situation in relation to the Indian problem has become such, in relation to U.S.A. and China not to mention Axis propaganda, that unless H.M.G. is prepared in a spirit not very congenial to the United Nations conception to adopt a "you-mind-your-own business" standpoint,[2] the publicity "tail" is almost beginning to wag the policy "dog". However that may be it is perhaps no bad thing to examine the line to be taken in the forthcoming debate from the angle of its publicity reactions.

I am not sure that I entirely agree with the answers Mr. Patrick puts forward to his own four questions:[3] for example it would be an equally justifiable answer to (2) that the Congress leaders have shown themselves to be so serious a menace to the cause of the United Nations that prudence requires them to be detained, like Sir O. Mosley, till the United Nations are safe. But whatever the answers should be I agree with him that the questions are such as must be faced in debate and require to be considered and a line decided upon by H.M.G. before the debate. They are perhaps not the only questions to be considered; there is also, for example, the proposition of the Lord Privy Seal that the opportunity should be taken for H.M.G. to come out with a declaration of a purpose of social and industrial reform—though that, one may hope, may be disposed of by itself.

You would perhaps wish to discuss.[4] At one stage or another it will surely be necessary to make sure of the Viceroy's concurrence in the line to be taken, though whether consultation of him should, in respect of all points, precede a preliminary consideration by the Cabinet is itself a matter for consideration.

D. T. M.

[1] No. 6.

[2] Sir D. Monteath added in the margin: 'which is a cruder way of expressing Mr. Joyce's (1).'

[3] No. 7.

[4] Sir D. Monteath added in the margin: 'with the Duke, & Mr. Patrick as well as Mr. Croft, Mr. Joyce & myself.' Mr Amery noted 'yes'.

22

Note by Mr Patrick (Extract)[1]

L/P&J/8/515: ff 79–80

Note of discussion with Messrs. Radcliffe. Cruikshank and Jebb, Ministry of Information, on American reactions to Indian developments.

I mentioned the Viceroy's recent telegram[2] to Lord Halifax appreciating the situation in India and we discussed Lord Halifax's own appreciation[3] of the attitude of Americans at this juncture. Mr. Radcliffe and Mr. Cruikshank confirmed that the position was serious. They held that during the last 20 years American disapproval of our continued political control in India had steadily increased, mainly owing to skilful and industrious Congress propaganda. This appealed very much to middle-class liberal-evangelically minded provincials deriving their impressions of India from protestant missionaries narrowly educated like themselves. These however were regarded as a key factor in politics e.g. the imminent Congressional elections, and therefore were courted by the Press. No doubt they felt that the presence of an American contingent in India and our dependence there on American war supplies gave them a heaven sent opportunity for bringing strong pressure on the Administration to put the screw on Great Britain.

Mr. Cruikshank said that Americans generally refused to admit the category "impossible". They simply disbelieved us when we said that a National Government could not be formed, publicists openly asserting that they knew it from high officials that we were not speaking the truth. The problem, in the face of their own emissaries' evidence to the contrary, was to prove to Americans our sincerity. It was not merely Indian lecturers on the war effort that were needed as stated by Bajpai. Sir M. Gwyer's abandonment of his visit was a serious disappointment. High placed Englishmen who knew the position in India could do much to debunk the Congress claims.

We spoke of the forthcoming debate and the chance it afforded of showing America that Parliament was under no illusions. But Mr. Radcliffe said that the Ministry's home intelligence reports indicated a considerable support in this country for the prevalent view in U.S.A. My host and his colleagues felt that something more forthcoming than the Prime Minister's statement was needed to steady the position. The rejection of the Cripps offer had temporarily given India a bad press. The Congress showdown had gone over surprisingly well, a good deal contrary to Sir G. S. Bajpai's forebodings. Now however there was a new landslide of anti-British feeling. Some further positive proof was needed of Indians' incapacity to share responsibility in order to prevent an open demand for American intervention. As it was, the mediator, in the person of Mr. Grew,

was being widely canvassed, and the President seemed not displeased that this should be so.

[1] Mr Patrick submitted this note to Sir D. Monteath on 25 September. The latter minuted: 'P[rivate] S[ecretary]. I think S/S s[houl]d see early.' Mr Amery saw it the same day and on 26 September it was circulated at Sir D. Monteath's suggestion to Mr Croft and the Duke of Devonshire prior to the meeting (see No. 21, note 4) proposed for 28 September. L/P&J/8/515.

[2] No. 9. [3] Presumably Vol. II, No. 749.

23

Secretary of State to Government of India, Home Department

Telegram, L/P&J/8/598: f 191

INDIA OFFICE, *24 September 1942, 5.40 pm*

16750. Your telegram of the 16th September, 7330.[1]
Casualty figures. I notice from Press that revised figures of casualties, derailments etc. were given by Sir Mahomed Usman in the Council of State on Tuesday.[2] For purpose of Parliamentary debate on 6th October please let me have by 3rd October most up to date information available on this score.

2. I may well be asked also for statement of total arrests & detentions or convictions. If any comprehensive figures are available before the debate please report them also.

[1] Vol. II, No. 747. [2] 22 September.

24

War Cabinet W. M. (42) 129th Conclusions, Minutes 1–4

R/30/1/3: ff 62–5

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1 on 24 September 1942 at 11.30 am were: Mr Churchill (in the Chair), Sir Stafford Cripps, Sir John Anderson, Mr Anthony Eden, Mr Oliver Lyttelton, Mr Ernest Bevin

Also present were: Sir Kingsley Wood, Viscount Simon, Mr Amery, Viscount Cranborne, Sir Archibald Sinclair, the Earl of Selborne (item 1)

INDIA

Minute 1

Request by Chamber of Princes for Statement of Policy by His Majesty's Government.

The War Cabinet had before them Memoranda by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (42) 391),[1] the Lord Privy Seal (W.P. (42) 420)[2] and the Minister of Economic Warfare (W.P. (42) 428).[3]

[1] Vol. II, No. 691. [2] No. 3. [3] No. 18.

The Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India contained a letter[4] from the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes to the Viceroy's Political Adviser, complaining that the interests of the Indian Princes had been neglected in the Draft Declaration by His Majesty's Government[5] and in the discussion which took place thereon. The Princes were disquieted by the apparent intention to impose on them a revision of their treaties and the introduction of democratic institutions, and they considered that non-adhering States—like non-adhering provinces—should have the right to form a separate Union of their own.

The Secretary of State for India, after consulting the Viceroy, suggested the terms of the reply to be made, which should be regarded as confidential.

The Lord Privy Seal, in his Memorandum, urged that it was undesirable to modify the stated policy of His Majesty's Government as regards the development of representative institutions in the States, and that we should do everything in our power to encourage the rulers of the States to introduce democracy. Further, the complications inherent in the idea of a separate States Union should not be introduced for the sake of providing the Princes with a bargaining counter. In his view, it was undesirable to make a further statement of policy to the Princes at the moment.

The Memorandum by the Minister of Economic Warfare emphasised the importance of our reputation as a loyal observer of treaties; and urged that it should be made public that Britain intended to honour all her obligations to the Indian States, and that pressure would not be brought to bear on them to expedite their constitutional development.

After discussion, the War Cabinet reached the following Conclusions:—

(1) The objections to making public a reply to the letter from the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes would not apply to a short, simple statement. Since the terms of any reply made were likely to become known, it would be better that the reply should be given publicly.

(2) The reply should be confined to two specific points:—

(*a*) It should be made clear that we adhered to our existing treaty obligations. The Lord Privy Seal's statement in the House of Commons (as to encouraging and expediting the development of suitable representative institutions in all Indian States) should not be taken as in any way inconsistent with those obligations; but we saw no reason to redefine those obligations or to add to them at the present time.

(*b*) The fact that no explicit provision had been made in the draft Declaration for Indian States, not adhering to the Indian Union, to

form a separate Union of their own should not be taken as constituting adverse discrimination, by implying that such States had no right to form a Union. The reason why the matter had not been referred to in the draft Declaration was that His Majesty's Government had direct responsibility for the Governments of the Provinces of British India, as contrasted with the independent status of the Indian States. No reason, however, was seen to enter at this juncture into a discussion of the detailed issues involved in such a development.

The Secretary of State for India was invited to draft a short statement on the above lines, which should be submitted to the Prime Minister, who would settle whether it should be circulated to the War Cabinet.

Minute 2

War Financial Settlement of 1940 and Indian Sterling Balances
(Previous Reference: W.M. (42) 125th Conclusions)[6]

At their meeting on the 16th September, 1942, the War Cabinet had invited the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in consultation with the Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State for India, to draft, and circulate to the War Cabinet before despatch, a telegram to the Viceroy in the sense that, while the Financial Settlement of 1940 still stood, His Majesty's Government felt bound to inform the Government of India of their views concerning the need for financial readjustment on a wider basis, and that, while His Majesty's Government were not disposed to press the matter at the present time, the issue would have to be raised at a convenient opportunity.

The War Cabinet now had before them:—

Note by the Chancellor of the Exchequer covering draft telegram to the Viceroy (W.P. (42) 421).[7]

Note by the Prime Minister covering revised draft telegram to the Viceroy (W.P. (42) 422).[8]

In the course of discussion, copies of Private and Personal telegrams exchanged between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy (Nos. 1129,[9] 1139[10] and 1143[11] from the Secretary of State, and No. 228–S[12] from the Viceroy) were handed o the War Cabinet.

[4] Vol. II, No. 115. [5] Vol. I, No. 456. [6] Vol. II, No. 750.
[7] Vol. II, No. 778. [8] No. 12. [9] Vol. II, No. 754.
[10] Vol. II, No. 767. [11] Vol. II, No. 770. [12] This should read '2828–S' (Vol. II, No. 773).

The War Cabinet agreed that the following action should be taken:—

(1) The Prime Minister would send a Private and Personal telegram to the Viceroy, on the lines discussed during the Meeting, explaining the course of the discussions on this matter in the War Cabinet.

(2) The draft telegram from the Secretary of State to the Viceroy, as set out in W.P. (42) 422, should be despatched, subject to the alterations shown below.

(3) This telegram should be sent under a covering telegram to the Viceroy, which should bring out the following points:—

(*a*) The views set out in the telegram referred to in Conclusion (2) did not arise out of the supervisory functions exercised by the Government of the United Kingdom over the Government of India, but represented a statement by the United Kingdom Government of their own position.

(*b*) While His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom felt it necessary that a statement of their own views should be put forward, they were not seeking to impose these views on the Government of India.

(*c*) The War Cabinet would be glad of the views of the Viceroy as to the best way of handling this matter in relation to his Council, before any communication was made to them.

(4) The telegram in (3) would be drafted by the Lord President of the Council and the Secretary of State for India, and shown to the Prime Minister before despatch.

NOTE.—The following are the amendments approved in the text of the draft telegram to the Viceroy as set out in W.P. (42) 422:—

Paragraph 1.—This should read as follows:—

"The War Cabinet have given further consideration to the question of the War Financial Settlement of 1940 and think it right to set out the point of view which they hold on behalf of His Majesty's Government."

Paragraph 2.—No alteration.

Paragraph 3.—For the last two sentences, substitute the following:—

"The whole principle on which the war has been financed amongst the countries who are fighting the common enemy is that in the result no one of them should build up a great indebtedness against any other."

Paragraph 4.—Delete the words—

It will be recalled that. . . .

Paragraph 5.—This should read as follows:—

"His Majesty's Government do not suggest that a new Settlement should be negotiated at the present juncture with the Government of India. A further review and eventual adjustment of financial relations between the United Kingdom and India will assuredly be required in the light and in the framework both of the general financial settlement between the Allied Nations and of the vital importance for all concerned of the speedy restoration of the maximum volume of world trade."

Minute 3

Parliament: Debate on India

(Previous Reference: W.M. (42) 123rd Conclusions, Minute 1)[13]

THE PRIME MINISTER said that on reflection he felt that there were certain risks in a debate on India in the near future. There were certain big issues which, if they were raised, would have to be answered, but which could hardly be answered without stirring up controversy. This would be undesirable at the present time. He thought that the leaders of the political parties should take suitable opportunities of representing this point of view to their followers.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA said that before the end of October it would be necessary to pass legislation prolonging the Section 93 Governments in certain provinces.

The general view of the War Cabinet was that the passage of this legislation should provide the opportunity for such discussion as might be necessary in regard to India; and that efforts should be made to avoid a controversial debate on the whole Indian position at the present juncture.

Minute 4

India and the United States

(Previous Reference: W.M. (42) 120th Conclusions, Minute 2)[14]

The War Cabinet had before them telegrams from our Ambassador at Washington (4650[15] and 505 Saving[16]) and from the Viceroy (2814–S,[17] 2816–S,[18] 2843–S[19] and 1146–S[20]) about the trend of American public opinion in regard to India.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS made the following suggestions:—

(1) We should give more information to the State Department in Washington about developments in India.

[13] The War Cabinet had discussed when India should be debated in the House of Commons. R/30/1/3.
[14] Vol. II, No. 676. [15] Vol. II, No. 749. [16] Vol. II, No. 762.
[17] Vol. II, No. 760. [18] Vol. II, No. 761. [19] No. 9.
[20] This should read '1146' i.e. Mr Amery's telegram of 20 September (Vol. II, No. 774).

(2) Proposals were on foot in the United States to raise the status of the American representation in India. The Foreign Secretary thought that a telegram should be sent to Lord Halifax, making it clear that while we would welcome a more authoritative representative, there could, of course, be no question of his undertaking negotiations for a settlement of the Indian political situation.

(3) The Secretary of State for India should give a broadcast, which would be heard in the United States, dealing factually with the Indian situation.

The War Cabinet gave general approval to these suggestions.

The Secretary of State for India undertook to submit the text of his proposed broadcast to the Prime Minister.

25

Mr Churchill to the Marquess of Linlithgow (via India Office)

Telegrams, L/PO/2/16: ff 60–6

IMMEDIATE — 10 DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL
MOST SECRET — *24 September 1942, 8.45 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL — *Received: 25 September*

1160. Following personal and secret from Prime Minister. I have now seen the Secretary of State's cable to you of 19th September,[1] and your reply[2] thereto. After Cabinet discussion the Secretary of State agreed with the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the following message:

1159. [*There follows the text of the Annex to No. 778 in Vol. II.*]

This was sent to me for approval and I suggested amendments, making it read as follows:

1161. [*There follows the text of No. 769 in Vol. II.*]

I was expecting to discuss these amendments with the Secretary of State and the Chancellor of the Exchequer in case of their disagreement. Instead of this, the Secretary of State telegraphed you only an extract from my amended version (telegram No. 1143).[3] This did not give a balanced picture of the position and you need not have been troubled until the Cabinet had had a further talk.

2. I quite see your difficulties and the many arguments in favour of letting sleeping dogs lie, especially at this juncture. I am quite sure, however, that things ought not to work out in the following way:

(*a*) Britain to defend India against the Japanese and also in the general war, especially with naval and air power.

(*b*) Britain, if successful, to be turned out of India if India wishes, and
(*c*) Britain thereafter to owe India an immense financial debt.

As Arthur Balfour used to say "This is a singularly ill-contrived world but not so ill-contrived as that".

3. You realize, I suppose, that the reason why we are piling up a huge debt to India is because five-sixths of our export trade has been suppressed[4] by us in the interests of war production, and that three-quarters of our shipping is actually engaged on war service and transport of munitions. The British nation is quite unaware of what is taking place and no one dreams that if the war goes on until 1944 or 1945 we may owe India seven or eight hundred million sterling[5] as part of the process of having kept the invader from Indian soil and as the concomitant of our departure.

4. You will see from the separate telegrams which are being sent to you by the Secretary of State, the conclusions which the War Cabinet have now reached in this matter.

[1] Vol. II, No. 770. [2] Vol. II, No. 773. [3] Vol. II, No. 770.
[4] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 has 'shipped'.
[5] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 has '708,000,000 pounds' instead of 'seven or eight hundred million sterling'.

26

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/F/7/2861: f 115

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *24 September 1942, 8.40 pm*
PERSONAL
16781 Sterling Balances. Matter was further considered to-day by War Cabinet. My next succeeding personal telegram contains views of H.M.G. as approved by War Cabinet for communication to you but I was requested simultaneously to inform you as follows:

(1) The views set out in this telegram do not arise out of the supervisory functions exercised by H.M.G. over the Government of India but represent a statement of the U.K. Government's present position on this subject.

(2) While H.M.G. feel it necessary that a statement of their views should be put forward there is no question of their seeking unilaterally to impose these views on the Government of India who are equally free now or in the future to express their views as to the working out of the present settlement.

(3) The War Cabinet would be glad of your views as to the best way of handling this matter in relation to your Council before any communication is made to them.

Please let me have your views as soon as possible.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/F/7/2861: ff 116–17

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *24–5 September 1942*

PERSONAL

16782 The War Cabinet have given further consideration to the question of the War Financial Settlement of 1940 and think it right to set out the point of view which they hold on behalf of His Majesty's Government.

The War Cabinet fully recognise that a considerable proportion of the expenditure so far incurred by the Government of India and recoverable by India under the 1940 settlement contributes to the general war effort but otherwise bears no relation to the defence of India. They recognise also that the spread of the war to the Far East has meant that India is now incurring far more expenditure in her own local defence than was contemplated when the settlement of April 1940 was concluded. They wish to acknowledge the extent of the resources in men and material which India is making available as part of the common war effort of the United Nations.

The War Cabinet nevertheless feel that they should put on record their view that the entry of Japan into the war, finally revealing the war as a world struggle against the forces of tyranny and reaction, has fundamentally changed the situation since the financial settlement of 1940 was negotiated. Great changes in the scope and character of the war have taken place since then, and even greater changes may take place. At that time the war was not being actively waged in the Eastern hemisphere nor was India exposed to imminent danger of invasion. To-day no country can afford to take a limited view of the nature of the struggle in its entirety, nor of the measures required for its own defence. This changed situation calls for a wider conception of India's partnership in the general war effort of the United Nations, and therefore of the contribution she needs to make in her own defence. The financial settlement as it stands leads to the United Kingdom accumulating large indebtedness to India on expenditure, much of which has been incurred in India's defence and in the common task. British industry, instead of meeting the adverse balance by exports, is absorbed in the output of munitions, and three-quarters of British shipping is carrying

troops and war supplies. The whole principle on which the war has been financed amongst the countries who are fighting the common enemy, is that in the result no one of them should build up a great indebtedness against any other.

At the time when the financial settlement of April 1940 was under discussion, the Chancellor of the Exchequer stipulated that the possibility of India's making some payment towards the general cost of the war should be considered from time to time as circumstances permitted.

His Majesty's Government do not suggest that a new Settlement should be negotiated at the present juncture with the Government of India. A further review and eventual adjustment of financial relations between the United Kingdom and India will assuredly be required in the light and in the framework both of the general financial settlement between the Allied Nations and of the vital importance for all concerned of the speedy restoration of the maximum volume of world trade.

28

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/2/16: f 58

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *24 September 1942, 9.30 pm*

MOST SECRET

28–U. Winston's 1160.[1] I had in fact intended to send you whole of original draft but was dissuaded by Kingsley Wood pending Winston's sanction, and did not subsequently think it necessary to send more than the operative paragraph in order to apprise you of what was in the wind and give you opportunity of expressing your views before Cabinet met. I do not suppose your reply would have been any different if I had sent the whole document. My agreement to the first draft was of course subject to what you might have to say and I have done my best since to fight your battle against any formal representation. I think however your private and personal telegram 2828–S[2] was to some extent due to a misapprehension which my personal telegram 16781[3] based on War Cabinet minute will now have removed. There can be no question of H.M.G. wishing to encroach on or override the Government of India in this matter and Government of India are of course free merely to take note or to answer argumentatively in whatever terms they please. I should have thought that if that were made sufficiently plain to your colleagues they might so far from being upset relish being dealt with as from one equal government to another.

[1] No. 25. [2] Vol. II, No. 773. [3] No. 26.

29

Sir H. Seymour to Sir G. Laithwaite

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

SECRET CHUNGKING, *24 September 1942*

Your telegram No. 1146.[1] When I saw Chiang Kai-shek yesterday he said he had received and read Prime Minister's message. He was clearly determined to say no more on this subject and I hope he has decided to leave north-east frontier alone at any rate for the present.

2. There has been no renewal of Press campaign. Papers report *any* statements by Indian leaders suggesting their readiness to find some solution and also American Press comments on the lines that solution must be found. General line taken is "something ought to be done" but whole subject is now far less prominent. It is possible pressure might be turned on again if there were renewed serious disorders or if American Press were to give example.

[1] Vol. II, No. 637.

30

Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

CONFIDENTIAL GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, *24 September 1942*

REPORT NO. III

My dear Linlithgow,

This report covers the month between August the 24th and September the 24th.

I. *General Appreciation.*—My last report[1] covered the course of the Civil Disobedience Movement up to August the 24th, by which date the first violence had subsided, and we had had more than a week of comparative calm. Since then we have had a period, which I would describe as witnessing the hard core of Congress resistance attempting to keep the movement going. I do not find it easy to make a clear and simple appreciation of the position, but I would sum up my general impressions as follows. They have not succeeded in putting us, during the past month, to any great strain, but the movement is by no means over. That is particularly the case where Congress is very strong, as in Ahmedabad, where difficult and delicate problems confront the District officers. That is also the case in those Districts where turbulent elements exist in

the population, as in Satara and parts of the Karnatak. In those areas, violent, sporadic flare-ups can be easily stirred up, and, unless checked, might spread widely. If one looked only at these two types of areas, the prospect might appear uneasy. But against them there are large parts of the Province where nothing is happening, and Bombay City, which could be most troublesome, has been well under control. Also, I cannot help being impressed by the feebleness of the attempts at sabotage with which we have had to cope. There appears, too, to be no real plan behind it—just stirring up, particularly of the young, to do something, with no very clear idea of what it should be. Taking the Province as a whole, therefore, we have had a fairly quiet month; but the movement is still going strong enough in certain places to render complacency dangerous.

* * *

The Prime Minister's statement[2] came in for a great deal of adverse comment. This was to be expected in a Province where the Nationalist Press is predominant. It has, however, produced much criticism from moderate circles. Sir Chimanlal Setalvad has condemned it, and others of moderate views have done likewise. There are suggestions, too, from some Districts that it has accentuated feeling and will give a fillip to the agitators. I think, however, it is too early to pass a final judgment on its effect. Its bluntness was a new departure, and when the first resentment has died down, those not committed to the Congress Party may find it less unpalatable. It has, I should expect, made it abundantly clear that no negotiations between Congress and Government are possible in the present situation and that, at the moment, may prove an asset, in spite of the unpopular reception which it has received.

[1] Vol. II, No. 624. [2] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 383, 10 September 1942, cols. 302–5.

31

Viscount Halifax to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 157

PERSONAL WASHINGTON, *25 September 1942, 4.25 pm*

No. 20. Your telegram No. 4843–S.[1]

I am very grateful for your most helpful telegram and glad to find that the line I have been taking with all, whether official or press or radio commentators with whom I have discussed, follows almost exactly your broadcast presentation.

[1] This should read '2843–S' (No. 9).

2. You can feel well assured that I shall continue to make what I conceive to be the two principal points, i.e. one, that the obstacle to progress is the Indian incapacity to agree, and two, that whatever damage may be accredited to the war effort from the present Indian situation is as nothing to the chaos that would speedily follow the public loss of confidence in the strength of your Government.

3. But whatever we say or do, United States opinion is going to be difficult. My own temper is often sorely tried by the ignorance amongst our friends even in high quarters.

And to this must always be added even less informed criticism some of which unconsciously derives I suspect from German promptings. The better informed of our friends are keenly alive to the danger from isolationists here, now temporarily out of ammunition, if they can get hold of something which they can dress up as moral issue. (2 grps. undec. ?Purpose of my) telegrams has therefore been to emphasise the importance of doing what we can within the limits open to us to correct the impression that our policy on the large issue is purely repression. It never has been and from your telegram clearly is not to-day but we need to keep on saying so (see paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 4699[2] to Foreign Office).

4. Any good figures you may have of recruitment for the forces or munitions words (sic ?works) since active trouble began would be helpful. Good luck.

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 4804 (for Secretary of State for India).

[2] Vol. II, No. 764.

32

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/598: f 219

SECRET INDIA OFFICE, *25 September 1942*
IMPORTANT *Received: 26 September*

No. 16828. In replying to question in Parliament on 11th September[1] I undertook to consult you on the question of publication of documents purporting to be instructions for the carrying out of a civil disobedience campaign. I referred in my reply to the Andhra Circular and said that it must rest with you to decide how much of the material in your possession is suitable for publication.

2. Matter will doubtless be raised again in the coming debate and I should be glad to have by 4th October at latest your views[2] in regard to publication and your conclusions as to the degree of responsibility for the recent disturbance to be attributed to (*a*) Gandhi, (*b*) Congress Working Committee, All-India

Congress Committee, (*c*) Subversive organisations not necessarily supporting Congress and (*d*) enemy agency. As regards the last you will be aware of the criticism of the Prime Minister's suggestion that Congress activities may have been aided by Japanese fifth column work (cf. the end of para. 5 of Home Department telegram of the 5th September, No. 348–S.C.).[3]

[1] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 383, cols. 516–17.
[2] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 omits 'your views'.
[3] Vol. II, No. 697; the reference should be to para. 3.

33

Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/3/3a: f 93

INDIA OFFICE, *25 September 1942*

Secretary of State's Minute: Serial No. P. 54/42

Prime Minister

Your Minute No. M. 396/2.[1]

I am arranging to discuss the matter contained in the Lord Privy Seal's note as desired, but I think it is very important that we should have the advice of Indians experienced in those matters who understand the social and religious factors involved, before we reach any conclusions. I therefore propose to ask my Adviser, Sir Atul Chatterjee, and perhaps one of my European Advisers, to attend at any rate a preliminary discussion. I think however that we ought to bring Mudaliar in on this. He has quite recent experience of labour legislation in India. It is however difficult to do this in the preliminary stages unless he is to come in at the Cabinet stage of our discussions on this subject. Would you see any objection to this?

L. S. A.

[1] Vol. II, No. 775.

34

Minute by Mr Spry

L/E/8/2527: f 317

25 September 1942

Lord Privy Seal

INDIA

1. The more your note of September 2[1] is considered, the more obvious it becomes that without some further attempt to break the present political

[1] Vol. II, No. 678.

deadlock your proposals for a programme of social reform cannot satisfactorily achieve the desired results.

2. That is, it seems essential that the political approach and the social approach be made together as a single approach.

3. Assuming as a hypothesis that a broad programme of social reform is possible and acceptable, its execution will depend not only upon imaginative direction from the top but the full co-operation of hundreds or even thousands of Indian civil servants, social workers, officials, doctors, etc. Unless there is some improvement in the political situation, that co-operation will not be found.

4. I attended a meeting of a Chatham House Group on India at luncheon today. Gerald Palmer was also present. The discussion was discursive and without clear conclusion. But the trend was unmistakable. Those present—a typical Chatham House group—believed:—
   (*a*) that the present situation could not be left without some attempted remedy;
   (*b*) that something vaguely called "National Government" or "Prime Minister's Government" within the ambit of the existing constitution was possible.

5. The definition of these terms varied, but consensus of the views expressed was this:—
   (*a*) The present executive council should be made more representative.
   (*b*) The Viceroy should call upon some leading Indian such as Mr. Jinna[h] or Mr. Rajagopalachari to be his Prime Minister and invite this Prime Minister to form a government representing elements now in the Council, the Moslem League, the Hindu Mahasabha and such Congress elements as would accept.
   (*c*) That the Viceroy should retain his powers to over-ride the decision of this Council at least in such paramount subjects as defence, communal difficulties and external relations, but should otherwise regard the council in practice as a cabinet.
   (*d*) There was no agreement on whether the Viceroy should or should not be Chairman of such a Council or attend its sessions.
   (*e*) There should be Europeans in the Council, but the Prime Minister should decide.
   (*f*) It was recognised that Mr. Jinna[h] would have to be induced to set aside for the war period his condition that Pakistan be acknowledged in principle.

6. I perhaps exaggerate the measure of agreement expressed by the group on these points, but the trend was, I am sure, quite definite.

35

Mr Tyson to Sir J. Herbert (Bengal)[1]

MSS. EUR. F. 125/42

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL *25 September 1942*

Dear Sir John,

As you know B. M. Birla has recently been having talks with certain of the heads of Clive Street firms. He asked me to see him also, and I have put in the form of a note one or two of the many impressions I brought away with me. They will probably be of some interest to you, and in any case you may care to pass them on to other appropriate quarters.

Yours sincerely,
G. W. TYSON

Enclosure to No. 35

25 September 1942

Mr. B. M. Birla, brother of Mr. G. D. Birla, and a past President of the Indian Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, has recently been sounding European businessmen as to their attitude to a "National Government". During the past ten days he has had the heads of half-a-dozen Clive Street firms at his house for talks, and yesterday he invited me for the same purpose. Throughout our conversation Sir Srinivasa Sarma was present. One or two points of interest emerged from the talk, and I record them as follows:—

1. Mr. Birla puts forward the thesis that as we are pledged to an independent India after the war it would help to create goodwill later on for British business if its leaders would join Indian businessmen in the demand for a "National Government" now. Anyone who knows Birla's past attitude to British business, will regard his new found solicitude for our future interests with some suspicion. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that as the next move in the game he would like to see British business interests join the ranks of the critics of the Government of India, and that whatever other nobler motives his recent talks may have had, he has also had this in view.

2. He is using the spectre of colossal sterling balances standing to India's credit at the end of the war to try and frighten British businessmen in India suggesting that, of course, one of the ways they can

P.S.V.—
This might be indirectly but effectively countered in my Calcutta speech—with the help of F[inance] M[ember]. *L.*

[1] Copy forwarded by Sir J. Herbert's Secretary to Sir G. Laithwaite under cover of letter No. 317-C.R. of 2 October. MSS. EUR. F. 125/42.

be turned to India's use is by acquiring British holdings in India against sterling in London. Like all his kind, he has a very keen money sense, but I doubt if he appreciates the practical limitations attaching to international capital movements of the kind he appears to envisage.

He was emphatic (and in this one must presume he represents a good deal of Indian national opinion) that any attempt to revise to India's disadvantage the present agreement between the British and Indian Governments on military expenditure would be strongly resisted. One already sees signs of the beginnings of a Congress propaganda campaign on this point.

3. I mention with diffidence my conviction (as a result of this conversation) that Colonel Louis Johnson's activities at the time of the Cripps talks were anything but helpful to British interests in India. The Birlas stand at the very heart of Congress politics, and what Mr. B. M. Birla said last night confirmed my earlier suspicions. He made frequent references to what they had been told by Colonel Johnson, or what the latter had said to others—all of which were designed to bring British probity and the honesty of our intentions into question.

4. It was very interesting that Birla should say to me that, in his view, if the Viceroy had at any time been authorised to make the same offer to India as Sir Stafford Cripps he would have succeeded where the latter failed. He said that the equivalent of the Cripps proposals put forward by the Viceroy would have been regarded as a natural development of twenty years of British policy; whereas the Cripps mission was regarded as a hurried last minute attempt to strike a bargain when we found we were in a jamb with the Japanese. He thought that the Viceroy would have been much more likely to convince Gandhi than Sir Stafford Cripps.

G. W. TYSON

36

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/7/5587: f 3

INDIA OFFICE, *26 September 1942, 12.40 am*

16853. Your telegram of the 21st September, 2831–S.[1] Reforms Commissioner. I fully agree with you as to the importance of maintaining this post and if you feel that Menon is best able to fill it I am content. But in view of its potential importance when the time comes to set up a constitution-making body and negotiate a treaty, would it not be preferable to appoint Menon on an officiating basis or for a limited period only so that we may have time to look round for an incumbent with wider experience?

[1] Vol. II, No. 777.

37

Minute by Mr Churchill

L/PO/3/3a: f 92

10 DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL, *26 September 1942*

Reference: Minute from the Secretary of State for India to the Prime Minister, dated September 25, 1942,[1] about bringing Mudaliar into discussions on India.

I see no objection. Lord Privy Seal to see.[2]

W. S. C.

[1] No. 33.

[2] Mr Turnbull noted on 28 September: 'Lord P.S. has seen and also has no objection.'

38

Mr Gandhi to the Secretary to the Bombay Government, Home Department

MSS. EUR. F. 125/137

26 September 1942

Sir,

With reference to your letter of 22nd September, I beg to say that I cannot exercise the privilege extended by the Government since I may not refer in my letter even to non-political matters mentioned in my letter of 27th August 1942.[1]

I am,

Yours, &c.,

M. K. GANDHI

[1] This letter (Vol. II, No. 638) was referred by the Home Department of the Bombay Government to the Home Department of the Government of India, who replied enclosing the draft of a letter which they suggested should be sent to Mr Gandhi. The draft asked him to furnish a list of the inmates of the Sevagram ashram with whom he wished to correspond on personal and domestic matters only; and it continued: 'In regard to your further request that you should be allowed to write and receive letters on certain matters other than those of a purely personal or domestic nature, I am to inform you of the decision of Government that it would not be in accordance with the purposes of your confinement to allow such an extension of the scope of your correspondence.' On 6 October the Bombay Home Department informed the Home Department of the Government of India that a letter in the terms of this draft had been sent to Mr Gandhi, enclosed a copy of his letter of 26 September and concluded: 'In the circumstances, it is presumed that no further action is now necessary.' MSS. EUR. F. 125/137.

39

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

CHUNGKING, SZECHUAN, *26 September 1942*

My dear Viceroy,

I greatly appreciate the fact that you found time, amid all your responsibilities and anxieties, to write me a personal letter,[1] confirmatory of your previous telegraphic message.[2] I quite understand, and fully reciprocate, the wish on Your Excellency's part to divest our relationship of all ambiguity and possibility of misunderstanding. I am glad that any suggestions that I am encouraged to make by Your Excellency's appreciation of my desire to show my goodwill towards yourself and India are viewed in the spirit in which they are made, even if they cannot be acted upon.

You will, I am sure, do me the justice of believing that my sole motive in suggesting[3] that our Commissioner in India should interview the Congress leaders was the hope that, perhaps, thereby a *modus vivendi* would be the more quickly arrived at. My one desire was to help in any way possible to bring India whole-heartedly into the war which, Your Excellency will forgive me for emphasizing, outweighs every other consideration. I felt that, if I could be even of the slightest help in restoring accord, I should be giving a proof of my personal regard for you, my friendship for India and, above all, my anxiety to see the cause of the Allied Nations strengthened.

Your Excellency will, I am sure, agree that the main thing is to defeat the enemy and that everything that is likely to promote that end should, at least, be thoroughly examined. It gives me especial pleasure to find that Your Excellency holds similar views and that the open and frank suggestions I have made have not been misunderstood. That China will continue to do her utmost in the common cause hardly needs emphasis.

We are sorry to part with Sir Zafrullah Khan on both public and private grounds. During his comparatively short stay here he has been instrumental in drawing closer both political and cultural ties between India and China.

Madame Chiang desires me to thank you for your message to her and joins me in the hope that health and happiness will attend you, Lady Linlithgow and your family.

Yours sincerely,

CHIANG KAI-SHEK

[1] Vol. II, No. 622. [2] Vol. II, No. 541, para. 2. [3] Vol. II, No. 540.

40

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *26 September 1942*

Heaven knows what you will be able to make of yesterday's Cabinet decision[1] and I can only hope either that you can induce the Cabinet to reconsider their decision or that you can persuade your Indian colleagues that this is a wonderful opportunity for them to show themselves the champions of India's rights by sending a good stiff reply to His Majesty's Government. You, in your capacity of Governor-General would, it seems to me, be perfectly justified, on an issue of this kind, in associating yourself with such a rejoinder. Meanwhile it may possibly interest you, at any rate retrospectively, to know how the whole business began.

2. The Bank of England and Treasury have for some time been worrying about the awful consequences on our post-war situation of India's having several hundred millions of free balances which they might throw on the market for use to extract from us goods for which we get no return. Raisman will no doubt have told you all about this. As a matter of fact, all this panic is exaggerated and arises largely from failing to realise the difference between our American debt after the last war which was in terms of gold and which we could not pay: (*a*) because America would [not] take British imports, (*b*) because we as free traders were not prepared to redress the adverse balance of trade by duties on American goods. Under a tariff policy it would have been perfectly easy for us to pay even the thirty odd million pounds a year gold required by the American debt arrangement. Personally, I believe nothing could be so valuable a stimulus to our heavy industries when they will most need it after the war as a large demand for reconstruction and industrial equipment from a country like India which, having sterling, would naturally buy from sterling sources.

3. Anyhow, Keynes seems to have got at Winston, who took alarm, harangued Kingsley Wood, and made him produce his first memorandum[2] which broke down in face of Raisman's criticism. After Raisman met the Cabinet[3] there was universal agreement that there could be no question of re-opening the existing settlement. However, as Winston was away and had taken a keen interest in the matter, it was left for final decision when he returned. The matter came up on Tuesday of last week.[4] Winston at once opened with a terrific tirade on the theme of the monstrous injustice of our defending India,

[1] No. 24; the Cabinet met on 24 September. [2] Vol. II, No. 375. [3] Vol. II, No. 435.
[4] Vol. II, No. 750; the Cabinet met onWednesday, 16 September.

then being kicked out and owing India a vast debt as our reward. As he talks all the time and does not really read papers, it has been almost impossible to get into his head either the fact that India does pay for British Forces now defending India or likely to go there in future for that purpose, or that most of the debt is incurred in respect of goods supplied for other theatres of war or for India's fighting in those other theatres, and, last but not least, that we have no means of altering the situation unless a friendly India were willing after the war to consider some adjustment. Anyhow, in spite of my very strong protests, the Cabinet, all extraordinarily weak reeds when it comes to standing up to Winston, acquiesced in some sort of reservation or representation being made to the Government of India and instructed Kingsley Wood, Simon and myself to draft something. I thereupon at once let you have briefly an indication of what was in the wind[5] and suggested myself to the drafting committee a very short message of two or three sentences to the effect that in view of the unforeseen developments since 1940 and the still more unforeseeable developments of the future, His Majesty's Government reserved the right to raise the question of an eventual adjustment in the light of the general peace settlement and of the need for the maximum development of world trade.[6] When it came to discussing this with Kingsley Wood I found he had a long argumentative draft[7] which I did not at all like for that very reason, because it seemed to me that every one of the *ex parte* arguments contained in it would annoy your colleagues and create the impression that we were determined somehow to use our position to compel or dictate readjustment. However, as Kingsley Wood had accepted various amendments of mine and Simon had also agreed it subject to some amendments,[8] I did not think it worth while to fight the issue further and reluctantly agreed to its going forward as amended, knowing that you would still have the opportunity of saying what you thought of it. What I agreed to was, of course, the draft being sent to you and I certainly was not prepared to agree to its being forced upon you if you thought it dangerous. I did want to telegraph it out to you at once, but Kingsley Wood persuaded me not to do so but to wait for the Prime Minister's amendments, if he had any to suggest.

4. Next morning I was rung up down in the country and told of the Prime Minister's amendments.[9] These, or rather the most important of them, not only made the thing more dictatorial and minatory, but was clearly based on the impression that this country is paying for British forces in India. I let Winston know that I could not agree to this and that it would have to come before the Cabinet again. Meanwhile, I felt it essential that you should know the kind of thing that was in the wind and be able to warn the Cabinet of the possible consequences of presenting it. I would have sent the whole document but, as it might very well have been further changed at the Cabinet, and only consisted of a lot of *ex parte* argument, which certainly would not have made

it more attractive from your point of view, I thought it was enough to send you the operative paragraph.[10] What you thought of it, or indeed of any reservation, was evident from the long telegram[11] which reached me on Monday morning.

5. I thereupon drafted a memorandum[12] attaching the telegrams bearing on the matter, in which I strongly urged the Cabinet not to send any reasoned reservation to India at all, though they might pass it for purposes of record on their own files, but at most to suggest that Raisman should be authorised, in answer to questions to say that His Majesty's Government while agreeing that the settlement stood, considered that it would be within their rights, as in those of India, in view of all the unforeseeable developments which may yet take place, to advocate some adjustment at the end of the war. At the same time Kingsley Wood circulated the draft which we had agreed on the previous Friday with a note, dated September 21st,[13] which implied that I agreed with it, though he knew from the talk we had that I no longer agreed in view of your reply. To my great surprise Winston told the Cabinet Secretary not to circulate my memorandum or the telegrams, but that I was to state the case orally at the Cabinet.

6. When the Cabinet met yesterday, Winston opened with a personal indictment against myself for having deliberately sent you only a part of the proposed Cabinet communication in order to incite your opposition, concealing all the admirable earlier argumentative part, which presumably you would have welcomed with such enthusiasm! He then had the telegrams circulated round the table, but without my memorandum, so that the Cabinet, while having some glimmering of your opposition, had very little clear idea of the situation, which he and Kingsley Wood kept on obscuring under the smoke-screen of the perfectly irrelevant attack on my loyalty to the Cabinet. Eventually I did get the matter explained and I think most of the Cabinet entirely agreed with me. I may say that under considerable provocation to lose my temper I was angelic, and said that if only they would get on to the merits of the question I was only too ready to apologise to the Cabinet for any omission in the telegrams I had sent you, or for sending them to you at all without waiting for a final Cabinet text. However, it was quite impossible in the middle of Winston's monologues and suggestions for amending the long draft which one or other member of the Cabinet produced, to get them back to the real issue whether any such message should be sent at all, and in spite of my protest they finally agreed on the text, which has been sent to you.[14] Winston's unfortunate amendment, as well as the reference to raising the matter at some earlier

[5] Vol. II, No. 754. [6] Vol. II, Nos. 752 and 763. [7] Vol. II, No. 757.
[8] Vol. II, No. 766. [9] Vol. II, No. 769. [10] Vol. II, No. 770. [11] Vol. II, No. 773.
[12] No. 13. [13] Vol. II, No. 778. [14] No. 27.

appropriate occasion, being happily excised. The one help I was able to get from one or two members of the Cabinet was that the communication should be accompanied by a covering telegram[15] making it plain to you that this was a mere expression of His Majesty's Government's views and that there was no question of its being imposed on India. This telegram, more or less in the wording of the Cabinet minute, was agreed by Anderson, Winston and myself.

7. So there we are at the moment. What can be the possible use of sending such a message which can only create difficulties with your Council and a general outcry all over India, on top of everything else that is happening there, I cannot imagine. If your colleagues resign, which I trust you will use every means to prevent, I doubt very much whether I shall be prepared to stay on myself. The only possible solution that I see to the matter is that your colleagues should take it, and you be able to persuade them to take it, as a heaven-sent opportunity for administering a firm rebuff to His Majesty's Government over the whole business, pointing out that the matter is one which could only be decided by mutual agreement and that they see no reason at present why India should agree to any departure from the existing settlement which, as things stand, is likely to impose an increasingly heavy burden on Indian finances.

[Para. 8, on States emerging from minority administration; para. 9, on the advisability of Council Government for small States; para. 10, on Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar's suggestion that the Junior Maharani of Travancore might be recommended for the Crown of India; para. 11, on the attack on the police station at Madhuban and, para. 12, on Honorary A.D.C.s to the King, omitted.]

I have just had a long evening alone with Mudaliar and find him most likable and intelligent. He ought to be of real value when he goes to America. And I get the impression that he has real grit.

All my sympathy to you in your difficulties. But Dorman-Smith from whom I heard yesterday says he has never seen you look fitter, so, like me, you bear your afflictions cheerfully or at least resiliently!

[15] No. 26.

41

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *27[1] September 1942, 2.20 am*

PERSONAL

No. 2920–S. Following is my personal appreciation midday, September 26th, for period 20th to 26th September. All going pretty well through the country

as a whole, and consolidation proceeding. A good many minor incidents in Bengal, Bombay and Bihar but nothing of importance. Bihar reports re-appearance of gangsters and revival of meetings and processions in Saran district following withdrawal of troops. Nothing of importance from Indian States.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Chungking, Washington (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

[1] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 gives the date as 26 September. The date and time of despatch given here are taken from L/P&J/8/603: f 8.

42

Mr Eden to Viscount Halifax[1]

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 145

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE, *28 September 1942, 6.40 pm*

MOST SECRET

5890. Your telegram No. 4650.[2]

His Majesty's Government have been considering with the Viceroy the position of the post of United States Commissioner at Delhi. Wilson held this post for only eight months and on the appointment of Johnson as the President's special representative it was held in abeyance. Since Johnson's departure from India in May, after a stay of only a few weeks, its duties have been performed by a Secretary. It is understood from your telegram No. 4259[3] of 22nd August that United States Government are now considering filling the vacant post. We would welcome this because apart from the desirability of the Government of India having beside them a responsible officer who could deal authoritatively with matters of local concern affecting the United States of America, we would like to feel that United States Government are obtaining from an officer of their own reliable and objective information regarding Indian political developments.

2. We also note, however, from your telegram under reference and Bajpai's telegram to India No. 231[4] of 16th September, that question is being canvassed in United States of America of a prominent American going to India in order to mediate. This is a separate idea from that of the filling of the Commissionership and its adoption would have the most serious effect upon the peace of India. The Congress Party's attempt at a revolutionary movement designed to

[1] Repeated by the India Office to Government of India, External Affairs Department, as telegram 17164 of 2 October.

[2] Vol. II, No. 749. [3] Vol. II, No. 619; the date should be 24 August.

[4] Vol. II, No. 762.

render the Government of India helpless in the event of a Japanese attack and to force us to surrender India to a Party Dictatorship appears to have been defeated for the present, although all trouble is not over. It is therefore probable that Congress Party will now seek their objective by other means, e.g. by trying to obtain intervention by United States Government which they imagine would be to their advantage. Consequently anything which could be colourably represented as a sign of readiness on the part of the United States Government to offer their mediation would be likely to encourage the prolongation of the present disturbances and discourage the elements in India hostile to Congress upon whom India's war effort depends. There is some danger in view of recent discussions in the United States press that the appointment of a new Commissioner at Delhi at this juncture might be misinterpreted in India as a step towards United States intervention. This danger could, however, be dealt with by means of suitable publicity concerted between ourselves and United States Government before the new appointment is announced.

3. There would seem advantage in taking the initiative in this matter in order to urge the United States Government to fill the vacant Commissionership as soon as possible, to warn them of the dangers indicated in paragraph 2 and to hint that our agrément for whoever they select as Commissioner will not be a formality. We consider it desirable that you should pursue the suggestion made in your telegram No. 4702[5] communicating to the State Department the substance of the Viceroy's telegram No. 2843–S[6] as an initial offering and, subject to your views, that you should take advantage of the opportunity thus afforded to speak to them on the lines of paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

4. You should add, if you agree, that we hope that if United States Government are willing to fill Commissionership, they will take into account our views regarding the type of man to be selected besides following the usual agrément procedure. We would welcome someone of substance who is an experienced observer, who has the confidence of his Government and who is ready to tour as much as possible in order to enlarge his contacts. We fear however that an active politician's domestic ambitions might tempt him to make a splash in India by interfering in Indian politics. Moreover we would like to emphasise the importance of whoever is selected being ready to stay in India some time (e.g. until the end of the war) in order to grasp the complications of the situation and an active politician might be reluctant to do this. Consequently we hope that selection will fall on a Foreign Service Officer of high standing. Paragraph 5 of your telegram No. 2092[7] of 10th May 1941, should be useful in this connexion.

[5] Dated 18 September, suggesting that the State Department should be asked to show the Embassy paraphrases of any interesting messages from the U.S. Agency-General in New Delhi, in return for which the Embassy would send them copies of the Viceroy's regular situation reports. L/P&S/12/707: f 14.

[6] No. 9. [7] L/P&S/12/2633: f 362.

43

Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/77

CONFIDENTIAL GOVT. HOUSE, NATHIAGALI, *28 September 1942*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

Thank you very much for Your Excellency's letter of 23rd September.[1] My report of 23rd September,[2] which crossed your letter, will have given Your Excellency a certain amount of further information regarding the situation here. So far, there is no doubt that things have gone extremely well for us here —a good deal better than most people would have anticipated. Although I do not for a moment consider that the danger is over, I think that the likelihood of any serious disorder here is now remote. I anticipate that before long there will be an attempt to picket law courts, and the situation will depend entirely on the numbers of people who try to picket and the intensity with which they do it. I heard last evening that the Red Shirts, some day soon, mean to make a procession, some hundred strong, and demonstrate outside the courts. If they come in these numbers we shall, I think, have to prevent them entering Cantonments, and this may lead to a little trouble. But even so, there is so little sympathy with Congress among the people in general that, even if the police or military have to take extreme measures, I do not think the trouble will spread.

2. As regards Congress personalities in the Province, the position is that Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and possibly one or two others are being constantly pressed by Congressmen elsewhere in India to do something to show that Congress in the North-West Frontier Province is still alive. I saw a letter two days ago from Abdul Ghaffar Khan to somebody in the United Provinces which was purely an apologia for the complete lack of success so far. He is therefore straining every nerve to do something. Dr. Khan Sahib, on the other hand, and Ali Gul Khan, the local President of the Congress, are all for peace. It may be said, "why, in these circumstances, not arrest Abdul Ghaffar Khan?" One answer to that is that it would inevitably bring Dr. Khan Sahib and Ali Gul Khan in against us, and they are such assets in our favour at the moment that I would like to avoid this. We are thinking of squashing the procession I mentioned above—if it materialises—by arresting the four men who are expected to lead it, on the previous night. This, of course, may bring Abdul Ghaffar Khan so much in the open that we cannot avoid arresting him, but I do not propose to do it until I have to.

1 and 2 Not printed.

3. I fully appreciate the weight of the point which Your Excellency makes regarding the necessity of keeping Muhammadans out of the present agitation. But of course the fact remains that, in the North-West Frontier Province, there are a good many Muhammadans who are ready to follow Congress in anything, and the anti-Congress feeling here has had to be worked up by pretty intensive propaganda on our part.

4. As regards the tribes, I am fairly happy. We have had to arrest few individuals here and there who have gone up into tribal territory, but the general effect of visits by Congress agents to tribal territory has been so far quite negligible.

5. Firoz Khan Noon is coming to stay with me when he comes to Peshawar, and I will talk over the whole question of a Muslim Ministry with him, as Your Excellency suggests. I pretty frequently sound people as to the possibility of such a Ministry, and so far the answer has always been in the negative. The main reason, I think, is that, as soon as a Ministry of that kind is formed, personal jealousies will come out which will almost inevitably lead to the defection of one or two supporters in the Assembly. The balance between Congress and non-Congress in the Assembly at present is so delicate that this would almost certainly mean a defeat for the Ministry in a division on any controversial subject. But before Firoz Khan comes I will make some more enquiries in the right quarter and then talk the whole thing over with him.

6. Finally, as regards feeling among Government servants. I had a meeting of Deputy Commissioners just after I wrote my report of 10th September,[3] and asked them to watch this matter particularly. Their latest reports are that they think that practically all their Indian officials are staunch. There are one or two school masters who have been reported on adversely, but otherwise there have been no complaints. The police have been most satisfactory. At the same time, I think that in the back of almost every Indian official's mind is some kind of reservation regarding the future, and I feel pretty sure that this must be true in every part of India. What I always impress on my British officials is that they must never ask an Indian official to do something which seems spiteful against Congress or any other particular political party; I am afraid we lost ground in this way in 1930–31. Provided they simply carry out the known orders of Government in a fair way, I don't think they have anything to fear from a future Congress Government, and they themselves know it.

7. I am afraid this is rather a rambling letter, but it gives Your Excellency a slightly fuller picture than I have given you hitherto.

Yours sincerely,

G. CUNNINGHAM

[3] Not printed.

44

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/613: f 191

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *29 September 1942, 7.55 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 30 September*

17020. Parliamentary question for Thursday 1st October asks if I can state present whereabouts of Jawaharlal Nehru. I am not aware that this has yet been made public and if you can confirm this I propose to refuse information. I should think it desirable to give no clue to his whereabouts but if you should prefer it in order to contradict rumours of deportation I could say that he is interned in India.

2. Same question asks if Nehru can receive correspondence. I propose to reply that he is allowed to correspond on family matters with his family. Please confirm very urgently.

45

Note by Sir S. Cripps[1]

L/E/8/2527: ff 304–5

1. The Prime Minister, in his Minute No. M 396/2[2] of September 20 has suggested that the Minister of Labour, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for India and myself should make a preliminary survey of the proposals outlined in paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16 of my note of September 2[3] on the subject of India.

2. The broad intent of my note was to suggest that an issue other than the constitutional issue be raised in order to emphasize in a new way the anxiety of H.M. Government to serve the peoples of India and that public attention here, in India and America should, in some measure at least, be focussed upon social conditions in India and their amelioration. I proposed that we should look to the economic necessities of various sections of Indian society, sections which cut across the racial and religious groups whose constitutional demands have of late been our main concern, and that a programme of social reform, so far as is practicable in wartime, should be adopted.

[1] Enclosed in a letter of 29 September from Sir S. Cripps' Private Secretary to Mr Turnbull, which said that the note was for the meeting to be held that afternoon in the India Office.

[2] Vol. II, No. 775. [3] Vol. II, No. 678.

3. The difficulties and limitations of such a programme and approach are fully recognised. They are political, religious, financial and practical.
   (i) There is the two-fold political difficulty: (*a*) the initiative in social and economic questions rests constitutionally with the Government of India or with the Provincial Governments and any attempt to take that initiative or interfere with the policies already being pursued in India might run counter to the wishes of the Governor-General and the Executive Council or the Cabinets of the five Provincial Governments in office: (*b*) the Indian political parties, particularly the followers of the Congress party, might treat the offer as a "bribe" or "hush money".
   (ii) It is important also to recognise that social changes acceptable to Europeans may directly conflict with religious principles of the communities in India.
   (iii) The practical and financial limitations are equally immediate. Materials and personnel are in urgent demand for the war effort, the revenues of the Central and of the Provincial Governments have been and are small in comparison with the costs of any significant programme.
4. It is also necessary to consider if what may be termed a social approach will yield desirable results apart from new efforts to improve in some measure the political situation.
5. Some of the social problems to be faced are outlined in my note of September 2. It will be necessary to define these problems more closely and to examine what proposals H.M. Government could make to deal with them in the light of the limitations above and of the constitutional position.
6. I propose therefore that the Secretary of State for India and myself be constituted a sub-committee which, with advisers we shall select, will proceed with all celerity to make a brief survey of existing information on conditions in India and set out those practicable proposals which this Committee of Four could consider and submit to the Cabinet.
7. The sub-committee might be directed to have this preliminary report to survey ready before the Debate on India in the House and if the Committee of Four and the Cabinet approved, a general indication of the intention of H.M. Government to propose to and consider with the Government of India a programme of social reform not inconsistent with the demands of the war effort, could be given to the House of Commons and the country.
8. The sub-committee and its advisers will not be able, within the brief time available, to draft a detailed set of proposals; these detailed proposals must be

elaborated by the sub-committee in a less rapid manner, but there is ample information in the various reports on the conditions of agriculture and labour in India to permit preliminary recommendations to be made to the Committee of Four or the Cabinet before the debate on India and, in any event, it is not proposed that the preliminary recommendations be given to the House in other than very general terms; terms limited, indeed, largely to the announcement of the fact that a Committee of the Cabinet is considering what steps are practicable.

9. I suggest, however, that the final proposals to be drawn up by the sub-committee and their discussion with the Government of India and by the Government of India with the Provinces should be well advanced by the end of November.

10. There can be no doubt about the conditions in India, great as their improvement has been in the last generation. Harsh contrasts between great wealth and extreme poverty exist. The average expectation of life at birth in India is less than half of that in England. Rural cultivators and industrial workers are born into debt, die in debt, and debt is accepted as a natural state of life. Education, against great difficulties, makes slow progress but literacy is the advantage of only a small fraction of the people. Individual or family incomes are so low that children must be withdrawn from school either to add minutely to that income or because they are enfeebled by ill-health and inadequate nourishment.

11. The responsibility for meeting these conditions may rest with the Government of India and the Provinces. But I suggest that any effort H.M. Government may make to assist these Governments in advice, information, personnel or finance cannot but help whatever political discussions may be necessary, and demonstrate to opinion here, in America and in India itself the determination of H.M. Government to serve the interests of the peoples of India and leave the estate, which Indians will ultimately themselves administer, as far advanced towards higher standards of living as may be practicable.

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Note of meeting held at the India Office on 29 September 1942, to discuss Sir Stafford Cripps' proposals about the possibility of launching a programme of social and economic reform in India

L/E/8/2527: ff 314–15

Present: Secretary of State for India; Chancellor of the Exchequer; Lord Privy Seal; Minister of Labour; Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar; Sir Atul Chatterjee; Sir John Hubback; Sir John Woodhead; Sir Frederick Leggett, Ministry of Labour; Mr W. D. Croft

The Secretary of State said that constitutionally these matters lay with the Central Government and the Provincial Governments and except in regard to Provinces under Section 93, where we still have a measure of authority and responsibility, the Provincial Governments were autonomous. As regards finance, some of the Provinces were comparatively well-off and have been devoting their surplus revenues as a matter of course to the nation-building services. He doubted whether India could expect help from the British Exchequer, the population being so large even a modest contribution would be very heavy. As to the political aspect, he thought it would be a mistake to start a movement of social and economic reform as a counter-blast to political agitation. It would be said why had we not done it 50 years ago and why were we now trying to queer the pitch of the political parties. We should avoid creating the impression that what we were doing was something new or that the present time was one at which striking changes could be undertaken. Whatever we did should be a matter of results rather than of promises and should appear as the continuance of an old policy with which we still identified ourselves, especially in regard to the Section 93 Provinces.

The Lord Privy Seal said that the general political question was one for the War Cabinet. The task of the present meeting was to advise as to specific measures that could usefully be undertaken.

Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar dealt with the subject under two headings—industrial and agricultural.

Industrial: Throughout the war he had been in favour of maintaining a continuity of ameliorative legislation for labour and he favoured the working out of a programme so that the post-war transition might be easier. In January 1940 and again later he had held a conference of labour ministers and labour advisers from the Provinces and, as a result, Bills had been put through. In 1942 he had succeeded in bringing together representatives of all the three parties—Government, employers and labour, the last two of which Government had previously had to deal with separately. In addition to the measures that had been

passed dealing with hours of work and holidays for shop assistants, etc., sickness assurance is being discussed. Housing plans were incapable of being carried out because they needed resources which were required for war purposes.
Agriculture: If British money were supplied for this purpose it would be resented as a bribe and regarded as a sign of death-bed repentance. It would irritate the political parties and give the impression that, notwithstanding its promises of self-government, the United Kingdom was still trying to keep a hold on the people and to detach them from the political leaders. He thought that since the collapse of self-government in the Congress Provinces the Provincial Governments had been marking time and that there might be a case for encouraging them to make progress with regard to tenancy legislation, etc.

Sir Atul Chatterjee said there were plenty of subjects for a labour programme, such as sickness, old-age and unemployment assurance, but all these involved money which is the real difficulty. They also involved reliable statistical material, which had hitherto not been available in India (though Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar referred to the recent passage of legislation for compulsory industrial statistics). Housing also meant money as well as other resources temporarily not available. The present Constitution, with its division of authority between the Centre and the Provinces, is not conducive to labour improvements. He thought that there was a good case for money being provided by the United Kingdom Government to be spent over a period of years. Part of the money to be provided might take the form of a return of India's £100,000,000 contribution towards the cost of the last war. He mentioned that only one penny and a farthing was spent per head of the population per annum on agricultural progress. Education also needed money as well as health and sanitation. Unlike Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar he thought that such a gift would be appreciated. What he had in mind was an unconditional gift of four or five hundred millions to be spent over a period of ten years at the discretion of the Indian authorities. Money was essential as he didn't know any beneficial welfare measures that could be carried through without it.

Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar mentioned that the present Provincial surpluses depended upon income tax receipts, which was controlled by the Centre and would not continue. The Provinces, therefore, could not enter into recurrent commitments.

Sir John Woodhead said that measures had been undertaken and were being undertaken and that it would not come well from H.M.G. to apply pressure in the direction of progress.

Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar said that if workers got more pay they took holidays. This was due to their low standard of living. (Mr. Bevin quoted John Burns's phrase "Poverty of their desires.")

Sir Atul Chatterjee said that neither advice nor information nor personnel should be volunteered unless it was asked for. Sir Stafford Cripps said that

there were many things in which they were held up for lack of statistics, to which Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar replied that he had just passed an Act for the compulsory collection of statistics. Sir Atul Chatterjee said that nothing much could be done while the war was still in progress as all energies had to be concentrated upon that, and he referred to the fact that in the United Provinces settlement operations had been suspended in order that personnel might be released for work connected with the war. Sir John Woodhead asked how, apart from money, the drive was to come from this end. These things had all been in the charge of Ministers for years. We must be careful not to irritate the Members of the present Government of India, nearly all of whom were Indians. Sir John Hubback said that when the Congress Governments went out of office he had carried on on their lines for a time, but after a few months he had launched out into beneficial plans on his own account. Mr. Bevin said there was a good deal of opinion in the United Kingdom questioning whether we had done all we might have done for the Indian people. A new era was ahead of us and it called for a constructive effort tending to the creation of western conditions in India. He was not so much interested in legislation as in its enforcement. Factory inspectors were not expensive and they often led to profitable results. It was more important to look forward than to look backwards. He would like to know what progress had been made in carrying out the recommendations of the Whitley Commission[1] and the Linlithgow Commission[2] and what still remained to be done. He was informed that a good deal of easily accessible and readable material was available in papers read to the East India Association, etc. Sir Stafford Cripps thought that we should not be unduly put off by constitutional niceties nor by doubts as to whether measures of reform initiated by us would be welcome to Indian opinion. We didn't hesitate to intervene in India for the purpose of repressing political agitation, why should we hesitate to intervene in regard to measures of social and economic reform. Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar asked how H.M.G. could say in the same breath that India was to have self-government in, say, 2 years and that a policy of social and economic reform should be dictated to India by the United Kingdom. Undoubtedly any such effort would be looked upon with great suspicion, especially in anything affecting industry, because whereas Indians regard the growth of Indian industry as of vital interest to them its growth may be in conflict with the interests of the United Kingdom, and any effort on the part of the United Kingdom to dictate the future conditions of Indian industry is apt to be regarded as inspired by a desire to hamper the development of Indian industry and safeguard the export trade of the United Kingdom.

[1] The Royal Commission on Labour in India (1929–31) chaired by Mr Whitley; for its report see Cmd. 3883.

[2] The Royal Commission on Agriculture in India (1926–8) chaired by Lord Linlithgow; for its final report see Cmd. 3132.

47

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

SIMLA, *30 September 1942, 2.50 pm*
Received: 30 September, 2.30 pm

No. 365–S.C. Your telegram, 26th September, No. 16853.[1] Reforms Commissioner. I have duly appointed Menon. I think myself that we should be very unwise to feel any optimism as to probability of our being able to get together the constitution-making body when the time comes or as to its reaching conclusions which will form a basis for treaty negotiations. But in any event I am satisfied that wise course is to put in Menon. His knowledge and experience will be essential even if special arrangements had to be made when the time came to supplement him or make him work with someone of higher standing and with different training.

[1] No. 36.

48

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

SIMLA, *30 September 1942, 9.15 pm*
Received: 30 September, 5 pm

No. 375–S.C. Your personal telegram of September 29th, No. 17020.[1] Nehru's place of detention has not been made public. I agree to answer you propose, and agree that if pressed you might say that he is interned in India. I also agree to answer proposed in your paragraph 2.

[1] No. 44.

49

Sir G. Laithwaite to Secretaries to all Provincial Governors

MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

SECRET VICEROY'S CAMP, SIMLA, *30 September 1942*

D.-o. No. F.-125/11/G.G/42.

My dear —,

I send herewith, by post given the absence of great urgency, and its length, a personal telegram from His Excellency to His Excellency the Governor. A telegram in the same terms has been sent to other Governors.

Yours sincerely,

J. G. LAITHWAITE

Enclosure to No. 49

COPY OF A PERSONAL TELEGRAM FROM VICEROY TO GOVERNORS OF PROVINCES, NO. 368–S.C., DATED THE 30TH SEPTEMBER 1942

There appears still to be no sign of a fast by Gandhi but I am anxious that we should have perfected our arrangements for dealing with one if it should unfortunately take place. Paragraph 10 of my Home Department's official letter[1] to Provincial Governments had set forth a plan of campaign against the Congress and indicated the procedure which would be followed if Gandhi went on hunger strike and this would follow past practice under which he was to be released on reaching danger point. I have since considered this matter further and have examined it in some detail with the Secretary of State, while it has also been before the Cabinet. In the result I have reached the somewhat different conclusions which are set out below, with which the Secretary of State and I have reason to believe Cabinet are in agreement.

2. Those conclusions are that the wise solution will be that, on Gandhi starting a fast and making it clear that this is a fast to death, we should, on the assumption that such fast is for the achievement of his inadmissible demands (*a*) warn him in the name of His Majesty's Government that we do not propose to interfere; that all facilities for medical treatment, &c., will be provided; but that the decision in the matter is one which he must take himself: (*b*) immediately invite his eldest son[2] Devadas Gandhi to join him at the Aga Khan's Palace: (*c*) tell Devadas Gandhi if he is willing to go that we will provide all possible facilities, doctors, medical or spiritual assistance, food, &c., and that he has only to ask for anything he wants, and that we will put Devadas Gandhi in charge of arrangements inside the Aga Khan's Palace and of Gandhi's

health: (*d*) that there will be no objection to Gandhi seeing a reasonable number of visitors or friends from outside; that we leave the selection of names to Devadas Gandhi, but that we expect him to operate that permission in a reasonable sense and to avoid any substantial number of people being let in and wholly to exclude the Press: (*e*) that we shall continue to keep Gandhi under treatment in these conditions until he either abandons his fast or it has a fatal outcome: (*f*) if Devadas who has the reputation of being as obstinate as a mule won't play we shall have to select some other member of the family or close associate or fall back on official in charge of Palace.

3. I have it in mind that, in the event of the situation under discussion arising, the facilities for visits should be made subject to such restrictions as would effectively limit Gandhi's freedom to communicate with the outside world. I contemplate the taking of a bond from persons admitted that they will make no public statement (I recognise that it will probably be difficult to ensure 100 per cent. compliance but we must do our best about that), and one would aim also at securing that the individuals let in by Devadas Gandhi are strictly limited to a few personal friends, and are not allowed to come as or constitute a political committee or darbar, and that they definitely should bind themselves not to convey out political instructions or directly, or indirectly, lend themselves to publicity. The bond to which I have referred above would cover these points.

4. Let me add that I was clear, on further reflection, that our earlier suggestion under which we should have set Gandhi at liberty to fast to death either at Sevagram or in the Aga Khan's Palace, though no longer our prisoner, would not work, for the reason that the moment he was known to have started a fast there would be an immense concourse of people anxious to dissuade him, to visit him or merely to be spectators, and possibly an extensive pilgrimage from all over India. It would also be most difficult to control the press which would write up exciting stories which would have an extremely bad effect on opinion here as well as abroad, while serious problems of public order might arise out of the assembling and control of crowds. The revised scheme substantially meets these points: we retain our control (assuming Devadas Gandhi's readiness to co-operate) of entry to Gandhi's precincts; we retain control of the press; and no one can complain either that Gandhi has been forcibly fed or that he lacks any comfort, or medical and other attention, for which he or his relations on his behalf may care to ask me.

5. I should be grateful if the foregoing could be treated as most secret.

[1] L/P&J/8/598: ff 305–8. [2] In fact his fourth son (1900–57).

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/P&S/13/998: ff 333–5

INDIA OFFICE, *1 October 1942*

Secretary of State's Minute: Serial No. P. 55(42)

Prime Minister

In accordance with War Cabinet Conclusions 129(42)[1] of the 24th September, I send you a draft of the assurance which the War Cabinet desired should be conveyed to the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes in reply to his letter of the 1st June[2] (Annexure B in W.P. (42) 391).[3] The assurance would be conveyed by the Crown Representative and embodied in a letter with the full text of which it is not necessary for me to trouble you.

As the draft differs so substantially from the form of reply which the Crown Representative recommended I feel it very desirable that he should be given an opportunity to comment on its terms before it issues. I would therefore propose, if you think the draft generally suitable, to communicate it to the Crown Representative under a telegram of which I also enclose a draft.[4]

L. S. AMERY

Enclosure to No. 50

DRAFT OF PROPOSED ASSURANCE TO THE CHANCELLOR OF THE CHAMBER OF PRINCES

(1) The general nature of the policy envisaged by H.M.G. and the particular action contemplated to bring it into effect were set forth in the draft Declaration which Sir Stafford Cripps discussed with a number of Princes and Ministers of States. That policy implies no intention to depart from the continued observance by the Crown of its obligations by Treaty or otherwise towards the States in so far as they elect to remain outside such new constitution for India as may be devised by agreement.

(2) H.M.G. see no present reason to redefine or amplify their conception of those obligations, nor should a recent statement by the Lord Privy Seal in the House of Commons, regarding the desirability of encouraging and expediting the development in all Indian States of suitable representative institutions be taken as in any way inconsistent with them.

(3) The fact that no explicit provision was contained in the draft Declaration for the formation of any Union of non-adhering States or groups of States is

not to be taken as constituting any discrimination to the disadvantage of the States as compared with the Provinces of British India. H.M.G. recognise a direct responsibility for the form of government enjoyed in the Provinces of British India, while they have no such direct responsibility within the territories of the Rulers of the Indian States. Hence H.M.G. saw no reason at that juncture to enter into a discussion of the detailed issues involved in such a development.

[1] No. 24. [2] Vol. II, No. 115. [3] Vol. II, No. 691.
[4] The draft was in the same terms as the telegram despatched on 7 October (No. 79).

51

Government of India, Home Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&J/8/598: f 189

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *2 October 1942, 7 am*
Received: 2 October, 8.30 am

7812 Your telegram No. 16750[1] dated 24th September. Following are latest casualty figures under heads—(*a*) military (*b*) police (*c*) railways (*d*) posts and telegraphs (*e*) other services. We would emphasise that these figures are still incomplete particularly in respect of damage.

2. (*a*) (1) Numbers killed by military firing 312 (half 624). (2) Numbers wounded by military firing 151. (3) Fatal casualties suffered by military 11. (4) Non-fatal casualties suffered by military 7 in addition 3 military were killed and 27 injured in railway accidents arising out of disturbances.

(*b*) (1) Number of times police fired 367. (2) Numbers killed by police firing 474. (3) Numbers wounded by police firing 1225. (4) Fatal casualties suffered by police 34. (5) Non-fatal casualties suffered by police (plus a large number (? slightly) injured) 536. (6) Police stations damaged or destroyed 73 (half of 146).

(*?c*) (1) Fatal casualties amongst railway staff 1. (2) Railway staff injured 21. (3) Railway stations attacked and damaged or destroyed 276. (4) Derailments 45.

(*d*) (1) Posts and telegraphs staff killed nil. (2) Posts and telegraphs staff injured 33. (3) Post Offices attacked 809, 56 half of 112 destroyed and 367 seriously damaged. (4) 6,000 cases of damage to telegraph or telephone systems. (5) Loss in cash, stamps and valuables looted rupees 203,000. This does not include figures for damage to apparatus, buildings etc.

(*e*) (1) Fatal casualties among other Government servants 11. (2) Non-fatal casualties 24. (3) Other Government buildings destroyed 180.

[1] No. 23.

3. Provincial figures for arrests still not available though Central Provinces reports over 4,800. Arrests in Bombay City were 2,600 and in Delhi (? were) 453. Figures for convictions and detentions still mostly incomplete. Former totalled 2098 in 6 provinces only and latter totalled 4940 in 5 provinces only. But these figures do not include Madras, United Provinces or Bihar.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/591: ff 53–6

IMPORTANT
PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, *2 October 1942, 5.30 pm*
Received: 3 October

17195 Your personal telegram 19th August 2504-S,[1] paras. 3 and 4. Non-official Advisers. It is probable that in course of debate on Amending Bill on October 8th demand may be made for some closer association of popular opinion with Section 93 administrations. Lord President will be winding up and I am inclined to suggest that he should take line sketched in following paragraph. I should be grateful for your early comments.

2. We are anxious to get responsible government restored at earliest possible moment, and to avoid doing anything which might impede it. Governors with official advisers are perfectly competent to conduct the administration on a sound basis and they have many traditional and competent channels such as district officers, now so largely Indian, for keeping in touch with common people. The advantages of substituting non-officials for officials to advise the Governor in the discharge of his responsibility for the administration of his Province would necessarily be mainly political and no special political advantage would be achieved unless the non-officials were representative politicians. If such men were pressed to associate themselves in an executive capacity with Government not responsible to the electorate they might prejudice their prospects (and those of their parties) when government under the regular parliamentary system is restored. It has therefore seemed doubtful policy so long as Section 93 operates in a Province, to attempt to associate with the authorities on whom the administrative responsibility is devolved by that section non-official persons performing in effect the duties of Ministers. On the other hand it may well be possible that in certain Provinces there may be non-officials of standing, not associated with any of the chief political parties, but well qualified by administrative experience and their knowledge of local conditions etc. to advise Governors on general or special questions affecting the administration. It has hitherto been felt that it was unnecessary to appoint

such persons formally as advisers since Governors and officials could always go and often have gone to them for advice in any case, and it has always been hoped that Section 93 regime might end at any time. Moreover it was felt that uniformity between Provinces was desirable and that only in some Provinces would such non-officials be available. Now, however, that Section 93 is being given an extended validity (though the main objective of restoring responsible government is constantly present to the minds of Governors) and in the light of the views expressed in the debate, H.M.G. will certainly reconsider the matter in consultation with the Governor-General and Governors. Indeed, it is already under active consideration in India, and it is hoped to reach a decision very shortly.

3. Other points on which up-to-date information is likely to be demanded are number of persons interned or sentenced to imprisonment as a result of rebellion, number of casualties inflicted and suffered by police and military respectively, number of sentences of whipping carried out. Approximate figures for these would be useful.

4. Question has been mooted whether it is right that long-term application of Section 93 should be allowed to stop progress in social, economic and labour reform. I understand from Hubback that for first few months of Section 93 regime he regarded himself as mere caretaker for Ministry, but thereafter regarded himself as free to take any progressive measures which seemed to him required in this sphere. No doubt other Section 93 Governors have acted likewise, but it would be very valuable if you could collect from them short summary of action of this nature taken by them in default of ministerial advice.

Please let me have your reply not later than Tuesday night.

[1] Vol. II, No. 584.

53

Sir A. R. Mudaliar to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

INDIA OFFICE, *2 October 1942*

[The first three paras., describing matters relating to the war discussed at the Cabinet meeting on 28 September, omitted.]

The political situation in India is causing some embarrassment here owing largely to ignorant people being very vocal. In America apparently it is causing even greater embarrassment. I feel, however, that it is as much due to the coming Congress elections in that country as to any genuine apprehension

about the war position in India. The debate on India is coming on the 8th. Meanwhile Sir Stafford Cripps has been busy with all sorts of panacea. He realises now that the political tangle is such that Congress cannot be induced to accept any reasonable solution. He has started a new idea that the peasants and the workers can be brought into the war effort more vigorously if steps are taken by the Government of India both by legislation and by administrative action. If funds were the obstacle he was prepared to suggest that the British Treasury should contribute a handsome amount for the purpose. The Prime Minister, to whom these proposals were apparently put, suggested that the matter may be thrashed out at a small Sub-Committee of the War Cabinet. The Committee, consisting of Mr. Amery, Sir Kingsley Wood, Mr. Bevin and Sir Stafford Cripps, met on Tuesday. I and three of the Advisers to the Secretary of State were invited to attend the meeting. The Cripps scheme was explained to us. I had to point out that in the first place no directions could be given to the Government of India or even to the Provincial Governments by His Majesty's Government on questions of this kind. For over 20 years these matters had been solely in the discretion of the Governments in India and any direction from here is bound to be resented, particularly by Provincial Governments. In the second place both the Provincial Governments and the Central Government had recognised since the outbreak of the War that legislation for improving the conditions of labour should not be held up owing to the war conditions, and I was in a position to give instance after instance where such legislation had been put through when I was in charge of the Department, thanks mainly to the co-operation of the Provincial Governments. I also referred to the system of conferences with Provincial Governments, employers and labour leaders, first in separate blocks and now at Round Table discussions to discuss and decide on labour legislation which might be put through and I pointed out that there was no legislation which can be rushed through, which would change the situation so radically and which would be accepted and worked upon by the parties concerned. The Governments were fully seized of the question and the matter may be left to their discretion. There was a suggestion from Cripps that a large grant may be given by His Majesty's Government for the purpose of improving the conditions both of industrial labour and agricultural labour, improvement of housing conditions, irrigation facilities and so on. According to Cripps the commencement of such a grant would establish the *bona fides* of His Majesty's Government and throw the labourers wholeheartedly into the war effort and on the side of the Government. I had to say plainly that any such grant would not be received in the spirit in which it was being offered nor serve the purpose for which it was suggested. The capitalists and the Press controlled by them and the Congress would describe the act of His Majesty's Government as a "death-bed repentance" and the money granted as "conscience money". They would also say that this

was an attempt to wean the allegiance of the labourers and peasants from their natural leaders and this was bound to fail. They would also suggest that not merely the amounts so granted but more ought to be given to make up for all the past "organised loots" of the British Government. I referred to the pamphlet on "National Debt" which the Congress Economics Brains Trust had brought out some years back. I pointed out further in reply to Mr. Bevin that any direction from here to hasten up labour legislation would be interpreted by the commercial and industrial magnates as a naive attempt to recapture the lost export markets by pushing up the working costs of industry. From every point of view I deprecated both the proposal to direct the Government of India to introduce more radical labour legislation and the proposal, *prima facie* attractive, of any financial grant for that purpose. Mr. Amery told me later that Cripps was considerably shaken and I am at his instance preparing a more detailed note on the subject of recent legislation in India. This is one of the hastily conceived "brilliant" ideas of an intellectual but I am certain it will come to nothing.

54

Mr Amery to Sir S. Cripps

L/E/8/2527: f 299

INDIA OFFICE, *2 October 1942*

My dear Cripps,

Indian Social Reform

I had a word with Bevin yesterday and I think the most convenient immediate step will be for my Office in consultation with Leggett of Bevin's office to draw up a short note of such progress as has already been achieved in recent years. We four Ministers might then meet and consider submitting a report to the Prime Minister.

It is quite clear to my mind that there is nothing possible in the nature of a publicly announced policy of social reform in India as a counter-blast to the political situation. It would have no effect in weaning the peasants from Congress and would be regarded by the whole of India as contrary to all our professions—and indeed practice of more than 20 years—of encouraging India to govern herself.

Nor, of course, can there really be any question of our spending money on India's social reform, any more than on Canadian social reform. Least of all can we run that as a policy simultaneously with the policy of asking India to refund to us some of her sterling balances. Those balances would indeed afford

to India a very valuable means of raising her whole level of industrial and irrigation plant and thus incidentally also afford some employment here.

It seems to me that all that we can do in the way of positive action is to encourage the Viceroy privately to encourage in his turn his own Executive and the Section 93 Provincial Governors to be active in good works, so far as war conditions allow. It might also be a very good thing for purposes of propaganda here and in America to show the extent of the actual progress achieved in recent years and I can no doubt give some general reassurance on Thursday that this side of things is not being neglected and will not be neglected in the Section 93 Provinces.

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

55

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

CONFIDENTIAL VICEROY'S CAMP, SIMLA, *2–4 October 1942*

13. I shall be interested to see what comes out of the forthcoming debate in the Commons. I have telegraphed[1] to you and other Governors to ask for any suggestions or points which you would like to put to Amery. My own judgment of Winston's speech entirely coincides with yours,[2] and I think that it is very valuable that he should have come into the open and said exactly what he thought. I do not suppose he is likely to speak in the forthcoming debate which will, I imagine, have to be conducted by Amery; but if I am right in thinking that this debate is the result of an anxiety to some extent on the part of the Conservative back-benches to back the Prime Minister's statement, it may at any rate have the advantage of making it clear here and elsewhere that Sorensen and his friends do not represent the general mind of Parliament on the Indian problem.

[1] See No. 63. [2] See No. 30.

56

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE SIMLA, *31 October 1942, 12.30 am*
PERSONAL *Received: 2 October, 10 pm*

No. 399–S.C. Your personal No. 16781[2] dated 24th September 1942. Sterling balances.

2. It is impossible to predict with certainty precise effect on Council of communication to them of contents of your personal No. 16782.[3] Sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of your No. 16781 would of course be communicated to them simultaneously with main declaration, and this should obviate any danger of individual resignations. They would however at once recognize declaration for what it is, namely, a formal reservation by His Majesty's Government in regard to the future treatment of the debt which Britain is incurring to India under the present settlement. Majority opinion would almost certainly be that such a reservation could not be accepted, and that a vigorously argued protest or challenge should be lodged on India's behalf. My difficulties in securing acceptance of Raisman's proposals for the undertaking of additional burdens within framework of existing settlement would of course be very greatly intensified. A counterclaim would most probably be put forward for a revision of the settlement in India's favour, for the fixing of a definite monetary limit to India's defence liabilities and for His Majesty's Government to defray unconditionally all excess expenditure.

3. Most serious aspect of matter lies however in consequences which would flow from open or surreptitious publication of fact that reservation had been lodged by His Majesty's Government. It is possible, but not I think likely, that Council might ask for publication. Even if they do not, however, I regret to say that it is quite impossible to ensure that no knowledge of the fact that a reservation had been made would reach the public. We have therefore undoubtedly to reckon with the effects of the inevitable disclosure of this fact. In what follows I am stating not merely my own and Raisman's views but also those of Taylor, Governor of Reserve Bank, who has been consulted.

4. There is already much uneasiness in Indian financial and commerical circles regarding size and rate of sterling accumulations, and in various quarters suggestion has been put forward that a demand should be made for payment at

[1] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 gives the date as 2 October. The dates and times of despatch and receipt given here are taken from L/F/7/2861: f 100.

[2] No. 26. [3] No. 27.

least in part in gold or dollars, or that India should receive a guarantee against post-war depreciation of sterling. In the meantime it is claimed that sterling[4] balances should be used for acquisition of private British investments in India as well as for repatriation of all public or quasi-public debt. This attitude has already been taken up by certain members of Board of Reserve Bank. Hitherto Taylor has succeeded in preventing passing of embarrassing resolution by emphasising importance and value of sterling for post-war re-equipment and industrial expansion of India. Raisman has taken similar line in legislature. When once however knowledge of His Majesty's Government's reservation begins to percolate, it will be impossible any longer to maintain this reassuring front nor could Raisman and Taylor with their private knowledge of the position be expected to do so. Matters would undoubtedly come to a head both in the legislature and in the Board of the Reserve Bank, the Hindu majority of which has strong Congress affinities. It is difficult to foresee the exact form in which the Board would set out to create trouble, but at the least we should be faced with a widespread and insistent demand for payment in other forms. Since His Majesty's Government would, I presume, not be prepared to incur a monetary debt to America in order to gratify India's demand for dollars or gold, the Board would probably refuse to acquiesce in the continued expansion of rupee currency against sterling assets, and would resign in protest. This in turn would have its repercussions on the position of Members of Council, particularly those whose contacts are with the Hindu commercial community. These would probably find it increasingly difficult to remain in office. The fact even that His Majesty's Government had purported to deal with Council[5] on an equal footing in this matter would be travestied as a cunning device to disguise the inescapable fact that His Majesty's Government would in the final reckoning still retain its advantage in dealing with the Government of India. In the event we should find that on this issue alone we had precipitated a further political crisis of most formidable proportions, and a most serious aggravation of our existing difficulties.

5. My considered conclusion is that I must warn the War Cabinet with all the emphasis at my command against communicating this reservation to Council. It can in my opinion do no good, and on the other hand it is difficult to exaggerate the gravity of the consequences it may have on the political situation and on the industrial and commerical aspects of India's war effort. Such a *démarche* would be fraught with great perils at any time during the war, and at the present critical juncture it may well prove disastrous. I would urge with all earnestness that the question of any adjustment of the post-war obligations of Britain to India be left to be taken up, if it seems necessary or desirable, with the post-war Government of India, in the light of conditions then existing.

6. I must add finally that, as I have already indicated in paragraph 10 of my private and personal telegram No. 2828–S,[6] dated 20th September, I personally could not possibly take note of a reservation of this character which could not be communicated to Council.

[4] Deciphered as 'secret'. [5] Deciphered as '(?Governor-General)'. [6] Vol. II, No. 773.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE SIMLA, *3 October 1942, 5.25 pm*
Received: 3 October, 4.30 pm

No. 406–S.C. Your telegram No. 16828[1] dated 25th September. Apart from Andhra circular published by Madras we have not published Congress instructions here because of course they have already received wide circulation. But extracts from some of them were effectively quoted in Assembly Debate and full use could suitably be made either in Parliamentary Debate or otherwise of those contained in my next succeeding telegram.

2. *Congress responsibility.*—Gandhi, Working Committee and All-India Congress Committee are indivisible and their respective shares of responsibility cannot be separately assessed. We feel valid distinction can be made between Congress responsibility for and Congress organization of disturbances. Former is undeniable but latter is true to only limited extent. Many who deny Congress responsibility are in reality denying only Congress organization. Home Member dealt fully with Congress responsibility in his speech to Assembly[2] full Summary of which was telegraphed to Fells on 19th September and full text of which should reach you by air mail shortly. Material supporting (*a*) Congress responsibility for and (*b*) Congress organization of disturbances is recapitulated briefly below:—

(*a*) *Congress responsibility.*—(1) Wording of All-India Congress Committee Resolution of August 8th[3] sanctioning mass movement on widest possible scale in which every man and woman must function for himself or herself.

(2) Activities of Gandhi, Members of Working Committee and other leading Congressmen prior to passing of All-India Congress Committee Resolution and particularly during period after passing of

[1] No. 32. [2] *The Legislative Assembly Debates*, vol. III, 1942 (Delhi, 1942), pp. 141–51.
[3] Vol. II, No. 470

Working Committee's Resolution of July 14th.[4] *N.B.* Gandhi's writings in *Harijan*, references to anarchy,[5] to the coming struggle as "a fight to the finish" in which he would "not hesitate to run any risk however great", finally his Press interview[6] after passing of Resolution of July 14th when he said "there is no room left in the proposal for withdrawal or negotiation. There is no question of one more chance. After all it is an open rebellion . . . My intention is to make it as short and swift as possible." Speeches of Rajendra Prasad,[7] Shankar Rao Deo, Vallabhbhai Patel,[8] Jawaharlal Nehru[9] and others also make it clear that coming struggle would be on widest possible scale and that Congress would not be deterred in this fight to a finish by violence or by Chauri-Chaura[10] incidents. These leaders also made particular point of approaching students; thus Patel and Shankar Rao Deo publicly exhorted Bombay students to assume leadership should Gandhi and other leaders be arrested, to discard studies and to take an active part in movement; in Bihar Congress ex-Premier and others urged students to join the "thick of the fray"; in Eastern United Provinces Nehru concentrated on students particularly Benares Hindu University. Finally Abul Kalam Azad in speech on July 17th said "we will not be responsible for the masses who may turn violent".

(3) It is commonly said by those who would absolve Congress of responsibility that disturbances were spontaneous outbursts arising from arrest of Congress leaders. Disturbances, however, clearly lacked main features of spontaneity. Thus they occurred mainly in strategic areas; they began simultaneously with similar objectives in widely separated areas not on day of arrests but two or three days later; objects of attack were mainly essential communications and Government property with on the whole notable absence of looting of private property which is of particular significance in view of large criminal element involved; many acts, particularly sabotage of railways and roads, displayed technical knowledge and those concerned must have been provided with necessary tools; there was marked absence of sabotage of valuable machinery and plant in factories even where strikes occurred; finally absence of communal trouble must be put down largely to disciplined abstention from interference with Muslims.

(*b*) *Congress organization.*—(1) Written instructions for carrying on movement issued by Congress, of which best example is Andhra circular. This was brought up to date after Bombay All-India Congress Committee meeting and full copy follows in my next succeeding telegram.

(2) Immediately after arrests, unarrested members of All-India Congress Committee met in Bombay where alleged last message from Gandhi was read, to effect that every man was now free to go to fullest lengths by non-violent means including complete deadlock and strikes and ending with words "do or die". A twelve-point programme was drawn up and copies taken by members present for distribution in respective Provinces; this programme is briefly summarised in my next succeeding telegram.

(3) Many local Congress workers particularly in the most affected Provinces went underground to evade arrest and continue organization of movement. Many known Congressmen have been prominent in many of the worst disturbances.

(4) Signs of discipline referred to in (*a*) (3) above.

3. *Subversive organizations.*—Indian independence is common aim of all subversive organizations which vary only in methods adopted to gain this end. So far as we know all subversive organizations in areas affected except Communists (though individual rank-and-file Communists did in some cases take part) supported Congress move and took part in disturbances as heaven sent opportunity to achieve their major aim. It is of note that Bihar and Eastern United Provinces where disturbances were most serious is an area in which terrorist organizations are strong, while Benares Hindu University whose prominent part in movement has been reported to you is well-known for its revolutionary connections. The existing underground network of these organizations undoubtedly added to seriousness of movement in this area. Congress may not have directly instigated these organizations to take violent action but must have been well aware that they would do so. Specific mention can be made of Congress Socialists and Forward Bloc. Former were active in preparing for movement in Bombay, Central Provinces, United Provinces and Bihar, particular attention being paid to propaganda among students. Yusuf Mehrali, Bombay leader, issued programme for movement stressing need for individual initiative and urging usual features such as mass strikes, boycott, interference with communications, &c.; since beginning of disturbances, numerous instructions believed to emanate from Congress Socialists have been seen advocating resort to violence on widest scale. Forward Bloc came out in support of campaign in Bihar, Central Provinces and United Provinces and

[4] Vol. II, No. 265. [5] See Vol. II, Nos. 67, 81, 134, 144, 150 App. III, and 171.
[6] See Vol. II, No. 275. [7] See Vol. II, No. 508. [8] See Vol. II, Nos. 380, 413, and 624.
[9] See Vol. II, No. 219.
[10] Gandhi's inauguration of a civil disobedience movement in February 1922 was followed almost at once by an incident in which a mob at Chauri-Chaura, a village in the United Provinces, attacked and set fire to a police station, killing or burning to death 22 constables. Gandhi thereupon summoned a meeting of the Congress Working Committee and had a resolution passed suspending civil disobedience.

have been conducting underground propaganda in form of leaflets, &c. advocating violence. Prominent local part played by Hindustan Red Army, affiliated to Forward Bloc in Central Provinces, has been reported in daily telegrams from that Province.

4. *Enemy Agency.*—Position as given in paragraph 4 of Home Department telegram No. 6664,[11] dated 22nd August, and amplified in their telegram No. 6855,[12] dated 28th August, still obtains. We have still no direct evidence to support this theory but certainly we are not prepared to discard its possibility and there is the fact that the large numbers of refugees from Burma almost certainly included some Japanese agents.

[11] Vol. II, No. 621, note 2.

[12] Stating that their intelligence agencies were devoting all their energies to further enquiries into the possibility of Japanese influence in the disturbances, but they were not yet in a position to give a considered view of the extent to which it may have been at work. L/P&J/8/617: f 311.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE SIMLA, 3 *October 1942, 5.5 pm*
Received: 3 October, 3 pm

No. 407-S.C. Reference my immediately preceding telegram. Congress organization of movement. Following is full translation of revised Andhra Congress Committee circular.[1]—

Begins. Programme of work for the attainment of complete independence.

1. Cutting off of all telephone and telegraph wires.
2. Removal of rails, wherever possible, and demolition of bridges, red flags being posted (at place where demolition work is undertaken) to avert possible danger to human life.
3. Travelling in trains without tickets and pulling the chains to stop trains.
4. Visiting military camps and telling the military[2] personnel to leave their jobs.
5. Visiting Police and other Government offices and forcing Government servants to resign their jobs.
6. Yarn and grains to be collected in villages which are self-sufficient.
7. Running our own post offices and arranging for prompt delivery of letters.
8. Picketing the law courts, occupying the seat of the magistrate and performing his functions and also settling disputes with the help of panchayats.

9. Not to pay land tax, sales tax, &c.
10. To arrange to inform the village munsiffs and karnams that British rule in India has come to an end and that India has attained independence.
11. If the village officers refuse to believe the above, they should be replaced by new officers.
12. If, however, replacement of the village officers by new ones is not practicable, they should be disowned by the villagers.
13. To organise *hartals* and news propaganda centres.
14. To organise picketing toddy and attack [arrack?] depôts, foreign cloth shops and Government offices.
15. To pass, if necessary, no-confidence motions against Government servants.
16. To impede the war efforts of the Government.
17. To tell the shop-keepers that British Government is no more in India and that the panchayat system of Government has taken its place.
18. Ryots and merchants to refuse to pay any kind of tax to the Government.
19. To arrange to prepare a seal, on the model of that of the Government of India, bearing the inscription "Government of Free India" or "Swarajya Sarkar" and use it.
20. To run parallel Government in competition with the British Government.
21. British currency notes have no value hereafter. Exchange your currency notes for silver coins.

Message delivered by Mahatma Gandhi while going to the jail—

1. That every Indian should, from this day onward, regard himself as an independent man and his country as an independent country.
2. That every Indian should think that he is free to do anything in a non-violent manner to free his country from the fetters of bondage.
3. That they should paralyse the British Government in India.
4. That *Satyagrahis* should sacrifice their lives in this struggle.
5. That India will attain freedom if *Satyagrahis* are prepared to invite and face death.
6. Do: Die: Either you must die in this struggle or attain independence for the country. Awake, arise and wait no more.

"Andhra Province Congress Committee". *Ends.*

Following is summary of A.–I.C.C.'s twelve-point programme, in which preamble states that with arrest of Gandhi every man and woman in India is his successor and victory or death be their motto.

(1) Country-wide *hartal* with meetings in villages and cities to deliver the "quit India" message. If meetings are banned, bans should be resisted.

[1] A summary of the earlier version of this circular is in Vol. II, No. 407.
[2] Deciphered as '(?training)'.

(2) Free manufacture of salt and resistance to salt laws.
(3) Complete "non-violent non-co-operation" with administration including no-rent campaign.
(4) Call to students, whose sacred duty it is to awaken the country. Students cannot be passive spectators but must leave their colleges and Universities to take the place of arrested leaders and conduct the non-violent struggle to its victorious conclusion.
(5) Government servants are asked whether they will betray their country by supporting the alien Government in this struggle. Those who have not the courage to resign and join the movement should at least refuse to carry out repressive orders.
(6) Every soldier should consider himself a Congressman and disobey any order which goes against his Congress conscience.
(7) Peoples of the Indian States must make common cause with the people of India in the struggle.
(8) Women have a decisive rôle and must be prepared for sacrifice and suffering.
(9) Every man and woman must carry a badge bearing the motto "do or die" to proclaim determination to be free or to perish in the attempt.
(10) All communities must participate in the struggle.
(11) The objective is the ending of foreign rule. Whatever helps in the attainment of that objective is permissible subject to condition of non-violence. People in the Provinces must devise ways of paralysing the administration. Each man is his own guide and leader; he must assert that he is a free man and banish fear.
(12) Last but not least "let us not forget spinning so dear to Gandhiji". "Do or die".

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/10/17: f 214

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *31 October 1942*

1196. Cabinet were disturbed by Halifax's telegram of 15th September repeated to Foreign Delhi No. 229,[2] regarding deterioration of American opinion on India and invited me to give a broadcast to U.S. which I hope to do soon after Thursday's debate. It has since been suggested to me from more than one source, and one of them a Canadian recently returned from U.S.A., that I should fly over there and make contact with President and State Department, and also give some public addresses with the frankly avowed object of explain-

ing British point of view and risks involved for successful conduct of war in premature move in direction of "national government." I have put this idea to Eden who was favourably impressed by it. I should be glad if you would let me have your opinion of it urgently as most suitable time would be about 25th of this month and if idea commends itself to War Cabinet there is not too much time to approach U.S.A. authorities and make arrangements.

[1] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 gives the date as 4 October.
[2] Vol. II, No. 749; the date should be 16 September.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/7/3350: f 136

IMPORTANT PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, *3 October 1942, 3.45 pm*
Received: 4 October

17254. Parliamentary question for next Thursday asks what leaders of unofficial Indian opinion has the Viceroy met since 8th August: what was the nature of such discussions and whether he has refused to grant any such interviews. Second question for same day asks what plans were discussed for ending present deadlock at meeting between you and Mookerjee and what developments have taken place since that interview. I have of course your telegrams Nos. 2743[1] and 2778-S[2] of 10th and 14th September, but perhaps you would be good enough to suggest replies to both questions.

[1] Vol. II, No. 722. [2] Vol. II, No. 741.

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Sir S. Cripps to Mr Amery

L/E/8/2527: f 298

RSC: PH

GWYDYR HOUSE, WHITEHALL, S.W.I, *3 October 1942*

My Dear Amery

Indian Social Reform

Thank you for your letter of 2 October.[1]

I agree as to the immediate step, except that I would like one of my staff to be in on these consultations, and I think David Owen would be best for the purpose. Perhaps you will arrange this.

[1] No. 54.

When we have the report which should also include any suggestions of future action—apart from political considerations—we could then discuss the matter again.

Yours,

STAFFORD CRIPPS

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL VICEROY'S CAMP, SIMLA, *3 October 1942*

I did not write to you last week as I was on my way up to Simla and had a particularly heavy programme before leaving Delhi. It is very pleasant up here and a great change after a summer spent, with the exception of three or four days, entirely in the heat of the plains, while the pressure of work is less great and one is free from some of the mass of interviews that take up so much time when one is at headquarters.

2. I have nothing very much to say in this letter. I hope that the debate will go well on the 6th. I have sent you off today a quantity of material prepared by the Home Department which will I hope be useful, and I shall be sending you[1] today or tomorrow a précis of, or extracts from, the views of Governors whom I thought it well to consult in case they should have any points which they thought worth putting to you in connection either with the recent Congress uprising or the situation generally. The main point which I shall emphasize again in my telegram to you and to which I know you are fully alive, is that we should not let the impression get about that the trouble is all over.

3. I fear that we have been a great nuisance to you about relations with the United States, the representation of the United States in India, and our own representation in Washington. I have every sympathy with the Embassy and I know the difficulties that they have to face. Nothing could be much harder than to get across to an ignorant and inevitably somewhat prejudiced public the facts about a situation so complicated as the situation in India. It is hard enough, goodness knows, to get the facts of that situation across even at home, where after all one can expect the general public to be more familiar with the background, and I do not envy Halifax and his helpers their task. For all that I am very clear in my own mind that it will be the greatest mistake to allow ourselves to be pushed into handling this business at someone else's pace, or on lines laid down by someone else; and I hope that we shall be able to stand firm about it. As for our representation, I of course know Bajpai very well and like

him very much: but he has always been keenly interested in his own status and position, and I doubt very much if he is likely to act as a brake on those who feel that the Agent-General ought to be a Minister, or even an Ambassador, and not merely Agent-General! But to concede the principle of Ministerial representation here and in the United States would raise very awkward questions for us, and might, in my judgment, be extremely embarrassing at this stage. I hope therefore that it will be possible to resist it, and so far as this end is concerned, you may be certain that I shall continue to resist it with all possible vigour.

4. Zafrulla should be back here in a few days from China, and I shall be interested to hear his impressions, though from what I gather he has found the Chinese somewhat irritating! That is not altogether surprising. It is an experience which we have had ourselves from time to time. Talking of which, I hope that the material which Laithwaite, on my instructions, has sent to Monteath about this proposal for the location of a large Chinese force at Ramgarh may be of some use to you at home. I was frankly very relieved to get Monteath's telegram, for it showed me that you and the India Office share my apprehensions as to the political implications of this move. Wavell of course has merely to test the position from the military point of view, and on that his opinion must carry the greatest possible weight. But such familiarity as I have with Chinese methods in the past in the diplomatic field leaves me with the very strong impression that they regard this as a good opportunity to consolidate their own position in relation to the future of Burma.[2]

5. Talking of which, you will separately have had my telegram[3] suggesting that Indian interest in the decision on that latter problem is likely to be serious, and likely also to be embarrassing to His Majesty's Government. I have suggested that it might be well if I and my successor were kept in touch with the mind of the War Cabinet as matters proceed regarding it, as that may assist us a little to keep things on the right lines. But I am perfectly certain that India, which has never been (as the problem of Indians overseas shows) at all tolerant

[1] Nos. 63 and 64.

[2] On 26 September General Sibert, General Stilwell's deputy in Delhi, informed General Wavell that Chiang Kai-shek proposed to send an additional 8,000 or more Chinese troops to Ramgarh to be equipped from American lease-lend stores and to be trained with the Chinese troops already there. General Wavell had no objection to the proposal so long as he did not have to provide equipment or transport; but Lord Linlithgow warned Mr Amery that it might lead to political embarrassments, more particularly to Chinese claims regarding Burma if a substantial Chinese force based on India had assisted in its reconquest. Sir D. Monteath thereupon informed Sir G. Laithwaite (telegram 1188 of 1 October) that the matter was to be examined at departmental level on the following afternoon, and asked him to indicate very urgently 'any aspects of immediate as against post-war political disadvantage' in the Chinese proposal. Sir G. Laithwaite replied in telegram 393–S.C. of 2 October, to which Lord Linlithgow refers above. MSS. EUR. F. 125/23.

[3] Telegram 388–S.C. of 4 October. MSS. EUR. F. 125/23.

of the views of other parts of the Empire, or of other countries, though exceedingly sensitive about her own rights, will weigh in heavily on the question of the position of Indians in Burma, the provision of labour, the provision of capital (so far as both labour and capital are to be found from India) and the relation to the defence of India, of the Burma position; and no arguments based on the status of Burma, the possibilities of its developing to a dominion, or anything of that nature are going to cut any ice. That is one of the problems inherent in the policy of His Majesty's Government for securing constitutional advance for India, and they will have to face it when the time comes. But it is well that they should have it in mind now. I shall be interested incidentally to see what reactions are at home to the points taken by Wavell in relation to the administration of Burma after its reoccupation and the substitution of a military Governor.

[Para. 6, on the future of the Eastern Group Supply Council, omitted.]

7. I broke my journey from Delhi to Simla to spend a day with His Highness of Patiala. I thought him improved, and I still think he is a very great deal better than his father, though of course none of us can guarantee how a Ruler of this type will develop. He was much more ready to listen, and though he is still, and I suspect will remain, rather vain and oversure of himself, I think that he has a good deal in him that gives ground for hope. He took one point of importance, which I think is worth putting on record, in connection with the recent disturbances. It reflects to some extent on our organisation here, and I will take steps to remedy it to such extent as I can. We have had a somewhat parallel difficulty over relations between Bihar and Nepal. Patiala's complaint was that during these recent very serious disturbances the States had been left far too much in the air; that he had himself a big State bordering on some of the more difficult areas which might have been affected by these disturbances; but that he had not been kept in touch with the position in Bihar and other parts of India, had had no regular explanations of how things were going from Government, and had been given no chance to put his house in order in case an emergency should arise in Patiala. In the old days, when we had been here with every prospect of remaining here indefinitely, and were prepared ourselves to look after and safeguard the interests of the States, that state of things was all right and perfectly understandable. But that was not the position now. Every day we advertised our impending departure, and every day we weakened our grip over India as a whole and more especially over British India. At the same time we depended greatly on the Princes: the Princes, as we had publicly admitted, had done an immense amount for us in the war, both directly and indirectly; they had kept their States quiet; they had prevented a dangerous situation from developing in those States; they had helped us with money and with men, and done everything they could to encourage war effort; and they

were entitled to claim in these circumstances, particularly where an anti-British movement in British India was concerned, that they ought to be taken into greater confidence. He quite accepted that it would be absurd to take small States (or even certain of the larger States) into our confidence; but we could easily use our discretion as to whom we kept in touch or whom we consulted.

8. I told the Maharaja that I thought his point was a good one, and that, while I would not say what could be done and while the problem was not nearly so easy as it looked, I would consult my advisers with a view to the future. I added that the main difficulty was that we had to cater for such political changes as might emerge in a short while; and that one had to bear in mind also what a Ministerial government at the Centre would be prepared to work to, and what could be advised having due regard to the British India of the future; and to the fact that whatever we might now be able to bring about might not be relied on to survive the expected constitutional changes. His Highness said that he had no desire, of course, to get into matters of high policy, and he agreed that provincial C.I.Ds. bordering on his State kept him in very close touch with all that type of information. At the same time he repeated that he, and he was sure others of the Princes, did not feel that they were sufficiently, or sufficiently authoritatively, in touch with what was going on outside; and at a time when, as he said, "we, the States, are surrounded by enemies, and when the intentions of His Majesty's Government and their policy was far from clear or reassuring, it was all the more important that we should have some warning in advance".

9. As I say, I think there is force in this point, and I will try to meet it. The fact is that this is the first disturbance of this type and on this scale that there has been for very many years, and we have had to buy a certain amount of experience in various respects during its course. The Nepalese complaints that they have been completely isolated owing to the state of rebellion in north Bihar, and that there had not been sufficiently close co-operation from the Bihar Government, are another facet of the same problem, and represent a point which again we shall have to take steps to deal with. But the general issue as affecting the Princes, who, so far as I can judge, are unable to see this country without Great Britain in the background, becomes no easier from day to day. We have to a large extent emasculated them; we have refused to allow them to raise troops or to arm themselves; we have given them assurances of protection, and we have in fact protected them against one another, against invasion from outside, and against British India. The continuance of effective protection against British India, if our present policy remains unchanged, is going to be the most difficult of any to solve in a practical way. But we may well have to contemplate, if we are going to implement our promises, a very much greater discretion to the Princes as regards raising troops of their own

and arming them, unpalatable as any such decision will be to the critics and the enemies of the Princes in British India.

[Paras. 10–12 on the future employment of the Chief Justice of Burma; paras. 13–14 on the Indian Seamen's Home at Calcutta; and para. 15 on the Revenue Commissioner, Orissa, omitted.]

16. You and I are hard at it by telegram about this tiresome business of Allah Bakhsh and his decorations.[4] I am most grateful for your help and advice. I dare say that we shall come in for a certain amount of sniping when the decision is taken, but whatever the doubts I may have felt in the first instance as to the wise course, they are now removed and I am sure that we have no option but to go ahead. I very much hope that Dow will be able to keep a Ministry together, and have no early relapse into Section 93.

[Para. 17, on the Sukkur Barrage, omitted.]

18. My Council are now scattered to the four corners of India on tours connected with their Departmental work. I am all for this—the more they show themselves, and the more also that they get on their feet and explain our policy and their attitude, the better. I still regard them as the best team that could be got together, and though their quality is very uneven, they are a competent and responsible body, though the situation often has its humorous side, and the unhappy Governor-General has to do a good deal of the work. You would have been amused the other day to see Jogendra Singh, who had fought shy for several days of bringing up in Council the papers about the Amendment of the Alienation Act, because he could not understand them, finally coming to the point—on the strength, I understand, of an assurance from Sultan Ahmed that it was all right, and that he would help Jogendra Singh out—and endeavouring to explain the issue to his colleagues. As part of his case, he started with immense gusto, to read out the relevant Section of the Government of India Act, and having first chosen the wrong Section and got well into it before his attention was diverted, he then, having found the right Section, read far beyond the relevant portions of it, to the speechless indignation of Spence, my Legislative Secretary, who is also Secretary of the Council, and who had been partly responsible for briefing the Honourable Member. A still more pathetic case (and I may say a very disappointing one) was the complete inability of Sarker, on two successive occasions, to hold his ground on this most important business of food policy, wheat, &c. with the result that by way of helping him out I had, on both occasions, to take charge of his case and make an extemporary presentation of it to get him through. "That is the act of a true friend" said Sarker afterwards, with his customary emotion. But though that may be so, it is not the business of the Governor-General! Even Sultan Ahmed who, being a lawyer in extensive practice, one might have expected

to know better, distinguished himself the other day by an active protest (in connection with the Ahmedabad mill strike) against our signing an ordinance while the Legislature was in Session. What in fact was under discussion, as was perfectly clear from papers that had been circulated and as Sultan Ahmed had to admit, was an addition to the Rules under the Defence of India Act, which had nothing whatever to do with the Legislature. Mohammad Usman can, on the other hand, be relied on to produce, in any circumstances, sentiments (which to his credit he is perfectly prepared to support in public) so conservative, as almost to be an embarrassment! But taking them all in all they are not a bad lot, and as I have said often I should find it very difficult to improve on them.

5 October 1942

19. As I close this letter (the bag has been advanced a day) I receive your letter of the 16th September.[5] I cannot comment on it this week but will in my next letter. I have asked Hallett to come up for two or three days, and he arrived last night. He is in very good form, and it is quite obvious that he has got his situation, which he has in my judgment handled with great competence, extremely well in hand. I find him, on one small point, very definitely of opinion that it will be a waste of time, and get us no thanks, to work in non-official advisers in the Section 93 Provinces, and I told him of the recommendation I had made on that subject to you in my telegram of yesterday;[6] talking of which, I am sorry to have burdened your cypher department with so much material over the week-end, but I think you will prefer to run no risks of having any gaps in the information available to you.

Best luck.

[4] Khan Bahadur Allah Bakhsh, Premier of Sind, informed Lord Linlithgow in a letter of 19 September that he had decided to renounce his titles of Khan Bahadur and O.B.E. in protest against British policy in denying freedom to India. After some initial hesitation (see No. 69, note 4) Mr Amery and Lord Linlithgow concluded that this action was inconsistent with Allah Bakhsh's position as Minister. L/P&J/8/647.

[5] Vol. II, No. 753. [6] No. 65.

63

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 4[1] *October 1942, 2.50 am*
PERSONAL *Received: 4 October, 12.55 am*

No. 414–S.C. I thought it well to ask Governors[2] whether there were any points which they thought worth putting to you in connection with the forthcoming debate. I told them that I proposed to bring out to you the importance of avoiding giving the impression that this performance is over and that we have seen the last of it. I have had all their replies and summarise or quote from them below.

2. There is general agreement as to great importance of avoiding any suggestion that we are out of the wood.

3. *Hope* suggests that if there is comment on restrictions placed on Press he thinks it well worth emphasising how considerably various manifestations of the movement, violent and otherwise, have spread and been augmented by quantity and nature of publicity given in the nationalist Press.

4. *Glancy* comments that the Sikhs are a potential source of trouble in the Punjab, and suggests that I might put it to you that you should avoid any such presentation of Pakistan issue as might arouse Sikh feeling and embarrass Provincial Government. Specific mention of Sikhs should, he thinks, be avoided, as there are many pitfalls.

5. I repeat Hallett's views in my immediately following telegram.

6. *Dow* remarks that even in Sind the movement is not finished and that efforts are being made to keep things simmering, with something more than passive sympathy from Hindu Press and Ministers and now from Allah Bakhsh. He adds that undoubtedly Martial Law[3] and floods are largely responsible for freedom of Province outside Karachi from disturbance, and present demand for restriction of Martial Law is motivated by desire for political agitation in other large towns coupled with fear of swifter and severer penalties under Martial Law.

7. *Twynam* states that Ram Rao Deshmukh, Member of the[4] National Defence Council, has emphasised two points.

(*a*) That Gandhi staged the movement in order to cover up his traces in connection with part he took in securing rejection of Cripps proposals and to divert attention from ensuing rifts in Congress party and so re-establish a united front. Twynam remarks that this is a common-place, but that Gandhi

has certainly succeeded in re-establishing bitterness against Britain as platform on which Congress unity rests.

(*b*) That Working Committee expected an even greater response than actually materialised; and this explains apparent foolhardiness of their policy. They expected the movement to be followed by further gestures of appeasement.

8. I repeat Stewart's views in my immediately following telegram.

9. *Cunningham* comments that the less said about the failure of Congress in the North-West Frontier Province the better. Emphasis will only stimulate Abdul Ghaffar Khan to further efforts. He adds that many people both Muslim and Hindu who are unquestionably friendly to British but who also have nationalist aspirations criticise Prime Minister's speech as betraying his lack of sympathy with any kind of constitutional advance for India, and that anything that can be done to remedy this would be valuable.

10. *Herbert* remarks that distressing feature of the movement has been incitement of unsophisticated elements for example Santhals[5] to violence, which may persist as a habit, and the utilisation of economic difficulties such as shortage of grain and high prices, for incitement to looting and commission of outrages. The movement has not been permitted to develop in Bengal, a great help to this end has been the closing of educational institutions and hostels which were hotbeds of agitation. Sporadic violence, however, continues in outlying[6] thanas and there remains the danger that terrorism, the seeds of which are always latent in Bengal, may be encouraged to reappear.

11. *Lumley* hopes there will be no weakening in our attitude towards this Congress movement but thinks that abuse of Congress is so easily turned into denial of national aspirations that it is best avoided. "We do not want to make it more difficult for those outside Congress to stick to us, and they are apt to regard abuse of Congress in Parliament as foreshadowing reactionary policy."

12. *Lewis* states that experience in Orissa within the last few days indicates how rapidly trouble can spread to areas hitherto free of disturbances, and thinks it important to remove impression that these disorders can now be treated as finished.

[1] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 gives the date as 3 October. The dates and times of despatch and receipt given here are taken from L/P&J/8/598: f 194.

[2] Lord Linlithgow's telegram 373–S.C. of 30 September to all Governors and the Governors' replies are in MSS. EUR. F. 125/110.

[3] That part of the Province of Sind lying north of Hyderabad and east of the Indus was placed under Martial Law on 1 June 1942 owing to the criminal activities of the Hurs, a professedly Muslim sect.

[4] 'Member of the' deciphered as 'denouncing'.

[5] A tribe of Chota Nagpur, Bihar, and Bengal.

[6] Deciphered as 'populous'.

13. *Clow* attaches importance to avoiding impression that we propose to wait passively during the war for agreement between major political parties which Indian public, knowing that it is impossible, will regard as evidence of lack of good faith. Herbert suggests that we should try to counter Congress propaganda to the effect that even if Indians agree about future constitution Britain will refuse to accept proposals. I need make no comment about either of these propositions. You are the best judge of how to handle the debate.

14. I have nothing to add to the above. If you have trouble in the debate about shooting from the air it may be worth saying that in many cases this action was taken against mobs engaged in tearing up lines on vital strategic railways in areas which ground forces could not reach owing to interruption of rail communication[7] by sabotage and of road communication by destruction of road culverts and by extensive flooding. But this is not true of all cases in which firing occurred from aircraft. In any event I think you may feel able to avoid the least suggestion of apology for air[8] action which was used with utmost care and moderation, and which has proved extremely effective in several most awkward situations.

[7] 'of rail communication' omitted in decipher. [8] Deciphered as 'our'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

NEW DELHI, 4[1] *October 1942, 6.30 am*
Received: 4 October, 10.15 am

No. 415-S.C. My immediately preceding telegram. Hallett's telegram No. G.-284 dated 1st October:—

Begins. Your telegram No. 373[2] dated September 30th. Conditions in the United Provinces though not unsatisfactory are by no means normal and possibility of recrudescence must not be overlooked. In particular[3] Congress agitation will continue so long as Congressmen believe in[4] impending negotiation with Congress. Recrudescence would be almost certain if Japan attacked India, even comparatively slight air raid. Recrudescence must be regarded as possible because: (*a*) some organisers still at liberty, e.g., Gairola, &c. of Benares University, (*b*) bomb outrages of which most serious was that at Aligarh to which Secretary of State might refer, (*c*) agitation maintained by students Universities and to lesser extent schools though in this sense we seem better than other Provinces, (*d*) encouragement given to criminal classes by rebellion (attempted escape from Muzaffarnagar Jail fortunately stopped by

courage and determination of subordinate police officers was no doubt organised by notorious dacoit who thought present conditions suitable for his plan of escape), (*c*) sporadic instances of minor sabotage such as cutting of telephone lines. Conditions also cannot be regarded as normal till railway traffic becomes normal and night-running of trains both here and in other Provinces becomes usual. Reports from other provinces show larger degree of recrudescence than we have yet experienced. *Ends.*

Stewart's telegram No. 123 dated 1st October:—

Begins. Your telegram No. 373–S.C. Indian Debate. I respectfully agree that Your Excellency should impress on the Secretary of State that though we are now on the top we are still relying on the support of troops and must continue to do so for some time. Sporadic incidents and the spate of subversive pamphlets indicate that there is still more ferment below the surface. In Bihar the military implications of outbreak have been if anything more important than the civil but I doubt whether it would be discreet to emphasise this point. I should therefore suggest a concatenation [concentration?] on disability[5] suffered by the civil population. Apart from the necessary denial of conveniences which had become its daily life, e.g., railway travel and posts and telegraphs, the supply position which was already difficult has been enormously aggravated. *Ends.*

[1] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 gives the date as 3 October. The dates and times of despatch and receipt given here are taken from L/P&J/8/598: f 195.

[2] See No. 63, note 2. [3] 'In particular' deciphered as 'Divisions of'.

[4] In decipher '(? Secretary of State for India's)' was inserted here.

[5] 'disability' was received corrupt.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

SIMLA, 4[1] *October 1942, 1.20 am*
Received: 4 October, 12.30 am

No. 416–S.C. Your personal telegram of 2nd October No. 17195.[2]

2. *Paragraph 4.*—I have telegraphed to Governors and will telegraph once I get their replies.

3. *Paragraph 3.*—I think that you have got most of the material necessary, but am checking and will supplement as may be needed.

[1] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 gives the date as 3 October. The dates and times of despatch and receipt given here are taken from L/P&J/8/591: ff 48–9.

[2] No. 52.

4. *Non-official Advisers.* I repeat in my immediately following telegram my circular telegram to Governors of 25th August, No. 2582–S[3] personal. Their replies[4] as received have been sent to you. As you will see, Madras was strongly in favour of non-official Advisers now, and alternatively of non-official *plus* official Advisers. Lumley thought non-official Advisers *plus* official Advisers the most workable device, but commented that it was difficult to obtain non-official representatives of any weight and thought it too early to make any changes now. He would have liked to bring in all non-Congress parties, including the Muslim League. Hallett considered impossibility of expecting non-official Advisers to deal adequately with law and order conclusive argument against change to purely non-official Advisers in present circumstances, and even in normal conditions thought that they would accomplish little owing to their poor quality and the fact that without the League the only strong party from which to draw was the Mahasabha. Until the internal situation was cleared he thought it essential to use best material possible, and on that account did not favour mixed team at present. Stewart favoured non-official *plus* official Advisers (you and I have been in correspondence separately[5] as regards possible team), but doubted whether any non-officials would join at present. It is fair to add in this case that Darbhanga seems to have done very little during recent disorders, and S. P. Narain Sinha to have been extremely wobbly. Cunningham would see no objection to the appointment of non-official Adviser in addition to his official Adviser, but thought the appointment of a non-official Adviser would have small effect politically in the Province. Twynam remains, so far as I know, of opinion that it would be well at once to add two non-official Advisers to his two official Advisers whom he would retain.

5. In the light of these reactions I thought it well to ask those Governors[6] who were not in favour of an immediate move of this nature to what extent they anticipated any embarrassment were we to abandon the principle of uniformity and let Provinces go their own way either on the basis, (*a*) of entirely non-official Advisers: or (*b*) of a combination of official and non-official Advisers.

6. Their replies,[7] which have been sent to you by mail as received are as follows: Hallett sees little harm in abandoning uniformity given the variations in conditions between Provinces, provided that if non-officials are appointed in any Province no suggestion whatever should be made that principle was being adopted applicable to Provinces but that it was an arrangement made by the Governor in the light of local conditions. He added that he thought it very probable that in Provinces no one would be anxious to take over the law and order subjects unless they had ulterior motives of helping Congress, an attitude which seemed to him to underlie recent statements of the Hindu

Mahasabha and other leaders. "They might press for non-officials for certain subjects, but their demand would be opposed by Muslim League which in this Province represents practically all Muslims. Thus whatever Madras or the Central Provinces do, it will be desirable for us to avoid following suit, and I think we could do so without much difficulty." Stewart thought that if Hope and Twynam were allowed to go ahead on the lines discussed above, his position would be most difficult if he did not follow either one or the other. In such circumstances, while public opinion would probably favour a completely non-official team, there would not, he thought, be overmuch criticism if he followed the Central Provinces (officials *plus* non-officials) rather than Madras (non-officials), a course which the Governor would greatly prefer. Cunningham would see no embarrassment in departure from uniformity elsewhere, and would propose one official and one Muslim non-official Adviser if it were decided to proceed with the scheme. Lumley, to whose views I attach great importance and who has a very difficult Province to manage, remarked that he would expect considerable pressure from elements inclined to support Government if any other Province added non-official to official Advisers, and doubted if it would be possible to resist such pressure without risking loss of their support. He added that it would in his judgment be embarrassing if one Province discarded officials for non-officials. Bombay considered itself progressive and would want to follow suit. Possibly non-officials might refuse to join an official *plus* non-official team if another Province had non-officials only. His own view was in favour of uniformity, but he repeated his objections to any change at this juncture: (*a*) because he would not expect to secure non-officials who would command much weight; (*b*) because a mediocre team would be anxious to secure public favour and would probably tend to weaken in dealing with civil disobedience. His general conclusion was in favour of waiting to see further developments before making any change. Herbert, who might be concerned if Bengal passed into Section 93, favours a mixture of official and non-official Advisers.[8] I have not consulted him about uniformity.

7. I do not myself attach decisive importance to the argument of uniformity in principle, but I will confess to being moved by the argument put up by Lumley. I cannot help but being moved also by the consciousness that in Bihar there is going to be great difficulty in getting a team that is worth while, and that clearly Lumley would anticipate similar difficulty in Bombay. These are all factors suggesting the need for caution and, given the reactions generally of Governors, I would not be disposed in any circumstances to go, in the light

[3] Vol. II, No. 627. [4] L/P&J/8/591: ff 64 and 69–73; MSS. EUR. F. 125/110.
[5] See Vol. II, Nos. 584, 597, para. 2, 603 and 701, para. 7.
[6] In telegram 2759–S of 11 September. MSS. EUR. F. 125/110.
[7] L/P&J/8/591: ff 59–62; MSS. EUR. F. 125/110. [8] L/P&J/8/591: f 57.

of the views recorded above, beyond a mixture of non-official and official Advisers. I doubt very much whether such a mixture will have the least general political value. It certainly will not satisfy those elements in my own Council who are anxious to see non-official opinion more closely associated—as you will remember, those who were in favour of a change in the Section 93 Provinces were without exception in favour of complete elimination of officials.[9] Moreover Congress would be out of court and we cannot hope for Muslim League's co-operation save on terms which we could not accept. Whether in those circumstances it is worth going ahead at all seems to me extremely doubtful: but my mind is open, and I shall be very ready to consider further, in the light of your views and any views that may be expressed by the Cabinet. If you and they thought it well to take the chances, then I have no doubt that Lumley would waive his objections, and I should not feel sufficiently strongly to press mine.

8. It is obvious in the circumstances described that we cannot be too positive or forthcoming on this subject in the House. I should be inclined to weight the arguments against rather more strongly than your draft suggests. I would bring out in particular that there is little political value in non-official Advisers unless they represent the major political parties, and that the same difficulties that have prevented us from giving effect to our anxiety to see India progress in the constitutional field at the Centre crop up here again in a slightly different form (you and I know that the Moderates are worth nothing in this business, and whether as non-official Advisers or otherwise are likely to be more a help than hindrance [*sic*] since they will continually be anxious to try to justify their defection from the pure nationalist cause by securing, under threat of resignation, some political concessions from us which the circumstances of the time do not justify).

9. I think it worth bringing out also in the second sentence of your paragraph 2 the very close and direct contacts between Governors and non-official opinion. Those contacts are often a good deal closer than the public imagines for the individuals concerned may not be too anxious to have it known that their views are available to the Governor or the Governor-General. In the penultimate sentence of your paragraph 2 I would add after "the minds of Governors" enclosed in brackets, the words "the Governor-General and His Majesty's Government". But I think it would probably be wise as already suggested to damp down expectations of any early general decision in favour of non-official Advisers.

10. If I can help in any other way on this point, please telegraph immediately, and I will let you have my view.

[9] See Vol. II, Nos. 625, paras. 10–11, and 672, para. 7.

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Government of India, Home Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&J/8/598: f 188

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, 5 *October 1942, 8.25 pm*
Received: 5 October, 7.45 pm

No. 7894 Congress disturbances. Continuation my telegram No. 7812[1] October 1st. Our information as to sentences of whipping is incomplete and is limited to the following.

(*a*) Madras. Two students engaged in railway sabotage.

(*b*) Bihar. One case up to September 18th.

(*c*) Central Provinces. 186 hooligans who took part in rioting at Nagpur. 79 Gonds in Betul District and 21 persons of lower classes in the Drug district who were concerned in damaging Government forests.

(*d*) Sind. 176 persons whipped at Hyderabad in martial law area[2] including number of schoolboys caned for taking part in disturbances.

[1] No. 51; the date should be 2 October. [2] See No. 63, note 3.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 446

L/P&S/13/998: ff 241–2

INDIA

INDIAN STATES: REQUEST BY CHAMBER OF PRINCES FOR STATEMENT OF POLICY BY HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY

GREAT GEORGE STREET, S.W.1, 5 *October 1942*

With reference to W.M. (42) 129th Conclusions,[1] Minute 1, the following documents are annexed:—

(A) Minute from the Secretary of State for India to the Prime Minister covering:—

(*a*) Draft of proposed assurance to the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes.

(*b*) Draft telegram from the Secretary of State for India to the Crown Representative.

[1] No. 24

(B) Alternative draft of proposed assurance to the Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes, circulated by direction of the Prime Minister.

E. E. BRIDGES,
Secretary of the War Cabinet.

Annex (A) to No. 67

MINUTE FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA TO THE PRIME MINISTER

[*There follows the text of No. 50.*]

Annex (B) to No. 67

ALTERNATIVE DRAFT OF PROPOSED ASSURANCE TO THE CHANCELLOR OF THE CHAMBER OF PRINCES, CIRCULATED BY DIRECTION OF THE PRIME MINISTER

(1) His Majesty's Government fully adhere to their obligations by Treaty or otherwise towards the States. They see no reason to re-define their conception of those obligations; nor should a recent statement by the Lord Privy Seal in the House of Commons, regarding the desirability of encouraging and expediting the development in all Indian States of suitable representative institutions, be taken as in any way inconsistent with them.

(2) The fact that no explicit provision was contained in the draft Declaration for the formation of any Union of non-adhering States or groups of States is not to be taken as constituting any discrimination to the disadvantage of the States as compared with the Provinces of British India. The draft Declaration contained a provision on this matter in regard to non-acceding Provinces, but not in regard to non-adhering States, because the responsibility which His Majesty's Government have exercised for many years for the Government of the Provinces of British India finds no parallel within the territories of the Rulers of Indian States.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 447

L/PO/2/16: f 40

INDIA

INDIAN STERLING BALANCES

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, *5 October 1942*

I circulate for consideration the Viceroy's reply regarding the reservation suggested by the War Cabinet on the subject of Indian Sterling Balances, the text of which is in Personal telegrams to the Viceroy, Nos. 16781[1] and 16782[2] dated the 24th September (already circulated). The objections and dangers stressed by the Viceroy, and his own earnest appeal to the War Cabinet not to raise this matter unnecessarily, will, I trust, be regarded as conclusive against pursuing the matter at the present cri ical juncture.

L. S. A.

Annex to No. 68

TELEGRAM FROM VICEROY TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA DATED OCTOBER 2, 1942

[*There follows the text of No. 56*]

[1] No. 26. [2] No. 27.

69

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *5 October 1942*

Your very earnest and weighty telegram[1] on the subject of sterling balances has just come in and I am circulating it to the Cabinet expressing my confident hope that in view of what you say they will not pursue the matter at the present critical juncture. I am not asking for an immediate Cabinet on the matter, but rather hope to let the telegram sink in for a few days. I shall try to press hard for complete abandonment of the idea of any reservation, but if I find that

[1] No. 56.

there is a strong tendency to urge that we must protect ourselves for the future by making a reservation at some time or other, I shall urge that this should not be done at this most unfavourable of all moments, but wait for a few months, when the tide of battle may have turned everywhere and when your successor will have had time to gauge the situation for himself. Whatever the pros and cons of the matter, I ought to be able to persuade them that it is unfair to your successor to start this additional source of agitation and trouble just before he arrives.

2. I am afraid Winston's statement has been a bad boomerang; at any rate in America, where it has undone almost all the good work that Gandhi had previously been doing for us. I hear a rumour that he wants to wind up the debate on Thursday, displacing John Anderson who was otherwise to have done so, and confess that this alarms me greatly. Even if he wants to explain himself and justify his past statement, I don't think he is capable of speaking sympathetically or with any conviction about Indian aspirations themselves, as apart from Congress and the difficulties of the immediate situation.

3. Meanwhile, I have had suggested to me from more than one quarter that no one could better set this Indian situation in its proper perspective, both to the administration and to the American public, than myself. I have telegraphed[2] to ask you what you think about it. I can at any rate speak with knowledge and some authority, defending myself and not anybody else, which always carries weight, as well as with fervent conviction. They might take it as a compliment and I should have the advantage, as a Rhodes Trustee for the last 30 years, of being known to most of the academic circles who count for so much in America. But it would be an appalling grind, and even a month away might be difficult at this time, when almost anything may crop up in India and when you may well need protection against the vagaries of the War Cabinet and above all of its Chief!

4. The Allah Bakhsh[3] business is unfortunate. We have naturally made a great deal of play of the fact that nearly half the Provinces of India are self-governing, supporting the war effort and helping to suppress the Congress attack upon the life of India. All this will look a little unreal if the world hears that a Prime Minister has been dismissed for returning his O.B.E. It will be said that Dominion Prime Ministers like Deakin the Australian and Hertzog in South Africa have refused Privy Councillorships, that neither Canada nor South Africa allow any honours which carry titles or lead up to titles, and that we

Amery seems to have overlooked our original exchange on this matter![4]

L.

can hardly refuse to re-establish Ministries in other Provinces if their members announce beforehand that they would not accept honours. I have no doubt I can make a case in the House out of the general tone of Allah Bakhsh's letter, showing him unfit, in the present extremely critical situation, to command confidence. But there again, the fact that he makes so much of Winston's statement will at once be seized on by Parliamentary critics, who will sum up the situation by saying that a Prime Minister has been dismissed because he does not like Winston's statement. There is also the possible repercussion in Bengal. So if he should resign under threat of dismissal, I confess I would regard it as a preferable solution.

[Para. 5, on the question of employment for an administrative officer, omitted.]

6. I am not at all happy about the "political incident" to which you refer in paragraph 12 of your letter of the 1st September[5] after reading the relevant papers which you sent to me. One point which struck me is that it seems pretty clear from paragraph 3 of Hartley's letter that Dadachanji had shown himself to his Commanding Officer, long before the expiry of the three months' probationary period, to be quite certain never to prove a suitable officer, at any rate with Indian troops—so certain that one would have thought he might have been summarily discarded at a much earlier stage, in which case the incident would never have occurred. Indeed it looks from his Bangalore report as if Dadachanji should never have been posted to the I.A. at all. That is more or less by the way; but it might be worth while considering whether Commanding Officers should not be given discretion in clear cases to cut short the probationary period.

C.-in-C.

L.

7. But what worries me most is whether the decision to let Dadachanji resign his commission rather than face a court martial was, on a long view, wise, particularly as general instructions have been issued that similar cases if they arise—one hopes there will not be many—should be similarly treated; the possibility that there will be, or indeed may already have been, a certain

[2] No. 59. [3] See No. 62, para. 16.

[4] In his telegram 2837–S of 21 September Lord Linlithgow suggested that 'we shall have to put up with' Allah Bakhsh's renunciation of his honours. MSS. EUR. F. 125/23. In reply (telegram 16709 of 24 September) Mr Amery said: 'I find it hard to stomach prospect of continuance in office, particularly in war-time, of a Premier whose allegiance to the constitution is to be assessed by his public renunciation of honours conferred on him by the King and the Viceroy'; though he added that the paramount consideration must be the public interest, and if Lord Linlithgow was satisfied that (*a*) an alternative Government was not possible, and (*b*) Section 93 administration was undesirable in present conditions in Sind or at any rate less desirable than the retention of Allah Bakhsh as Premier, 'then I suppose we must put up with it'. L/P&J/8/647.

[5] Vol. II, No. 672.

number of such cases is suggested by the corresponding case of the Hindu storeman mentioned by Hartley in his paragraph 9. It is a very difficult matter on which to take a decision. I quite agree that if the procedure were to be court-martial followed by cashiering or dismissal there is a grave risk that the officer would either pose, or be represented by interested parties, as a political martyr; but is it not equally possible that if, like Dadachanji, the recalcitrant individual, particularly in the officer class, is allowed to resign, he may pose or be publicised as a hero who has sacrificed his military career to his political principles or national feelings? The political ill-consequences seem to me to be about equal in either case, though I should have thought that with the Army in India the size that it now is there was no very great risk of any great degree of publicity attaching to court-martial and dismissal, even when the charge has a political background. If it is agreed that the possibilities of political exploitation, either of resignation or of court-martial and dismissal, are fairly equally balanced, is there not a good deal to be said for adhering to the canons of military discipline and, by a strict adherence to them, instilling into these new "non-martial" elements in the commissioned ranks of the Indian Army a realisation of the cardinal principle that the first duty of officers is obedience to the authority from whom they derive their commissioned rank, with all its powers and its responsibilities? After all, these responsibilities in a military officer do not differ whether the Government which the officer is serving can be represented as the British Government or an Indian Government. Either may have to call on the military for the support of its civil power.

I wonder what has actually transpired.

L.

[Para. 8, containing personal comments, omitted.]

All good wishes.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

SIMLA, 6[1] *October 1942, 1.10 am*
Received: 5 October, 11 pm

No. 445–S.C. Following may be of use in connection with debate:—

Begins. Throughout the period of the disturbances, the market for Government Securities remained strong. A series of Provincial Government loans were successfully floated, the Bombay issue being over-subscribed within 15

minutes. Subscriptions to the third Defence Loan, which has been on tap since the 7th July, continue to come in at an average rate of over a crore a week, which compares favourably with rates of subscription to previous issues. In short, there was no visible sign of loss of confidence by the investing public in the stability of the Government. *Ends.*

[1] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 gives the date as 5 October. The dates and times of despatch and receipt given here are taken from L/P&J/8/598: f 192.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE SIMLA, *6 October 1942, 2.15 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 6 October, 12.35 pm*

No. 449–S.C. Your telegram of 3rd October, No. 17254.[1] Object of questions is of course to put onus on us of seeking out political leaders and find the settlement for them which they cannot find themselves. With Congress leaders in jail or not co-operating, there remain outside Europeans only the Mahasabha and Muslim League. Mookerjee I have seen, and you know what passed between us.[2] Jinnah I asked the other day to come and dine, and he refused (characteristically) on grounds of previous engagement. I did not think it well to make further approach to him nor will there be least point in my sending for him unless I have something to say in the political field which I have not. I do not want any publicity given to his refusal which has not got out here. Fazlul Huq proposed at an earlier stage to come to Delhi and to ask for an interview, but was unavoidably detained in Bengal. On the other hand I have just had three days with the very representative National Defence Council, and have had individual talks with many of its Members (Huq and Parlakimedi very unfortunately absent and Allah Bakhsh would not help our argument given imminence of his dismissal) and I have also, in addition to interviews since 8th August with people of standing such as the European group (no publicity was given to this), Zia-ud-din, Sir Mohammad Yusuf, &c. in the Assembly, the assistance of my own Council, whom this might be an opportunity to boost as representative individuals.

2. I think the best line (leaving actual wording to you) on the first question would be:

Since 8th August the Viceroy has had three days with his National Defence Council, the representative character of which is well-known to the House,

[1] No. 60. [2] See Vol. II, No. 722.

and has had the opportunity of discussion with individual Members of it. In addition he has seen the leaders of the Hindu Mahasabha and the European group and as well as a Member [number?] of non-officials. The Viceroy has not declined to see any leader of Indian opinion, and is well known to be ready at all times to receive any representative of any party or organisation who is concerned to discuss constructive steps.

Apart from the close touch with the Provinces maintained by the Viceroy through Governors, he has the great advantage of constant consultation with the non-official Members of his Executive Council who are in the closest touch with representative political opinion, and in a position at all times to provide him with up-to-date information of the movement of public opinion throughout the sub-continent.

It would be neither proper nor in the public interest to disclose what has passed in confidential conversation between the Viceroy and Members of his National Defence Council or his Executive Council or other prominent public men whom he has seen.

3. In reply to the second question, the enquiry as to what passed between me and Mookerjee will be covered if you answer the first on the lines I suggest. As for developments since that interview, the Mahasabha have been in touch with prominent persons in the political world[3] and have been reviewing the position in the last few days at Delhi. An Associated Press message of 2nd October states that according to informed circles the political negotiations initiated by the Mahasabha have so far failed in their objective, and that an important section of its Working Committee shares the view stated to have been expressed by Mookerjee that no common ground exists between the Mahasabha and the League and that no purpose could be served by making any approach to the League at present. As you know, I had no expectation of anything coming out of the Mahasabha discussions: nor, I suspect, have they, by now. We must however await outcome of their present Delhi deliberations. I think I had better leave it to you to do the drafting on this point in the light of what I have said above.

[3] See Vol. II, No. 728.

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War Cabinet W.M. (42) 132nd Conclusions, Minutes 1 and 2

R/30/1/3: ff 60–1

Those present at this meeting held in the Prime Minister's Room, House of Commons, on 6 October 1942 at 11.15 am were: Mr Churchill (in the Chair), Mr Attlee, Sir Stafford Cripps, Sir John Anderson, Mr Anthony Eden, Mr Oliver Lyttelton, Mr Ernest Bevin

Also present were: Viscount Simon, Mr Amery, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Mr James Stuart (item 1)

Minute 1

Parliament: Debate on India

(Previous Reference: W.M. (42) 129th Conclusions, Minute 3)[1]

The War Cabinet discussed the arrangements for the Debate in the House of Commons on Thursday, the 8th October, and decided as follows:—

(1) The Government spokesmen should be the Secretary of State for India and the Deputy Prime Minister, who would wind up the Debate.

(2) It was desirable to avoid a controversial Debate on the Indian position at the present juncture.

(3) The Government spokesmen would, no doubt, emphasise the magnitude of the offer embodied in the draft Declaration. Stress should be laid on the fact that, although the offer was still open, the Congress Party had thought fit to embark on a course of open defiance and hostility; and that so long as the Congress Resolution stood negotiations could not be resumed. It should also be made clear that there was no possible Government in India, other than the existing Government, which could press forward the war effort. In this connection reference might be made to the importance of the defence of India from the point of view of China.

Minute 2

India

Request by Chamber of Princes for Statement of Policy by His Majesty's Government

(Previous Reference: W.M. (42) 129th Conclusions, Minute 1)[2]

At a previous Meeting the War Cabinet had invited the Secretary of State for India to draft a statement in reply to the request for an assurance made by

[1] No. 24. [2] *Ibid.*

the Chamber of Princes. The War Cabinet now had before them a Memorandum (W.P. (42) 446)[3] containing—

(A) Drafts of the proposed assurance and of a telegram to the Crown Representative, prepared by the Secretary of State for India.

(B) An alternative draft assurance, circulated by direction of the Prime Minister.

The War Cabinet—

(1) Approved the alternative draft assurance (draft (B)), subject to the first paragraph being amended to read as follows:—

(*a*) "His Majesty's Government adhere to their obligations, by Treaty or otherwise, towards the States. They see no reason to define their conception of those obligations. The statement by the Lord Privy Seal in the House of Commons on the 28th April, 1942, is in no way inconsistent with them."

(2) Authorised the despatch to the Crown Representative of a telegram in the terms proposed in W.P. (42) 446, in order to give him an opportunity of commenting on the assurance before it was issued.

[3] No. 67.

73

Mr Amery to Sir Kingsley Wood

L/PO/2/16: f 50

6 October 1942

My dear Kingsley,

I enclose a copy of the Viceroy's reply[1] about sterling balances. I am circulating this to the Cabinet with a very short minute[2] expressing my hope that the Cabinet will regard it as decisive against making any reservation at the present time; but I think you may like to have a copy for consideration immediately. I doubt if it will come up in the Cabinet before next week and the urgency so far as India is concerned is now over as the Legislature's autumn session has closed.

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

[1] No. 56. [2] No. 68.

74

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE SIMLA, *7 October 1942, 1.55 am*
Received: 7 October, 3 am

No. 467–S.C. Following is my appreciation midday 6th October, for period 26th September to 6th October. Consolidation and general improvement proceeding though incidents, arson, wire-cutting, interference with railway lines, of varying importance continue. These are more particularly marked in the case of Bengal and Bombay where also there has been one serious derailment due to sabotage. A noticeable feature is number of incidents in which crude bombs have been used in Bombay. Bihar reports steady progress but much clearing still remaining to be done and movement not yet definitely scotched. Madras speaks of continued flood of objectionable circulars and leaflets which no doubt help to keep violence alive. In North-West Frontier Province which has remained entirely quiet Governor reports that Abdul Ghaffar Khan and others had definitely hoped to organise intensive picketing of law courts on 2nd October but that idea seems to have been given up owing to lack of support. Governor of the United Provinces who has just been staying with me gives me a very encouraging account of progress of clearing up in his area but, like other Governors, is clear that we must continue on the alert and must avoid mistake of thinking that these troubles are at an end. Nothing from Indian States. On the whole I would judge situation to be definitely satisfactory but to require continued watchfulness.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Chungking (for Secretary to Agent-General), Washington (for Agent-General), Kuibyshev.

75

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE *7 October 1942*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 468–S.C. I am not sure when debate takes place but trust you will do what you can to offset calamitous effect of *Times* leader[1] reported by Reuter, which

[1] *The Times* leader of 6 October, *Initiative in India*, noted that three principles would dominate the forthcoming Commons debate: (1) that the G. of I. had a primary duty to preserve order; (2) that a more broadly based G. of I. was essential if India was to play her full part in upholding her own

will shake confidence of all our supporters, and encourage Congress and our enemies. No doubt you will be able later to give me some idea of its source and of reasons why we had no warning of so abrupt and important a change of front.

cause and that of the United Nations; (3) that while Britain retained power in India she must exercise the political initiative. Enlarging on (3) the leader urged 'the Indianization of the Viceroy's Council by handing over to Indians the remaining and all-important portfolios of finance and home affairs, and the control of defence, limited only by the powers that must be exercised by the commander-in-chief in time of war'. The critical attitude of U.S. opinion was 'yet another reason—though the reasons inherent in the situation are already overwhelmingly strong—why the British Government cannot accept the destructive attitude of the Congress Party as a sufficient reason for inaction'.

76

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT *7 October 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 470–S.C. Your private and personal telegram of 4th October, No. 1196.[1] I am sure your broadcast will be of real value and of much assistance to Halifax.

2. As for a visit by you to U.S.A., I can think of none better able to put our case. Only doubts I feel are (*a*) whether your word would be accepted by American hostiles or sentimentalists as against the protests of irresponsible people like Sardar J. J. Singh or Clare Boothe (who would be certain to claim that she, unlike you, speaks from first-hand and most recent knowledge based on visit to India, and who is I gather (perhaps incorrectly) standing for Congress on the India issue), (*b*) whether there is not the risk of taking American feeling too seriously, and, by a visit by the Secretary of State, largely with the object of dissipating misunderstanding suggesting that we feel we are on the defensive, (*c*) risk of encouraging those in U.S.A. who are anxious to make India a United Nations issue and take responsibility for it out of our hands, to which I need not develop objections you and I would see.

3. We are, moreover, just about to send the Jam Saheb, Zafrullah, Mudaliar, and the rest of the I.P.R. team.[2] It is an ill business trying to persuade deaf adders, but I would expect Indians of their prominence to carry real weight. I would have thought too that interest in India might subside a little once the Congressional elections were on next month, and that once they were over the State Department (which I agree has behaved with great correctness) might be a little more inclined to come out more positively on our side. Finally, we

have to face the fact that the war has still a good time to run, that India will remain a live issue and the sort of thing to appeal to American sentiment, and that it would be a pity to spend our best ammunition prematurely.

4. My own inclination would therefore be to suggest that if you do decide on a visit, it might be more effective after the ground has been prepared by the Indian delegates to the I.P.R., the Jam Saheb, &c., and *after* the Congressional election—possibly early next year. I quite agree that in any event the cordial support and agreement of the White House would be an essential precondition, and it occurs to me too that if all one hears about American suspicion of "propaganda" is correct, it is arguable that a visit to speak on behalf of British war effort generally, devoting however a substantial proportion of your address to the Indian question (as might naturally be expected from the Secretary of State for India) might run more smoothly and avoid a concentration by the hostiles on the purely Indian issue.

[1] No. 59; the date should be 3 October.

[2] The Jam Saheb was expected to leave the U.K. at the end of October on a visit to Canada and the U.S.A.; in the event the visit was postponed, and finally prevented owing to the death of his father, which necessitated his return to India. Sir Zafrullah Khan and Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar were the senior members of the Indian delegation to the Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations which was to have been held in December in the U.S.A., but the venue was in fact changed to Mont Tremblant, Quebec.

77

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: ff 133–4

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *7 October 1942, 9.55 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 8 October*

1207. Your private and personal telegram, No. 2816–S[1] of 18th September, and paragraph 2 of your private and personal telegram, 400–S.C.[2] of 3rd October regarding U.S. representation in India. The instructions sent to Halifax after discussion in Cabinet were contained in my official telegram to External Affairs Department, No. 17164[3] of 2nd October. My immediately succeeding telegram repeats Halifax's reply.

2. If the President nominates Phillips or Grew I hope that you will agree that we should accept. Someone of Wilson's type would doubtless suffice for

[1] Vol. II, No. 761.

[2] Explaining why he could not agree to any proposal to make Sir G. S. Bajpai an independent Minister at Washington. MSS. EUR. F. 125/23.

[3] See No. 42, note 1.

disposal of business with Government of India, but a man of bigger standing is needed if the U.S. Government is to rely on his reports on the Indian situation. Roosevelt is under great pressure about India, and it would help him to keep his public opinion steady if he were known to have at Delhi a representative who commanded general confidence. Both Phillips and Grew have sufficient standing for this purpose. Confidential reports by British Representatives at posts where they served describe both as level-headed, disinterested[4] and experienced men, the best type of American gentleman. Both are at the end of distinguished careers in the Foreign Service and we need have no fear of their advocating a policy dictated by personal ambition. If you establish close and constant personal contact with whichever is selected and open your mind frankly to him this would be our best hope of keeping U.S. Government straight regarding India.

3. Phillips is aged 64 with 39 years' service. He was Minister at the Hague 1920–23, Ambassador, Brussels, 1924–27, Minister, Ottawa, 1927–29, Under-Secretary of State, Washington, 1933–36, and Ambassador, Rome, since 1936. He is now in London on special mission representing the Office of Strategic Services with personal rank of Minister.

4. Grew is aged 62, with 38 years' service. He was one of the U.S. representatives at Versailles, Minister, Berne, 1921–24, Under-Secretary of State, Washington, 1924–27, Ambassador, Ankara, 1927–32, and Tokyo since 1932.

5. I suggest that we might accept Welles' view that a bare announcement of appointment would suffice as first step, but that we should try to arrange beforehand with U.S. Government that if this produced speculation about mediation, the Press should be told at once, preferably from a U.S. source, that nothing more than filling of a vacant post is involved and that new Commissioner has no special mission.

[4] Deciphered as 'charming'.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 135

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *7 October 1942, 11.15 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

1208. Following is repetition of Washington telegram 4933 of 2nd October. *Begins.* Your telegram No. 5890.[1] In Hull's absence I spoke to Welles to-day about the question of U.S. Commissioner at Delhi. I said that His Majesty's

Government and the Government of India would welcome it if the U.S. Government sent some responsible person of the type you suggest.

2. I put the points in paragraph 2 and said that you would be glad to have the opportunity of expressing an opinion upon any individual they might think of selecting before final selection were made.

3. Welles made no demur to this last point, saying that it was in the nature of seeking agreement. He did not think it was necessary to have any public statement beyond a bare announcement of an individual's appointment if and when made. He then told me that he was making formal submission to the President of two names, Phillips, late U.S. Ambassador at Rome and now in London, and Grew, late Tokyo. He said that he did not anticipate that we should feel any difficulty about either of them and I took it upon myself to assure him that I had no doubt he was right. I have seen Grew several times here and been much impressed with his breadth and steadfastness.

4. I also told him that I would be glad to let him have any information I might receive from the Viceroy as to actual situation and hoped that he would do the same by us. With this he agreed. *Ends.*

[1] No. 42.

79

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/13/998: ff 322–4

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *7 October, 11.15 pm*

17470. Your telegram of the 25th August, 2591P.[1] Draft reply to Jam Sahib has been discussed by War Cabinet[2] whose view is that since the terms of any reply made are likely to become known (*vide* end of paragraph 5 of your telegram) it would be better that the reply should be given "*publicly*". They consider that the objections to making the reply public would not apply to a short simple statement which in their view should follow the lines of the draft contained in my immediately succeeding telegram.

2. The draft is in the form of a letter from your Political Adviser to the Chancellor which could be communicated by one or other to the Press. It does not refer specifically to the Jam Sahib's letter[3] (which was marked secret) but generally to representations made by the Princes. The Prime Minister asks me to say that he would welcome any criticisms that you may have to offer on the wording before he finally approves the draft.

[1] Vol. II, No. 629. [2] No. 24. [3] Vol. II, No. 115.

3. I think it would be helpful to the Prime Minister to have your views also on the following points which occur to me in this connection:—

(i) Would you apprehend any unfavourable reactions from British Indian parties if such a statement were published, seeing that none of them has received a similar clarification or explanation of the draft declaration subsequent to the Cripps Mission?

(ii) You and I are, I think, in general agreement that nothing should be done to cause the Princes to relax their efforts to set their houses in order and prepare in this way for whatever the future may hold. Do you[4] think a published statement on the above lines would encourage them in any way to sit back and rely on H.M.G.'s support rather than on their own efforts?

(iii) We cannot afford to be pushed into a discussion as to how we intend to carry out our treaty obligations. Is there more risk of embarrassing pressure of this kind arising from a short published statement on the lines indicated than from the procedure proposed in your telegram?

(iv) Would you consider it advisable in so far as the proposed statement does not cover all the points raised by the Jam Sahib to supplement it by a confidential letter dealing with the remaining points on the lines discussed between us?

4. It is clearly important that the answer to the Chancellor's letter should not be delayed much longer and I hope you will be able to let me have your views urgently on the above points and any other considerations that you would wish to put to me.

5. In view of the representation received from Hyderabad regarding Commons statement by Cripps (Chhatari's letter of 15th August)[5] it seems desirable that a letter should be sent to Chhatari in similar terms (with the necessary verbal alterations) to that sent to the Jam Sahib.

[4] 'Do you' deciphered as 'You may'. [5] Vol. II, No. 692.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/13/998: ff 325–6

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *7 October 1942, 8.10 pm*

17471. Following is draft referred to.

I am desired by His Excellency the Crown Representative to write to Your Highness on the subject of certain anxieties which are understood to be entertained by the Order of Princes on the subject of the intentions of His

Majesty's Government towards the Indian States in pursuance of their policy in relation to the realisation of self-government in India which they authorised Sir Stafford Cripps to discuss with representatives of the Indian Rulers as well as with British Indian leaders. (To Hyderabad only: The representation submitted by you on behalf of the Hyderabad Government on a particular aspect of the matter has been duly forwarded to His Majesty's Government.)

2. His Majesty's Government have taken note of the terms of Your Highness's letter of 10th April[1] to Sir Stafford Cripps communicating the views of the Indian States on the proposal and of the Resolution passed by the Chamber of Princes to which it referred. They have authorised His Excellency the Crown Representative to inform Your Highness with reference to paragraph (b) of the Resolution of the Chamber, that they adhere to their obligations, by Treaty or otherwise, towards the States. They see no reason to define their conception of these obligations. The statement by the Lord Privy Seal in the House of Commons on 28th April, 1942, is in no way inconsistent with them.

3. An assurance was asked for in Your Highness's letter of 10th April that, in the event of a number of States not finding it feasible to adhere to a constitution devised for India as a whole, the non-adhering States or groups of States so desiring should have a right to form a union of their own. I am authorised to say that the fact that no explicit provision was contained in the draft declaration for the formation of any union of non-adhering States or groups of States is not to be taken as constituting any discrimination to the disadvantage of the States as compared with the Provinces of British India. The draft declaration contains a provision on this matter in regard to non-acceding Provinces, but not in regard to non-adhering States, because the responsibility which H.M.G. have exercised for many years for the government of the Provinces of British India finds no parallel within the territories of the Rulers of Indian States.

[1] Vol. I, No. 591.

81

Sir A. Clow (Assam) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/35

No. 60 GOVT. HOUSE, SHILLONG, 7 *October 1942*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

In your letter of 25th September[1] Your Excellency invited me to amplify some observations in a recent fortnightly letter on the subject of weakness in the Indian services on occasions like the present.

[1] Not printed.

2. Although emergencies like this one bring out any weaknesses that exist, the tendencies to which I referred have been at work in the provinces for some years past. Several senior officials familiar with administration in other provinces had spoken to me of a sail-trimming tendency, especially among Hindu officials, even when these were serving in a Section 93 Province. Officers in the Secretariat especially wrote and advised with one eye on the Adviser or Governor who would act upon their notes and another on the future Ministers who might read them. It would be fair to recognise that, to some extent, their outlook is coloured by a greater responsiveness to public opinion than the average British official shows, and is not mere weakness. But, as a rule, other motives come into play.

3. One of these, in the case of Hindus at least, is to be found in the fact that the natural sympathies of their community are more with the Congress than with any foreign rule. Their heads may tell them that it is essential that we should defeat the Axis; but their hearts tend to fill them with more dislike of the foreigners who are omnipresent than of those whom they do not know; and few Hindus allow their heads to govern their hearts. I believe, however that, while a few are bitter, a number of Hindu officials are less influenced by this than by fear of the future. If he felt that we were here for his time, the average Hindu official would accept the fact without much ado, and be ready to act accordingly. The conviction that, while we may hold India for the war, we are going to leave it thereafter, had a potent influence. He believes that he will then have to live in a world where the Congress outlook may be dominant, and where those who can be regarded as hostile to it will suffer accordingly if, indeed, they are not regarded as enemies of society. The senior ones, with a long tradition of service under the old conditions, and with a shorter future to worry about, probably feel this less strongly than the others; and there are a number, especially in the all-India services who display a praiseworthy firmness. Nor was the tendency to which I refer particularly apparent in the Government of India. This was possibly because there had been no experience of Ministerial Government in the past, because officials of stronger calibre tended to gravitate there, and because the prospects of "popular" rule there were more remote. I think also that the tendency is less strong in a province like Assam, where Congress is less powerful, than in some other Provinces. The tendency is not entirely limited to Hindus, but they are naturally more prone to it than either Muslims or Europeans.

4. It is, I fear, impossible to provide any complete remedy for this weakness. A suggestion was thrown out, I think, in a speech of Mr. Amery's, that Congress might have lost their chance of attaining power; and to those who view the prospects with detachment, there are grounds for hoping that its tyranny over the intelligentsia may be comparatively short-lived. It is held together

mainly by hatred of British domination and will lose its cement when that domination comes to an end. But it would be difficult to convince Hindu officials at present that Congress will not ultimately rule; and whatever new alignments there are in politics, those in power are never likely to regard zeal for the maintenance of the present Governments as a testimonial. At the same time I suggest that the dissemination of the idea that the power of Congress is on the wane would be sound propaganda and would have a good influence in this and other directions.

5. The other step I would recommend is the grant of safeguards and especially a promise of the right to retire on proportionate pensions when further changes are introduced. At present the right is given only to the all-India services. To be effective, such a promise would have to be accompanied, in the minds of those receiving it, with complete assurance regarding the safety of the pensions; but as England will be deeply in India's debt after the war, it should be easy for His Majesty's Government to give a guarantee of such pensions. An official who knows that if conditions become unpleasant, he can retire with a small income, feels greater confidence and is likely to show greater courage.

Yours sincerely,

A. G. CLOW

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/10/17: f 219

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

9 October 1942
Received: 10 October

1214. Your private and personal telegram 470–S.C.[1] I feel the force of your points (*b*) and (*c*) and as I find Eden after further consideration on the whole also opposed have abandoned idea at any rate for the present. I shall broadcast to United States probably towards end of next week.

[1] No. 76.

83

Dr Savarkar to Mr Churchill

Telegram, L/P&J/8/510: ff 176–7

9 October 1942

Hindu Mahasabha succeeded in producing national demand on fundamental points, namely, immediate recognition by British Parliament of India as an

independent nation; national coalition government during wartime, leaving Commander-in-Chief free in military operational matters as Allied War Council dictates; and all constitutional and controversial details to be decided by a post-war All-Party Conference.[1] The Sikh leaders, Presidents of Christian Federation, Momin and Azad Moslem Conferences, three Premiers of Provincial Governments of Sind, Bengal and Orissa, of whom two Moslems, one Hindu, and prominent Liberal leaders, several other bodies and personalities signed and supported it.[2] Congress Resolution too being more or less on same lines, this demand is as representative of Hindus, Moslems, Christians and others as any demand could be and consequently entitled to be recognised as All-India national demand. In view of repeated assurances, the British Government should transfer power, now that a joint national demand is framed by Indians, and enable India to put forward whole-hearted and unstinted war effort in defending herself against invasion.

[1] Cf. Vol. II, No. 722. [2] Presumably the enclosure to No. 728 in Vol. II.

84

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *9 October 1942*

Yesterday's debate[1] went very well from the Parliamentary point of view. My own speech was, I think, generally approved and I only hope that my very direct condemnation of Gandhi and Congress, which I felt necessary in order to make the situation clear at home, has not been embarrassing from your point of view. Oliver Stanley made an excellent debating speech, and Attlee wound up in one of the most effective and well-reasoned speeches I have yet heard him make. The out-and-out opponents were singularly ineffective and Campbell Stephen's suggestion that Gandhi should be made Viceroy with Nehru as Prime Minister indicates their kind of outlook. Greenwood, as leading the Opposition, was woolly, but I fancy that was more or less arranged between him, Attlee and the Labour Party which, with few exceptions, voted right.

2. The *Times* under its new Editor, and, more particularly, the baneful influence of E. H. Carr, has been anything but helpful. Even today, when it could say nothing else, it suggested that India's war effort might be multiplied ten-fold by a political settlement! Its sudden excursus in favour of an immediate complete Indianisation of your Executive is, I suspect, due to Mudaliar, who may have had some talk with Barrington-Ward or Carr. Anyhow, he launched it, without previous consultation with myself, at a private lunch and at the private meeting of the Empire Parliamentary Association at which at least a

hundred members were present. The meetings *were* private and he had been told he could speak with complete frankness, but all the same I was a little surprised. On the other hand, I don't think he is likely to say anything indiscreet on any public occasion. I had rather expected some speakers might ventilate the idea in the debate, but obviously it doesn't interest the out-and-out opponents of the Government, while of the pro-Government speakers only one very tentatively suggested that the three offices now held by Europeans might be double-banked. You may notice, if you read carefully what both Attlee and myself said on the subject of the Executive, that we dealt with the matter indirectly but without referring to it.

3. Our strongest argument against any such immediate change, apart from the fact that it would cut no ice with the political parties and might give rise to communal differences within the Executive, is the obvious need for continuity. If that is our main plan, we may have to face the succession of Maxwell, who I think retires next year, by an Indian, and in that case I am not sure that Mudaliar himself might not be the right successor. Though a Hindu, he is, I believe, personally on excellent terms with Jinnah and strikes me as a man of courage, who would stand no nonsense from Congress.

4. I was a little disturbed by the letter from an Indian officer to Firoz,[2] which you sent on to me with Hartley's at any rate partial concurrence in the Indian officer's view. I dare say that a feeling of resentment is naturally stronger among the class that would hope for ascendancy when we are gone, and stronger relatively among Muslim officers than among Muslim civilians, in view of the fact that communal feeling is much less strong in the army. All the same, I imagine that the letter only expresses one point of view, perhaps even only a temporary one on the part of the writer, and that the greater part of the Indian officers are all right. They certainly have shown themselves so in the Middle East. But it will certainly be important to avoid everything that can savour of discrimination, whether in pay, or in promotion, or social treatment. I am only too glad that the tiresome question of their powers of punishment was got out of the way at last, in spite of Grigg and Winston.[3]

* * *

[1] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 383, cols. 1386–1456.

[2] See Vol. II, No. 577, para. 15. This letter, dated 1 August 1942, was enclosed in the letter of 18 August from the Private Secretary to the Viceroy to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State. It pointed out that the Indian officer had no knowledge of Nazi or Fascist ideas, and was interested only in revenging two centuries of racial discrimination and injustice suffered under Imperialism. His loathing of the Englishman was therefore far greater, because more personal, than of the Japanese or German. For this reason there was 'almost unanimous support from the Indian officer for the forthcoming movement', irrespective of caste and religion. Muslim League opposition to the 'Quit India' movement had caused the Muslim officer to be more anti-British than the Hindu in order to prove that he was 'just as ready to kick the English out'. MSS. EUR. F. 125/137.

[3] Vol. II, Nos. 349–50, 673.

12 October 1942

11. I have just had a talk with Mudaliar and suggested that it might be embarrassing to you if he ventilated in public his suggestion of an early Indianisation of the whole Council, as I did not know that you had come to any conclusion on this matter which was essentially one for yourself. Expressing my personal view, I said that I had little doubt that it was upon the present Council that the responsibility for India would rest for some very considerable time to come and that it was a case of justification by works rather than by advertisement. To my mind to make the kind of change he suggested for the sake of impressing public opinion in India or elsewhere would be a mistake. The propaganda effect would be *nil* and might only discount the real effect produced by good work. I had deliberately underplayed in Parliament the two expansions of Council of the last year and a half so as not to invite criticism but to leave the value of the Council's work to sink in as I believed it had done. In fact, I said to him, I thought the most important Indian constitutional development of recent years had been the decision of himself and his colleagues, regardless of personal considerations, to fulfil the first duty and responsibility of the Government when they arrested the Congress leaders. Any further changes I suggested should come as and when the occasion for them arose on merits of the work to be done and should be done without advertising, but leaving themselves again to prove their justification. In any case I reminded him that some of the new departments were of the first importance and anyhow it was the collective opinion of the Council that mattered. He took all this in very good part.

12. This is a business on which the ground we stand on must be that of continuity and efficiency. We cannot very well put up a colour bar either for or against European members in any department. When a post becomes vacant it will naturally be open to consider every candidate on merits. What occurs to me is that there might be something to be said for deciding in advance as to the succession to Maxwell when he goes in April and, if we decide on an Indian, announce the name now. That would both show that we mean to continue with Indianisation, but also that we are not going to do it as a political stunt. If that is the line, then what about Mudaliar himself as a possible successor? He strikes me as not only able but courageous. He certainly has no use for Congress and, though a Hindu, is I believe on very good personal terms with Jinnah.

13. There is a further possible development of that situation on which I should like your reactions, not so much as something for you to do at this moment, but as a step which might be taken by your successor. That is, in view of the impossibility of getting a Government of party leaders in the near future to convert your Executive more definitely into a Cabinet, reserving your

own general powers, but at the same time appointing one of its members as Prime Minister and leaving to him not only the normal arrangement of business, but also a considerable range of influence in advising you as to the filling up of vacancies, &c. This would be something approaching the National Government which everybody talks about, but which none of the political leaders are prepared to agree upon except on their own terms, and would at the same time preserve that ultimate control which both for the sake of the war and of the carrying on of the Government of India pending the discovery of a constitution, must be retained by you and your successor.

14. This brings me to yet another direction in which my mind has been moving tentatively. In spite of the innumerable speeches I have made for the last two years, I have said that there is nothing to prevent Indian leaders coming together now to agree upon a constitution, and in spite of the fact that if that did happen and the constitution were agreed upon, we should find it very difficult to say that it must be kept in cold storage until after the war, nothing seems to induce Indians to be willing to do anything about it. Does not that throw some responsibility on someone to take the initiative. In doing at any rate some preparatory work? Might that not be something which even your present Council might undertake? The kind of thing I have in mind is that the Council might set up a small Committee to discuss what preparatory steps might be taken and as the outcome of that either set up a small fact and material finding commission or even invite a small commission to go somewhat further and consider possible lines of approach both to the constitution-making body and to the constitution itself?

15. You asked me in your letter of the 14th September[4] what had resulted from the soundings I was making about a successor for Gwyer. I am as anxious as you are to secure a really good man as Chief Justice, but it is likely to be extraordinarily difficult to do so and we may have to be content with someone of much lower standing than we should like. The fact is that it is not in existing conditions a very attractive post because the legal work is so small in amount and the complete uncertainty of the future prospects of the appointment make it compare very unfavourably with other judicial appointments here for which all the really suitable people are possible candidates. Further it is natural for really capable men to feel that, in times like these, they ought to be doing something which provides a hard day and contributes to the conduct of the war. It was mainly for these reasons that Monckton turned down the offer and Simon has forcibly pointed out to me that we cannot expect to draw from the top rank for an appointment with so few attractions. He does not think that any of the High Court Judges here would look at it and at Kemp's suggestion and with Simon's entire approval I have approached R. C. [F. R.] Evershed, K.C.,

[4] Vol. II, No. 744.

who is a man of excellent reputation and at one time was tempted by the possibility of becoming Chief Justice in Bombay. I have seen him myself and think he would do admirably, but I very much doubt if he will be ready to accept as he has an important administrative job under the Ministry of Fuel and Light [Power]. I am at present waiting to hear his decision, but I am not very hopeful. If he declines, the only really satisfactory alternative candidate who has been suggested is Radcliffe, who is now head of the Ministry of Information. I very much doubt if he would look at it, but I shall sound him if Evershed turns it down.

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Mr Eden to Viscount Halifax

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 123

IMPORTANT FOREIGN OFFICE, *10 October 1942, 10 pm*
MOST SECRET

No. 6169. Your telegram No. 4933.[1] Attitude of United States Government is extremely satisfactory and I congratulate you on your successful handling.

2. The Viceroy in commenting on your telegram No. 4650[2] expressed fear that if Grew or Phillips were appointed Commissioner in India they would be driven by their reputation or by public expectation which has been aroused in United States of America (and no less in India) to interfere in Indian politics.[3] We are confident however that great diplomatic experience of both candidates would ensure that they steer clear of such a temptation and we think that either would be a very helpful appointment. We are therefore urging Viceroy to accept either of them and hope he will agree.[4] Meanwhile, it would be well for you to avoid so far as possible committing us further to these particular names.

3. Both candidates are of course big for the ordinary business of Commissioner's post. Their main duty as we conceive it would be to observe and interpret, and we would not like appointment to go through under any impression that a Legation or an Embassy could be set up in India.

4. We should be most reluctant to lose both candidates, and if there is danger of this and you cannot avoid carrying matter further, pending the Viceroy's agreement, you may say that, subject to the Viceroy's reply, we would welcome on personal grounds either candidate (Grew would, we think, be particularly good, and Phillips is doing excellent work here from which we should regret to see him moved), and make the points in paragraphs 2 and 3

above converting Viceroy's comment into your own confident supposition that there is no ground to fear what he apprehends.

5. I agree with Welles' suggestion that only a bare announcement of the appointment would be necessary. But guidance will be required for the Press to prevent undesirable speculation. Unless you see strong objection please ask State Department to make it plain in giving such guidance that the United States Government have no intention of attempting to mediate. This would be very helpful, as you will remember Grew and Phillips have already been specified by American columnists as particularly suitable to explore chances of a settlement.[5]

Repeated to Viceroy (Personal).[6]

[1] See No. 78. [2] Vol. II, No. 749. [3] Vol. II, No. 761. [4] No. 77.
[5] See Vol. II, Nos. 749 and 762. [6] Received by the Viceroy on 12 October.

86

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL VICEROY'S CAMP, SIMLA, *10 October 1942*

Many thanks for your interesting letter of the 16th September.[1] I think it is very lucky that the first meeting of the Cabinet that our representatives attended should have been one in which Mudaliar had a chance of putting across our case as regards rice. I have always thought him extremely persuasive, clear and balanced, and I should hope that he would have made a very good impression. Also, from a different point of view, the fact that the discussion immediately after brought him in direct contact on a business basis with people like Cranborne and Leathers was, I am sure, of real value. I am most grateful to you for backing both him and the Jam Saheb up so well, and for the help you have given them by entertaining them and by getting other Ministers to give them the general survey which you mention in paragraph 2 of your letter. Mudaliar has written to me to say how well they have both settled in and how kind everyone, and particularly yourself, has been to them; and I gather that he and the Jam Saheb had a somewhat characteristic interview with Winston, which they seem to have enjoyed![2]

2. The financial settlement which you discuss in paragraph 3 of your letter is no easy matter for any of us. Raisman has been into the detail with J. B. Taylor, and after discussion with both of them I sent you a few days ago a

[1] Vol. II, No. 753. [2] See No. 2.

further telegram.[3] But the sort of argument which has developed over this at home brings out very forcibly the difficulties which a complete Indianisation of my Council would give rise to; and when I saw the most unhappy *Times* leader of a couple of days ago about which I telegraphed[4] to you I could not help feeling that you and anyone else in the Cabinet who had been through this financial discussion would share my own view of the impossibility of the situation that would have arisen had Raisman not been where he is.

3. I will certainly make enquiry about the Press control matters which you raise in paragraph 5 of your letter.

* * *

6. You will remember our correspondence[5] at various stages about the political activities of Mr. Alexander and the Friend's Unit. I have sent you copies of the letters that have passed with him from time to time. He saw my Private Secretary a few days ago and was clearly very anxious to co-operate as fully as possible, and that is satisfactory. He said that he may have misunderstood what you said to him, or might not have construed your caveats with sufficient preciseness; but that of course if I did not want him to do political work here he must defer to my wishes. He expressed the hope that ordinary contacts with persons who might have a political character or standing would not be excluded, and was told that there could, of course, be no objection to his maintaining his ordinary social contacts as long as there was no question of his being taken as being in a position to do anything politically as a result of them; and he was again assured that we are most anxious (as indeed I am) to give every possible assistance to the humanitarian work of his Unit. I hope therefore that all will now go well, for I think that Alexander's intentions are probably good, and that he may have come out here to some extent under a misapprehension for which he was himself responsible.

* * *

8. You will remember the correspondence[6] that we had early in September about a possible visit here by Sherwood Eddy with a view to mediating. I did not much like the sound of this and you and Winston were both kind enough to help with Washington. I have now had a letter[7] from this man, of which I send you a copy by this bag. I am sure he is well meaning, but equally sure that there is nothing doing on these sort of lines, and that in any case we cannot possibly have these well-intentioned mediators bursting into the situation, starting innumerable hares, and expecting us to tidy up whatever complications result, and to carry the blame if their endeavours fail. I shall have to send a polite reply to Mr. Eddy, but will wait for a few days before doing so. This renewed American pressure is really an intolerable nuisance. I agree that we cannot ignore it, but on the other hand it is most undesirable that we should

let ourselves be jumped by it into unsound conclusions. However, there is little more that I can say with advantage on that subject today.

9. Many thanks for your private and personal telegram of 9th October, No. 1214,[8] about your possible visit to the U.S.A. I think, if I may say so, that your decision is probably wise—the arguments are rather neatly balanced, and I am not altogether surprised that you have come down on the side that you have, though as I said in my telegram I can imagine no one who could make a more effective statement of our case than yourself.

* * *

16. I sent you a copy some time ago of a rather greasy personal letter[9] which I had sent to Chiang Kai-shek by way of softening the blow of my refusal to allow his friends here to contact Gandhi. I have had a very polite reply[10] and a copy of it goes by this bag. I am all for keeping the personal door open, and I dare say that now and then it may help to smooth matters. I have sent you a telegram[11] in that connection about the suggestion that applications for political visas for people from China should be addressed to me personally. I think you will appreciate the force of the reasons for which I have suggested that they might more conveniently go from Seymour to Caroe. Mr. Wen made quite a good impression. He is very intelligent and has a solid European background. He was rather bitter, I think, at our having been turned out of Hong Kong since he has left his wife and family behind him there and his house, and his bitterness against the Japanese has to be heard to be believed. But he is of good quality, and I hear rumours that there may be some idea of his replacing the somewhat stolid present Chinese Commissioner[12] in India who has made no impression so far.

17. Apropos of Commissioners I have had your telegram[13] about the succession to the American Commissionerate. I could rather have wished that Halifax had not gone so fast, and for the reasons that I have explained to you I think there is probably much to be said for somebody of the Wilson level, for an ex-Ambassador, though the Viceroy of the day can of course keep him in touch, is apt to look for results of some sort, and there is not a very great deal that we shall be able to produce here. But it seems to me that it would be very difficult indeed, given Halifax's conversations in Washington, to make difficulties now over the nomination of Phillips or Grew. And while I still await the advice of my External Affairs Department I have let them know that subject to anything they may have to urge, I would propose to agree to one or other of these. Whichever comes, if either of them does you may rely on me

[3] No. 56. [4] No. 75. [5] Vol. II, Nos. 355, 408, 498, 509, and 672.
[6] No. 16 and Vol. II, Nos. 662, 673, 700, and 724. [7] Vol. II, No. 732. [8] No. 82.
[9] Vol. II, No. 622. [10] No. 39. [11] Not printed. [12] Mr. Shih-Hua Shen. [13] No. 77

to do all in my power to keep them on the right lines. But I do definitely hope that I shall not have another politician such as Johnson: while I noticed in a report that Currie, who as I told you[14] talked to me exclusively about China and refused to discuss the Indian problem, but was subsequently briefed by one of our opponents here, has taken the line in the United States that he had no discussion on the Indian issue while in India! A difficult people, and we are bound to have a great deal more difficulty I think once the war is over—a fact that one cannot altogether exclude from one's mind even when one reflects on how invaluable their present assistance is.

18. Since I dictated the above, I have had the report of the debate. It has come through very slowly from Reuters (no doubt because we are in Simla), and in fact the Press reports have reached me almost as soon as the latest Reuter sections. My warmest congratulations to you on your admirable statement of this difficult case. I do hope that it will produce some effect on those who are willing to hear. For anyone who is prepared to apply his mind objectively to it your arguments are decisive, and I am so glad that you should have had an opportunity of putting them across so forcibly. The figures of the division are the best answer to any suggestion that the activities of Sorensen, Silverman, Davies, &c. represent the mind of the House of Commons. But, as always of course, it is the noisy, if tiny, minority which gets reported in full, and the substantial mass of back-bench opinion which is quite unmoved by these excitements and lends consistent support to the policy of the Government passes unnoticed. Moreover at a time when Congress and its supporters here realise what a mess they have got themselves into and are so desperately anxious to grasp at any straw, the left-wing criticism naturally gets an amount of publicity quite out of all proportion to its importance or to anything that it deserves.

19. I am a little puzzled, to be frank, by the attitude of the *Times*. As I mentioned in my telegram and also earlier in this letter I was much disturbed by their leader of a few days ago. I have taken great pains with Holburn (whose quality I would put very high). While he is entirely independent, he has shown himself very quick at picking up the facts of this complicated situation, and it has been an encouragement to me to think that in the result his conclusions accord, so far as I can judge, so very closely with those which you and I have reached on the much greater mass of material available to us. The stuff he has been sending home, so far as I have seen it in precensorship, is entirely sound, and I was aware that he was sending home a quite conservative despatch which must have arrived on the night of the 5th. He was himself puzzled and a little uneasy at the tone of the subsequent leader. I notice too from the *Times* of September 11th, which has just arrived, that while its leader coincided with a long and sensible article from Holburn on the middle page, the paper had been at pains in the leader to fix on what Holburn's article said about frustra-

tion instead of on the entirely opposite lessons and arguments that could have been drawn from his article. For your own ear, I gather that he has in the last couple of days been given a hint to pipe down a little. I suppose that a possible explanation of the whole business is that the *Times* thinks that the position *vis-à-vis* of the United States is delicate, and that we must therefore trim our sails accordingly. I of course and you, are only too well aware of the difficulties presented to us by American sentimentalism and ignorance of this problem. But the *Times* is in a position to do us great injury and to influence a great many reasonably-minded people at home, and I am the more concerned that without, so far as I can judge, any justification on the merits, it should be starting to take the line that it apparently is. Can you (or could Joyce through his different sources) give me any reason for this? It is a nuisance to us out here that the *Times* should show these signs of wobble, for anything it says is very closely watched, and the Congress Press are adepts in turning to their own advantage anything that appears to be critical of the policy of Government, and equally the great mass of public servants and the Muslims, &c. are bound to keep a close eye on any signs that we are going to throw our friends over again. What you said in the debate must have most materially helped to dissipate any such suspicions. But apart from any difficulty it causes to us out here, the type of editorial comment I am now discussing makes, as I realise only too well, your own hard task much harder still.

20. I was delighted to see what very effective use you had made in the debate of the material[15] sent in by Governors from the Section 93 Provinces to show that we had not been letting things go by default during our period of stewardship there. As I said in my original reference to Governors,[16] there is obvious difficulty in planning or developing certain types of policy when one imagines that the basis of Government is going to be altered radically in a few weeks or even a few months' time. But I think that the material that the Provinces have produced has very definitely been reassuring, and I got the impression that it has enabled you to make a most effective reply to any suggestions that we had been supine.

21. As I dictate this letter news comes through by telephone from Dow of the conclusion of his discussions with Allah Bakhsh.[17] I am sorry to have been

[14] Vol. II, No. 522. [15] MSS. EUR. F. 125/110.

[16] Telegram 418–S.C. of 3 October to Governors of Section 93 Provinces and of Assam and Orissa which asked (as requested in No. 52, para. 4) to what extent Governors had regarded themselves as caretakers or free to take measures of social and economic reform, and what measures of that sort they had taken. MSS. EUR. F. 125/110.

[17] See Nos. 62, para. 16 and 69, para. 4. Mr Amery had referred the question of Allah Bakhsh's renunciation of his honours to the War Cabinet, which considered it on 7 October. They concluded that the right course would be for Allah Bakhsh to resign; but that if he showed any reluctance to do so, his letter to Lord Linlithgow might well be treated as constituting relinquishment of office. Sir H. Dow pointed out that the latter course was open to objection in that Allah Bakhsh, when

such a nuisance to you over this tiresome case, but I quite appreciate the reasons for which the Cabinet were anxious to avoid dismissal; or if dismissal had to come, the underlining of the fact that it was dismissal: and as you will have seen, I therefore suggested a revised form of announcement for use by Dow in case Allah Bakhsh should refuse to resign, which you will I hope have thought an improvement on the earlier draft, and which Dow in the events that have happened is now employing. I cannot quite understand why Allah Bakhsh should have been so tiresome about this business; but I dare say that Dow is right in thinking that his head has been a little turned and also that he has the future a good deal in view. What I do sincerely hope is that Dow will be able to get Ghulam Hussain, whom I gather he is seeing today, to form a Ministry without delay, for that is the best counter to Allah Bakhsh's activities and the best answer to any critics outside who may suggest that he really represents feeling in the Province. I get the impression that while certain of the Hindu Ministers like Nihchaldas are very ready to coquet with Congress, Allah Bakhsh has in fact been in the Province the only person really in close touch with them: and if Ghulam Hussain is able to form a Ministry, the result may admit of being regarded as another check to Congress.

Best luck.

publicising his renunciation, had stated that he had no intention of resigning. He was informed that while H.M.G. expected him to do his best to avoid having to dismiss Allah Bakhsh, in the last resort there would be no alternative to this. At their interview on 10 October Sir H. Dow, having failed to persuade the Premier to resign, dismissed him; a communiqué was issued stating that in the light of their discussion he had no option but to inform Mr Allah Bakhsh that he no longer possessed the Governor's confidence and that he could not in consequence continue to hold office. Sir H. Dow thereupon invited Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah, the Home Minister, to form a Ministry. L/P&J/8/647.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT *11 October 1942*

No. 537–S.C. Warmest congratulations on your admirable speech and exposition of the case. I do hope it will carry the weight that it deserves. I hope you are satisfied with the way the debate went.

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Sir A. Hope (Madras) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/70

SECRET GOVT. HOUSE, GUINDY, *11 October 1942*

REPORT NO. 9 OF 1942

My dear Linlithgow,
Since I last wrote, the situation is definitely better, but students continue to cause trouble here and there, and there is still a good deal of cutting of wires, both civil and military. Some of this is ordinary stealing as wire fetches a good price.

2. Although semi-Congress people pay lip-service to the necessity of maintaining law and order, they nevertheless continue violent anti-British propaganda behind the scenes, and I am quite certain that it is quite useless to expect any compromise with Congress or near-Congress elements. For instance, the *Hindu* has had some scandalous articles lately, and I have had it warned over a particularly bad one attacking General Irwin's broadcast speech. Srinivasan, the editor, only got back last night from Bombay, and I have not heard his reactions, but if he does not improve, we will have to take action, despite his exalted position.

That's the stuff!
L.

3. Rajagopalachari is also becoming more talkative, and you will have seen his very doubtful remarks about the eagerness of Indian soldiers to fight under the present régime. I do not think he is trailing his coat, as I have heard that he definitely does not want to go to gaol.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT *12 October 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 543–S.C. Your private and personal telegrams No. 1207[1] and No. 1208[2] of October 7th. U.S.A. representation in India. Halifax will not have had gist of certain earlier telegrams[3] I sent you on this subject. But I quite agree with

[1] No. 77. [2] No. 78. [3] Vol. II, Nos. 760–1; see also No. 85, para. 2.

you that given the length to which his conversations at Washington have gone it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, now to oppose nomination of Phillips or Grew, and that being so, I would be very ready to agree to either. Of the two, if we had any choice, it looks to me as though Grew, given what Halifax says about him in paragraph 3 of his telegram No. 4933[4] of October 2nd, and his experience of Japan, might be the better man for us, but there is probably not a great deal to choose.

2. I also entirely agree with what you say in paragraph 5 of your private and personal telegram of October 7th No. 1207, and hope very much that arrangements on those lines can be made.

3. My main concern in all this business is of course on the one hand to help Halifax and American authorities so far as we properly can, but on the other to avoid excursions into this difficult Indian political field nature of which caused so much embarrassment in the case of Johnson. Nor do I want U.S.A. representative to establish a position as a "mediator" here. That would be most embarrassing to me, and even more so to my successor in his early days. Subject to that you may be quite certain that I, and I am sure my successor too, will be at pains to maintain the closest and most friendly relations with him. I gather that Engert, who has just been here from Kabul, has made an excellent impression and has been most friendly and understanding, and if we can get as representative a man with that outlook and anxious to co-operate, it will make a lot of difference.

[4] See No. 78.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/10/17: f 220

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *13 October 1942*

1224. Your 468–S.C.[1] *Times* Leader came as surprise to me and is I agree most unfortunate. It did not, however, receive much support in debate and was effectively dealt with by Stanley. I regret to say that I am confidentially informed that it results, though not through intentional design on his part, from views expressed to influential individuals here by Mudaliar.

Times under Barrington-Ward is much less in touch than under previous régime and we cannot expect to be told in advance of editor's intentions nor does the usual leader writer on India show any disposition like his predecessors to consult us.

[1] No. 75.

91

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/WS/1/1247: f 226

INDIA OFFICE, *13 October 1942, 2.30 pm*
Received: 14 October

17775. Please refer para. 3 of telegram from C.-in-C., India, to War Office No. 24423/1[1] dated 4th October. I have also seen D.I.B.'s surveys up to No. 33 of 12th Sept.[2] which are very relevant. I should be glad to receive your considered views as to extent to which Indians are being effectively used by the Japanese for pro-Axis propaganda and fifth-columnist activities inside India. A considered appreciation based on all information available would be valuable after appraisement of evidence so far obtained both from military intelligence and police sources. I should also like to know what arrangements are in force for rounding up and scrutinising individuals in parties making their way into India from occupied Burma.

[1] Summarising internal security situation. Para. 3 read as follows: 'Two parties each of five Indians caught after being landed from Japanese [submarine?] on Kathiawar and West Madras coasts respectively. Each man had rs. 500. Stated task was propaganda and adversely influencing internal situation. Apparently were trained in Singapore for despatch from Penang by submarine. Enquiry proceeding. No publicity being given. Increasing number Indian military and civilian personnel crossing Eastern frontier on release by Japanese. Obviously include proportion fifth columnists. Japs paying out large sums against promises to work in Japanese interests. Indications point to intensification Japanese efforts introduce subversive agents and spies. Dib [D.I.B.?] agreed.'

[2] Not printed.

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Viscount Halifax to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 116

SECRET WASHINGTON, *13 October 1942, 8.1 pm*
Received: 14 October, 4 am

No. 5080. Your telegram No. 6169.[1]

I do not think United States Government are likely to pursue the matter further until the President has decided on the actual candidate for the post and *agrément* is requested. I do not therefore propose to say anything further to the State Department in the meantime, especially as I do not think that any difficulties should occur in connexion with the considerations mentioned in paragraph 3 of your telegram.

[1] See No. 85.

2. When the time comes and the *agrément* has been granted I will of course speak to the State Department as suggested in the penultimate sentence of paragraph 5.[2]

3. In the meantime I very much hope that the Viceroy will not pursue his objections to Grew or Phillips, mentioned in paragraph 2. To attempt the rejection of either of these excellent candidates would cause a most unfortunate impression on the United States Government. Furthermore if we were to turn down either Grew or Phillips, we might well be landed with someone much less suitable.

[2] Mr Amery repeated paras. 1 and 2 to Lord Linlithgow in telegram 18025 of 15 October referring to No. 93. L/P&S/12/2633: f 117.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE SIMLA, *14 October 1942, 5.30 pm*
Received: 14 October, 2.55 pm

No. 571–S.C. Your personal telegram of October 11th, No. 17700.[1] U.S.A. representation in India. I am most grateful for your support. Your telegram has crossed mine of October 12th[2] from which you will have seen that I agree to accept Grew or Phillips, and also as regards Welles' suggestion about announcement.

[1] Repeating No. 85. [2] No. 89.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 467

L/P&J/8/617: f 162

INDIA

CONNECTION OF ENEMY AGENCIES WITH THE RECENT DISTURBANCES

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, *14 October 1942*

The War Cabinet at their meeting on the 24th August (W.M. (42) 117th Conclusions, Minute No. 1)[1] invited me to report the considered view of the Government of India on the extent to which the recent disorders might have been provoked by agencies working directly on behalf of the enemy.

This is a matter which has been engaging the close attention of the Government of India since the disturbances revealed themselves as having the purpose of an attack on points of strategical importance; but the Viceroy reported a few days since that the Intelligence authorities still have no direct evidence to support the theory of enemy agency. It is recognised that it is a possibility that cannot be ruled out, and it is not overlooked that the large numbers of refugees from Burma have almost certainly included some Japanese agents. It is to be recognised, also, that Axis broadcasts may well have played some part, though its extent cannot be estimated, in stimulating subversive activities, particularly in areas such as Bengal, where the influence of Subhas Chandra Bose persists.

L. S. A.

[1] Vol. II, No. 621.

95

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *15 October 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2991–S. (Here insert text of telegram No. 36–U, dated 15th October 1942).[1]

Meanwhile however his statement to the *Times*[2] is off the mark and damaging, and I would like to suggest that you might consider a letter either from yourself or from your Publicity Officer to the *Times* to dispose of the suggestion that lack of leadership in India is responsible for failure to produce innumerable legions of fully equipped soldiers, &c., or that our supply performance has been jejune and laggard. The India Office have all the material I think to enable them to dispose decisively of that suggestion or the type of suggestion made by Johnson, but if there is anything else you want you have only to ask me.

[1] 36–U read: 'No doubt Schuster's interest in weak points of Indian problem may diminish a little once (?) my successor's name has been announced. (Here insert text of my immediately succeeding telegram 2991–S).' L/PO/10/34: f 17

[2] Sir G. Schuster's letter to *The Times* of 14 October (among other things) attacked war preparation and war production in India for lack of vision, urgency, and drive, suggesting that otherwise Indian divisions could have been sent to Burma 'sufficiently trained and equipped to resist the invader' and noting Colonel Johnson's remark in April that 'India has done a fairly good job of war production; but it is a peace-time job'. Sir G. Schuster continued: 'Let us be frank. It has been a record of failure to give inspiring leadership or to rise to the needs of the occasion. The British leaders connected with this failure cannot now create the atmosphere which is needed. The right men must be found.' Indian ministers should hold the platform who must have a vigorous and inspiring policy not only in war production but also in the field of social measures.

2. This seems a good opportunity again to correct persistent tendency to undervalue India's military contribution.[3]

[3] In telegram 1265 of 26 October to Sir G. Laithwaite, Mr Turnbull replied that 'we composed rejoinder to Schuster's letter which was signed and sent in by Sir Hugh O'Neill, but *Times* have not published it'. L/PO/10/17: f 227.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *15 October 1942, 7.50 pm*
Received: 15 October, 9.10 pm

No. 2986–P. Your telegram No. 17470[1] dated 8th October. My views on the four questions put to me in paragraph 3 are as follows:—

2. Question (*i*). Proposed public statement would attract wider attention here than publication of White Paper in England and there would be much critical and indignant Press comment directed particularly against the wide and unqualified reaffirmation of obligations by Treaty "or otherwise" towards States and against the implications of paragraph 3 of the draft. I interpret this paragraph (and it would certainly be so interpreted by Princes) as conceding to a group or groups of States, or even some individual States, the same position as is envisaged in paragraph (*c*) (*i*) of the Cripps' Draft Declaration. This would imply admission of the possibility of such States attaining ultimately status of the Indian Union, namely, that of a Dominion in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs. Any such admission, the implication of which goes far beyond mere discussions as contemplated in paragraph 6 of your telegram of 15th August,[2] would enable the States to claim abolition not only of paramountcy but of the "subordinate co-operation" specified in so many Treaties.

3. Question (*ii*). Assurances contemplated or anything approximating to them certainly seem to me calculated to promote feeling of complacency among Princes and to stiffen their already obstinate resistance to proposals involving diminution of individual sovereignty by measures of co-operation or confederation *inter se*. An even more serious apprehension is that if they felt that union or unions of their own and of the nature which they desire could be had for the asking our hopes of successful negotiations for their accession to an All-India union would practically disappear. My dislike of such a prospect has already been explained in paragraph 9 of my telegram of 25th August[3] and has become stronger as result of further reflection.

4. Question (*iii*). The proposed publicity in India as contemplated by His Majesty's Government, would certainly tend to bring into immediate prominence the question of how our obligations for protection, &c. would be implemented and embarrassing pressure for disclosure[4] of our intentions might be expected from British Indian as well as from Princely quarters. But I am constrained to add in this connection that before Princes are asked to make final choice as between (*a*) continuance of existing arrangements, (*b*) formation of groups *inter se* and (*c*) association with British India they will be entitled to much fuller information than that at present possessed by them or indeed by me as to machinery contemplated for protection of non-acceding States or States grouped separately from Provinces.

5. Question (*iv*). If His Majesty's Government's draft is to issue in anything like its present form my answer would be in affirmative. In particular last sentence of paragraph 2 of draft would not in view of its context allay misgivings aroused by Lord Privy Seal's speech in Parliament. This will have to be done in terms of last sentence of paragraph 4 of your telegram of 15th August.

6. In paragraph 4 of your telegram you authorise me to refer to considerations other than those dealt with above. I therefore offer observations on two points arising out of paragraph 2 of His Majesty's Government's draft.

7. Firstly, there is the wide and unqualified nature of the proposed reaffirmation which goes far beyond what was contemplated in first sentence of paragraph 5 of my telegram, dated 25th August. You are aware of difficulties experienced over proposed similar reaffirmation in connection with Federation (*vide* correspondence ending with Patrick's letter No. P.Y.539/38 dated 8th September 1938)[5] and also of fact that Princes cherish many "rights" which (e.g. customs concessions) have no basis other than courtesy or convention and that there are others in the economic and fiscal sphere which may have to be adjusted under pressure to meet new constitutional conditions. Consequently inclusion of words "or otherwise" might prove highly embarrassing. Moreover general situation has so changed since federal discussions that I consider legitimate expectations of Princes would be sufficiently met by limiting reaffirmation to obligations accepted by Treaty or otherwise for protection of their territories and (*vide* Canning Sanads) "perpetuation of their Governments and continuation of the dignity of their houses".

8. My second point is that already raised in last sentence of paragraph 10 of my telegram of 25th August. Sooner or later it will have to be made clear that obligations for protection and perpetuation cannot be unqualified and that

[1] No. 79; the date should be 7 October. [2] Vol. II, No. 561; the date should be 16 August.
[3] Vol. II, No. 629. [4] 'pressure for disclosure' deciphered as 'press disclosure'.
[5] L/P&S/13/738.

interpretation of the letter of relevant treaties, already affected by usage and sufferance, must become increasingly related to manner in which States, either under advice or of their own volition, adapt themselves to necessities of changing times particularly in the matter of pooling their sovereignty and resources for purposes of raising administrative standards. In my view it is essential that any public reaffirmation of nature now contemplated by His Majesty's Government should be combined with a general caveat regarding these requirements. Such combination would not only be salutary warning to Princes but remove sting from anticipated British Indian protests against such authoritative reaffirmation at present juncture of intention that States be perpetuated.

9. You will infer from the above that I have grave doubts as to proposals summarized in paragraph 1 of your telegram. I much regret this but have hopes that what I have said above may convince His Majesty's Government that my misgivings are well-founded. In that even[t] choice would seem to lie between (*a*) limiting ourselves for the present to replying to Jam Saheb on lines agreed to in my telegram of 25th August and (*b*) supplementing that letter by public pronouncement on lines suggested in paragraphs 7 and 8 above. In event of decision to adopt latter alternative it seems to me more suitable that pronouncement should be made orally, preferably in Parliament, e.g. by reply to a prearranged question. This could be followed up by me in some speech relating to States which I shall almost certainly have to make before leaving India.

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/P&J/8/510: f 179

INDIA OFFICE, *15 October 1942*

Secretary of State's Minute: Serial No. P. 57/42

Prime Minister

I think the accompanying telegram[1] from the President of the Hindu Mahasabha should be acknowledged by the Viceroy on your behalf. It claims that the Mahasabha, in the negotiations which have been carried on for some weeks past by Dr. S. P. Mookerjee and others, has won so wide a measure of support from various parties for its programme that it must be regarded as a "national demand" for the recognition of Indian independence and the transfer of power to an Indian National Government. The Mahasabha demands are in fact pretty much the same as those made by Congress in August, but the support claimed for it is less substantial than the telegram suggests. Dr.

Mookerjee saw Mr. Jinnah early in September, but failed to get any change out of him; the latter stands fast on Pakistan, which is anathema to the Hindu Mahasabha. Dr. Mookerjee also saw the Viceroy about the same period;[2] the Viceroy reported that Dr. Mookerjee really had no clear idea of what he meant by a national government, and admitted he had little if any hope of getting either Congress or the Moslem League to support it. The Viceroy's opinion in the middle of September was that Dr. Mookerjee had failed to make any substantial advance; and he confirmed this opinion a week ago.[3]

I suggest that the Viceroy be asked, if he sees no objection, to send a suitable acknowledgment on your behalf, stating that you note with appreciation the endeavours of the Hindu Mahasabha to promote unity among the several elements in Indian life, but observe that they have not so far resulted in specific and constructive proposals enjoying the support of all the major parties.[4]

L. S. AMERY

[1] No. 83. [2] See Vol. II, No. 722. [3] See No. 71, para. 3.

[4] On 16 October the Prime Minister's Private Secretary wrote to Mr Turnbull that Mr Churchill had minuted: 'Commit me to nothing new.W.S.C.' He continued: 'unless you feel that this differs in any way from the proposal in the last paragraph of Mr Amery's minute, would you please ask the Viceroy to do as Mr Amery suggests?' Mr Amery conveyed his proposal to Lord Linlithgow in telegram 18238 of 20 October. L/P&J/8/510: ff 175 and 178.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT *16 October 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 2997–S. Many thanks for your private and personal telegram of the 13th October, No. 1224.[1] I thought Mudaliar might be responsible. It is a nuisance about the *Times* but we shall just have to make the best of it and try to keep them on the right lines. To what extent is it worth trying to develop our connection with the *Telegraph?* It does not of course carry anything like the weight of the *Times*, but we need someone to rely on.

[1] No. 90.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/13/998: f 318

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *16 October 1942, 6.40 pm*
Received: 17 October

No. 18121. Your telegram of the 15th October, 2986–P.[1] I should be glad in putting your views before Cabinet to be in a position to indicate your preference between alternatives (*a*) and (*b*) in your paragraph 9. Could you kindly make this clear by telegram supplementary to your 2986–P and not (repeat not) referring to this enquiry.

[1] No. 96.

100

Sir D. Monteath to Sir G. Laithwaite

Telegram, L/P&S/13/998: f 318

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *16 October 1942, 8.30 pm*
Received: 17 October

No. 18122. Laithwaite from Monteath. Reference Secretary of State's immediately preceding telegram. There are obvious risks in ventilating this delicate question in Parliament and if His Excellency inclines himself to alternative (*a*) it would be helpful if he could give a strong lead in favour of it, suggesting that it could be supplemented later on by a statement by himself as indicated at end of 2986–P[1] which e.g. could bring out the points in para. 8 of his telegram.

[1] No. 96.

101

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *17 October 1942, 12.15 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 17 October, 10 am*

No. 3003–S. Following is my appreciation for period 6th October to 15th October. Minor incidents of sabotage to communications continue to be reported from most Provinces (including one derailment in Assam) and now

form one of the main problems. General situation continues to show slight improvement though Bengal reports many incidents throughout the Province and in Ahmedabad City there is a certain amount of unrest. In North-West Frontier Province picketing of courts led to disturbances at Mardan and Peshawar. Student activity reported from several Indian States and from Bengal. In Bihar re-establishment of police stations continues though there is considerable underground activity which may increase during Pooja Holiday.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Washington, Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/8/6: f 47

17 October 1942

29-U. Cannot get P.M. to decide on your successor pending prospective military operations.

103

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI,
17 October 1942

I got back to Delhi from Simla two or three days ago and hope to leave here tomorrow afternoon by air for Rawalpindi, where I have two or three very strenuous days looking at various forms of military activity and holding a large Durbar of old soldiers, &c. I send you by this bag a copy of what I propose to say in reply to their address of welcome.[1] The Rawalpindi Division has a really remarkable military record and seems to have produced the most astonishing number of recruits, and I am very anxious to take this opportunity to give a public commendation to the war effort of the Punjab as exemplified by the good work at Rawalpindi. The Army Commander, Noyes, will be there: so will Glancy and all his Ministers. Noyes has laid on a heavy programme of inspections for the remaining two days of my visit to Pindi, and I shall be very glad to see how things are going with my own eyes. Thence I propose, all going well, to fly to Quetta (I have not previously visited Baluchistan and think

[1] Not printed.

it well to do so before I leave India). Here again there is a pretty strenuous programme of inspections, parades and the like: but I am sure it is worth while.

2. I am due back here about the 27th October and hope immediately after that to have our Chinese parliamentary mission[2] to stay. I will do all I can to brief them, and I will of course see that they have talks with the Chief, Caroe, Maxwell (so far as the internal situation is concerned), &c. Seymour has sent Laithwaite a telegram expressing the hope that we will get them when they arrive at Chungking to "speak with one voice"! I quite agree, and so far as we are concerned we will do our best. Actually they look to me a pretty good team.

3. Hallett suggested some time ago that it might be worth while making a collection of photographs to illustrate the style and nature of the damage done during the recent disturbances. I thought the idea a good one, and I consulted Governors. One or two of them are doubtful—Lumley is not quite sure, and Lewis, who has little damage to photograph, is also uncertain; and I think that the case against using these photographs for *publicity* purposes is probably pretty strong—the war has familiarised the ordinary public with far more striking instances of destruction and desolation than any that we could produce, while in this country publication might on occasion suggest action of the same kind to disaffected persons, and might apart from that even be used as propaganda for Congress in evidence of the scale on which it has been able to organize disorders. I think the best thing in these circumstances will be that I should send you by the bag as I get them one set of the photographs which reach me in case you should find them useful with visitors such as Members of Parliament or the like. I will make arrangements for a second set to be kept for official record in the Home Department here in case at any later stage reference to them might seem desirable.

* * *

6. Not much else here at the moment. I have just had your telegram[3] (and Monteath's telegram[4] to Laithwaite) about the line to be taken in the Cabinet on this question of the reply to be given to the Jam Saheb's letter, and hope to get a telegram off to you today or tomorrow. I do not see what alternative we have to taking the general line advocated in my telegram,[5] given the policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to Indian constitutional development, though were our hands not tied one's instinct would be to lean a good deal more to the Princes who after all, whatever their faults, have done a very great deal for us and to whom we have great obligations.

7. I have sent you a short telegram[6] about Schuster's somewhat unnecessary letter which I see has now the support of Wardlaw-Milne.[7] I was amused by Sir Mahomed Usman in the course of his interview yesterday. He said that he thought that he might properly indicate his view of one aspect of the general

questions of relations between His Majesty's Government and India by a Muhammadan story. According to him a not very intelligent Muhammadan was observed by three rogues of his own community buying a sheep. The rogues made up their minds that they were going to get the sheep. The first accordingly came up to him and said "Brother, it scandalizes me that you, a follower of the Prophet, should be seen in public leading a pig". The purchaser replied that the animal was not a pig but a sheep and refused to allow himself to be convinced. When he had gone another quarter of a mile the second man came up, lifted his hands in horror and said "I cannot believe what I see—you in public leading a pig—the unclean beast, an abomination to all our holy faith". The owner of the sheep again protested vigorously but found himself somewhat shaken. When he had gone another quarter of a mile along the road, the third rogue met him and reproached him on the same lines. This time it was too much. He abandoned his sheep, convinced against his will that he had been misled and that there was nothing else to do. That is, said Sir Mahomed, what so many of your critics are trying to do at the moment, and I only hope that His Majesty's Government will not behave like the foolish Muhammadan! I think there is some force in what the old man says.

[2] The British Parliamentary Mission to Chungking arrived in New Delhi on 2 November.
[3] No. 99. [4] No. 100. [5] No. 96. [6] No. 95.
[7] In a letter to *The Times* of 16 October.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *18 October 1942, 3.40 pm*
Received: 18 October, 1.30 pm

No. 3012–S. In continuation of my telegram No. 2986–P[1] dated 15th October, I should like to make it clear that of the two alternatives stated in paragraph 9 I would personally prefer (*b*).

2. My reasons are: (1) there seems nothing to be gained by delay and present opportunity offered by States problem being before Cabinet should be fully utilized.

(2) Jam Saheb's presence in England also affords an opportunity for you to impress upon him momentous importance of this pronouncement and to invoke his co-operation.

[1] No. 96.

(3) Proposed reply to Jam Saheb gives wide assurance regarding fulfilment of treaty obligations and if this is to be qualified by public pronouncement interval[2] should be as brief as possible.

(4) My time is drawing to close and proposed pronouncement would greatly strengthen my hand for final endeavours to persuade Princes to make themselves worthy of survival.

3. I feel that combined weight of above considerations establishes strong case for early and authoritative publicity initiated if possible in United Kingdom.

[2] 'interval' deciphered as 'that this'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/PO/8/6: f 46

18 October 1942

37–U. Do for pity's sake continue your (omission)[1] Winston. Much more delay will place my successor in an intolerable position. I do not propose in conversation to attempt to conceal my impending departure in April and hope this may not inconvenience you.

[1] Mr Amery inserted 'pressure on' here.

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Mr Eden to Viscount Halifax

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 114

IMPORTANT FOREIGN OFFICE, *19 October 1942, 2.45 pm*
MOST SECRET

No. 6339. Your telegram No. 5080.[1]

Viceroy has now agreed to either Phillips or Grew, inclining towards the latter, and promises closest and most friendly relations with whomever is appointed.

2. I agree that you need say nothing further about announcement and guidance to the press (to which Viceroy attaches high importance) until after President's choice has been made and agreed.

3. Unless you see objection you might now mention to Mr. Hull our inclination towards G. on lines of paragraph 4 of my telegram No. 6169.[2]

Repeated to Viceroy New Delhi (Personal).

[1] No. 92. [2] No. 85.

107

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

L/P&J/8/515: ff 57–60

INDIA OFFICE, *19 October 1942*

I have no doubt you get as bored as I do with the continuous clamour for some "initiative" to break the deadlock, some new "constructive" policy, by people who have neither initiative nor constructive ideas of their own to suggest, but who feel that somehow, somewhere, there is an "Open Sesame" that needs only to be spoken by you or me to create a united self-governing India throwing itself with undivided enthusiasm into the war. What nobody seems to face is that there can be no immediate solution (apart from the continuance and possible strengthening of a nominated government) unless there is some approach to agreement as to the future constitution, and that, therefore, the only line of progress, slow though it may be, is to concentrate on anything that may help forward serious consideration of the future. In a measure the Cripps proposals did do that, and that is why Gandhi & Co. so fiercely resented them and staged their campaign whose whole object was to force an immediate solution in their favour.

From that point of view I have always attached the greatest importance to Coupland's work and only hope that the actual analysis of the constitutional problem in his third volume[1] will come out reasonably early next year. I should be quite glad, too, much as I am opposed to any form of American political intervention, if some American university were to appoint its own Coupland, or even trio of Couplands, to study the constitutional problem.[2] The conclusions, good, bad, or indifferent, might at any rate help both Indians and Americans to realise what the problem is.

In that connection we have more than once exchanged views as to the possibility of starting some sort of serious research work by Indians directed by an impartial chairman. One of the difficulties about an overt initiative on our part has always been the suspicion which would be directed against any team nominated by ourselves. Somehow it ought to come from Indians, but so far neither party leaders, nor even Indian students or business men seem to have made the slightest attempt to get down to it.

[1] R. Coupland, *The Future of India* (Oxford University Press, 1943). [2] Cf. Vol. II, No. 120.

That is why I was interested to hear about the more or less informal discussions which have been taking place on your Council,[3] and Mudaliar has since in private conversation suggested that such exchanges of views might be extended, in fact that your Council might itself be charged with the task of elaborating a future constitution. As to that, I confess I share the view which you have expressed that it would not only be outside their constitutional functions (a minor objection) but unduly divert their attention from their immediate duties.

On the other hand it seems to me that there is much to be said for letting your Council, and more particularly its Indian members, without undue diversion from their primary duties, have the satisfaction, and also the credit, of having taken the actual initiative in this matter.

The suggestion that I would commend for your consideration is that the Council might appoint among themselves a Committee of three or four members, all of them Indians, to investigate the possibility of creating an organisation of non-official political investigators working under an impartial Chairman such as a Judge from one of the Dominions (I have particularly Feetham in mind and could no doubt get Smuts to lend him). The terms of reference might be:—

(1) to study and recommend methods in expansion of or alternative to those proposed in the draft Declaration for bringing into existence the kind of constitution-making body that would be most likely to lead to an agreed and workable constitution;

(2) to prepare materials in the form of studies of particular problems bound to engage the attention of the constitution-making body which might serve to facilitate the subsequent discussion of these in that body itself.

As to the source from which the individual research workers would be drawn, the Council Committee would no doubt have its own ideas; but I should imagine that it would be possible to secure the services of individuals who follow in politics the views of all the principal parties without it being necessary to include in the Committee any of the actual political leaders or limit its members to persons who take a prominent part in political activities. It would not be necessary to exclude those who sympathise with Congress or have been connected with, e.g. Rajagopalachari, merely on that ground. As the invitation to join the team would come not from yourself but from the Committee of Council, the choice of individuals would appear less suspect than it was represented to be, for instance, at the Round Table Conference.

I do not pretend that a move of the kind suggested would be likely to win any extensive commendation in the American Press, especially as it relates only to the prosecution of our long-term policy. But in official American quarters at any rate it would have the merit of showing that your Government is not

indifferent to the need for preparation now for the setting up of a constitution-making body when the time comes, that its object is to enlist the co-operation of Indians of all schools of thought in this preparatory work and that it has no wish to influence their deliberations. If the parties did not impose an embargo on their supporters' acceptance of the invitation to co-operate and the Chairman succeeded in producing a measure of agreement among them, some definite progress would have been made towards the fulfilment of our policy. If the invitation were rejected and it became impossible to assemble the team, it would be difficult for our critics not to draw the conclusion that the sense of responsibility essential in those charged to devise and work a constitution for India was lacking in the parties which have been clamouring for a national government.

It may be argued that the outcome of such a study, begun as a mere preliminary, might be a superficial and ill-thought scheme on which the parties might yet unite and, on the strength of it, demand an immediate "National Government" with unlimited powers. I should have thought that the answer to this would be that until a constitution and the accompanying treaty are actually in being, by which all causes of dispute, whether among Indian parties, or between India and Britain, can be settled there can be no unlimited and unqualified transfer of power. Any Indian government constituted on the basis of a provisional agreement—and I would risk its being set up—would still have to be subject to the Viceroy's ultimate veto in respect: (*a*) of the conduct of the war; (*b*) of the protection of minorities and of the other interests which are to be ultimately secured by treaty; (*c*) last and not least, of the protection of the future constitution itself.

In any case I do not imagine that any committee for study thus set up would arrive at immediate conclusions. What it would, I hope, do is to stimulate the process of thinking and turn India's mind on to the concrete problem to be settled and distract it from the futile clamour for impossible, because irreconcilable, demands.

I shall look forward with interest to your comment on these ideas which I throw out for your sympathetic consideration.

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

P.S. 1.—Talking to the Jam Sahib the other day he mentioned that the Princes had begun to set up something in the nature of an enquiry among themselves. Obviously if your Council should initiate such an enquiry it ought to subsume into itself, or amalgamate with, whatever study group the Princes may have formed. Clearly the study should be on an all-India basis from the start and not on a British-India basis with the Princes' point of veiw tacked on

3 See No. 298, also Vol. II, Nos. 625, 666 and 672.

afterwards. Indeed, I see no reason why the Princes should not take a lead in this whole business of practical approach to the future constitution. If you don't like the idea of the initiative being taken by your Council, why not get the Princes to do it on their own and let them invite on to their commission of study whatever public men or students from British India they think will be helpful.

P.S. 2.—I enclose a letter[4] from Edwin Haward in today's *Times* which takes up the same idea as that which I have expressed in the main body of this letter.

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

P.S.V.—

I think this stunt might well cost me my Government. It would be known all over India within a week and from the moment they embarked on their enquiry, my colleagues selected for this duty would be the target of propaganda and prejudice from all over India. In any event, none have the time to do the thing properly.

L.,—15.11.

[4] Not printed.

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Sir G. Laithwaite to Mr Turnbull

MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *21 October 1942*

No. 13-Q.C. Laithwaite to Turnbull. Following from His Excellency for Duke of Devonshire:—

Begins. Sincere congratulations on your speech in the debate.[1] I am particularly glad you corrected *Times* newspaper, who for long is going to pay threepence for the sort of stuff they have been selling of late? Best luck. Linlithgow. *Ends.*

[1] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of L., vol. 124, 20 October 1942, cols. 668–721.

109

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/537: ff 75–6

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *21 October 1942, 11.5 pm*
Received: 23 October

1252. Your private and personal telegram 577-S.C.[1] Full text of Jam Sahib's interview published in *Sunday Express* of 11th October has been telegraphed

to Puckle. You will see that this was mainly devoted to exposure of Congress policy and of Gandhi in moderate but convincing terms. I agree that his reference to Indianisation of Council, change of its designation and removal of Whitehall "interference" which was in fact mentioned by Strabolgi in Lords Debate was unfortunate. I suspect it was inspired by Mudaliar if, indeed, it was not Mudaliar who was present at the interview who made it. But the article in general was of first-rate propaganda value and carried great weight coming from this source.

2. I will take opportunity to impress on Jam Sahib before his departure for Canada and U.S.A. that he must eschew there as recommended by Halifax any public reference to constitutional questions in India and concentrate on role of Indian military forces in United Nations cause. I have already had a word with Mudaliar about embarrassment caused by reference here to Indianisation issue.[2]

[1] Of 19 October, expressing concern regarding this interview, in which the Jam Sahib had advocated complete Indianisation of the Executive Council, changing its name to Cabinet, and cessation of Whitehall interference in administration of India. MSS. EUR. F. 125/23.

[2] Lord Linlithgow acknowledged this telegram with thanks in his telegram 68 Q.C. of 26 October. MSS. EUR. F. 125/23.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/8/6: f 43

22 October 1942

30–U. Your 37-U.[1] Have spoken again to Winston but fear you may still have to wait three or four weeks for an announcement. Meanwhile I see no reason why you should not informally let it be known that you are not continuing.

[1] No. 105.

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Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/110

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, *22 October 1942*

No. 294 H.E.

My dear Linlithgow,

I write in connection with your personal telegram No. 368–S.C.[1] dated September the 30th, which was sent by post, and which deals with

[1] No. 49.

arrangements in case Gandhi should start to fast. Fortunately, as there is still no sign that he contemplates a fast, it is possible to consider this matter without a pressing sense of urgency. I have therefore taken some time to consider it and I have discussed it, most confidentially, with a few officers principally concerned.

2. I am beginning to entertain the belief that Gandhi is now unlikely to fast, at any rate, for some time to come; but we can only guess at the way his mind is working, and he has so often taken an unexpected and apparently illogical course, and external events might so easily change any calculations we may make, that we cannot afford to rule out the possibility of a fast, and I fully agree with the importance of having our plan of action thought out in advance as far as possible. It is, too, of much importance to my Government, which will have to carry out the policy finally decided upon, to be clear before hand about what is to be done.

3. The conclusions described in your telegram make a radical change from what has previously been contemplated, in that they propose not to release Gandhi when he reaches danger point but to continue to keep him in custody even until he dies. I have already expressed, in my private and personal telegram No. 548[2] of August the 8th last, my personal views as to the reactions which would follow if we allowed Gandhi to fast to death under arrest. I have no reason to alter the views which I expressed in that telegram, and I must make it clear beyond doubt that, if Gandhi dies under arrest, we must be prepared to meet a very serious situation in this Province. That is the view also of the officials with whom I have discussed these proposals. Some of them go further than I do and expect that attacks on Government officers would take place on a very large scale. I need not labour the point, but I have no doubt at all that the reaction would be so strong that considerable forces would be required to meet it, and for a considerable time.

4. The undoubted seriousness of the reaction to be expected and particularly the prolonged effect on the Indian attitude to the war, convinces me that we should not risk that reaction except in circumstances which allow of no alternative. If for instance, Gandhi staged a fast at a time when the Japanese were trying to invade India, there would, in my judgment, be no alternative but to keep him in custody. On the other hand, if he were to begin a fast now when the present movement might be held to be languishing, and with the object, possibly, of giving it greater momentum the disadvantages of releasing him, considerable though they would be, would in my view be not nearly so great and probably not so prolonged as those which would follow his death under detention. These two examples do not, of course exhaust the possibilities, but I use them to illustrate my point that the reaction to Gandhi's death, from

a fast, under detention, is going to be so formidable that we ought not to allow it to happen except under extreme circumstances. I would therefore urge most strongly that we should not commit ourselves to a decision not to release him if he fasts but that, while perfecting our plans in case that decision has to be made, we should await the circumstances, and regard it as the resort to be used only when there is no alternative.

5. I have, in the preceding paragraph, endeavoured to make my view clear about the main change which your telegram proposes. Examination, however, of the mechanics of the proposals, tends also to confirm my view against the change, for I have considerable doubts whether they will prove effective in securing the objects which they are designed to secure. I understand the main objects to be to keep Gandhi cut off from outside contact and from securing that publicity, on which he thrives and of which he has been largely deprived since his detention. I believe, in the first place, that the proposals will not work. As soon as Gandhi starts to fast it will be the purpose of all those connected with him to secure his immediate release in the hope that he may be induced to give up his fast, once he is at liberty. Devadas Gandhi will almost certainly believe that by accepting the mission proposed for him he will be playing Government's game, and I feel certain he will refuse and will devote all his energies towards mobilising opinion to demand his father's release. If he takes that line, no other person closely connected with Gandhi will take on the rôle which Devadas has rejected. That is very likely to be the first hitch, and we should not succeed in our effort to show that, except for release, every kind of decency including the presence of his son, is being extended to him. Even if Devadas accepts the mission, it would be, I am certain, useless to count on the proposed bond to prevent publicity of what would be going on inside the Aga Khan's palace. Even though those who went to see him might refrain from giving direct interviews to the Press, everyone of them would talk and the newspapers would be full of anonymous but inspired versions of what was going on. We can certainly succeed in preventing newspaper correspondents from having access to Gandhi, but we could never prevent newspapers from carrying as much indirect news of him, and probably indirect messages from him, as they wanted. Indeed I will go so far as to say that the whole conception, that by keeping Gandhi in custody we shall be depriving him of publicity, is a delusion. Once he begins to fast, whether those who have access to him talk or not, his fast will be the only front-page news in all Indian newspapers, and still more so if he dies. If it is argued that though we cannot deny him publicity we can limit his communications with the outside world, again I would say that we are unlikely to do so effectively. Either those who visit him will, in spite of their bond, talk, or the newspapers will put their own construction on what they

[2] See Vol. II, No. 480.

believe Gandhi would like to pass out and the effect on the public will be much the same. In short, I do not believe that the proposals now made will work, and in so far as they seek to deny publicity to Gandhi or to limit his communications with the outside world, they would not be effective even if they could be put into operation. It would, therefore, be a very small counter which we would be throwing into the balance against the heavy weight of the reaction which his death in detention would bring us, and at the most the counter would last for a week or two while the reaction would be very prolonged.

6. It is also urged on behalf of the new proposals that serious problems of public order might arise if he were released and continued to fast, and by implication that these problems would not arise if he were continued in custody. I am unable to agree with this implication, and certainly those responsible for law and order in Poona do not except to be relieved of any problems of public order if he is not to be released. While it is true that there might be great pilgrimages to dissuade him from fasting, if he were released, there might be pilgrimages, in a different temper, to force his release if he remained in detention. We have for some time had ready a scheme of military and police dispositions in Poona to control great crowds who might try and reach the Aga Khan's palace once a fast began. The dispositions will have to be much the same whether he is in or out of detention, and the problem of public order is the same in either case, except that the public temper is likely to be much worse if he were not released.

7. I, therefore, have serious doubts whether these proposals will secure their objects. The problems of public order which they will produce will certainly be no less. I fail to see how they would result in control of the Press. I do not think they would effectively limit Gandhi's communication with the outside world, or, to be more accurate, that they would prevent Gandhi from providing the maximum of inspiration and incitation to his own countrymen and the maximum of sensational news to the outside world. I would rather face the fact that if Gandhi fasts there is no way of preventing it from being exploited to the full. That further confirms me in my view that we should be wise not to allow him to die in our hands except in circumstances which allow of no alternative, for there are only the slenderest and most temporary advantages to be set against the really formidable problems with which his death in those circumstances would face us.

8. I trust that these arguments will receive consideration, but if the decision is made not to release, we shall in this Province make the best of it, and there are one or two minor points which will need to be cleared up—

(*a*) Nothing is said in your telegram about publicity by Government. Once Devadas is approached, the fast will be public property. I suggest

that the Government of India should immediately announce the fast and make known the facilities which will be given to Gandhi, and thereafter give frequent communiqués.

(*b*) Although I expect that Devadas will refuse and that no one else will accept the mission, it would be advisable to have a second and third choice in mind so that we can know as early as possible whether that part of the scheme will work. We should also decide what is to happen if it does not work.

(*c*) The telegram proposes that the selection of names of visitors will be left to Devadas Gandhi. Would he be allowed to include other détenus? The first person Gandhi will want to see will be Vallabhbhai Patel. I do not think that should be allowed, but the point should be settled beforehand.

(*d*) As I am quite certain that we should have to meet a very serious situation, far more serious than what has arisen hitherto, I have begun to concert with the District Commander ways in which troops could be disposed to the best advantage throughout the Province as soon as a fast becomes certain. At the present moment there are a welcome number of troops available, but many of them may go elsewhere before this eventuality arises. I, therefore, take this early opportunity of saying that in this Province we shall need very considerable support from the Army and that I hope the strength of troops on whom a call could be made will be diminished as little as possible. I do not know whether our need will be greater than that of other Provinces, but I think it should be remembered that Gujarat is Gandhi's principal stronghold, that Bombay City is in a large measure devoted to him, and that the centre of events will be Poona; for all these reasons it would be a wise precaution to expect a major explosion in this Province.

(*e*) If, on the other hand, it is eventually decided to release Gandhi when his condition approaches the danger point, I would emphasise that the advice given to me by the Surgeon-General, who attended Gandhi during his last Yeravda fast, is that at his age and with his blood pressure, a very quick deterioration is likely to set in. He thinks that it would probably not be wise to expect that he could get through more than 3 or 4 days without reaching a state from which he would probably not recover. If, therefore, we do decide on a policy of release there is not likely to be too much time for deliberation.

9. In conclusion, I still have a good deal of expectation that there will be no fast: but if we are unfortunate, and Gandhi stages one, I do not think we should be under any illusion that it would not be a matter of the gravest character, with very serious effects on the whole war effort in India, should he die in

detention. For that reason I think we ought to go a long way to avoid that development, the more so since I have doubts whether the new conclusions, described in your telegram, will have much chance of effecting their purpose.

Yours sincerely,

ROGER LUMLEY

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/13/998: ff 309–12

IMPORTANT
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, *23 October 1942, 8 pm*
Received: 24 October

1259. Proposed assurance to Jam Sahib.

2. I was most grateful for comments on Cabinet formula for publication in India in paragraphs 2 to 5 of your 2986–P.[1] They have convinced me and will I hope convince my colleagues that this formula will not do.

3. I have since tried my best to draft in the light of your 3012–S[2] an alternative formula on lines suggested in paragraphs 7 and 8 of your 2986–P for publication here. But with every wish to see this tiresome business settled in the way that most appeals to you, I am brought up against following difficulties.

(*a*) Would not specific reaffirmation of pledge to perpetuate States' Governments be held to bind us to recognise rights of petty States without Canning Sanads to maintain in perpetuity their own separate administrations which, e.g. in Kathiawar, we are agreed must eventually be wholly absorbed in larger units?

(*b*) At the same time would not conjunction[3] in official "pronouncement" of caveat proposed in your paragraph 8, unless this were expressed in such general terms as to rob it of all effect, be objected to by Princes generally as a formal qualification of present Treaty position, thus depriving assurance of any value for them and increasing rather than lessening their anxieties?

(*c*) Further disappointment would be caused by omission of public reference to their criticism of Cripps' speech of 28th April and to their desire to have proposals for Union of States considered.

(*d*) By initiation here of a public pronouncement about relations with States we could hardly hope to dodge British–Indian criticism; on the contrary, I would expect such criticism to be stimulated by the adverse Parliamentary comment which such a pronouncement whether made in Parliament or outside would evoke.

4. My inclination would therefore be to try to persuade Cabinet to agree to a reply generally on lines proposed in your telegram of 25th August.[4] I should prefer to circulate only your 2986–P, expressing my own strong preference for your alternative (*a*), to be followed in India by action contemplated in last sentence of your telegram. Incidentally, arguments 1 and 2 in paragraph 2 of your 3012–S carry less weight now that Jam Sahib will be leaving for two months' absence[5] before terms of reply can be finally settled.

5. I anticipate that my colleagues will still wish reply to be in a form suitable for publication in India and therefore that it should be briefer than is contemplated in your 2591–P.[6] On this basis most of material referred to in paragraph 7 of that telegram might be omitted. On points of detail:—

(*a*) I would advocate adherence to the language in reply to Jam Sahib's paragraph I (*a*) to (*f*) contemplated in your paragraph 5, but to add something to the following effect:—

> "The Crown Representative to whom the Princes look for support must expect from them in their own best interests a conformity with world opinion in regard to administrative standards as it has developed since relations with them were established, and as exemplified in the administration of British India."

(*b*) Explanation of Cripps' speech might be restricted to last sentence of paragraph 4 of my 14395.[7]

(*c*) I agree with answer about Union of States proposed in paragraph 8 of your 2591–P.

6. Should Cabinet accept these proposals I shall probably have to ask you to telegraph draft text of Craik's reply for their approval and for transmission to the Jam Sahib. Any further oral explanations would have to await his return.

7. Please let me know if on further consideration you agree to my proceeding as proposed.

[1] No. 96. [2] No. 104. [3] 'conjunction' deciphered as '(group corrupt inclusion?)'.
[4] Vol. II, No. 629. [5] During his proposed tour to Canada and U.S.A.
[6] Vol. II, No. 629. [7] Vol. II, No. 561.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/591: f 45

PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *23 October 1942, 7 am*
Received: 24 October

18416. Your personal telegram of the 4th October, 416–S.C.[1] Very many thanks for this and all the other helpful material you sent me for the debate.

2. As regards non-official advisers nothing emerged from the debate to suggest that I ought to press you to consider this matter further. In all the circumstances I share your doubt whether political advantages would be sufficient to justify introducing in some Provinces a mixed team of official and non-official advisers, and in view of the difficulties in Bombay and Bihar I think we may let the matter rest there for moment.

[1] No. 65.

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Mr Amery to Sir S. Cripps

L/E/8/2527: ff 278–80

INDIA OFFICE, *23 October 1942*

My dear Cripps,

I enclose herewith a very full memorandum[1] which has been prepared in this Office on what has been done up to date in India in regard to social reform. It is a very good and comprehensive bit of work and I understand that neither Leggett nor Owen, to whom it was sent a fortnight ago, had any comments or wished to meet its authors with a view to elaborating it further. I think therefore that we might regard it as sufficient material on which we can now discuss the matter on the ministerial plane whenever you think suitable.

On that plane the question for us to consider really is: what are we aiming at? If it is simply to stimulate good work in respect of social reform in India and afterwards have the satisfaction of having done it, and possibly some small measure of credit to the existing Government of India, it is obvious that we can only work through the existing Central and Provincial machinery and that our power to effect results is very narrowly limited. The most that I see we can do is to discuss the matter with the new Viceroy-designate, whenever he is designated, persuade him that he should apply his constant stimulus to his colleagues on the Executive, in so far as they have any say in these matters, and

through the Governors to the Provincial Governments, insofar as the Governors can exercise influence.

In doing this, of course, they would be limited all the time by the urgency of war demands and will not have very large sums of money for immediate improvements or be in a position to borrow largely for long-term projects.

If we are to consider the question of any financial help towards social reform in India from here, I think we must face the fact that very substantial sums would be required to make any impression, and that anything we did would probably be resented and only do harm politically. There is the further difficulty that the actual money spent in India would have to be raised, whether by taxation or by borrowing, in the form of rupees, and that therefore the only possible result of a subvention from here would be the still further increase of India's holding of sterling balances against the end of the war! The balances that are likely to be accumulated will indeed be available for every kind of long-range re-equipment of India, whether for industry, irrigation, railways, or other public works. These things would probably do more to raise the standard of living after the war than anything else, and would incidentally also dispose of the sterling balances in the shape of orders for capital goods from here, and to that extent help the employment situation during the years of transition from war to peace.

If, therefore, we want to produce anything in the nature of an impression upon India of our good will towards her, and to that extent counteract the bitterness worked up by Congress, it seems to me that the only kind of thing we can do is something that involves the spending of sterling here at home. From that point of view I can think of several things. Good work is already being done in connection with seamen's hostels for Indian seamen: this could be vigorously pushed and well advertised. Then there is room for showing our interest and sympathy with India and the East generally from the point of view of language, literature, art, and religion. We are already providing a site for a mosque in Regent's Park and we are prepared to go up to £100,000 for it. I believe the actual site is going to cost somewhat less and I have had it suggested to me that the balance might very well be spent on providing a modest but adequate mosque in the place of the little meeting house at present frequented by Moslem seamen in the East End. We might even go further than the giving of the site and add another £100,000 towards the cost of the mosque itself.

[1] This memorandum, entitled *Notes on Social and Economic Policy in India*, began by explaining the effect of constitutional changes since 1919 on policy in the social and economic sphere. It then described recent legislative and administrative measures taken by the Government of India and Provincial Governments relating to Labour, Land Tenure and Land Revenue, Agriculture, Irrigation, Education and Public Health. Section 9 summarised the material supplied by Governors of Section 93 Provinces showing the 'nation building' activities undertaken during the period of direct rule. A table was appended giving figures of recent and current expenditure by the Central and Provincial Governments on selected social, etc., services. L/E/8/2527: ff 172–8.

Then London, at the centre of a great Eastern Empire, is disgracefully badly equipped from the point of view of oriental studies generally. Hailey the other day made an impassioned appeal[2] for more funds for the School of Oriental Studies. A really generous donation in that direction might make a very real impression in India, as would a donation or endowment for a school of Indian art and literature. There is, I believe, a very real opportunity for us, at a comparatively moderate cost, to do something that would really strike the imagination of India here in London. If we thought well of the idea of doing something of that sort, we might get together a small committee under someone like Hailey to think out for us how a given total might best be applied.

To sum up then, my recommendation would be that we should encourage the outgoing Viceroy, in spite of war commitments, to retain an active interest in social reform, and ourselves show an intelligent and generous interest in India from the cultural point of view, by making up for past deficiencies and endowing something really worthy here at the centre of the Empire.

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

P.S. I am sending the notes and a copy of this letter to Bevin and Kingsley Wood.

[2] At a joint meeting of the East India Association and the Royal Empire Society. Mr Amery and Lord Zetland (who was in the chair) endorsed Lord Hailey's appeal. *The Times*, 16 October 1942.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *24 October 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 46–Q.C. I repeat in my immediately following telegram (No. 47–Q.C. of October 24th) telegrams received from (*a*) Members of Council mentioned, and (*b*) Firoz Khan Noon, which are self-explanatory. I will consider what reply to give and also whether I have any suggestions to put to you. Meanwhile could you telegraph what exactly was said on point about Indianisation. As you will see division substantially communal on this issue persists inside my Council.

2. Reference to Simon's statement (here again I would welcome exact words used) again indicates extreme touchiness of certain members (I suspect Sarker in particular) as regards their position *vis-à-vis* Governor-General and his Majesty's Government.[1]

[1] L/PO/10/17: f 225 has 'Lord Linlithgow' instead of 'his Majesty's Government'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *24 October 1942*

No. 47–Q.C. My telegram No. 46–Q.C.

(*a*) Following is telegram received from Members of Council.—

Begins. We have read with considerable surprise the statement[1] said to have been made by the Secretary of State in House of Commons that "the present European members were being retained merely because of difficulty in finding suitable Indians for posts". If the Secretary of State has been correctly reported we beg to dissociate ourselves wholly with the position taken up by him. In our considered opinion there is no difficulty whatsoever in finding suitable Indians for any positions in Government of India and we have to remind the Secretary of State that if Congress and the Muslim League had accepted the Cripps' proposals there would have been at the Centre today a wholly Indian Government with very wide powers. We have to add that statement in question is entirely at variance with facts and constitutes an affront to Indians and we have to request Your Excellency to communicate these our views to the Secretary of State. We also desire in this place to call attention to the Secretary of State's declaration that he was not prepared in the present circumstances to permit interviews with Congress leaders and to enquire where the members of the Government of India come in on this policy and whether they have any say in it. In this connection Lord Simon's statement in which he describes members of the Government as Advisers seems significant.[2] We would not have troubled Your Excellency with this communication while you are on tour but we feel very strongly our position has been rendered extremely difficult by declaration of this character. *Ends.*

Above telegram is from Mody, Sultan Ahmed, Aney, Sarker, Ambedkar, Srivastava, Jogendra Singh.

(*b*) Following is telegram received from Firoz Khan Noon:—

Begins. Some members held the usual private meeting. Usman and I not present. Aney wanted me to sign statement which is being cabled to you tonight for transmission to the Secretary of State. I and Usman have refused to sign. Benthall not asked. My reason is that my signature would amount to going back on stand I recently took in Council against complete Indianisation. Usman refusing for same reason from Muslim point of view.[3] *Ends.*

[1] For texts of statements by Mr Amery and Lord Simon referred to in this telegram, see No. 119.
[2] 'significant' deciphered as 'to (?derive) special significance'. [3] See enclosure to No. 298.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT QUETTA, *24 October 1942, 5.15 pm*
Received: 24 October, 7 pm

No. 50–Q.C. Your No. 17775[1] of October 13th. There is no doubt that Japanese are trying to send large number of Indians as agents to this country and that they have been fairly successful in doing so. These include both Indian civilians long resident in enemy-occupied territories and Indian and Burman military personnel, captured in Burma and Malaya. Preparation of potential Indian agents is in the hands of Japanese officers and renegade Indians. Usual approach is ill-treatment of prisoners, both civil and military, to secure their submission to Japanese aims or alternatively strong propaganda about the fight for Indian freedom followed by course of instruction comprising collection of military intelligence; propaganda; means of causing internal unrest; sabotage, &c. Agents are then despatched to selected spheres of operation in India. School for training of agents on these lines is functioning at Penang but standard reached so far seems relatively low but must be expected to improve as schools get under way. Agents are evidently led to expect and instructed to seek aid from Congress leaders and followers, but we have as yet nothing definite to show that this expectation is justified, but in any case arrests made must have frustrated attempts. Propaganda is of course largely left to Japanese radio, harm done by which has recently led us to authorise Provincial Government to confiscate receiving sets primarily used for this purpose.

2. It is difficult to assess extent of infiltration of agents into India up to date. Some 45 apparently genuine agents have so far been caught. Of these some 24 were members of Indian National Army; 10 were agents landed in two parties by submarine; remainder were civilians of various categories probably mainly introduced in refugee stream over Burma frontier. A number more mostly Indian and Burman military personnel who became agents in order to escape from the Japanese have on arrival in India reported to authorities. Others are untraced, including probably one further party of five landed by submarine, while presence of many more is doubtless unknown. Agents so far arrested have not proved remarkably intelligent or staunchly pro-Japanese and though Japan may have launched intelligent [intelligence] drive on higher level, we have so far no evidence to support this. There is no parallel drive from Afghanistan where Axis legations appear to be concerned mainly with collection of intelligence about India and extending their influence with tribes. Degree of

success achieved in first objective is not believed to be great (see Armindia telegram No. 26012–I, dated October 21st, to Troopers [i.e. War Office]).[2]

3. There is still no direct evidence to show that the work of these agents has been effective nor have any acts of sabotage which have occurred been brought home to them. And while it remains significant that many forms taken by present movement, both in its initial outburst and in subsequent sporadic sabotage, are in fact forms on which Japan would most probably have concentrated and are occurring in areas she would have selected had she been directing movement, we have still been unable to discover direct evidence of Japanese organization or instigation of movement or of Japanese-Congress connection.

4. Responsibility for examination of refugees entering India over the eastern land frontier has hitherto been that of the Provincial Governments concerned. But their police resources were insufficient and at the height of influx during the summer anything in the nature of 100 per cent. examination was impossible. All that can be said is that the majority of pro-Japanese elements who may have entered at this time had probably not received any training or definite instructions from the Japanese. Possibility cannot be ignored however that they may have used personnel recruited and trained pre-war. Some statements extracted from suspects tend to confirm this. We have since evolved new scheme which will provide for examination of all persons crossing the frontier and which will it is hoped commence operation by the end of this month. This scheme will be administered by the Central Government and will consist in essence of arrangements to collect all persons as they cross the frontier and to shepherd them to appropriate examination centres of which four are being established in Assam and one in Bengal under War Department control. Interrogation will here be carried out by combined police and military staff. Persons whom this preliminary examination reveals to be really suspicious or to have information of important operational value will be sent for further interrogation at Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre which has been established in Delhi and in which D.I.B. and General Staff are combining resources both in interrogation and assessment of and action on results.

[1] No. 91. [2] Not printed.

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Sir R. Maxwell to Sir G. Laithwaite

MSS. EUR. F. 125/137[1]

NEW DELHI, *24 October 1942*

My dear Laithwaite,
I am replying to your d.-o. No. F.-125/48/G.G./42[2] of 15th October enclosing a copy of Clow's letter[3] about the reactions of the Indian Services to the present situation. As the Home Department is interested in various aspects of the morale and the protection of the Services I thought it advisable to obtain the views of Conran-Smith and Tottenham and I think that His Excellency would like to see their notes which I enclose. I might also suggest that Thorne should be consulted as he has been dealing with the general question of protecting the Services from victimisation and the effect on their morale of the Congress rule in certain Provinces. I agree very generally with what Conran-Smith has said but both these notes compared with what Clow has written show that it is difficult to produce a comprehensive diagnosis or to determine what remedies are required. It is evident that no one diagnosis will apply to all sections of the Services. It is obvious, for instance, that the same people cannot both sympathise with Congress and fear Congress domination. If we are to assume that a large proportion of the Hindu element in Government service is Congress-minded, there is no need to reassure it against the possibility of Congress rule. Or, again, if as Conran-Smith says, most Hindu officials desire self-government for India, there is no need to protect or compensate them when they get it. On the other hand, it would appear that those who fear Congress cannot sympathise with it, nor, if they believe that self-government will mean Congress rule, can they want self-government. But, even in regard to such persons, if we believe that the Congress will fall to pieces when self-government is attained, even the people who now fear Congress will not need so much protection. But again if, after the new alignment to which Clow refers, those in power are not likely to regard with favour past zeal for the present Government, propaganda to the effect that Congress is on the wane will be merely an attempt to delude them by creating a sense of safety that may not be justified and, in any case, Clow admits that such propaganda will not be likely to convince Hindu officials—so we are left where we were.

2. All this sounds rather contradictory and it is difficult to make sense of it, but I think we must apply a simpler form of analysis and allow ourselves to take a commonsense view of the situation that actually exists—a situation full of inherent contradictions and almost without parallel in the history of any country. We have firmly announced our intention at no very remote date to

abandon India to a yet undetermined National Government or Governments, yet we expect loyalty in the meanwhile from our public services and have to rely on them to support the present system of Government against attacks from their possible future rulers or from others no more favourable to the maintenance of the *status quo*. It is to these future rulers, whoever they may be, that Indian officials must look for their future employment and prospects. In the circumstances their faithfulness during the recent disturbances has been nothing less than remarkable but, as Conran-Smith has suggested, it can largely be explained by the attitude of Indians towards their employers and the, to them, vital problem of obtaining and keeping employment. Service under this or any other Government is regarded simply as a paid job. It is not a matter of principle or political sympathies but simply one of earning their daily bread. Although attempts have been, and are being made to induce Government servants to resign, these are merely part of the campaign to embarrass us and I should say that no one, not even a Nationalist, would regard it as blame-worthy on the part of any person to perform the duties necessary to retain his job whatever his private sympathies might be. Nor would most of our Government servants regard it as inconsistent with any principle to accept future employment under the parties against whom they were now called on to take action.

3. At the same time in the given situation our officials—and especially the Hindus among them—must naturally in considering their future prospects look towards the rising rather than the setting sun. The one thing quite certain that they have to go upon is that we shall not be here to employ or protect them in the future. If we told them that Congress would not be in the ascendant in the future, they would still be looking round them to discover who their next masters would be. These people share with a large part of the human race a desire to be on the winning side. There must, in the uncertainties of the present situation, be a natural tendency to hedge and we cannot reasonably expect our servants to do more for the present Government than their duty actually requires. We can, however, I think expect them not to do less and our expectations have, speaking generally, been fulfilled. In my opinion the rank and file of the public services have little to fear under any future Government. Those on whom more responsibility rests in taking executive action are naturally under more pressure and different officers may take different views of where their duty begins or ends, but my impression is that the average officer has not much to fear from the present opponents of Government if he has done his duty fairly and without oppression and tyranny. The officers who will be marked men will be those who have displayed ill-will in the performance of

[1] Enclosed in the letter of 24 November from the Deputy Private Secretary to the Viceroy to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State.

[2] Not printed. [3] No. 81.

their duties or acted in a needlessly vexatious or tyrannical manner. In Hindu India the Hindu official is pretty safe for a job under the new constitution, for the new Government will want to take on the machinery of the Services. The Muslim is not so certain and that is one of the reasons why Pakistan is demanded.

4. Coming to Clow's specific suggestions I think there is no use in embarking on any line of propaganda unless we believe it. It is merely a matter of speculation to say that the power of the Congress is on the wane unless and until we have in sight some other movement arising in the country which can offer a serious challenge to it: that may yet come but I doubt whether there is time for it before constitution-making begins. In the meanwhile under the present régime the only prescription that will hold our Services together and keep their hearts up is firm Government such as will produce a sense of security and itself deserve the loyalty of those who work for it. Clow's other suggestion that proportionate pensions should be allowed to all Indian Government servants coupled with a guarantee for their payment, does not seem to me to be worth exploring. In the absence of any neutral authority established in this country which could act as the agency for disbursements, pensions could not, in practice, be paid from England to Indians living in India under a National Government.

5. My general conclusion is that there is nothing much to worry about. If there had been anything seriously wrong we should not have had the service there has been from all classes of Government servants during the recent disturbances but we must not expect too much in the situation that our own policy has created for the Services during the last years of the present régime. If there is no deterioration beyond what we have already experienced I do not think we shall have much cause to grumble.

Yours sincerely,

R. M. MAXWELL

Enclosure 1 to No. 118

The broad propositions stated in the letter of Sir Andrew Clow are that—

(*a*) Under present circumstances some weakness has been revealed in the Indian Services;

(*b*) The natural sympathies of the majority of Indian officials, at any rate Hindu officials, are more with Congress than with any foreign rule;

(*c*) A number of Hindu officials, particularly the more junior ones, are less influenced by (*b*) than by a fear of what may happen to them in the future when British rule in India has ceased and a fear lest those who have supported the present Government may be made to suffer for their allegiance in a land where Congress influence is predominant; and that

(*d*) Possible remedies are the dissemination of the idea that the power of Congress is on the wane and the grant of safeguards, particularly a guarantee of pensions by His Majesty's Government.

2. I have heard it said more than once that 95 per cent. of Hindu officials are Congress-minded and I have had an opportunity to discuss this suggestion frankly with two Indian officers, both Hindus, who, I believed, were prepared to take a dispassionate view. It might be of interest if I summarised their views. Both officers told me that they had frequently discussed this question generally with other Indians of different grades and walks of life and had therefore material on which to base an estimate of Hindu opinion.

(1) Both were agreed that the majority of Hindu officials are in their hearts sympathetic towards any organisation which had for its avowed object the establishment of National Government in India. (Muslim opinion of course tends to interpret this as an aspiration for Hindu Raj.) This may be regarded as a natural feeling, not necessarily confined to Hindus. One of them stated that many younger members of other communities, e.g. Parsis and Christians, felt the same. One of them, probably rightly, included Congress among the organisations towards which Hindu officials were sympathetic; the other took the view that the majority of officials disapproved of the subversive activities of Congress and were not therefore sympathetic towards the Congress, but that they resented the failure of His Majesty's Government to offer any constitutional advance during the war in response to the demands of national leaders; but

(2) Both, however, were agreed in saying that the average Hindu official would not allow this sympathy with what he regards as natural aspirations of an Indian national to interfere with the discharge of their official obligations. In other words, they would not allow their private feelings to prejudice their loyalty to the employer who paid them. It was stated that this could of course be affirmed more confidently in respect of the older members of the Services with longer traditions behind them. In support of this assertion the case was quoted of an Inspector of Police who arrested his own brother-in-law, a member of the Congress, with whom he lived. (I might mention that when I recently questioned a temporary clerk suspected of Congress sympathies, the latter, while admitting allegiance to the Congress flag, seemed genuinely surprised at the idea that his ability to perform the duties for which he was paid by Government should be regarded as in any degree impaired thereby or that he could not possess two loyalties simultaneously when one of them reflected his private feelings and the other was concerned with the occupation by which he earned his daily bread.)

(3) Neither of the officers with whom I talked accepted the view that the attitude of Indian officials towards their duties was materially affected by

apprehensions concerning their future after the constitution of a National Government and the cessation of British rule. Both were definite that they had seen little or no evidence of this and they did not believe it was a factor of any great importance.

(4) Neither attached much value to safeguards. Both considered that officials who had served in Congress Provinces had been disillusioned on this point and that their attitude was not likely to be influenced by the offer of any future assurance of that nature.

3. My own views, for what they are worth, are—

(*a*) There can be little doubt regarding the sympathies of most Hindu officials; they regard aspirations towards a National Government in India as natural and legitimate and most of them, although they may disapprove of the subversive activities of Congress, sympathise with its objects. (This applies much less to the older officials who have a tradition behind them and have become more or less officialised); but

(*b*) The majority of Hindu officials (there are of course exceptions) see no great difficulty in serving the existing Government so long as it survives and while aspiring to replace it by a Government of their own, they regard service under this Government as a means of earning their daily bread, which can be kept distinct from, and unprejudiced by, any aspirations towards constitutional changes. If this were not the case there would surely have been more widespread resignations during the recent disturbances organised by Congress. There must of course have been a conflict in the minds of many Indian officials but the reports I have seen seem to show that the Indian official on the whole stuck to his duties, even if they were at times distasteful to him;

(*c*) With all respect to the views expressed by the Governor of Assam, I do not myself believe that the average Indian official worries very much about the future, i.e. about the possible effect on his career and pension under a National Government or his service under the Government as at present constituted;

(*d*) It is almost certainly true that experience under the Congress Governments has disillusioned the majority of Indian officials in respect of the value of safeguards. An assurance by His Majesty's Government that their pensions will be guaranteed stands of course on a different footing, but apart from the extreme nature of this step—(it is one thing to guarantee the pensions of British officials who do not belong to this country and another to offer guarantees in respect of those who belong to and live in India)—it might be regarded as an admission that in spite of all we have said and done to suppress Congress we anticipate a Congress Government in the future and not a Government which could be trusted to play fair by its servants. In any case, if I am right about (*c*) such guarantee would hardly be necessary;

(*e*) Finally I would agree that, as suggested by Sir Andrew Clow, dissemination of the idea that the power of Congress is on the wane would be right policy and would have a healthy and heartening effect generally. To many, even among those who cherish the strongest aspirations towards Self-Government, it would be welcome.

4. I apologise for the length of this note which Additional Secretary should see. H.M. may like to discuss after Additional Secretary has also recorded his views. The matter seems to be one in which S.G.G. (Public), who has previously handled the subject of "victimisation", is closely interested.

E. CONRAN-SMITH,—19.10.42

Enclosure 2 to No. 118

As regards proportionate pensions, I agree with Secretary. Moreover, there is the fact that, if India is to be given "the right of secession", I do not see how His Majesty's Government can, or indeed why His Majesty's Government should, guarantee proportionate pensions to those who may eventually oppose the decision to secede. All that we could and should do is to protect and give a fair deal to those who serve us loyally while we are here. Judged by the results of the searching test to which the Services have recently been exposed, I do not think we need go out of our way to suggest possible weaknesses and find remedies for them. In actual practice, there has been extremely little "weakness"; and I have always thought that victimisation, if it ever does occur, is more likely to follow communal lines than to be based on the past records of individuals.

As regards propaganda, I feel that attempts to suggest that the power of Congress is waning will not produce much effect. A more fruitful line, I suggest, would be to concentrate on the suicidal methods of the present Congress High Command and the need for a radical alteration of policy under a new set of leaders. If India is to govern herself, there must be a revolt from all the negative and sterile concepts of Gandhi and his "Yes men"—the deliberate undermining of authority; the creed of non-co-operation; the glorification of jail-going and civil disobedience which they have long encouraged as things that are good in themselves, but which, if they are allowed to remain imbedded in the Indian mind, will render the task of firm administration by Indians doubly difficult and will hinder the path of constructive statesmanship. As part of a propaganda campaign on these lines it would, no doubt, be appropriate to emphasize the importance of maintaining a competent Civil Service composed of men who knew their jobs and were not to be deterred from doing them by political or communal considerations.

R. TOTTENHAM,—20.10.42

119

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/10/17: ff 226–7

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

25 October 1942
Received: 26 October

1262. Your telegrams 46–Q.C.[1] and 47–Q.C.[2] Following are verbatim texts of statements which are in question.

(1) On 22nd October, in answer to question by Mander whether I "would give assurance that reason for not completing Indianisation of Viceroy's Executive by appointing three Indians to the portfolios still held by Englishmen is not because of any difficulty in finding suitable Indians for the position". I replied *Begins*: "The Viceroy in the expansion of his Executive in order to meet war conditions, has been concerned to secure both efficiency and continuity, and is satisfied that his existing Council consists of those best qualified at the present moment to fill their respective offices. There is no question of any particular appointment being held on grounds of race or of the present European Members being retained merely for the reason suggested by the honourable Member."[3] *Ends.* I added nothing material to present issue in supplementaries, and my reply must I think have been misreported.

(2) In reply to Sorensen who asked whether I was aware that you had rejected request of Mahasabha to interview Gandhi and whether I would "take steps to enable non-Congress representatives to meet Congress leaders respecting proposals of the former." I said *Begins*: "I am aware that Viceroy declined to allow Dr. Mookerjee to see Mr. Gandhi and I am not prepared in present circumstances to ask him to permit interviews with Congress leaders."[4] *Ends.*

(3) Passage in Simon's speech referred to dealt with proposal put forward by Samuel that when new Viceroy is appointed he should cease to preside over Executive Council and should appoint Prime Minister in fact accepting advice of Council. Simon was arguing that this would involve constitutional changes of fundamental kind as in absence of provision for responsibility to Legislature Council would be irresponsible. Having referred to existence of provision in the Act in respect of Provinces for responsible Ministries he said *Begins*: "Nothing of the kind exists at the Centre. The Government of India Act contains no provision making Viceroy's Council responsible to Central Legislature. The Government of India is essentially the Government of the Viceroy with his advisers. It does not for this purpose matter whether they are Indians or civil

servants. The Viceroy is answerable to the Secretary of State and to Government here."[5] *Ends.*

2. It would perhaps be useful to point out that Ministers are referred to as advisers in Sections 9 (1) and 50 (1) of the Act and that this term is not in any way derogatory as regards status of Council. Words "for this purpose" in their full context mean for purpose of argument Simon was deploying namely that until Government of India can become responsible to elected legislature it must remain responsible to His Majesty's Government and Parliament and that this necessity is unaffected by whether Council is composed of unofficial Indian statesmen or of officials, or both.

3. I will make inquiries as to origin of mis-reporting of my answers.[6]

[1] No. 115. [2] No. 116. [3] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 383, cols. 2091–2.
[4] *Ibid.*, col. 2093.
[5] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of L., vol. 124, 20 October 1942, cols. 716–17.
[6] Mr Amery's telegram 1273 of 28 October informed Lord Linlithgow that in cabling his answer in (2) above Reuter had omitted the words 'to ask him'; that atmospheric conditions had prevented his answer in (1) being received in full and that the abbreviated version had got into some Indian papers before Reuter's cabled text came through. L/PO/10/17: f 227.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/PO/8/6: f 42

27 October 1942

38–U. Your telegram 30–U.[1] Many thanks. I hope you may succeed in getting a decision within four weeks.

[1] No. 110.

121

Mr Amery to Sir Kingsley Wood

L/PO/2/16: f 39

27 October 1942

My dear Kingsley,
On the whole I think it will be best if I send a minute to the Prime Minister about sterling balances.

I enclose a copy of what I propose to send to him.[1] Would you let me have any comments on it before I send it?[2]

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

[1] No. 122. [2] Mr Turnbull noted: 'agreed by phone. 27/10.'

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/2/16: f 38

INDIA OFFICE, *27 October 1942*

Secretary of State's Minute: Serial No. P. 58/42

Prime Minister

INDIAN STERLING BALANCES

I have discussed this question with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who is prepared, in view of the objections and dangers stressed by the Viceroy in his telegram of the 2nd October (circulated as W.P. (42) 447),[1] not to pursue the matter further at the present critical juncture, on the clear understanding that he retains his right to raise it again at a more suitable opportunity. In view of Linlithgow's strong representations I hope this way of disposing of the matter for the time being will commend itself to you, in which case I do not suppose the question need come up again before the Cabinet in present circumstances.[2]

L. S. A.

[1] No. 68.

[2] On 29 October, Mr Peck wrote to Mr Turnbull informing him of Mr Churchill's agreement with Mr Amery's minute. L/PO/2/16: f 36.

123

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *29 October 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 3084–S. Your private and personal telegrams Nos. 1262[1] and 1273[2] of 25th and 28th October. I am most grateful for this information. I took the matter in Council today.

2. They were completely satisfied as regards point A.

3. As regards point B they were anxious that the same publicity of the true text should be given and fully accepted that no criticism could be made of your handling of the matter. I am asking Puckle to take the question up with Reuters.

4. As regards point C my colleagues appreciated the position but urged most strongly that given the connotation which the phrase "Adviser" has now

acquired in this country we should be at particular pains to avoid using it at any time in reference to the Executive Council. I said I would convey that to you, and I think that you as I do myself will probably appreciate what underlines their grumble in this case. Suggestion was made that we should organise greater publicity for what Council does and its powers, and I will consider this.

5. I will comment in greater detail in my next letter. Meanwhile I think we may be satisfied that this little breeze is over, and am most grateful for your prompt replies.

[1] No. 119. [2] See No. 119, note 6.

124

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT *29 October 1942*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 3090–S. Turnbull's telegram of 26th October No. 1265.[1] I am very grateful. I fear it is clear that *Times* attitude is hardening. As I recently suggested, why not try the *Telegraph* and seek by all means to build up the public reputation of that paper? I am of course continuing to give all possible special facilities to *Times* correspondent here who is most friendly and understanding. But if *Times* becomes definitely hostile, we may have to consider some slight cooling off on our side.

[1] See No. 95, note 3.

125

Dr Ambedkar to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

NEW DELHI, *29 October 1942*

My dear Lord Linlithgow,
In the course of my second weekly interview with you I told you that the position of the Scheduled Castes was very unsatisfactory and that the Central Government had not done what I thought it was bound to do for their treatment. On that you very kindly asked me to prepare a Memorandum for your consideration containing the grievances of the Scheduled Castes and the remedies

for removing them. All this of course must be within your recollection. Indeed it is you who reminded me several times since then if the Memorandum was ready. Unfortunately owing to the heavy pressure of work which fell on me since I took charge, I could not give to the work of preparing the Memorandum the priority which I should have liked to give to it. I am, however, happy that at last I have been able to submit it for your consideration.

2. The Memorandum[1] unfortunately has become a very lengthy document. I had a choice between making the Memorandum a short one containing bare recital of the grievances and the remedies to remove the same or to make it an exhaustive one containing not only the grievances and the remedies but also the reasoning in support of the remedies suggested. I have chosen the latter alternative. In doing so I have had to bear in mind the fact that the grievances set out in the Memorandum and the remedies suggested for their removal will go to different Departments for their opinion, and unless the Memorandum contained the reasons, the remedies can have very little chance of being accepted.

3. For convenience I am setting out below in bare outline the grievances and the remedies which are included in the accompanying Memorandum:—

I. Political Grievances—

	Pages.
1. More representation in the Central Legislature	5–9
2. More representation in the Central Executive	9–10
3. Assurance of fair representation in the Public Services—	
(i) By declaring the Scheduled Castes as a minority and by reserving 13½ per cent. of the annual vacancies for them.	10–21
(ii) Raising the age bar	21
(iii) Reduction in Examination Fees	21
(iv) Appointment of Scheduled Caste Officer to protect Service rights of the Scheduled Castes.	21–22
4. Representation on the Federal Public Service Commission ..	22

II. Educational Grievances—

1. An annual recurring grant of Rs. 2 lakhs for scholarships to Scheduled Caste students studying for Science, Engineering and Technology at the different Universities.	23–25
2. An annual grant of Rs. 1 lakh for education in Science, Technology and Engineering in foreign countries to students belonging to the Scheduled Castes.	23–25

	Pages.
3. Scholarships and free-ships for Scheduled Caste boys at the Indian School of Mines conducted by the Central Government.	25–26
4. Appointment of two representatives of the Scheduled Castes on the Central Board of Education established by the Government of India.	26–27
5. Facilities for technical training by reserving—	
(*a*) apprenticeships in Government Printing Presses, and	27
(*b*) apprenticeships in Government Railway workshops.	27–28
III. Other Grievances—	
1. Provision for adequate publicity of the social and political grievances of the Scheduled Castes.	29–30
2. Special provision for securing for members of the Scheduled Castes a footing in the Government Contract system in the Public Works Department.	30–31

4. I give this Summary because I quite realize that it will not be possible for you to find the time necessary to go through the whole of it. I wish you could find time to read the whole of the Memorandum. But if you cannot read the whole, I would request you at least to read Part IV (pages 32–36) of this Memorandum. In that Part of the Memorandum I have instituted a comparison between the condition of the Scheduled Castes and the Anglo-Indians and the efforts made for the betterment of the latter. I request you to read it because I feel sure that by its perusal you will see how just and modest are the demands I have made and what the Government of India has done for the elevation of a class not more unfortunate than the Scheduled Castes.

5. I need not say that I hope the grievances of the Scheduled Castes will be remedied before you go. Believe me, I have read with genuine sorrow that you will be quitting your office in April next. I have no idea who is going to be your successor and what attitude he will adopt towards the Scheduled Castes. In you I have learnt to place great confidence as the benefactor of the Scheduled Castes. You have done the greatest deed towards them by giving them a place in your Executive Council. It is a most revolutionary act for which there can be no parallel in India's history. I have no doubt and no member of the Scheduled Castes has any doubt that if you knew the grievances of the Scheduled Castes you would never hesitate to set them right. It is from this point of view that I say that I am happy to have to seek justice for my people from one who knows that justice is due to them. I know you have the

[1] Not printed.

will to do it and that you will not like to leave it to your successor to do what you wish to do, and what you can do. I need hardly say that for this act of justice myself and the 50 millions of the Scheduled Castes will ever remain grateful to you.[2]

Yours sincerely,

B. R. AMBEDKAR

[2] Dr Ambedkar submitted a further memorandum to Lord Linlithgow under cover of a letter dated 8 January 1943, in which he stated that this memorandum presented the case against the Constituent Assembly from the standpoint of the Depressed Classes and set out the questions on which the Depressed Classes had desired him to obtain an assurance from the Secretary of State. MSS. EUR. F. 125/125. See No. 336, para. 9.

126

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *30 October 1942, 8.25 pm*
Received: 30 October, 7 pm

No. 3108–S. Following is my appreciation for period 16th to 28th October. Internal situation generally continues to improve and Governors of Bihar, Central Provinces and Madras have now discontinued sending regular reports. Though there have been no major incidents, isolated interference with communications by cutting telephone wires, removal of fishplates, &c. continues and there is a disturbing suggestion (not yet confirmed) from Central Provinces that a gang of skilled saboteurs operating on main railway line is possibly inspired by enemy agents. Calcutta has been quiet and districts of Bengal appear to be settling down. In Ahmedabad mills have not yet resumed work and firing with minor casualties was necessary on two occasions. In North-West Frontier Province following picketing of courts the Red Shirt leader, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, has been arrested. So far country appears to have taken bombing in Assam and Bengal very calmly and labour on aerodromes is reported to have stood up well.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Washington and Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

127

Dr Savarkar to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

SAVARKAR SADAN, KELUSKAR ROAD, DADAR, BOMBAY–28,
30 October 1942

Your Excellency,
Dr. Moonje has already written[1] to you for granting a passport to the deputation which is going to America to acquaint the American public with the ideology, policy and programme of the Hindu Mahasabha and to represent the Hindu cause in general.

2. You will allow me to clarify this, our objective, by citing a few details. We mean to restrict our propaganda in America strictly to the following perfectly constitutional and legitimate items:—

(*a*) To acquaint the Americans with the special mission of the Hindu Mahasabha so far as Hindu ideology is concerned.

(*b*) To maintain that the general impression in America that the Congress represents the special interests of the Hindus is erroneous as the Congress itself resents and repudiates any such "charge" brought against it. The Hindu Mahasabha alone is the most outstanding Hindu body representing Hindu interests, aims and aspirations. Consequently any constitutional change which is ratified by the Congress and the League alone cannot be looked upon as a compromise and agreement between the Hindus and the Muslims without the sanction or ratification by the Hindu Mahasabha.

(*c*) To explain to the American public that the reasons which would make the Americans to oppose a demand on the part of the Negro minority in America to create an independent "Negrosthan" or a demand on the part of a state to secede from the Union are precisely the reasons why the Hindu Mahasabha opposes uncompromisingly the Pakisthan proposal or the claim on the part of a Province to have a right of self-determination.

(*d*) To emphasize the fact that the Hindu Mahasabha has been actively and effectively working in persuading the Hindus by thousands to join the Army, Navy and the Air Forces, &c. in as much as it believes that this militarization movement to strengthen the Indian Army during this war is absolutely necessary for defending India herself and to this extent the Hindu Mahasabha has been extending responsive co-operation to the British Government ever since the war began. Nay, more, it will continue to do so quite irrespective of constitutional issues.

[1] Not printed.

(*e*) To point out that this war effort on the part of the Mahasabha could only be effectively discharged if the National demands forwarded by the Hindu Mahasabha and which are almost identical with the Cripps scheme barring the exception of the Pakisthani clause are immediately granted by Great Britain.

3. The Mahasabha will never press the point that the American Government should officially meddle with India's case in this respect because we know they cannot. All that the Mahasabha seeks to achieve through this Deputation is to secure the moral support of the American public to the Hindu cause and raise the Mahasabha in American estimation.

4. Moreover, it was only after I was assured by the representatives of leading papers and parties in America which take interest in Indian affairs that just as they knew something about the Congress and the League, the American public would like to know the attitude of the Mahasabha too, that it was decided to send the Deputation to America.

5. I strongly hope that Your Excellency will find nothing objectionable in this objective. If it is permitted to go to America the Deputation will convince the Americans that the British Government does not want to bar any legitimate political representations being made to the foremost ally of Great Britain and likes to let America know everything regarding the Indian question. This step is bound to strengthen mutual confidence between Britain and America and prevent any misunderstanding which otherwise may grow.

Yours sincerely,

V. D. SAVARKAR

128

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *30 October 1942*

You will have been greatly relieved by getting my telegram[1] telling you that this tiresome business of sterling balances has been shelved *sine die*. Kingsley Wood knows perfectly well that there is nothing doing, but *vis-à-vis* Winston wishes at any rate to preserve his right to be able to raise the matter again if the development of the situation should warrant it. I don't think that is in the least likely and anyhow this particular dog will be left sleeping for the rest of your time, and I cannot imagine a new Viceroy being prepared to take on the business of poking the animal into life on top of all the trouble he is going to inherit.

2. I am not sure whether I have ever said anything to you about a sudden brainwave of Winston's some weeks ago, taken up with considerable enthusiasm by Cripps, namely, that we should sidetrack the whole political crisis in India by a vigorous policy of social reform. We had a most comic meeting[2] on the subject not long ago at which Mudaliar and Chatterjee differed as to the effect of such an intervention on the part of the British Government with funds from here. Mudaliar thought it would only offend India and aggravate the political situation, while Chatterjee suggested that it might have quite a good effect providing the amount was at any rate reasonable, and he explained by "reasonable" he meant at least four hundred to five hundred million pounds. You should have seen Kingsley Wood's face at the suggestion that the adverse sterling balance should be increased by that amount! Mudaliar and myself had also to point out that apart from British financial help the whole matter was anyhow entirely within the sphere of political responsibilities which had been transferred years and years ago and that the suggested policy was at any rate some decades out of date. The present phase of the question is that I have sent round a letter[3] to the Ministers who were asked to look into the matter pointing out that there was really nothing that could be done in India except that the Viceroy and Governors should continue to show an active interest in social questions, and that as regards anything to be done at this end it would have to be by money spent here which would not add to the sterling balances. My suggestions in that connection were a lavish endowment of the School of Oriental Studies and things of that sort.

What fun!

L.

3. *The Times* has undoubtedly been tiresome, and I am afraid Eddie's[4] well deserved comment on their ridiculous statement[5] that India's war effort could be multiplied tenfold by a political settlement only drew a general denunciation of you, myself and all concerned, for lack of initiative and all the rest of it. I don't think it is much use my trying to talk to Barrington-Ward who is obstinate and not easily influenced. By far the best disinfectant against *The Times*' leaders are Holburn's excellent telegrams, and I would not let your annoyance with *The Times* in any way influence your helpfulness to him. As for the *Daily Telegraph* I see Coote, who left *The Times* because he doesn't like the new atmosphere, pretty often, and his leader on the 28th on Willkie was the direct result of his lunching with me the day before.

Never fear!

L.

[1] See No. 139. [2] See No. 46. [3] No. 114.

[4] i.e. the Duke of Devonshire's comment in his speech in the Lords debate of 20 October. See also No. 108.

[5] *The Times* of 9 October.

* * *

6. I have just been reading Colonel Fisher's admirable little work on co-operative administration in Central India, a copy of which reached us privately. He has I think taken the most hopeful and fruitful line of approach, both in fact and in persuasiveness to the mind of the Rulers concerned, by throwing his main emphasis, not on the mere mechanical savings arising from combined administrations, or even on the improvement in quality which might thereby result, as on the creative aspect of new wealth for Rulers and peasants alike from co-operation in new methods of production. It is always easier to co-operate in connection with some new field of activity, where there are no existing vested interests to break down, than to combine existing administrations at the expense of salaries or positions jealously held by local people however incompetent. Among his suggestions I notice is one for Central *mandis*, or sale depôts. I do not gather however that he takes the further step—and I am afraid I do not remember whether your original report ever advocated it—of setting up for grain and other products something in the nature of the Canadian elevators, i.e. storage depôts, to which the producer delivers his crop and gets at once a substantial cash instalment and a subsequent dividend depending on the market price secured, the marketing as well as the storage being entirely in the hands of the elevator company or co-operative. The farmer thus has no concern except to produce good stuff and deliver it in clean condition. He gets a substantial amount at an earlier date, thus reducing the necessity of too much borrowing. He is not at the mercy of local middlemen but has the best price secured for him by an agency which, dealing on the large scale, can both afford to sell at a good price and to charge a very moderate rate for its services. I have always thought the system might be capable of application to a good many other things than wheat, and in India, where the peasant is particularly subject to exploitation both by the middle-man and the money-lender, such a system might prove of immense value, more so perhaps even than a system of agricultural banks. Incidentally also, and this bears on the present day situation, such a system giving good prices at the start and securing for the peasant his share of rising prices, might well be a steady encouragement to getting stuff delivered instead of being hoarded by local speculators.

We turned it down & for the very good reason that India cannot count on any surplus available for export. Ref.
L.

All rubbish!
L.

129

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir R. Lumley (Bombay)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

IMMEDIATE *31 October 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 3111–S. Gandhi. I am much obliged for your most helpful letter of 22nd October[1] which shall have my best attention. I think you are aware that War Cabinet have shown utmost reluctance to agree to any plan involving Gandhi's release from detention. I am exploring with open mind every possible course that occurs to me; and entirely agree with you that we shall be wise to think ahead but not to commit ourselves to any particular plan until we can measure the precise circumstances in which a fast if it comes will occur.

2. Will you please let me have by letter or telegram your reaction to suggestion that if Gandhi should declare a fast at a moment of real military difficulty we should that very day fly him to Aden or Africa and hold him there whether he dies or lives?

3. If we decided to hold him fasting in Poona but not to allow anyone not now in the Palace to see him do you consider that we could conceal fast from the public for three or four days so as to reduce to minimum duration of public tension? Do you think this course would be expedient?

[1] No. 111.

130

The Nizam of Hyderabad to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

CONFIDENTIAL HYDERABAD, DECCAN, *1 November 1942*

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

I venture to write to Your Excellency regarding a matter in which, I am sure, I have no right to interfere as it rests entirely with the British Government, and is no concern either of myself or of my State. I am writing, nevertheless as the "Faithful Ally of the British Government" to acquaint you with my private news [views?] on the subject hoping that I may be excused for my boldness in doing so. The matter I refer to is this:—

Some of the newspapers both in England and in India are busy just now making forecasts as to who will be Your Excellency's successor as Viceroy and Governor-General of India when the second extension of your term of office

expires next March or April. The names of several distinguished personages in England are being mentioned in this connection as likely to be selected for this high office as it is said that for various reasons you are not likely to accept a further extension if it is offered to you.

(2) My personal feeling on the subject is that it is necessary for statesman with your wide experience and deep insight into the affairs of this country to remain for some time longer in this important office as a new Viceroy would not possess your intimate knowledge of Indian affairs and the practical experience you have gained during seven years' régime in India. He would surely be a new man and a stranger to Indian conditions. Considering in addition to all this that, at the present juncture, violence and bloodshed are rampant in the country, to the disturbance of peace and security, and political parties have been unable to come to an amicable agreement but are determined on the other hand, to persist in their opposition to each other, for this and that matter, the continuance of Your Excellency as Viceroy is all the more necessary in the best interest both of British India and the Indian States. But if for any reason this is not possible, then in my opinion the selection of His Majesty the King-Emperor's younger brother, His Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester, would be much better than that of any other person however qualified he may be. This would be desirable not only in view of the conditions now prevailing in this country but also because the personality of His Royal Highness as a Member of the Royal Family of England would, I feel sure, instil new life and revive the genuine enthusiasm among the people. It would not therefore be surprising if in that case the anxiety and distrust now being shown in various ways was completely ended or at least greatly allayed. There is strong hope for this because I believe that the recent visit of His Royal Highness to India at a critical juncture produced a great effect all round and was appreciated at least by the Princes of India and by other loyal and sagacious persons who believe the continuance of the British Government to be of great value to India as well as being necessary to the existence, in peace and happiness, of the Indian Princes.

(3) The question now arises whether it is possible for a Member of the Royal Family to be appointed as Viceroy. In this connection I may say that, so far as I remember, the Duke of Kent of the revered memory had at one time been nominated for the Governor-Generalship of Canada but the appointment could not take effect as it had to be postponed owing to the outbreak of the war, and later on the sad tragedy occurred of his death in a flying accident. If such an appointment was possible in his case, there should be no bar to His Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester being made Viceroy. If, however, there are any other strong reasons against this, that is a different matter. Your Excellency would probably know them better than anyone else.

(4) In short, the atmosphere of chaos and disorder now prevailing in India demands that it should be changed into one of peace and security without any delay. For this it is necessary that there should either be an experienced politician and a great administrator like Your Excellency at the helm of the office, or that there should be a Member of the Royal Family on the pedestal of Viceroyalty who would exert the necessary influence with great tact or his outstanding personality to bring about a change in the hearts of those who are disloyal, or to create confidence in the minds of malicious people so that the present clouds of deadlock and uncertainty may be dispelled and faith and goodwill may shine forth once again.

(5) In conclusion, I may explain that the great liberty I have taken in expressing my personal views so plainly has been due to the kindness and consideration you have uniformly shown me from the day of your arrival in India up to the present moment—a kindness for which I feel deeply grateful.

(6) In short, I cannot refrain from adding that if Your Excellency were to remain in India for a further period the Princes of India at least would greatly rejoice and even the present popular disaffection would by degrees grow less. This is because you possess those qualities and virtues which are necessary for controlling the present delicate situation. I can say so quite sincerely and without any flattery or exaggeration as Your Excellency has given proof of it by your acts and deeds, although there are some disaffected persons who knowingly deny it. But that is of no importance for, as the old Persian adage says: "Dogs that bark in the moonlight cannot dim the lustre of the bright moon, no matter however strong the noise may be."

With respectful regards,
Yours very sincerely,
MIR USMAN ALI KHAN

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *1 November 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

I have two or three letters from you to answer—your letters of 5th October[1] and 9th/12th October[2] which arrived together, while your letter of 25th September[3] has also reached me safely.

[1] No. 69. [2] No. 84. [3] No. 40; the date should be 26 September.

2. First of all a word of sympathy and thanks for all your help in these discussions over the disposal of the sterling balances. You have indeed had a most exhausting and trying time, and I feel very much for you in the circumstances that you describe, all the more so in the light of the background that Raisman has been able to give me and of what one gathers from him of the atmosphere at home. I dare say that in some ways it is just as well that the opposition case was put so strongly as it was, because it produced a situation which could not possibly be accepted by us here and which made it essential for us to come back with a very definite statement of the objections, objections which I am bound to say seem to me entirely destructive, and for your support of which I would like to thank you again. I hope that you feel that we have given you all the material that we possibly can. Here, as in all other corners of this immense and varied field for which you and I are responsible, I am sure you will never hesitate if you think there is any further information or the like by which we can strengthen your hands to telegraph and ask for it.

3. I think that the debate went extremely well and I have sent a telegram[4] to Eddie Devonshire congratulating him most warmly on his speech in the Lords and saying also that I was very glad that he had faced up to this issue of the *Times*. Your letter of the 9th makes clear the difficulties which face us. Carr I do not know except by reputation, but I should have thought that he was far too steeped in the doctrine of the League of Nations and in the appeasement view of the Foreign Office to be a very helpful collaborator from our point of view. Barrington-Ward, though of course a person of excellent standing, may very well not have the solidity and balance of Geoffrey Dawson, and I seem to remember, too, hearing the criticism at one time (there may of course be no foundation for it and I am in no position to judge) that while Geoffrey Dawson spent his time very largely away from the *Times* Office developing contacts, picking up news, seeing Ministers, commercial magnates, &c., Barrington-Ward was at all times greatly concerned with a fairly minute control of the problems that arose inside the Office and of its administration, with the result that he had rather less time to browse or to collect that general impression which one would have thought was the essential foundation of good journalism when one is governing a paper of such vital importance as the *Times*. I have suggested[5] to you that we might do what we can to try to build up the *Telegraph* if the *Times* really starts being tiresome. But I am only too well aware of the difficulties, and I hope that as time goes on the paper will feel disposed to take a rather more helpful attitude than it has in these last few weeks. I have nothing but praise for the *Times* Correspondent here, Holburn, who has been exceedingly helpful, and while we have of set purpose left him to make up his own mind, it has been a source of real satisfaction to find that in the outcome his views seem to fit so closely with yours and with mine. I have,

I need not say, given him all possible facilities, and he has enjoyed just as much confidence as ever did Sandy Inglis, a confidence which like Inglis he has used without ever in the least degree abusing.

4. I am sorry to have had to trouble you[6] about these doubts which were engendered in the mind of my Council (not I think unnaturally) by these serious reporting errors of Reuters'. I would like to thank you again for the promptness of your reply.[7] The full text when received completely disposed of the complaints about Indianization and about your alleged "decision" without consulting us here to forbid interviews with Congress prisoners! They are touchy on this business of "advisers"; and in the light of the discussion, which I have reported to you by telegram,[8] I think that you will probably agree with me that even if there is technical justification for using that phrase (though I rather suspect in that connection that "aid and advice" in Sections 9 (1) and 50 (1) of the Act is a term of art) we shall do better to avoid it, the more so as it does not really in any way materially help our argument or our position.

5. Two further questions arose—the first whether something cannot be done to give greater publicity to the nature of the work which falls to my Council and of the powers exercised by it as distinct from those which it exercises subject to the power of the Governor-General and the Secretary of State to interfere. Mody (who is always anxious to get a little ahead) wants an arranged Parliamentary question in the House in reply to which you could read out a long and flattering statement of this nature and give reassuring replies to supplementaries. I am bound to say that unless things have changed very much since I have been out here, I shall be astonished if the Speaker were to view with much zeal a lengthy oral reply by you on a highly technical subject very important in itself but not of immense interest to individual Members. But it does occur to me that we might be able to handle the matter by arranging for a *non-oral* question, in reply to which a fairly extensive statement, of which I would send you a draft, could be printed in Hansard and picked up therefrom and telegraphed out here by Reuters as your reply to a Parliamentary question. I will ask my Reforms Office to think about the terms of a draft, and if they produce something that looks like being satisfactory I will probably telegraph it to you with this suggestion.

6. The other point raised in the discussions was with reference to the statement which you made in the debate that there was not at present any intention of further constitutional changes in the Centre or in the Provinces. Certain of my colleagues harked back to the constitutional discussions we had had, and asked whether it would not have been more appropriate that they should have been informed that that was your view before you made any such statement in public? I realise of course that you had probably by the time of the

[4] No. 108. [5] No. 124. [6] See Nos. 115 and 116. [7] No. 119. [8] No. 123.

debate not received the full text of the discussions which, owing to my other preoccupations I was only able to send you on 10th October,[9] though I had of course given the gist of the suggestions put forward at an earlier stage. But I took the line that, as I had reminded my colleagues when I initiated those discussions and allowed them to proceed, they were all of them on matters which were outside the purview of Council, and on which as such it had no *locus standi*, and that while I was very ready to let you know of their nature and the views expressed by various Hon'ble Members, that could not be regarded as imposing any obligation on the Secretary of State to send a formal and considered reply. They accepted that: but, while I have protected the technical position in that way, I think you will probably agree that it would be a good thing if you could let me have some fairly short message, sympathetic but yielding nothing, which I could give them. The matter is more one of handling and of courtesy, I think, than anything else, and though I have no doubt that I shall be involved in another debate if and when you do send me such a message, I am quite prepared to face that, and think indeed that there is some advantage in continuing to keep the air clear. If that would be any help, let us discuss drafts by telegram.

7. I see no particular sign of change in the general political scene here. Rajagopalachari has been very active, but his scheme[10] so far as India is concerned seems to have fallen almost completely flat. I should be sorry to see him go home (I see the *Daily Herald* urging that he should be given facilities), for he would unquestionably be a great nuisance there. He does not really represent anything here: and if he were to go home we shall be bound to allow the Muslims to send someone home on the other side immediately. A cynic might say that there would probably be some advantage in this, since the more bored people at home got with this Indian problem in wartime and the more the unreasonableness and the mutual incompatibility of the demands of the various parties was brought out the better! But I confess that that is not an entirely convincing argument. Talking of which I have just had from the Mahasabha an application for passports for America to enable Moonje and some of his friends to go and put their case over there.[11] That application I propose to refuse. Here again were we to let one party start off on these lines, we shall have the whole lot following. The Muslim League, if only in self-defence, would have to send a Pakistan delegation: and Ambedkar has already complained bitterly to me that the Depressed Class case is going by default; that Ramaswami Mudaliar is the very last person to put it; and that he ought to have a man of his own on the I.P.R. Conference. Our friends the Sikhs, who have already a little foothold in California, &c. would not be left behind, and so on. And despite the attractions of securing peace and happiness for ourselves here and being left at liberty to get on with fighting the war while the dialectic battle is waged under the

Stars and Stripes, I do not feel much doubt that it is wiser to let the combatants argue matters out on their native soil.

* * *

10. I have read with much interest what you say in paragraphs 6 and 7 of your letter of 5th October about the Dadachanji incident. I will have a word with the Chief and will comment further in a later letter.

11. I have read with much interest, too, what you say in paragraphs 11 and 12 of your letter of 12th October about the Indianization of my Council. The whole matter, and the question of what is to be done, e.g. when Maxwell's term comes to an end, is in my mind. I comment on that specific aspect later in my present letter.

12. On the main general issue, I think it was quite wrong of Mudaliar to have taken the line he did in this meeting of M.Ps.,[12] and I think it would have been well (though I realise that these matters have to be handled with tact) if he had let you know (or you had tried to obtain from him) in advance the general lines of what he was going to say: for he is after all, even though he may be temporarily employed in London, a Member of my Council and I cannot have Members of my Council, whether attached to the War Cabinet or not, endeavouring to short-circuit me or short-circuit those Members of my Council who do not share their views. It would raise serious issues if there were to be any sign of that and I hope you will be able to keep Mudaliar on a pretty tight rein. Otherwise we shall have to reconsider the position.

13. Apart from that, I do not, to be frank, entirely follow the argument which you used with him as described in paragraph 11 of your letter. For the effect of that argument seems to me to have run the risk of suggesting to Mudaliar (and so to his colleagues here) that the only opponent to complete Indianization was myself, that you had nothing to do with it and that the Cabinet had not come in at all. Nothing, I need hardly say, is further from the case, and I am certain that that was not the impression that you had intended to convey. In this whole matter of Indianization I have throughout been in step with you and with the Cabinet; and while of course the Cabinet and you have given due weight to the considerations I have advanced from time to time, there can be no question of anything but a solid front in this business between you, the Cabinet and myself. I suggest that it would be a good thing if in any further discussion you not only get across to Mudaliar the point I have taken in the preceding paragraph, but also that on the matter of Indianization there is nothing between you and the Cabinet and myself, and that we are all of us satisfied that the objections are decisive. Otherwise there is the inevitable risk of

[9] The date should be 12 October; see No. 298.
[10] See Appendix A to No. 153.
[11] See No. 127.
[12] See No. 84, para. 2.

people trying to drive wedges between us. That is the one thing during the time I have been out here that I have always been most concerned to try to avoid.

14. Now let us look at this business in a little more detail from the point of view first of political expediency; and secondly of merits and the position of the new Viceroy. On the political side I have nothing to add to what I have said in the past. In effect, while it would gratify certain sections (but not the Muslims) to see the Council completely Indianised, any attempt so to Indianise it would at once raise the communal issue in an acute form over the filling of the vacancies: it would be wholly contrary to the principle on which we have been working, which is that we are making our selections on merits and that no racial issue enters in: whatever satisfaction we give to those who want to see the change (and I would not regard them as being all of them our friends) would be short-lived in the highest degree, and we should get no thanks from anyone. Politically therefore I would regard a move in this direction as the throwing away of a card which may have some little value if kept in hand but for which we shall certainly get no thanks the moment we part with it.

15. On merits, the case is more decisive still. One has only to imagine discussions such as those which have been proceeding with Raisman and with myself over sterling balances if the Viceroy were advised by an Indian politician as Finance Member. They would have been quite out of the question. In the Home Department field we may occasionally get similar problems. I have got to consider, too, (or rather to ask His Majesty's Government to consider, for my time is coming to an end) that the whole set-up is completely different from the set-up which we had in view when we devised the Act of 1935 with its federal provisions. That Act, as you will remember, even after the Federation had come into being and the Governor-General was advised by Federal Ministers over a large area of the field, gave the Governor-General the right to appoint Counsellors and provided for a Financial Adviser.[13] The Governor-General, in other words, had some independent advice and some official assistance over finance, and he might equally have decided to appoint a Counsellor to assist him over certain other aspects of the field. How easily all that network of arrangements would have functioned it is difficult to say. It might very well have broken down at an early stage. But at any rate the new system would have started off on those lines. As matters are now, in the event of a complete Indianization of my Council and particularly of the Finance portfolio, and given what must, in my judgment, remain the position that there must be effective financial control in the discretionary field and in the field of the Crown Representative, the Governor-General will be left in a position in which on matters affecting the States or affecting the self-governing Provinces of very great political importance on occasion, it may be open (I say *may* deliberately for I have some confidence in the commonsense of the ordinary Indian politician

of this level) to his Finance Minister to interfere fairly effectively on matters affecting the States and on the affairs of a particular Province. Now if for example you are dealing with the Punjab with a predominantly Muslim Ministry and the Finance Minister is a member of the Hindu Mahasabha, or if contrariwise you have a Muslim Finance Minister and there is difficulty with a Hindu Province, it does not take much imagination to envisage the sort of trouble that is going to develop, and that at very short notice. Even in present circumstances I have to exercise care lest people should think in Bengal that, e.g., Sarker is pulling the strings against Muslim interests in that Province, or that Firoz is not seeing altogether eye to eye in the case of Punjab problems with the views of Sikander. That problem would be greatly aggravated by any Indianization of the Finance portfolio. In the case of the Home portfolio (though I can conceive circumstances in which we could find the right man) the problem may on occasion be equally acute and equally delicate. In the case of both these portfolios while these prominent politicians (none of whom represent anything in terms of following in the country) are anxious to get all that they can and to extend their sphere of control, patronage, &c. as much as possible, I am often surprised at the risks which they are so light-heartedly taking. And I have no doubt that in the last resort, it is the long-suffering Governor-General who would be left to carry the baby, for while I was able to take my Council with me without any European official member in it over the arrest of Gandhi, &c., it took a very great deal of patient negotiation and argument: and I can easily envisage circumstances in which, given a recrudescence of the Congress rebellion and a particular individual in charge of the Home portfolio, there would be nothing left for the Governor-General but to go his own way and face the resignation of his Council or of certain Members of it. That is a contingency that will have to be faced up to in due course—I have no doubt about that, and we shall have to be prepared to call the bluff of those who are disposed to use those tactics. But for obvious political reasons, and particularly in the middle of the war, one does not want such a situation to develop: and one has to consider the effect of it on what must be at all times our paramount consideration, the effective prosecution and the winning of the war.

16. Let me only add on that point that you can with my full authority take the line consistently that Indianization or further small changes in the Centre not only will have no effect on the war effort in terms of improving or increasing it: they are likely to have precisely the opposite effect. That is a point of first-class importance.

17. I think therefore that His Majesty's Government (though I realise that they have to face very heavy pressure from important quarters) will be much better advised to face up to the bowling as regards complete Indianization or

[13] Government of India Act 1935, Secs. 11 (2) and 15.

as regards the complete elimination of the service element from the Governor-General's Council. And I think that there is a great deal to be said for starting to consider whether we ought not to devise some method (comparable to that of the Financial Adviser or Counsellors) of buttressing the Governor-General and Crown Representative in respect of the fields reserved to him. On the political side he will of course have (I think you share my view as to the desirability of making that post permanent whatever doubts Raisman and others here may feel) the Political Adviser, who would take something off his shoulders. But the financial side is a very important one, though the problem of devising methods of dealing with that aspect is far from easy. I should welcome your own reaction on this problem. But I would like to repeat before passing from the general issues involved in this matter my very strong sense of the unwisdom from the point of view of His Majesty's Government of allowing themselves to be rushed, and my strong sense that if they do allow themselves to be rushed, the effect in terms of war effort will be bad and not good.

18. In paragraph 13 of your letter of 12th October you mention an interesting suggestion—the possibility of converting the Executive Council more definitely into a Cabinet, and appointing one of its Members as Prime Minister. I fear that I am quite clear that this is not practical politics. It would lead directly to the matter of the Governor-General's overriding powers, and I do not see how we can slur over the difference between Council and Cabinet. For good and sufficient reason arising out of the internal circumstances of this country we have been forced to devise the present elaborate system by which these heavy responsibilities are concentrated on the Governor-General personally. I am bound to say that save at the cost of taking risks that we should not be justified in contemplating, I do not see in existing circumstances any effective alternative to retaining controls approximating to the present ones.

19. Equally I should be very averse to putting my Council on to working out a future constitutional solution as you suggest in paragraph 14. We should find ourselves in the minimum of time confronted by elaborate and far-reaching suggestions to which we could not give effect and some of which would certainly be unsound and might precipitate a major row in the constitutional field.

20. Indeed over the whole of this business His Majesty's Government will just have to make up their minds one way or another, either to stand firm despite pressure from outside, or to a very large extent throw their hands in; and they cannot throw their hands in without taking an immense responsibility to the people of this country as well as to Parliament, a responsibility which I, personally, would not be prepared to share. And, if there is any run out of this type, it will be in face of my considered advice, which has always been, as you

know, in favour of taking such reasonable risks as we can, but equally wholly against surrender to unreasonable pressure, or the taking of unreasonable chances in deference to suggestions with no solid basis whether from political elements here or from the political elements at Home. I realise only too well the circumstances in which Winston, you yourself, and the War Cabinet have to deal with this problem, with the multiplicity of other pressing business arising out of the war that weighs upon you; and we, all of us know how great the temptation is in such circumstances to look for short cuts, or easy solutions (I would judge Cripps' Mission to have been one of these and though it has had a very definite value it has also been an expensive experiment). But we have got to the point I fear in the Indian situation in which short cuts are no good and in which we have to face the hard facts and settle what our line is going to be having regard to them.

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22. Thank you so much for all your help about Gwyer. I can well imagine that the lightness of the work and the uncertainty of the prospect are such as in combination greatly to reduce our chances of getting the right man. The fact is that we have got our Federal Court in advance of our federation or of anything comparable: we must in those circumstances do the best we can and I hope that Mr. Evershed, if, as I gather you think, he is of the requisite quality, may be willing to accept. I mention elsewhere in this letter the value to the Viceroy of the day of having in the Chief Justice of the Federal Court, someone with that wider experience and those wider contacts, the absence of which is so severe a handicap out here.

* * *

2 November

29. Many thanks for what you say about Hodson in the last paragraph[14] of your letter of 5th October. I agree that we had best let the *Statesman* find its own feet. Stephens, I think, is definitely anxious to be helpful, and Moore is ceasing to cut much ice. Talking of Hodson, I authorised Caroe to send Home to your External Affairs Department a little while ago a paper[15] of his on future policy in the Indian Ocean. I made it clear in doing so that I had not had time to read the paper, and must not be regarded as committed in any way to any of the propositions contained in it: and it was on that understanding that I allowed it to go Home. I have now had to read it in somewhat unusual circumstances! Firoz Khan Noon having been asked to contribute a paper to the I.P.R. discussions has produced one which more or less embodies the contents of Hodson's! That is all right so far as Hodson is concerned for I gather that he told Firoz that he could make whatever use of the paper he liked. But the

[14] Not printed. The reference to Hodson stated that he had accepted 'a post under Lyttelton and is therefore not available' for consideration as a possible Editor of the *Statesman*.

[15] L/P&S/12/724.

paper itself, now that I have gone through it, fills me with dismay. I can imagine nothing more likely to play into the hands of the Americans and those who wish to bring the whole world in on these areas of Asia with which we have been specially concerned. I fully agree that it may be very difficult to keep the Americans out, and possibly the Russians also, and that of course the final answer to all these questions must turn on the outcome of the war and of the peace negotiations. But it would in my judgment be the greatest possible mistake to supply from a British source, arguments which would be jumped at by American critics or newspaper men to support a thesis of American interference, while the paper apart from that touches on matters so controversial as the disappearance of tariff walls in the post-war period. Anything on these lines under the name of a member of my Council would be most dangerous, and I have told Firoz that he must substitute something much more conservative, omitting references to American or Russian intrusion in the post-war period, and omitting equally controversial tariff issues! But I feel that I would prefer in all the circumstances that the paper be given no distribution or circulation at home, and perhaps you would be kind enough so to instruct your External Affairs Department.

* * *

33. I have dealt elsewhere in this letter with the more general aspect of Indianization of my Council. Let me now turn to what you say in paragraph 12 of your letter of 12th October about the Home portfolio. I agree with you that it may be difficult to avoid facing this matter when Maxwell's term expires: though I can assure you that given non-co-operation by Congress and the Muslim League it will be the most difficult thing in the world to find suitable people to fill any more Indian vacancies. As you know, I am completely held up so far as the filling of the Information vacancy goes. In an earlier letter[16] I commented on the very considerable strain under which my successor was likely to find himself owing to the fact not only that he would himself be new to the country and with a new staff, but that Lumley (the best of my Parliamentary Governors), the Home Member with all his experience, Craik, and the Federal Chief Justice, are all due to hand over more or less simultaneously with myself. I dare say that it does not matter very much about the Federal Chief Justice. Administratively it is more or less immaterial whether he hands over or not. But the value of Gwyer has of course been his great experience of the world and his wide contacts, and it does not look too much, from what you tell me in your letter, as though we were going to get someone of comparable quality to replace him. Craik, though I am only too conscious of your doubts about him, is a valuable and experienced man. I think that some of the critical comment which you pass to me from time to time must be the result either of Political Department jealousies (they will have to put up with

that anyhow for they have not themselves been able to throw up a man of the right quality) or comments by people such as Raisman who object in principle to the post and are anxious (quite wrongly in my view) to see it abolished. But there is a fund of mature wisdom in Craik which I have found most useful, and which would be equally useful to my successor; and given the importance of the Crown Representative side there may well be a case for a further short extension for him in the spring if he remains up to the mark and there is then no very obvious alternative. But the most important of these posts is Maxwell's; and my own considered view is that it would be well (though there would undoubtedly be a certain amount of criticism of such a course) to give him an extension, if his health would stand it, for say three months, or preferably six months, which would enable the new Viceroy to get well into the saddle. I have sounded Maxwell. He tells me that he would be perfectly ready (subject of course to the overriding consideration of health) to fit in with any arrangement that would suit you and me, and would suit my successor; and that he would be willing either to hand over before the normal end of his term in April, or to stay on for the sort of period I have indicated. I would myself strongly recommend a short extension and I should be glad of your views on this; since if there is to be any question of it, it will affect Maxwell's arrangements and we ought to let him know.

34. As for the succession to him, if an extension is granted, the matter will come up for decision after my time. But my own clear view is that if it is to be an Indian, then the wise course would be to put in Sir Mohammad Usman. He is strongly conservative (indeed occasionally a little too much), he is entirely reliable, has courage, and, served by a good department (and I think we can keep the quality of Home Department pretty high), he might give us all the advantage which we have from a service Member such as Maxwell combined with the political advantage we should derive from having a non-official Indian-in-Charge. The fact that he was Home Member in Madras for many years is a relevant consideration. I should be very strongly opposed to Mudaliar: we should get terribly tied up in politics and intrigue if we had him in there, and Maxwell agrees with my estimate. No difficulty would arise over the service qualification since Usman next spring (I forget the exact date—possibly even by the beginning of next year) will himself have ten years service under the Crown.[17]

35. But if and when we do lose Maxwell I should much like to try to strengthen my Council and help my successor by working in an Indian Civil Service representative. One name that has occurred to me is Hydari, who is now acting as Chairman of the Supply Council. The difficulty is that he is not very senior and in the ordinary way would have had to wait for some time

[16] Vol. II, No. 701. [17] See Government of India Act 1935, Ninth Schedule, para. 36 (3).

before he could have been in the running for Council; and I have no doubt that his appointment would be set down to skilful intrigues on his own part! I would not say that he was of outstanding quality intellectually. But he has great tact, experience, excellent manners, was a good Secretary in the Labour Department, gets on admirably and without any suggestion of prejudice with Europeans (he has a European wife), and seems to me to have handled the Supply Council as acting Chairman, with much address. You might care to see what Carter thinks of him. Moreover he is a Muslim, and that community is not rich in persons of any particular quality; while he has, owing to his father,[18] certain contacts with the States. I repeat that I do not think the appointment would be a popular one with the services because of the usual jealousies, and I think, too, that we would probably be shot at on the ground that we were maintaining by devious methods service representation instead of filling all vacancies as they occur by politicians. But we may have to face some of that sort of trouble. The burden on the Governor-General as I know from experience is immense, and while I have grown into it and much of the present system has been developed under my Viceroyalty since the introduction of Provincial Autonomy in 1937, the new man is going to find it, even with a thoroughly experienced and competent private office, a very heavy load, and the more help we can give him in his Executive Council (so long, that is, as the present type of Executive Council continues) the better. I should greatly welcome your views.

36. Laithwaite has I think put privately[19] to Turnbull certain possibilities as regards the Private Secretaryship if the post is filled from here and if you should be asked to advise as to possible names. I would like very strongly to support the suggestion which has been made. But if my successor should be at all disposed to make an appointment from out here, and to select the man whose name has been put forward, it would be essential to release him without any delay and give him a rest; while if he were to go home in the near future he could then come out with the new Viceroy. But I realise of course fully that the selection is a wholly personal one, and that you or I would come in only in the event of the new Viceroy wanting advice. The post, which has always been important, has grown very greatly in importance in these last six years, and, in my judgment, is a key position the importance of which may grow still further as constitutional progress develops; and I should myself judge that we ought to get for it the very best man that can be found. In the case of the name which has been mentioned to Turnbull, important as his present functions are, I could make other arrangements, and I would judge the balance of public advantage to rest with letting him go to the Private Secretaryship if he were wanted for it.

37. Rajagopalacharia's latest efforts,[20] while they have attracted a good deal of attention at home (thanks partly to Shiva Rao) seem to have fallen quite

flat in this country. They have produced from Jinnah a statement[21] which reaffirms the Muslim minimum preliminary demands in most uncompromising terms (I will send you copy by this bag). Vernon Bartlett's contribution[22] does not seem to have had much better luck. I am puzzled, incidentally, by one apparent discrepancy. The *News Chronicle* reports Rajagopalacharia as describing it as a parallel effort and a good thing. But Rajagopalacharia has separately published a statement saying that he wholly disagrees with it (I enclose copy of the statement).[23] The fact is that we are going to have any amount

[18] Sir Akbar Hydari, President, Hyderabad State Executive Council 1937–41; Member for Information, Viceroy's Executive Council 1941; died 8 January 1942.

[19] This letter has not been traced. [20] See Appendix A to No. 153.

[21] Mr Jinnah said that there could be no settlement without agreement on fundamentals. These were 'that all parties, including the British Government, should agree to the Muslim right to self-determination and undertake to abide by the verdict of Muslim plebiscites in those zones (north-west and eastern zones) where the Mussalmans are in a majority and give effect to it . . . Referring to proposals made by "a section of the public opinion both in England and America to secure the wholehearted and active support of the Congress to the war effort",' Mr Jinnah said: ' "Appeasing the Congress means sacrificing Muslim India, which must lead to disastrous results. We are concerned with 100 million Mussalmans and their future destiny, and it will be more desirable for people to stop this kite-flying. It is doing more harm than good." ' *The Statesman*, 1 November 1942. L/P&J/8/514: f 25.

[22] An article by Vernon Bartlett entitled 'A Plan to End The Indian Deadlock' appeared in the *News Chronicle* of 29 October. Mr Bartlett's proposals for the immediate future were that the Executive Council should be entirely Indianised 'and the representation should include those sections of Congress Party which were prepared to play' and the Chamber of Princes. The Council would maintain its formal responsibility to the Crown but otherwise would be responsible only to itself. The custom that the Governor-General did not veto majority decisions could be changed into a written Convention that the veto 'would never be used except in some matter of defence or foreign affairs affecting the vital interests not of India alone, and still less of Great Britain, but of the United Nations'. As well as the Agents-General at Washington and Chungking, India might appoint Ministers to other foreign Governments. Indians could be given a say in their own defence 'if an Eastern Defence Council were formed on Indian soil, under the chairmanship of the Commander-in-Chief, India, as representing the British Government', with representatives from India, China, the United States and possibly the Soviet Union. Indian taxes should be spent under the control of the Indianised Executive Council to strengthen the Indian home front. More direct military expenditure would be the responsibility of the Eastern Defence Council. The Secretary of State for India should be an Indian. The Offices of Governor-General and Viceroy should be separate. 'The Governor-General . . . would act, as suggested above, as Executive Head of the Government of India, or, in effect, as Prime Minister.' The appointment of a member of the Royal Family as Viceroy would be a guarantee that H.M.G.'s promises for the future (which Bartlett proposed should be embodied in a Parliamentary measure and a Royal proclamation) would be honoured.

[23] In this statement, Mr Rajagopalachari said that Mr Bartlett's scheme was 'vitiated by a background of suspicion', fought shy 'of applying the principle of responsibility to the people of India', and was 'constructed entirely on the basis of hand-picked individuals', whereas the essence of his own proposal was 'the background of Indian responsibility'. To make the war a people's war something more positive was required than 'the mere principle of no taxation without representation or the trusting of a few respectable Indians'. In order to retain the full co-operation of the people, they must be trusted. Representation of the Princes in the interim Government should not be considered until 'the Princes' areas are absorbed in a federal constitution'. *The Statesman*, 31 October 1942. L/P&J/8/514: f 24.

of this well-meant intervention and of this manœuvring for position; but none of it is going to achieve any better or more satisfactory results than you and I have been able to get over these last few years as the result of efforts a great deal more intensive and fully as sincere.

38. I was a little bothered by Lewis' hints[24] that Parlakimedi might be disposed to throw his hand in, and had indeed offered to get Parlakimedi (who is an old friend of mine) up here and give him a talking to. Fortunately the latest reports are reassuring and he seems to have made up his mind to face the Legislature.

39. In paragraph 5 of your letter of the 16th September[25] you mention two cases of outgoing Press messages which caused embarrassment at home. To take the Whipping Act case first; the Reuter message, dated August 11th, was as follows:—

> "Bombay Government communiqué. Government further measures quell rioting city. Emergency Whipping Act applied and several hundred police drafted to city from districts."

In so far as this message merely summarised the official communiqué, I do not think it could legitimately have been held up. It was, in fact, one of those ill-advised "flashes" of which Reuters were so fond. Lumley's telegram No. 550[26] of the 14th August which was repeated to you explains the position about the Whipping Act. The fact that there is no misunderstanding in this country about its application was, I think, responsible for the failure to realise the effect such a message might produce in England. The Governor was merely employing a measure against hooliganism which had been used on previous occasions, and had been generally accepted in this country, even by the Congress Ministry. The obvious reason why the Governor did not use the Penalties (Enhancement) Ordinance was that he had his own Bombay Act ready to hand whereas the Ordinance was designed for use only in the event of enemy invasion. It was not until some days after the disturbances had started that Provincial Governments were informed that they were at liberty to make use of the Ordinance in dealing with the disturbances.

40. In the *Hindustan Times* case I quite agree that the message should have been suppressed. On August the 28th an A.P.I. message on the subject was suppressed, but subsequently on the same day a very similar message was passed, although at the same time a much fuller account of the proceedings in Court was banned. Such cases raise the question whether the military censorship, which is the only agency available for stopping outgoing messages should definitely be used for political purposes. We have hitherto taken the line that the military censors only operate to prevent the transmission of news which may be of value or interest to the enemy for military reasons: but I am not at

all sure that we may not have to face up to the big question of openly instituting a political censorship, on the ground that political messages of which the enemy may make capital, other difficulties of a different character apart, are no less dangerous than messages of military value; though I can see that we should be hard put to it to find the necessary staff.

* * *

42. In my letter of the 3rd October[27] I mentioned my talk with Patiala and his complaint that the States had been left rather in the air as regards news during the recent disturbances, and I said that I proposed to take the matter up. I have asked Craik for his advice, and he has discussed with Maxwell and with Intelligence Bureau. Pilditch is clear that he cannot agree to allow his own weekly report to go to States; nor can he undertake the preparation of a special periodical survey of information for their use. He has suggested that if we can secure the consent of Provincial Governments, the present flow of information to States should be supplemented by a periodical review compiled from the Chief Secretaries' fortnightly reports which probably give the best general background of events in India, this summary being prepared by the Political Department. It would include only the more important happenings and would omit those of purely local interest; and Craik suggests that it should be communicated only to the more important States and perhaps not to all of them, through, of course, the Resident or Political Agent concerned. I think this is the right line, and I have authorised Craik to go ahead and to take the matter up with the Provincial Governments.

43. I hope you may have noticed the amusing item in the fortnightly report from Assam for the first half of October,[28] paragraph 18 of which records that "while a Sub-Deputy Collector in Kamrup was proceeding on tour to hold a revenue sale, he was obstructed by some boys lying down in front of his elephant and he did not proceed"!

[24] On 29 July, 14 and 19 September, Sir H. Lewis had reported hints from the Maharaja of Parlakimedi of his wish to resign. The Ministry's reputation was low, it lacked an assured majority in the Assembly and suffered from internal strains between the groups led by Parlakimedi and Pandit Misra. Lewis had avoided expressing a view whether Parlakimedi should resign because he believed that the latter hoped to fasten on to him responsibility for a decision from which the Maharaja shrank himself. On 23 October, Parlakimedi (then at Poona) requested leave of absence for two months on health grounds and submitted a medical certificate. His two fellow ministers requested a postponement of the Assembly due to meet on 28 October. Lewis refused both requests. He thought the deciding factor for Parlakimedi 'at this stage has been that, while still hesitating to carry the responsibility of a decision to resign, he has been unable to face the prospect he much dislikes of the coming session of the legislature. . .' (Lewis to Linlithgow, report 20, 26 October.) In reply, Lord Linlithgow offered 'to send for him and give him a talking to' (Tel. 3121–S of 1 November). But by then Parlakimedi had returned and Lewis felt it best to keep Linlithgow's suggestion in reserve. MSS. EUR. F. 125/84.

[25] Vol. II, No. 753. [26] Vol. II, No. 549. [27] No. 62. [28] Not printed.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to all Provincial Governors

L/P&J/8/618: ff 98–100

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *2 November 1942*

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

I am anxious that every possible step should be taken to trace and bring home to those concerned the part played by "Big Business" in the recent disturbances. It has always been known that Congress has depended for financial assistance on a number of wealthy capitalists and the D.I.B. has recently asked Central Intelligence Officers to probe further into the matter with the assistance of Provincial Special Branches. I enclose a copy of a memorandum[1] which he has sent to them giving examples of the manner in which this financial assistance is believed to have operated during the last few months.

2. Civil disturbances and interruptions of production such as have occurred are not in themselves favourable to "Big Business" and it is therefore necessary to look for ulterior motives. There is, or has until recently been, a widespread belief among Hindus in this country that we shall not be able to keep the Japanese out of India. This belief has no doubt given rise to a fear among millowners and others that if India becomes the scene of warfare their plant and machinery will run the risk of being destroyed by either the invading or the defending forces and their primary object (as is evidenced by the outcry against the denial policy) is to prevent this from happening. They hope that such a situation might be avoided either if a Government could be established which could be relied upon to make terms with the Japanese or if the condition of things in this country were such as to persuade the Japanese that India was friendly to them and that forces existed here which could be relied on to neutralise our war effort without the necessity of a direct attack.

3. A further and even more important possibility is that there is a clique of financiers in India who, taking a leaf out of Japan's book, and even possibly with Japanese assistance, are endeavouring to use the Congress organisation and the political ferment which it has brought about to establish for themselves a position of financial domination in India comparable to that obtained by the "Big Four" in Japan. . . .[2] It is generally assumed that the Hindus are naturally sympathetic towards the Buddhist culture of Japan and would welcome its support against the Muslims if the Japanese came to India. There may be some such feeling but it may well have been fostered by the Birla brothers with a view to their ulterior objects.

4. If these surmises are true it may well be the case that "Big Business" is the *fons et origo* of the recent disturbances and the real link between the Congress

and Japan (whatever other independent links there may be through the Bose brothers or the Forward Bloc). On this supposition the political motive exploited by the Congress is a secondary one and is being financed only because it will serve the major object in view. It is quite possible that only Gandhi and his intimates are aware of the exact place which the Congress political programme occupies in working out much larger designs.

5. You will readily appreciate the importance of this theory if it is correct. It means that our investigations must not stop short with establishing the connection between the Congress (or allied bodies) with the recent disturbances and if properly pursued may lead to the unmasking of a deeper conspiracy than we had supposed and to the exposure of the real motives actuating Gandhi and the Congress. If such an exposure could be brought about it would destroy for ever the patriotic pretensions of the former.

6. It will be obvious to you that this is a case for very delicate handling and it is for this reason that I am writing to you personally to stress the importance of these investigations rather than pursuing the matter officially. I contemplate that a stage might be reached when we could strike against the Birla brothers and other leading financiers engaged with them in the conspiracy but for the moment it is important not to give any hint of our ideas or to take premature action which might put those concerned on their guard. I am considering further what special agencies might be able to help in unravelling the plot but for the present it will, I think, be sufficient if you can give a hint to your C.I.D. of the importance that we attach to all information bearing on the financial support which the Indian mercantile community has been giving to Gandhi, the Congress, and the present Congress movement, and the motives underlying it.

7. Finally, let me repeat that I am most anxious that no risk whatever should be incurred of conveying the slightest hint or warning of what is afoot to the parties under suspicion.[3]

LINLITHGOW

[1] Not printed. [2] Personal comment omitted.

[3] The Governors replied as follows: Sir B. Glancy, 5 November; Sir R. Lumley, 6 November; Sir G. Cunningham, 9 November; Sir M. Hallett, 9 November (in report U.P. 166, para. 4); Sir A. Clow, 10 November; Sir H. Lewis, 14 and 27 November 1942; Sir T. Stewart, 1 February (in report 84–G.B., para. 4); Sir H. Twynam, 26 February; Sir J. Herbert, 1 March; and Sir H. Dow, 6 March 1943. In these replies, the Governors stated that they had indicated the importance of the subject to their C.I.Ds and mentioned such information, if any, as had come to their notice. L/P&J/8/618. See also No. 595.

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Sir S. Cripps to Mr Amery

L/P&J/8/514: f 82

GWYDYR HOUSE, WHITEHALL, S.W.I, *2 November 1942*

My dear Amery,
I had a talk the other evening with Smuts about the Indian position and both he and I feel, I think, that it would be a good thing if we could get Rajagopalachari over here as it would be some continuation to action in contradistinction to inaction, and even though it is unlikely to produce any definite result it would show our friends—particularly in America—that we were trying to do our best to get a settlement. If this were to happen, then I think it would be a good thing if Rajagopalachari were able to see the Congress leaders before he came in order that he might be able to say what their thoughts were on the present situation. But this latter point would not, of course, be published or advertised.

You might let me know what you think about the idea.

R. STAFFORD CRIPPS

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Mr Amery to Viscount Halifax

L/P&J/8/515: f 49

2 November 1942

My dear Edward,
I enclose an article on India of Ned Grigg's in yesterday's *Sunday Times* which may not have reached you in the ordinary course. It reproves Willkie very effectively, but also makes a positive suggestion which I think I have made to you more than once before. That is that some American University or group of universities, might appoint their own little commission of one or more to study, not the immediate Indian trouble, but the constitutional problem itself, i.e. the form of constitution required to enable the different conflicting elements in India to live together. The idea is I think well worth discussing with Harold Butler and possibly with someone like Aydelotte who would know the best kind of individual or individuals to make such a study.

One clear conviction I have derived from all this Indian business is that there is only one expeditious road to a solution, and that is if Indians get together now and find out for themselves the kind of constitution that would fit them.

Till they have agreed upon that all this clamour for immediate unlimited power means nothing, for each section is asking for something inconsistent with what the others ask, and therefore we are in no position to give it. Even if they did think they agreed for a week and we handed over to them, there would be no constitutional means of resolving the quarrels that would almost certainly arise and which can only be resolved in the ordinary way by the ultimate responsibility either of an Indian constitution, or pending that, by the existing responsibility to Parliament here. Indians are, I think, just beginning to realise this and anything in the nature of a constitutional enquiry which will set them thinking on lines different from the conventional British pattern will help. I hope a good deal from Coupland's report,[1] the third volume of which will however not be out till the spring.

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

[1] R. Coupland, *A Report on the Constitutional Problem in India submitted to the Warden and Fellows of Nuffield College Oxford* (Oxford University Press), Part I, *The Indian Problem 1833–1935* (1942); Part II, *Indian Politics 1936–1942* (1943); Part III, *The Future of India* (1943).

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/8/89: f 198

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *3 November 1942, 7.30 am*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

1287. Successor to Gwyer. Please see para. 15 of my private letter of 9/12 October.[1] Evershed ultimately declined. Only other suitable candidates suggested by Lord Chancellor were W. P. Spens, M.P., Radcliffe & Jowitt. Former is new idea since my letter was written. The latter two could only be spared, even if willing, with greatest difficulty. I have therefore approached Spens who is, I am glad to say, willing to accept. He is fifty eight. Kemp regards him as most suitable of three named above & I hope this choice will be agreeable to you. Simon tells me that he is of the right quality for a High Court Judgeship here.

2. Spens has asked when appointment will be announced & when he should reach India. I have told him vacancy is in April & I assume you would wish him to arrive approximately on termination of Gwyer's term on 25th April. Please confirm. Will it be convenient at your end to announce as soon as King's pleasure has been obtained?

[1] No. 84.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/10/17: f 233

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

3 November 1942
Received: 4 November

1288. Your private and personal telegram 3090–S[1] of 29th October. After some delay *Times* ultimately published O'Neill's rejoinder to Schuster[2] and gave it first place on leader page. It should give Schuster and others something to think about.

2. I do not despair of *Times* coming to see folly of not placing responsibility for present deadlock squarely on Indian shoulders. Their leader of 28th October dealing with Willkie was refreshing and did not repeat their recent line that we have equal responsibility with Indians for making further move. Joyce heard that there had been some searching of heart in Printing House Square partly resulting from Inglis' candid conversations with Barrington-Ward. Holburn's despatches have also shown that editorial policy ignores certain realities and this has by no means passed unnoticed in political circles. Barrington-Ward came to see me yesterday on his own initiative and seemed genuinely anxious for guidance.

3. *Telegraph* has always been very helpful and since arrest of Congress leaders has had no less than nine leading articles giving helpful interpretation of our policy. I am in personal touch with *Telegraph* leader writer on Indian matters and will continue to encourage them as much as possible. Editorially *Telegraph* cannot wholly compensate for lack of support from *Times*, but it has, of course, an immense circulation now.

[1] No. 124.

[2] See No. 95. Sir Hugh O'Neill's letter, published on 28 October, noted that Sir George Schuster quoted 'with assent the statement of Colonel Louis Johnson (made after spending no more than a few days in India)' on India's war production, and that he criticized British leadership in India 'in a series of questions which avoid any positive allegations'. Sir H. O'Neill quoted figures on India's war effort. He agreed that more could have been done at the beginning of the war but questioned whether it would have been wise in May and June 1940 to send munitions or machinery on a three months' voyage to India when neither instructors for new Indian Army units nor skilled personnel were available. He continued that the two remaining official members of the Viceroy's Executive Council were, 'apparently "the British leaders who are connected with this failure" of whom Sir George writes.' Sir George, he noted, was tempted by the vision of a united and militant India, but himself accepted that full constitutional responsibility could not be handed over to Indian ministers without agreement between the main elements in India. In the absence of such a solution, Sir Hugh concluded, 'India needs the most efficient administration that can be found. The Viceroy's Council is as representative now as it can be without representation of the major parties. So long as that is impossible we need be in no hurry to remove two tried and experienced officials from the Viceroy's counsels.'

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *3 November 1942*

There is an unexpected mail and there is also no very special news at this end, so you will only get a very short letter this time.

2. I won't attempt to say anything about developments on the political side, as I am waiting for your reaction to sundry suggestions I made a few weeks ago. Here at this end I think the agitation for doing something or other indefinite is rather dying down. Vernon Bartlett, *after* producing a scheme[1] of his own to settle the Indian deadlock, came to see me yesterday, and as a result is piping rather small in this morning's *News Chronicle*. I was able to convince him that Rajagopalachari's scheme[2] comes back to the old idea of immediate Congress control of India and nothing more. Barrington-Ward, whom I had deliberately avoided seeing after the bad leaders in *The Times* a little while ago, and who now seems to have had it impressed on him from various quarters that *The Times* line was none too helpful, asked to see me yesterday, and his whole attitude was that of someone seeking guidance and only too anxious to follow it. So I hope for better things from *The Times* which, after all, matters more than any other paper. I had Colin Coote, now of the *Daily Telegraph*, to lunch the other day and there was an excellent leader on Willkie next day.[3]

3. I was talking the other day to C.I.G.S. about Auchinleck's prospects. He feels that the real thing for him is to go back to Commander-in-Chief, India, if and when Wavell is given something more important in some other field of the war. Meanwhile he hinted a doubt as to whether it was altogether tactful of Auchinleck to be staying in Delhi side by side with Wavell and whether the latter might not possibly feel a little embarrassed. I don't know how the land really lies there, but if there were any embarrassment you might be able discreetly to set it right, possibly even hinting to A. that it might be wiser to go elsewhere.

I have no view!

L.

He does not feel embarrassed because both men have confidence in me!

L.

[Para. 4, on a report by the Political Agent in the Orissa States, omitted.]

[1] See No. 131, note 22. [2] See Appendix A to No. 153

[3] i.e. 28 October (see No. 128, para. 3).

P.S.—In connection with my suggestion[4] that your Executive Council should, through a sub-committee, set up a study Commission on the constitutional problem it would be a good thing, both on merits and on effect abroad, if they invited an American and a Swiss constitutional authority to join them.

Save us!

L.

[4] See No. 107.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

INDIA OFFICE, *3 November 1942*

Cripps has just sent me the enclosed memorandum which he says is by a B.B.C. official who recently spent some months in India. He regards it as good, and suggests that the Cabinet might see it. I am telling him that I am sending it out to you for comments and should prefer that it is not circulated until I have your views.

I do not know who the author is and have not had time to ascertain. It would seem that he has been readily receptive of Congress ideas, but it may be that so far as the "Listening" public (which I assume is mainly the urban intelligentsia) is concerned, it has some foundation in fact. But whatever the merits of the picture drawn of Indian public opinion, some of the suggestions at the end merit serious consideration.

I hope you can let me have your views by telegram.

I suppose we must continue the weary business of educating our masters. Why S/S should allow his leg to be pulled by this sort of tripe, I cannot conceive. I should myself regard it as a complete waste of Cabinet time to ask them to read this sort of tripe. If they are to read it, it should be circulated with the appropriate reply.

L.,—2.12.42.

Enclosure to No. 138

1. When I arrived in India, I learned from Indians that British prestige had never been lower and that bitterness against the British had never been so intense. When I left four months later nothing had occurred to restore our prestige as men or soldiers, and as we had just shot more Indians than we have ever done at one time since the Mutiny, the bitterness against us had intensified. The common sayings on the situation among Indians when I left were, "Britain

has opened the Second Front in India", and "Britain has created in India the biggest Fifth Column in history".

2. The enemy wireless rapidly took advantage of the situation. It got full and accurate information from the Beam, and if it only took what American journalists were allowed to put out, it had enough and to spare to go on. It spread rumours and lies of a kind that only an oriental appetite could swallow. (I think it overdid that, which gives us an opportunity.) It gave hints on sabotage; from Saigon it gave orders and directions, and next day would announce that the orders and directions of the previous day had been obeyed with the following results. The extent and power of the ether war raging in India every night is most difficult to convey to anyone in this very medium wave island. The usual question when an Indian buys a wireless set, I was told by big dealers in Bombay, is "Can I hear Germany and Japan on this". That was long before the troubles. Nine large stations batter at India every night. They are all powerful and offer good reception, and with technical proficiency in programme presentation, they combine a very fair understanding of the spirit of the peoples to whom they are broadcasting all over India. Against this, there are only A.I.R. and the B.B.C.

3. When I arrived the Japs had made a few excursions by sea and air, sufficient to keep India generally, and Bengal and Madras particularly, in a very nervy state. Calcutta at the end of May was expecting air-attack, and thought invasion very possible. Madras was quiet at the beginning of July and reminiscent of its scare. During these weeks however, there had been silence in Delhi on political issues and all political India wondered where it stood. Bitterness was growing as this silence encouraged suspicion, and it was commonly said that if the British would not give real power when they were in military desperation in April, they certainly would not if they recovered. It was about the end of July then that I first began to hear what became one of the statements most commonly offered me—that the Japs would take India much more quickly than they had taken Burma because they would get so much more help from the people. The Japs are not popular in India, but have become a name as deliverers from the British.

4. The present unrest has been stimulated in towns by an artificial food shortage and the appearance of a black market. Rural India is in a chronic state of semi-starvation, but Rural India scarcely comes into the propaganda purview unless Congress starts the no-rent campaign, which, as usual, [is] on the list of methods of attack when the time is considered ripe for organised rebellion. But in towns the position is serious.

5. It is more difficult to write of this aspect of the background in India and my observations suggest that the picture accepted in London is inaccurate.

Congress lost face over the Cripps Mission, and a campaign had to be initiated to recover face. Gandhi was out to fight, violently if need be. He was out for his last tilt against his old enemy, the Delhi monster. As usual, all Congress would follow him. As usual, it did. But it gave various reasons for doing so. The most generous interpretation of Congress motives would run: the country is threatened with invasion, and the temper of the people is as bad as could be. Delhi cannot put this right, possibly does not realise how serious the feeling is, being, as it admittedly is, out of touch with real Indian opinion. We are the only party which can bring the people round, so we must take power.

6. That Congress now has the sympathy of the people, there can be no doubt. The publication of the Allahabad papers in an attempt to discredit Congress was regarded as contemptible and did a great deal to help Congress. The arrest of the leaders had the usual effect of enshrining them once again as national heroes, and the shooting did the rest. India, outside the Punjab and the States, is united against us at the very moment when we most require its co-operation in the running of a campaign in Burma.

7. It has been suggested that the rising following upon the arrests was planned and calculated. The Indians to whom I spoke thought that this was not so, and dangerously erroneous conclusions have been drawn from this supposition. It was certainly to be expected that during the weeks following upon the Wardha meeting and before the Bombay meeting, that Congress would organise its campaign. In fact, it denies having done so. Was the rising then after all spontaneous? No doubt its nature had been eagerly discussed, and plans had grown hot in many young brains. But the deduction from instruments used, and the similarity of the attacks and the military significance of the attacks on communications can be readily explained. Press censorship was not complete in the first days, and reports of rising[s] and the shape they took in one place was sufficient to suggest methods in another. The same instruments for cutting wires and removing railway lines are the best everywhere, and when a whole people is enraged, these instruments are easily obtainable.

8. The suggestion that the movement was planned overlooks the grave danger inherent in the present situation. Most Indians I met just before leaving thought that the movement would go underground, which implies that the planning that was neglected by Congress was now going on, and going on in an atmosphere of unparalleled bitterness. Furthermore, the planning will now go forward with the passive assent of the vast majority of the people, and the active co-operation of far more than Congress could have hoped for two months ago.

9. I was given the most absolute assurance in the Punjab that the peoples from whom the Indian army is recruited are absolutely loyal to us. Young

Indians who came in contact with Indian soldiers on trains told me they were as full of their own prowess as they were of contempt for the British Army. A very experienced officer in the Indian army told me that the only danger was the Indian officer who was keen and efficient, but very critical therefore as well as politically-minded.

10. The morale of the British soldier was as good as could be expected in a country with a dreadful climate, in which he knew he was unpopular, in which he was very badly paid, in which the arrangements for his billeting were often outrageous and never have been civilised, and in which there was no Naafi or attempt at one to help him, but only the wicked old contracting system meant for a small garrison.

11. What sort of propaganda is useful to this India, and in what ways can it be put across? The pain and the anger and the frustration on both sides must be dissolved before the propagandist can do much. But he must go on with his work meantime. His obvious duty is to create a sympathetic atmosphere. The instruments at his disposal in the order of their extensiveness are film, Press and broadcasting.

(*a*) A very extraordinary percentage of the population of India now goes at least once a week to see a film. Every facility must be given to the Government of India and the Provincial Governments to extend their work on feature films.

(*b*) The use of the Press for direct propaganda is at the moment a waste of time. The people are too much against us. So far, it has been badly done. What M.O.I. sends out to the Information Bureau mostly goes straight into the waste-paper baskets of editors unread. We can take a lesson from the Americans in Delhi on this matter; they have a competent journalist in charge who edits all the material sent to him, so that it is properly presented in suitable lengths for Indian papers. It gets in.

(*c*) The first thing Indians want from the wireless is the news. That they get from the B.B.C. and A.I.R. in a satisfactory way. The 9-30 p.m. (I.S.T.) bulletin of the B.B.C. is listened to with great respect throughout British India and the States. It is accepted as the best available summary of the day's news. For ten minutes before that, A.I.R. puts out a domestic news bulletin, which used to be very good indeed, but since the troubles it has been a little ticklish for the News Editor. Apart from the news, there should be the absolute minimum of talking about events either military or political. The B.B.C. has made great strides in four months, and with its Delhi office the future may be regarded with confidence. A.I.R. requires a great deal of help, and A.I.R. is our greatest potential asset. On the engineering side, it is as good as possible. On the programme side it has never had enough money to develop properly.

Strong action would be necessary to put this right, as the trouble with this long starvation has become radical. The recipe for A.I.R. broadcasting is easy; the best posts and the best singers put over in the best way, and enemy broadcasting would lose its great audience. As things are now, however, a big overhaul would be necessary to use this simple recipe.

(*d*) The enemy have so many stations at their disposal that for the two peak hours of listening in India, there is a deluge of lies and insinuations and provocations. Jamming by us is much talked of, but not used. Against that it may be said that it is obvious that we are losing the ether war very heavily, because the enemy has the great advantages of numbers and power in his stations—and irresponsibility. It is also arithmetically certain that when we begin winning, arithmetic is still against us, and he will jam. If our resources would run to small jamming sets, two in each of the half-dozen cities in India, we could kill the deadliest of the enemy broadcasts every night. For direct reply on the air is not good. Often there isn't a reply; and to reply is to advertise what he is saying.

(*e*) Another blow to the enemy would be to stop using that Beam. He would then find it rather difficult to keep up his appearance of having reliable news of all parts of India.

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Sir Kingsley Wood to Mr Amery

L/PO/2/16: f 30

TREASURY CHAMBERS, WHITEHALL, S.W.1, *3 November 1942*

My dear Leo,

I have been looking at the text of the telegram[1] which you propose to send to the Viceroy in regard to sterling balances. It would be more satisfactory to me if you could separate the simple statement of the decision we have taken from any commentary that you may think it wise to send to the Viceroy. As far as I am concerned I have in mind the following:

"PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Your personal telegram No. 399–S.C.[2] dated 3rd October sterling balances. I circulated your telegram to Cabinet.[3] Chancellor has now agreed[4] and Prime Minister approved[5] that question should not be further discussed here at this stage but on clear understanding that Chancellor retains the right to raise it again on some future occasion."[6]

This would leave the Viceroy in no doubt about my position and the decision of the Prime Minister. So long as that is clear as between you and me and you and the Viceroy, I do not think that I am concerned with anything

further you wish to say to the Viceroy about the handling of the matter at the Council. It is for you to consider whether the Prime Minister should see the telegram as a whole.

Yours ever,

KINGSLEY WOOD

[1] Mr Turnbull had sent the Treasury a copy of this draft telegram on 29 October, asking to be informed as soon as conveniently possible whether Sir Kingsley Wood agreed. Para. 1 of the draft telegram read: 'Your personal No. 399–S.C. dated 3rd October. Sterling balances. I circulated your telegram to Cabinet for consideration and urged that the objections and dangers stressed by you and your own earnest appeal to Cabinet not to raise unnecessarily this matter of making a reservation should be regarded as conclusive against pursuing the matter at present critical juncture. Chancellor has now agreed and Prime Minister approved that question should be disposed of for present by simple expedient of not being brought up for further discussion but on clear understanding that Chancellor is not estopped from raising it again at a more suitable opportunity.' Paras. 2 and 3 were the same as paras. 2 and 3 of No. 140 except for the two discrepancies noted there. L/PO/2/16: ff 33–5.

[2] No. 56. [3] No. 68. [4] See No. 121, note 2. [5] See No. 122, note 2.

[6] Mr Amery transmitted this telegram as suggested by Sir Kingsley Wood to Lord Linlithgow as 1294 of 4 November. L/PO 2/16: f 26.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/2/16: ff 27–8

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *4 November 1942, 9.30 pm*
Received: 5 November

1295. My 1294[1] is in form agreed to by Chancellor. I think it is unlikely that you, at any rate will be worried about it again.

2. I hope that this arrangement will meet requirements at your end. I take it that matter is certain to be raised again in Assembly in the Budget Session, if not earlier (cf. line Raisman took as reported in your private and personal telegram 22nd September, 2849)[2] and discussed in Council in relation to that occasion whenever it may arise. If so I should suppose that for that purpose Raisman on basis of what has passed[3] would feel able to hold position by statement to effect that on his visit he had found H.M.G. desirous of raising question whether Settlement should not be revised unfavourably to India, that he had pressed Indian view and pointed to great increase inevitable in Indian expenditure under existing Settlement, that no communication had been received from H.M.G. pressing matter further, that he inferred that they were not pursuing question and that it was not thought advisable to pursue it further from Government of India's side also?

[1] See No. 139, note 6. [2] No. 11.

[3] In the draft sent to the Treasury (No. 139, note 1) the words '(excluding private and personal correspondence)' followed the word 'passed'.

3. If however it would strengthen Raisman's hands to be able to say that he had been informed instead of that he inferred that H.M.G. are not pursuing matter at present I am ready to send you personal reply to your 399–S.C.[4] in sense of my immediately preceding telegram.[5]

[4] No. 56.
[5] The draft sent to the Treasury has 'para. 1 above' instead of 'my immediately preceding telegram'.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/514: ff 80–1

PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *4 November 1942, 9.50 pm*
Received: 5 November

19118. Parliamentary question for Tuesday, 10th November asks "whether I will accept the offer[1] of Rajagopalachari to visit this country and will invite him to discuss the present situation in India."

2. Simultaneously I have received letter[2] from Cripps to effect that in light of talk with Smuts he believes latter is in agreement with him[3] that it would be useful as evidence of continued action by H.M.G. to get R. over here and that though unlikely to produce any definite result it would show our friends here and in America that we are doing our best to try to get a settlement. He adds suggestion that if R. were to come he should be enabled, without publicity or advertisement, to see Congress leaders first so as to be able to say what are their thoughts on the present situation.

3. I should be grateful for your suggestions as to replies to both enquiries. It seems clear that no fruitful results can emerge from discussion with representative of one element only unless he can show some indication of agreement by other main elements also. That being so, action taken, despite foreknowledge of its failure, simply to show well-meaning but ignorant people that we are not inactive, would seem only to raise expectations that must be falsified. In light of Jinnah's uncompromising attitude to Rajagopalachari's offer and suggestions of the same order from other quarters, I should anticipate that whatever effect invitation to R. might have here and in America it would only exacerbate position in India.

[1] See Appendix A to No. 153. [2] No. 133. [3] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 has 'with you'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir M. Gwyer

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *4 November 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

My dear Gwyer,

I have just had a telegram[1] from Amery about the succession to yourself when to the great regret of all of us your term as Chief Justice has to come to an end. I gather from him that there has been considerable discussion at home with which naturally Simon has been prominently associated, and in the result the name which I am now asked to consider is that of Mr. W. P. Spens, C.B.E., at present M.P. for Ashford. Amery tells me that on the advice he has had Spens would appear to be the most suitable man in the field and that Simon tells him that he is of the right quality for the High Court at home. Spens himself is willing to accept.

2. This is not of course a matter on which I am really myself in a position to form an independent judgment save to the extent that I may know an individual personally. I do not know Spens, but I feel that if Simon and Amery and his Legal Department all think that he is the best man available, I have no real choice in the matter, and I would propose therefore to let him know that I agree (it would, in any event, be not too easy for me to question this choice if, as I gather is the case, Spens has been approached and has indicated his readiness to serve). But you may be able to give me some background, and I need not say how very much I hope that he is a man in your judgment of the right calibre. While he will not have your immense and invaluable familiarity with the constitutional discussions that led up to the Act of 1935—that is something that we can no longer hope to find in our Chief Justice—I am glad to think that he has had some political experience, for you and I would both I think feel that he would find it very useful.

3. Spens has asked when the appointment (if the King approves it) will be announced and when he should reach India. Amery tells me that he has explained that the end of your term would be on 25th April next, and he has asked me to confirm his assumption that I would wish the new Chief Justice to arrive approximately on that date. There is the further question of an announcement. Amery must of course take the King's pleasure; but once that has been signified, I think you would probably yourself feel it convenient (as for obvious reasons it would be convenient to Spens) that we should make an announcement. Will you let me know what you feel about this?

[1] No. 135.

4. I cannot finish this letter without saying how much I regret that our time together should be coming to an end though in any event it will have to come to an end with my own return in April next, or how profoundly grateful I have at all times been to you for your wisdom, your great experience and your invaluable help and advice on many matters falling well outside the normal burdens which are carried by the Chief Justice. We have had an interesting and not easy period of work together, and I think that both of us feel the same disappointment that all the efforts that have been made and all the goodwill that has been shown should have produced so little in the way of tangible result.

Yours ever,
LINLITHGOW

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Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

SECRET AND PERSONAL GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, *4 November 1942*

No. 295–H.E.

My dear Linlithgow,

I write in connection with your private and personal telegram No. 3111–S[1] dated October the 31st, which deals further with the question of the arrangements to be made if Gandhi were to begin a fast.

2. With regard to the suggestion that if he should declare a fast at a moment of real military difficulty we should at once fly him to Aden or Africa, I would not be in favour of this course if he had already started a fast. In that event, he would probably have to be carried, out of the house and at the aerodrome. This would almost certainly become known, and, I think, the idea of flying a man of his age, who was fasting, would create a worse impression than if he were to die in custody where he is at present. It would be a different question if he were to give notice that he was going to fast and we were able to fly him away before he began. There is, I feel, much to be said, at first glance, in moving him out of India before he fasts at a time of real military difficulty. If he fasts when he reaches his destination we would, at any rate, be spared, at a critical moment, the very considerable local difficulties which his fast would be bound to create. On the other hand, the reactions to his death, through fasting while in detention, would be the same whether he died in Africa or in Poona. I do not think, therefore, that there is very much to be gained by this method, and there is the danger that he might start to fast as soon as he was moved from the Aga Khan's Palace, and might die *en route*, and that, again,

would, I feel, create the worst impression. On the whole, therefore, and with some reluctance, my reaction is that the flying proposal does not seem to have sufficient advantage in it to make it worth while. I suppose, too, that it would not be too easy to make sure that the right aeroplane would be available at a moment's notice.

3. With regard to the second question, I think it would be possible to conceal the fast from the public for three or four days if we decided to hold him fasting in Poona but not to allow anyone, not now in the Palace, to see him. I think we have been successful, so far, in preventing all leakages as to what is going on in the Palace, except on the occasion of Mahadev Desai's death when an outsider came in, and, therefore, provided outsiders are excluded, I should feel fairly confident that we could preserve secrecy. That would, of course, mean that no doctors, other than those who normally attended, would be allowed to visit him. If any doctor, not accustomed to visit him, were to be allowed, that fact would at once be known, and would arouse immediate speculation. However, as he is regularly visited by the Inspector-General of Prisons and by Colonel B. Z. Shah, the Superintendent of the Yeravda Mental Hospital, who has been in charge of the health of the inmates of the Aga Khan's Palace, there would be no lack of normal medical attention, though there would, no doubt, be much pressure from the other inmates for further specialists.

I find it difficult to make up my mind whether this course would be expedient. It would depend so much on the circumstances prevailing at the time, which it is very difficult to foresee. I am inclined to think that it would always be better to make public the fact that Gandhi had started to fast rather than to keep the fact secret. It is possible, however, that the circumstances might be such that it would appear almost essential to keep it secret for some days, and if that should be the case, I think we could manage to preserve secrecy.

4. I asked the Inspector-General of Prisons two days ago how he thought Gandhi was, and he replied that in health he was certainly well and had put on some three pounds in weight since he has been in detention. I asked him, further, if he had formed any opinion as to his mental attitude, and he replied that when he first received newspapers he was distinctly upset over something, and that had caused a rise in blood pressure, but that had now passed, and, though he continued to be a diligent reader of the newspapers, he had, for some time, appeared to be unworried.

Yours sincerely,

ROGER LUMLEY

[1] No. 129.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT *5 November 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 3156–S. Your private and personal telegram of 3rd November, No. 1288.[1] This is more reassuring and I need not say how grateful I am to you for your help. Holburn remains very steady here and that should be of value. My best thanks also for your help with the *Telegraph* who seem to be doing us admirably, though, as you say, the critical thing is absence or lack of support[2] from the *Times*.

[1] No. 136. [2] L/PO/10/17: f 235 has 'art (sic)' instead of 'support'.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/514: ff 78–9

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *5 November 1942, 12.20 am*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

1296. I have sent you personal telegram[1] about Rajagopalachari's offer to visit this country, which it may conceivably be necessary to circulate, together with your reply to it. I have not yet been able to get a line on Cripps' belief that Smuts agrees as to desirability of inviting R. However that may be, I should, of course, deprecate anything that might divert attention from the fundamental fact that no solution can possibly be reached by H.M.G. with any one element in India and that first essential is agreement between Indians themselves. If, nevertheless, any purpose were seen in visit by Rajagopalachari I should strongly deprecate, as no doubt you would, prior consultation by him with Congress leaders now detained which could hardly be arranged, as Cripps suggests, without publicity or advertisement.

But whereas invitation to Rajagopalachari to visit this country would be most unlikely to produce any useful result, and almost certain in meantime to harden attitude of minorities, I am not so sure that it would produce equally dangerous false expectations if you yourself found opportunity to discuss Rajagopalachari's plan with him in a similarly unobtrusive interview to that which you accorded Mukerjee. If you felt this to be possible it might help if

you were to throw out the suggestion in your reply to my personal telegram, but if not it would be better not to allude to the point in that reply.

[1] No. 141.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *5 November 1942*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 3169–S. Your private and personal telegram of 5th November No. 1296.[1] Rajagopalachari. I am sending you separately a "personal" reply. I hope it will not cause you difficulty. I am quite sure that this is a business on which there ought to be no compromise whatever. I wholly agree with you as to objections to Rajagopalachari contacting the Congress prisoners. Nor would I be prepared to send for him. Mukerjee's interview with me was given usual prominence in Court Circular and Press. (He is a Minister and as such entitled to be received by me.) There could be no hope of Rajagopalachari seeing me without that being generally known, and any invitation from me would certainly be misconstrued. His scheme has fallen completely flat save to the extent that it has been condemned specifically by other Party Leaders such as Jinnah; and there is nothing that he wants more than advertisement for Congress and himself which a visit home would give. I am sorry that you should find yourself in the position of having to give a blank refusal of this nature, and no doubt there will be criticism. But my view is quite clear.

[1] No. 145.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *5 November 1942, 11.40 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 5 November, 9.30 pm*

No. 3170–S. Your personal telegram of 4th November No. 19118.[1] Rajagopalachari. I entirely agree with your criticisms. Rajagopalachari's scheme has fallen completely flat here, having attracted much more attention outside India than in it. It has been condemned by Jinnah and has had no support from any

[1] No. 141.

Party. I should in these circumstances be wholly opposed to giving any facilities for journey home (for which he has not in fact so far as I can ascertain asked). It would be an advertisement to Rajagopalachari and Congress, and Cabinet should know: (*a*) that though Congress leaders and Gandhi have for some considerable time now been receiving newspapers, &c., there has not been the very slightest sign of any change in their attitude or any move to suggest that they are not in as open opposition and rebellion as in August; (*b*) while Rajagopalachari has formally broken with the Congress Party I doubt if that breach has had any effect on his close domestic relation or his close political sympathy with Gandhi.

2. These considerations apart, it would be out of the question to single out an individual, however important, so closely associated with the work of one Party to go home and negotiate or discuss with His Majesty's Government, or publicise a particular solution in the United Kingdom. There would be instant outcry from other parties, and in my view that outcry would be justified.

3. Finally, now that we are committed to post-war discussions here between Indians themselves, I am strongly of opinion that India and not the United Kingdom should be the venue for political exploration in the meantime. It will confuse issues and raise hopes destined to be disappointed if we lead people to think that by going home they can take advantage of the inevitably less close familiarity of His Majesty's Government with the position in this country and get solutions accepted that would have no hope of success out here. And any facilities for Rajagopalachari or anyone else associated with Congress at this stage would be taken as a sign of surrender by Muslims, Princes, Depressed Classes and our other supporters.

4. Invitation would again be likely as you suggest to raise difficult question of allowing Rajagopalachari to visit Gandhi or other Congress leaders. To that I would be entirely opposed, and I am sure Cabinet will realise force of my reasons, which I will if necessary develop. Publicity or advertisement could not be avoided, nor could we refuse facilities to other prominent politicians if we gave them to Rajagopalachari.

5. I suggest following answer:—

(*a*) "His Majesty's Government welcome the endeavours of Mr. Rajagopalachari and others to clear the ground for the settlement of the Indian problem. But Mr. Rajagopalachari, however well-meaning, represents no one but himself. His scheme has attracted little attention in India and that attention predominantly critical. In particular Mr. Jinnah has made it clear that Muslims are not prepared to consider it. Nor can His Majesty's Government discriminate in this matter by giving special facilities to a single individual or the representative of a single party."

(*b*) Supplementaries.

Question.—Has Mr. Rajagopalachari asked for facilities?

Answer.—No, Sir.

(I am asking Hope to confirm that he has made no request in Madras, and will telegraph further. I have little doubt myself that what he is waiting for is an invitation by His Majesty's Government or by me with the increase in stature which that would inevitably involve.)

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Mr Gandhi to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

DETENTION CAMP, *5 November 1942*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I have just read about the sad but heroic death of Hon'ble Peter Wood in action. Will you please convey to Lord Halifax my congratulations as well as condolences on the sad bereavement?[1]

I am,
Yours sincerely,
M. K. GANDHI

[1] Lord Linlithgow acknowledged this letter on 14 November, adding that he would at once forward Mr Gandhi's letter to Lord Halifax. MSS. EUR. F. 125/124.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, *6 November 1942, 2.5 pm*
Received: 6 November, 12.40 pm

No. 3174–S. My personal telegram of 5th November No. 3170–S.[1] Rajagopalachari. On further consideration I think second sentence in draft answer (*a*) proposed in paragraph 5 might be regarded as a little provocative. I suggest amending it to read "But Mr. Rajagopalachari, however well-meaning, is not a Party leader and does not represent or carry any mandate from any important Party or interest".

[1] No. 147.

150

Mr Amery to Sir S. Cripps

L/P&J/8/514: f 74

6 November 1942

My dear Cripps,
I have now consulted the Viceroy on the suggestion in your letter of 2nd November[1] that Rajagopalachari should be invited over here, and I enclose copies of the telegrams.[2] Linlithgow entirely supports my own view that such an invitation would be unlikely to produce any positive result and might have very adverse repercussions among those who oppose the present policy of Congress in India. Rajagopalachari by himself would represent only the Hindu point of view, if all of that. To ask him here alone would create great alarm among other communities especially if he came after seeing the Congress leaders and in effect as their representative. The fact that he had seen them would certainly become public whatever attempts we made to conceal it. Rajagopalachari's plan has had a cold reception in India and Jinnah has made it quite clear that he is not prepared to co-operate on such a basis. Rajagopalachari's plan is in fact no more than a clever variant of the position Congress have throughout adopted.

The difference between Rajagopalachari and the rest of the Congress leaders is that Rajagopalachari wants to make terms with the Moslem League by admitting the possibility of Pakistan, so that a joint Congress–League demand for "a national government with full powers" can be put forward. On the constitutional issue he takes the same position as the Congress leaders took when you were in Delhi, namely that they were prepared for the Commander-in-Chief to have control of the defence forces, but wanted complete control of everything else and no Governor-General's veto. This is made no more acceptable to us by creating a Legislature to which such a Government can be responsible because the essential thing is that during the war we should in the last resort have power to implement the essentials for waging the war in all departments of the Government of India.

Rajagopalachari achieves an appearance of conceding a lot by offering the Moslem League as many seats as it likes in the Executive but at the same time he makes the Executive responsible to a Legislature with a permanent Hindu majority. If there is a deadlock he says that the Viceroy can "dissolve one or the other". It is quite clear that it could not remedy the situation if he were to dissolve an indirectly elected legislature and in effect the Moslems in the Executive would have to accept the decisions of the Legislature or go.

I am sure that we must not be stampeded by the Americans or the press here into a step of this sort simply out of a desire of appearing to be doing

something. Jinnah's attitude is rapidly and dangerously hardening under the impact of various "schemes" ventilated in India and elsewhere, and a great deal of harm might be done in India by giving way to this clamour; when any new step failed we should only be asked to do something else. If I saw any prospect of a further approach really achieving results on a basis that we can accept for the war period I should be all for it; but at present at any rate I do not see any sign of a change of mind. It is possible that it may come if we have some big successes.

I should propose, unless you want the matter considered by the Cabinet, to answer the question on Tuesday on the lines which Linlithgow suggests, and should be grateful if you would let me know on Monday morning whether you want it considered.

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

[1] No. 133. [2] Presumably Nos. 141 and 147.

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Sir J. Herbert (Bengal) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/42

DARJEELING, *6 November 1942*

6. *Political.*—The fact is that I am apprehensive of an increasing lack of support for Government in this all-important question of law and order, and even in the war effort, in quarters where we generally expect it. At a recent meeting of the Provincial Muslim League Working Committee, the view was advanced that the "neutrality" towards the war effort forced upon the League by the attitude of the British Government might be regarded as an asset to Muslims in the event of a successful Japanese invasion! It seems to me that the wind of which this straw may be an indication may blow far beyond the confines of Bengal. I am concerned at the grave possibility of our losing throughout India the support of even those whom we have hitherto regarded, if not as our friends, as the enemies of our enemies.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *7 November 1942, 2.15 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 7 November, 12.15 pm*

No. 3182–S. Following private and personal telegram[1] from Hope is repeated for information. Hope has separately confirmed[2] that R. has not made any application for passport facilities:—

Begins. Your telegram No. 3168–S[3] of November 5th. I gave Rajagopalachari an interview yesterday at his request and shall be reporting to you separately on this. Actually the conversation was inconclusive and of no great import or significance.

As regards his visiting England he said he did not want to undertake the trouble and anxiety of journey unless he saw some chance of it being fruitful, and for this to be the case he felt some sign of a "change of heart on the part of the British Government" to be necessary.

I did not specifically ask him if he had applied for a passport but am practically certain he has not. However I will check up and telegraph to you again repeating to Secretary of State. *Ends.*

[1] Tel. 218–M of 6 November. MSS. EUR. F. 125/70.

[2] Tel. 220–M of 6 November addressed to Viceroy repeated to Secretary of State. MSS. EUR. F. 125/70. L/P&J/8/514: f 65 gives the date as 7 November.

[3] Asking Sir A. Hope to confirm that Rajagopalachari had made no passport application in Madras. MSS. EUR. F. 125/70.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 519

L/P&J/8/514: ff 62–4

INDIA

SUGGESTED INVITATION TO MR. RAJAGOPALACHARI TO VISIT ENGLAND

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, *7 November 1942*

I circulate herewith telegrams exchanged with the Viceroy on the above subject. I attach as Appendices A and B respectively the text of a Reuter message reporting Mr. Rajagopalachari's plan for a solution of the Indian deadlock and a note examining the implications of his scheme.

L. S. A.

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY OF STATE TO VICEROY, DATED NOVEMBER 4, 1942

[*There follows the text of No. 141 except that in the first sentence of para. 2 the words 'in light of talk with Smuts he believes latter is in agreement with him' are omitted.*]

TELEGRAM FROM VICEROY TO SECRETARY OF STATE, DATED NOVEMBER 5, 1942

[*There follows the text of No. 147 as amended by No. 149.*]

TELEGRAM FROM VICEROY TO SECRETARY OF STATE, DATED NOVEMBER 7, 1942

[*There follows the text of No. 152.*]

Appendix A to No. 153

MR. RAJAGOPALACHARI'S PLAN

(Reuter Message from New Delhi dated October 21, 1942)

MR. RAJAGOPALACHARI, former Madras Premier, who resigned from the Congress Working Committee, told press men here to-day: "If I can get a plane and a passport, neither disinclination nor work will stand in the way of my going to England." "I feel," he added, "that the British people have been misled in connection with the Indian problem and that I can make them see the truth."

Mr. Rajagopalachari stressed the importance of a national government for India and the guarantee of Burma's future status before any offensive was undertaken.

Nothing is known in London, Reuter adds, of any suggestion that Mr. Rajagopalachari should visit this country.

Referring to statements that no specific proposals for a settlement of the Indian question had so far been advanced, Mr. Rajagopalachari outlined a scheme for a provisional government, which he claimed would necessitate the minimum of parliamentary enactments, and which, speaking with knowledge derived from his recent talks and also of the issues involved, he was convinced that both Congress and the Muslim League would accept. He suggested that the Viceroy should act as the Crown would in a crisis in England. The Viceroy should select those who were the most popular and most responsible and ask them to run the Government. The Viceroy could visualise what kind of legislature would come into being if elections were held, and he could, if he liked, select men for the Government who could face a proper Legislature. Such a government should be formed straightaway. Then arrangements should be

made to hold elections, direct to the Provinces, and indirect to the Centre from the Provincial Legislatures.

Mr. Rajagopalachari added: "I press so much for elections because unfair use has been made of the position by British propagandists who want to tell the world that we desire to have a national government responsible to nobody. We don't desire any such thing. We want the national government of which I am speaking to be responsible to this Legislature. I am suggesting that it should be brought into existence immediately." There was nothing, he added, to prevent the Government selecting five important Congressmen whom the Viceroy felt would top the list in elections anywhere at any time, and would command the respect and loyalty of the people throughout the country. Mr. Rajagopalachari said it would include people in prison, adding: "Let there be no mistake about that." He suggested that the Viceroy should ask Mr. Jinnah to join this Government with as many men of his choice as the Moslem League Leader liked. The purpose of this was to meet Mr. Jinnah's fear that the issues might be prejudiced by the formation of such a government. That was in accordance with Mr. Gandhi's express offer that he was prepared to have the entire government given to Mr. Jinnah on the real transfer of power from the British, said Mr. Rajagopalachari. These men from Congress and the League should then add to themselves three persons, representing roughly any important factors left out or anyone the Government might feel was sufficiently important and might be accepted as a cementing factor for the time being.

Mr. Rajagopalachari added that this Government would be an ideal one to face the Legislature and serve the country at the present juncture. "I don't think," he said, "that Congress or the Moslem League can refuse the offer without losing their leadership. If this Government faces the new Legislature it will get the confidence of that Legislature, but if it does not, the Viceroy, acting in the position of the Crown, will know what to do—dissolve one or the other."

Mr. Rajagopalachari made it clear that the transfer of power which he visualised would include protection for the Commander-in-Chief and war strategy as agreed on more or less definitely at the time of the Cripps talks. Declaring that any "reasonable" Viceroy should agree to his scheme and press it on the Government, Mr. Rajagopalachari said he was convinced that the British Government would not take upon themselves the responsibility of standing in the way. The Viceroy must take the initiative.

After stating that he was prepared to go to Britain, Mr. Rajagopalachari was asked, what about America?

"I don't want pinpricks on England," said Mr. Rajagopalachari. "I want to go direct to Britain. If America in her own interest feels that she should tell Britain what she should do, America may do so. If there is American pressure it should be spontaneous—not indirect pressure from India. I feel the British

people have been misled in this matter. I feel I could make them see the truth." Commenting on the Duke of Devonshire's references to "prelates,"[1] Mr. Rajagopalachari remarked: "I think that prelates are as good as the landlords in this matter. When there is a great quarrel between a great people and a great government, it is good even for prelates to intervene. I think the London *Times* right and the Duke of Devonshire wrong when it says it is dangerous to start an offensive with a hostile nation behind.

"The story that popular government in India would be unpopular with the present Armed Forces is entirely false." Mr. Rajagopalachari said he was prepared to take a vote of the present soldiers on whether they want a national government for India or not and abide by their verdict. They would die more cheerful if they had a national government.

Declaring that India is not in any sense a domestic concern of the British Empire, Mr. Rajagopalachari asserted: "If the British Government had not stated clearly, as they have done, that post-war India shall be independent, it could be claimed that it was a domestic concern, but seeing at the end of the war our independence has been declared and assured, the position of India during the war period is a war matter and not an imperialist one. The Allied Nations," he said, "should all sit together and consider what is the best thing to do with the present Indian Government for the war period. Incidentally, it is no use the United Nations coming to India to take evidence, because if their object were only to gain time and feed us on hopes, it would be a good plan, but if their object is to do something now, I would advise the United Nations Mission to settle down in London and discuss it with the British Government who are obviously in possession of all the facts, and if necessary send for the important men from India. After all, it is not a permanent settlement, but only for time of war and for the purposes of war. That would bring about speedy results; the party to be convinced most is the British Government, and action is to be taken by the British Government."

Appendix B to No. 153

NOTE ON MR. RAJAGOPALACHARI'S PLAN

MR. RAJAGOPALACHARI'S object is to put forward a scheme which purports to remove the difficulties stated by His Majesty's Government to stand in the way of a political advance. The ex-Premier of Madras is an experienced administrator, but his present proposals are of the nature of a political manifesto and lack the precision of a specific and workable scheme.

He proposes the complete transfer of power to a provisional Indian Government (it is to be presumed that his proposals include the exercise by the provisional government of all the powers now exercisable by His Majesty's

[1] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of L., vol. 121, 20 October 1942, col. 675.

Government through the Viceroy and Governors in the Indian Provinces), with the important reservation that control of military policy and operations would remain with the War Cabinet in London and the Commander-in-Chief in India. But the implications of this reservation, if it is to be satisfactory to His Majesty's Government, are not discussed. The Commander-in-Chief, in directing and carrying out military policy, requires the full co-operation and support of the civil power in all manner of ways—finance, supply, transport, recruiting, the maintenance of law and order, to mention some of them—and this would necessitate maintenance in the hands of the Viceroy of an overriding authority enabling him to control and intervene at need as now in almost every branch of the civil administration. But Mr. Rajagopalachari would no doubt deny that the Viceroy, as the servant of His Majesty's Government, needs for war purposes or should have such power. The point was crucial in the break-down of the Cripps negotiations. Mr. Rajagopalachari says that the transfer of power should be subject to the reservations regarding the Commander-in-Chief and Defence *roughly agreed* at the time of the Cripps conversations. The extent of Congress agreement is stated on page 10 of the White Paper.[2] Where they disagreed is stated in the latter part of the Congress resolution issued on the 11th April (White Paper, page 18).[3]—"It has been made clear that the defence of India will in any event remain under British control . . . . to take away Defence from the sphere of responsibility at this stage is to reduce that responsibility to a farce and nullity." Presumably Mr. Rajagopalachari would not be satisfied with a transfer of power less than what Congress demanded in April. The problem remains, how are the Commander-in-Chief and the War Cabinet, from whom he must continue to receive his orders, to be assured of the support of an autonomous Government to the extent essential to the execution of his functions?

The proposals now put forward purport to answer the questions that have been asked by Government Speakers here— to *whom* is power to be transferred? and to *whom* is the new executive authority to be responsible?

The new *executive authority* is to consist (*a*) of five Congress leaders selected by the Viceroy as persons who he feels "would top the list in elections anywhere at any time" (and who would include persons now under detention); (*b*) of Mr. Jinnah and as many of his Moslem League colleagues as he would wish to bring in; and (*c*) of three persons selected either by (*a*) and (*b*) or by the Viceroy to represent other important factors or as persons of importance who "might be accepted as a cementing factor for the time being." In defence of (*b*) reference is made to Gandhi's paradoxical statement that he is prepared to have the whole government entrusted to Mr. Jinnah if there were a real transfer of power by Great Britain. (Those who will may believe him!) Neither Congress nor the Moslem League could refuse the offer, it is said, without losing their leadership. This composite body must surely have a leader, but the

proposals contain no reference to him, to the manner in which he is to be chosen (presumably the onus of selection is to fall on the Viceroy), or as to his functions and powers.

This new executive is to be responsible to the *Indian Legislature*, not to the present body, but to one newly constituted (*after*, not before, the provisional government takes charge). It is proposed that there should be fresh elections of the Provincial Legislatures and that the persons so elected should in turn elect the Central Legislature. Nothing is said as to the constitution and size of the latter, but we may perhaps suppose that Mr. Rajagopalachari has in mind the indirectly-elected Federal Legislature contemplated under the 1935 Act insofar as it is representative of British India (for his proposals leave no room for the representation of the States in the provisional Government).

The first hurdle here is the holding of Provincial elections, which it was decided to postpone owing to the internal excitement and interference with the war effort which they would cause.[4] Mr. Rajagopalachari meets those objections by the argument that it is a heavier task to suppress disturbances than to hold elections. Even if the choice were as simple as that, the argument is not necessarily convincing; an electoral campaign covering the whole of British India, with such momentous issues at stake, might well engender enough excitement (extending possibly to the Indian Army, by whose political views Mr. Rajagopalachari says he would be content to abide) to paralyse temporarily the country's preparedness for defence against an invader. Assuming, however, that this hurdle could be got over, or avoided by making use of the existing Provincial Legislatures, what would be the make-up of a Central Legislature elected by the Provincial members? How would the two principal parties stand?

The 1935 Act provides that the Federal *Assembly* shall consist of 250 members from British India (and half as many, in addition, from the Indian States). The 250 seats are divided as follows: General, 105; Moslem, 82; Commerce, 11; Labour, 10; others (European, Sikh, Christian, &c.), 42. It seems unlikely that at the most more than 90 Moslems would occupy seats, and it would be unwise to suppose that all of these would support the Moslem League, though undoubtedly a far higher proportion would do so now than would have done, say, in 1937. As regards Congress, we could hardly assume that they would capture fewer seats in the Provincial Legislatures than they did in 1937. Taking the 1937 returns, and assuming that the proportion of Congress seats in the Provincial Legislatures would be reflected in the Central Assembly, calculation suggests that 116 of the 250 members would belong to the Congress Party. They would undoubtedly be the strongest single party, and although not having an absolute majority would probably enjoy the support of enough other members to dominate the position.

[2] See Vol. I, No. 587, p. 726. [3] See Vol. I, No. 605, p. 747. [4] L/P&J/7/4005.

It would be rash to suppose that an Assembly so constituted would for long support a ministry in which the Moslem League held half or more of the seats. It will be open to the Viceroy, says Mr. Rajagopalachari, to dismiss the ministry or dissolve the Legislature. That would almost certainly mean that the Moslem League would "walk out," cease to co-operate and possibly attempt by force to set up Pakistan. In any case, what would the Viceroy do (and this in the middle of a war)? Set up a predominantly Congress Ministry to ensure to Congress predominance in the Legislature; or hold *fresh* elections with the certainty of the same results; or return (if that were conceivably possible) to the present system of government?

Mr. Rajagopalachari's scheme is really only another device for securing to Congress, or at any rate to the Hindu elements, the immediate control of India. It has been far too transparent to take in Mr. Jinnah, who has roundly condemned it. It has in fact found no support from any party, and such attention as it has received in India has been predominantly critical. It is impossible, therefore, to regard the scheme as it stands as a promising basis for a solution of the political deadlock, or as justifying an invitation to Mr. Rajagopalachari to visit this country.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *8*[1] *November 1942, 1.45 am*
Received: 8 November, 12.35 am

No. 3187–S. Following is my appreciation for period 29th of October to 6th of November. There has been resurgence of sabotage and arson in Bombay Province including two train derailments and two cases of interference with high tension power lines one of which was successful. In the United Provinces two patrol trains were derailed and a station attacked and burnt by 100 men armed with guns and spears. One goods-train reported derailed in Madras. In Bengal, except in Midnapore district, disturbances are reported to be fewer and popular opinion showing signs of coming round against hooliganism. Assam reports that agitators are losing ground in some parts. There is nothing of interest to report from other provinces and except in Bombay I would judge position to be generally quieter.

Repeated to Ambassadors Washington, Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

[1] MSS.EUR.F. 125/23 gives the date as 7 November. The date given here is taken from L/P&J/8/603: f 4.

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Sir M. Gwyer to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

THE FEDERAL COURT, NEW DELHI, *9 November 1942*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I am much obliged to you for your letter of November 4th.[1] I hope that I may be permitted to write frankly about it.

I confess that I was shocked to learn that the appointment of a new Chief Justice of India had been settled without reference to the Government of India, or perhaps I should say to Your Excellency as head of that Government. It seems to me quite incredible that a step of this kind should be taken without ascertaining the views of India on the question whether the next Chief Justice should be an Indian or, if he is to be a European, who should be the person to be appointed. I had hoped that the Federal Court deserved better treatment than this.

I venture to enclose a copy[2] of a judgment given by the Court only a few days ago on four applications which were before it for leave to appeal from decisions of the Court to His Majesty in Council. You will see that the Court dismissed all four applications and I draw your attention to the reasons which it gave for doing so. We took the view that we were not a subordinate Court, and we also said that we could not pretend to ignore the evolution of political thought in India even since the date when the last applications of the same kind were before us. In these circumstances, we were not disposed to encourage Indian litigants to seek for decisions on Constitutional questions other than in their own Supreme Court, the first Court sitting on Indian soil with jurisdiction over the whole of British India, even though that jurisdiction is at present a limited one.

It appears, however, that we were wrong and that the Federal Court is still to be regarded as a subordinate Court and indeed as an appanage of the English judiciary, to which, as with the latter, judges are appointed on the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor without reference to India. I took occasion when the Lord Chancellor was anxious that Sir Zafrulla Khan should be appointed to the Judicial Committee instead of to the Federal Court, on the ground of the greater distinction and importance of the former, respectfully to point out that he (the Lord Chancellor) failed to appreciate how profoundly the situation had been altered by the establishment of the Federal Court, to be a Judge of which must necessarily in future become the ambition of every Indian lawyer in preference even to a tribunal so august as the Judicial

[1] No. 142. [2] Not printed.

Committee; but it never occurred to me that, so far as the appointment of judges were concerned, the only difference would be that the new Tribunal sat in Delhi and not in London.

I have done all that lay in my power since I came to India to better the relations between India and His Majesty's Government, and I have never ceased to urge, in my contacts with Indians, that India should believe in the sincerity of all those statements in which His Majesty's Government have declared their ardent desire to assign to India that status which she so greatly covets, at any rate so far as the circumstances of the present time permit. I was convinced of that sincerity; but I am not sure that I can say now that I have the same conviction. The Federal Court is one of the few symbols of the unity of India, which are not so numerous that any of them can be safely neglected. The Court has, I believe, secured the confidence and respect of Indian opinion. It is divorced from politics; nor could the recognition, or indeed the enhancement of its status and prestige as a genuinely Indian institution raise any political issues. When the treatment accorded to it becomes known (as is bound to happen), the psychological effect upon Indian opinion will be disastrous. I do not forget that the appointment of all Federal Judges is vested in His Majesty and that in this matter the Secretary of State is His Majesty's constitutional adviser. I take leave, however, to point out that it is the same with High Court Judges, but that there is a wholesome practice whereby any High Court appointment, and certainly that of the Chief Justice of the High Court, is preceded by discussions with Your Excellency and the Governor of the Province, so that the final appointment is made with full knowledge of local conditions and opinion. It is humiliating to learn that a privilege allowed in the case of High Courts is denied to the Federal Court.

I have written above on the broad general principle, but I should like to add a word on the important question, as it seems to me, whether the next Chief Justice of India is or is not to be an Indian. I have ventured more than once to point out to Your Excellency that, at the present moment, out of eleven Chief Justices in India only one is an Indian, though this number will be increased to two within the next month or so. It seems to me difficult to justify the continuance of so great a disproportion, and therefore the next appointment to the Federal Court assumes an even greater importance. I think it may well be that, for some time to come, a European element will add strength to the Federal Court, and I have heard Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru expressed the same opinion in the past, though I do not know what he would say now. But the assumption which seems to have been made in London that the next Chief Justice must necessarily be a European seems to me unwarranted, especially where it involves the supersession of the two Indian judges whom I have the honour to call my colleagues. I should be disposed to agree that the junior of the two, though he possesses many of the qualities which would one day

make him an excellent Chief Justice, has sat for too short a time in the Court to be considered now for the post. The passing over of my other colleague, however, will, I am sure, cause deep resentment in India. His reputation as a lawyer and as a judge is of the very highest; his legal knowledge is unrivalled; and he possesses judicial qualities which would adorn the Bench of a Supreme Court in any country. It should not be forgotten that the Chief Justice of India, unlike the Chief Justices of the High Courts, has none of the very important administrative functions with which the latter are vested; and therefore any criticism of Mr. Justice Varadachariar on the ground that he lacks administrative experience or that knowledge of public affairs which would enable him to develop it is beside the point.

I understand that the post of Chief Justice has already been offered to an English barrister and that he has accepted it. I do not say that Indian opinion might not have acquiesced, even though reluctantly, in the appointment of an English lawyer or judge of the highest quality: but I do not think that this will be their attitude towards the lawyer who has been selected. I am unwilling to say anything which might be construed as criticising a fellow Bencher of the Inner Temple, and still less to be thought making any personal comparisons; but I was myself so fortunate as to have been working on Dominion and Indian Constitutional problems for eight or nine years before my appointment and to have been closely associated with the three Round Table Conferences, the Parliamentary Joint Select Committee, and the drafting of the Indian Constitution Act, all of which brought me into friendly relations with a large number of distinguished Indians. These fortuitous circumstances no doubt made my appointment more acceptable to Indian opinion than it might otherwise have been. But I do not think that the selection of an English Member of Parliament, even if he happens to be a King's Counsel, will be regarded as anything else in India but a political appointment, and the person appointed does not appear, if I may say so with the utmost respect, to possess such outstanding qualities as might serve as a counterweight.

It may be said that these are matters of policy with which I am not concerned. The regard, however, in which the Court over which I have the honour to preside is held is a matter very dear to me, and I conceive myself to be at least entitled to say what I have in this letter. I think that what is proposed to be done will have most unhappy consequences and will give grave offence at a time when the stock of goodwill on which His Majesty's Government can still draw is a rapidly diminishing quantity.

I regret to have to find myself compelled to write this, but I should not be acting honestly unless I did so.

Believe me,
Your Excellency's most sincerely,
MAURICE GWYER

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Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/77

CONFIDENTIAL

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE GOVERNOR'S REPORT NO. 21, DATED 9TH NOVEMBER 1942

We had to arrest Abdul Ghaffar Khan on October 27th, as he deliberately challenged an order forbidding him to go to Mardan and address a meeting there. This action was considered necessary as parts of Mardan District were showing signs of becoming disturbed. His arrest did not cause much excitement, but small *hartals* took place in two or three towns. We have also arrested a number of Red Shirts who have actually taken part in attempts to picket the Law Courts. About a quarter of them have already apologised and given security for good behaviour in the future, and I anticipate that a good many of the others will follow suit before long. I hope that we shall not have to retain permanently more than 100, if as many.

2. For the time being, the district authorities are well satisfied with the situation. There has been no gathering at all in Mardan for the last few days, and in Peshawar the number offering themselves for arrest have decreased to about 25 per day. They do not even bother to go to the Courts, but walk straight to the Police Lines. There is no doubt, I think, that the prestige of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Dr. Khan Sahib and other Congress leaders is even less today than it was at the beginning of August, and I think we have avoided what was the chief danger, the resuscitation of the old Red Shirt spirit and the creation of an unnatural sympathy between it and Congress. Dr. Khan Sahib is something of a problem. The motive that keeps him active is, I am told, a rooted conviction that within a month or two Congress will be in power again. He has made one or two foolish speeches. But he has undoubtedly been an influence for moderation, and when asked yesterday by a friend of mine why he did not stop this "picketing" by Red Shirts, he said, "If they don't do that they will do something worse"; and that, I think, is very probably true. We have had some C.I.D. reports lately about a small group of Red Shirts who are out for violence, and we are trying to trace and arrest them.

3. I am pretty well satisfied as to the attitude of the people in general, both rural and urban, as distinct from the occasional manifestations of Red Shirt activity in the way of processions and "picketing". There seems to be practically universal agreement that the general feeling is good, and that there is no

similarity whatever between the atmosphere now and that of the Red Shirt troubles which started in 1930. This applies to tribal territory as well as the settled districts. One or two small indications I may mention. This year—for the first time, I think, in history—the Chitral reliefs went off without any incident and without a shot being fired, although one might have expected a certain amount of excitement, as all tribes knew that regular troops were making their final exit from Chitral. Again, on the evening after Abdul Ghaffar Khan was arrested, I held the annual Investiture at which hundreds of the local people, wild as well as civilised, attended. It was interesting that not a single one of the many people that I spoke to even mentioned the name of Abdul Ghaffar Khan or of the Red Shirts. Another satisfactory sign is that the Police are doing ordinary patrolling in the districts, in small parties of ten and less, and have no difficulty in effecting arrests when required.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *9 November 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

I have no letter from you to answer but send a few lines. I hope that my reply[1] about Rajagopalachari will not have been embarrassing to you and that you will not have found yourself under too much pressure in a contrary sense from Cripps. I am sure that the difficulties which you and I see in anything in the nature of an invitation or for that matter in taking his proposals, which have been a complete failure here, too seriously are decisive: and I was glad to find from Arthur Hope's telegram which I repeated to you[2] that, despite all the talk, Rajagopalachari himself is not apparently keen on going home save in response to the usual gesture indicating the usual change of heart on the part of His Majesty's Government. He is now coming up here to see Jinnah (whether at his own suggestion or at Jinnah's invitation I am not too clear). I doubt very much if anything will come of that. Jinnah is reported to have told Press Correspondents last night that he doubted if he could do more for Rajagopalachari than offer to write to the Viceroy to support any application from him for permission to be allowed to see Gandhi! If Rajagopalachari in fact lets himself be manœuvred into a position in which he has to appeal to Jinnah to intercede for him with me, I should expect his stock to slump a little further in orthodox Congress quarters. Jinnah himself, as his latest statement

[1] No. 147. [2] No. 152.

which I have just been reading makes clear, remains as entirely uncompromising on the general issue as ever.

2. Sultan Ahmed remarked in a recent conversation with me that his impression was that the bad men in the recent disturbances were quite unrepentant and that they realised, in so far as he could ascertain, that they had been beaten in their recent attempts, and could regard themselves as having failed in their objects. They were lying back in these circumstances and endeavouring to reconsolidate, and to save face. But he did not feel much doubt as to their original disposition persisting. They are all he said keen to stimulate American intervention as their one hope of escape from their present eclipse.

3. I am not without hope that if we can keep up our earlier achievement in North Africa it may have a very healthy effect on the political situation generally. Nothing could have been more encouraging than the way in which Alexander and Montgomery have broken through Rommel's defences, and if the operation in Morocco and Algeria goes well, it will put a very good face on the Mediterranean position.

[Para. 4, on the Parliamentary Mission to China, omitted.]

5. I have been increasingly concerned of late with the unsatisfactory character of our arrangements in connection with food production, supply and distribution, &c. here and have now decided to set up a separate Food Department which after some hesitation I propose to leave in the Commerce Department. To be in charge of it I have selected one B. G. Holdsworth, I.C.S., a competent Madras Civilian who has been doing Rice Commissioner, and I propose to concentrate in this department the food purchase work at present done by Supply, and certain aspects of military food purchasing handled by the Q.M.G., and also to arrange for a very close liaison between the Department and the Department of Education, Health and Lands, the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research, and the Q.M.G.'s organisation. The new Secretary will be directly responsible to the Commerce Member. I have confidence in Holdsworth from what I have seen of him, and that the reorganisation is administratively sound I have no doubt whatever. Sarker has, I must say, been rather a disappointment in handling this business. He is singularly ill at ease in expressing himself in Council or conducting an argument; and I rather suspect that he does not always grasp all the facts of his case. Nor has he been helped by the Department, for Lloyd, though he has had a distinguished and varied career, suffers, I fear, on the indications I receive from widely different people, from a marked incapacity to make up his mind as to what to do himself or to advise his Member to do. The new arrangements should put an end to that. The matter is of course of the greatest importance and the greatest urgency.

[Para. 6, on future of Burma; and para. 7, on interpretation of Government of India Act 1935, Ninth Schedule, Sec. 85 (2) (b), omitted.]

8. I am a good deal concerned about the deterioration in the outward appearance of Delhi which has arisen from the war developments of the last year or two. Improvement of conditions in Delhi and the Delhi Province was one of the first things I set my hand to on coming out here. I selected Jenkins, who prove[d] I need not say, a first-class success, to be Chief Commissioner in 1936, and during my time I have got the place equipped with an up-to-date sewage scheme (badly needed); an Improvement Trust has been set going on a sound financial basis; the countryside has been developed by the driving of arterial roads which have opened up hitherto inaccessible areas; we have got town-planning on to a sound basis; and one has been able to bring about a large number of other improvements. Had I had more money in the pre-war years, one could have done more still: but even as it was the results were encouraging. But in the last 18 months or so, with the great development of General Headquarters, one has had, however reluctantly, to agree, just as have had the Office of Works at home, to a number of proposals for temporary war buildings, the erection of wireless masts, the formation of hutted camps, &c. not only all round The Viceroy's House itself but in other prominent areas of New Delhi. As at home the answer is of course military necessity. There has been no alternative to doing what has been done. I wish I could hope that the inhabitants of these various temporary abodes would be easy to dislodge within any early period after the conclusion of the war! I fear that our own experience at home after the last war does not encourage optimism, and memories of St. James' Park, hideously spotted with temporary huts—even into the late twenties—tease my conscience.

9. I am glad you have at last been able to find a successor for Gwyer. But I fear that your choice has caused Gwyer little enthusiasm! Indeed I have had from him a long and somewhat highly spiced criticism[3] of the choice, the procedure and everything else. He does not think Spens quite up to the level, and thinks the appointment will be regarded as a political job: he is not certain that Varadachariar might not have been a better Chief Justice, and would have favoured an Indian selection: he does not feel that any commitment ought to have been entered into without reference here, &c. On that I am not sure that he is not technically right (I am looking up the rules) and if he is, I shall have to try to soothe him and see how any departure from the rules can be covered. Gwyer I think has a somewhat false idea both of the importance and the attractiveness in present conditions of the Federal Court. It is quite clear from what you have been kind enough to tell me that there is no prospect, things being as they are, of our getting a man of the highest quality, and that

[3] No. 155.

we must be content with somebody who is a little below the highest. As for the appointment of an Indian Chief Justice at this stage, I am perfectly certain that we could not appoint Zafrullah. He has had less than a year on the Bench, and I do not suppose the Federal Court has had two dozen cases (possibly not half that number) before it in that time. Varadachariar is an excellent Judge for whom both on record and on what I hear of him I have the highest respect. But my own feeling is that whatever Gwyer may think or say (and of course his view would always be entitled to, and receive, great weight) we ought to have another man with experience of the Bar at home. Too little has happened in the Federal Court in Gwyer's own time to give him a chance of moulding it and its procedure, and a Judge appointed from out here would be at no slight disadvantage in performing that most important function. I therefore myself have no doubt whatever that the wise course is to succeed Gwyer when his time is up by another man from home who can, if as I trust may be the case the position improves so far as work goes, make that contribution to the shaping of the Court and the establishment of its traditions, &c. which circumstances have prevented Gwyer from giving. As for Spens, I have no knowledge of him or of his work. But I am assured by you and your legal adviser that he is a suitable choice, and behind you you have the great authority of Simon and Simon's specific statement that he is of the level for the Bench at home. I am myself perfectly content in those circumstances to accept him. Gwyer has raised certain other points[4] such as the date on which the appointment is to be made, &c. These look to me on a brief perusal of his lengthy letter rather technical and I should like to take advice about them.

10. I have been greatly shocked by the casualty figures in this Midnapore cyclone. Herbert has been quite extraordinarily costive about it, and the first news I had of the scale of the casualties was about ten days later from the Press; while even now I have practically no details. I telegraphed to him a message of sympathy, and my wife and I also offered to contribute to any fund which might be started. He published my message and thanked me for it, but I am still quite in the dark as to what Bengal are doing. I quite appreciate of course that the very serious interruption of communications, particularly in the type of country affected, makes inevitable some delay in getting the whole story. But I should have thought that from their own point of view the Bengal Government would have been very well advised to have given the utmost publicity to their relief measures, the energy with which the business was being tackled, relief funds, the figure they wanted to collect, &c. I cannot help feeling not only that an opportunity has been missed but that (partly because the opportunity had not been taken) when things quieten down there will be the usual spate of allegations against officials, the local Government, &c. of supineness and lack of interest.

11. Talking of Herbert, he has been pressing for the issue of a communiqué in Calcutta warning the population of the possibility of further attacks and urging them to evacuate. That has been considered by my various official advisers here and by the Commander-in-Chief. They are unanimously entirely opposed to it and think that something of this nature would be calculated merely to start a panic. I do not in the very least degree overlook Herbert's difficulties, and of course the evacuation of Calcutta a year ago was a very big business. But the evacuees have now come back, and I do not see how we are going to be able to prevent them from coming back. The view, too, is taken that last year's experience has been very valuable and has substantially reduced the risk of serious panic. This is a matter in which the views of the Chief must carry very great weight, and I have had no hesitation in the light of what he and my civil advisers have said in agreeing with them that Herbert must be told that he cannot publish his communiqué.

12. I have been touched by a friendly and very lengthy letter[5] from the Nizam asking me to extend my time out here, in view of what he was good enough to describe as the very intimate and friendly relations that have existed between us. I do not know to what extent I deserve the Nizam's praise, for I have had on occasions to be rather firm with him! But it is kind of him to have written and I am thanking him warmly. On the main issue you are in no doubt as to my own feelings! and I wait impatiently for the name of my successor, but I have now mentioned in public once or twice that I am handing over in April, and that gives me a little more room to move. To revert to the Nizam, I have also had from [him] an amusing but very pathetic protest against the extravagance and misbehaviour of his sons, and I send you a copy of it for your own information by this bag. I shall have to see what can be done with these "prodigal shoppers", as he calls them! But it is not going to be too easy.

All fortune.

[4] No such points are raised in No. 155, but see No. 175. [5] No. 130.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *10 November 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 3196–S. Your private and personal No. 1295,[1] dated 4th November 1942.

Raisman considers, and I agree with him, that a mere inference of His Majesty's Government's attitude in this important matter will not satisfy

[1] No. 140.

Council. When the question has been taken to the War Cabinet, Council will expect a more or less formal pronouncement of His Majesty's Government's attitude to it.

In the circumstances I would be glad if you would take action proposed in your paragraph 3.[2]

[2] In response, Mr Amery sent the text of the telegram agreed with Sir Kingsley Wood and already despatched as a private and personal telegram (see No. 139 and note 6) as personal telegram 19471 of 10 November. L/PO/2/16: f 23.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/515: ff 43–5

IMPORTANT PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *10 November 1942, 12.15 am*

19387. My personal letter of 19th October.[1] I should be glad to know what view you take of suggestion that your Council should take steps to set in motion studies by experts in India preparatory to the setting up of a constitution-making body after the war. If the idea appeals to you and your Council are themselves in favour of action on these lines it might be a considerable help to Mudaliar in the U.S.A. if he could assert that the present Executive Council is thus actively concerned in promoting the long-term part of H.M.G.'s policy.

2. I have for some time had it in mind that Halifax might discreetly prompt some academic body to send a constitutional expert to investigate personally in India the possibilities of a long-term constitutional settlement and produce a report on the same sort of line as Coupland's. It had occurred to me that this would have considerable educative value for Americans and help to ensure an intelligent reception of Coupland's report. If that idea commended itself to you Mudaliar could, no doubt, follow it up in appropriate quarters with Bajpai's and Butler's help. But on further thought I feel that unless the Government of India were themselves active in the same direction it might have awkward consequences if we were known to be prompting a mission which since the invitation would come to be known in fairly wide circle might be represented as that of[2] having been called in to settle our problems for us.

3. Accordingly I am now rather disposed to prefer a variant which would combine American experience with action of the nature suggested in my letter of the 19th October. It closely corresponds with a suggestion thrown out

by Edward Grigg in the *Sunday Times* of 1st November that one or more acknowledged experts in the American federal constitution should be specifically invited to join forces with experts in India in studying the Indian constitutional problem. They and possibly also a Swiss constitutionalist might be co-opted on to the organisation that I suggested on page 2 of my letter. An arrangement of this sort would have the advantage of ensuring that the American contribution was made with a full sense of responsibility and would bring Americans fair and square up against Indian political intransigeances. If this idea which is complementary of course to the proposition in my letter of 19th October strikes you as worth pursuing for the double purpose of showing that the Government of India are in earnest and also that we are not averse from seeking suitable advice in American quarters, Mudaliar might go as far at any rate as taking cautious soundings as opportunity offers in appropriate quarters as to the reactions to any such invitation: but even this would depend on your Council having decided to proceed on lines suggested. I should therefore welcome early expression of your views so as to discuss with Mudaliar how far he might go and on what line in dealing with American hints of readiness to lend a helping hand.

[1] No. 107. [2] 'that of' deciphered as 'America'.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/537: f 71

PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *10 November 1942, 1.10 pm*
Received: 11 November

19419. I should be glad to learn the present position regarding the vacancy of Information Member on your Council. Are the duties being temporarily discharged by another member? You originally intended to assign them as a temporary arrangement to Srivastava but para. 6 of your letter of 14 Sept.[1] leaves present position in doubt. You will I know be alive to the importance of making permanent arrangements as early as practicable.

[1] Vol. II, No. 744.

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Mr Amery to Dr Dalton

L/E/8/2527: f 267

INDIA OFFICE, *10 November 1942*

My dear Dalton,

I enclose a copy of a letter[1] I had from Bevin some time ago. I have had what he says (which is I think very much to the point) considered here with reference to the training of Indians in this country and we shall bear the post-war aspects of that in mind, but I think that what Bevin says also has bearings which should be considered by your Department and the Board of Overseas Trade in connection with any plans for post-war trade development with India which you may have under consideration. I have no doubt that Bevin is right in emphasising that post-war trade with India will be more a matter of capital goods and less a matter of consumer goods than in the past. In this connection it is relevant that India may finish the war with large sterling assets in this country and may well wish to use them for capital developments.

As regards technicians, we are sending all that can be spared to India and are doing all we can to train Indian technicians both here under Bevin's scheme and in India. Technicians are scarce and the facilities for training them limited and everything in this sphere must at present be directed solely to promoting industrial war production to the maximum.

Yours sincerely,

L. S. AMERY

[1] No. 5.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, *11 November 1942, 10.55 pm*
Received: 11 November, 7.45 pm

No. 3213–S. Rajagopalachariar has been here for discussions with Jinnah. I do not gather that Jinnah has conceded anything. He is thought to have told Rajagopalachariar that he must have Congress behind him *plus* guarantees for acceptance of Pakistan in principle and plebiscite in the first instance. Rajagopalachariar has now asked to see me and I am seeing him at 9.15 to-morrow.

2. He will almost certainly ask to be allowed to contact Gandhi, &c. and I have no doubt will try to exploit position. As you know there has been no

sign of the slightest change of heart on the part of Gandhi or the Working Committee, or any endeavour on the part of Congress sympathisers to condemn or call off the rebellion. Rebellion itself, while under control, continues to smoulder. Effect on the Services, the Army, and I suspect (despite Jinnah's manœuvres) the Muslims, as well as on our supporters elsewhere in India of release of Gandhi and the Committee or any sign that we were reopening negotiations with them would be deplorable. I propose to stonewall, ask Rajagopalachariar whom he represents, point out impossibility of dealing with a body still in frank rebellion, and say that I cannot agree to his seeing Gandhi or the Committee in present circumstances. I suspect that he is rather depressed by his talks with Jinnah.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *11 November 1942*

PERSONAL

No. 3214–S. Your personal telegram of 10th November No. 19387.[1] Your personal letter of 19th October[2] not yet received. But (unless reference is in fact your letter of 9th October)[3] I take it suggestion referred to is that in paragraph 14th of that letter. If so, I replied[4] by last mail that I did not think this was really practical politics. All that would happen would be (as discussion earlier this summer has shown) that we should find ourselves confronted with the minimum of delay with propositions not all of which would be practical politics in respect of which there was likely to be communal division in my Council and which we should be pressed to implement as a whole or in part as a gesture. I should therefore be entirely opposed, while quite appreciating your motives, to raise this issue with my Council or taking any steps of the nature suggested in paragraph 1. The last thing I want (as I know you will understand) is to split that body into mutually antagonistic groups, largely on communal lines, and to have my colleagues intriguing (for that would inevitably follow) with the outside politician of the more extreme type. His Majesty's Government have made their own views perfectly clear about this business. Whether circumstances arising out of the make-up of the Indian constitution are going to make it possible for us to implement the policy we have been and are so anxious to implement is another matter. But no discussions, &c. in my

[1] No. 159. [2] No. 107. [3] No. 84. [4] No. 131, para. 19.

Executive Council will contribute to that one way or the other, and I think experiment would be a very dangerous one which I could not support.

2. I have considered carefully (and again with every sympathy for your anxiety to see progress made) the proposals put in paragraphs 2 and 3 of your telegram. But here again, though with regret, I fear I am opposed. I do not believe that this device would have the least effect on United States opinion, and I should be very uneasy as to reactions to it here. I trust therefore that you will agree to drop it and I could not myself support it.

3. Mudaliar will no doubt be very anxious to play his own hand in the United States and to do what he can to further his own particular point of view. I trust you will make it clear to him, if necessary with Prime Minister's authority, that we should not welcome and indeed would be most strongly opposed to any interference by the United States (or China) in settlement of this business. I hope myself that now that the tide of war seems to be turning more in our favour and that the Americans have something to think about, we may find them less actively interested in the Indian problem. But I have no doubt as to the wisdom of letting Mudaliar know the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards any intervention by America, and the more we can do to damp down American interest in a problem which with the best of intentions they sadly fail to understand, the better. The type of reaction that is now being provoked here is well instanced by Jinnah's statement of a few days ago that the United Nations, America, China, &c. could not, even if they wanted to, bring effective pressure to bear on the Indian Muslims, and I shall not be surprised if the ultimate reaction in this country towards the United States is, as time goes on, even more critical.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/514: ff 58–9

MOST IMMEDIATE PERSONAL — INDIA OFFICE, *11 November 1942, 2.5 pm*
Received: 12 November

19484. Your personal telegram 3174–S.[1] Rajagopalachari. In view of reported conversations between Jinnah and Rajagopalachari now in progress I propose to give answer in following form and should be grateful if you would let me have any comments by tomorrow morning:—

2. *Answer begins.* His Majesty's Government welcome the endeavours of Mr. Rajagopalachari and others to clear the ground for a settlement of the Indian

problem, but Mr. Rajagopalachari, though an important figure in Indian politics, is no longer a member of the Congress and does not lead a party. In these circumstances false hopes and apprehensions and all the ill results that follow from them would be created by inviting Mr. Rajagopalachari or any other prominent Indian politicians to this country in the absence of much clearer signs than are to be seen at present that the fundamental differences that divide the main political parties in India are in a fair way to be resolved. This process, as experience shows, is one that to have definite and lasting results can only be developed in India. *Ends.*

3. *Times* Correspondent and others appear to think that difference between Rajagopalachari and Moslem League may not be as great as made publicly to appear. I should be grateful if you could give me any indications which have reached you of what is going forward. I think it would be unwise in circumstances to base answer on apparent rejection by Jinnah of Rajagopalachari's plan.

4. *News Chronicle* reports to-day that high authority in Delhi has stated that passport will be granted to Rajagopalachari if he applies for it to visit this country. Has this statement any foundation?

[1] No. 149.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *11 November 1942*

The war kaleidoscope has certainly had a good shake in these last few days and presents a much more attractive picture. Whether we still have to fight seriously for Tunis or not, it certainly does look as if the next few weeks should see us in complete mastery of North Africa. In that case, given sufficiently strong air concentration at Bizerta commanding the Sicily Strait, we ought to be able to make considerable use of the Mediterranean and this may be of immense importance in connection not only with the Middle East, but with India, from the point of view of communications. Anyhow, we ought to be able to use the North African air route in preference to the one so laboriously built up through West Africa. Winston is, of course, absolutely right in regarding this merely as the closing of one chapter in order to begin the even more serious chapter in front of us. Personally I have always believed that the German dragon should be attacked on its soft underside and that Sicily, Crete and the Balkans offer our best line of approach. The difficulties of a landing in France or the Low

Countries seem to me almost insuperable, unless and until Germany begins to be disorganised. Then, of course, the short road to Berlin will lie that way.

2. Meanwhile, what has been happening should have an excellent effect both upon Indian public opinion generally and upon our Congress friends in their leisure for reflecting on the situation. The question of Rajagopalachari may be coming up in the Cabinet tomorrow, but I don't think Cripps will get much support for his suggestion. Smuts, I am glad to say, is altogether against it. On the other hand, he is in favour of early complete Indianization of the Executive (retaining Raisman as financial adviser) and also of such modest initial measures for studying the constitution as I have put to you in previous letters. I have told him that I regard this as essentially a matter for your successor. I can only hope that I may now be able to get at Winston and compel him to turn his mind to the necessity of coming to a decision at once, both on this and on Bombay.

What does Smuts know of this?
L.

[Para. 3, containing personal comments, omitted.]

4. . . . it seems to me that the time has surely come for obliterating the old distinction between Presidency and other Governorships and indeed for considering whether increasingly all of them should not be filled from outside the ranks of the I.C.S. There is a two-fold reason for this; firstly, that you will soon have very few I.C.S. men who have not been subordinates of Indian Ministers, while it becomes even more inappropriate that Indian I.C.S. men should be Governors over Ministers whose subordinates they have been. The other reason is that it is becoming increasingly clear that in the future constitution of India the Provinces will be much more separate entities than was contemplated under the 1935 Constitution and will probably want to retain, not only residual powers, but the direct appointment of Governors from here, whether they are to be English public men or Indians of eminence. The matter is one which your successor will clearly have to face and I shall be very glad, for the purpose of discussing it with him, to have your views on it.

5. I see that Lumley is still very anxious about the possible consequences of a Gandhi fast and very doubtful whether the arrangements you have proposed can possibly work.[1] I confess I am still very sorry that it was not possible to deport Gandhi to Aden and can only hope that in view of all that is happening in the world outside he will continue to put off the appropriate moment for fasting. If it should coincide with a Japanese invasion, then my own conclusion would be identical with Lumley's, or even stronger: that is to say, I would let him fast to death and make no concessions in the nature of handing the control over to Devadas or letting him see visitors. But I confess

I should be very glad of your comments on Lumley's criticisms of the existing plan.

[Para. 6, on the affairs of Kotah State, omitted.]

7. What you say in paragraphs 7 to 9 of your letter of the 3rd October[2] is interesting and provocative of thought. I quite agree that we should do what we can to reassure Patiala, though I am not entirely clear what it is he has in mind. I notice that he is satisfied with the information about day-to-day subversive activities which he receives from the neighbouring Provincial C.I.Ds. What he wants is more general guidance. If it is guidance about the ultimate or even the more immediate policy of His Majesty's Government in the general field which he wants, the difficulty of meeting his requirements is plain enough. (May I, by the way, remind you in this connection that on one aspect of this matter I am awaiting the reply to my letter of May 16th, 1941,[3] which you promised in paragraph 14 of your letter of the 23rd June 1942?[4]) If however it is guidance on the Government of India's policy for dealing with a subversive movement such as we are now encountering, that is a question which falls to your advisers to consider in the first place. I can quite believe that in Willingdon's time these things were easier, and that when the last Civil Disobedience Campaign was in progress a closer liaison could be maintained. Your advisers will be able to say how close it in fact was: I am interested to see from the files here that (in Political Department Circular, dated the 7th January 1932, No. F.–20–P. (S.)–32)[5] there was issued a general invitation to States to co-operate in the suppression of the campaign, and this in itself had no doubt a good moral effect. It was presumably accompanied or preceded by a certain amount of authoritative information about the Home Department's plan of campaign. It might well be [*sic*] to consider how far anything of that kind is possible in present-day conditions. I am not very greatly impressed by arguments against taking action in present circumstance on the ground that it might not be possible to continue the practice under hypothetical future constitutional arrangements.

8. As regards what you say in paragraph 9, I do not feel that we are going to do much practical good—and I am sure we should do an immense amount of harm—by encouraging the raising of State troops with an eye to the contingency of civil war or the threat of it. The maintenance by the States of sufficient force to ensure ordered progress within their own limits stands, however, on quite a different footing, and I can see no reason why official backing should be withheld from well-considered schemes of this nature whether related to individual States or to groups of States whose individual

[1] See No. 111. [2] No. 62. [3] L/P&S/13/889: ff 63–72. [4] Vol. II, No. 181.
[5] L/P&S/13/831.

resources are too small to enable them to stand alone. Encouragement and even stimulus in this direction has indeed not been wanting.

[Para. 9, on the question of Ministers going 'on leave', omitted.]

10. The Editor of the *Sunday Chronicle*, acting on Kemsley's instructions, has written to me recently and said that they proposed that Mr. Beverley Nichols who is one of their chief contributors, should pay a visit to India with the object of writing a series of articles presenting the British attitude on India in as popular a form as possible and possibly also a book for world-wide publication. The Editor said that Nichols was most anxious that a true picture of the situation in India, with particular emphasis on the British point of view, should get a wide public here and in the United States, where Nichols is also a considerable literary figure. I think that this is probably a valuable proposal. Nichols is of course a contributor to the lighter kind of journalism, but he has a good pen and a considerable public and I think we can rely on Kemsley's guidance to ensure that the right kind of articles are published. Joyce is informing Puckle about this, but I hope you will be able to arrange for Nichols to have all reasonable facilities and guidance.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, *12 November 1942, 10.5 am*
Received: 12 November, 6.50 am

No. 3216–S. Your personal telegram of 11th November No. 19484.[1] I concur in proposed answer. As you know I am now to see R. myself this morning. No details available of his talk with Jinnah but no reason to believe (compare my telegram of last night)[2] that Jinnah has abated his essential minima though he would of course be delighted to play off R. against us and vice versa.

2. Your paragraph 4. None so far as I am aware. Responsible Departments, viz. Home and External Affairs, have had no application and no such statement has been authorised by them or me.

[1] No. 164. [2] No. 162.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *12 November 1942, 8.50 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 12 November, 8 pm*

No. 3228-S. My personal telegram of 11th November No. 3213-S.[1] Rajagopalachari. I saw him this morning. We had a friendly conversation which lasted nearly an hour. Short point was that he wanted to see Gandhi, to which I said I could not agree.

2. Rajagopalachari said he had found Jinnah in a different mood and almost inclined to be constructive about the future. He even showed signs of readiness to approach the details of Pakistan though evidently he had not thought them out himself, a state of things which always made the position of the other party somewhat difficult. Congress, he thought, began to see his (Rajagopalachari's) point. He was clear himself that the Governor-General must take the initiative. The Cabinet and all at home were much too busy to get down to this problem. I said I feared I could not agree and that it seemed to me that His Majesty's Government and the Secretary of State had been extremely active about it.

3. I asked him whether he was prepared in the earlier phase of the final settlement to contemplate a division of India. He said he had given close thought to this matter and that his answer was now in the affirmative. Certain of the extremer elements and the Mahasabha were, he thought, even inclined now to say that they were prepared to agree to a division as an interim arrangement. He doubted them holding to that if it came to the point, and he did not himself favour that proposal.

4. I asked him whether in his conversations with Jinnah he had got down to Cabinet-making or to details of arrangements. He said no, and that he had thought it imprudent[2] of him to do so. I replied that in my experience the real difficulties began when one got down to analyse the details. He rather brushed this aside and in effect admitted that he had done no real business with Jinnah. Jinnah's line, he said, was that he had now made an offer and that it was for Congress to make a counter-offer, and that was a very strong argument for my allowing Rajagopalachari now to contact Gandhi and ascertain his view.

5. In reply I took him through the drill and said that in my judgment civil disobedience while it had been brought under control, still remained very dangerous and had a much more criminal tinge than previously. I noticed

[1] No. 162. [2] Deciphered as 'impudent'.

that no one in or on behalf of Congress had made the slightest effort to recant, or to say that they were prepared to call off civil disobedience. Gandhi had written me once and there was no reason why he should not write again if he wanted to. Clearly in taking my decision I had to weigh many considerations (I did not specify what these were). Taking all in all I was clear that my answer must be no. Rajagopalachari asked whether that was final. I said that I was not prepared to add any qualification. I quite realised that the present position could not and ought not to be sustained for ever. Congress contained many ingredients which were essential to the final structure. There was no finality anywhere in these matters, but the answer I had given him stood. Rajagopalachari replied as regards my suggestion that Gandhi might have written that the Mahatma worked to a rule under which he could not comment while under restraint. I did not explain that I had had two or three letters from him (copies of which have gone to you as received), but asked whether if that was really Gandhi's rule and Rajagopalachari did not suggest that he should be released consequent on a visit by him to Poona, why did he think that he could persuade Gandhi to break the rule? To that he replied that he had good reason to hope that he could. Would I not give him (Rajagopalachari) some encouragement? Would I say that he could come back to me? I said that I did not intend to play with him, that I had given him a perfectly straight answer and to that I stood. I was not prepared to use the word "final". What I had said needed no qualification. He asked if he could with my authority go about among his friends and hold out some hope that he would be allowed to see Gandhi later? I said that I could add nothing to my reply and that I had nothing more to say. He said he thought my decision was a wrong one and that I would have been better advised to allow him to contact Gandhi. I said that I quite appreciated his feeling about that but that I had no doubt myself that my decision was right and that the responsibility in any event was one that must fall on me. He went away saying that he felt somewhat dejected. I told him to cheer up but did not encourage him to think that I could meet him on his points.

6. As I have already commented I doubt very much if Rajagopalachari has got the least concession out of Jinnah. It would suit Jinnah very well to be able either (*a*) to ask me on behalf of Rajagopalachari to allow Rajagopalachari to go and see Gandhi. If I refused Jinnah would still have the credit of having acted as mediator and could pose as liberal-minded and anxious to bring Congress and the Muslim League together. If I agreed, he would still have the credit of having secured that concession, and would have no responsibility for any failure on Rajagopalachari's part, or the inevitable subsequent demand that Gandhi should see the Working Committee, &c. (*b*) All evidence available suggests and Rajagopalachari confirmed this in terms that Jinnah has impressed on Rajagopalachari that if he is to do any business he must have

something solid behind him, and must, if he is to get in the Muslim League, be able to satisfy Jinnah as regards the plebiscite and Pakistan. While Rajagopalachari may be prepared to go some distance, possibly even the whole way on those points, I do not for a moment believe that general feeling in Congress or general Hindu feeling would follow him.

7. Hope tells me by telephone that in amplification of his telegram of 6th November No. 218–M,[3] he found Rajagopalachari extremely difficult to pin down to anything positive. He expressed the view that Congress would agree to come in and form a Government on a basis of 5 Congress and 5 Muslim League seats, and this did not apparently stand cross-examination. As regards the Viceroy's veto, he said he would allow the Viceroy to keep it subject to a gentleman's agreement that it should not be used. He complained to Hope that the British Government did not "trust us". Hope replied that so long as Gandhi was there, it was extremely difficult for His Majesty's Government to put full confidence in Congress and Gandhi clearly ran them all. Rajagopalachari replied that while Gandhi would not help in the war, neither would he hinder, on which Hope commented that he had gone pretty near to hindering during last summer. Hope's general impression was that he was very doubtful whether Rajagopalachari at this stage represented anything. I doubt myself if he does: but of course had I given him permission to see Gandhi or accepted him as a mediator or negotiator, it would have infused a good deal of substance into his present shadow and that is an additional reason for the decision I have taken.

[3] See No. 152.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

MOST IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, *12 November 1942, 10.40 pm*
Received: 12 November, 7.10 pm

No. 3233–S. My personal telegram[1] of today. Rajagopalachari has issued a highly distorted version of our conversation to Press.[2] In view of this I have

[1] No. 167.

[2] *The Times*, 13 November 1942, reported that Mr Rajagopalachari had informed newspaper correspondents that he was surprised at the Viceroy's decision not to allow him to see Gandhi. 'He would not have made his request to the Viceroy if he had not, as a result of his conversations with Mr Jinnah . . . seen a prospect of settlement distinctly before him.' The British themselves admitted that a settlement was impossible without Congress or Gandhi, but the Viceroy's refusal blocked all chances of a settlement through him (i.e. Rajagopalachari). He declined to answer questions on why

thought it well at once to issue a communiqué[3] text of which is being sent you direct by Reuters. I have avoided getting into details and taken it on the broad issue. My telegram of this morning will have given you the full background.

the Viceroy had refused him, but had he thought that his request would increase the risk of disturbances, he would not have made it. In fact, he believed his talks with Gandhi would have diverted people's attention from such activities. He believed the Viceroy's decision was so wrong that it was bound to be altered soon. He said that Mr Jinnah was as disappointed as himself at the Viceroy's refusal. He refused to give reasons why he regarded a settlement as possible, but said that 'what he had meant was that between the two parties there was only a small difference'. L/P&J/8/514: f 50.

[3] This stated that the Governor-General saw Mr Rajagopalachari at his request; that the latter made it clear that he could speak only for himself and was unable to show any concrete support for his proposals; that the Governor-General was anxious to further all reasonable efforts to achieve a settlement but that the attitude of the Congress leaders appeared entirely unchanged though they were fully aware of the 'evil consequence' of their policy. 'With the best will in the world, it was clear that in the absence of a change of attitude on the part of the Congress leaders there could be no question of any special facilities for discussion with the persons under restraint for revolutionary activities, whose expressed and published aims were wholly inconsistent with the maintenance of peace and order in India and the prosecution of the war.' *The Times*, 13 November 1942. L/P&J/8/514: f 50.

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War Cabinet W.M. (42) 152nd Conclusions, Minute 2
R/30/1/3: ff 56–7

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 12 November 1942 at 6 pm were: Mr Churchill (in the Chair), Mr Attlee, Sir Stafford Cripps, Sir John Anderson, Mr Ernest Bevin

Also present were: Field-Marshal Smuts, Mr Amery

INDIA

(Previous Reference: W.M. (42) 135th Conclusions, Minute 3)[1]

The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (42) 519)[2] as to the reply to be given to a Parliamentary Question about a suggestion that Mr. Rajagopalachari should visit this country.

In discussion, THE LORD PRIVY SEAL said that he thought it was important that the answer given should not create the impression that we were half-hearted in our efforts to promote a settlement of the Indian problem. It might, however, be that there was some other way by which we could show that we were neglecting no opportunity of reaching a settlement on this matter.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA thought that any discussions on Indian Constitutional questions should take place in India and not in this country. Further, there was very little which we could usefully do on this matter at the

present time. He agreed, however, that the form of the draft reply proposed in the Memorandum might be somewhat amended.

After discussion, the War Cabinet—

Agreed that a reply should be given by the Secretary of State on the following lines:—

His Majesty's Government warmly welcomed any endeavour which Mr. Rajagopalachari and other leaders might make to promote an agreed settlement of the Indian problem; but any such agreement must come about in India between the Indian parties. His Majesty's Government therefore saw no advantage in Mr. Rajagopalachari visiting this country. It should be added that the Viceroy had already seen Mr. Rajagopalachari during the last few days.

[1] Not printed; see No. 86, note 16. [2] No. 153.

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Mr Amery to Viscount Halifax

Telegram, L/P&J/8/514: ff 45–6

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *13 November 1942, 9 pm*

19637. You will no doubt have seen Reuter reports of interview given by Viceroy on 12th November to Rajagopalachari. Recent moves by latter will presumably have attracted attention in America as to some extent they have in this country and you may find it helpful to have brief appreciation.

2. Viceroy reports that R.'s proposals have fallen completely flat in India except for such criticism as they have received from Jinnah or other party leaders. It is easy to understand Jinnah's rejection of proposals which while allowing Moslem League ample representation in provisional Government would leave such ministry responsible to a legislature with a permanent Hindu majority. Allegations of a certain narrowing of differences between Jinnah and R. were not borne out in interview with Viceroy who states latter in effect admitted that he had done no real business with Jinnah. It is also plain that the further R. goes to meet Moslem League over Pakistan the less likely he is to carry support of Congress or of Hindu feeling generally. R. is in fact at present playing a lone hand and Viceroy sees no point in giving him the advertisement of an interview with Gandhi, quite apart from the major objection to allowing any access to Gandhi or the Congress leaders at a time when the general situation in India is in a dangerously explosive state and when Congress leaders have shown no inclination to renounce civil disobedience.

3. As regards suggested discussions in London H.M.G. on their part see no advantage in R. visiting this country and consider that an agreed settlement of the Indian problem must be reached in India between the Indian parties.

4. Please inform Butler and Bajpai (see also Puckle's telegram to Hennessy No. 9054[1] of 13th November).

Repeated to Viceroy.

[1] L/P&J/8/514: f 47.

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Mr Amery to Viscount Halifax (via Foreign Office)

Telegram, L/P&J/8/515: f 36

13 November 1942, 11.40 pm

No. 7019. Following from Secretary of State for India:

My letter of 2nd November.[1] I find Linlithgow is opposed,[2] at present at any rate, to any constitutional enquiry by Indians and also to study of Indian question by an American group. I should however be interested to have your and Butler's views on the suggestions in my letter though no soundings should be made at present in any other quarter. In this connexion I have heard privately that Paton of International Missionary Council, who is in touch with Van Dusen of Union Theological Seminary, New York, and such people as Coffin and Niebuhr, has had much the same idea but I am doing my best to discourage him.

One forcible objection to it at present which had not occurred to me is that Members of such an enquiry could not get far without seeing Congress leaders and it is unlikely that this could be allowed at any rate during coming cold weather.

[1] No. 134. [2] See No. 163.

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/8/6: ff 33–4

INDIA OFFICE, *13 November 1942*

Secretary of State's Minute: Serial No. P. 59/42

Prime Minister

May I urge you most earnestly not to postpone any longer a decision on the succession to Linlithgow and Lumley?

As regards the first, I think the issue has really narrowed itself down to a choice between Anderson and Attlee and I am increasingly disposed to urge the latter. He knows the Indian problem and has no sentimental illusions as to any dramatic short cut to its solution. He also has a good shrewd understanding of military matters and at this time the Viceroy has to be the prime mover in the war effort as well as the political head. From the point of view of outside comment he would also get a much more favourable reception than Anderson, who would be regarded as a rather routine appointment, whereas Attlee's might strike the imagination as being both Deputy Prime Minister and head of the Labour Party. Incidentally, there are not many of the Labour Party suitable for Empire posts and this would meet Labour criticism on that score. Lastly, if I may say so as a spectator, I should have thought that you could spare him much more easily than Anderson, who disposes of so tremendous a volume of work here on the domestic side.

Failing either of these, the only other person whom I would suggest is R. A. Butler. He is somewhat young, but has a very good Indian background and knowledge of Indian affairs and would certainly take to the task with keenness and ability.

As regards Bombay, I would place the possible candidates in the following order: Colville, Crookshank, Cross, Strathcona, Bruntisfield, Munster, Feversham, and should like your approval to start approaching them in that order at once, subject to the prior approval of The King. Other possible names will be found in my letter of October 14th.[1]

In the Bombay case it is especially urgent that you should let me get about the business at once. It is at any rate probable that more than one of those first approached will refuse and each new approach means time spent, and further delay will put those chosen in a most difficult position in settling their personal affairs and choosing their staffs. Staffs and personal effects at any rate will have to go by sea, and the voyage takes over two months.

I have not included Hardinge in the Bombay list. Obviously I could only sound him on the question if he were first choice, or if we mentally decided his place somewhere down the list and then sounded him after others had refused.

I should like very much to see you about this as early as possible next week.

L. S. AMERY

[1] Not printed.

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Dr Dalton to Mr Amery

L/E/8/2527: f 266

MILLBANK, *13 November 1942*

My dear Leo,
Thank you for your letter of the 10th November[1] enclosing a copy of a letter you had from Bevin some time ago about our post-war export trade with India. Bevin also sent me a copy of this letter. I quite agree with you that the points to which he refers should be carefully studied by the Board of Trade and, in particular, by the Department of Overseas Trade. As you will no doubt already have seen from Harcourt Johnstone's letter to Bevin of 3rd October,[2] of which I understand a copy was sent to you, these matters are, in fact, already being considered by the Post-War Export Trade Committee over which he presides. I shall myself keep an eye on this most important piece of post-war planning, so that there is no risk of its being forgotten.

Yours ever,
HUGH DALTON

[1] No. 161. [2] The India Office could not trace having received this letter.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to the Nizam of Hyderabad

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *13 November 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL
My dear Nizam,
I write to thank Your Exalted Highness most warmly for your very kind letter of 1st November[1] about the Viceroyalty. Your Exalted Highness and I have had much to do together during the long term for which I have been here, and I cannot tell you how very great and real a satisfaction and pleasure it is for me to receive from the leading Prince in India so kind and so warmly expressed a message as that which you have been good enough to send me. I do greatly value your suggestion that I should stay for a further period. But I have, I fear, made clear already to His Majesty's Government my desire that they should in fact relieve me at the end of my present extension. That, as you may well imagine, is not from any lack of appreciation of the importance and the absorbing interest of the great task which His Majesty was pleased

to entrust to me when he appointed me to the Viceroyalty. But there comes a time when a change is wise, and one has also to bear in mind factors such as physical condition, though I am thankful to say that I have been singularly favoured in that respect.

2. I greatly value also the suggestion you have been good enough to make as to a possible successor. That I have no doubt will be in mind. But I should think it unlikely myself, more particularly after the lamentable death of His Royal Highness the Duke of Kent, that it would be possible for His Majesty to spare another Member of the Royal Family for a long period of service overseas. Your Exalted Highness (his time with whom His Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester enjoyed so immensely) knows yourself of the great value of short visits by a Member of the Royal House to India and to various other parts of the Empire, and I think we have to set that against the value which equally would attach to the appointment of a Member of the Royal Family to a particular post.

3. I am aware that the question of the succession to myself is under very active consideration, though I have not yet heard on whom the choice is likely to fall. I need not say that like Your Exalted Highness I fully appreciate its very great importance.

4. Let me again thank you most warmly for the message which has given me great encouragement and deep personal satisfaction.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

[1] No. 130.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir M. Gwyer

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

CONFIDENTIAL THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *13 November 1942*

My dear Chief Justice,

Many thanks for your letters [letter?] of the 9th November[1] about the succession to the Chief Justiceship. I have also seen your letter of yesterday[2] to Laithwaite and I have now looked up the memorandum of procedure which you mention in it.

2. I think there is no doubt so far as the memorandum is concerned that there has been a serious error in procedure for which, so far as responsibility

[1] No. 155. [2] Not printed.

rests here, I must apologize to you. The memorandum of course provides that the Chief Justice shall initiate suggestions and that thereafter the Governor-General shall deal with the matter with the Secretary of State, and that has not been done; though your present letter makes clear the nature of the suggestions you would have put forward.

3. First of all about the nature of this appointment. The Government of India are not concerned with it: it is a matter for the Governor-General so far as any authority here is concerned, and though naturally the views of the Chief Justice would be of much importance, the matter is not (not indeed that I think you suggest that) for the Federal Court as such. So far as the London end goes, the responsible adviser of the Sovereign, so far as I understand it, is the Secretary of State; and while I note what you say about the Lord Chancellor's relation to the selection I think you will agree with me that so long as a Member of the Cabinet is responsible for the submission, he must take advice at home, and that advice in a case such as this must be the advice of the Lord Chancellor. But this is all on the purely technical side and I do not want to argue it at any length.

4. Proceeding to the next point; the question as to whether the succession to yourself should be an Indian or an European, I have read with great attention and respect what you say on that point and if I myself do not share your view it is not you may be sure from any failure to appreciate your argument, or the importance which you attach to the decision. But I have clearly felt myself, and I have so informed the Secretary of State in the past, that in the present circumstances the new Chief Justice, in my opinion, ought to come from the Home Bar. You have done an immense amount for the Court in the time you have been here, but I still feel that a further period of guidance by someone steeped in the traditions of the Courts and of the Bar at home will be on a long view of decisive value from the point of view of the Court. That, it goes without saying, is entirely without prejudice to the legal capacity and value of your present colleagues. I quite recognize that this is a matter in which there is room for an entire difference of view; and it will of course be my duty to make clear to Amery what your own feeling is. The matter is of real difficulty; but as I say, though I may be wrong, and though I will not for a moment claim on the purely technical side to express any view of value, my own feeling is definitely in favour of an appointment from the Bar at home.

5. I have had very little information as to what is happening at the other end. There was a time I know when Monckton was in the running and I think you and I would both have felt that Monckton, could he have been persuaded to serve, would have been an admirable Chief Justice. Up to the last few days I have had no information of what has been happening. I

gather that one or two other names have been mentioned but have been regarded either as unsatisfactory or as being unlikely to accept an invitation to serve. As for Mr. Spens, the first I heard of him was from the Secretary of State's telegram the gist of which I gave you in my last letter, from which it appeared that he had in fact been approached. I think we have reason to complain that we were not given any opportunity here of commenting before the matter was taken so far; and I propose to make that clear to Amery, and to associate myself with your own criticism on the point, for the post is one of great significance and importance.

6. And following from that you should, I think, know that I have never failed to impress on the Secretary of State that if the appointment to this most responsible office was to be made from home it must be a man of highest quality. I had hoped indeed myself that it might be possible to secure someone from the High Court to fill it; and I am most disturbed to think that in your judgment Mr. Spens is not really of the requisite quality. That again I must put to Amery, though as I have said above, things have now apparently proceeded so far that any change may be difficult to arrange.

7. I am indeed gravely concerned, I need not say, at your own personal feeling, and I think it is essential that the Secretary of State should know what that feeling is, and I would propose to make it clear to him that (though on that, as you know, with great regret I shall not be able to give you the full support I could have wished) your own feeling is strongly in favour of an Indian appointment and in that event of Mr. Justice Varadachariar; and that you are also quite definitely not of opinion (if I am right in thinking that that is your view) that Mr. Spens is of the requisite quality, and that you are apprehensive that the appointment may be regarded as in the nature of a political job and may not have anything like a good reception here. It seems to me arguable, too, if you are clear in your assessment of Spens, that I should put it to the Secretary of State that if nothing better can be found from home, the claims of, e.g. Derbyshire (though I am familiar with what can be said on the other side) who combines experience of the Home Bar with knowledge of India and the headship of the largest Indian High Court, should be considered. I would like, in addition, to make the further point, if you would let me know in what terms you would like it conveyed, on which you touch in your letter of yesterday to Laithwaite, about the date of any announcement and the date from which any new appointment should run. But it seems to me clear in the light of what you have said that if the Spens appointment has to stand the wise course would be to postpone an announcement until the New Year, and to arrange for the new Chief Justice to assume his duties at the end of the long vacation (perhaps you would let me know when that would normally be). I suppose that in the event of a case arising of such a character that it had to be

considered during the vacation, a Special Court could be convened for the purpose with an acting Chief Justice, or am I wrong about that?

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

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Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/91

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL GOVT. HOUSE, LAHORE, *13 November 1942*

D.-o. No. 417–F.L.

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

There is little of any great importance to bring to Your Excellency's notice since we met at Rawalpindi last month. Any active support of Congress appears to be on the decline, though there have been a few minor demonstrations on the part of students and others from time to time. The Sikh community as a whole has wisely continued to abstain from any participation in the Congress crusade. There is no doubt that the "Sikander–Baldev Singh pact"[1] has been a powerful factor for good and that it has exercised a distinctly pacifying effect on the Sikh community. There are signs that Baldev Singh is inclined to attach increasing value to his appointment as a Minister and that he is less likely to run out of the ropes. Communal relations have on the whole been less strained and social gatherings have been held at Lahore on the occasions of the 'Id and the Diwali with the object of bringing the various communities together; the Sikhs are about to organize a similar event in commemoration of Guru Nanak's birthday. This happy state of affairs is in danger of disturbance when Mr. Jinnah pays his forthcoming visit to the Punjab. Lyallpur, Jullundur and Lahore are included in his programme, and it is only to be expected that his tour will give rise to further disquieting cries for "Pakistan" and counter-attacks on the part of non-Muslims. Sikander, who would of course be much relieved if Jinnah's visit were cancelled, has chosen this time to float his scheme, of which I have already informed you,[2] for the possible dismemberment of the Province. The main object of his exposition is to point out the practical difficulties that lie in the way of partition, and in this he has not been without success. The scheme has not been popular with Muslims and it is of course intensely disliked by Hindus. Sikh leaders have been professing to take the idea seriously and some of them have been attempting negotiations with Jinnah, the intention being apparently to see whether they can get more out of Jinnah or Sikander; steps have been taken to point out to some of them in the course of friendly discussions that they are not likely to secure any practical benefit from dealings

with Jinnah and that the various elements in the Province would be better advised to try and settle their difficulties among themselves. I do not think that responsible reasonably-minded Sikhs have any serious desire to see the Province dismembered as long as they are likely to be given a fair deal.

[1] Since the 1937 elections, when the Unionist Party won a clear majority in the Punjab Legislature, its leader—Sir Sikander Hyat Khan—had held office as Premier with a Cabinet consisting of 3 Muslims, 2 Hindus and 1 Sikh. By the so-called Sikander–Baldev Singh Pact, announced on 15 June 1942, the Premier promised certain concessions to the Sikh community in return for which Baldev Singh, who now entered the Ministry, undertook to support the Unionist Government in the interests of communal unity and the defence of the country.

[2] Vol. II, No. 243.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to all members of the Executive Council[1]

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *13 November 1942*

My dear——,

As my colleagues are aware, I have had the question of how best to deal with the vital issue of Food and its connected problems under my close consideration for some time past. In the result and after consultation with those of my colleagues who are most directly concerned, I have decided that the wise course will be to set up a separate Department of Food with details of the composition of which I need not trouble you at this stage. The new Department will form part of the portfolio of the Commerce Member; and I enclose an advance copy of a communiqué which will issue tomorrow.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

Enclosure to No. 177

COMMUNIQUÉ[2]

The Governor-General in Council has given most careful consideration to the growing difficulties of the food situation within the country. While the principal foodgrains and foodstuffs have recorded a sharp rise in prices in recent months, the consuming areas are finding it increasingly difficult to secure adequate quantities of foodgrains to meet their normal requirements. The natural difficulty, during war, of securing a free flow of commodities from producing

[1] Except Mr Sarker.

[2] Lord Linlithgow transmitted the substance of this communiqué to Mr Amery in telegram 3241–S of 13 November.

to consuming areas owing to heavy pressure of movement of war requirements has been aggravated by the tendency to treat foodstuffs as a form of investment. To meet these difficulties the Central Government has already initiated control in certain directions, but as the problem has been growing in magnitude and complexity, it is considered necessary to tackle it on a more planned and comprehensive basis. On a careful examination of the situation, it is clear that it is essential in the present circumstances that a separate Department should be constituted for the purpose and entrusted with the task of studying future requirements with a view to the forward planning of production and of ensuring the equitable distribution of available supplies. The Governor-General has, therefore, approved the establishment of a separate Department of Food under a Secretary to Government. The new Department will take over administration of all measures for control over prices, supply and distribution of foodstuffs and for the procurement and purchase of the requirements of the Army, which are at present the concern of the Commerce Department and Supply Department respectively. It will also establish an effective liaison with the Department of Education, Health and Lands and the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research which will continue to be responsible for securing maximum production on the basis of the forward programme of requirements worked out by the Food Department. The Department will further maintain close touch with the Department of War Transport so as to ensure that the movement of foodstuffs shall be made with the utmost efficiency and economy of transport that may be possible. The Governor-General has assigned the new Department of Food to the portfolio of the Hon'ble Mr. Nalini Ranjan Sarker, the Commerce Member of the Government of India. The date from which the Department of Food will begin to function will be announced in a later communiqué.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *13 November 1942*

I was glad to hear from you that Mudaliar and the Jam Saheb were pleased with their reception and interested in what they saw and heard at the outset.[1] Only the other day, however, I heard through a friend the Jam Saheb's account of their first interview with Winston in the Downing Street garden. So alarmed were they by his tirade on the subject of India that when they went back to their hotel they agreed that if his statement on the following day was on anything like the same lines they would throw up the sponge and ask to be allowed

to go back to India at once. When they heard the actual statement next day they at any rate were greatly relieved and attributed that to my moderating influence—not altogether without reason, though that influence did not extend quite as far as I should have wished. For the rest, I think they have been reasonably satisfied, though I know they feel that these regular Monday Cabinets are much more in the nature of an audience listening to the reports by the Chiefs of Staff and conversation by Winston than in the nature of definite decisions taken on proposals brought before them—the decisions of course being taken outside by Winston with the Chiefs of Staff. That is of course true, but applies equally, not only to the Australian representative, but to myself or the members of the War Cabinet. This is, after all, in essence a one-man government, so far as the conduct of the war is concerned, subject to a certain amount of conversation in Cabinet. It might no doubt be better to have a more systematically planned organisation which would produce definite projects which could then be formally considered in Cabinet. But that is not the way in which Winston works and his greatness in other respects is such that we have to accept him as he is. Last night in Cabinet[2] discussing Cripps' suggestion that Rajagopalachari should be allowed to come here, he suddenly burst out, in front of Smuts,[3] in a terrific tirade against the whole conception of Indian self-government. It may be that we are all wrong in hoping that a self-governing India, established with our goodwill and on a sound basis, may continue to stay within the Commonwealth of its own accord. But what is the alternative? The idea that we shall be able to hang on indefinitely against the growing tide of Indian nationalism seems to me out of the question, even if there were a united public opinion here to support it.

2. To return to my Indian colleagues. The Jam Saheb came and spent the last week-end with us at Bailiff's Court in Sussex—Walter Moyne's place, which he has lent us during his absence in the Middle East. He has a great deal of practical commonsense and a very reasonable broad outlook on the whole Indian problem. I am by no means sure that when the time comes it isn't the Indian Rulers who may do most to find a solution and lead the future India. They and their Dewans do know something about administration and probably have an instinctive feeling as to what their peoples really want or are prepared to accept. I have taken a good deal of trouble with both of them to see that they have been accorded proper precedence at public functions, &c. At the Mansion House[4] the Jam Saheb went in with the little party consisting of the Lord Mayor, Winston, the Lord Chancellor and the Archbishop, while at the Prime Minister's dinner on the eve of the new session both of them were at the little high table with the Speaker, Eden, and the mover and seconder of the

[1] No. 86, para. 1. [2] See No. 169. [3] [By Mr Amery]: 'The Indians were not there.'
[4] Presumably the luncheon held on 7 November 1942 prior to the installation of a new Lord Mayor of London.

Address. My diligent P.P.S.[5] also sees to it that they can attend all debates that interest them.

3. I confess that I am still not wholly convinced by your objections[6] to starting anything in the nature of a preliminary and material-collecting enquiry into the problem of the constitution. I should have thought that the one important thing was to get Indians away from the immediate demand, which cannot be satisfied until there is a constitution, in order to consider the real problem of the constitution itself. Indeed, I am not altogether convinced that one might not go further and set up a Royal Commission, saying quite definitely that as there can be no fundamental change until there is a new constitution and as a new constitution must take time to work out, we are going to get started on that at once. Looking back, I sometimes wonder whether we should not have done that in conjunction with the August 1940 Declaration,[7] instead of saying anything in that Declaration about interim changes in the Government. It still seems to me that the one problem is to get the Indian mind away from clamouring for something now on which they cannot agree, in order to find ways and means of agreement on something which they can have as soon as agreement is reached.

They would take damned good care not to agree until they see daylight and have made essential adjustments on the more vital issues.

L.

4. I send you with this letter an extract from a report which Richard Law drew up in September after his visit to the U.S.A. It gives a good picture of American opinion about the Empire and India and will no doubt be of interest. It is, of course, highly confidential and for your own eye, though I should have no objection to Puckle seeing it if you think it would be useful to him to do so.

I can't remember who is Richard Law.

L.

SECRET

Enclosure to No. 178

EXTRACT FROM MR. RICHARD LAW'S REPORT ON HIS VISIT TO AMERICA

33. Earlier in this paper I referred to the suspicions of our motives, which are so general even among those well disposed towards us. These suspicions are based, all of them, upon serious misconceptions about the British Empire. While I was in Washington or New York I had no desire to discuss the Colonial question or the Indian problem. I was trying to form some impression of the extent to which we might rely upon American co-operation after the war in the political and economic field. But it was impossible to get away from the British Empire; whenever two or three were gathered together the subject inevitably cropped up; and it very soon became clear to me that unless we were

able to remove the misunderstandings which exist in the mind of the average intelligent American, the chances of genuine Anglo-American collaboration would be small. This is so, because the Administration, whether this one or some successor, and however enlightened or friendly it may be, cannot go further than its public opinion will allow it. It would be untrue to suggest that American opinion would not take kindly to the idea of partnership with the British Empire. It is certainly the fact that it would not accept the idea of partnership with the kind of British Empire which exists, highly coloured and completely distorted, in the American imagination. There is an intense interest in these questions. And there is the most astonishing ignorance—which is admitted with the utmost candour. But it would be a mistake to suppose that, because the American attitude is rooted in ignorance far more than in malice, it is unimportant or that it will be easy to remove.

34. Nor, I think, would [it] be wise to assume that the American attitude to what they think of as "imperialism" is a surface agitation which has been provoked by events in the Far East and in India, and which will subside when the war takes a turn for the better. The normally prevailing attitude of mind has been intensified by recent developments; it has not been created by them. There are ghosts which haunt the American scene—ghosts of North and the Hessian troops, ghosts, too, of ancient tyrannies from which so many of the American people have fled in the past hundred and fifty years. It may be that these ghosts will never be laid, and that it will not be possible to instruct the American people in the real nature of the British Empire. But it ought to be possible to instruct the Administration and those influential circles outside of it which are anxious to befriend us. And instruction is needed, not only in the facts but also in our own attitude towards them. For there is everywhere the greatest ignorance of our own intentions and doubts of our own faith in ourselves. I was very much struck by the very general belief, implied rather than stated, that we were ready ourselves to abdicate. And I found that protestations to the contrary were received, not with anger, but with gentle and kindly incredulity.

35. It is very necessary, I think, for us to understand, first of all, the nature of the interest which Americans have in the British Empire. It is so startling to find a blend of such fierce dogmatism and such bland ignorance, freely confessed and, indeed, almost gloried in, that one is inclined to dismiss the whole thing as the amiable aberration of a well-meaning but incurably meddlesome people.

36. But the interest of Americans in these matters is very real and, in its way, very practical. If one were to say to them, as one is so often sorely tempted to do: "Why are you so passionately anxious to instruct us in our relationships with native populations when you are quite unable to solve, for example,

[5] Mr Robert Cary, M.P. [6] See No. 163. [7] Vol. I, Appendix I.

your own negro problem?"—they would probably reply "Yes. You are absolutely right. The negro problem should never have arisen, reflects very badly upon us and is probably quite insoluble. But we have a very much more practical interest in, say, India, or Malaya than you have in Harlem or Alabama. Whatever we may or may not do to the American negro you will hardly be affected. But we have a deep interest in India, for we share the defence of India with you. And we have a deep interest in what you may feel called upon to do hereafter in Malaya or in the Caribbean. For you may have to call upon us at some time to share in the defence of those areas."

37. This feeling that the Americans have of interest, almost of self-interest, in the British Empire is most marked in relation to India—for India is the more urgent problem; India is regarded as part of the Japanese problem which is, of course, far more real to them than it is to us. It would be difficult, I think, to exaggerate the importance of India in the minds not of American liberals only but of thoughtful Americans everywhere. I do not think that there is a great deal of interest among the general public (although Mr. Henry Luce would not agree with me).

38. The general opinion about India in influential circles is roughly as follows: "India is a far more difficult problem than we had imagined. The Cripps mission taught us that. It taught us also that Britain is a good deal more enlightened than we have supposed. Nevertheless, the present position is clearly full of danger not only for Britain but for us as well. You may succeed in controlling violence—for the moment. We do not believe that you can sit on the safety valve for ever, and violence may become the more dangerous when it is driven underground. Somehow or other you must come to terms with India. Is there nothing we can do to help?"

39. This kind of opinion is widely held, and is deeply rooted. And it is full of danger for the war effort. In the first place, I am inclined to think that a number of newspapers (the *Washington Post* is one) who have so far held themselves back in the belief that, after all, we must know our own job best, may come out into the open with very strong criticism. If this happens, and if there is a public storm, it will become much more difficult, I would think, for the President to hold his military in check (from the point of view of assignments for example); and it will be more difficult for him to hold a balance between the Far Eastern war and the European war—it is very difficult for us at home to realise how much closer Asia is, than Europe, to the minds of the American people.

40. The feeling about India in the United States is based in ignorance and misunderstanding, but it is deeply rooted and, I think, it is dangerous. Nevertheless it would not be altogether impossible to change it. The ignorance of the

Americans is such that one cannot help feeling resentment at what we regard as their unwarrantable interference. We feel, very justly, that these are matters for which we have the responsibility and in which the decision must be ours alone. It is an unfortunate fact that the Americans do not see things in the same light. They believe that they have an interest in these matters, and they believe that we should admit their interest. It is difficult, in the circumstances, to avoid giving them the impression that we are determined to keep them at arm's length. This impression, however, only increases their anxiety to interfere. At the same time it does not convey to them an idea of strength and confidence and power. On the contrary, it gives support to the view which, unfortunately, more and more of them are beginning to hold, that we are little men of little minds and that the vision that has made England great has gone for good. I cannot help feeling that, if we could somehow let them see that we admit their interest in the problem (while maintaining our own responsibility for the final decision), we should gain their respect and diminish, rather than increase, the chances of an embarrassing American initiative.

41. As to China, Mr. Ashley Clarke and others have pointed out the quite extraordinary feeling for China that there is in the United States. It is almost exactly comparable to the popular feeling in this country for Russia, but it is of longer standing. But I do not think that I have seen anywhere an account of one element in American thinking about China which to me, at any rate, is very marked. I mean their fear of China. I have already said that the Americans tend to think in centuries and continents. And they are beginning now to see, in the distant future, China as a greater and infinitely more dangerous Japan. They see China succeeding, as Japan never succeeded, in rallying the races of the East and arming them. They are anxious, therefore, not only to keep on terms with China, but, somehow or other to bring China into the mainstream of Western Life. I had the impression very strongly that this conception of a militant China leading a militant Asia against the West will become increasingly the background of their Far Eastern Policy.

42. It is difficult to know how we are to deal with the United States on these great questions of imperial and world policy. When I left England I thought that we ought to begin to formulate our own views and then state them clearly and fearlessly. I do not think now that this will be good enough. For one thing it is very likely to land us in open controversy with the United States Administration. The evil consequences of such a situation would be immeasurably disastrous. I[t] would be far better, I think, to discuss these problems informally with the Americans before we make any public statement. I feel fairly confident that it would be possible to make them see our point of view. And if they did see it, they would find, I believe, that they were more in sympathy with it than they (or we) suppose.

43. I have found in Washington, as I have said, a genuine anxiety to work with us and a deeply rooted suspicion of our intentions. I believe that, with great difficulty and great understanding on our side, suspicions can be removed and a real basis for co-operation be found—always postulating the continued existence of the present Administration or of one remotely resembling it. But it will be a most exhausting task, and the question must arise whether it is, in fact, worth attempting, or whether the Roosevelt Administration will be supplanted in two years' time by one with which it will not be possible for us to co-operate.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *14 November 1942, 4 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 14 November, 7 pm*

No. 3254–S. Your personal telegram of 10th November No. 19419.[1] Information Member. Duties are being temporarily discharged by me with Puckle as Secretary. I have considered both Srivastava and Noon, but have come to the conclusion that it will be a mistake to add Information to either. We have made considerable play with the importance of Civil Defence and of Defence. We have also made a good deal of play with the importance of Information. I think to double Information with either portfolio might therefore expose us.

2. I have done my very best to find a suitable man (I am pretty clear that it ought to be a Muslim and that appointment of anyone but a Muslim would be much resented by Muslims). But though we hear so much about the abundance of talent available for Indianization, it is almost impossible to find anyone. Sultan Chinoy of Bombay has been mentioned. But he is not particularly prominent, and he is also a Bohra and it is important to get a Sunni if we can. Nor even in the Hindu fold is there anybody very obvious. On the other hand no criticism has manifested itself of existing arrangements and indeed practically no interest has been shown in the Press or in Public in the filling of the vacancy. I shall probably have to wait a little longer before I can make permanent arrangements.

[1] No. 160.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *14 November 1942, 11.40 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 14 November 11 pm*

No. 3255–S. Your telegram of November 13th No. 19637.[1] I am grateful for this advice to Washington. You will have had my two Press communiqués[2] through Reuter. You should know the following internal developments in my Council.

2. I did not consult my Council before seeing Rajagopalachari (I would hardly have had time to even if I had wished) but I had behind me two decisions one of August and one of October 28th against contacts of any sort. I summoned them yesterday morning and gave them a detailed account of what had happened. Ambedkar and Sarker were absent on tour. Save for Mody, who was pathetically weak, and Aney, who thought that it would have been well to let Rajagopalachari see Gandhi so as to avoid any impression in the minds of reasonable people here that we were not helping in a solution, there was unanimous and complete support for action taken. Even Aney and Mody agreed that conversations if permitted could have come to nothing. Ahmed urged that Council should have been consulted because, as it had not been, Rajagopalachari was trying to drive a wedge between them and me and also to lower standing of Council by suggestion that their advice could be dispensed with. Srivastava was clearly profoundly disturbed by revelation that Rajagopalachari would have advocated Pakistan plan to Gandhi, and said it would have been intolerable in such circumstances to allow him to see Gandhi when Mukerjee and Mahasabha had been refused permission. Firoz and Usman were anxious that it should be brought out that there was nothing to show that Jinnah had ever accepted Rajagopalachari's propositions. I said that I thought that I could leave Jinnah to look after himself. Mody found himself in a complete minority.

3. Having ascertained later in the day that Rajagopalachari was issuing further statement expressing satisfaction that decision was that of Governor-General and not of Council, and also that same point was being taken in statement by Chimanlal Setalvad, I summoned Council last night and placed before

[1] No. 170.

[2] For the first, see No. 168, note 3. The second, dated 13 November, read as follows: 'In view of statements which have appeared in the Press, the Government of India desire to make it clear that the decision recently taken on Mr Rajagopalachari's request to be allowed to see Mr Gandhi represents the considered policy of the Government of India.' *The Times*, 14 November 1942, L/P&J/8/514: f 43.

them as draft the communiqué which has since issued. Position was same as in the morning: Mody quite terrified and anxious that no communiqué should issue; Aney of his previous view, but quite content that position of Government should be made clear; Muslims anxious to add to the communiqué a disclaimer as regards Jinnah's position; Srivastava anxious to add that Rajagopalachari's proposals were disastrous in their effect on the unity of India, &c.; Ahmed to add that ban must exist so long as civil disobedience and absence of repentance on the part of Congress continued. These various additions after discussion cancelled one another out and draft communiqué in original form was approved by Council.

4. Jinnah very wisely has refrained from saying anything. There is some reason to believe that he is annoyed that his name should have been used by Rajagopalachari. It is quite clear that while latter in his anxiety to get Jinnah's support may have moved towards Jinnah, Jinnah has not abated in the slightest degree his own claims. Effect of my first communiqué taken with the second (Government of India) communiqué has been I think to take a little of the gilt off Rajagopalachari.[3] Press are divided between those who say that I made a great mistake, and those who say any other decision would have been a great mistake. I am in no doubt in the matter myself. Further points brought out by various Indian members in discussion in Council were disastrous effect on public opinion here police and Services of appearing to be negotiating with Congress; effect on public opinion on [of] its being known that Rajagopalachari was going to see Gandhi by special permission of Government carrying proposals consistent with Pakistan claim; calamitous effect on internal situation in the country of any pronouncement for or against Pakistan during the war; significance of absence of any sign of repentance on the part of Gandhi, though the latter was free to write to me if he wanted to do so. I do not myself doubt that Gandhi would have used Rajagopalachari's mission to try and obtain immediate liberty for himself and the Working Committee by claiming that neither he nor they could be expected to do business unless he could consult them as free men.

5. I am quite well satisfied with the way this has gone. Had Rajagopalachari in fact had Jinnah's formal support, or had I had an application of this nature from Jinnah, position would of course be different and one would have had carefully to consider line to be taken. But as I have already said Rajagopalachari represents nothing but himself, at any rate at this stage.

[3] 'Rajagopalachari' deciphered as 'it'.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/E/8/3297: ff 321–4

INDIA OFFICE, *14 November 1942, 12.35 pm*
Received: 15 November

19636. I have been much exercised over your food problems, both as regards wheat for the Army and rice for Ceylon, about which as you know I have been very much pressed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. As to latter, your 3188–S[1] appears to me to make your case as well as it can be made and I propose to rest on this in respect of the old crop, relying on you to make any addition that may be possible to the supplies available during this difficult period. But it appears to me that the events of the past six months afford disturbing evidence that there is an absence at the Centre of effective control either of food prices or supplies and insufficient co-ordination or direction of provincial powers to safeguard vital requirements of the country as a whole and all classes of it. It appears to be a situation which calls for more Central intervention than could normally be contemplated.

Your Commerce Member, at the 6th price control conference, made what seemed to me an excellent point when he argued that control of prices and supplies alike can only be effective if the controlling authority has at its command a substantial holding of the commodity in question—a view which is certainly borne out by experience here.

Bearing in mind the increased tempo of the next period of the war now opening, with its difficulties of supply and transport, I hope you will urgently consider the possibility of early steps to acquire sufficient stocks of foodstuffs in the hands of Government when the new crops begin to come in. No doubt the agency of the provincial governments would be indispensable part of any such measures, but whether the task calls for an executive organ of the Central Government or merely for the control and co-ordination of provincial organs the additional burden involved may be more than any of your existing departments can carry in addition to its present responsibilities. I should therefore like you to consider also whether you ought not to set up a separate Dep[artmen]t under separate Member to deal with your food problems and if you take the view that such development is desirable I would urge you to get the necessary machinery started without delay so as to be able to attack the problems in good time with a view to acquiring control of an adequate part of the new year's crops.

You might even consider the possible desirability of some portion of the

[1] Of 8 November, explaining why there were little, if any, prospects of improving immediate supplies of rice to Ceylon. MSS. EUR. F. 125/23.

land revenue being collected in kind. I appreciate that failing a far-reaching measure of this kind it may well be impossible to tap supplies in hands of actual producers. But it should not be a hopeless task to secure control of such quantities as pass into the hands of middlemen and traders sufficiently to meet comparatively limited requirements of those classes which have no direct access to food supplies and of Government itself.

I should be glad to know very early what are your reactions to the above suggestions. I think you realise my difficulties and Mudaliar's in dealing with such aspects of the problem as arise here, of which wheat and rice are cases in point and which impinge upon the most vital of all our war problems, namely, shipping. They would be greatly lessened if we could point to comprehensive measures to be taken in the near future and I feel sure you will be anxious to do whatever may be possible to strengthen the position of Government as insurance against possible calls for military supplies and also against the possibility of internal shortage or maldistribution of food amongst the civil population.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/515: f 30

PERSONAL *14 November 1942, 1.45 pm*

No. 19665. Your personal telegram No. 3214–S[1] of 12th November. In the light of your strong reaction against suggestions in question I will not pursue them. I feel sure that Mudaliar requires no hint from us here to abstain from inviting Americans to settle Indian constitutional problem since he and Jam Saheb have both shown while here critical attitude towards U.S.A. anticipated at the end of your paragraph 3.

[1] No. 163; the date should be 11 November.

183

Viscount Halifax to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 111

SECRET WASHINGTON, *14 November 1942, 4.29 pm*
Received: 15 November, 12.40 am

No. 5597. Your telegram No. 6339.[1]

Hull told me this morning that they have decided to appoint Phillips to the post of United States representative in India and that he has accepted. He was

under the impression that we had been informed a few days ago and as I had already (group undec. ? received) instructions—see your telegram No. 6169[2] and your telegram No. 6339—told Welles informally that you would be ready to accept either Phillips or Grew. I presume formal request for *agrément* can be dispensed with.

I will take early opportunity of speaking in the sense of the last paragraph of your telegram No. 6169.

Repeated to Foreign New Delhi telegram No. 300.

[1] No. 106.

[2] Of 10 October. Mr Eden referred to Lord Linlithgow's fears that either Grew or Phillips, if appointed, might interfere in Indian politics. While the Foreign Office were confident that their diplomatic experience would ensure that they steered clear of such a temptation, Mr Eden in his final paragraph instructed Lord Halifax, unless he saw strong objection, to ask the State Department to make it plain, when giving guidance to the Press, that the United States Government had no intention of attempting to mediate. L/P&S/12/2633: f 123.

184

Mr Churchill to Mr Amery

L/PO/8/6: f 40

10 DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL, *14 November 1942*

Reference: Minute to the Prime Minister from the Secretary of State for India (P. 59/42)[1] *re* the succession to Lord Linlithgow and Sir Roger Lumley.

I shall try to come to a decision next week.

W. S. C.

[1] No. 172.

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Mr Turnbull to Sir G. Laithwaite

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 505

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *15 November 1942, 2.45 pm*
Received: 16 November

1334. Turnbull to Laithwaite. Is S/S likely to receive any recommendation from H.E. based on Lumley's personal letter No. 294–H.E.[1] of 22nd October forwarded as enclosure to H.E.'s private [P.S.V.'s?] letter of 27th October. S/S may feel it desirable to bring these views to notice of some of his colleagues.

[1] No. 111.

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Secretary of State to Government of India, External Affairs Department

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 110

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *16 November 1942, 8.15 pm*

19780. Washington telegram No. 5597[1] of 14th November Phillips. You will doubtless agree that formal request for *agrément* would be redundant in this case as we have already agreed to Phillips in advance. But please telegraph to Washington repeating to me whether you agree to appointment.

2. H.M. Ambassador is being asked to ascertain date of publication of appointment in Washington and to report result of his action on paragraph 5 of Foreign Office telegram 6169.[2]

[1] No. 183. [2] See No. 183, note 2.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *16 November 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Many thanks for your letter of the 19th October[1] which I have just received. In actual fact you and I had already disposed of the issues raised in it, for when I got your telegram[2] about this suggestion for a sub-committee of my Council or the like, I thought at first that it might refer back to what you had been kind enough to say on that subject in your letter of the 9th October,[3] and I telegraphed to you.[4] Now that I have had the fuller argument in your present letter I am telegraphing again. Meanwhile I have had your telegram[5] telling me that you have decided to drop these suggestions. I have no doubt whatever that you are right. As I said in my telegram of today[6] I think that to attempt anything on these lines might very well result in the loss of my Government, or at any rate in the development inside it of cleavages so deep and so important, and of a distraction to its Members from their ordinary work (which is quite enough to keep them busy) so great that the effect would be calamitous. There is nothing for it in this business but to go on stone-walling and expressing our readiness to play. It is not an easy task, as I know well to my cost here, and I realise of course, equally, how much pressure you may from time to time find yourself under from the intelligentsia at the London end. The fact is that there

are here in this situation none of the materials for agreement or settlement. We may find ourselves forced to recognise that publicly a little later on, but at the moment our policy must continue to be to refuse to accept the responsibility for a state of affairs that is none of our making and that is wholly contrary to our expressed and specific policy.

2. I was relieved to find that you think it unnecessary to give Mudaliar any warning as to how we should react to any suggestions of bringing in the Americans. Mudaliar of course has a hand of his own to play in this business, and I have not been altogether favourably impressed by what you have told me of his talking to Members of Parliament (and for that matter to the *Times*) on his ideas about the Indianisation of the Council, &c. The Jam Saheb is a charming person, and will represent the States very well; but Mudaliar is quite capable of getting him to express views on the British India side which he would do much better to keep to himself, and which may well prove explosive in their boomerang effect so far as the Princes are concerned. I shall be a little happier when they are both safely out of the United States.

3. I have just had your telegram[7] about the Food Production Department. As it happens it crossed my official telegram[8] giving you the outline of what is now proposed and you will by now have had my letter of the 9th November[9] in paragraph 5 of which I gave you the background of these changes. I have no doubt whatever either as to the necessity for them or as to the improvement which they represent.

4. I have had a great deal of trouble with Gwyer over the succession to himself. I told you last week that I had just had a lengthy protest[10] which at the time that I wrote I had not had time to study. I have been into it all now. I send you a copy of it by this bag, with a copy also of my reply.[11] As you will see, I think it would have been wiser had I had a chance of commenting on Spens, as he was a new name, before the actual offer was made to him. For that would have enabled us to take Gwyer with us, or at any rate would have reduced any possible embarrassment from a protest such as he has now made. Do not think from that, that I am not prepared to be guided by you or by Simon on that (subject to anything I might pass on to you in the light of Gwyer's reply) whether the choice falls on Evershed or Spens, or anyone else from the Home Bar, I must take your view and that of the Lord Chancellor as to the quality, &c. of the man concerned. Had the issue been an open one, I think we might have had to think more seriously in the light of Gwyer's criticisms about the possibility of appointing someone from here if no one stronger than Spens can be found at home. Even as it is I think I shall have to be prepared at any rate to put to you the possibility of someone like Derbyshire

[1] No. 107. [2] No. 159. [3] No. 84. [4] No. 163. [5] No. 182. [6] No. 188.
[7] No. 181. [8] Not printed. [9] No. 157. [10] No. 155. [11] No. 175.

(who has indicated that he would like to be considered) as an alternative to Spens, if Gwyer thinks that worth doing; though it will cause me no surprise if I find that your reply on the whole business is that discussions with Spens have gone too far to justify reconsideration.

5. The first trouble in this business is this Memorandum of Procedure to which Gwyer refers. That Memorandum was drawn up by my Public Department some years ago, and copies of it were sent to Dawson under my Public Secretary's letter of the 21st June 1940, No. 18/1/37-Judicial-G. I cannot think how it is that there got into it (the memorandum is based on discussion in my Public Department) this proviso that so far as the Chief Justiceship is concerned the outgoing Chief Justice should communicate his views. I am perfectly clear that that is a proviso that ought never wisely to have been introduced, and that we must amend the procedural arrangements on the occasion of Gwyer's handing over, so as to make it clear that the selection of the Chief Justice is a matter that shall be dealt with in Private and Personal correspondence between the Governor-General of the day and the Secretary of State of the day.

6. Gwyer, as his letter clearly shows, is moved a good deal by consideration of the standing of his Court, and by some resentment at any thought of the Lord Chancellor coming in. But the Lord Chancellor, as I have made clear in my reply, has got to come in in this business as your Adviser so far as submissions to the King are concerned; and as I hinted in my letter last week, I doubt if Gwyer realises that his Court does not yet carry the full weight or exercise the full authority which it will when it has been in existence longer. On the issue of whether the Chief Justice should be an Indian or not, I am perfectly clear in my own view (as I have made clear to Gwyer) that (whatever case there may be for considering a European Chief Justice already serving in India if no man of the requisite calibre can be found from home) the time is not yet ripe for us to appoint a man as Chief Justice whose experience is essentially Indian. What of course chiefly disturbs me is Gwyer's very definite suggestion that Spens is not up to the mark. So long as the man who comes from home is of the requisite quality we are on very strong ground. If Gwyer is right in thinking (as against Simon's judgment to which such weight must attach) that Spens is not of that quality, a more difficult situation arises. The whole business is thoroughly untidy; but I must try if I can to take Gwyer with us, and so provide against an uncomfortable reception for his successor. And I may have to exercise a little more patience with that object in view. I will telegraph as soon as I get his reply.

7. Rajagopalachari has been a great nuisance and I cannot say that he has played very fair. His object, as I have made clear in my telegrams, is to get some backing, however unsubstantial, as a result of which he can again become

a person competent to negotiate. He has got nothing out of Jinnah, though Jinnah of course is well satisfied to turn Rajagopalachari's approach to him to such political advantage as he can. I am quite certain that he does not represent the ordinary mind of the Hindu community, and that the Mahasabha in particular are greatly fussed by the thought of what he may have promised over Pakistan. (I see that Jinnah in his speech at Peshawar yesterday says that in May last Rajagopalachari expressed his readiness to accept Pakistan, and that may well further alienate orthodox Hindu sympathy from him.) He realises that his endeavour to drive a wedge between the Governor-General and the Executive Council has failed with the communiqué which we issued stating that the decision not to allow him to see Gandhi represents the considered view of the Government of India. He realises equally, that the questions which the Muslims are now beginning to put as to what, if any, arrangement he reached with Jinnah are questions which cannot be answered; and I see that in his embarrassment he has today said that it matters not in the least what Jinnah may have said to him, or him to Jinnah—what really matters is whether the Viceroy is right to refuse to allow him to see Gandhi. The whole business has come at rather a fortunate moment when even here, and I dare say still more at home, the public is much too concerned with what is going on in North Africa to have a great deal of time to spare for the Indian question. But Rajagopalachari has nothing to gain by consistency, and nothing much to lose by being exposed, and I shall expect him to follow the well established Congress technique of making a different statement every day for some time to come, in the hope of successfully clouding the issues.

8. Mody has been lamentable in this business. He is frightened out of his wits at the thought of trouble with Congress, or of exposing himself to the charge of not being progressive. Aney, as always, has been thoroughly honest, and the argument which he puts up is one which I respect and can understand. The balance of the Council are clear in their minds, as my telegram[12] will have shown you; and I am very glad indeed to have had this opportunity to go through the drill with them again and get a reaffirmation of their earlier policy. Thank you so much for the very helpful telegram[13] which you sent to Washington. Puckle had telegraphed one or two points from here, but your telegram was most useful and a very fair statement of the case.

9. I have been amused by a letter from Savarkar, dated 7th November,[14]

[12] No. 180. [13] No. 170.

[14] Dr Savarkar wrote to Sir Gokul Chand Narang that 'you will of course realise that in case Rajaji is allowed to proceed with his absurd but nevertheless most harmful proposals we cannot afford to leave him to roam in political circles in England unchallenged on the spot there, especially on the question of Pakistan' and asked his correspondent to head a Mahasabha delegation if necessary. (Enclosed in the letter of 1 December from the Private Secretary to the Viceroy to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State.) MSS. EUR. F. 125/137.

seen in censorship, and its comments on Rajagopalachari's "absurd but nevertheless most harmful proposal", and I send you a copy of it by the bag.

10. I send you by this bag a very interesting report,[15] dated 13th November, from a reliable informant (I have been told his name and we can regard him as quite definitely reliable) of a recent talk with Jinnah, which gives the clearest exposition of his views on the Pakistan issue that I have yet seen, and which you may care to have.

11. I saw Fazlul Huq yesterday. He was in very good form, and I think that my discussion with him early in October at Simla, and my subsequent communications to Herbert, have greatly eased the position as between Huq and his Governor. On this occasion he spoke very warmly of Herbert and I think they are getting on well. Let us hope that that will continue. He went on to say that he had been to see Jinnah while he was here for the National Defence Council, but that Jinnah made it clear to him that while he was prepared to readmit him to the orthodox fold if he would make the appropriate gestures, he must make those gestures, and that otherwise he, Jinnah, could agree to no Muslim Leaguer joining Huq's Government. Huq asked me how he could possibly throw over his friends in this way, and he went on to say that, while the Governor had so far refused to agree to his increasing his Cabinet by the addition of new Ministers because he thought that Huq might regret having done so were he later to need extra seats for Muslim League representatives, now that it was clear that the Muslim League were not coming in, he trusted that he would be allowed to have his own way on this point. I shall mention that to Herbert. He was very contemptuous of Rajagopalachari and said that he thought that he and his friends must resolve the basic problems among themselves before going any further.

12. I also had a friendly talk with Parlakimedi. He has settled down again and I urged on him, in terms which I do not think he will misunderstand, the extreme importance of his continued personal presence in Orissa if his Government was to be kept together. He is an old friend and though he has his weak points I feel sure that he is worth trying to hold together. Luckily his personal relations with Lewis seem admirable.

13. I also had a talk with Chhatari who, I gather, finds His Exalted Highness, on occasion, somewhat of a trial, and told me that he had scrupulously avoided appealing to the Resident even when he had not been too happy over these last few months, given the irascibility of the Nizam, and the advisability of keeping this card up his sleeve for an emergency.

14. You will remember that in paragraphs 6 and 7 of your letter of the 5th October[16] you commented on the "political incident" which I mentioned in

paragraph 12 of my letter of the 1st September.[17] I have discussed further with the Chief and with Hartley. They do not think that they can add a great deal. They agree with you that the matter was a very difficult one on which to take a decision and they add that it was only after long discussion and after examining the question from every angle, and reviewing in the course of that examination all the arguments put forward in paragraph 7 of your letter, that they reached the conclusion that our interests would best be served by allowing those afflicted with "Congress conscience" to resign rather than be tried by court martial. They do not agree that the size of the army in India has any bearing on the publicity which could be given to a court martial, since the subject matter, more particularly if a prominent politician is retained for the defence, is likely to produce a maximum of publicity in given circumstances. The Chief and Hartley add that they can see no reason up to date to regret their decision, the only cases that have come to notice having been this man Dadachanji and a R.A.F. storeman at Vizagapatam. Should "conscience" become really prevalent they agree that we should doubtless have to reconsider the position; but they suggest that in that case a situation very different from that which prevails today would have arisen in that Congress feeling in the armed forces would, somehow or other, have become immeasurably greater than it is now, and that we should in those circumstances have to revise our views pretty considerably as to the value of the Indian Army as an instrument of war.

15. As regards your suggestion (paragraph 6) that it might be worth while considering whether commanding officers should not be given discretion in clear cases to cut short the probationary period, the Chief tells me that commanding officers have that discretion already. As you will remember, Hartley in paragraph 3 of his letter of the 28th August,[18] quotes from the commanding officer's special report on Dadachanji, and uses the words "while at the same time avoiding getting himself entangled". That, they suggest and I agree, is the real point. I should think there is little doubt that the commanding officer had formed his opinion within a month of Dadachanji's arrival that he was never likely to be much good as an officer. But Dadachanji never committed himself sufficiently deeply to merit instant removal, and the commanding officer had perforce, therefore, to wait the full period of 3 months, when he could send in a balanced judgment over the period laid down, which is a period reasonably long enough to enable a balanced judgment to be formed.

* * *

[15] See Annex. [16] No. 69. [17] Vol. II, No. 672.

[18] Vol. II, No. 672, note 13. The C.O.'s report stated that Dadachanji was of 'the type who is out to give as much trouble as possible, while at the same time avoiding getting himself entangled'. MSS. EUR. F. 125/124.

21. I have had from Gandhi a manuscript letter[19] forwarding a letter of sympathy to Edward Halifax on his son's death in action, and I am sending it, so that it can go on to Halifax, by this bag. It is characteristic to the Mahatma in more ways than one. I have sent him a personal acknowledgment.

All the best.

[19] No. 148.

Annex to No. 187

MSS. EUR. F. 125/137[1]

REPORT BY A RELIABLE INFORMANT OF A TALK WITH JINNAH GIVING EXPOSITION OF HIS VIEWS ON PAKISTAN ISSUE

A reliable informant's account of a recent interview with Jinnah is as follows:—

2. Speaking on the present political deadlock, Jinnah stoutly denied that it was of his creation or that he relished its continuance. He had again and again made it clear that, within the framework of the present constitution, he was prepared to co-operate in the formation of a "so-called" National Government "on an equal footing". Lest it should be thought that he was a reactionary and was not in favour of rapid political progress, he had gone further and agreed to withdraw the condition that the Provisional Government must function within the existing constitution, provided the principle of self-determination was first recognised and Pakistan conceded after the war in response to the verdict of a Muslim plebiscite. See the Bombay resolution[2] of the Muslim League Working Committee. On this basis he was, and had always been, prepared to co-operate; he had told the Viceroy so; but he was not going to sell Muslims for the sake of a temporary political settlement and "a few crumbs of office" during the war.

3. His position was this: Did Muslims want separation or not? If they did not, the problem was simple. He could today go to the Congress leader and tell them that all that Muslims ask for was separate electorates, special weightage and similar safeguards. He was certain Congress would grant him any special concessions he wanted, even though it might go back on them in future years after it had secured complete control of the governmental and Parliamentary machinery. But in that case Muslims must accept the position of a "minority" and expect to be treated as minorities were treated all over the world. Speaking for himself, he did not regard Muslims as a "minority": Muslims were as much a "nation" as the Czecho-Slavs or the Irish were a nation and as much entitled to a separate homeland.

4. But if Muslims really wanted Pakiṣtan—and he believed they did—then it was impossible for him to take any line other than he had taken. Let

there be no mistake: This "provisional" Government, which was being so much talked about, was "Provisional" only in the sense that it was to be hand-picked without reference to the Legislature; it would function not only during the war but for a considerable period *after* the cessation of hostilities; it would be in authority at that critical time when the future of India was to be decided and the distribution of power was to take place, with Britain no longer there to hold the balance or pretend to do so; and in the matter of what India's future should be and how power should be allocated, it would play a dominant and decisive part. When that time came and Muslims found themselves in a helpless minority as much in the central Government as in the central Legislature, there would be an end of Pakistan. Muslims would be told that the "provisional" arrangement had worked excellently and must consequently be made permanent; and there would at that time be no means of resisting such a decision. That was why he was so insistent on his demand for the establishment of a Provisional Government "on a footing of equality". He was not prepared to explain what he meant by "footing of equality", but in any case he must have parity with Hindus. That was the only way in which he could safeguard Pakistan. To accept responsibility in a Provisional Government on any other terms would be to walk into the trap which Congress and Hindus generally were carefully laying for the unwary or impatient Muslims. It was a deep game; and he, at least, was not prepared to play.

5. The present was a time when Muslims were faced with a "life and death problem". He did not say that in an oratorical sense; he meant it literally. Muslims must either choose to assert themselves and win for themselves a place in the comity of nations or go under and accept a position of permanent inferiority. It was for them to say what they wanted. If the former, he was prepared to fight for them till the last; if the latter, he was willing to "take leave and concern himself with making money at the bar".

6. Far from taking a negative line, his attitude was a distinctly positive one. He was prepared to co-operate in the war effort and, to that end, ready to join an emergency Government on conditions which he had clearly and precisely defined. What more could he do? He could not force the Viceroy to accept them; Congress had no intention of accepting them; and the other parties had no standing entitling them to negotiate a settlement. It had been put about that Gandhi, just before his arrest in Bombay, had agreed to see him and settle terms; that was lying propaganda. Rajagopalachariar represented nobody except himself and, in his recent talks, had merely sought to clarify some points on which he professed to feel some doubt. If Rajagopalachariar could persuade

[1] Enclosed in the letter of 17 November from the Private Secretary to the Viceroy to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State.

[2] Vol. II, No. 598.

the Viceroy to let him see Gandhi and then persuade Gandhi to see what Muslims were insisting upon, there might be a possibility of going ahead; as it was, there was none.

7. He had been told that he had never clearly defined Pakistan. The fact was that everyone knew perfectly well what was meant by Pakistan and what the words "north-western and eastern zones" signified. The exact delineation of the boundaries of these zones, when separately constituted, and the fiscal and other adjustments which must follow the separation were matters to be decided by special commissions to be set up for the purpose. The question at present was: was the principle of separation to be unequivocally conceded or not? (Separation, envisaged in the Cripps proposals, was an eye-wash.) Once that principle was agreed to, there would be no difficulty in settling details.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *17 November 1942, 5.15 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 17 November, 3.45 pm*

No. 3267–S. Your personal telegram of 14th November No. 19665.[1] Many thanks. I am very glad that you have reached this decision. Since my telegram of 12th November[2] I have had your letter of 19th October[3] and have read with great care what you say in it. It does not alter the considered opinion which I have already expressed to you, but I would go a little further after thinking it over and say that in my considered judgment action on these lines might well cost me my Government. It would be known all over India within a week, and from the moment they embark on this enquiry my colleagues selected for the duty would be the target of propaganda and prejudice from every conflicting interest in the country. That is of course a very serious consideration and affirms the wisdom of your own conclusion that we should drop the idea. Apart from that, I am quite certain that none of the Members of my Government have in present circumstances and under war pressure the time to do the thing properly.

2. I am very glad that you are satisfied that it is unnecessary to give a specific hint to Mudaliar as regards the Americans.

[1] No. 182. [2] No. 163; the date should be 11 November. [3] No. 107.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *17 November 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 3268–S. Your private and personal telegram of the 23rd October No. 1259.[1] Jam Saheb. I have held up reply as I have been anxious to go personally and in some detail through what has passed between us officially, and pressure of other business has been great.

2. In the light of this further review I have reached following conclusions which as you will see differ in some ways from those which we have been tentatively considering through the official channel:—

(*a*) I would not go beyond general line set out in my official telegram of 25th August[2] (I suggest below that in certain respects it may be necessary to restrict scope of that reply).

(*b*) I am against publicity either here or at home, and would think right course a shortish letter to the Chancellor on lines referred to in (*a*), to include a general caveat of the nature suggested in paragraph 8 of my official telegram of 15th October No. 2986–P.[3] I appreciate that Cabinet may feel that we are giving assurances, &c. in private which are of general interest. I do not regard that argument as convincing, for our case is substantially that we are reassuring Princes as to position of assurances already given, while much of remainder of any letter would be devoted to removing unimportant misconceptions. Question of a Union is an exception. I deal with that below. Criticisms which we have to answer have been put to us[4] in the letter of 2nd June[5] which was secret and clearly not intended to be published, at any rate at this stage. Its publication and that of reply would certainly not help atmosphere in British India, and might well expose His Majesty's Government to some Parliamentary difficulty, though I do not exaggerate importance of that.

(*c*) I am now quite clear in my own mind that a separate union of States is just not practical politics, and that it is not worth wasting time thinking it out. I am equally clear that it would be disingenuous to encourage States to go on thinking on those lines. Practical arguments against will be sufficiently present to you but I will readily elaborate them by telegram if you wish me to

[1] No. 112. [2] Vol. II, No. 629. [3] No. 96.

[4] 'to us' deciphered as 'conservative (sic)'. The India Office thought that 'frankly' might have been intended. [5] Vol. II, No. 115.

do so. I deal below with question of line to be taken on this point in any reply to the States.

3. But there is a more fundamental issue involved and I would welcome your reaction to it. Is it wise or worth while in present circumstances here unnecessarily to alarm or dishearten the States? They are doing everything they can for us over the war. They are the one solid and dependable element so far as our relationship with India is concerned. Technically they are in an extremely strong position, given treaties, assurances, &c., and they can hold us to these save in extreme circumstances, or hold us up if we default on them as having broken faith publicly. I am as conscious as anyone of the weaknesses in the States' make-up, and as you know I have devoted my energies while I have been here to trying to bring them up to date, make them realise how weak in certain ways their position is, &c. But I gravely question the wisdom in present circumstances of antagonising, for no good purpose, the only element in which we can feel any substantial confidence, particularly when we are under binding and serious obligations to that element. The draft declaration of last March, put together as you know in circumstances of extreme pressure, never in my judgment sufficiently considered the difficulties of the States' problem. I fear I am now myself convinced, and am prepared to say so to Cabinet if you wish, that there is little hope or prospect of anything coming out of the proposed post-war constitutional round-table discussions, and that if we can ever get these people to sit together round a table, only result is likely to be an impasse worse than ever as between the British Indian parties, with the result that His Majesty's Government will probably have to impose some sort of solution which will however necessitate the abandonment of anything like Dominion Status of the ordinary kind, and will also necessitate the maintenance of some form of British connection carrying certain obligations on the part of India in return. It would be idle to speculate on such a hypothesis at this juncture, but I see no reason, given my pessimism, for weakening the bargaining position of States such as it is in relation to such a position should it arise, or for choosing this moment to dishearten and discredit an element whose weaknesses are patent, but who are lending us loyal support.

4. Alternative is of course while reassuring States as to broad treaty position in replying to Jam Saheb, simultaneously to give States now a severe and public lecture on their shortcomings; a warning that for practical purposes they must protect their own corner and can look for little help from us, and an encouragement to get ahead with projects such as a Union with its implications of severance or material modification of their historic relationship to the Empire.

5. I definitely prefer the first alternative. But if that alternative were accepted I would favour a pretty straight talk by you to the Jam Saheb simultaneously

with issue of our letter to him on shortcomings in the States, necessity for combined administrations, elimination of the weaker brethren, &c. You might add that His Majesty's Government so as to avoid public embarrassment to the States had refrained from a public statement in those terms, but that they had also instructed me before I handed over (on assumption that there will not be a meeting of the Chamber before I leave) to address a letter to the Chancellor which might be published, and which would draw pointed attention, though in a friendly manner, to the various references to this subject which I have made during my Viceroyalty, and to the urgent necessity for quickening the pace.

6. I now turn to the business of a States Union. I would be disposed to reply on this point that His Highness is quite right in thinking that this matter has not been worked out, and that the practical considerations and difficulties involved will be only too present to him; that he will remember that the Draft Declaration was in very general terms and proved abortive for reasons with which he is familiar; and that while the broad principles of that offer stand (your reply of 30th July[6] and Prime Minister's statement of 10th September[7] in the House of Commons) the form and nature of such proposals is a matter for the future. I would suggest that if you accept that view you should privately at the same time make it clear to the Jam Saheb that the practical difficulties in a States Union looked on the face of it almost decisive.

7. We must not promise more than we feel we can perform. But we have got to reconcile that with the existence of our formal engagements. And the States are well aware (too well aware) of the strength of their position *vis-à-vis* His Majesty's Government. On the whole (though I have been attracted by the idea of making the suggestion to them) I am inclined to agree that we can leave it to them to protect themselves in any negotiations by making their own terms as regards adhesion, retention of the sovereignty of the King, the British connection, &c. I see no reason for encouraging the would-be secessionists or for giving those who have backed us the feeling that at any cost we propose to encourage those who wish to terminate the British connection. Those are fences that we shall ourselves have to face up to. But it is quite useless to talk, as Cripps against the instructions of the Cabinet did, about right of secession unless it is accepted simultaneously that Princes will not come into a Union that proposes to secede, and that that may very well be the case with certain of the Provinces. Nothing short of the Crown (and the British connection) is going to preserve any form of Indian unity, and we shall be short-sighted if we refuse to accept that view.

[6] Vol. II, No. 366.

[7] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 383, 11 September 1942, cols. 552–630.

8. I have set out my views very frankly and await your reaction. I realise that you may have difficulties with Cripps, &c. in the Cabinet, but I personally am prepared to take responsibility for what I have said above with the Cabinet, and I can claim now to speak with some considerable practical experience, and (with a full realisation of the need for considering opinion in America, &c.) to be better able than anyone else concerned with these matters to judge what is likely to work in India. I would of course be most anxious to put my views in the way most likely to help you and strengthen your hand in Cabinet, and if you have any suggestions to make I will I need not say consider them with the greatest sympathy.

9. I do not think we need bother too much about the Jam Saheb's programme. He knows he has set us some rather difficult questions and while, like you, I should like to give him an early answer the issues involved are so considerable that we must take our own time to examine them.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *17 November 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 3270–S. With the greatest sympathy for your difficulties which I appreciate I am getting rather fussed about the succession to the Viceroyalty. Not from my own point of view, for I of course am off anyhow, but from that of my successor and of the office itself. Suggestion is now being widely made here that no one can be found to take it, and the most improbable names are being put forward. That cannot but do harm to the office and possibly also to my successor. Apart from that time is running out very rapidly and the new man has now no more than some four months to get his background, arrange for equipment, wind up his private affairs, &c. Finally (and this is really important) there is the matter of staff, and particularly of the Private Secretaryship. If he were to wish to choose a man from here (Laithwaite has put a suggestion to Turnbull, and see paragraph 36 of my letter of 1st/2nd November)[1] and the choice fell on the man I have suggested it would be essential to relieve him here immediately. Equally if the new Private Secretary comes from home he will be very hard put to it to get sufficient background in the short time remaining. If choice is from here I would propose if my successor agrees, to discuss with the P.S.V. designate before he goes home in what way burden on Viceroy

could be lightened at any rate in opening days by dispensing with submission of certain classes of papers, arranging for précis, &c., until he has found his feet.

2. I apologise for my apparent importunity. As I say it is less because of my own arrangements than because of my sense of the difficulties that may confront my successor. I know your own difficulties, but if you could possibly do anything to expedite a decision I am sure it will be well worth while. And I am sure that Lumley too would value an early announcement about Bombay.

[1] No. 131.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *17 November 1942, 9.10 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 17 November, 7.45 pm*

No. 3273–S. Following is my personal appreciation for period 7th to 16th November. Little change in the situation since my last report. There has been no noticeable improvement in Bombay Province where sabotage and clashes between mobs and police continue. In Bombay city 70 per cent. of students have now rejoined schools and colleges. Sporadic incendiarism and attacks on Government property still being reported from Assam, Bengal and United Provinces. We must continue to expect underground activity but victory in North Africa is likely to afford relief by suggesting to many that by backing Congress they are not on the winning side and if no Japanese attack occurs, it is probable that the movement will become further discredited and lose still more support.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Washington, Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

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Sir M. Gwyer to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

NEW DELHI, *17 November 1942*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I am very sorry not to have replied before to your letter of November 13th[1] but I have been away in Lahore for a few days and only returned this morning.

[1] No. 175.

I recognise, of course, that there is room for different opinions on the question whether the next Chief Justice should be an Indian or a European and, as I said when I wrote to you, I hope that there will be a European element in the Court for some time to come. But I am convinced that the feeling in India will be very strong indeed so far as the Chief Justiceship is concerned, especially if (as seems not unlikely) the jurisdiction of the Court is soon to be extended, though I think that that will weigh with them far less than the other aspect of the matter.

That brings me to the particular appointment which has been made. I dare say that the person appointed is as competent as the average King's Counsel may be expected to be; though, with reference to the Lord Chancellor's opinion that he is of the quality to be a High Court Judge in England, I cannot refrain from observing that no Lord Chancellor has, up to the moment, thought of so appointing him. It seems to me, however, that in the particular circumstances of the case something more than average competence is required, if the appointment is to be made in any way acceptable to Indian opinion; and I am quite sure that you will agree with me in thinking that Indian opinion cannot be wholly disregarded. Walter Monckton's position, both at the Bar and in Public life, is such that his appointment would have been an excellent one, and would have gone a long way towards mitigating Indian disappointment and irritation at the passing over of my two colleagues; but it does not seem to me that there can be any comparison between him and the person who has in fact been appointed and I remain of the opinion that the appointment will be regarded in India as a political one and as a reward to a supporter of the late and present Governments. It is very distasteful to me even to have the appearance of criticising the merits of a fellow Bencher of my own Inn, and I have no doubt at all that he would fill with credit many legal posts; but nothing is known about him in India save that he is a Member of Parliament, and I do not think that he has achieved that prominence at the Bar which would make his name familiar to the profession out here. It is that reason and none other that has made me critical of the appointment.

I observe that you refer to the Chief Justice of Bengal, but, though I have known him for a good many years, I can assure you that, in the view of the profession in India, almost any appointment would be preferable to his.

As for the date on which the appointment should take effect, it seems to me that it might be difficult to justify an appointment running from the date of my own retirement. It is in the highest degree unlikely that we shall have any cases to hear during May, since all appeals already entered will have been disposed of before that, and it is doubtful whether any new ones would be ripe for hearing before the autumn. The new Chief Justice would therefore be drawing a salary for a period of five months of inevitable idleness, for it is almost impossible to conceive circumstances which would require the calling

together of the Federal Court during the Vacation to hear a case, and the ordinary and quite infrequent Vacation business of the Court is disposed of by a single Judge. The English practice in such circumstances is to make and announce a new appointment just before the end of the Long Vacation. I do not know whether there would be any advantage in making the announcement in the present case early in the New Year, except the rather vulgar one that an announcement once made puts an end both to speculation and sometimes perhaps to less innocent activities.

Your Excellency's most sincerely,
MAURICE GWYER

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Sir A. R. Mudaliar to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

INDIA OFFICE, *17 November 1942*

2. I have attended about ten meetings of the War Cabinet and I have given to Your Lordship some account of the proceedings but I think Your Lordship would equally like to know my general impressions of the War Cabinet and the atmosphere that prevails there. You will not be surprised to hear from me that the Cabinet is dominated by the Prime Minister. There is a feeling, not only in the War Cabinet but in the entire country, that he is irreplaceable and that there is really no second in command who can step into his shoes at any time during this war. By his energy, by his grim determination to carry on under all circumstances, by his unflagging courage and by his remarkable capacity for exposition of the war situation and for rallying the public in times of depression, he certainly occupies a unique position. He is also a keen student of military affairs and can sometimes rival his technical experts on questions of military strategy. His position is both understood and understandable but there are both advantages and disadvantages in the formidable position that he has attained. There seems to be one point of difference between the present War Cabinet and the War Cabinet of Lloyd George (about which I can only speak from hearsay and from my knowledge of the memoirs of those days). Lloyd George had among his colleagues men who were not only of his age but also men who had more or less comparable experiences of public administration, like Balfour, Curzon, Milner and others whose opinions could not be lightly brushed aside. In the present Cabinet there is not that feeling of what I may call "nearness to equality" even and there is consequently too much of a tendency not to press one's own opinions and to accept somewhat too readily the opinions of the Prime Minister. Nothing illustrates my

point more than what is happening with reference to the treatment of prisoners of war. The decision on our side was taken by the Prime Minister without consultation with any of his colleagues either formally or informally within a few hours after he had heard that the Germans had threatened to manacle our prisoners. The question was raised in the Cabinet later and the Prime Minister said that he should be allowed some time to see what effect his reprisal had on the Germans. Every other member of the Cabinet feels that we ought to give up the idea of reprisal whether the Germans follow us or not but the Prime Minister is firm and in spite of the evident dissatisfaction of practically all the members the matter is left in its present unsatisfactory state. I do not by any means suggest that questions are not discussed and opinions not expressed or that the majority's view does not operate in the Cabinet but where the Prime Minister has previously made up his mind there seems to be no possibility of arguing on such points.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *17 November 1942*

The news continues good and one sees nothing but cheerful faces. There is, as you may have gathered from the newspapers, a certain complication in North Africa, due to Eisenhower's having fixed up things with Darlan to the exclusion and to the detriment, for the time being at any rate, not only of de Gaulle, but of most pro-ally Frenchmen in those parts. Apparently he became convinced that only by use of the mantle of Pétain was it possible to induce either army, or navy, or civil administration in North Africa to stop fighting, and Darlan, as Pétain's emissary, has been making use of the sacred name and getting away with it, in spite of poor old Pétain's passionate disclaimers and protests, discounted on the ground that he is no longer his own master. It is really a very comic situation. The justification of it lies in the fact that it should enable us to get to Tunis and Bizerta before the Germans have accumulated forces formidable enough to hold them for any length of time. But it will be very awkward if Darlan & Co. now entrench themselves as the main collaborators with the United States in North Africa, or even claim to bring in West Africa under their ægis. We certainly have no reason to be over-delicate in our treatment of Darlan when he has served his purpose; but the Americans, who have always been very anti de Gaulle, may feel it difficult to get out of their increasing commitments to him.

Perhaps they rather relish running a rival set-up!

L.

2. Meanwhile, the latest American naval victory at Guadalcanal should greatly diminish your fears of anything like a formidable Japanese attempt to invade India, and encourage hopes of an early advance by ourselves into Burma. The same applies to the stubborn Russian resistance in the Caucasus, which means a very direct reduction of any threat to Persia in the immediate future. At the same time, the Libyan and North African successes, once they really open up the Mediterranean, not only constitute a saving in shipping, oil, and mobility of fighting power, but also to some extent reduce the importance of Abadan. Taking things all round, India should be entering upon 1943 in much better mood than she began in 1942.

3. I have no doubt that is also true of the political situation. Looking back, it was obviously a great mistake sending Cripps out at a moment when we were being defeated right and left by the Japanese. We here, of course, never thought of the two things together. As you know, the whole Cripps business developed as an alternative to a reply by telegram to Sapru & Co. which I had drafted for Winston and which you were well satisfied with, both of us feeling that at that moment there was nothing that could be hopefully attempted.[2] Cripps' own going out only added to the impression that we were at our wits' end. Possibly, if the whole thing had been allowed to wait until now, and the proposals offer[ed] by you, or by myself, and therefore regarded as less sensational, they might have met with a much better chance of acceptance.

I did, & I said so. See my U.[1] *to the P.M.*

L.

4. I somehow don't think that we shall hear much more of Rajagopalachari's offer to come and settle things over here. Holburn in this connection has done most valuable service and if you think it suitable you might convey my appreciation to him. I believe Monteath and Emerson had a good heart to heart talk with Barrington-Ward the other evening and that may also have had a good effect. There is very little obviously that can be done now while the war is on, and what little can be done had better be left to your successor, whoever he may be. On that point Winston has promised to give me a decision this week, but whether I shall really get it, in spite of my continued worrying, I am not quite sure.

[1] Presumably Vol. I, No. 124. [2] See Vol. I, No. 66, Minute 3.

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Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

CONFIDENTIAL GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, *18 November 1942*

REPORT NO. 114

My dear Linlithgow,
This report covers the first half of November.

1. *General Appreciation.*—During the first week of this period, the increase in the number of sabotage incidents, which I mentioned in my last report, continued, but during the past week there has been a slackening in activity. I do not count on this improvement being maintained; but our measures for meeting the activities of the saboteurs are increasing, and I expect we shall keep them in check. An improved atmosphere, owing to the victories in North Africa, is generally noticeable in Bombay, and reports from several Districts mention that this news has had an encouraging effect upon educated opinion. There is still some disposition to wait to see what is going to happen in Burma, before admitting that India's position has been improved by the turn of events, but I expect that the latest Allied naval victory in the Solomons against the Japanese will help materially to improve the atmosphere. I do not think that this improvement will necessarily mean a cessation of underground activity, for those engaged in it are probably too inoculated with hatred to be influenced by the turn of events. I expect, however, to see the more ordinary Civil Disobedience activities die down, and a good deal of heart taken out of the support which it has received hitherto. A comparison between the general atmosphere during this movement and the 1930 movement was made to me a week ago, which is of interest. It is possible, I was told, to travel throughout the Province by car, and to meet with complete friendliness in every village on the way, whereas in 1930 there were many parts of the Province where a hostile attitude was most marked.

The Press has reacted in the usual way to the refusal by the Government of India to grant permission to Rajagopalachariar to interview Gandhi, but my impression so far is that this is a very artificial demonstration, and that there is not much feeling behind it. This I would attribute mainly to the resentment felt in Congress circles to Rajagopalachariar's defection and to the belief that he is prepared to go much further to meet the Muslim League demands than most Hindus.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *19 November 1942, 7.25 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 3289–S. Your private and personal telegram of 3rd November No. 1287.[1] Succession to Gwyer. I have informed Gwyer who has not, I fear, taken appointment at all well. He represents[2]—

(*a*) that under existing procedure he ought to have had a chance of expressing his view in the first place (that is apparently correct and I think we shall have to revise our procedure so as to eliminate any such necessity in future cases by amending the memorandum sent by my Public Secretary to Dawson under his letter of 21st June 1940, No. 18–1–37–Judl.–G.);

(*b*) that he himself thinks an Indian and not a European ought to be the next Chief Justice. He agrees that Zafrullah is not ripe but thinks Varadachari would do it;

(*c*) (and this is the most important point)

[*There follows a summary of the third para. of No. 192.*]

2. Gwyer (I have sent you copy of our correspondence by the bag of 17th November) also showed signs of a disposition to criticize the position of the Lord Chancellor in relation to this appointment.

3. I have made it clear in reply—

[*There follows a resumé of the main points in No. 175.*]

4. I am sorry that there should have been any slip over procedure either at this end or at yours. I think it would have been better had I had a chance of consulting Gwyer about Spens before we were committed to him and I have told him so. But I realise that soundings have to go fairly far before you can be sure that a particular man will serve if invited. As for Spens and his quality perhaps you would consider again what Gwyer has said. On this matter however as I have told Gwyer I must be in your hands with the assistance of the Lord Chancellor's advice. If you and the Lord Chancellor think that Spens is of the requisite quality, then I must accept your judgment in the matter: and Gwyer has made no effective alternative suggestion from here save Varadachari on which I repeat my view that the appointment in the forthcoming vacancy had best go to a European.

5. On a further point as to the date on which the appointment should take

[1] No. 135. [2] Nos. 155 and 192.

effect, Gwyer comments that it might be difficult to justify an appointment running from the date of his own retirement. "It is in the highest degree unlikely that we shall have any cases to hear during May, since all appeals already entered will have been disposed of before that, and it is doubtful whether any new ones would be ripe for hearing before the autumn. The new Chief Justice would therefore be drawing a salary for a period of five months of inevitable idleness, for it is almost impossible to conceive circumstances which would require the calling together of the Federal Court during the vacation to hear a case, and the ordinary and quite infrequent vacation business of the Court is disposed of by a single Judge. The English practice in such circumstances is to make and announce new appointment just before the end of the long vacation." On this matter again I must be guided by you, and would welcome your views in the light of what Gwyer says.

6. I have thought it well in view of Gwyer's sensitiveness to set out his views in much greater detail than would normally have been necessary. I should be grateful for very early reply.

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Government of India, External Affairs Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 109

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *19 November 1942, 5 pm*
Received: 19 November, 3 pm

9222. Addressed to Secretary of State for India repeated to Washington.

Washington telegram No. 5597[1] dated November 14th. Phillips.

2. We are glad to learn that decision has been taken and will be interested to hear when President proposes to make announcement in order that we may co-ordinate with publicity here.

3. In view of discussions which have proceeded in Washington and particularly of Welles' remark reported in first sentence paragraph No. 3 of Washington telegram 4933[2] dated October 2nd we consider principle of agreation has been sufficiently preserved.

4. We note that Ambassador states Phillips is being appointed as U.S. Representative in India. On the other hand Agent-General reports that "President has selected Phillips to be his personal Representative". Which will Phillips be?

5. When may I expect him?

6. Above drafted before receipt of your telegram 19780[3] November 16th.

[1] No. 183. [2] See No. 78. [3] No. 186.

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Sir G. Laithwaite to Mr Sherwood Eddy

L/PO/5/41: f 13

D.O. No. F. 408 (2)–GG/42 *19 November 1942*

Dear Mr. Sherwood Eddy,

His Excellency, who had already heard something from Lord Halifax about his discussion with you on the Indian problem, has asked me to thank you for your letter of September the 11th[1] enclosing a draft of your tentative four-fold plan for the solution of it. It has, as you know, been his constant concern throughout the seven years of his Viceroyalty to do all that he can to overcome the difficulties which lie in the way of the further constitutional development of India in conformity with the policy of His Majesty's Government, and he has been much interested in your views on the subject and desires me to thank you warmly for them.

Yours sincerely,

J. G. LAITHWAITE

[1] Vol. II, No. 732.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *20 November 1942, 7.35 pm*

Received: 20 November, 9 pm

No. 3306–G. Your telegram of 14th November No. 19636,[1] and my telegram of 17th November No. 3266–S.[2] New Food Department is in process of formation and should begin to function before the end of the month. Meanwhile operations are being carried out by existing Wheat and Civil Supplies Commissioners.

2. As regards your suggestion that we should secure control of such quantities of foodgrains as pass into hands of middlemen and traders, conditions in India render so all-embracing a scheme extremely difficult. The marketable surpluses of all foodgrains are estimated to total 17½ million tons. This amount passes into the hands of a hierarchy of middlemen of whom the majority are interested only in local and inter-district trade and only a fraction is left for export

[1] No. 181.

[2] Acknowledging No. 181 and referring to Lord Linlithgow's telegram 3241–S of 13 November which gave Mr Amery the substance of the communiqué (enclosure to No. 177) announcing the establishment of the Food Department. MSS. EUR. F. 125/23.

beyond the producing Province to other deficit areas or for Army requirements. To attempt to get control of the stocks accumulating temporarily in the hands of middlemen engaged in local trade would involve a colossal task probably too large for practical administration and might entail undesirable political repercussions in view of large scale displacement of private trade involved. Following deliberations at last Price Control Conference it has already been decided that Central Government should purchase through approved agents in the trade all wheat required for the Army and for civilian consumption outside the province of production. A similar proposal in respect of other major foodgrains will shortly be considered in Council. It is hoped that these schemes, which will involve the prohibition of private trade in the movement of grain beyond provincial boundaries, will act as a check on hoarding and speculation and induce the release of stocks at prices lower than would rule if the agents of the various importing provinces were to compete for supplies in the producing markets. It is expected that under the schemes which we have in contemplation the Central Purchasing Agency of Government will have to purchase some three to four million tons of foodgrains. Some Provincial Governments also are trying to build up reserves. It is intended that both Provincial and Central Government buying shall be effected through one Agency.

3. It is recognised that a substantial holding in the hands of Government would be the most effective weapon for control of prices and supplies. The difficulty so far has been that the pressure on our available stock for immediate consumption has been so great that we have been unable to afford to keep any substantial quantities out of consumption. It will, however, be the aim of the new organisation to establish as large a holding in the hands of Government as possible. The attainment of this object will of course depend on co-operation and assistance of Provincial Governments of whom some have shown a reluctance to permit the export of grains being doubtful of accuracy of statistical surpluses and desirous of encouraging the upward trend of prices in the interest of the producer. We are studying the problem of ensuring closer co-operation and stricter control.

4. One of the main difficulties which we have and shall continue to experience is the unreliability of our statistics of the marketable surplus. Foodgrains come to innumerable petty rural markets and there is no organised commercial intelligence in existence as in the case of cotton and jute. Consequently our purchase operations though starting with a programme based on the best and latest figures available will have to proceed on the principle of trial and error.

5. Although doubtful whether it would be practicable or politically desirable, we will consider further your suggestion that a portion of the land revenue

may be collected in kind. It is a matter on which the views of the Provincial Governments would be essential. It has been considered at the Centre once or twice already but has not so far been thought practicable. It can be considered only in *Ryotwari* settled areas where revenue is paid direct to Government but even in such cases the problem has been found to involve numerous complications.

6. The immediate rice position is now somewhat easier than reported in my No. 3188–S[3] owing to fact that Madras have found it possible to spare about 33,000 tons during November against 12,000 tons which they previously maintained was their limit. Of this quantity 12,000 tons goes to Ceylon, 15,000 to Travancore and Cochin and about 6,000 to Mysore and Hyderabad on whom Madras relies for imports of dry grains. Madras will consider at the end of November if they can continue exports on this scale. This affords a good example of the difficulty referred to in paragraph 4 above.

[3] See No. 181, note 1.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *20 November 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 3310–S. Your private and personal telegram of November 19th No. 1358.[1] You will by now have had my private and personal telegram of November 19th No. 3289–S.[2] If in the light of it you are clear that Spens is the right man, then we must go ahead, and I have warned Gwyer that there may be an announcement next week. I should however be grateful (particularly in the interests of keeping Gwyer sweet for his attitude towards the new man may be of much importance out here in legal circles) if you would let me have earliest possible reply on the point taken in paragraph 5 of my telegram of November 19th. It is also of great importance, given the doubts expressed by Gwyer, that we should write up Spens if selected as well as we possibly can. Could Joyce telegraph Laithwaite material which we could use here when the time comes?

[1] Saying that Spens' position was becoming impossible because of pressure for consultations from clients; that Mr Amery and Lord Simon were convinced that Spens was the best available candidate; and that Mr Amery therefore proposed to submit his name to the King unless he heard from Lord Linlithgow by 21 November. MSS. EUR. F. 125/23.

[2] No. 196.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/8/89: ff 186–7

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *20 November 1942, 10.45 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 21 November*

1362. Your 3289–S.[1] Successor to Gwyer.

1. I am quite satisfied that Gwyer's estimate of Spens is not in harmony with that now held at Bar here. Lord Chancellor assured me that he was the type whom he had been thinking of choosing for High Court here and Kemp's information confirms this. He may not be among the half-dozen pre-eminent leaders of the bar but Kemp certainly regards him as outstanding and not to be described as of average competence. Lord Chancellor also emphasises that he has the gravitas appropriate to the position.

2. You and I are agreed that a European from home should be appointed and I assure you that on that basis we are fortunate in having Spens' offer. Post is not attractive in existing conditions.

3. I have to-day seen Spens with reference your paragraph 5. He wants an early announcement to enable him to begin winding up his practice, which he cannot do until reason is public. He does not feel he can properly continue to appear in Court here when he is a C.J. designate except to complete cases but he does not in the circumstances particularly want to assume office in April. He would like to come by sea probably arriving June or July provided he can be sworn in on arrival. Although Court is in vacation I presume there is no difficulty about this? He would then have time to study the legal and constitutional lay-out in India and to meet or at least acquaint himself about some of the principal legal personalities before vacation ends. This programme would in part meet criticism suggested in your paragraph 5, and also enable Spens to complete seven years' service for pension before he reaches 65 as he is 58 on 9th August. This is important point for him.

4. I consider it impracticable to postpone announcement until towards end of vacation as Gwyer suggests. This would surely lead to speculation and lobbying and clearly any new man from here needs some months to close his practice. I propose therefore, to submit Spens' name to King early next week unless you feel strongly about it, in which case I should be glad if you would telegraph to reach me by Monday morning[2] at latest.

5. I should like to announce Wednesday or Thursday adding that Spens will assume office on his arrival in India which is expected to be in course of summer.

6. Having regard to wording of S. 200 (1)[3] which seems to require the existence of a Chief Justice, I presume you are satisfied that it will not be necessary to appoint additional judge on Gwyer's retirement & that Court can continue in being with two judges only pending Spens' arrival even if one has to be appointed acting C.J. Please do not delay reply on merits of appointment to examine this point which bears only on date of arrival.

[1] No. 196. [2] 23 November. [3] Government of India Act 1935.

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Mr Eden to Viscount Halifax

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 105

FOREIGN OFFICE, *20 November 1942, 10.55 pm*

IMMEDIATE AND SECRET

No. 7239. Government of India telegram No. 9222.[1]

We have assumed that he will be called simply United States Commissioner at Headquarters of Government of India. If there is any doubt about this please explain to United States Government that in view of India's experience of what happened in the case of Louis Johnson, Phillips' description as President's Personal Representative would greatly increase danger of belief arising in India that he has a mission of mediation.

Repeated to Government of India.

[1] No. 197.

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Viscount Halifax to Mr Amery

L/P&J/8/515: f 26

BRITISH EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C., *20 November 1942*

My dear Leo,

A line to thank you for your letter of 2nd November[1] which has been overtaken by your telegram 7019[2] from the Foreign Office of November 14th.

I did happen to have a word with Frank Aydelotte the other night, but purely in general terms, and I did not in fact get very far before we were interrupted.

When I got your letter I made exactly the same reflection that you have made in your telegram. It seemed to me that any outsiders going to India,

[1] No. 134. [2] No. 171; the date should be 13 November.

however academic or juristic their approach, would be certain to feel that their work must have two aspects; one, the scientific examination of a constitutional problem, involving, it may be, the kind of idea that Ned Grigg throws out, or, as I have always thought, a closer examination of the possibilities of the presidential system as they have it here; and, two, what would be in fact the judgment of Indian politicians. And the first thing that I would have guessed likely to happen would have been that they would certainly, as you anticipate, wish to see the Congress leaders.

I shall therefore do no more about it until I hear further from you.

I don't think there is anything more that I can say about feeling here than you know already. A great deal always turns upon the actual phrasing employed in any statement about India, and from the American point of view this has not always been happy. I do hope that you will not allow this aspect to be underrated. I certainly don't see at the present moment what different policy you can pursue, but this does not diminish my own conviction that you and all those who speak with authority about India need to put the right label on the bottle all the time for American patients.

Yours ever,

HALIFAX

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT *21 November 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 3312–S. Your private and personal telegram of 15th November No. 1332.[1] Zafrullah. He will be very valuable on the Chinese and I see no objection to his breaking return journey in London, but should warn you before you make up your mind that so far as Indian political situation is concerned he may well produce something embarrassing, for in the constitutional field he is entirely ruthless, and oblivious of all practical considerations in his self-appointed mission to be first past the post of self-government! I dare say we shall see some signs of that while he is in the United States, and you will remember that at an earlier stage while still on my Council he put up political proposals which went a good deal further than we could support. As in other cases he assumes that there is going to be a complete landslide, and wants the credit for having provoked it. I do not myself believe there is going to be a landslide and for that reason I am inclined to be a little shy of giving its evangelists a pulpit. But I have no doubt that with that warning you will be able to keep him reasonably

in hand. You will not overlook that a combination of Zafrullah and Mudaliar in favour of a marked degree of early constitutional advance, Indianisation, &c., which they can advocate all the more readily as they have no responsibility, might well present both you and me with difficulties of the type with which we are so familiar. If in the light of the above you would like me to do so I will of course readily suggest to him that he should return via London.

[1] Saying that Casey, who had seen Zafrullah in Cairo, had suggested to Eden that Zafrullah, after fulfilling engagements in Canada and U.S., should visit London to give first-hand impression of Chungking. L/PO/10/17: f 238.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *21 November 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

I am off to Bhopal tomorrow morning to stay two or three days with the Nawab, and must therefore close this letter a couple of days earlier than I should normally do. I shall also probably miss the bag containing a letter from you. There is not a great deal to say. The most important business has been the Rajagopalachari incident, the reactions to which I think are now beginning to settle down. I gain increasing evidence from various points that there is substantial apprehension among the Hindu elements that Rajagopalachari might have sold the pass or further strengthened Jinnah's hands on the Pakistan issue had he been allowed to go and see the Mahatma, and had it been known that he was sympathetic to Pakistan. That is all to the good. While one comes under a good deal of criticism for one's decision there is quite clearly little sign of any bitterness.

2. Sapru accompanied by Jagdish Prasad has now arrived here, both of them I gather pretty thoroughly frustrated. J. P. Srivastava tells me that they spent an hour with him this morning (preparatory to similar talks with other Indian Members of the Council) on the general line that unspeakable excesses were being indulged in throughout the country, and that the Indian Members ought to resign in protest. Srivastava, who could not discover that either Sapru or Jagdish Prasad had any programme of any sort whatever, or had indeed anything except extreme bitterness, pointed out to them that the responsibility in these matters is that of provincial governments, and that if they had any specific complaints they should address them to the provincial governments. He added that if they had any concrete instances he would be quite willing to hear them himself, though he could not accept responsibility. Sapru, after some argument

as to the legal aspect suggested that it would be best to leave that and concentrate on the moral aspect! He got no more change out of Srivastava on that, and I gather that they left him in a thoroughly bad temper. Sapru was to conduct a Press Conference this evening, and I dare say that some of his bad temper will manifest itself there and no doubt be a nuisance to us. But he stands for nothing. Neither does Jagdish Prasad, and neither of them know quite what to do. That is their trouble at the moment.

3. The campaign news continues to be first class and I think one can sense a very definite readjustment on political circles here in the light of it. Let us hope sincerely that things continue to go so well.

* * *

5. Sir V. T. Krishnamachari has just been in. He had been attending a meeting of Ministers here at which, I gather from him the problem of getting smaller States to acquiesce (I will not say welcome) in poolings of jurisdictions, &c. was much to the fore. He is of course very sensible on that. On the general political position his attitude was that there was no hope whatever of the parties getting together either now, or even in the post-war period, and that the only way out would appear to be that His Majesty's Government, after an interval during which the world could see for itself that there *was* no hope, should themselves impose a settlement. The political parties were now completely dug in, whether Congress or the Muslim League; neither was prepared to move one inch towards the other; while Jinnah had played his cards with great skill. He added that he thought that the removal in the course of nature of either Gandhi or Jinnah might ease matters a little. Gandhi's attitude was now completely negative and non-constructive; and he thought that his faculties had undergone some deterioration, though for all that he was still the one person that really mattered in the Congress world. That made it all the more lamentable that the outlook should be what it was. He agreed that the general situation in the country was very much easier; but, in reply to a question about the recent recrudescence of trouble in the Bombay Presidency, said that his information was that Vallabhbhai Patel had used to the full the interval between the meeting of the Working Committee in July and the meeting of the All-India Congress Committee early in August to organize on the fullest possible scale in Gujarat; that he had at that time bought ten lakhs' worth of food-grain such as Bajra, Jawar, &c. as a reserve to be used to keep supporters out of work in good heart while out of work; and that he had no doubt whatever that the Ahmedabad mill-owners were helping to keep the agitation going—there was plenty of money behind Congress in the Bombay Presidency. All this chimes very closely with my own conclusions, but I was interested to find that they were also Krishnamachari's views.

* * *

8. I have had from Clow an interesting letter[1] on the reactions of the Indian Services to the present situation. I asked Maxwell as my principal service adviser to comment, and I send you by the bag not only Clow's letter but Maxwell's comment,[2] and the views enclosed in it of Messrs. Conran-Smith and Tottenham. I am asking Thorne for his views and will send those when I receive them; and I will thereafter comment further on the general issue. Maxwell does not of course consider what should be done if there should be a serious deterioration (which has not yet occurred) in the attitude of the Indian Services. I have no doubt that the answer to that is largely that reflection on the part of potentially disloyal officers would show that disloyalty to one master is not necessarily a good recommendation for employment by another, however opposed politically. But as I say I will comment further in due course.

9. Ambedkar has sent me a long letter[3] and a very much longer memorandum about the grievances of the Scheduled Castes. It is a good piece of work, though of course informed by Ambedkar's particular point of view: and knowing the interest which Parliament has always taken of [in] these people, I think that it may be of use to you to have copies both of his letter and of the memorandum. These I send you by the bag. I will arrange for the appropriate departments of the Government of India to consider the specific points which he raises. I may mention in this connection that the China Parliamentary Mission while they were here appeared to be quite actively interested in the Scheduled Caste position. Ambedkar unfortunately was on tour and had no opportunity of talking things over with them: but I let Wedderburn (who as you will remember, was detained here for a few days after the others) go through his memorandum.

* * *

11. I have sent you a long telegram[4] about Gwyer and the Federal Court, and I send you by this bag a copy of his reply[5] to my letter to him. I am sorry to have inflicted so lengthy a statement on you, but given Gwyer's attitude I thought that it was the least that I could do. I now await with interest your reaction. I think you will agree that his second letter is a good deal more temperate than was his first.

[1] No. 81. [2] No. 118. [3] No. 125. [4] No. 196. [5] No. 192.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *22 November 1942, 6.25 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 3324–S. Your private and personal telegram No. 1362.[1] Gwyer. I am most grateful for the trouble you have taken. I have again been through the case with him personally in great detail and think I have soothed him, though he still thinks the appointment will be criticised out here. I therefore now agree to—

(*a*) announcement on lines suggested in your paragraph 5. It ought to be simultaneous, so please telegraph full text and date proposed as early as possible;

(*b*) Spens' plans as set out in your paragraph 3, on assumption therein stated which I have asked Gwyer to confirm.

2. Your paragraph 6. I am asking Gwyer to advise on this.

[1] No. 201.

207

Viscount Halifax to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 103

MOST SECRET WASHINGTON, *22 November 1942, 11.4 pm*
Received: 23 November, 6.30 am

No. 5706. Viceroy's telegram to the Secretary of State for India No. 9222.[1]

Welles informed me today that Phillips will be appointed as personal representative of the President with rank of Ambassador.

2. Welles promised to let me know in advance the form of statement in which the State Department would announce the appointment and the time of its issue.

Repeated to New Delhi.

[1] No. 197.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/8/89: f 179

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *23 November 1942, 2.10 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 24 November*

1368. Your p[rivate] and p[ersonal] telegram 3324–S.[1] Many thanks. I am submitting to King. Please let me have urgently your views as to swearing in and on para. 6 of my telegram 1362[2] as these will affect terms of announcement.

[1] No. 206. [2] No. 201.

209

Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/77

CONFIDENTIAL

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE GOVERNOR'S REPORT NO. 22, DATED THE 23RD NOVEMBER 1942

The Congress movement has pretty well died down, though a few people, including Dr. Khan Sahib, still make occasional speeches and try to enlist the sympathy of Red Shirt supporters—but with little success. Also, about 10 Red Shirts continue to offer themselves daily for arrest at the Police Lines in Peshawar; they have given up any attempt at picketing Law Courts. Outwardly, therefore, there are few signs of any Congress activity at all; and I doubt if there is much going on below the surface that we do not know of.

2. I recently spent five days riding through part of Peshawar and Mardan Districts, and visited a large number of villages and saw a great many gatherings. I was pleasantly surprised by the almost complete lack of interest shown in recent Congress and Red Shirt activities. Swabi Tehsil, in Mardan District, was one of the bad spots in 1930–31. It is difficult now to picture it as ever having been in that condition. It is a great recruiting area, and has a very fine record during this war. One village which has produced 550 recruits in the last 3 years has got a war memorial of the last war which shows that only 112 men were enlisted between 1914–18. In all the country through which I have toured the paucity of young men of military age is now very noticeable.

The pleasure of the people generally at the Allied successes in North Africa was clearly genuine. They have a remarkably shrewd appreciation of the war situation, whether things are going well or ill for us.

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Note of Meeting on Social and Economic Reconstruction in India

L/E/8/2527: ff 243–4

23 and 24 November 1942

Present: Mr W. D. Croft (in the Chair), Sir Theodore Gregory, Sir Malcolm Darling, Sir Frederick Leggett and Mr Jack (Ministry of Labour), Mr A. D. K. Owen (Lord Privy Seal's Office), Mr Dibdin (India Office)

Mr. Croft said that the meeting had been called to discuss the Memorandum[1] prepared by Mr. Owen on social and economic reconstruction in India, and in the light of any comments or criticisms that might be made he would revise it and place it before Sir Stafford Cripps for submission to a meeting of Ministers.

Sir Theodore Gregory, who is in charge of reconstruction discussions in India, said that a great deal has already been done, as a result of various Commissions such as the Linlithgow Commission, and a series of committees has been set up to deal with various reconstruction problems. The first is very much on the lines of the Reconstruction Committee, dealing with demobilisation problems, etc.; the second deals with Public Works and Government Contracts, the third with War Contracts, and the fourth is a large committee concerned primarily with questions of foreign trade and agricultural policy. During the next few months a committee on public finance will have to be formed, and although it won't deal with the question of the unbalanced budget, it will consider the whole question of sterling balances, and the future of the rupee, etc.

Mr. Croft said that it was necessary to realise that the centre of gravity in matters of this sort rests in India and mostly in the Provinces. In the self-governing Provinces we have no *locus standi* at all now, although in the Section 93 Provinces we could issue instructions through the Viceroy and through him to the Governors, but before instructions of this sort were issued it would be necessary for the Government of India to be consulted. It must also be realised that there is always the underlying assumption that India remains politically as it is now, i.e. that there is no Pakistan, otherwise the whole layout is altered. He asked Sir Theodore Gregory whether the Provinces are setting up their own reconstruction committees, and in reply Sir Theodore said that in recent months there has been strong pressure for the establishment of provincial reconstruction committees, but the Government of India do not really welcome this at the present stage, partly because it is essential first to have an all-India policy properly co-ordinated, and partly because of the strong feeling between Provinces as to where certain industries should be located, e.g. the

sugar industry. Both Bihar and the United Provinces think they should have their own sugar industry. So, in order not to get reconstruction problems muddled with provincial difficulties it would be better to wait until further progress has been made at the Centre. Young intellectuals at the Universities have been mobilised and a consultative committee of 25 young economists has been set up, with a vast programme of memoranda.

Mr. Croft went on to say that it is recognised that India is and must remain primarily agricultural, and the relation between industrial development and agricultural development must be taken into account. Industrial development must depend upon agricultural development and the raising of the standard of living of the agricultural worker because the former pre-supposes a market, and the market depends upon agricultural consumers having spending power, which means that the industrial standard of living cannot go very far ahead of the agricultural standard of living. Everybody assumes, no doubt rightly, that industrialisation will go ahead greatly, but however greatly it does so it cannot be relied upon to do much to relieve pressure on the land as it is not likely to do more than carry its share in the increase in the population. Sir Theodore Gregory agreed with this and said there is a strong tendency to exaggerate the possible repercussions of industrialisation on employment difficulties in India. Over the next decade the number of workers employed in industry is not likely to increase to more than 12 million, and that is very little in a country with India's population. At the same time rationalisation may decrease the number of workers actually employed. But it must be remembered that a large volume of agricultural output automatically creates a good deal of secondary employment, e.g. transport, distribution, marketing, clerical labour, etc. Industrialisation cannot be looked to as the solution of the problem of unemployment in India, but it would add variety to the number of openings and, chiefly we must look to it as expanding the national income. Sir Theodore did not think that Russian methods could be applied to India without a violent reaction, but Sir Frederick Leggett thought this had to be faced if the standard of living as a whole in India is to be raised.

One of the greatest problems raised by the progress of large-scale industrialisation in India is the complete disorganisation of the traditional handicraft industries, as the factories manufacture goods on a mass production basis, at a lower cost, and employing less than a tenth of the number of people employed in handicrafts. The real crux of the situation is not the urban industrial worker, who on balance is better off than the agriculturist, but the mass of village industry workers. Mr. Owen suggested that it was easier to make a start with raising the standard of living of the factory worker, as in a country like India the chief growing point is the industrial population in the cities. There it is possible to set up civilised standards, even if it is grossly unfair that one section

[1] An earlier version of the enclosure to No. 276.

of the community should be better off than others. Sir Theodore Gregory agreed that it would be easier to start with the industrial workers, but the real problem in India is the peasant, and if any lasting good is to be done a start must be made with him, as agrarian poverty is the most wide-spread difficulty of all. When the standard of living of the industrial workers is raised prices rise and the poor peasant cannot pay them.

Sir Malcolm Darling agreed with the foregoing but said that the fundamental point to start from in all questions of social and economic reform is education and, more than that, the people themselves must understand what is being done. One of the greatest difficulties in this connection is the provision of good teachers, but the payment is bad and so the large number of potential teachers being turned out in India do not come forward. The best plan would be for education to be provided on a contributory basis, that is, the Community should provide the building and land for the school, while Government provides and pays the teacher. There was general agreement with this point of view. Sir Malcolm felt very strongly that it would be a good plan to send a small commission of experts to Russia (not now, but at some appropriate time) to see how they have dealt with the problem of literacy. Although it is not suggested that the Russian model should be copied wholesale, there is probably a lot that India could learn from Russia. The Russians have used different methods of education, such as the radio and the cinema, and it was thought that India might with advantage try out these methods, although there would be the special difficulty of language in the use of the radio. For all these schemes large sums of money would be required and the question of raising this needs careful consideration. H.M.G. cannot intervene in matters of Provincial finance, nor could large sums be supplied from this country, and the rate of income tax in India is already very high, although the number paying income tax is very small in comparison with the total population. In some Provinces legislation has been passed for compulsory education but teachers cannot be obtained owing to lack of funds.

Finally, Sir Frederick Leggett suggested that a conference organised by the I.L.O. should be convened in India in order to consider all Eastern problems, including education. Such a conference would give Indians themselves an opportunity of hearing what is being done elsewhere, and the rest of the world, particularly America, would be able to get first-hand information as to what is being done and what has been done in India. It would be necessary first to draw up the agenda and decide which subjects could most usefully be discussed. Such a conference was on the point of being held when the war broke out, and the United States were very much interested, although there was a certain amount of competition as to whether it should be held in India or in Japan. It was thought that such a conference would be welcomed by the Government of India (the High Commissioner has already been asked to

mention it to the Labour Member) and, apart from education, such questions as the localisation of industry and public health could be discussed. The general opinion was that for at least two years after the war everyone would be too busy with their own problems to be able to attend such a conference, so that if it were to be successful it would be best for it to be held some time before the end of the war, possibly in 1943. In that case a full-scale conference would probably not be possible, but a meeting of such a body as the Emergency Committee of the I.L.O. could be arranged without much difficulty, or even something midway between a Governing Body meeting and a full conference.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/91

VICEROY'S CAMP, CHIKLOD, BHOPAL, *24 November 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

My dear Glancy,

Many thanks for your private and personal d.-o. No. 417-F.L.[1] of the 13th November, and for the news contained in it. I am glad that Baldev Singh is settling down and, as you know, I have always attached very great importance to the Sikander–Baldev Singh pact, and hope sincerely that it will continue to pay a good dividend. I should think that you have got out of Jinnah's tour pretty lightly on the whole! I have read his speech at Lyallpur and, of course, on the main Pakistan issue he has not the slightest intention of making any move whatever. But I think that most people, too, appreciate Sikander's difficulties with the very awkward balance which he has to maintain between Muslim, Sikh, and Hindu in the Punjab, and realise the motives that prompt his occasional appeals against the Qaid-e-Azam and also his alternative schemes for dismemberment. I get the impression of closer contact between the Muslims and the Sikhs, and you touch on that indirectly in paragraph 1 of your letter. It is an aspect of the general problem on which you may care to comment at some later date.

[1] No. 176.

212

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces) (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/105

SECRET VICEROY'S CAMP, CHIKLOD, BHOPAL, *24 November 1942*

2. Rajagopalachari had nothing whatever positive to offer me: he had got nothing out of Jinnah. He surprised me greatly by telling me that he was prepared himself to accept Pakistan in the post-war period. (I cannot believe that the Mahasabha, or the Congress for that matter, would ever support that point of view, and I was not surprised at the effect which it clearly had on Srivastava when I gave Council, for their secret information, an account of my conversation.) I have of course been sharply criticized for refusing to grant this meeting; but I fear I remain quite unmoved and entirely satisfied that to have agreed to it would have been the greatest possible mistake. I have found no one even among the critics, who imagines that an interview would have produced any results, and it goes without saying that we might either have had Gandhi urging that he could not negotiate under duress, or asking to see the Working Committee, or asking for their release, or putting forward propositions quite unacceptable but such that Rajagopalachari could with plausibility have asked me for a further interview. What would have been the result? Clearly the result which Congress desire to see achieved—a widespread impression that Government and the Congress were again negotiating; depression among Muslims, loyalists, and the Services; a general position of uncertainty; and, when the inevitable failure came, quite as much criticism of Government for its intransigence as we have earned now by my decision to refuse these facilities straight away. I am glad that Amery also took a firm line in the House, and that there was no criticism of our policy there.[1]

[1] See *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 385, 17 and 19 November 1942, cols. 220, 488–9.

213

Government of India, External Affairs Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 92

IMMEDIATE BHOPAL, *25 November 1942, 10.5 pm*
Received: 25 November, 10 pm

No. 597–G.C. Halifax's telegram to Foreign Office 5706[1] of November 22nd. I appreciate difficulty arising out of Phillips' high status, but I trust Halifax will be instructed to press point made in Foreign Office telegram 7239[2] to Washing-

ton and give reason for our strong preference for officially recognised designation of Commissioner. Apart from designation grant of Ambassadorial rank would cause much embarrassment here. It is also bound to react on Bajpai's position in U.S.A. Strictly, matters having gone as far as they have, I am prepared to agree to accept him as personal representative of President and recognise the compliment implicated in this. But I hope it will be possible to straighten out position as regards Ambassadorial rank, though I would not press our objection to point of refusing agreement.

[1] No. 207. [2] No. 202.

214

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT BHOPAL, *25 November 1942, 9.5 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 25 November, 10.15 pm*

No. 596–S.C. My External Affairs Department's telegram of today.[1] American representative in India. I much hope that you will be able to help us over this. I quite realise fact that Phillips has been an Ambassador making it difficult now not to grant ambassadorial status. But as you know I have not been particularly keen at any time on taking a man of this type as distinct from an ordinary career diplomat, and objections referred to in our official telegram are very real. Nor could I contemplate giving a higher rank to Phillips, whatever his past employment, than that held by e.g. Johnson, viz. below my Executive Council. I hope therefore that it may be possible to get the ambassadorial suggestion dropped if necessary mentioning matter to the Prime Minister and to bring strong pressure on Halifax to stand up to State Department over this. Point is of real importance.

[1] No. 213.

215

Secretary of State to Government of India, External Affairs Department

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 94

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *25 November 1942, 11.40 pm*

20334. Addressed by Secretary of State for India to Government of India No. 20334. Repeated to Washington.

Washington telegram No. 5706[1] of 22nd November. Phillips. Appointment is presumably likely to cause speculation in India regarding American mediation,

[1] No. 207.

particularly in view of Phillips' position as personal representative with rank of Ambassador. As you know we are trying to arrange that U.S. Government shall give guidance to the press. Your best answer to speculation should be to refer to this guidance, but if it is not forthcoming and you feel that something is required, I suggest you issue unofficial statement to the effect that U.S. Government are in the ordinary way filling the vacant post of Commissioner, although P. has the personal rank of Ambassador and is described as the President's personal representative: and you could add, if it seemed essential, that there is no question of external mediation.

2. I understand that P. will be leaving here in about ten days.

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Viscount Halifax to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 91

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, *25 November 1942, 11.36 pm*
MOST SECRET *Received: 26 November, 7.10 am*

No. 5768. Your telegram 7239.[1]

Sir R. Campbell took this up with Mr. Welles to-day. Latter indicated appreciation of our point but said that United States Government were anxious not to have to deprive Mr. Phillips of the title of Ambassador which he had enjoyed for so long. He asked whether it would be acceptable if Mr. Phillips were called United States Commissioner with personal rank of Ambassador. Sir R. Campbell said he imagined there would be no objection to this but that he would like to confirm it.

Please instruct me as soon as possible on reply as Welles said he thought United States Government would be ready to make the announcement any day now. I hope you will be able to grant the wishes of the United States Government in view of Mr. Phillips' distinguished service in United States Diplomatic Service and desirability that he should have precedence.

Repeated to Government of India telegram No. 308.

[1] No. 202.

217

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir A. R. Mudaliar

MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *25 November 1942*

My dear Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar,

I am most grateful to you for your regular reports on your doings in London, and feel somewhat ashamed that I should not have been a better correspondent myself. But the pressure of events has been quite exceptionally heavy, and I have found it very difficult to find time to settle down to letter writing.

2. It is quite clear from your letters that your visit is serving a most useful purpose, and I congratulate you on the close and friendly relations that you have clearly established with the Cabinet, and on the impression that both you and the Jam Saheb are making at home. I need not say that this letter carries with it my best good wishes for the success of your American tour. I am sorry that these difficulties have arisen at the last moment over the credentials (if that is the right word to use) of our delegation to the I.P.R. Conference,[1] but I think that they will admit of being smoothed over; for the delegation is, I feel, a very strong one, and well qualified to give a balanced view, from its various aspects, of the Indian case.

3. In the political field, I think the most important incident since I last wrote to you has been Rajagopalachari's approach to me for permission to interview Gandhi. I have sent you, through the Secretary of State, a short message[2] bearing on this, and you will of course be receiving in the ordinary way the proceedings of Council which will show you how the discussions in Council went.

4. As you will remember, we had decided as a Council in August to proceed on the basis of no contacts with Gandhi and the Working Committee, though we subsequently relaxed that to the extent of making provision for domestic correspondence and for supplies of newspapers; but the main principle holds good. Doctor S. P. Mukerjee subsequently asked me for leave to go to see the Mahatma, and I had no hesitation in refusing him—a refusal that did not create any particular fuss outside. The matter again came up in Council at the end of October (largely owing to a misunderstanding on my part of some observations by Mody), but it was clear from the discussion that then took

[1] A Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations was to be held at Mont Tremblant, Quebec, in December. The Indian delegation, of which Sir A. R. Mudaliar was a member, claimed to have been sent by the Indian Institute of International Affairs; but Pandit Kunzru, a member of the Council of the Institute, had stated that they had not been properly appointed.

[2] Not printed.

place that the general mind of Council remained the same. I was therefore in no doubt as to the feeling of my colleagues when I received, at the shortest of notice and late on the night of 11th November, a request from Rajagopalachari for an interview at the earliest possible date and, as on the three following days I was due to be in charge of the Defence Council for most of the day, I thought the wise thing would be to fit him in at 9.15 the following morning. I did so, and talked with him for 50 minutes. But it was abundantly clear from the outset that whatever his good intentions he could in fact speak for nobody but himself, that he had got nothing out of Jinnah, and (to the extent that he told me that he was himself now prepared to contemplate Pakistan in the post-war settlement) that he was most unlikely to be able to count on any support from the Mahasabha or for that matter from Congress. He frankly admitted the difficulty likely to be experienced in moving Gandhi but told me that he was not without hope that he might prevail. But it was perfectly clear that there was no substance in him, and I was equally clear as to my own duty which was to refuse the facilities for which he had asked. He expressed himself as very dejected at my doing so, but I cannot really believe that in his heart he could have hoped that I would grant to him facilities that had been denied to Mukerjee (who after all was not merely a Minister but prominent in the Mahasabha), or that we should be disposed to give him the additional credit which would inevitably result from his being allowed to go to interview Gandhi on the general political position.

5. I thought it well to bring out to Rajagopalachari the complete absence of any change in the mind of Gandhi or the Working Committee, despite the fact that they have been having papers for some considerable time and must be well aware of the violent and criminal character of the Congress disturbances; and I reminded him that those disturbances were by no means finally liquidated, and that they were in fact in certain parts of the country taking on a still more criminal character than they had in the past. But you will not be surprised to hear that none of this moved him very greatly!

6. Council, as you will see from the minutes, were in full agreement with the course taken, with the exception of Mody and Aney. Of these two, Aney put up a perfectly understandable argument which was that had we allowed Rajagopalachari to go to see Gandhi nothing would, indeed, have resulted, but we should have avoided the suggestion that might otherwise plausibly be made that we were standing in the way. Mody was clearly greatly concerned by the criticism which had already manifested itself in the Press. But he stood alone, and it was very evident that the information, which I gave Council for their personal information, of Rajagopalachari's attitude towards Pakistan had gravely disturbed Srivastava. Since then Jinnah has made it clear that Rajagopalachari got nothing out of him, and the incident is in process of being

liquidated. As I have said above, I have not the least shadow of doubt that the course taken was the right one, and I was glad to see, when the Secretary of State in Parliament[3] made clear what the policy of the Government of India had been, that there was no sign of any criticism.

7. The other important matter of direct interest to you which has been concerning me lately has been the reorganisation of the Commerce Department with a view to getting this business of price control and food production on to a sounder basis. It had been in my mind for a long time past, and you and I have touched on it at various times in our conversations. Food supply and price control are, as I think we both agree, at this moment about the most important matters before the Government of India, and the wise course seemed to me to be to take out of the Supply Department the important food-purchasing function which it at present discharges, to establish a closer liaison between the food secretarial organisation and the Department of Education, Health and Lands, and the I.C.A.R., and to concentrate the whole subject in the Commerce Department under a separate Secretary. For that post, I chose Holdsworth, who has of course been working hard on rice and wheat, and is of an appropriate standing. I trust that he will justify my selection, and I have every reason to believe that he will. . . .[4]

8. We have been doing our best to help Ceylon. I am very grateful to you for the information you have been kind enough to let me have from time to time on that subject, and also for all your help in explaining matters in the Cabinet.

9. I read with great amusement and much sympathy the account in your letter of the 2nd October[5] of Cripps' proposals for the solution of our problems out here. The discussion as reported by you very well illustrates the somewhat Utopian ideas that sometimes enter the minds of even the most experienced of politicians when they have not the requisite degree of Indian background. I need not say that I am in the fullest agreement with the argument which you advanced, and I am glad to think that it should have had the damping effect which clearly it did have on these somewhat wildcat schemes.

10. Very many thanks, too, for the help you have given us with Lord Leathers about the shipping position, and also both with Lord Leathers and with Oliver Lyttelton, &c. on this really important question of locomotives. You may be certain that we shall continue to make full use of your presence here, and if there is any point on which you would like fuller material for the purpose of these discussions, you have only to let me know.

11. I am delighted that you and the Jam Saheb should have seen Smuts, who is I see now on his way back. He is one of the outstanding figures and

[3] See No. 212, note 1. [4] Personal comments omitted. [5] No. 53.

personalities of this day and, as you know, he has always taken a keen and well-informed personal interest in India and its problems.

12. The news from all the fighting fronts during these last few days has been an immense encouragement to us all. I need not say that I hope that it may not be quite without its effect on the political situation here, and that some of those who have in the dark months through which we have passed supported the Congress through uncertainty as to our capacity to win through may begin to think again.

13. Let me again send my warmest good wishes for your American tour; and I hope that you will give a message from me to Zafrulla when you see him. I had a very useful talk with him on his way through Delhi from Chungking, and found his impressions of China and the attitude of China towards India, both now and in the future, of great value.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

VICEROY'S CAMP, CHIKLOD, BHOPAL, *25 November 1942*

CONFIDENTIAL

19. In the wider political field, I confess that I see no sign whatever of any hope of progress. It is becoming increasingly clear that the parties have dug themselves in for good, with Jinnah continuing to consolidate and improve the Pakistan position. And if I am right in thinking that the Muslims do not really want to move (and I think there is a great deal to be said for that), he has nothing to lose by being as intransigent as he likes at our expense and that of the Congress. The Congress continue to sulk and to hope no doubt that the Left Wing at home and in the United States, and possibly in China will succeed in getting them what they want against our opposition. I suspect they may find themselves rather badly mistaken in that. Moderate opinion continues to count for as little as ever, and the activities of Jagdish Prasad, Sapru, &c. have led to nothing so far, while their essentially Hindu character becomes more and more widely recognised. The States continue to look on. What does interest me (and I would welcome any impressions that you may have on the point) is the increasing number of people of standing and experience who come to see me and take the line, which they would never have taken a year ago, that there is no hope of progress with the parties; that it is ten-to-one that a post-war

conference will break down because people will not attend it save on their own terms which are incompatible with one another; and that we shall be forced (unless we are prepared indeed to turn our backs on this country) to carry on with some scheme of government imposed by ourselves with, of course, the inevitable corollary that we shall remain there to hold the balance. I would not, I confess, be altogether surprised if opinions were to turn out that way: though given the specific character of our undertakings and the publicity we have given to them it would be essential that, if such a situation were to develop and if we were to have to impose our settlement and look after it, it should be perfectly clear to world opinion as well as opinion at home that, as in the case of the Communal Settlement,[1] we have only done so because of the complete failure of Indians themselves to produce any solution, and of the impossibility, consistently with our obligations, of leaving this country to fend for itself. It may, of course, be (though the attitude of the *Times* both as regards India and the Colonies is disturbing) that with the end of the War, if we win by a sufficient margin, there may be a disposition to take a somewhat more realistic view of our relation to our overseas commitments, and that people may be a little less patient than we have been, perhaps mistakenly, over so many years, with the hostility of bodies such as Congress.

20. What the answer is to be is of course a question of the utmost difficulty. Federation is much despised, and it is the fashion for people to go out of their way to condemn it. Nor have I ever overlooked that the federal scheme of the Act (which was incidentally far less closely scrutinised than the Provincial plan at the time of the Joint Select Committee) has many flaws and imperfections. But failing all suggestion of Indians themselves producing anything that is workable, we may yet (I hope you will not think that this is a case of King Charles' head with me!) find ourselves back to the federal scheme, or some portions of it, as the solution that is on the whole the least objectionable and has the least measure of opposition to it.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW

[1] In a statement dated 4 August 1932, His Majesty's Government announced that, in the absence of any agreement between the Indian communities, it had itself decided how seats in the Provincial Legislatures were to be allocated among the communities under the proposed new Indian Constitution then under discussion by the Round Table Conference (Cmd. 4147). This allocation, known as the Communal Award, was, with some modification, to form the basis of the distribution of seats in Provincial Legislatures eventually laid down by the Government of India Act 1935.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *25 November 1942*

The question of your successor still remains undecided, though I hope it will be settled in the next two or three days. All sorts of suggestions have been made, but I will not trouble you with them because I hope to be cabling to you long before this reaches you.

2. Meanwhile, Phillips, the new American Representative of the President, came to see me yesterday. I first met him in Ottawa a good many years ago and I know he got on very well with our people in Canada. He has long experience of this country and of the Empire and has passed the age when he might be thinking of making political capital for himself in India or anywhere else. So I think you will find him really hopeful [helpful?] and the sort of person whom you can take very largely into your confidence. I enclose a brief note of the talk I had with him yesterday.

Enclosure to No. 219

NOTE OF A TALK WITH MR. PHILLIPS AT THE INDIA OFFICE ON TUESDAY, 24TH NOVEMBER 1942

Mr. Phillips came in and told me how delighted he was to go to India and how immensely interested in what lay before him. I told him that we were even more delighted that one of his wide experience in the British Commonwealth and outside, would, after a long gap, be permanently and regularly available at Delhi in order to keep the President informed at first hand and reliably on the progress of affairs in India. We discussed the Indian problem generally, which gave me an opportunity, in connection with the fact that the deadlock is really between Indians themselves, to touch on the Viceroy's anxiety lest his mission should be supposed in any way to be that of mediation. He emphatically disclaimed any such idea, but subsequently said that the President wished him to be helpful if he could do so in any way, and he asked me what in fact would constitute being helpful. I told him that anything that he could tell them about how the American constitution or Dominion constitutions came into being and could bring them back to the point that it was only on the same lines and by agreement among themselves that they could get anywhere, would be all to the good. Also, if he could convey to them the impression that thinking America while keenly interested in seeing a solution of the Indian problem, was not blaming us for Indians not agreeing.

He was anxious to know what he should do about his quarters: whether to go to a hotel or whether it would be wise for him to accept an invitation from the Viceroy. I suggested that nobody could misunderstand his staying with the Viceroy for the first few days, either actually at Viceregal Lodge or in one of the houses in the grounds. As to the people he should see, he suggested, very properly, that the first for him to call on after the Viceroy himself would be the members of the Executive. As for the rest, I told him that he would naturally meet them socially in Delhi or if he visited the other capitals, just as he would meet them in London or Ottawa, and that there was certainly no objection or obstacle to his meeting any and everybody in the ordinary course. I added that he was not likely in the immediate future to meet Congress leaders and he said that he had no desire to do so. I added that he would get substantially the same point of view on the constitutional future, though with a different outlook as to methods, from the Indian moderates and in certain other respects from the Mahasabha.

L. S. A.,—24.11.42

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Government of India, External Affairs Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 79

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *27 November 1942, 11.50 pm*
Received: 27 November, 11 pm

No. 9459. Addressed to Secretary of State for India and repeated to Washington.

Washington telegram to Foreign Office No. 5768[1] of November 25th. Phillips.

2. We are very glad to see that United States of America Government appreciates our position in regard to the point of designation and we think that some such formula as that of "Mr. Phillips lately U.S.A. Ambassador in Tokio and Rome has been appointed to fill the post of Commissioner of the United States to India and will retain while serving in that appointment the personal rank of Ambassador" would meet the purpose.

3. We readily agree to the special personal rank in the warrant for P. and he will be placed in the same position as Johnson held as the personal representative of the President viz. after Article 9.

4. We should prefer if possible to avoid giving the title of (Excellency) and to style him (Honourable) but would welcome your advice on this point.

[1] No. 216.

221

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/8/6: f 32

27 November 1942

32-U. Hoping to secure Colville formerly Secretary of State for Scotland for Bombay. He will do excellently. As regards Viceroy we are pressing Cranborne who is seeing his doctor over week-end but I am not too hopeful.

222

Secretary of State to Government of India, External Affairs Department

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 89

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *27 November 1942, 3.50 pm*

20402. Following is repetition of F.O. telm. to Washington No. 7361 of 25 November. *Begins.*

Your telegrams Nos. 5706[1] and 5661.[2]

We all attach great importance to this appointment being properly launched. If the United States Government leaves the possibility of mediation undealt with or in doubt, questions on this point will inevitably be put to the authorities in New Delhi, who will in these circumstances have to produce their own reply.

2. You are in the best position to handle this. If the Americans maintain the view expressed by Welles in your telegram No. 5661 you have no doubt considered whether President might be persuaded to give at his press conference a reply in terms concerted with you. Please keep New Delhi urgently informed.

3. Secretary of State for India had satisfactory talk with P. yesterday.

4. See also telegram No. 20334[3] from Secretary of State for India to Viceroy which is being repeated to you. *Ends.*

[1] No. 207.

[2] In his telegram 5661 of 19 November 1942 to the Foreign Office (repeated by India Office to G. of I., tel. 20221 of 24 November), Lord Halifax reported that Mr Welles 'was doubtful of wisdom of offering spontaneous guidance to press, fearing it might seem case of *qui s'excuse s'accuse*', and thought that a routine announcement of Phillips' appointment should be made 'giving the appearance of a step in the ordinary course of diplomatic events'. However, if announcement produced any signs of 'undesirable speculation', Mr Welles undertook that U.S. Government would make the position clear. L/P&S/12/2633: f 104.

[3] No. 215.

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Mr Eden to Viscount Halifax

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 77

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE, *27 November 1942, 3 pm*
MOST SECRET

No. 7396. Your telegram No. 5768.[1] In commenting on your telegram No. 5706[2] the Viceroy has again stressed the objection to P. being described as Personal Representative, though he is reluctantly willing to accept this if necessary. He says however that ambassadorial rank will cause special embarrassment and has asked that an attempt should be made to get this proposal dropped.

2. I am afraid that matters have gone too far to make this possible and if you think so you may accept proposal in your telegram under reference. If as I assume it means abandonment of intention to call Phillips the President's Personal Representative so much the better. I leave you discretion on this but if this title is retained importance of guidance to the Press about mediation increases vide my telegram No. 7239.[3]

3. Whatever Phillips is called he will have the same high precedence as Johnson, i.e. in the Article which contains Members of the Governor-General's Executive Council. Viceroy cannot contemplate putting him higher. You will remember that the preceding Articles contain only Governor-General and various Governors in their respective gradations, Commander-in-Chief, and Federal Chief Justice.

4. I hope that appointment will not raise any question of alteration in Bajpai's position. We could not agree to this.

Repeated to Government of India, External Affairs Department.

[1] No. 216 [2] No. 207. [3] No. 202.

224

Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, *27 November 1942*

My dear Linlithgow,

Laithwaite, in his letter of November the 21st[1] to Garvin, asked for a further report from the Superintendent of the Ahmednagar Detention Camp, on the

[1] Not printed.

general behaviour of the detenus there. As I have just returned from Ahmednagar, and had an interview with the Superintendent, this letter may perhaps take the place of a further report. The Superintendent told me that everything was working smoothly in this Detention Camp and that the detenus were quiet and well-behaved. The only one who occasionally was difficult was Asaf Ali, whom he considered highly strung and inclined to get excited, for which he was afterwards always repentant; he has also luxurious tastes, and it was not always easy to obtain the things for which he asked. The others read a great deal and wrote, and played badminton; and Nehru was busy gardening. I asked the Superintendent what he considered to be their attitude of mind. He said they all seemed resigned to a prolonged stay, and appeared to take the line of least resistance, by which he meant, were disposed to make themselves as comfortable as possible. He often heard their comments on matters in general, and noticed that they were always keen to read any statements or speeches made by the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State, presumably to see whether any change was to be detected in their attitude. Dr. Pattabhi casually remarked to him a little time ago that he was surprised that disturbances had continued so long.

I also took the opportunity to look inside the outer wall of the Fort and to see what the keep in which they are interned looked like. I need hardly say that I did not go inside the keep. It seemed to me an ideal place for their confinement, being completely shut off from the rest of the Fort. I was also interested to hear from the Superintendent that it was not generally known, even in Ahmednagar, who was interned in the Fort. It was understood generally that Nehru and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad were there, but it did not seem to be known what the others were.

If you would like a more detailed report from the Superintendent, it can be easily got.

Yours sincerely,

ROGER LUMLEY

P.S V.—

We would of course like any fresh news if such is forthcoming. Otherwise, I think this covers all I want.

L.,—30.11.42

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

INDIA OFFICE, *27 November 1942*

I am sending you today a telegram[1] on the long-delayed business of the reply to be given to the Jam Saheb's letter. The matter has rather swung backwards and forward as it seems to me, for the Cabinet's proposed short text so over-emphasised the position of the Princes—except in the one particular of the reference to Cripps and internal reforms—that it seems to have rather made you swing further in the opposite direction than you originally favoured. In my telegram I am suggesting that we should get back to the position we originally agreed upon, with, in the main, only minor modifications. One point, however, I am clear upon in my own mind, and that is that it would be a mistake to evade the issue of principle and *izzat* raised by the question whether the Princes are entitled to form a separate union of their own in case an all-India Union fails to commend itself to them as the outcome of the constitutional convention. The matter as I see it is purely one of theoretical principle and pride. To say to them, who are already more independent than the ordinary Province, that they are not entitled, when we set everyone else on their feet, to come together, and that we have less faith in their wishing to remain linked to the Crown and within the Empire, seems to me to be giving them unnecessary offence. In practice that, and the similar right of the Provinces, is after all only in order to force the Hindu Provinces to be reasonable. In other words it is only another way of emphasising the principle of a constitution based on agreement. In fact, this business of separate unions so teems with difficulties that I can hardly conceive it coming off. If it did, say in the shape of a northern bloc, a western bloc and a southern bloc—some States possibly preferring to join neighbouring Provinces—even then I cannot imagine the Princes concerned conceding to such a Union more than a very limited range of powers. As regards certain matters, for instance, namely, the protection of their family rights, succession, &c. they will still, I imagine, prefer to retain the link with the Crown Representative and only surrender to a common authority such things as defence, customs, railways, &c. Even as regards that union, they certainly would not wish to separate from the Crown. All that would involve a readjustment of treaty relations and there might very well be in respect of the matters taken out of the several States and transferred to the common constitution, a separate new treaty between that and the Crown. In that case we could no doubt insist, in return for such a protection or promise of assistance as we might be prepared

[1] No. 226.

to give, on a more efficient organization of their own forces, or on the standard of the Civil Service and general administration, as well as on such matters as minority rights. My own feeling on the whole matter is that we ought to encourage the Princes more and more to take a lead themselves, on the one hand in eliminating internal weaknesses and liquidating or absorbing the smaller States, but also on the other hand in guiding India in the right direction constitutionally. The best hope for India in the future may well lie in the Princes on the one side and the rising generation of Indian officers in the British Indian Army.

2. Meanwhile, it seems to me that for the near future—and that may extend for a good few years—we cannot well do more at the Centre than carry on and strengthen the existing form of Government. By strengthening, I mean more particularly emphasising its effectiveness and its independence, subject only to the ultimate reserve power centred here, in the ordinary conduct of its affairs. I like your suggestion[2] of some sort of statement, either in answer to a written question or otherwise, which should get out the nature and functions of the Government of India and am looking forward to your telegram on the subject. I am not sure that a White Paper describing both the Government of India and the work of the India Office would not be very useful at the present moment.

3. As regards further Indianisation, I am on the whole prepared myself—though this naturally will be a matter which your successor will have to face—to go somewhat further than you are. I should, for instance, be definitely inclined to follow up your idea of Maxwell being succeeded by Usman.[3] Whether that should happen simultaneously, or some months after your successor's arrival, there is much to be said, I think, for its being announced at a fairly early date. I fully realise the difficulty of the communal position, but am inclined to think it could be met partly by increasing the Muslim element (though not up to the 50/50 proportion demanded by Jinnah) and partly by the Governor-General formally intimating that his reserve powers would certainly be called into play by anything that savoured of communalism either in the administration or in prejudging the future constitution.

4. In that connection I can assure you that I certainly did not give Mudaliar the impression that you were the main obstacle to Indianisation, and though I did mention that his raising the subject was embarrassing in so far as he had no lead from you to do so, I also put to him, as my own opinion and therefore that of the Cabinet here, the various objections to his proposal.

5. That brings me to another point on which it seems to me that the present constitutional position does not quite correspond to the constitutional principles to which we are committed. The discussion of the future constitution of India is

technically outside the purview of your Executive. But that, after all, corresponds to the situation when it was assumed that any constitutional changes in India were decided by Parliament here. Now we have arrived at the position that the structure of India's future constitution at any rate is entirely a matter for Indians themselves, it is obviously illogical that those Indians who happen to be treated with the special confidence and trust that is reposed in members of the Executive should be debarred from its discussion. To my mind, the logical division is that it is not for your Executive, at any rate at present, to discuss the constitutional relations of an Indian Government to His Majesty's Government, for that has been expressly reserved to treaty negotiations between His Majesty's Government and a future Indian Government—or that Government in embryo at the moment of fixing up the constitution. On the other hand, it is pre-eminently for them to discuss the structure of India's future constitution in so far as it is not concerned with United Kingdom–India relations but with the relations of the different elements in India to each other. Providing that distinction is kept perfectly clear, I still think that there is great advantage in making the Indian Members of your Executive responsible, through whatever sub-Committee they may appoint, not for framing a constitution, but for setting in motion some of the processes required before any constitution-making body can come into being. I mean, for instance, the setting up of some fact-finding body to collect materials or possibly even the setting up of a commission to investigate the best kind of constitution-deciding body, or even possibly types of constitution. For my part, I certainly was never enthusiastic about the particular constitution-making body suggested by Cripps. I would much sooner have had one composed of delegations either from the Provincial Governments, or possibly from the Provincial Legislatures, as well as from the States, so as to emphasise the fact that its separate units have come together to frame a constitution, as everywhere in the Dominions—and also to emphasise the geographical and local interest as against the merely communal.

I despair!

L.

* * *

9. I enclose a copy of Swinton's letter about his talks with Zafrullah. What Zafrullah says about the Chinese fits in very much, I fear, with other intelligence which you have sent us about the intrigues of Chinese representatives with Congress. I have no doubt we shall have to be very much on our guard against the Chiang Kai-sheks and their entourage both during and still more after the war. I am sure it would be a good thing to have some talk with Zafrullah here on his way back from America. But I shall keep in mind your warnings about him.[4]

[2] See Nos. 123, para. 4 and 131, para. 5. [3] No. 131, para. 34. [4] See No. 204.

10. One of the aspects of your enlarged Executive which has been most helpful, at any rate at our end, has been the way different Members have spoken up and stated the case either for the Government or against Congress. Ambedkar has been most effective more than once and so at an earlier stage was Firoz Khan. Even Jogendra was quite useful. I am sure the more they are encouraged to speak in public or to broadcast and to feel that they are defending their own case and the justification for their continuing in office, the better they will get at it themselves, and the greater the cumulative effect both in India and outside. So I hope you will keep them steadily at it.

11. I think the demand for bringing Rajagopalachari over here is fading out. I had a letter from the new Archbishop of Canterbury[5] urging it, but I sent him a very strong reply to which I have not yet had an answer. The Archbishop of York,[7] I might add, is thoroughly sound and made an excellent little speech in the Lords during the last debate.[8] I might add that he had taken the chair for me that same morning when I addressed the Church Missionary Council at length, and that we had also lunched together. However, he is a thoroughly sound man anyhow.

He was (we know!) assisted by the Metropolitan[6] who himself does not understand.

L.

* * *

Enclosure to No. 225

RESIDENT MINISTER'S OFFICE, ACHIMOTA, ACCRA, *12 November 1942*

SECRET AND PERSONAL

No. R.M–143.

My dear Leo,

Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan and Begum Shah Nawaz came to see me on their way through to America. Zafrulla said there were certain matters he wanted to talk to me about alone. He hoped to come back through England and see you and Anthony, but would like to take the only opportunity available to him of giving certain impressions and opinions to a member of the Government.

He had only had a few days in India on his way from China to the United States. He had had one talk with the Viceroy, and I gather had expressed his views to the Viceroy, so that you probably have them already. However, in case there is anything new, I should like to report to you the gist of his conversation. Incidentally he spoke in warm terms of both Anthony and yourself, and was obviously anxious to have talks with you.

China.—Zafrulla said that his stay in China, coupled with all his experience of Chinese activities in India, left him in no doubt as to Chinese aspirations and

intentions. Chiang Kai-shek was thinking very big. His aim was that, after the war, China would occupy the position Japan had mapped out for herself in Asia. The Marshal aimed, not only at acquiring all territory that had ever been Chinese, but of assuming a predominant position in Asia. He took it as a matter of course that Indo-China would revert to China, but he went a great deal further. Burma would be brought within the Chinese orbit as a tributary state, and his ambitions extended to parts of India also.

The picture in his mind was a Peace Conference immediately after the war, in which China would make her demands and would be supported, as he hoped, by the United States. One reason why the Marshal wanted a Congress Government was that it would be weak and amenable to his pressure.

Zafrulla said that the Chinese representative in Delhi received definite orders from Chiang Kai-shek to present everything through Congress glasses. He was discouraged from reporting home any news or facts which did not fall in with Congress views, and, if he did so, his reports were disregarded.

Zafrulla said that the American Ambassador in China[9] had a good knowledge of China and the Chinese and was a realist and quite proper in his actions, but he was rather shy and retiring. I have no means of checking the value of this appreciation. Zafrulla said, however, that the American Press correspondents in China were very different. They encouraged and played up to the Marshal, and took the line that in doing so they were advancing American interests.

Zafrulla said that Chinese aims were completely misunderstood by the great majority of the Press and people of India, who regarded China as a disinterested friend. Zafrulla had suggested to the Viceroy that, when he got back, he should form an Indo-Chinese Cultural Association. This Association would be purely an unofficial body. It would entertain Chinese who came to India and would indeed invite Chinese to come and lecture. The Association would, however, comprise a number of Indians who would, while treating the Chinese with courtesy and friendliness, as he put it, debunk their extreme views by asking intelligent questions, engaging in correspondence in the Press and similar activities.

I do not know whether the Viceroy has said anything to you about this. Zafrulla spoke on China with obvious sincerity and conviction and he said he was speaking as an Indian loyal to the British connection, but he wanted an India for the Indians and not for the Chinese.

India.[10]—Zafrulla went on to say that he wanted to say something about his own friends, who were co-operating wholeheartedly in the war effort. They were becoming discouraged. Some of them had been to see him during his

[5] William Temple.
[6] Foss Westcott, Bishop of Calcutta and Metropolitan of India, Burma, and Ceylon.
[7] C. F. Garbett.
[8] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of L., vol. 124, 20 October 1942, cols. 686–7. [9] Mr. C. E. Gauss.
[10] Cf. Vol. II, No. 412.

short time in India, and asked his advice. They had the feeling that we made concessions to our opponents, but not to our friends. I naturally said that he, with his long record of public service, knew that we did keep our word and that our attitude throughout towards the Muslims did not give colour to any such view. Zafrulla said, however, that without making any constitutional changes, we could do a good deal to encourage our friends. He gave two examples.

He said that we could carry further the Indianisation in the officials of the Public Services. He would not ask that anyone should be appointed who was not competent to do his job. But there were a number of Indians of the right kind, friendly to us, and quite competent to fill administrative posts. In fact, appointments had been made; but in form the old fifty-fifty arrangement stood, and he pleaded for an advance. He said that to get more good, competent and reliable Indians into the Administration now would not only be an encouragement to our friends, but would make the machine better and more reliable whenever constitutional change came.

His other example was in the Army. Many Indians have done well as officers. But here again they felt that in form they were working under the old dispensation, and that, when the war was over, they might be replaced by junior British officers. It would have a heartening effect if a statement could be made that Indians, who had proved their loyalty and capacity in the Army would retain their positions so far as the size of a post-war army permitted, and would not be replaced by British officers.

I naturally did not express any views of my own, nor do I know how far Zafrulla was presenting a true picture, but I did of course know his record, and I remember that years ago, when I was Colonial Secretary, he had talked to me very reasonably and helpfully about Palestine. I certainly feel no doubt of the sincerity with which he spoke, and I naturally am sending you at once a report of his conversation. I enclose another copy of this letter, as you will want to send a copy to Anthony.

Yours ever,

SWINTON

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/13/998: ff 295–9

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *28 November 1942, 9 pm*
Received: 29 November

1391. Your p. & p. telegram 17th November 3268–S.[1] Many thanks for this careful survey. Subject to comments below, way is now clear for you to reply

officially to my telegram of 7th October[2] and I will suppress intervening correspondence. I greatly appreciate offer in your para. 8 and am most anxious to present clear and concise recommendations from you on which I can take my stand, together with your own revised draft of what should be said in letter. Otherwise I foresee confused and fruitless Cabinet discussion.

2. I therefore beg you not to break fresh ground covered in paras. 3 and 7 of your telegram, however desirable it may be to do so on some other occasion. So far as immediate issue is concerned, Cabinet as a whole are anxious to satisfy Princes and have no wish to dishearten them. I presume you agree that no question of antagonising them need arise provided that the language of your caveat is carefully framed, e.g. somewhat on lines of suggestion in para. 5 (a) of my p. and p. telegram 1259.[3]

3. As regards rest of your telegram, I agree generally with para. 2, though as regards (c) I do not see that we can as a matter of principle deny to the States what we are prepared to concede to Provinces. Not to state that plainly in your reply to a straight question would, it seems to me, only give unnecessary offence. I say "unnecessary" because the whole question of separate unions is, except as a bargaining counter, academic and unpractical. What I would suggest is that you first explain on lines suggested at the end of draft in my 17471[4] reason why it was not explicitly stated before, then admit the right in principle to the same position as the Provinces in the event of an All-India Union proving unacceptable, combining this with such of the qualifications suggested in your paragraph 6 as would still be apposite. I should be prepared to give suggested *private* hint to Jam Sahib. I agree in principle with para. 5 but, without wishing in any way to shirk any duty properly mine, I feel that Viceroy can most effectively deliver straight talk of this kind, in view of his more intimate knowledge of detailed points involved and his special position as King-Emperor's representative. Moreover in view of the capacity in which the Jam Sahib is here I should naturally wish to avoid upsetting our cordial relationship as colleagues in Cabinet. But I do not wish to prejudge what you say in your official telegram on this point. I could in any case mention to Jam Sahib that H.M.G. were asking you to deal with this matter and that he might expect to hear from you before your departure.

4. As I think we are now in substantial agreement on immediate issue, I venture to suggest that your covering telegram commenting on revised draft letter to Chancellor should be on following broad lines: (1) You consider that Cabinet's draft[5] is too sweeping (e.g. the words "or otherwise"),[6] that reference to Cripps speech in para. 2 will merely puzzle not satisfy[7] Princes and that paragraph 3 is unsuitable without some qualification (see sub-para. (3) below).

[1] No. 189. [2] No. 79. [3] No. 112. [4] No. 80. [5] i.e. No. 80.
[6] See No. 96, paras. 2 and 7. [7] 'satisfy' omitted in decipher.

(2) You are against published statement at all, since it would have all the disadvantages indicated in para. 3 of my telegram of 7th October and is not necessary, for reasons given in (b) of your para. 2. You therefore adhere broadly to reply suggested in your telegram of 25th August[8] but have cut it down in some respects and are telegraphing revised draft.

(3) You recognise that it would be politically very difficult to explain or defend refusal to States of principle conceded to autonomous Provinces of British India of right to form separate unions in event of all-India union being unacceptable, as such refusal would in effect rob States of equivalent bargaining counter to that in hands of potential dissident Provinces. On the other hand the more you reflect on question the greater you find practical difficulties in any such development if it were ever seriously contemplated as something to be carried into effect. For example, paragraph 3 of Cabinet draft might seriously mislead Princes unless qualified by indication that recognition of separate States union or unions would inevitably affect our future interpretation of our obligations towards the States now in exclusive relationship with the Crown. You therefore propose to deal with the point on lines I have suggested in para. 3 above.

4. You feel it desirable to qualify reassurances to Princes as little as possible, and on no account to alarm,[9] dishearten, or antagonise them. But in their interests as well as ours you consider it essential to introduce into letter a caveat about adapting themselves to changing times, and to pursue question separately (what you say here will depend on your reactions to para. 3 above).

5. If you think this general line suitable (I think it represents your feelings) I should be able to carry it through the Cabinet without undue difficulty.

[8] Vol. II, No. 629. [9] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 has 'allow'.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: ff 80–1

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *28 November 1942, 6.30 am*
PERSONAL

20448 Your telegram No. 596-S.C.[1] of 25th November. Phillips. I fully appreciate difficulties of status which may arise. Our main desideratum should however be to ensure that Phillips' official position is primarily that of Commissioner whatever other personal attributes he has. We therefore considered it wise while putting your points to Halifax to give him discretion to accept

proposal in Washington telegram No. 5768[2] of 25th November. Moreover disposal of question of status may help Halifax to obtain public disclaimer by U.S. Government of idea of mediation to which I attach great importance.

2. Rank of Ambassador would be personal and would not mean that Commissioner's post becomes an Embassy even temporarily. F.O. point out that diplomatic precedence follows from official position and is unaffected by personal rank. This should I hope ease embarrassment which you contemplate.

3. Phillips is, of course, a career diplomat. I am clear from my talk with him that he is anxious to be co-operative and it would be a mistake to rub him up wrong over points of protocol.[3]

[1] No. 214. [2] No. 216.
[3] MSS. EUR. F. 125/23 has 'point anyhow' instead of 'points of protocol'.

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Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/91

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL GOVT. HOUSE, LAHORE, *28 November 1942*

D.-o. No. 419–F.L.

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

The best thing to be said about Jinnah's tour in the Punjab is that it has come to an end; it was throughout a success for the Qaid-i-Azam, but it has certainly not tended to improve communal relations. At the beginning of his crusade at Jullundur Jinnah made a pointed attack on the author of a certain new formula devised for the solution of India's difficulties; he was obviously referring to Sikander's "partition scheme",[1] though he did not mention the Premier by name. A day or two later Sikander found it expedient to attend the Muslim League meeting at Lyallpur and to make his obeisance to the Qaid-i-Azam. In return for this Jinnah was kind enough to express his approval of the Premier and to say that at Jullundur he had not been alluding to Sikander's formula, which he had not had time to study. Sikander was undoubtedly in an embarrassing position and he could scarcely have been expected to risk an open rupture with Jinnah, but in proclaiming that he saw eye to eye with the champion of "Pakistan" he has to a considerable extent weakened the Baldev Singh–Sikander Pact[2] and undermined whatever confidence other communities have reposed in his assurances. The Sikhs in particular are feeling injured and bewildered. Master Tara Singh has been freely criticising both Jinnah and

[1] Vol. II, No. 243. [2] See No. 176, note 1.

Sikander. Giani Kartar Singh appears to be still groping for some means to satisfy the separatist ambitions of his community. In a speech at Nankana he made bold to say that Sikhs should work for the unity of India as a whole, but should aim at an appropriate partition of the Punjab. One of the suggestions is that this partition should be based not on population, but on landed interests, as this would lead to results more favourable to the Sikhs. Among the Muslims there is a definitely increasing number shouting for "Pakistan", without for the most part any serious attempt at analysing what it means. The general atmosphere is more uneasy than it was and it looks as if cleavages would grow more pronounced.

Another Communal Reunion Party took place yesterday and I was among those present. This time the occasion was the anniversary of Guru Nanak's birthday and the host was Baldev Singh, who showed up well throughout and seems to be gaining self-assurance. The usual speeches were made and everyone appeared very friendly, but there was a certain air of unreality about the proceedings.

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Sir H. Twynam (Central Provinces and Berar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/63

SECRET CAMP, *28 November 1942*

No. R.–127/G.C.P.

4. I was discussing today and yesterday the effect of the recent Allied victories with the two Provincial National War Front organizers, Rai Bahadur Verma and Mr. Kanitkar. They both confirm that the improved military situation has done much more than any amount of propaganda to remove the sullen atmosphere of ill-will which has been prevalent for many months. Banerjee, the Commissioner of the Chhattisgarh Division, reports to the same effect. Both the organizers are also inclined to agree with me that a great mistake has been made in endeavouring to press the Indians too much in connection with the war effort. The American Press largely, and even responsible British newspapers like the *Times*, seems to think that India can be persuaded to adopt the Allied cause as enthusiastically as, for instance, the British themselves, or the Chinese. This attitude, in my opinion, has done a great deal of harm and is partly responsible both for the failure of the Cripps negotiations and for the recent "rebellion". In the early days of the war, my old friend Sir Nazimuddin, who is undoubtedly a friend of the British and the British connection repeatedly stressed that it would be unwise to expect the same measure of support from

Indians as Britishers are prepared to give wholeheartedly. He explained that Indians did not feel themselves to be in this war in the same way that Britishers are. We have been imploring, cajoling and threatening the Indian public for a 100 per cent. all-out war effort. But, as both my Provincial Organisers agreed, the Hindu Indian public only wants peace and almost peace at any price. It is quite true that we have succeeded in recruiting large numbers to the Army, especially from the Punjab and other areas where the military tradition is strong. But it is quite a different matter to persuade Indians of other classes, especially the well-to-do and professional classes and the great mass of the cultivating population to become war-minded. It would be an impossible task even if the country were invaded: so strong is the feeling in favour of peace and so lukewarm or non-existent is the feeling in favour of resistance. Matters were made much worse when appeals for a 100 per cent. effort were intensified at times when the Allied cause looked most unhopeful. Indians were not at all attracted by the idea of throwing themselves heart and soul into what looked like a lost cause. They have not the same unreasoning confidence as the British and looked at the war situation coolly and unsympathetically during such crises as the battle of Britain, the loss of Burma and the retreat of the British army into Egypt. The last two of these crises coincided with the Cripps Mission and the decision of the Congress Working Committee to embark on civil disobedience. At that time, Congress opinion was expressed in Mr. Gandhi's phrase of a post-dated cheque on a crashing bank. I have always taken the view that the National War Front movement should not be overdone and that demands for a 100 per cent. war effort from India, whether as consideration for offers such as the Cripps offer, or as put forward in the American Press, or by certain British newspapers such as the *Times*, or by the Chinese, do infinitely more harm than good.

In short, much disaffection towards the British Government has arisen from the fear that our defeats would lead us to enforce similar sacrifices on India as Britain itself has endured.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *29 November 1942, 5.25 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 29 November, 4.15 pm*

No. 3371–S. Your personal telegram dated 28th November No. 20448.[1] Phillips. I am grateful for your help. I agree that in no circumstances could any

[1] No. 227.

question or suggestion of mediation be considered, and it is of vital importance to get this clear.

2. As regards status and style you will now have seen my official telegram No. 9459[2] of 27th November. I think that meets the case adequately. Commissionerate staff here are already talking about what is due to an individual "with the status of Ambassador" and that makes it all the more important to bring out clearly that the appointment is one of Commissioner and the rank of Ambassador one retained for personal reasons. I of course entirely agree as to importance of keeping Phillips sweet. He will rank *after* my Executive Council and Political Adviser, as did Johnson.

3. Accommodation. I shall be delighted if he will stay with us for two or three days if I am in Delhi when he first arrives (I shall be in Calcutta 16th–20th December, and on tour 26th December to 6th January). Maharaja of Cochin's house was assigned for use of American Commissioner, and occupied by Wilson as such. Since Wilson handed over, it has been used primarily as office accommodation by Commissioner's staff. But it is an excellent house, and far better than any alternative available, especially in present critical housing position here. Merrell is therefore being informed that it must now revert as personal accommodation for new Commissioner, but that subject to consent of Cochin Darbar, we will arrange additional office accommodation in its compound, and will concert detail of such accommodation with him once Darbar agree.

4. Do not hesitate to telegraph if you have any other suggestions as to have [how] I can help Phillips or any enquiries from him.

[2] No. 220.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/PO/8/6: f 31

29 November 1942

40–U. Your telegram 32–U.[1] Many thanks. I do hope you may succeed about Cranborne. Colville I know and he will do first class.

[1] No. 221.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *29 November 1942, 8.45 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 29 November, 7.30 pm*

No. 3372–S. Following is my personal appreciation for period 17th to 28th November. The majority of the Ahmedabad mills reopened on 23rd November with 80 per cent. of the workers present although five attempts were made to blow up electric sub-stations supplying the mills. Full working is expected shortly. Situation in remainder of Province shows slight improvement.

2. Bengal. In Midnapore District Congress Workers are reported to be inciting population to refuse to accept relief measures organised to counter effects of recent cyclone or to work on reconstruction of dykes, &c. Except for the derailment by sabotage of a troop train in Assam (four killed, forty injured) and a goods train in the United Provinces, no other major incidents to report.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Washington, Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *30 November 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Many thanks for your letter of the 30th October[1] and for the interesting comment in it. I agree about sterling balances—it has given us both a very great deal of trouble, and I hope, as you say, that the creature will now be allowed to go quietly to sleep, though I shall not feel happy until, first Raisman has been able to get the result of his discussions in London through my Council (who propose to consider them this week) and, secondly, we have been able to give the Assembly the explanation which they wanted last session and which, for reasons with which you are familiar, had then to be postponed.

2. Mudaliar sent me an amusing account[2] of his talks with Cripps and others on the suggestion that the political crisis should be side-tracked by a vigorous policy of social reform; and from his account of what passed I should have

[1] No. 128. [2] No. 53.

thought that he hit any such ideas (and equally some rather wild-cat ideas of Cripps' which he also mentioned) pretty hard. I need not say that I entirely agree with every word you say on this, and I am sure that in this discussion Mudaliar's presence will have been of material assistance to you.

3. As for the *Times* I am grateful for all your help. I think it is a real tragedy, given its importance, that it should show this tendency to go against us: for whether it talks nonsense or not, it carries very great weight and its hostility is as important as its support. But it sounds from what you tell me as though the present management was unduly doctrinaire; and though I, while I am here, must be concerned with the Indian problem primarily, I cannot say that I read with any enthusiasm the suggestions recently made in the *Times* that we should be only too delighted to have America giving us a hand in the solution of our colonial problems. The Americans will unquestionably be only too glad, and indeed very anxious, to have a finger in the pie, and they will be a great nuisance to us when the time comes: but there is no possible justification for encouraging them. Holburn has been most helpful, and relations with him are very close. I had a long talk with him a couple of days ago, and he sees my Private Secretary every day, and is (like his predecessor) better informed, so far as I am concerned, about the inmates of this prison house than probably anyone in this country.

* * *

5. Many thanks for what you say in paragraph 6 of your letter about Fisher's scheme. My Commission did consider the establishment of these storage depôts but turned it down, and for the very good reason that India cannot count on any surplus available for export (see Report of Royal Commission on Agriculture in India, paragraph 344).[3]

* * *

13. The point was taken with me by the Raja of Salempur, a sensible Muhammadan, the United Provinces Zemindar, at the last meeting of the National Defence Council, that the land-owning class, who had on the whole stood by us very well, deserved a pat now and then; and he expressed his regret that in your recent speech, while other elements received special mention as having kept aloof from the troubles, the land-owners were not mentioned at all. You and I know of course perfectly well that the landowners are not immaculate, and that in Bihar in particular Darbhanga (whom I spoke to pretty sharply on this question when I saw him at the National Defence Council) and others played a somewhat unheroic or at best a somewhat supine part during the disturbances. But over the country as a whole, while they have many faults, they do represent a class of opinion that still has great influence and that has on the whole stood by us well; and if you should have a chance of saying a word of

appreciation of their steadiness during the recent rebellion I think it would be useful and much appreciated.

* * *

16. Reading a report, dated 15 August, received by Puckle's people from his London correspondent, about Krishna Menon and his activities in connection with the Working Committee's resolution, I would [could] not help regretting again that it has not been found possible to accept the suggestion which I have I think made once or twice that we should take pains to break up Menon and break up the India League with him. I am certain that so long as he is there he will be a focus of discontent and difficulty, and I should myself have thought that he was really worth taking a little of a chance. Perhaps you would think this worth turning over again in your mind? I should be much interested to hear your final judgment.

17. I send you by this bag two letters which in their different ways are of great interest. The first is copy of a letter[4] from Moonje; the second a letter[5] from Dr. Varadarajulu, President of the Madras Provincial Hindu Sabha, in which he asks me for a passport and facilities for a journey to England by air, as he desires under the instructions of Savarkar to proceed to England with a view to giving His Majesty's Government a correct appreciation of the present political and communal situation in India, since "in case Mr. C. Rajagopalachari is allowed to proceed to England and carry on his anti-Hindu propaganda unchecked and unchallenged great harm would be done to Hindusthan as a nation and a state"!

18. Moonje's letter was of very great interest to me, for it makes it quite clear that the Mahasabha, who are no fools, have got the substance of this business and realise as well as we do that if these gulfs between the major communities are not to be bridged there is no local answer to the Indian political problem, and that the natural corollary to that is that we shall find ourselves in this country for some considerable time to come—and that not because of any reluctance on our part to hand over responsibility to the Indian but because

[3] Cmd. 3132.

[4] To Ganpat Rai. Dr Moonje said that the snag in the Government's announced intention of giving India independence at the end of the war was that the disagreement between Hindus and Muslims would leave it with ample scope for 'dubious diplomacy' which would 'result in the retention with the consent of the Muslim League of the substance of political sovereign power in the hands of the Britishers'. He believed that the British would successfully resist Japanese invasion and the 'Quit India' slogan therefore appeared to him 'childish' and 'full of mischief in the future to the Hindu India'. The result would be 'to enthrone the Muslims in the administration of India' under the British. If Hindus did not take a realistic view of the future as the Muslims were doing, they would be doomed to destruction. The British were not ready to part with power. C.I.O. Lahore Daily Report 88, 23 November 1942. L/P&J/8/512: f 486.

[5] Not printed.

of the incapacity or reluctance of the Indian to accept or carry it. I am thinking, incidentally, of bringing out in my speech to the Associated Chambers of Commerce at Calcutta on the 17th December, that the real trouble is not Britain's reluctance to part with power but the fact that Britain has offered to part with power, and that it is that which has led to every item of difficulty, disturbance and uncertainty in the Indian problem today. The worst of it is that there is so little chance of any of these prominent political personalities facing the facts or realising that India has no hope of standing in the future world without the moral support (and in certain circumstances the military support) of a great power; while there is almost equal reluctance to face up to the shortage of qualified personnel which India herself is likely to throw up, and the fact that the moment she acquires independence or dominion status, or whatever you may call it, she loses her present protected position.

19. I have read with some amusement the telegram[6] of which I enclose a copy in this bag from the non-Brahmins of the Central Provinces indicating that they view with frightful alarm the activities of Rajagopalachari! I am sending them a polite reply.

* * *

21. I am becoming very seriously disturbed about the food situation here. Lumley reports grave shortage in the Bombay Presidency, and the same is true of the Deccan States. There are complaints in Madras, and Herbert has sent most urgent representations to me as regards Bengal. In Delhi itself the shortage of wheat is very marked. In other words there are indications from widely differing points, all of them of very great importance, that we are going to be hard pressed over food supplies; and Lumley, indeed, goes so far as to suggest that in Bombay they may have to adopt famine measures. Simultaneously with this we are under heavy pressure (the reason for which I quite recognise) from His Majesty's Government to keep Ceylon going. I have just received a telegram urging that we should send some wheat to Persia, arrangements for payment being made later: there are these demands from the Arabian Principalities (Aden too is asking us) to help them. A particularly important indication now reaching me is that the Indian States have in them the germ of very serious trouble; and if I am right in that we shall just have to look after India first, whatever the political reactions outside India. I think it well that the Cabinet should realise how potentially serious the situation is here (and this is complicated by Congress agitation in favour of hoarding, &c.) and that they should realise that things may come to the pass which I have just mentioned. The new Food Department will, I am certain, give us very valuable help, but I fear that this is not merely a question of machinery. I propose therefore to get my people to put together a telegram giving a general review of the position so that you may be warned well in advance.

22. I am most grateful to you for your help over the Viceroyalty, and I trust the next few days will see a solution of that problem. Meanwhile I have been gratified by an announcement on the Tokyo wireless which puts the candidates now in the running in the following order, (*a*) Brigadier-General Robert T. H. Law (retired), (*b*) Cranborne, (*c*) Rab Butler. I was intrigued by the Brigadier-General, and looked him up, and I can assure you that it was a great consolation to me to find that he was born in 1855, had fought in the Zulu war (medal and clasp), and left India in 1885. I can imagine no one better suited than he to grapple with the problems of today! I suppose that the explanation is that they made a slip up, and confused him with Richard Law.

Best wishes to you and yours for X'mas and the New Year.

[6] Not printed.

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/8/6: ff 28–30

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *1 December 1942*

My dear Winston,

You must not think that I want to press on you the suggestion which I made to you last night. From my own personal point of view what I am most interested in, after all, is the immediate post-war situation in this country. To wean this country, or at any rate the Conservative Party, from the internationalist tripe which has, of necessity perhaps, been talked during the war, back to a healthy and constructive Empire policy is what interests me above everything. Nor do I see anyone, least of all Anthony, who can give the kind of lead that I believe wants to be given and that I shall hope to try and give if I am here.

At the same time I am very gravely concerned about the Indian position. I do not believe that there is any hope of a constitutional solution for some years to come at the earliest. We shall have to go on working the existing constitution, i.e. that of a Governor General with a nominated Council subject, in the last resort and on certain major issues, to the ultimate responsibility of Parliament here. How to carry on during that interval without turning the whole of India irremediably sour against us but on the contrary by practical measures making them feel that we both wish to forward their growing stature and fitness for self-government, and also make them realise the immense advantages of retaining the connection with the Crown, is the supreme problem. Its solution depends enormously on personality, in other words on a Viceroy who is equally determined to keep India within the Empire and to show that he

genuinely sympathises with Indian nationalism. What is more he must be able to put both ideas across both in public and in private utterance.

I believe I have that essential qualification. As for age I do not suppose that the next few years in India will be a heavier job than yours here at home! While it is perfectly true that the Congress Press in India and here will call me a Die-hard, the great bulk of the Labour Party will, I have no doubt, give me their confidence. So will the Conservative Party naturally, and so will the public in the Dominions. Anyhow it is not the first impression that counts but the actual work done.

I put these points to you because I think they deserve serious consideration. I shall be only too relieved personally if you do not think that they carry sufficient weight.

In that event I am still as strongly opposed as ever to the idea that a middle-aged diplomat, with no knowledge of the Empire or positive Imperial zeal, and traditionally inclined to postpone action in the political sphere and with no knowledge of administration, is suitable for a post which requires both administrative drive and constructive political vision.

The best solution in that case would I think be to appoint Lumley. He has done admirably in Bombay. Linlithgow put him after Cranborne and Anderson as his next choice,[1] and only in my last letter from him refers to him as being "first rate".[2] His time comes to an end on the 18th March in Bombay. If he were selected he could fly back at once leaving an Acting Governor to carry on till his successor can arrive on the scene, and so take on from Linlithgow without any gaps in the actual Viceroyalty. Possibly in that connection Linlithgow might be persuaded to stay on a couple of months longer. I don't think from any point of view it would be fair to him or to the job to ask him to stay on longer than that. As Lumley has already got his household belongings out there he would not have to spend any time on equipping himself, collecting a staff, etc., but could simply fly here for consultation and for a brief holiday. There is, of course, always the possibility that the reasons which made him refuse an extension of Bombay, would make him refuse the Vice-royalty. But I doubt it.

I took the opportunity over the week-end of asking Linlithgow what he thought about Colville.[3] I have just had his reply[4] which runs as follows:

"Colville I know and he will do first class."

He is I believe coming to see me this afternoon. He fully realised the other day that I was only sounding and not in a position to make an actual offer. But I have no doubt that he is by far the best person we can get for that job.

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

[1] Possibly a reference to No. 1.

[2] No recent letter from Lord Linlithgow containing this reference has been traced.

[3] No. 221. [4] No. 231.

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Mr Churchill to Mr Amery

L/PO/8/6: f 27

10 DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL, *1 December 1942*

Prime Minister's Personal Minute: Serial No. M. 566/2

Secretary of State for India

I do not think the suggestion you were good enough to make last night could be entertained, but I quite understand your public-spirited motive in making it. The man[1] I have in mind is far more than a diplomat. Certainly he is middle-aged, but if you did not think 69 too old how can you cavil at 61? I will not take any decision without a further talk. I am lunching with the King today.

W. S. C.

[1] i.e. Sir Miles Lampson.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/8/6: f 26

2 December 1942

34–U. Colville fixed up. Cranborne's doctors have vetoed his going. I have been urging Lumley but Prime Minister thinking seriously of Miles Lampson. If you have any comments please let me have them by most immediate telegram.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/PO/8/6: f 25

MOST IMMEDIATE *3 December 1942*

42–U. Your telegram 34–U.[1] I am only too well aware of difficulties of position and would wish to attune my comments to these. But I cannot refrain from (? saying that) though I like Lampson personally I regard him as a very unsuitable choice. India is approaching most difficult phase of change and growth

[1] No. 236.

in which leadership will require to be vigorous and inspiring. Demobilisation and post-war reconstruction will be critical problem, and burden of personal work is in any circumstances immensely heavy; and long *political* experience is increasingly essential for handling my Council. I should not myself expect to find Lampson possessed of the speed, resource and freshness on the subject without which it will be most difficult for new man to keep his head above water. Also (? man of) 62 is much too old for this job and climate, particularly as new Governor-General will have to start with Delhi hot weather.

2. . . .[2] Any of other political candidates in your original list[3] would in my view be stronger, but in existing circumstances Lumley's would in my opinion be admirable choice. If Prime Minister is disposed to consider him I think that it would be essential that Lumley should have a spell of leave before assuming charge. In that event if Winston so desires my wife and I would be ready to hold on here until Lumleys become available.

[2] Personal comment omitted. [3] Vol. II, No. 642.

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/8/6: f 24

SECRET INDIA OFFICE, *3 December 1942*

My dear Winston,

Please see the enclosed telegrams.[1] Linlithgow's comment only confirms my definite view as to Lampson's unsuitability for the post. The appointment would be badly received everywhere, I think, though that is a minor consideration compared with my conviction that it would prove a bad appointment in the actual working.

If we are to gamble with inexperience I would much sooner do it with Wilfrid Greene, who has got first-class ability and a remarkable knowledge of constitutional problems as well as a knowledge of military affairs.

For all-round experience I would still consider Sam Hoare and rely on his making good, even though the appointment were not received with any enthusiasm.

There remains Lumley. He may not have been impressive as a young back-bencher in the House, but by all accounts he has grown up to his responsibilities, and is still young enough to develop further. He knows the job and could, by coming home for a short spell of leave, make himself thoroughly familiar with

the position here and with the views of the Government. I think I could get Colville out by the end of February and, as you will have seen from Linlithgow's telegram, he is willing to stay on for a little and could be persuaded, I have no doubt, to stay on till July, which would give Lumley four months at home.

We really must come to a decision and, please remember, that decision is one which I shall have to share and defend.

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

[1] Nos. 236 and 237.

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Viscount Halifax to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 72

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, *3 December 1942, 2.2 am*
Received: 3 December, 7.40 am

No. 5860. Following is text of draft announcement referred to in my immediately following telegram.

The President has appointed Mr. William Phillips of Massachusetts as his personal representative to serve (grp. undec.) Government of India. He will have personal rank of Ambassador. Mr. Phillips who is at present in London, is expected to proceed to New Delhi in the near future, where he will assume charge of American Diplomatic Mission there.

The mission at New Delhi was established in November 1941 by Mr. Thomas W. Wilson. Following Mr. Wilson's appointment as American Minister Resident at Bagdad, charge of the mission at New Delhi was assumed by Colonel Louis Johnson.

Mr. Phillips, who entered the Diplomatic Service of United States in 1903, has rendered his Government long and distinguished service in the Far East, Europe and Washington. He served twice as Under-Secretary of State and was United States Ambassador at Rome until the outbreak of war with Italy.

Repeated to Foreign New Delhi.

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Viscount Halifax to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 73

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, *3 December 1942, 2.25 am*
Received: 3 December, 9.30 am

No. 5861. My immediately preceding telegram and your telegram No. 7548.[1]

State Department now state that title of Commissioner or any other title they can think of except personal representative of the President, will require reference to Senate with serious risk of undesirable discussions there and suggestions on the nature of Mr. Phillips' explicit instructions. The Under Secretary of State has however promised to provoke the question at his press conference, the answer to which would make clear that the mission was not one of mediation.

2. I think that the State Department's fears are valid and that in view of the Under Secretary of State's promise we should agree to the title of "Personal representative of the President with personal rank of Ambassador".

3. My immediately preceding telegram contains the text of the announcement prepared by the State Department as a basis for discussion. If you agree I will endeavour to arrange for immediate issue of details here and presume that on hearing (2 groups undec: ? that you agree) in addition you would wish to make identical announcement in London and Delhi.

4. Fuller telegram[2] on State Department's views, which was drafted before the receipt of your telegram under reply, follows.

Repeated to Foreign New Delhi.

[1] Dated 2 December, noting that *Daily Telegraph* carried a report that Phillips was to go to India as President's special representative, and hoping that in view of this apparent leakage official announcement would be made at once. L/P&S/12/2633: f 62.

[2] No. 5862. L/P&S/12/2633: f 69.

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Viscount Halifax to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

PERSONAL WASHINGTON, *3 December 1942*

No. 87003. My telegram No. 5861.[1]

Phillips is an extremely good man and will I am sure wish to be helpful and discreet in every way. You are lucky to get him. See as much of him as you can.

Repeated to Foreign Office, telegram No. 5870.

[1] No. 240.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *3 December 1942, 6.30 pm*
Received: 3 December, 5.50 pm

No. 3402-G. Your telegram No. 20480[1] dated November 28th. Information received since my telegram No. 3356-S[2] of November 27th indicates serious deterioration in food situation in India. It is essential that you and Cabinet should be acquainted with the situation immediately. Earlier forecasts indicated that while the 1942-43 rice crop would be short of quantity required for normal Indian consumption *plus* Army requirements *plus* exports to Ceylon, Arabia, &c. by something over two million tons there would be a surplus of slightly under $1\frac{3}{4}$ million tons millets, 175,000 tons wheat and 25,000 tons gram leaving a total deficit of about 200,000 tons. Substitution of millets for rice would have been essential and would have caused some difficulty in case of rice-eating communities but could probably have been managed. Information recently received, however, indicates that Bombay and adjacent States which were forecasted to produce three-quarter million tons of the surplus millets have suffered an almost total failure of this crop due to lack of rain in October and that instead of a millet surplus are likely to show a deficit. In consequence our statistical position will probably be a shortage of about one million tons of foodgrains. In addition to the Bombay failure the recent cyclones in Bengal and Orissa likely to worsen the position. Accurate estimates of losses in the above three calamities are not yet available. The statistical position is alarming enough but as I have explained in previous telegrams actual position is likely to be even less favourable owing partly to hoarding by dealers for higher prices, building up of large reserves by middle-class consumers and the tendency on the part of the small subsistence farmer to keep back more of his grain than usual for his own consumption, a course rendered possible by the enhanced prices realised by such part of his produce as he sells. Present position is thus one of acute difficulty. There is increasing evidence to show that in the past few weeks private merchants have been unable to buy wheat in the Punjab for which they hold export permits at anything like the control price. This state of affairs is confirmed by Government's own buying agents and the question of Army's food supply is causing acute anxiety, wheat deliveries this

[1] From Secretary of State to Government of India, External Affairs Department, conveying Cabinet direction to ensure that G. of I. were aware of urgency of meeting Ceylon's requirements of rice. L/E/8/3297: f 306.

[2] Stating that between 1 November and end of year, Ceylon was likely to receive 43,000 tons of rice plus anything additional that Bengal and Madras could spare. MSS. EUR. F. 125/23.

year being short by five months' quota. The whole situation and certain proposals for controlling the prices of all the major foodgrains and raising the existing control price of wheat to parity with them are under consideration in Council, but I think it probable that until our own position becomes clearer we shall have to stop all exports of foodgrains from India and also ask for additional imports of wheat at least sufficient to ensure half the Army's total annual requirements of 500,000 tons. I realise that this will mean serious difficulty in Ceylon and Arabia and an unwelcome call on shipping but export of foodgrains from India has already excited considerable public criticism. If it continues despite a threatening internal shortage it may become a political issue of considerable gravity and until our own position is clearer and we see whether the new measures now in contemplation improve the situation continuance of exports is likely to do serious harm. On the other hand the announcement that in future there will be no exports of food-stuffs and that large shipments of wheat have been arranged is likely to have a stimulating effect in India and may go far to induce a freer flow of grains into the market. In that case it might prove practicable for us if we can make the internal position safe to resume exports and perhaps to reduce the additional imports of wheat.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *3 December 1942*

No. 3408–S. Sir Mohd. Usman tells me that he asked Jinnah a few days ago what his attitude would be towards the Indianization of Council by the appointment of non-officials to Home and Finance. Jinnah replied that he would regard any such change as a matter on which under the general undertakings which had been given by His Majesty's Government and by me he would be entitled to be consulted. Usman asked whether this was necessarily the case seeing that such a change could be made *within* the present Act by appointment of persons in substitution for the two officials who had a sufficiency of Service under the Crown in India. Jinnah replied that that was merely a technical point; that the intention of the framers of the Act had never been to meet the Service qualification in that way, and that his view remained as expressed. His position would be made impossible with the Muslim League were we allowed to fill these posts by non-officials since his followers would see the Muslim position suffering still more and their opponents getting into power. I got the impression of a very clear hint that if he were consulted in such

circumstances he would make the usual answer that he would agree to no change save on the terms he had already set out.

2. Jinnah asked Usman to convey this to me. While I do not think we could accept his proposition in its entirety this has a very important bearing on the whole business of further Indianization and may well strengthen our hands materially as regards the retention of Maxwell (see paragraphs 33 and 34 of my letter of 1st–2nd November[1]). The objections to reducing officials further are strong enough on merits. I have always been quite clear that their[2] elimination would not contribute materially to placating the Hindus, &c., or have indeed any lasting effect whatever, and if there is to be any risk[3] of its, in addition, embroiling us with Jinnah and the Muslims that is a very strong argument against.

[1] No. 131. [2] 'their' deciphered as 'impediment to'. [3] 'risk' deciphered as 'probability'.

244

President Roosevelt to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

THE WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON, *3 December 1942*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I have selected Mr. William Phillips to serve near the Government of India as my Personal Representative with the rank of Ambassador.

Mr. Phillips has had broad experience in the diplomatic field, having represented his country at various posts abroad, and having served twice as Under Secretary of State and more recently, until the entry of the United States into the war, as my Ambassador at Rome. I commend him highly to you as one especially possessed of the experience and qualities essential to a successful and mutually agreeable accomplishment of his duties as my Representative to the Government of India.

Very sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

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Mr Churchill to the Marquess of Linlithgow (via India Office)

Telegram, L/PO/8/6: f 23

10 DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL, *3 December 1942*

SECRET AND PRIVATE

35–U. The last sentence of your 42–U[1] makes me wonder whether you yourself would be willing to stay on for another six months. Meanwhile Lumley could come home for a rest, & his appointment be considered. I cannot be sure that Japan will not make some diversionary attack upon India in the spring, and it would be better not to have a new man feeling his feet at such a juncture. This is a singularly bad moment from every point of view to have to make a change. Please let me know in order that all alternatives can be weighed.

[1] No. 237.

246

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Churchill (via India Office)

Telegram, L/PO/8/6: f 18

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *4 December 1942*

43–U. Your telegram 35–U.[1] Following for Prime Minister. *Begins* I fully realise your difficulties, and immense importance of getting right man; and I realise also force of what you say about war position. In all the circumstances I would be willing, if asked, to stay on for another six months, though decision has been no easy one. Without in the least degree qualifying my readiness to accept if invited, it would help politically here as emphasising that I retained your full confidence and theirs, were any announcement to say this extension was at special request of His Majesty's Government. And I would venture to add how much I hope decision as to Lumley or another could be announced by say June (which would not in practice give him more time than he would need to collect his staff, etc.). But both points must be entirely for you and I am in your hands. If you decide to recommend an extension and the King approves the sooner we announce it the better.

[1] No. 245.

247

Government of India, External Affairs Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 66

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *4 December 1942, 8 pm*
Received: 4 December, 7.15 pm

9649. Addressed Secretary of State for India repeated Washington. Washington telegrams Nos. 5860,[1] 5861[2] and 5862[3] dated December 2nd.

We are far from content either on point of designation or in regard to text of announcement. Fuller comments will follow in 48 hours on Viceroy's return to Delhi.

[1] No. 239. [2] No. 240. [3] See No. 240, note 2.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/512: f 503

PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *4 December 1942, 12.15 am*

20805. Reference para. 6 of your letter of the 1st November.[1] I think there must be some misunderstanding as I cannot find that I said in the House that there was not at present any intention of further constitutional changes in the Centre or in Provinces. On the contrary I reiterated on 8th October[2] that the door remains open for favourable consideration of any proposal made by leaders of parties other than Congress within the frame-work of the draft declaration. Only explanation that occurs to me is that in answering a question on 15th October[3] whether it was proposed to complete Indianisation of your Council I said no such change is at present in contemplation. This can hardly have come as a surprise to Council, see para. 68 of your letter of 12th October[4] and ought not in itself to have excited the comment reported in your letter. Perhaps you would give foregoing explanation to your Council unless of course you are in a position to enlighten me as to context of the statement attributed to me. Or would you prefer to let me have a draft of the kind of message suggested in last sentence of your paragraph and covering the above explanation.

[1] No. 131. [2] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 383, cols. 1386–99. [3] *Ibid.*, col. 1754.
[4] See No. 298, note 1. Para. 68 reported in effect that Lord Linlithgow had intimated to his colleagues that complete Indianisation of the Council was unlikely to take place 'in the very near future'.

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Secretary of State to Government of India, External Affairs Department

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 68

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *4 December 1942, 11.55 pm*

Addressed to G. of I. E.A. Dept. 20891 repeated to Washington.

Reference latest telegrams ending with Washington telegram No. 5869[1] of December 3rd to Foreign Office regarding Phillips' appointment, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and I are agreed that we cannot contest State Department's argument regarding possible difficulties with Senate (which have doubtless been increased by general election that has taken place since Senate confirmed Mr. Wilson's appointment as Commissioner) and that title proposed for Phillips must be accepted. We trust you will feel able to concur, more especially as our main desideratum is now secured in that (*a*) Welles will scotch at his press conference any talk of mediation by the U.S. and (*b*) Phillips, with whom I have had a very satisfactory talk, seems the very last man to meddle in such things and in fact emphatically disclaimed any such idea.

2. H.M. Ambassador is being instructed[2] that as soon as he receives your concurrence he should inform U.S. Government that we much appreciate the helpful spirit which they have shown in this matter and are satisfied with the proposed title and draft announcement; except that we must ask the U.S. Government to drop the word "diplomatic" from "American Diplomatic Mission" as being inaccurate (as well as possibly misleading) for the reason that India's present constitutional position does not admit of her appointing or receiving diplomatic missions—hence Bajpai's technical position as a member of H.M. Ambassador's staff.

3. Reference para. 3 of your telegram No. 9459[3] dated 27th November, Phillips should be styled "Honourable". This is in fact style which State Dept. would use to him as Ambassador as they do not address their own Ambassadors as "Excellency".

[1] L/P&S/12/2633: f 70. [2] *Ibid.*, f 56. [3] No. 220.

250

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

L/PO/8/6: ff 19–20

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *4 December 1942*

My dear Linlithgow,

I need not tell you how relieved I was to get your telegram yesterday[1] which I think has disposed for good of the Egyptian menace. Fortunately my telegram[2] of enquiry to you was entirely unbiassed, so Winston could not suspect me of having put you up to queering the pitch. But I was really anxious, for Winston had apparently sent a telegram to Lampson asking if he was willing to be considered (I have not seen it myself or the reply), and I felt I might be in for a real tussle, as I was personally convinced that he was anything but suitable, even in himself and apart from his livelier half.

2. It was a real misfortune that the doctors quite firmly told Cranborne he could not go. He would have been good in every way. As it is, Winston could not spare people like Anderson or Attlee or Sinclair—the last named because it might have meant Herbert Samuel becoming Liberal Leader and entitled to some sort of place in the Government! He won't look at seasoned old-stagers like Sam Hoare, or untried men of first class ability like Wilfrid Greene, and he does not like Rab Butler. At one moment he was seized with the idea that Dick Law might fill the bill, but Dick, though an admirable fellow, sincere and courageous, knows nothing about India . . .[3] At one moment we toyed with the idea of Gwilym Lloyd George; but Winston could not spare him from organising coal and I had doubts myself as to his having quite enough distinction for the job.

3. Anyhow, Winston has seized upon your very generous offer to stay on a bit to help over Lumley in order to convert it into a request to you to stay on six months to enable him to postpone a decision. I confess I don't think that is really fair to you, after all you have stood up to uncomplainingly, but if you and your doctors feel you can do it I shall naturally be only too happy that our partnership should continue a bit longer.

4. One of the difficulties of the situation as I now see it is that we are entirely in the dark as to whether Lumley really would accept even the Viceroyalty if, after looking at him, Winston made up his mind in his favour. It is at any rate possible that the domestic reasons which made him refuse a continuation of Bombay might influence him even against the bigger job, though I don't think it very likely. There is also the somewhat awkward situation that

[1] No. 237. [2] No. 236. [3] Personal comment omitted.

if he knows nothing about the possibility he will naturally pack up all his goods and belongings, send them off by sea and possibly wish to come home by sea himself. All this would of course mean a lot of unnecessary trouble and confusion if in the end he were appointed. On the other hand it would be equally unfortunate if he left everything behind in Bombay, flew back, and it then became known that he had been looked at and discarded. I don't know that I at present see any way out of this second difficulty. But I wonder whether it would be possible for you in any way, without committing us at this end, to find out what Lumley's reasons for rejecting an extension of Bombay were and how far they are reasons that would lead him to reject even the offer of the Viceroyalty?

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

251

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

INDIA OFFICE, *4 December 1942*

I have written to you separately[1] about the question of your successor and the tangle into which it has got. I can only hope that it will get straightened out eventually and that the right man may be found, if not now then a little later on.

2. I have just been speaking to the C.I.G.S. about Auchinleck, to whom I showed his letter[2] to you. We both feel that it is quite natural for him to be sensitive about continuing on full pay while doing nothing. Brooke is going to look into the matter and see whether possibly something in the nature of reduced pay cannot be arranged after the end of January. Like myself, he feels that it is really very hard that Auchinleck, who was ideal as Commander-in-Chief, India, and had every expectation of a full term of office, should now be stranded. On the other hand, C.I.G.S. is not quite so sure, after Libya, that Auchinleck has got quite the gifts for handling an actual fighting force under modern conditions, so that—apart from reverting to Commander-in-Chief—there may not be anything much offering in the near future.

3. Meanwhile, there is something that I have in mind, which I have not so far mentioned to Brooke in case he can think of anything better, but for which Auchinleck is just the right man. It seems to me that it is already time for us to give serious consideration to what sort of an Indian Army, or rather Indian fighting services, we are to have after the war. There are, of course, many uncertain factors; but I think we can reasonably start with the assumption that no new constitution could actually come into effect until two or three years

after the war and that any Government that then took over would naturally want to have as efficient fighting forces as possible. That should obviously be the first consideration. The second, and one which would be of no little importance in securing continuity and saving the army from violent changes after self-government has come into force, is to my mind a more rapid Indianisation immediately after the war and a progressive but practical scheme for further Indianisation in subsequent years. What I mean is something that could be effectively defended against political pressure to recast the whole army system immediately British control is removed. This, of course, hangs together with the question of the extent to which, by mutual agreement, British forces were left in India. Naturally we should be in a position to stipulate, in return for such forces, that the Indian Army itself should remain of a certain standard during the years for which the agreement is concluded.

4. The whole problem is a very big one and it seems to me that the first investigation of it should be made in India. What I have in mind is the appointment of a committee—and Auchinleck would be the obvious chairman—which would examine the whole problem and report to you in the same way as the Modernization Committee which was appointed by the Commander-in-Chief before the investigation of the Chatfield Committee.[3] I should be very grateful to have your views on this proposal as soon as possible.

5. In this connection I am glad to see from your telegram No. 5726[4] of yesterday's date that you are turning your mind towards the future of the Indian Air Force and proposing the setting up of a small Inspectorate responsible direct to the A.O.C.-in-C. through his deputy. I think in this connection you will find Baldwin helpful and broad-minded. The air is going to be so important a factor in defence in the future that we cannot overstress its importance. For a good time I am convinced that India will want to keep R.A.F. squadrons in India, even after it has been prepared to do without British battalions. But that should not preclude the very maximum expansion of the Indian Air Force.

6. I think I have mentioned in earlier letters something of Winston's sudden brain wave that we might initiate a great policy of social and economic reform for India as an alternative to political changes and that this was warmly taken up by Cripps. It was very much deflated by a meeting, which I subsequently held, of Ministers more immediately concerned,[5] when it emerged that nothing less than 400 millions in the way of contribution from this country

[1] No. 250.
[2] Of 14 November, enclosed in a letter of 17 November from Lord Linlithgow to Mr Amery. MSS. EUR. F. 125/23.
[3] Expert Committee on Indian Defence 1938–9, chaired by Admiral of the Fleet Lord Chatfield.
[4] Not printed. [5] See No. 46.

would be more than a fleabite in dealing with India and that even then it would not make any difference to the political situation. However, I thought it as well to get the office to draw up a pretty comprehensive account[6] of the progress which has actually been made up to date on the basis of your Agricultural Committee, Whitley Committee, Labour Committee, &c. This was circulated to Ministers concerned and on it A. D. K. Owen, one of Cripps' secretaries, drafted a memorandum urging a much bolder policy in a number of directions. This was discussed by him with Croft and others in the office as well as with Gregory,[7] and no doubt Gregory will have reported on the discussions which took place. I understand that as the outcome of these discussions Owen is producing a modified memorandum.[8] I should like to make it clear, however, that these discussions have been quite without prejudice, and merely with the object of assisting Owen to put up to Cripps a memorandum of a reasonable kind, for Cripps, if he wishes, to bring up before the Committee of Ministers. The India Office have throughout made it clear that any detailed plans can only be worked out in India, that we see no substantial political advantage to be gained, and as regards finance see no possibility of doing anything from here as the process would merely increase by very large sums the sterling balances which are already regarded with alarm.

7. I think it has sunk in sufficiently that there is no question of a vast subsidy from here—and indeed such a subsidy would be merely an addition to India's sterling balances, while the actual money would have to be found by Indian borrowing or taxation or by the printing press method—and that social reform is in fact a matter which Indians already control and will insist on doing in their own way, at any rate in the provinces that have self-government. But as regards the Centre and the Section 93 Provinces, the idea still is that the matter could be dealt with by way of instructions to your successor. I am all for your successor following your example in taking the keenest possible interest in social and economic questions, but I certainly doubt the wisdom of anything in the nature of detailed or specific instructions and in any case such instructions could only be framed after consultation with India. You are, I know, considering the post-war situation and drawing up reconstruction policies just as we are here, and it might be very helpful to have from you something in the nature of a brief memorandum of what you are planning to do and of the lines your post-war social and economic policies are likely to take.

8. There is one thing that I am not without hopes of getting out of all this. I was able to convince Kingsley Wood that the only possible financial gift from this country aimed at improving relations with India would have to be spent in this country and could be spent most effectively on something in the nature of improving cultural relations. I am in touch with the British Council, not only about bringing India more effectively within the scope of their

activities, but also with a view to considering whether something in the nature of a really worthy centre of Indian art and culture could be established in London. I believe I could persuade Kingsley Wood to find a quarter of a million or even more for such an object. I have suggested to the British Council the setting up of a small committee under Zetland or [of?] people with special knowledge of that aspect of India and hope to bring Hailey into the picture as soon as he gets back from America.

9. In connection with this matter of reconstruction I have just, since dictating the above, had a talk with Azizul Huque. He was eager to know what was being done and I think would very much wish himself to be entrusted with the charge of directing such a study. He is beginning to feel that he might be better value to the common cause in India, and I think there is a good deal to be said for that, for I have formed a high opinion of him and he will go back, whenever it is, with a real fund of goodwill towards the British connection. He has indeed in all his speeches gone out of his way to emphasise what India has owed to us in the past. Of course in this matter his own strong family feelings, the sense of being cut off from his wife and children, as well as the expense of two establishments, all come into the picture. But I think he is also genuinely keen on pulling his weight at home and he will certainly do so with added effect after having been here for a while.

10. Meanwhile, he remains anxious to go back early in the New Year, for the purpose of meeting Vice-Chancellors and Provincial Governments in conference on the whole question of the position of students in this country. On this his general line is the perfectly sound one that it is disastrous from every point of view to let men come here who are not going to do any good, but will only ruin their own lives as well as impoverish their parents, and that the essential thing is to select at the Indian end the men who will really make a success of it. Incidentally, they are the men who will return, not embittered, but with a good opinion of this country, and so be a useful element politically.

11. You sent me with your letter of the 10th October[9] a copy of the letter[10] you had had from Mr. Sherwood Eddy. No doubt, as you say, he is entirely well-meaning, and he seems to have a rather better appreciation of the Indian situation than many of our would-be American helpers, but I agree that in present circumstances at any rate it would have been impossible to let him come to India, and I think we are fortunate that the American Government did not press his request.

12. I am exceedingly sorry you have had all this trouble about Spens' appointment. The question of the succession to Gwyer was of course precipitated by the suggestion about Monckton in your private and personal telegram

[6] See No. 114, note 1. [7] See No. 210. [8] See enclosure to No. 276.
[9] No. 86. [10] Vol. II, No. 732.

No. 1953–S[11] of 22nd January. I had however taken it from your private and personal telegram No. 2188–S[12] of 25th July that you were by then fully satisfied that there was no one suitable in India, and that we were in complete agreement that a European from here would have to be found. I admit that it would have been better for the purpose of dealing with Gwyer if I had let you know what was proposed before Spence [Spens] was approached, but for reasons which we both have regretfully to recognize the field here was so narrow and the only other two possible candidates were so obviously doing more valuable work that there seemed little option left in the matter.

13. No doubt Gwyer would have been much easier over this if he had been consulted beforehand, but I am bound to say that I think he has behaved in a rather unreasonable manner. He is quite entitled, of course, to hold his own views about Spens, though he can hardly be in touch with present day opinion at the Bar here, nor perhaps was he very closely in touch with it before he went out. Simon assured me that Spens had been under consideration for the High Court and was of that calibre, and I certainly do not see where we could hope to get anyone better, given that you have not anyone in India. Gwyer's objections to Spens taking office in July seem to me somewhat purist especially as the loss of pension involved would be very unfair to Spens.

14. As far as I can see the criticism in India has been mainly on the ground that a European has been appointed, which is commonplace enough, and I have not seen anything to suggest that there is any criticism of Spens from a legal point of view. I certainly think that the present rule of which, although it was on record here, I was unfortunately unaware until you mentioned it, under which the initiative in this matter apparently ought to come from the Chief Justice himself ought to be altered, though that provision might be quite appropriate in the case of judges.

15. As you desired, I asked Halifax to communicate the appointment to Zafrullah in advance, and I am sending you with this letter a copy of a telegram from him regarding the result. Zafrullah seems to have taken it all in good part and not to feel any of the doubts which Gwyer has expressed.

Enclosure to No. 251

FROM WASHINGTON TO FOREIGN OFFICE

No. 5829, dated 1st December 1942.
Your telegram No. 7435. Following received from H.M. Consul-General, Chicago, telegram No. 26, November 29th:—

Begins. I made oral communication to Zafrullah tonight (he dined with me last night and our relations are good).

2. He said it was courteous of the Secretary of State and Viceroy to advise him in advance. He had never heard before Spens was interested in his career. As far as he personally was concerned this appointment made no difference. Had his opinion been asked he would have recommended senior judge. He himself might be a candidate at some future date but he could afford to wait. There would be some criticism of appointment of a European but not very much.

3. Last night in private conversation he had observed that conditions in India could be improved if the 3 portfolios at present held by British were held by Indians so I was surprised at his lack of opposition to this appointment.

4. I am assuming you will inform MacDonald in Canada. *Ends.*
Ottawa informed.

11 and 12 Not printed.

252

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/8/6: f 21

5 December 1942

37–U. Your most helpful telegram[1] has I think disposed of the Egyptian menace but I fear proved a boomerang from your point of view. Personally while glad to have accepted your very generous offer to stay for say three months to give Lumley a rest I should have hesitated to press for more especially as Natal begins to get hot and rainy from October. But if you and Lady Linlithgow are willing and your doctor approves I need not tell you that I shall be delighted.

1 No. 237.

253

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/8/6: f 17

5 December 1942

38–U. Your 43–U[1] addressed to Prime Minister. Very grateful for your self-sacrificing decision.

1 No. 246.

254

Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

CONFIDENTIAL REPORT GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, *5 December 1942*

No. 115

My dear Linlithgow,

This report covers the last half of November.

* * *

5. *Food situation.*—This is now much my greatest anxiety. I have already telegraphed the position to you, and I am most grateful for your help. The position in Bijapur District is very serious. Our efforts have succeeded in getting supplies into this district in small quantities so far; but I am greatly perturbed at the difficulty which we are finding in obtaining supplies from other Provinces and States. The Commerce Member is visiting Bombay in the coming week, and we shall take the opportunity of placing our position before him. If it is the case that the situation in the country as a whole is one of considerable difficulty, I would hope that it may be possible to import grain from abroad, in order to avoid starvation on a large scale which, I fear, will occur, if we cannot feed our famine-stricken Districts.

Mine too!

L.

P.S.V.—

I think we shall have to start a service of information from Food Dept. to G[overnor]s through M[ember]. Speak. *L.*

255

Mr Churchill to the Marquess of Linlithgow (via India Office)

Telegram, L/PO/8/6: f 15

IMMEDIATE *5 December 1942*[1]

39–U. Following from Prime Minister. Your 43–U.[2] I am most grateful to you for undertaking this additional task. I will make a submission to the King immediately. The announcement, which will be published in Tuesday morning's papers will state that the extension is at the special request of His Majesty's Government and will refer to our confidence in you. Certainly all must be settled by June. Meanwhile I shall be very glad to see Lumley over here.

Text of announcement follows.

[1] MSS. EUR. F. 125/158 gives the date as 6 December. [2] No. 246.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/8/6: ff 13–14

IMMEDIATE *5 December 1942*[1]

40–U. My 39–U. Following is text of announcement for simultaneous publication in morning papers of Tuesday, 8th December. *Begins* The Most Honourable the Marquess of Linlithgow, P.C., K.T., etc. has, with the approval of the King-Emperor, at the special request of His Majesty's Government who place on record their high confidence in him, consented to undertake a further extension of his term as Viceroy and Governor-General of India for six months namely until October 1943. *Ends.*

King's formal approval is in process of being obtained but has been signified informally. I will ensure text is not released by cable or wireless before 3 a.m. on 8th. Announcement will be made from 10 Downing Street.

[1] MSS. EUR. F. 125/158 gives the date as 6 December.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *6 December 1942, 9.30 pm*
Received: 6 December, 7.15 pm

No. 3441–G. Continuation our telegram No. 9649[1] dated December 4th. Phillips.

2. After further consideration in the light of the information in Washington telegram No. 5862[2] dated December 2nd, we are prepared to concede designation of Personal Representative of President. We shall be glad to receive priority telegram from Washington quoting question and answer which Welles intends to provoke at his Press Conference.

3. On the other hand, we feel it necessary to ask for some revision of the draft announcement. We consider it of much importance to make it clear that Phillips is retaining the rank of Ambassador in recognition of his services and is

[1] No. 247. [2] See No. 240, note 2.

not receiving that rank in view of importance of post he is assuming. Similarly we doubt correctness of—

(*a*) describing New Delhi post as "diplomatic mission";
(*b*) the statement that charge of Mission was assumed by Johnson following Wilson's appointment at Baghdad.

Possibly State Department could be induced to accept redraft as in immediately succeeding telegram.

4. The above was drafted before receipt of your telegram No. 20891[3] of December 5th. We adhere to our views in regard to amendment of draft announcement.

Repeated to Ambassador, Washington.

[3] No. 249.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *6 December 1942, 9.55 pm*
Received: 6 December, 8.15 pm

No. 3442–G. Following is a suggested draft announcement referred to in our immediately preceding telegram:—

Begins. President has appointed Mr. William Phillips of Massachusetts as his personal representative to serve near Government of India. Mr. Phillips who entered diplomatic service of United States in 1903 has rendered his Government long and distinguished service in Far East, Europe and Washington. He served twice as Under Secretary of State and was United States Ambassador in Rome until the outbreak of war with Italy. In recognition of these services he will retain personal rank of Ambassador.

2. Mr. Phillips who is at present in London is expected to proceed to New Delhi in the near future where he will assume charge of American Mission which was established there in November 1941 by Mr. Thomas W. Wilson. *Ends.*[1]

Repeated to Ambassador, Washington.

[1] In telegram 96909 of 9 December to Lord Linlithgow (repeated to Foreign Office No. 5969), Lord Halifax announced the State Department's acceptance of this draft subject to the following modifications (which Lord Halifax had accepted on Lord Linlithgow's behalf): (1) in third sentence 'he has served' instead of 'he served', (2) in fourth sentence 'have' instead of 'retain', (3) addition of following as final sentence: 'subsequently Colonel Louis Johnson served as Personal Representative of President at New Delhi.' President Roosevelt was to announce the appointment at a press conference on 11 December. MSS. EUR. F. 125/130.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Churchill (via India Office)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *7 December 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 3449–S. Following for Prime Minister. My warmest thanks for your very kind message[1] and for the terms which you have used in announcing extension.[2] I am most grateful. You may be certain that I will do everything in my power to keep things going on right lines, and knowledge of your confidence in me and your support is invaluable.

[1] No. 255. [2] No. 256.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *7 December 1942*

No. 3450–S. Most grateful for your good wishes and help. It is not going to be a light burden, but I shall do my best to keep things going.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT *7 December 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 3452–S. Sterling balances. In continuation of my private and personal telegram No. 2847–S[1] dated 22nd September 1942. On receipt of your telegram No. 19471[2] dated 10th November these questions were again taken in Council on the 2nd and 4th December after Raisman had had a further informal discussion with Sarker and Mody. Sarker had circulated a paper, main points in which were—

(*a*) He was still disposed to argue that Joint war measures were a disingenuous invention of the Finance Department which involved additional liabilities on India not contemplated in the original Settlement.

[1] No. 10. [2] See No. 158, note 2.

This view was supported by Mody, Aney and Ambedkar. It is not clear how far frequent explanations by Raisman of the inevitability of Joint war measures and their natural evolution from the terms of the Settlement really convinced them.

(*b*) The Defence measures even now being taken in India are in excess of the measures required for her local Defence, and anyway they are not really for the local defence of India but are an integral part of the United Nations' war effort on the Middle East and Far East theatres. India has now become strategic base for United Nations' offensive against Japan, and United Nations should pay. The Commander-in-Chief demolished the substance of this argument, but it was not abandoned.

(*c*) Huge increase in revised budget for current year is beyond India's capacity to pay. Raisman contested this.

(*d*) There is no limit to the burden on India under present Settlement which will go on increasing.

(*e*) He would only agree therefore to pay one-half the capital cost of the new aerodromes, and the rupee costs of the Indian Air Force Squadrons, all other expenditure on the Air Forces in India, capital or recurring, should be paid by His Majesty's Government.

(*f*) If above was accepted in modification of Raisman's offer to pay all rupee costs of Air Forces in India, then he would agree to Raisman's other offer to pay for one-half the capital cost of industrial expansion in India. Otherwise not.

2. At the Council meeting held on the 2nd December, Sarker's line was generally followed by Mody, Sultan Ahmed, Aney and Ambedkar (Srivastava, Jogendra Singh and Noon were absent). This group of five maintained its attitude with vehemence and showed no signs of compromise, or of being influenced by debate. In support of Raisman were the European Members and Usman, five in all.

3. It was evident that although the alleged invention of Joint war measures would be adopted and used as far as it could be as a prop to their case, their real stand would be taken on their view of India's capacity to pay, and on the unlimited nature of the liability which the present Settlement imposes on India.

4. In view of the strength of the opposition and of the undesirability of forcing through his proposals by a close vote, Raisman offered to consider whether a limit should be fixed in one way or another to India's liability within the spirit of the present Settlement. Council adjourned until the 4th December to enable this examination to be undertaken.

5. In the meantime on the 3rd December the best forecast possible was made of the revised estimate for the current year and the budget for next year. The

figures before Council (which had been prepared in June) were 222 crores for the current year *excluding* Raisman's "offers" which had been shown as an additional 71 crores capital and 16 crores recurring in a full year. The hurried forecast now prepared shows that these figures are likely to be greatly exceeded, and the revised estimate for the current year looks as if it might become about 260 crores without the "offers". Due to the rise in prices and changes in the composition and strengths of the Air Forces the "offers" look like costing an additional 100 crores capital and 33 crores recurring.

6. To have put such figures as these before Council on the 4th and to have maintained that they made no difference in principle would have been to invite a crisis and a blank refusal from the opposition block to accept anything. At the meeting on the 4th therefore Raisman asked for further time to consider the matter on the ground that the formal revised and budget estimates would be available this week and that it was undesirable for him to advise Council on the strength of hurriedly prepared intermediate figures which might prove very wide of the mark in a few days time. The question was adjourned for about a fortnight.

7. It is evident that the Mody–Sarker group are determined not to accept Raisman's offers and that they are actuated by purely political considerations. They will attack Raisman's offers and (when they see the latest estimates) probably the Settlement itself ostensibly on merits, but in reality because they are not prepared to face the country as willing supporters of such gigantic increases in India's war budget. Mody has admitted this in private conversation with Raisman. They will refuse steadily to be convinced on merits and it is almost a waste of time to discuss the merits of the case with them. They feel that they have already strained their weak position in the country by acquiescing recently in several unpopular measures and are determined not to incur further odium by subscribing to Raisman's recommendations. Some of them would possibly welcome release from their present responsibilities on grounds which could be represented to the country so favourably to themselves. They believe that they have only to refuse to accept any further liabilities and His Majesty's Government will be bound to acquiesce, and that if we are to keep them in office, we have to carry them with us at their own price.

8. Although it is impossible to say how far they will willingly to [? go] when the revised figures are before them, we shall have to be prepared to work out a new approach to the question. We have this under consideration and I will telegraph you again towards the end of the week after we have seen the revised figures.[3]

[3] For subsequent correspondence on the detailed application of the War Financial Settlement, see L/F/7/2861 and L/PO/2/16.

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Mr Eden to Viscount Halifax

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 55

MOST IMMEDIATE SECRET FOREIGN OFFICE, *7 December 1942, 6.42 pm*

No. 7694. Viceroy's telegram 3441–S[1] to Secretary of State for India.

1. Paragraph 2. Please do what you can to let Viceroy have earliest possible report of what is actually said.

2. Paragraph 3 (*a*) was dealt with in my previous telegram.[2] Point (*b*) and suggested redraft of State Department's announcement. I share Viceroy's preference for linking Phillips' Ambassadorial rank to his previous service rather than to his present appointment important though that is. I realise, however, that having ourselves engineered appointment of a man of this calibre we must be careful not to nag at United States Government over details which are really their business. But as Murray stated that the draft was put forward as a basis for discussion I hope you will find it possible to effect some modification in the sense desired by the Viceroy.

Repeated to New Delhi.

[1] i.e. 3441–G; No. 257. [2] See No. 249, para. 2.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *8 December 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Many thanks for your letters[1] of the 3rd November. I am not, I confess, very much impressed by the memorandum which Cripps has had, though there are bits of it sensible enough. I should myself have thought it was a complete waste of the time of the Cabinet to ask them to read this sort of stuff and that if they were to read it, it should be circulated with the appropriate reply. A good deal of it (in relation to jamming) is covered by correspondence that we have been having officially. But I will have a word with some of my people here and see if I can let you have suitable comment at a later date.[2]

2. The business of the Viceroyalty has of course now been disposed of. I will confess that the prospect of a second hot weather in Delhi in the eighth year of

my tenure of this post is not one to which I look forward with much zeal! But I think that in the circumstances the decision is probably the right one: and I of course much value this further sign of Winston's confidence and of yours. It is just conceivable that I might in these few remaining months be able to direct things a little more towards some practicable objective, but much will turn on the way the war goes, on the attitude of the Muslims, &c. But I need not speculate further on that business now save to say that I do think it most important that my successor's name should be known not later than June and that I am very relieved to find that Winston seems ready to help us over that. Fortified by my own past experience in this matter, I shall take leave from time to time to enquire of you how the hunt is proceeding! In any event, I hope you will open fire at No. 10 not a moment later than May 1st, and keep shooting till you get what we all so much want.

3. I read with interest what you say in paragraph 3 of your letter about Auchinleck and his future. It all seems somewhat indefinite at the moment, and you will by now have had Auchinleck's recent letter[3] to me about his position. I shall be interested to see your comment on it. I quite appreciate the C.I.G.S.'s doubts about the wisdom of Auchinleck and Wavell living side by side here, but I do not in fact think that Wavell has felt any embarrassment. Both these men have confidence in me and I think we had best leave things as they are.

[Para. 4, promising to pass on to Craik an enquiry of Amery's about the aboriginal population in the Orissa States; para. 5, praising the ability of the Government of India's Agent in Burma; para. 6, on allegations that British Press gave insufficient attention to Indian war effort; and para. 7, on proposed extension of powers of Federal Court, omitted.]

8. Many thanks for your help about publicity for Spens. As it happens the appointment has attracted practically no comment, either critical or otherwise, and that is no doubt all to the good. I gather that there is in certain quarters a feeling of mild relief that the choice should not have fallen on Zafrullah, who is thought to be moving into the political field to a greater extent than is altogether desirable for a Judge, by his visit to Chungking, and his visit to America and the speeches he is reported to have made there; and that the advantages of continuing for the present to fill the Chief Justiceship by a European from home, wholly detached from India's communal and other problems, are much more widely accepted than one would have imagined from the vigour with which Gwyer pressed for a local appointment.

[1] Nos. 137 and 138.
[2] See Lord Linlithgow's letter to Mr Amery of 28 February 1943. MSS. EUR. F. 125/12.
[3] See No. 251, note 2.

9. Otherwise the political position generally seems fairly quiet, and there is no sign of any change in fundamentals in the various camps.

P.S.—At such a juncture, I like to cheer you up with a personal anecdote, chosen to show that there is still a little life in the old dog. I flew to Bahawalpur Friday afternoon, shot partridges 4.30 p.m. till dusk. Saturday we shot duck and the Viceroy was in form. I started off with 4 right and lefts without a miss, went on to get the first 15 birds with 17 cartridges, reached the 100 in 32 minutes with 145 cartridges, knocked down 196 in the morning, and came back with 164 (water deep and covert thick and the "swimmers" always escape). Shot duck again next morning Sunday and flew back, to reach Delhi at 5.45 p.m.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *9 December 1942*

I need not repeat to you my thanks for stepping into the breach at such cost to yourself. When all your plans have been made for taking the collar off your neck, to face another six months of pulling the old cart uphill in the hot weather requires real courage. Anyhow, it gives the opportunity

* * * * * *[1]

As the *Daily Herald* remarked in one of its natural nagging comments, postponement is better than a bad selection. As a matter of fact the press as a whole has given a friendly and sensible reception to the news. I took the trouble to see the Editors of *The Times* and *Daily Telegraph* separately yesterday as well as all the Lobby Correspondents. What is annoying is that some of the papers, e.g. the *Evening Standard* repeat the story that certain people like Sinclair were definitely approached and refused. I cannot believe this story true about Sinclair. Certainly Winston scouted the suggestion of him quite firmly on the grounds I have mentioned to you[2] and I cannot imagine that he would then definitely approach Sinclair without at any rate letting me know that he had done so. What I do not like about it is the danger of an impression being created in India that the Viceroyalty has been hawked about and refused by a number of people. However, all that is now past history.

He did not. I have verified this.
L.

2. We now have the best part of another year ahead of us. Obviously there is no room for any major constitutional changes, but only for the development

and consolidation of the present position. Every month during which your present Executive shakes down together, finds its feet and feels—and is felt by India—that it is really effectively governing, is all to the good. I am looking forward to the telegram[3] which you have promised about the working of the Government of India and am at present inclined to incorporate it in a White Paper together with some explanation of what the work of the India Office here is. I think it is of the first importance that the public here and in America should realise the extent to which the Government of India is a real government, running its own show and coming to its own decisions and not a mere mouthpiece to convey orders from here; conversely, too, the extent to which the India Office here is a liaison office and an agency for the Government of India far more than an administration attempting to govern India at a distance and, as the proverbial story goes, asking what Johnny is doing in the nursery and telling him not to.

3. One of the difficulties in that connection is, of course, the habit of questions in the House. What I should like to do would be to secure from the Chair something of the same sort of ruling as is applied in regard to the Dominions, namely, that questions within the sphere of the Dominion Governments are not allowed. The trouble there is the absence of any clear definition. Even in the self-governing provinces so many things today are being done in pursuit of the Defence of India Rules and therefore of my ultimate responsibility to Parliament. But I am all for taking every opportunity of emphasising the position of the Government of India and the more you do things on your own without consulting me the more I shall be pleased.

4. In that connection I cannot help feeling that it would be a good thing not to prolong Maxwell now you are staying on, but to adopt your alternative suggestion of appointing Usman. From my point of view it certainly would afford the best answer to the clamour for complete immediate Indianisation, for I could stand firmly on the attitude hitherto taken up that our basis is not colour, but experience and continuity. A prolongation of Maxwell would at once be taken as due to one reason only, namely, to keep out an Indian, and from the point of view of your successor would be worse than useless, unless indeed Maxwell were prolonged for another year or nine months at the least. Incidentally, it would enable you to fill the vacancy created by Usman's transfer with another Muslim. I do not think that you should be guided in this matter by any views that Jinnah may express. Naturally he would like to have a say in your Council and to put in his claim for a 50/50 representation. But he has a possible grievance in the smallness of the present representation and could not really make anything of a grievance if you added one or two more. No

[1] These asterisks are reproduced from MSS. EUR. F. 125/11.

[2] See No. 250, para. 2.

[3] See Nos. 123, para. 4, and 131, para. 5.

doubt he can prevent members of his League accepting and the field without them is not very wide. Still, I dare say you could find someone, e.g. if necessary Azizul Haque, of whom I have formed the best impression.

[Paras. 5, 6, and 7, on India's representation on War Graves Commission, omitted.]

11 December 1942

8. I have just been having a very interesting talk with Sir Malcolm Robertson, the Chairman of the British Council, and his chief adviser on the Empire side, Sir Angus Gillan. You are hardly likely to have heard much about the British Council owing to the fact that its development has taken place so largely since you left this country, though just possibly you may have heard something of it from George Lloyd, who was the Chairman before he took office. The original conception of the Council was to do for the culture, i.e. literature, art, architecture, science, &c. of Britain what the French and every other big country have long done for their own culture, namely, interpret it in foreign countries through the best type of lecturer, &c.—the whole entirely divorced from politics. The thing has been a remarkable success in South America and all over Europe, though of course suspended temporarily in many cases by German occupation. It is only quite recently that the British Council has entered the Empire field and so far on a small scale and tentatively. The idea in this field is, so far as possible, to work on the mutual basis. In Canada, for instance, a committee has been formed with similar objects, primarily to interpret Canada to the R.A.F. training out there, but present also to interpret it here and to work together with the British Council from here, developing its lectures, &c. in Canada.

9. It seems to me that there might be a really great opportunity for indirectly improving relations between Britain and India through the Council, i.e. if it could get the Indian universities to consider both encouraging the best type of lecturers from here to come out to India, provided and financed by the British Council, and at the same time also build up an Indian organisation which would provide lecturers from India to this country, or for that matter to other countries. What, however, would facilitate its sending lecturers here is that the British Council at this end could make arrangements to ensure that these lecturers find their audiences and no doubt also contribute to costs at this end.

10. In the same connection I think I wrote to you the other day,[4] *à propos* of Winston and Cripps' idea of starting a new social policy for India, that the one thing we could do at this end would be for the Treasury to grant a substantial sum for the creation of a really worthy centre in London of Indian culture. If that were done it would of course provide an admirable centre through which an Indian Council in India could work at this end, whether with the help of the British Council or through such trustees as would be set up—naturally including Indians—for the new institution.

11. If the idea generally commends itself to you I would propose to set up an *ad hoc* committee, possibly under someone like Zetland, at this end, to consider a little bit how the thing might work out, while at a later stage the right sort of emissary from the British Council could go out to India to pave the way and see what interest he could create in the starting of an Indian Council.

I shall have to consider whether to tell Council of this.

L.

12. All this is by way of preliminary warning. I hope to receive a memorandum and material about the British Council in the next few days and to send you a much fuller letter on that asking for your views and I hope your blessing; but pending that I thought you might as well have a preliminary notion of what is in my mind. The subject is one on which Gwyer might have ideas, possibly in the direction of making Delhi University the focus of an Indian Council whose business it was to interpret Indian culture not only to Britain but to the world at large.

All my best wishes for you and yours for Xmas and the coming year—you deserve them!

[4] No. 251, paras. 6–8.

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Government of India, Food Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/E/8/3297: f 297

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *9 December 1942, 11.10 pm*
Received: 9 December, 10.15 pm

9796. Your 19013[1] dated November 3rd. Food situation in India has deteriorated seriously in the past month. Forecasts of 1942–43 crops indicate that the country is likely to be over 1½ million tons short of internal requirements of rice. This position (? is) due to loss of Burma rice, floods in Sind, cyclones in rice growing areas of Bengal and Orissa and an indifferent rice crop generally in Bengal which is the main rice producing province. Anticipations of covering rice deficit by increased millet production disappointed owing to lack of October rains in western India where millet crop is reported to be total failure in two out of three divisions of Bombay. Now estimated that total food grains crop 1942–43 will be at least 500,000 tons short of internal requirements and if needs of Ceylon and Arabia are added deficit will be increased by nearly another 500,000 tons.

[1] On supply of wheat for civil and military needs. MSS. EUR. F. 125/23.

2. Present position is causing acute anxiety. A number of army mills have closed down for lack of wheat. Reports are coming in from all sides of inability to purchase wheat in the Punjab at controlled rates. There is grave shortage in Calcutta Bombay and Delhi and serious difficulties are being experienced in finding food for employees on essential war works. Measures to meet (? situation) have been considered and it has been decided to extend control to all food grains which (? will) involve lifting control price of wheat. This may ease the situation temporarily but reference is (corrupt group) to previous telegrams in which difficulty of extracting stocks from millions of small producers has been emphasised. It is not practicable to bring this vast mass under statutory regulation and resort to requisitioning in past has owing to dispersal of stocks in small quantities and secret stores yielded disappointing results and aggravated warehouse situation subsequently.

3. In above circumstances we are compelled to approach again with the request for an additional 600,000 tons of wheat. To produce the desired psychological effect this should be consigned to Food Department with no allocation for military and civil. Food Department, who are now responsible for military as well as civil supplies, will see that military needs are given preference. If this wheat could be despatched not in regular monthly quotas but with an initial consignment of substantial proportions the psychological effect in releasing stocks in India would be enhanced. It is realised that this demand involves a most serious call on shipping and that its satisfaction must seriously interfere with transport of other war requirements. The food situation is, however, so acute that immediate substantial assistance is essential if war work in India is not to be seriously disorganised and law and order gravely menaced. Assistance for civil supplies has become definitely a war requirement justifying allotment of increased shipping space. We shall of course accompany our new control measures by intensive drive against hoarding but we are extremely doubtful of effect of this. Commander-in-Chief was present at Council meeting at which it was unanimously agreed that increased imports of wheat were urgently needed and should be asked for. If as a result of new measures and a substantial import of wheat the situation in India improves sufficiently we shall at once reduce our requirements.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *10 December 1942, 8.50 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 10 December, 6.15 pm*

No. 3475–S. My Food Department's telegram of December 9th, No. 9796.[1] Present proposals are made consequent on discussion in Council since my telegram of December 3rd.[2] Wavell concurs in this request. Situation is a serious one and I hope you will be able to help us.

[1] No. 265. [2] No. 242.

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Viscount Halifax to Government of India

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2633: f 48

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, *11 December 1942, 11.9 pm*

No. 326. President has just announced the appointment of Phillips in his conferences. He also read out agreed statement. He further worked in frequent remarks to the effect that rumours had been current that Phillips would carry some special instructions with a view to Hindu [*sic* ? U.S.] mediation or something of that kind but there was no truth in them. Phillips would carry out the ordinary functions of an American diplomatic representative abroad.[1]

Repeated to Foreign Office No. 6019.

[1] In telegram 6014 of 10 December to Foreign Office (repeated to Foreign New Delhi), Lord Halifax had transmitted the draft text of a question and answer on the mediation issue, warning that it could not be guaranteed that the exact words would be used: Question, 'Rumours are current that Mr Phillips will carry out a special plan or formula for solution of Indian problem. Is there any truth in these rumours?' Answer, 'There is no truth in such rumours. Mr Phillips has been selected to assume charge of American Mission at New Delhi which was established in 1941. He will perform regular duties of an American diplomatic representative abroad.' L/P&S/12/2633: f 51. According to *The Times* report of 12 December of President Roosevelt's press conference, the President said 'that there was no truth in any report that Mr Phillips would carry with him any plan or formula for the solution of the Indian problem. He will perform "the ordinary diplomatic duties of the personal representative of the President abroad".'

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/10/17: ff 267–8

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *12 December 1942*

1447. Your private and personal telegram 3408–S.[1] It seems to me that Jinnah is rather over-reaching himself and I cannot think that he would have any ground for effective complaint if vacancy on Maxwell's retirement were filled by an Indian and an additional Moslem added to your Council, more especially if this were so arranged as not to involve amendment of Act to abrogate provision requiring three members with Service qualification. I doubt therefore whether Jinnah's *démarche* need prevent us from considering matter on its merits.

2. The position as to Maxwell's succession is of course affected by your extension. There is now obviously a balance of advantage in appointing someone who will be firmly in the saddle by the time your own successor arrives. From my point of view the appointment of Usman would create the most defensible position in reply to the demand for immediate complete Indianisation and enable me to stand as hitherto on the line that our basis is not colour but experience and continuity. It would indeed be very difficult to make out a convincing case for any other course. On these grounds I should certainly favour Indianisation of the portfolio. But there are obviously considerations which have to be carefully weighed and I should be glad to know what your definite conclusion is, when you have had time to think things over, in order that I could then bring the matter before the War Cabinet.

3. There are two particular considerations on which I should be glad of your views in some detail. The first is the position in regard to the Intelligence Bureau. The main considerations which weighed in 1935 against putting the D.I.B. under the control of an Indian politician were of course (*a*) that this would put politicians in possession of secret information which they would be strongly tempted to use to assail their political enemies; (*b*) that if the "sources" knew or believed that their identity was known or could become known to politicians they would cease to give information. If these considerations still prevail they are more serious now than in normal times, especially as weakness of intelligence is one of the lessons of recent disturbances. It would I imagine be more difficult now to let D.I.B. pass under the War Department as proposed in 1935 and you might find it necessary to make some arrangements more directly under yourself.

4. The second matter is the handling of Service cases. There are some awkward personal cases arising from the recent disturbances—some involving high

officers. If the Home portfolio were Indianised should we not have to secure by some device that at any rate individual service cases were decided by yourself or myself? That might mean your appointing someone to advise you who in that respect would exercise some of the functions of the head of the Civil Service here. Or is it a matter you would be prepared to leave to the Home Member but under the exercise of a considerable measure of personal supervision from yourself?

5. Looking at the longer term political considerations involved it seems to me as if we shall be compelled to continue on the basis of the existing type of government for some years—if indeed it is not to set the permanent pattern of India's government—and that the only line of progress may lie in increasing the authority and acceptance of this government by gradual further Indianisation and further practical independence of His Majesty's Government except in such matters as require the Governor-General's reserve authority both in order to secure full support of the war effort now and to preclude any prejudging of communal or future constitutional issues by the temporary majority of the Council. If the maintenance of that reserve authority and the intention to exercise it are sufficiently clearly emphasised I should be inclined to think that the communal question would not arise in an acute form even if the European members successively disappeared and the Moslems had less than the fifty per cent. which Jinnah not unnaturally demands if the reserve power is to go. Anyhow the reduction of European members by one and the addition of an extra Moslem might enable you to judge how the situation developed *ambulando*.

[1] No. 243.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *13 December 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 3495-S. Food situation. My official Food Department telegram No. 9796[1] of 9th December. I am very uneasy about position that is rapidly developing. It may become critically serious at short notice (e.g. Lumley has just reported that failing immediate supply of 50,000 tons of wheat Bombay would be without food by the middle of January and that he would be driven to evacuate large portions of the population to the country. The Food Department report that this amount of wheat is quite out of their reach and that they

[1] No. 265.

will have to make up the required food values from all sorts of grains.) It is of really vital importance therefore that we should have shipping to import from outside, and I hope you will do all in your power to assist us. This is a matter in which I can claim to speak with considerable experience of the problem both of food control and of distribution. We are very badly placed here by inadequacy of statistics, paucity of really high quality personnel with experience of such work and extreme difficulty of regulating either production or consumption over areas and by population so vast. Fact that this is mainly a country of subsistence farmers encourage[s] me to believe that political reaction of any shortages might admit of being largely confined to towns and industrial areas. But those, as you know, are precisely the most inflammable areas in some ways from the political point of view, and apart from that effect on war effort of general shortage would be disastrous as would also any shortage affecting military rations.

2. Causes for this sudden change in the situation are fully set out in my official telegram. I hope you will convey to the Cabinet my opinion that we are confronted by a very serious situation.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/5/42: ff 115–17

MOST SECRET INDIA OFFICE, *13 December 1942, 1 am*
PERSONAL
IMPORTANT

21405. My next succeeding personal telegram repeats telegram from Prime Minister to Dominion Prime Ministers regarding proposal for joint declaration by ourselves and U.S. Government on general colonial question. I should be glad to have any comments which you may wish to offer as soon as possible.

2. I am in general agreement with proposed declaration of principles, and practical application of them. I understand that intention is that we should be ready in first instance to discuss with U.S.A. practical applications of them in South East Asia as being the area where U.S. has already practical experience and where Defence question will be of most importance. I have emphasised to Cabinet that in my view one of most important features of proposals is that each parent state should have unquestioned right to administer its own territories. I have also pointed out that in conversations with U.S. Government it will be best to assume that proposals are irrelevant to India as India is not within South Eastern Asia area and as principles apply to "peoples unable to assume

full responsibility for their affairs". If India came into Regional Commission she might well claim the same status as parent States and China. But at present this would be premature and India's interests could be watched by H.M.G.'s representatives on Commission.

3. As regards Burma, I have pointed out that self-Government is our declared policy, but in interests of Burma herself there is bound to be interim reconstruction period before this is realised and even then we shall probably have to continue to bear primary responsibility for her defence. As Burma belongs geographically to South Eastern Asia, it may be desirable that she should be included in general defence scheme, but any common policy agreed by parent States concerned in that region as regards internal, social, economic and political developments might only have limited application to Burma in view of prospect of early self-Government. I have added that I understand that it is contemplated that other Nations substantially interested might take part in Regional Commission in addition to parent States. If so I presume China's part on a Commission for S.E. Asia would be restricted to international questions affecting her interests and not include formulation of parent States' common policy regarding internal affairs of territories under their charge. Reactions in Burma would be unfortunate to any Chinese participation in internal policy.

4. Please repeat this and succeeding telegram to Governor of Burma. I shall be glad of his comments on Burma aspects.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/5/42: ff 118–19

PERSONAL
MOST SECRET
IMPORTANT

INDIA OFFICE, *13 December 1942, 7.30 pm*
Received: 14 December

21406. Following is telegram referred to in my immediately preceding personal telegram.

Begins:—We have for some time past had under consideration the question how to deal with the considerable volume of criticism which is heard from time to time regarding British Colonial Policy. Recent events in America—for example, Mr. Luce's article in *Life* and Mr. Wendell Willkie's recent speeches, have raised the question in an acute form. It is clear that there is a widespread and rooted feeling in the United States which regards the British Colonial

Empire as equivalent to the private estate of a landlord preserved for his own benefit. Clearly, this view is unreasonable, but it is no use ignoring its existence. Moreover, we must, if we can, endeavour to get the United States to express their willingness to enter some general defence scheme which would include the defence of Colonial areas. Their assistance, however, will not be forthcoming unless we can secure their general goodwill. With this in view, it is essential that we should act now to convince United States opinion that our Colonial policy is not a danger and an anachronism as certain quarters in that country are inclined to regard it.

2. Some time ago His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington had a discussion with the United States Secretary of State on this matter. Mr. Hull referred to the question how the statements of the Atlantic Charter could best be utilised to guide opinion wisely in relation to backward peoples of differing grades and capacities, and said that his idea was to get some general statement in which we might all assert broad purposes making plain that attainment of freedom involved mutual responsibility of what he called "Parent States" and of those who aspired to it. He was prepared to include a very clear expression against officious intervention from outside with affairs which were responsibility of parent State and said that wide variety of the problem could be appropriately stressed.

3. It appears to us that Mr. Hull's suggestion affords a valuable basis for further action, and we have been considering, in consultation with General Smuts during his visit to London, what would be most convenient course.

4. It seems to us that, as a first step, it would be desirable that we should endeavour to remove the misconceptions about British Colonial policy which are prevalent in the United States and elsewhere. We should explain the principles on which our Colonial policy has been founded, how, within our resources, we have consistently applied liberal ideas in social economic and political sphere for the benefit of the peoples concerned and how our administration of backward territories has never meant that others have been deprived of free access to their resources. Lord Cranborne's recent speech in the House of Lords[1] was therefore designed with this object in view.

5. It is clearly important that we should encourage the United States to look outwards rather than inwards and to be a world power rather than a hemispheric power. For this purpose we should do well not to resent but rather to welcome American interest in the British Colonial Empire, and there would be advantages in so arranging our affairs that the United States joins in public acceptance of a line of policy towards Colonial peoples and their development. As a next step, therefore, we should propose to follow up the suggestion thrown out by Mr. Hull and propose a joint declaration (to which other Colonial

Powers might possibly subscribe) on the general Colonial question. Such a document, if participated in by the United States Government, should do much to damp down the restless, irresponsible and ignorant criticism which has been prevalent in America and help to dispel the illusion that this is an Anglo-American question, whereas it is, of course, of equal concern to all Powers with oversea possessions. It would not, of course, constitute a formal commitment on the part of the United States to join in a general defence scheme for Colonial areas, but it would certainly be a step towards the acceptance of obligations for defence.

6. We are greatly attracted by Mr. Hull's conception of "Parent States" and something on the lines of his remarks on that point would be an essential basis of the declaration. With this in mind as a basis the line which we should like to see such a declaration take would be as follows:—

(1) First aim of United Nations is to defeat present aggression and render future aggression impossible.

(2) This aim requires for its successful achievement the establishment of conditions under which security and prosperity can be assured to all nations. Since it is evident that there are certain peoples whose social equipment and resources are not yet such as to enable them to achieve these ends by themselves, it will be a clear responsibility of all Parent States to enter into general defence schemes designed to ensure freedom from fear for all peoples.

(3) The Parent States must aim to promote the social, economic and political well-being of peoples who are unable, without danger to themselves and to others, to assume full responsibility for their affairs. Defence having been assured, the Parent States, with their special qualifications for the task, must accept the duty of guiding and developing the social and political institutions of the territories with which they are concerned, that their peoples may in due course be able to discharge the other responsibilities of government.

(4) By this combination of defence and orderly development the Parent States will fulfil their responsibilities to those peoples and enable them to enjoy rising standards of life and to continue their advance along the path of progress. In pursuance of this policy the natural resources of Colonial territories will be organised and marketed, not for the promotion merely of commercial ends, but in the best interests of the peoples concerned and of the world as a whole.

7. We should propose that His Majesty's Ambassador should in the first place sound Mr. Hull on the above list of points as the basis for a declaration. If Mr. Hull agrees that a declaration on these lines would be in accordance with

[1] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of L., vol. 125, 3 December 1942, cols. 401–16.

his views His Majesty's Ambassador would then explain to him that we think that practical application of these principles would need to be discussed and agreed as soon as the declaration had been published and inform him that our present line of thought is:—

(*a*) That necessary practical measures would take the form of machinery for consultation and collaboration between Parent States with the aim of ensuring a common policy in those regions of the world in which they have interests as Parent States. For this purpose Regional Commissions composed of representatives of such States should be constituted. Provision should also be made for the representation of nations which have a major defence or economic interest in the regions concerned. Such regions might be first, the Far East, secondly, Africa and thirdly, the Western Atlantic, and any others which, at a later stage, may seem appropriate.

(*b*) That within this framework and subject to the principles laid down in paragraphs (2) and (3) of the Joint Declaration responsibility for administration of its own territories would rest with the individual Parent State concerned.

8. Should be glad to learn as soon as possible whether you have any comments or suggestions to make regarding the above proposals. You will appreciate that we are very anxious to proceed with the matter with the least possible delay. *Ends.*

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT *14 December 1942*

No. 3498–S. Your private and personal telegram of 28th November No. 1391.[1] Jam Saheb. I am most grateful and agree generally. I readily agree not to press the points which you mention in paragraph 2 and I am sending you separately an official telegram[2] as desired. The important thing is that we should be able to get this, as agreed between us, through Cabinet. If therefore on seeing the official text you have any further suggestions please let me have them privately before you circulate the telegram to Cabinet, and I will try to meet them if possible. You might care to consider in this connection whether it is really necessary to enter into detail as in paragraph 5 of the revised draft reply[3] on the various relatively minor points therein referred to some of which are now disposed of. But it may be better to let this stand so as to avoid any suggestion that we are running away from any of the Jam Saheb's complaints.

2. As regards paragraph 3 of your telegram, I quite appreciate your reluctance to have difficulty with the Jam Saheb, particularly while he is working as a colleague. But you will realise that precisely the same argument holds good of relations between me as Crown Representative and him as Chancellor. I think it essential therefore that he should have a fairly direct talking to from you on the lines I have already suggested which I will supplement when he comes back, and I hope you will agree to that. As you will see I have included a suggestion on these lines in my official telegram.

3. Finally I am a little uneasy lest even now my alternative draft should (to the extent that it follows your suggestion) suggest that this business of States Unions is practical politics. I hope you will feel able to make very clear to the Jam Saheb (as I shall) that we, both of us, think the difficulties likely to be insuperable.

[1] No. 226. [2] No. 273. [3] No. 274.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *14 December 1942, 2.51 pm*
Received: 14 December, 1.45 pm

No. 3499-P. I have very carefully considered your important telegram of 8th October No. 17470[1] and the points therein raised by the War Cabinet as also their alternative draft reply[2] to the Jam Saheb's secret letter of 1st June.[3]

2. I fully appreciate force of arguments used by the Cabinet and by yourself. But in the outcome and after mature reflection I would myself favour a somewhat different approach. I discuss below (*a*) general line which I think should most wisely be taken, (*b*) important issue of publicity raised by the Cabinet, (*c*) important delicate general question of a States union. I deal with these points seriatim.

3. As regards the general line to be taken I have given fullest weight to arguments mentioned by you, but in the result would still strongly urge that we should not go beyond general line proposed in my telegram of 25th August.[4]

4. No doubt owing to its brevity draft proposed by Cabinet would seem to me (*a*) to be too sweeping particularly in regard to reaffirmation. Thus the

[1] No. 79; the date should be 7 October. [2] No. 80. [3] Vol. II, No. 115.
[4] Vol. II, No. 629.

words "or otherwise" in paragraph 2 would be interpreted by the Princes as applicable to numerous "rights" which by reason of their origin or nature deserve no such sanctity; (*b*) the reference in paragraph 2 to Stafford Cripps' speech in my judgment would merely puzzle rather than reassure Princes unless amplified on the lines of paragraph 4 of my own draft; (*c*) I attach the greatest importance to qualifying reaffirmation by a caveat as in paragraph 3 of my draft.

5. On this last point, I see no reason why such a caveat should offend or discourage any Prince whose opinion deserves respect, particularly if publication is not to take place without the consent of the Chancellor, if in effect it merely conveys an endorsement by His Majesty's Government of the advice which I have repeatedly given in public to the Chamber. I believe that this would be welcomed rather than resented by those more important Princes who realise the dangers which conditions in many small States involve for the whole Princely Order. Following quotation from covering letter from the Committee of Ministers appointed to examine questions "arising out of Cripps Mission" presenting their report to the Chancellor, lends, I suggest, strong support to this proposition:—

Begins. Many of the units that constitute Indian India are too small to maintain efficient administration. Recent events clearly demonstrate that unless suitable action in respect of joint services is taken immediately by the Rulers of these States there is grave danger to their sovereign position. The continuance of the present position system of individual independence conditioned by Paramountcy is not a future we can face with equanimity. *Ends.*

(Jam Saheb is not aware that I have seen this letter, and above quotation is for information of His Majesty's Government only.)

6. As regards publicity I have given full weight to your arguments. But I am strongly opposed to publicity either here or at home. It would have all the disadvantages in my opinion indicated in paragraph 3 of your telegram of 7th October.[5] Apart from that, while I appreciate that Cabinet may feel that we are giving assurances, &c. in a private letter which are of general interest, I do not regard that argument as convincing, for our case is substantially that we are reassuring Princes as to the position of assurances already given, while much of the remainder of any letter would be devoted to removing unimportant misconceptions. The criticisms which we have to answer have been put to us in the letter of 1st June which was secret and clearly not intended to be published, at any rate not at this stage. Its publication and that of our reply would certainly not help the atmosphere in British India, and might I think well expose His Majesty's Government to some Parliamentary difficulty, though I do not exaggerate the importance of that. Finally, while Princes would no doubt

welcome publicity for reaffirmation of treaty obligations they might feel differently in regard to the caveat by which I think it essential to qualify that reaffirmation. I realise that the Jam Saheb himself has given wide publicity to the content of his letter in his recent address to the East India Association, but that does not affect my views.

7. One other issue of great importance remains. I am conscious that it might be politically difficult to explain or defend the refusal to the States of the principle conceded to autonomous Provinces of British India, and the right to form separate unions in the event of an all-India Union being unacceptable, since refusal would in effect rob the States of a bargaining counter equivalent to that in the hands of predominantly dissident Provinces. On the other hand the more I reflect on the question the more I am convinced of the practical difficulties in any such development if we ever seriously contemplated it as something to be carried into effect. In that connection paragraph 3 of the Cabinet draft might in my opinion seriously mislead the Princes and raise unjustifiable expectations unless qualified by a warning that the recognition of any such union must inevitably and probably[6] drastically affect the nature of their present exclusive relationship with the Crown.

8. In all these circumstances I adhere to the general line of reply suggested in my telegram of 25th August, though as you will see from revised draft contained in my immediately following telegram, I have altered it in certain respects. I trust that Cabinet, in light of explanations now given, will feel able to accept it.

9. Let me add only that while you will see I have been at pains to consider the feelings and attitude of the Princes in the revised draft I very strongly recommend, if[7] the Cabinet approve, that you should give the Jam Saheb a pretty straight talk, simultaneously with the issue of our letter to him, on the shortcomings in States, the necessity for combined administrations, elimination of the weaker brethren, &c. In the course of any such discussions it might be possible to add that His Majesty's Government, so as to avoid any public embarrassment to the States, had refrained from a public statement in these terms, but that they were also instructing me as Crown Representative to draw pointed attention, though in a friendly manner, to the various references to this subject which I have made during my Viceroyalty and to the urgent necessity for quickening the pace, either at any meeting of the Chamber that might take place before I hand over next October, or if there is not such a meeting, in a letter to the Chancellor which might at a later stage be published.

[5] i.e. No. 79. [6] 'probably' omitted in decipher. [7] Decipher reads 'as'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/29

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *14 December 1942, 9.10 pm*
Received: 14 December, 11 pm

No. 3500–P. My immediately preceding telegram. Following is text of draft letter from my Political Secretary to Pro-Chancellor in reply to Jam Saheb's letter of 1st June[1]:—

Begins. 1. Necessary discussions with His Majesty's Government have inevitably delayed the sending of a reply to His Highness the Chancellor's important secret letter, dated 1st June, 1942, in which he brought to notice misgivings aroused in the minds of the Princes in connection with the mission of Sir Stafford Cripps to India and asked for reassurances on certain points. In His Highness' absence from India I have been desired by His Excellency the Crown Representative to address Your Highness regarding these matters and to make it clear at the outset that the terms of this letter have been expressly authorized by His Majesty's Government.

2. In part I of his letter His Highness recapitulated assurances given from time to time to the Princes in regard to the inviolability of their Treaties and Engagements and desired an authoritative statement which would remove certain impressions created by the phraseology of the Draft Declaration which Sir Stafford Cripps brought to India. In reply I am to say that the Indian Princes may rest assured that the fulfilment of the fundamental obligations arising out of their Treaties and Sanads remains an integral part of His Majesty's Government's policy and that the absence of specific mention thereof in the Draft Declaration has no significance. In accordance with that policy such a reference to those obligations was made by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons in announcing[2] the official purpose of Sir Stafford's mission. Nor does there appear to be any good ground for alarm at the reference in the Declaration to the necessity for a certain degree of Treaty revision. The use of the word "negotiate" implied that no unilateral denunciation was intended and Sir Stafford was at pains to make it clear to the Princes that the Treaties of non-adhering States would not be revised without their consent.[3] Still less is there any foundation for the suggestion that the Crown no longer attaches value to the loyal services and assistance of the States. Shortly after His Highness the Chancellor's letter was written His Royal Highness the Duke of Gloucester brought to India a personal message of greeting[4] in which His Majesty made a gracious reference to the unstinting loyalty and co-operation which the Princes "true to their traditions" were so signally displaying.

3. His Excellency the Crown Representative is confident that what has been said above should remove the misgivings which His Highness the Chancellor has so frankly brought to notice. He is equally confident that he and his successors may expect the Princes, who naturally look for support to the Crown which he represents, to strive, in their own best interests, after conformity with world opinion in regard to administrative standards as developed since relations with them were established. The interpretation of the letter of relevant Treaties, as Your Highness is aware, has long been affected by usage and sufferance and must become increasingly related to the manner in which the States adapt themselves to the necessities of changing times, more particularly in the matter of the pooling of sovereignty and of resources for the purpose of raising the quality and the stability of their public services.

4. In part II of his letter His Highness the Chancellor refers to grave concern caused by statement made in Parliament by Sir Stafford Cripps after his return from India. In that connection I need hardly remind Your Highness of the view to which the Crown Representative himself has given public expression (and which is fully endorsed by His Majesty's Government not so much in their own interest as in that of the Princes themselves) that effective machinery should be established in all States whereby the legitimate wants and grievances of their subjects can be brought to notice. But it is for the Rulers themselves to devise what precise form of machinery is best suited to achieve that object and there is nothing in the speech to which His Highness the Chancellor has referred to indicate a change of policy in regard to abstention from the imposition upon States of constitutional reforms.

5. Part III of the Chancellor's letter refers to certain miscellaneous matters some of which no longer call for reply. Point (*f*) for instance has been fully met by His Highness' own appointment to the War Cabinet in London and point (*b*) has already been dealt with above. In regard to point (*a*), however, I am to point out that so long as the fundamental responsibilities for armed forces remain in the hands of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the interests of Indian States are unaffected. In the absence of any intention to depart from that position Sir Stafford Cripps considered it unnecessary to consult the States' delegation in regard to the Defence formula. Similarly in regard to point (*d*), I am to say that, under the Draft Declaration, adherence of a State to any new Union was for the discretion of that State. It would thus have been open to it to endeavour to negotiate terms which would set at rest the apprehensions which appear to have prompted this observation. As regards point (*e*)

[1] Vol. II, No. 115. [2] Vol. I, Nos. 308–9. [3] Vol. I, No. 527, Answer to Question 9.

[4] In the course of this message to 'the Princes and people of India', the King-Emperor noted that 'the Princes, true to their traditions of loyalty and attachment to my Throne, have been unstinting in their offer of men and money and personal services'. *The Times of India*, 13 June 1942.

a constitution-making body could hardly be debarred from interesting itself in the internal affairs of prospective adhering units in so far as its discussion related to the machinery whereby the Union Government would function. Nor would it in any case be easy to lay down in advance the precise procedure which such a body would adopt. But, since its function would be to frame a workable Constitution, it would be open to representatives of States to protest against any discussions outside that limit or to refuse to participate in them.

6. Part IV of the Chancellor's letter briefly reviews the claim of the Princes that in the event of a number of States not finding it feasible to adhere to a Constitution devised[5] for India as a whole such non-adhering States "should be afforded the option of having a Union of their own with full sovereign status". In so far as His Highness has interpreted the absence of any such provision from the Draft Declaration as doing less than justice to the right of the States to expect treatment not less favourable than that accorded to Provinces, I am to explain that there was never any intention of such adverse discrimination. On the contrary the reason for it is to be found in the fact that the direct responsibility exercised by His Majesty's Government in regard to the administration of British India finds no parallel within the territories of the Princes. I would only add that His Highness will appreciate that this matter has not been worked out in close detail and that the practical considerations and difficulties involved will be only too present to you. The Draft Declaration which was in very general terms, proved abortive for reasons with which Your Highness is familiar, and though the broad[6] principles of that offer stand, the form and nature of their application to the States is a matter for the future.

7. In conclusion I am to inform Your Highness that arrangements have been made for a copy of this letter to be supplied to His Highness the Chancellor by the India Office simultaneously with its issue to yourself. *Ends.*

[5] 'devised' deciphered as 'if it is not (? omission)ed'. [6] 'broad' deciphered as 'outlined'.

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Secretary of State to Government of India, Food Department

Telegram, L/E/8/3297: ff 283–5

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *15 December 1942, 11.30 pm*

21551. Your telegram 9796[1] dated 9th December. Food. I am consulting responsible Departments of H.M.G. and while matter is, of course, one for decision on highest level, I think it desirable to give you some concrete idea of

cost to main war effort at which imports such as you ask for would in existing circumstances be made.

2. It seems practically certain that ultimately any such allocation of shipping, except to extent to which it might be covered by reduction of other imports into India, must be made at expense of British import programme which is already cut to bone and involve serious inroads into stocks both of food and of materials. Some additional tonnage assistance is expected from U.S.A. but extent of this cannot be precisely assessed at present and this increases difficulty of weighing your demands against other needs. But at best, meeting of your demand would mean cut in volume of imports into U.K. of materials, etc. for war production by some 10, repeat 10 per cent. over period of 6 months and if American assistance falls short of best that we have any reason to anticipate some further cutting down of U.K. food ration would almost certainly be involved in addition.

3. In view of this critical position it will be clear that your demand has formidable obstacles to overcome. In any case, American assistance is not likely to be very effective in first quarter of 1943 and I should warn you that additional shipments of wheat in the next 6 weeks are practically out of the question and during the first quarter of 1943 almost equally difficult. You should therefore lose no time in setting on foot any measure which though drastic will serve to place maximum food supplies at disposal of Government, and full co-operation of provincial authorities should be secured by all means available to you.

4. Supposing it was necessary for at least some part of these shipments to be made at expense of your own import programme, please indicate where you would propose to make equivalent cuts and what consequences would be. I suggest you answer this question by reference to figures of 15,000, 30,000, 45,000 tons a month.

5. Replies are also needed to following questions:

(*a*) If your demand is conceded would you be prepared to guarantee maintenance of supplies to dependent markets, in particular 30,000 tons a month of rice for Ceylon?

(*b*) What is period over which supplies demanded are required?

(*c*) Can you assure H.M.G. that all Indian-registered ships are now under full control so as to afford maximum utilisation for war effort.

6. Trade enquiries are being made in world markets for wheat for India. It is essential that purchases outside India itself should be made through Ministry of Food and merchants in question have been told to cease enquiries. You no doubt realise that difficulty is entirely one of shipping and I shall welcome your

[1] No. 265.

assurance that you will not pursue enquiries through commercial channels which cannot in fact be effective.

7. If you enforce export embargo on rice I assume that it will not extend to rice already purchased for Ceylon and other Colonial Governments.

8. Please reply immediately.

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Sir S. Cripps to Mr Amery

L/E/8/2527: ff 231–40

15 December 1942

My dear Amery[1]

I am afraid that owing to my change of office there has been some delay in completing the enclosed paper on a "Social and Economic Policy for India" which Owen has prepared for me as a complementary document to the interesting papers[2] which you circulated some weeks ago on recent social and economic advances in India.

In preparing this paper Owen has followed the suggestion which I made that he should consult with Leggett of the Ministry of Labour and with some of your officials. I understand that several useful meetings[3] have been held to discuss the paper and that, in its present form, it has received a considerable measure of general approval.

Thanks to the helpful criticisms and suggestions which Owen has received from your officials—particularly from Croft and Dibdin—and from Sir Theodore Gregory and Sir Malcolm Darling, the paper will, I think, serve as a useful basis for discussion at Ministerial level. Perhaps you would have it circulated to Bevin and Kingsley Wood, indicating that it represents the completion of work undertaken during my period of office as Lord Privy Seal.

Yours very sincerely,

R. STAFFORD CRIPPS

Enclosure to No. 276

SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS' PRIVATE OFFICE

10 December 1942

A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICY FOR INDIA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. During the last forty years great advances have been made in the social and economic life of India.[4] Yet it cannot be said that much impression has been

made on the poverty, ignorance, and ill-health which characterise the Indian scene. The Reports of the International Labour Office and of the League of Nations refer to the low standards of nutrition among the Indian agricultural and industrial workers. The "Blunt" Report on Social Services in India (1938) speaks of parents "living in penury and steeped in debt", children "withdrawn from school as soon as they can work . . . and add, however minutely, to the family income".[5] Only 11 per cent of the population is literate. Peasant and industrial workers are in debt for the greater part of their industrial lives. Many are born in debt. Over a wide range of industry working conditions are deplorable. Disease is rampant and mortality rates are high. The average expectation of life at birth is 25 years, compared with 54 in England and Wales. Yet the annual expenditure on public health throughout British India is considerably less than that of the London County Council.

2. It is plain that there is no lack of room for progress. The exigencies of war and internal politics may set limits to what is immediately possible. Even so it is hardly open to doubt that some things could be pushed on with immediately and that preparations could be made now for going ahead with other matters as soon as conditions are favourable.

3. In the following paragraphs an attempt is made to describe briefly the nature of the problem and to indicate what appear to be some promising lines of advance. Finally suggestions are made concerning the procedure which might be adopted to give effect to some of the proposals which are made.

II. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

4. The fundamental explanation of India's low social standards is to be found in the fact that, in spite of its external trappings, India is an ancient society with a medieval economy. The questions at once arise: How can the ancient society of India, and its medieval economy, be modernised? How can a scientific agriculture and a large industry be created? A similar social and economic problem has been tackled in Japan and Russia with some success. On what lines should it be tackled in India?

5. In India the solution of the problem is rendered far more difficult by the unfortunate historical incidence of the growth in population. The fall in the death rate and the rise in the survival rate has accompanied the growth of modern economies everywhere. But in "Western" industrial countries the

[1] Mr Amery minuted: 'Has dept. any views? This is much improved.'

[2] See No. 114, note 1. [3] See No. 210.

[4] [Note in original.] The main features of recent social advances in India are admirably summarised in the document, prepared by the India Office, which has already been circulated. [See No. 114, note 1.]

[5] *Social Service in India: An Introduction to some Social and Economic Problems of the Indian People*, ed. Sir Edward Blunt (London, H.M.S.O. 1938), p. 256.

contemporary increase in the physical productivity of agriculture and industry raised output disproportionately to the growing population. As a result average production and consumption—i.e. the standard of living—rose steeply.

In India this has not happened. British rule removed war and plague—the main checks to multiplication—long before any widespread mechanisation of industry or agriculture had taken place. In the last forty years famine has been conquered, and the rate of population growth has received yet another stimulus. It is now increasing by tens of millions in every decade. Yet industry still offers employment to no more than one tenth of India's population; and the average productivity of agriculture is increasing very slowly.

The "Malthusian devil" has therefore been unchained in India. An increase in the general standard of living is thereby rendered peculiarly difficult. Temporary improvements in average production are soon submerged by an increase in the number of mouths, and the pressure upon land grows heavier. As a consequence many proposals—e.g. for the reduction of infant mortality by greater medical care—though inspired by the highest motives, are not likely to touch, and in certain cases will exacerbate, the real problem.

6. The crucial object of policy must be to bring the growth of population—or at least the birth rate—under control.

In other countries the vicious circle has been broken by two forces: the slow spread of rational ideas and of scientific knowledge has rendered the population willing and able to limit the size of their families; the increase of productivity has provided men and women, or large numbers of them, with a higher standard of living that they were eager to protect. No other factors compare in importance with these.

Both these methods of improvement presuppose, however, a growth of scientific rationalism in the village and the emancipation of the peasant from his ignorance and his superstitions. These are plainly *educational* problems.

7. In view of the vital importance of the Indian population problem it is desirable that it should be the subject of an investigation by a team of experts, including an experienced medical officer, an economist, a statistician, and a sociologist with intimate knowledge of social conditions in different parts of India. Ten years ago it could not have been possible to embark on such an enquiry. Since then there have been great changes in the public attitude to the discussion of population problems, including birth control; and it seems that useful results could now be obtained.

8. If it is assumed that some parallel progress can be made towards limiting the increase of population, then the second requirement of economic policy is an improvement in the productivity of agriculture, and of the vast range of handicraft industries closely linked with agriculture.

9. Finally, it is reasonable to ask whether the process of industrialisation itself—the vast industrial revolution that India is only just beginning—cannot be better guided as a result of the experience that we and other industrial countries have painfully gained in the last hundred and fifty years.

10. There are, therefore, three things that India needs above everything else:

(i) More education (and a reduction in the birth rate);
(ii) Higher productivity in agriculture (and associated industries);
(iii) A rapid increase in non-agricultural employment.

III. THE VILLAGE

11. Nine-tenths of the people of India live at very low standards in 750,000 villages that are largely self-contained, most of which are still cut off from urban life, practising a primitive form of cultivation, burdened by a heavy weight of debt, excessive rates of interest and, in some parts of the country, high rents, gripped firmly by the Malthusian devil and dominated by superstitions. The villager, therefore, needs more education, better health services, and a more satisfactory diet.

12. (i) *Education*

Only 1 in 10 of the Indian villages possesses a school. Only 1 in 3 have access to a school. Only 11 per cent of the adult population is literate.

The existing primary schools are for the most part suitably housed but are badly staffed by underpaid *men* (instead of women) who concentrate far too heavily upon literacy—forcing the children to spend too much of their time upon the gloomy repetition of letters and numbers and controlling them by far too liberal a use of corporal punishment. These schoolmasters usually receive about 5s. a month, never more than 10s.

There is no widespread mass movement for *adult* education in existence.

13. The intricate problems of mass education have been dealt with imaginatively during the course of this century in Russia, Japan and Turkey; by the Americans in the Philippines and by our own colonial administration in parts of Africa. There should be no insuperable obstacle in India. It is not difficult to see what is wanted.

(*a*) It is necessary to build more village schools for young children and to staff them with better paid *teachers* who are compelled to attend regular "refresher" courses and who are persuaded to practise modern methods of education.

In the meantime it would be desirable to work "double shifts" in the existing schools both to increase the output of literacy, and to provide more time for the other activities of the children. This arrangement is

working satisfactorily in all other countries with similar educational problems.

(*b*) No large and permanent improvement in the teaching of young children can be maintained until the difficulty of supplying qualified *women* for the village schools has been overcome. It is, therefore, plainly desirable to increase the number of Training Colleges that will send out a stream of teachers *and nurses* to the villages, who can live in pairs in the school buildings. The nurses would be charged with the task of improving the health of the children and, possibly, spreading a knowledge of contraception.[6]

The difficulty of securing women for this work in India is extreme and familiar. The early age of marriage and the subsequent segregation of the wives limits the supply of women greatly. At the same time, the existing Colleges have not been empty and there are certain groups of women—widows and the wives of the male teachers—whose services are available. Moreover, the provision of medical care in the schools would, in all probability, increase the number of girls who were sent to them.

(*c*) The time is ripe for the launching of larger campaigns than in the past—similar to those that yielded such remarkable fruits in Russia and Turkey—for the mass education of *adults*. For this purpose a special mobile Service of Indian students and graduates, specially trained for the work, who would go to the villages but who would not settle in any one of them, is required.

All this is familiar ground. A programme of this kind could be started tomorrow if the necessary impulse were given from the centre. Here an incoming Viceroy would have a great opportunity. There is no lack of interest in the subject and a great deal of good work is already being done in many parts of the country. What is needed is a strengthening of the central directorate of education—at present hardly more than embryonic—and the provision of funds at the centre to be used as grants in aid of new educational developments in the Provinces. Any attempt to strengthen the position of the centre in dealing with an important provincial subject such as education would raise familiar constitutional difficulties. These difficulties, however, are not insuperable. Thus the success of the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research, as a means of reconciling Provincial and State autonomy with the advantages of Central co-ordination and initiative, suggests a possible line of development. The establishment of a comparable body for educational research and development would be a great step forward—but it would be necessary to endow it with considerable financial resources to enable it to give an effective impetus to promising experiments and developments in the Provinces.

14. In preparation for a development of this kind it would probably be helpful if studies were made of the new techniques which have been used in rural education in Russia, Turkey and in the British colonies.

In particular it is almost certain that it would be profitable to send a small expert commission of enquiry to investigate the position in Russia where radio, itinerant exhibitions, wall newspapers and other devices are said to have been used with great effect.

15. There is, however, a different and more difficult problem to be tackled. It is essential, if newly acquired literacy is to be maintained, to provide the literate with something to read. Literacy is no use without literature. It is essential to produce and distribute to the village a supply of vernacular newssheets, books, wall sheets, and travelling films. Obviously this is not a task for the British. It should, however, be possible to stimulate the production of suitable material by the Indians themselves.

16. (ii) *Agricultural Productivity*

Greater agrarian efficiency depends upon higher levels of education. Better methods of production, and the use of co-operative societies to provide cheaper credit and profitable markets, can rarely be established or maintained without considerable scientific understanding on the part of the peasant. But a direct attempt to raise productivity should, nevertheless, go hand in hand with the educational programme, since knowledge without prosperity would be sterile.

17. The main methods for *improving the crops* of a primitive agriculture have been established by the experience of a dozen other countries and the most fruitful available to India are: (i) better strains of seeds, (ii) better breeds of animals, (iii) the consolidation of holdings, and the limitation of rents, (iv) the development of co-operative credit (by which the undue power of the money-lender can be broken) and (v) the development of co-operative selling (and buying).

All these policies are being followed to some extent in India already. What is needed is a new and more powerful stimulus all along the line. The simultaneous extension and intensification of these five improvements could bring about an immense increase in the output of the fields.

18. The modernisation of peasant agriculture can either be secured (as in Russia) by the practice of ruthless compulsion or (as in France and Germany during the nineteenth century) by the longer paths of peaceful persuasion. It is

[6] [Note in original.] Congress has suggested that a cultural centre could be built and financed in each village by the grant of a land endowment for the construction of a school and the payment of a teacher—the building to be used for the education of two groups of children, one in the morning and one in the afternoon, and of adults in the evening. It is not quite clear why the endowment should be made upon a voluntary basis, nor why the medical education of the villagers should not be equally pressed.

only the second method that can be seriously considered for India. The peasants must be shown village by village, and above all by practical demonstration in their midst, that new practices do not call down the vengeance of angry gods, nor merely fail to work, but really do produce more food.

To develop this work of technical emancipation it will be necessary to extend, parallel to the educational and nursing service for women, the existing itinerant *Agricultural Service*, for men. The purpose of this greatly extended service would be to secure the co-operation of the peasants. Such a service would provide a second outlet for the unemployed graduates from Indian Universities, who should, however, be carefully selected for the task. Academic attainment would be less valuable than a real knowledge and sympathy in dealing with the problems of rural life.

19. (iii) *Model Villages*

The enemy of progress, in India as elsewhere, is lack of imagination and faith.

It would, therefore, be well to begin with small experimental areas, single villages or small groups of villages, that could be richly provided from the beginning with women teachers, nurses, agronomists, and co-operative societies. In such restricted areas the possibility of full emancipation could be demonstrated and "doubting Thomases" could find conviction and inspiration.

Many experiments of this kind have already been tried particularly Mr. Brayne's campaigns in Gurgaon. The results have often been disappointing but this has been due to the *temporary* nature of the missions to the villages. It is essential that *permanent* services should be supplied to small areas.

20. (iv) *Transport to and from the Village*

The key to village reconstruction in India is greatly improved transport. Most Indian villages lack a good road. Yet until satisfactory roads exist the cost (and, in many parts of India, the physical difficulty) of transport will keep the inhabitants of villages shut in and the rest of the world shut out. Neither education and amenities, nor tools and implements can come into the village. Nor can its produce go out to realise its potential value in the markets of the world or even in those of nearby country towns. Nothing would do more to raise the standard of living of the Indian village than a great road-building campaign in which village co-operations should be engaged. Metalled roads, suitable for motor transport, are needed on a large scale, especially in the populous alluvial soil areas. Elsewhere the provision of "Kachah" roads by communal effort in the villages, under technical direction provided by the Government, would be a great step forward.

IV. THE TOWN WORKER

21. It is less easy to see what can be done for the urban worker. The lessons of history in his case are not so plain to read. It is not clear what could have

been done to ease the lot of the industrial proletariat in the early stages of the Industrial Revolution, for the fundamental fact is that urban civilisation cannot be developed overnight and the peasant, forced out of the village, does not want to live in the town.

Three things, however, might be done:

22. (*i*) *Factory Legislation*

A considerable body of enlightened legislation has already been enacted. The chief need is, therefore, to extend it to the smaller factories (those employing less than 10 workers) in which the most appalling conditions continue to exist, and to intensify its observance by an increase in the size of the *factory inspectorate*. The creation of an efficient inspectorate has always been the crucial administrative problem in the development of reasonable conditions in the factory.

(*ii*) *Housing and Sanitation*

Urban housing conditions in India are extremely bad. In most cities large slum clearance is necessary and a good deal more could be done to enforce higher standards of sanitation and to provide cheaper and better housing (in the form of hutments) near the new factories in the less congested cities. This is particularly important for the seasonal worker from the village who now lives in conditions of appalling squalor. Again it would be better to concentrate upon providing a small number of properly equipped housing estates, or permanent camps, to act as models, rather than to spread limited resources too thinly over a vast field.

(*iii*) *Destitution*

Plainly the development of complex "social services"—with registration, compulsory contributions and convenanted benefits—belongs to a later stage of industrialisation. The stability and understanding of the Indian proletariat is not yet great enough to make such schemes practicable. But it would seem desirable to provide some permanent relief in kind (the most primitive form of the Poor Law) for the destitute and starving in order to supplement private and religious charity.

These measures, though very modest, would do something to improve the condition of the industrial worker and make the movement from the village to the town less painful.

V. THE PROMOTION AND CONTROL OF INDUSTRIALISATION

23. The fact that India, by the end of the war, will have wiped out her external debt and accumulated considerable sterling balances, should make it possible to embark on an ambitious programme of capital development

without recourse either to a high degree of forced saving (such as practices in Russia and other authoritarian countries) or to heavy foreign borrowing.

In view of the deeply rooted Indian legend of "the drain" the resumption of the traditional forms of external borrowing should be avoided. But this need not rule out the investment of international funds in India altogether. Such investment may, indeed, be necessary to facilitate socially desirable enterprises where Indian entrepreneurs are not prepared to venture. It may be hoped that the mobilisation and direction of British, American and other foreign funds for investment in India (and, indeed, in other undeveloped countries) after the war will become the responsibility of some organ of the "United Nations".

24. But there is no reason why India should not make use, straight away, ot modern techniques of economic planning and the modern device of the Public Corporation. In order to avoid the economic distortions which arise from exaggerated Provincial Loyalties, a start should, at once, be made with the construction of an *All-Indian Programme of Industrial Development* into which could then be fitted, after negotiations with the Provincial Governments, a series of Provincial Programmes. These programmes would consist of a list of projects for: the building of railways and roads, the development of sources of power, and extending the capacity of the industries that have already been established.

The Central and Provincial Governments could maintain control of, and secure consistency in, the programme by offering the protection of their guarantees for approved and licensed projects and by an appropriate creation of Public Corporations. These devices could be extended later to the planned development of new industries.

25. Some measures of this kind are absolutely essential if the development of Indian industry that has taken place during the war is to continue smoothly and profitably. They represent an adaptation of Russian and European methods of planning to the Indian scene. It is understood that a number of promising studies of Indian reconstruction problems have already been set on foot by the Government of India. It might well be that these studies will provide the basis for the programme-building which is needed. They should certainly be given every encouragement and assistance.

26. The great success of the scheme for training Indian workers in Great Britain initiated by the Minister of Labour under which they have not only received technical training but have also obtained a better understanding of British institutions, should be greatly extended without delay. It should be supplemented by other schemes of a similar character so that a large number of Indians competent to take posts up to all grades of management may be trained both here and in India with close ties with British Industrial practice and

organisation. A large number of technicians have already been sent to India and their number should be increased. Such measures would create good-will and the inevitable and necessary growth in the industrialisation of India would be accompanied by a growth of personal ties which would be in the best interests of both countries.

VI. FINANCE

27. The proposals for development in village and town are not new, but they require money and upon this obstacle previous suggestions of this kind have broken down.

28. There are, however, a number of reasons for supposing that financial stringency can be overcome or, at least, greatly reduced:

(*a*) The foreign debt of India is being rapidly repaid and the interest is being saved.

(*b*) In spite of greatly increased direct taxation considerable fortunes are being made as a result of war expenditure. There is reason to believe that the direct taxes upon landowners could be further increased and it might not be impossible to raise more from the normal sources of revenue (i.e. the peasant) if responsible governments could really show that disproportionate benefits were accruing to the village.

(*c*) Small saving is already encouraged by favourable rates of interest but a vigorous drive to "mop up" the savings of "small" people whose incomes have recently been greatly increased might produce a handsome yield. The deeply rooted tradition of *borrowing* to spend on marriages, funerals etc. is one of the great curses of Indian life. Now is the time when propaganda encouraging peasants and handcraft workers to *save* for future spending might have great success.

29. What is essential, however, to the success of any far-reaching policy of social reform and development is the availability of funds at the centre which can be used to prime provincial pumps, stimulate investigation and experiment, and to train personnel.

30. It appears that considerable funds are now being set on one side by the Government of India for post-war reconstruction purposes. These might be augmented by the British Government in the form of a grant to an Indian Social Research and Development Fund. The present difficulty of making payments in rupees would be avoided, to some extent, if part of the grants made to this fund by the British Government were, for the time being, used to assist Indian studies in this country. If there was a real programme of social reform and development in India it is not out of the question that several

American Foundations would be willing to give financial assistance for the training of personnel, research projects and experimental development work.

VII. PROCEDURE

If it were thought desirable to proceed with some such programme as this it would be desirable:

(*a*) To communicate a Memorandum to the new Viceroy expressing the wish of His Majesty's Government to pursue a *Forward Social Programme* and to suggest a number of positive measures to be included in it.

(*b*) For a sympathetic and determined Viceroy to formulate in detail, and mobilise considerable Provincial and All-India Support for, such a Programme of economic and social improvement.

(*c*) To consider the possibility of holding an Eastern Regional Conference of the International Labour Organisation to discuss some of the issues such as nutrition, health, labour legislation etc. touched on in this Memorandum in a wider setting. If the I.L.O. received an invitation to hold such a Conference in India it should be possible for them to arrange for strong visiting delegations from the United States, China, Australia and New Zealand, as well as from Great Britain, and Russia (though not a member) might send technical representatives whose experience would be specially valuable. The Conference would attract a great deal of attention in India and would focus attention on the need for economic and social reforms.

In spite of the difficulties in the way of arranging a conference of this kind in war-time it is desirable that it should take place before the war comes to an end. If it is postponed everyone will probably be too busy with the urgent problems which peace will bring to a head to attend such a conference for at least two years. Even if, as is probably the case, a full-scale conference cannot be arranged during the war, the same effect would be achieved by a meeting in India of the Emergency Committee of the I.L.O. together with small expert delegations from the countries mainly interested.

Although it is hardly possible that even a modified conference of this kind could be held sooner than the Autumn of 1943, preparatory studies could be initiated as soon as the decision to hold it was reached. The results of the conference would be certain to strengthen the hand of the new Viceroy and of everyone in India seeking to develop a progressive economic and social policy.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *15 December 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Many thanks for your letters of 11th November[1] and 13th November,[2] for which I am most grateful. Things have gone admirably during the last week, though here, as I suppose at home, there was a shade of disappointment among the public, who did not quite realise the difficulties, at the slight slowing down of the pace of events in North Africa. The capture of El Agheila has had an excellent effect. It looks as though we might have a rather sticky time in Tunisia, but I hope very much that despite the weather and the difficulty of improving aerodromes in the hinterland we may be able to bring sufficient force to bear before the Germans have been able to reinforce to a really embarrassing extent by air. I need not say that I wholly agree with what you say in the first paragraph of your letter of 11th November, both about the importance of the complete mastery of North Africa, and about Winston's suggestion that when we have established ourselves there, that is no more than the closing of one chapter in order to begin the even more serious chapter that follows.

* * *

5. I realise the importance of the question of filling Governorships other than the Presidencies, and my mind is quite open about going outside the ranks of the I.C.S. as vacancies occur. But there is a good deal to be said on both sides. I am conscious that the ordinary Indian member of the I.C.S. would probably be extremely reluctant in present circumstances to take on a Governorship if one were offered to him. Bajpai always took the line that no Indian could, given the special responsibilities and the bitterness of the communal problem, conceivably act or serve as a Governor. Mohammad Usman, speaking from experience, is most emphatic on that point, and I think there is a good deal in it. On the other hand, as you know, I have not too much in reserve in the way of high quality among my more senior European Indian Civilians, and that is a possible argument for going outside their ranks and recruiting from home. But having said that, one must consider the other side. It is true that in the case of the Presidencies, Governors do not suffer materially from unfamiliarity with language, with revenue systems or the like; and it may well be that Ministers, if we get Ministers again in Provinces, would be more easily handled by someone from outside than by Indian Civil Servants.

[1] No. 165. [2] No. 178.

But I think there is a good deal to be said for using the I.C.S. talent while it does continue available, and my own disposition would therefore be to leave the consideration of the use of the other source until a little later in the day, though it is, I have no doubt, a matter that will have to be faced sooner or later. And another point which I think we must bear in mind is that these Governorships are not sufficiently attractive either in situation or in prospects, or in the expectation of advancement that may arise from a successful holding of them to be likely, I would judge, to tempt public men of any quality from home (the United Provinces or the Punjab might be an exception). And there is nothing whatever to be said for bringing out second or third rate politicians or backbenchers to hold the charges if we can get men with some local knowledge of administration and familiarity with the language to look after them. Let me only add that I am not at all impressed by the fact that Indian Civilians have been subordinates of Indian Ministers, for the practice, as you will remember, to which we are working, is that a man shall not normally (and not I think in any circumstances if he has served under Ministers in it) be appointed as Governor, whether acting or substantive, in his own Province. As for the direct appointment of Governors resting with the Provinces, I should put off that day as long as possible! Infinite difficulty will arise the moment that stage is reached.

6. I shall be telegraphing to you about what is to be done if Gandhi decides on a fast. I sent you Lumley's letter[3] at the time, and I have seen Turnbull's telegrams[4] asking whether I intended to make a recommendation on it. I have deliberately marked time to see how things developed, and to discuss the position with Maxwell, &c. But I am now clear that Lumley's objections are decisive, and I shall be telegraphing to you in the next day or so, and asking you to go back to the Cabinet on that point.

* * *

8. You will have gathered from correspondence[5] that crossed your letter that I have taken steps to keep Patiala and the other Princes in closer touch with what is happening during crises. I do not propose to take them beyond that. Incidentally I have so far delayed sending a reply to your letter of 16th May 1941, though I have had a draft ready long ago, given the continuous changes in the situation, the latest of which is represented by the correspondence we have been having about the reply to be given to the Jam Saheb. Once that difficulty is out of the way, I will let you have a final reply.

9. As for the raising of State troops, I quite realise the arguments on both sides. I doubt in fact if we are likely to get very much in the way of well-considered schemes such as you refer to from Their Highnesses.

* * *

11. I am of course most anxious to help the *Sunday Chronicle*. I cannot think myself that Beverley Nichols is anything but a light weight! But given the circumstances in which he has been recommended, we will of course give him all possible help here.

12. I read with much amusement paragraph 1 of your letter of 13th November. Mudaliar has kept me pretty well in touch, and I think he has settled down and is enjoying himself. I suspect that it is no bad thing for Winston to blow off steam in this way now and then; and while people may complain about his referring to his reluctance to see the liquidation of the Empire, I have not a shadow of doubt that there is a very substantial element that welcomes that sort of proposition with positive relief. For my part, I confess I greatly prefer it to the watery ululations of Printing House Square!

13. I have read again with care what you say in paragraph 3 of your letter about fact-finding. But I fear that I am entirely unconvinced, and that I should be wholly opposed to making any move whatever in these directions. What I should like to do is if I can (I realise that I may not be able) to hold this position very much as it is for the rest of my time and until my successor takes over. There is a wide realisation inside this country now that internal difficulties are likely to make any material change highly improbable: and while Sapru and his friends are as active as ever, they carry no weight in the country, and have not even had the wisdom to associate some Muslims with their deliberations. I shall be addressing the Associated Chambers of Commerce in Calcutta on the 17th, and I send you with this copy of my speech.[6] As you will see I have again urged on the competing parties the importance of getting together, and the essential necessity of agreement if anything is to be done. I have endeavoured to encourage the Mahasabha, &c. by reverting to the topic of the unity of India, though I trust in terms sufficiently guarded so far as the Muslims are concerned to avoid giving Jinnah a legitimate grievance. But I have also thought it well, for the point is a most important one and the centre of our position, to bring out that the difficulties of this country are not due to our reluctance to transfer power but to the fact that we have offered to transfer power.

14. Talking of which I read with great interest the extracts from Richard Law's report on his visit to America which you were kind enough to send me in your letter of 13th November. I will let Puckle see it. It will be of real value to him, now that he is going to Washington. It struck me as a very able piece of work, and I am myself in agreement with a very great deal of what he says.

[3] No. 111.
[4] See No. 185. Mr Turnbull sent a further telegram 1434 on 8 December. L/P&J/8/600: f 504.
[5] Not printed; but see No. 131, para. 42.
[6] See The Marquess of Linlithgow, *Speeches and Statements* (New Delhi, 1945), pp. 338–52.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *16 December 1942, 11.35 am*
PERSONAL *Received: 16 December, 9.45 am*

No. 3517–S. Following is my personal appreciation for period 29th November to 15th December. Since my last telegram remainder of Ahmedabad mills have resumed work and though sporadic bomb incidents continue in the city and in some districts no major damage has been done. In Midnapore district in Bengal improvement of communications, &c. has permitted progressive restoration of law and order resulting in general improvement though intimidation continues. A few incidents have been reported from Bihar and Assam but in other Provinces situation generally is quiet and disturbance to communications has been reduced recently owing partly to effectiveness of protective measures now being applied.

Repeated to Ambassadors, Washington and Chungking (for Agents-General) and Kuibyshev.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *16 December 1942*

No. 3521–S. Your private and personal telegram of 12th December No. 1447.[1] Home Membership. I agree that we must now consider this. I propose to turn it over in my mind for a few days longer before expressing a final view. Not the least of our difficulties is the entire absence of any non-official Muslim of competence outside my Council who is available and could fill the vacancy which the transfer of Usman would involve and the fact that we cannot afford to add another Hindu. As you know that has been one of the reasons for which I have been unable to fill the Information Portfolio. But I am fully alive to all considerations involved and will let you have my views shortly.

[1] No. 268.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

INDIA OFFICE, *16 December 1942*

One unfortunate consequence of the way in which the question of your succession, or rather non-succession, was handled is that the Press have got it into their heads that the post was offered to a number of people who rejected it. This is of course entirely untrue.

* * * * * *[1]

Nevertheless, several of the papers had the most circumstantial account of how and why Archie Sinclair had refused—all based on the fact that he was with Winston when the latter was doing a tour of inspections, while since then the *New Statesman* has had a most poisonous article on the theme of the Viceroyalty hawked round and, I believe, Ward Price something to the same effect in the *Daily Mail*. It seems to me most unfortunate that an impression should get about either that we think so little of India, or despair so entirely of India's future, that no one of any standing is willing to accept the post. The real answer, of course, is that the importance of the post over a good many years to come is fully recognised and in a way by no one more than Winston, but that for one reason or another he cannot spare people or doubts their qualifications.

* * *

5. I enclose a copy of a letter which Bevin has sent me from one of his trainees. It touches the quick of one of our greatest difficulties, the sensitiveness of Indians on the one side both to kindness and to rudeness, and the surviving tradition outside England of arrogance on the other—generally from people with the least right to think much of themselves at home.

* * *

10. I was interested to read Lewis' account in his letter of November 27th[2] of the Birla shops in Orissa. Obviously the Birlas are out for mischief, but

[1] These asterisks are reproduced from MSS. EUR. F. 125/11.

[2] This letter to Lord Linlithgow and the enclosed papers explained that Mr G. D. Birla contemplated a scheme for cheap food and clothes shops and planned to make a start in Orissa where one such shop had already been opened. Volunteers distributed coupons to really needy persons who could then obtain supplies at reduced rates at the shop. Pandit Misra had 'recorded his view on the file that the shops are being started for a political purpose; that Birla is a great supporter of Mahatma Gandhi and his movement; and that the ultimate object of these shops is to set up an agency which in its beginnings will be employed to meet local needs, but which when complete would be used for paralysing the administration'. L/P&J/8/618: ff 87–9.

judging from the local sub-divisional magistrate's account the shops are doing good by keeping down prices and preventing hoarding. That raises in my mind the question whether if the food situation becomes worse it might not be possible for the Provincial Governments, or for that matter the Central Government, to set up stores at which food and other necessaries are sold at a price well below that to which hoarding may force up the market. There is of course the difficulty not only of organisation, but of the Government's having a sufficient stock to work with relative to the quantities hoarded. Otherwise the hoarders might come to the conclusion that the Government was bluffing, that extra supplies from outside would not be forthcoming, and consequently accentuate the hoarding policy even further.

11. I read Ambedkar's letter[3] and memorandum about the grievances of the Scheduled Castes enclosed in your letter of November 21st.[4] It does seem to me as if it would be well worth while giving them a substantial leg-up and assimilating their position increasingly to that of the Muslims. There are, after all, politically very considerable advantages in having two substantial minorities to whom consideration has to be paid, and not to be put in the position of being merely labelled pro-Muslim and anti-Hindu. I realise the practical difficulty of offering a fixed proportion of places to a community which may not be able to produce a sufficient number of educated candidates for the services. Would it be possible to lay down a proportion to be attained at the end of a given number of years, with a smaller initial proportion, and utilise those years for the development of special educational facilities? That could apply both to the civil services and to the fighting forces. I am not sure whether, when you or your successor have added one or two more Muslims to the Executive, it might not be worth while adding yet another Untouchable on the basis that after all they are somewhere between a sixth and a seventh of the whole population of India.

12. I am sorry that Gwyer should think that Spens' appointment was in any sense influenced by party political considerations. Do assure him from me that nothing of the sort ever entered my mind. His name had never even occurred to me until it appeared high up in the list of eligible candidates suggested by the Lord Chancellor, and was put even higher by my own Legal Adviser, Sir Kenneth Kemp. The fact is that Spens is not in any sense an active party politician for whom an award for party services would be regarded as necessarily due. If he presided at one time over the 1922 Committee that was precisely because he was thought to be a man of a good judicial temper to take the Chair at meetings of the Committee at which differences were from time to time pretty acute. He hasn't spoken often, and though universally liked and respected, has never been a conspicuous figure in the cut-and-thrust of Parliamentary debate. It is purely and solely on his legal qualifications that he has

been selected, and if those are not outstanding it is simply that the post itself does not offer at this moment the attraction which could counter-avail against the more urgent work which the best men are all doing over here. So unless we had plunged on an Indian Chief Justice, against which there is much to be said from the point of view of having an impartial Chairman for any future constitutional convention, we had in fact done all we could for you, and no amount of previous consultation with Gwyer—much though I regret it was overlooked—would have altered the situation.

13. My impression is that interest in India is really dying down here in spite of the efforts of Krishna Menon and his league to maintain some sort of activity. We are watching that gentleman closely but up to date have not found sufficient justification for taking action against him. But Sorensen and his little clique have alienated the sympathy of the bulk of the Labour party, who are now pretty sound. One of them, George Ridley, has in fact just produced an excellent little pamphlet[5] on the subject which should do a lot to steady opinion. If there are copies available in the Office one will go with this letter; if not, by next mail.

* * *

15. Your final suggestion[6] for the answer to the Jam Saheb's letter has just come in and subject to a few verbal alterations I hope to bring it before the Cabinet in the course of the next week. Taking that, together with the short but very precise public answer which I gave in the House of [to] Astor's question the other day,[7] the Cabinet ought, I think, to be satisfied.

Enclosure to No. 280

Mr Levy to Mr Tomlinson

KRYN & LAHY (1928), LTD., COBURN WORKS, LETCHWORTH, HERTS, *7 December 1942*

Dear Sir,
I know Mr. Bevin has taken a great interest in the Indian students and I thought he might be pleased to read the enclosed memorandum, and possibly pass it on to Mr. Amery.

Yours faithfully,
GEORGE LEVY,
Chairman, Kryn & Lahy (1928), Ltd.

[3] No. 125. [4] No. 205.
[5] George Ridley, *India: what now and what next?* (London, The Labour Publications Dept., 1942).
[6] No. 274. [7] See Annexure C to No. 290.

MEMORANDUM

4 December 1942

After two months as a student in our Foundry, Mr. Gandhi asked to see one of the Directors in order to say good-bye and to thank the Company for the help he had been given. He saw several of the Directors and Mr. George suggested that he might like to talk to the Editor of the *Iadom*. The following is his story:—

"When we left India we all thought of the English people as something horrible and as great snobs. Please forgive me saying 'snobs' but that is what we felt. Coming over on the boat we were fifteen Indians and about 200 English passengers and they would not mix with us at all. The British Government had booked us second-class passages and we felt that we should be treated as other second-class passengers. If for instance we went into the tea lounge and all the tables were occupied, and there were four people at a table, for six, they would not let us have the other two chairs. However the boys got together and decided that they would do something about it. We all went down to the tea lounge one afternoon, one hour before tea, and sat down, one at each table. When the English people came in and saw what had happened they went away, but the following day they were much better and mixed more, and allowed us to sit next to them. We were very sorry to compel them to treat us equally, but that is the fact.

"Then we got to Cape Town. There we found that Indians were not allowed in bars, shops, or cinemas and our feelings rose very high against the British. We were coming out to serve the British people. We had two main ideas; to learn British methods of mass production, working machinery and to go back to India with the idea to help our own mother country, India, and to win the war and bring it to a speedy end. We had risked our lives and when we got this treatment our feelings for the British people became worse. We had expected them to co-operate with us so that we might improve the systems in India, but after sacrificing ourselves we found we were not allowed in the shops, cinemas, or bars. Our feelings were something horrible.

"When we left Cape Town, on the ship a notice was put up which invited all second-class passengers to the Sports, and for each item there would be a certain entrance fee. We all got together and we said we must forgive and forget the past and we must join in the sports. We had always regarded the Englishman as a great sport and we agreed that we would play out the various games with him. To our great surprise, the man who was in charge of the ship came to our officer and said 'Please see that none of the Indians enter'. Is it a crime, or a sin to be a blackman? We began to doubt the treatment that we would get in England. In Cape Town we got bad treatment, what is the treatment we will get in their own country?

"We landed at Liverpool and as we walked through the streets through people we did not know some shook hands with us and they all smiled. They

said 'Well boys, we wish you a good time in England.' It was wonderful. It was something we had never dreamed of, that welcome in the streets of Liverpool.

"I have had ten weeks at the Ascot with the English workman and I found he liked me. He drank with me, smoked with me and talked with me. So we realised our mistake that we must not judge the whole English race by the people we had met in our own country.

"I worked at Kryn & Lahy for two months and I found each and every workman, right from the Manager, Mr. Dereck Wells, to the lowest labourer in the foundry, each a perfect gentleman, a good sport, and I found him very sympathetic to me and with Indians. Some of the workmen invited me for tea to their homes. It is not the costly things we are craving. It may be ham, or bacon, or may be tea without sugar, but it is the feeling of friendliness and affection that we so much want. It has been so much more than we ever dreamed or ever imagined.

"If I were to write all I feel about the Englishmen—that they are gentlemen, thorough sports, generous and hospitable, it would be called propaganda, and if I had read it before I should not have believed it. When I go back to India I shall say that the Englishmen are great sympathisers for us, that they are hospitable, but they won't believe me and they will think the British Government have bribed me to say it."

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Sir A. Hope (Madras) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/70

SECRET GOVT. HOUSE, GUINDY, *17 December 1942*

REPORT NO. II OF 1942

3. The food situation is really serious and is made much worse by the comparative failure of the monsoon, although we are now getting more rain, but not nearly enough. The difficulties of food are enormous, what with hoarding, smuggling, black markets, distribution, and genuine shortage. It is not only rice but other grains, sugar, &c. that is short, and prices have risen alarmingly. Our having to provide rice for Ceylon gives ground for a lot of discontent but it has, of course, got to be done. We have commandeered certain hoarded rice and are selling it at our fixed price in the city, and I hope that this may be a lesson to other hoarders. Hood has gone to Delhi for the Food Conference together with Scott Brown, the Special Food Officer.

* * *

7. I end this letter as I began, namely that economic and food problems are interesting the great mass of the people far more than politics. The interest in the latter is largely confined to the educated Congress-minded lawyers, journalists and students. There is a feeling that the War is certain to be won now and that India will not be attacked, in fact, a very dangerous form of complacency is arising. The Congress intellectual is in his heart disappointed, because, despite all their public protestations, they felt that they would impose their régime on the country much more easily if the Axis won, or preferably if there was a stalemate.

8. The more I see and hear of the Congress attempts to dominate, bully and ill-treat the politically indifferent villagers, &c., the more I feel that Jinnah is right in refusing to be under a Hindu (i.e. Congress) régime. They are dictator-minded and will suffer no opposition, and I shudder to think what will happen if and when we go. I still think that we could mobilise non-Congress opinion if we co-operated more with the loyalists, such as having non-official Advisers.

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Government of India, Food Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/E/8/3297: f 267

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *18 December 1942, 4.10 am*
Received: 18 December, 6.30 am

10045. In continuation of our telegram 9796[1] dated December 9th. Conference of high level representative[s] of Provinces and majority of States held in Delhi 14th and 15th to discuss food situation has disclosed that crop position is even worse than previously reported. Failure of South West monsoon has seriously affected Madras Presidency and part of Hyderabad also. Statements put in by representatives indicate that export surpluses of producing areas are short of requirements of India's consuming areas for next 12 months in respect of rice by 1,400,000 tons and in respect of Millets by 650,000 tons. The above figures do not include requirements of the Army, Ceylon or Arabia. Position in respect of rabi crops wheat and gram was considered only for the next 5 months i.e. till the next crop is due. This shows that available surplus is short of claims for Indian civilian consumption by 400,000 tons in case of wheat and 200,000 tons in the case of gram. In addition to the above civilian requirements the Army need 200,000 tons of wheat during the same period. Although no doubt the representatives framed their estimates of surpluses more conservatively than those of deficits it is clear that India is faced with an acute shortage of food grains and that the utmost possible help is essential at the earliest possible date.

The deficits are so large that we cannot cover this by imports under the present conditions and only hope to induce holders to put stored reserves upon the market. It is extremely difficult to achieve this in a rising market but import of a substantial quantity of food grains from abroad would depress prices and help to draw out stocks. The reduction in demand that can be produced by rationing is very limited as it is not considered practicable to ration the cultivators who form majority of the population.

Reply to your telegrams 21551[2] dated 15th and 21876[3] dated December 16th is in preparation and will be despatched earliest possible.

[1] No. 265. [2] No. 275. [3] This telegram has not been traced.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *18 December 1942*

The Times gave a pretty full report this morning of your excellent speech in Calcutta.[1] I thought it a most timely restatement of our whole general attitude. Talking it over with the Jam Saheb just now he was a little afraid that your references to the necessity of a federal solution might be twisted by the Congress press as implying an intention on your part to go back on the Cripps proposals and of our offers to let Indians frame their own constitution in order to impose the limited constitution of 1935. I don't think there is much risk of that and I should have thought that the only quarter from which you might perhaps meet with criticism is that of the Pakistanis, who would suggest that you were going back on the offer of non-accession. But here again we have always made it clear that in our opinion some sort of unity for India is essential and that the freedom to stand out has been conceded, not in order to encourage division, but to encourage give and take and ensure a really agreed settlement. Personally I have always thought that when it comes to business a great deal of the valuable detailed work on which the 1935 Act was based will be accepted with very little discussion. On the other hand, I am no less convinced that a parliamentary Executive of the British type is not suitable and is never likely to be accepted either by Muslims or Princes and that something different will have

I have not noticed this reaction.

L.

[1] See No. 277, note 6. In telegram 1475 of 19 December, Mr Amery sent Lord Linlithgow the following message: 'Congratulations on your excellent and timely address.' MSS. EUR. F. 125/23.

to be devised, probably more on the basis of an Executive nominated by Provincial Governments and in continuous existence, a proportion of its members changing every few years. Also, it would have to have powers not less than those that the Viceroy enjoys today, or are enjoyed by the President in America, *vis-à-vis* the Legislature. We may some day have to come to imposing at any rate a provisional settlement on some such lines, but for the time being I am sure we are right in compelling Indians to try and face their own problem.

[Para. 2, on Dr Paton's proposal for a goodwill mission to India from British Churches, omitted.]

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL CALCUTTA, *19 December 1942, 5.15 pm*

No. 613–S.C. You are familiar with our present difficulties over food. Bengal (where I now am) have pressed their case most strongly so far as that Province is concerned and I am clear as to seriousness of such[1] position (I have seen your official telegram[2] about shipping and will discuss terms of reply to it on my return to Delhi at the beginning of next week). I have suggested to Sarker that it would be of great value if we could obtain temporary loan of the services of one of the experts from the Ministry of Food to advise on situation. He quite agrees that this might prove of real assistance and in any case whoever came out would be able on return to explain our difficulties to authorities at home. If someone could be spared a man with considerable experience of food grains would be most suitable for our purpose.

2. I would be most grateful for any help over this. What we really want is a good and fairly high up man from home and I am sure that apart from its practical aid such visit would soothe opinion in India and convince public that we mean business, reinforce our hand should we have at later stage to refuse food grains to Ceylon and/or Arabia, and be of material assistance to you in that unfortunate event with Colonial Office and Foreign Office. Apart from that he would on his return provide in London a source of technical and up-to-date opinion on our position in India while his deputation would strengthen our position with U.S.A. in the event of shortage being felt by the armed forces here. I would be most grateful therefore for your help.

[1] 'such' deciphered as 'Nowgong'. [2] No. 275.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/13/998: ff 260–1

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *19 December 1942, 2.15 am*
Received: 20 December

1476. Very many thanks for your official telegrams[1] of the 14th December regarding the reply to the Jam Sahib's letter. I am greatly obliged to you for the draft reply. This seems generally most suitable and I have only the following few drafting points to suggest, subject to which I shall be glad to recommend the draft to the Cabinet. In circulating your official telegram 3499–P, I shall point out that my reply to Parliamentary Question on 3rd December[2] has already secured full publicity for our attitude towards Princes' Treaties and has thus eliminated case for public reply to Jam Sahib.

2. I share the view expressed at the end of para. 7 of your telegram 3499–P, and the only alteration of substance that I feel disposed to suggest in the draft reply is the introduction of a similar phrase with the object of strengthening paragraph 6 of the draft. Would you be prepared to insert the following before the last sentence of that paragraph—"Nor should it be overlooked that the recognition of any such union as is referred to by Y[our] H[ighness] must fundamentally affect the nature of the present exclusive relationship of the individual States with the Crown"?

3. I would also suggest the following minor amendments:—

(*a*) Near the end of para. 3, for "sovereignty and of resources" substitute "powers and resources" which seems a more precise and less alarming term.

(*b*) In the last sentence of para. 5, before "function" insert "essential", the point being that the body may have other functions e.g. the discussion of the contents of a treaty.

(*c*) In the last sentence of para. 6 for "the outlined principles" substitute "the main principles" and omit words "to States" for question of application is open not in relation to States alone.[3]

4. If you agree to the foregoing amendments they can be inserted forthwith in the draft reply at your end and here, unless you prefer to telegraph them officially. Please also repeat the words at the beginning of para. 6 from "not finding it feasible" to "for India as a whole" which are not decipherable with certainty.

[1] Nos. 273 and 274. [2] See Annexure C to No. 290.

[3] Lord Linlithgow agreed to the amendments in para. 2 (noting that 'Your Highness' should read 'the Chancellor') and para. 3 in telegram 3582–S of 23 December. MSS. EUR. F. 125/23.

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The Nawab of Chhatari to Sir A. Lothian

L/P&S/13/998: ff 192–4

No. 633–C.C. *20 December 1942*

His Exalted Highness' Government views with some concern the recent developments in the political situation in India and their possible bearings on the constitutional proposals of the future. It fully appreciates that the requirements of the war and of the internal situation demand the undivided attention of His Excellency the Crown Representative, but as His Majesty's Government has recently reaffirmed the broad intentions of the last constitutional offer and a movement has since been launched by the major political party in British India which aims at striking at the root of the British connection, H.E.H.'s Government considers it necessary, even at this stage, to invite His Excellency's attention to certain points of principle which vitally affect Hyderabad.

2. The broad intentions of the proposals of March 1942 include the possible establishment of more than one Union enjoying Dominion Status of a variety implying "free association" with, and even the right of secession from, the British Commonwealth. While His Exalted Highness' Government welcomes the recognition, implicit in the proposals, of the right of any Province to determine whether it will join the Indian Union or form a separate Union, and would welcome similar option being given to the Indian States, it is a matter of anxious concern to Hyderabad that it is likely to have, contiguous to its territories, a Union dominated, even more than the last Congress Ministries of the three neighbouring Provinces, by a party hostile towards Hyderabad as well as the British Government. Hostility towards the latter in fact makes it probable that, within a measurable distance of time, such a Union may even secede from the Commonwealth. Moreover, Dominion Status must imply a greater degree of adherence than what was contemplated in 1935, and the organic union of the State with any such Union of British India must lead either to constitutional restrictions on the power of the Union, or the abandonment by the State of much of its sovereignty and many of its cherished rights and privileges. Any endeavour to escape the implications of the latter must inevitably result in limitations and safeguards which, if they are to be effective, will curtail the free exercise of Dominion powers by the Union Government and thus cause dissatisfaction to British India as the major partner in it. Hyderabad does not wish to stand in the way of the legitimate aspirations of British India and feels that, as things now are, the most appropriate and the safest course for it would be to preserve its separate identity, organically unconnected in any Union with British India

and in the enjoyment of direct treaty relations with the Crown in the United Kingdom with such modifications of existing treaties as may be actually agreed upon.

3. The State recognises that, subject to its consent, arrangements more particularly in the economic sphere, will be required, in the light of the new conditions, involving revision of existing treaties and the conclusion even of fresh agreements. While H.E.H.'s Government is confident that, in the changed conditions of the future, the settlement of disputes or differences arising from treaties and agreements must and will be by conciliation or arbitration where such methods were advocated even in the past by the framers of the Montagu–Chelmsford Report and by the Butler Committee, it considers that a precise ascertainment of disputed rights by impartial enquiry, such as was urged by the State for the interpretation of its Commercial Treaty of 1802, must naturally precede and will, indeed, become necessary for the purpose of revision itself. Moreover, with Dominion Status in the picture, the stage has been reached for the position to be readjusted. In a future which admits the possibility not only of no all-India Centre but even of the secession of any of the Unions from the Commonwealth, the existing extra-territorial arrangements for such matters requiring co-ordination as Railways, Posts and Telegraphs, will become all the more anomalous, and should be regulated by agreements as between different administrative entities.

4. His Exalted Highness' Government desires particularly to invite attention to the Treaties of 1766, 1768, 1800 and 1853, read in the light of the Supplemental Treaty of 1860 and the Agreements of 1902 and 1936.[1] It is not intended to go into the details of these Treaties by which certain territories[2] were ceded or assigned in lieu of specific military guarantees, but two basic facts must be stated, namely, that these cessions and assignments were for military assistance and that they were made to the British Government. The privilege of enjoying the cession or assignment goes, therefore, hand in hand with the responsibility of fulfilling the obligations effectively, and His Exalted Highness cannot acquiesce either in the separation of the privilege from the responsibility or in their transfer to any other Government. This position applies equally to all the territories ceded or assigned by the State, and any idea of their inclusion in the territories of any Dominion on the basis of the continuance of the military guarantees by the Crown in the United Kingdom will be repugnant to the spirit of the Treaties and be unacceptable to His Exalted Highness. Such an arrangement, arrived at by no matter what formula, would present the anomaly

[1] C. U. Aitchison, *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, vol. IX (Calcutta, 1929); *Gazette of India Extraordinary*, 13 November 1936.

[2] Principally the Northern Circars (i.e. the northern districts of Madras), territories in the Deccan known as the 'Ceded Districts', and Berar.

of the Dominion concerned acquiring possession of the cessions and assignments while not being responsible for the defence of the State, and, even if the Dominion were willing and able to provide such defence, the choice of a defensive ally must rest with the State. The position of the territories, if absorbed into the Dominion, would become all the more untenable should it decide to secede from the Commonwealth, in which event the territories in question would be lost both to the British Government and to the State. Separation at that stage would not be constitutionally or politically feasible, and it would indeed be an irony of history if treaties, concluded once with a mutual desire to "improve" relationship and a sense of security, were, in the course of political change, to ensure, on the one hand, to the weakening of the State's position and the loss of its possessions, and, on the other, to the strengthening of forces not responsible for securing to the State its treaty guarantees and in many respects hostile both to the British Government and to the State.

5. In his letter to His Excellency the Viceroy dated 1st August 1931,[3] His Exalted Highness drew attention to the significance of the part played by Hyderabad in the maintenance of stability in the Indian Empire and in the evolution of the British connection with India. Much has happened since then, and much is likely to happen in future, to test even further the strength and mutual value of the alliance which has so far stood the strain of almost two centuries of change. The State does not desire to recount here its past or present services as it bases its case more upon the inherent justice and reasonableness of its claims which lead it to believe that its position or status in the future dispensation will become in no way inferior to the Union or Unions of India. With its Alliance strengthened, its territories saved in a manner to be negotiated, its economic life assured against the possibility of strangulation by the State securing thus an access to the sea,[4] it looks forward to the role it may be enabled to fulfil in the future of promoting still further the interests of stability and of providing, in the heart of the Indian peninsula and in the midst of growing change, both the nexus of its own "perpetual friendship" for the continuance of a historic connection and a position of even greater security and honour for the Faithful Ally.

[3] L/P&S/13/541. [4] Presumably through the Northern Circars.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

L/PO/8/6: f 5

PRIVATE AND SECRET *21 December 1942*

My dear Linlithgow,

You will remember that in the Prime Minister's telegram No. 39–U[1] about your recent extension he accepted your proposition that a decision must be taken about your successor by June next. As you know from our previous correspondence the position is that a number of names have been under consideration and among them Lumley's. It has occurred to me that unless something is done to prevent it, Lumley on vacating office in the middle of March will probably return by sea and that this will take him at least two months and possibly longer, so that there is quite a chance that he will not reach this country until some time in June. The Prime Minister is intending to consider Lumley among others when the decision has to be taken and I foresee the possibility that if Lumley is on the high seas at the time, a decision may be further postponed for that reason. This being so, I have informally approached the Prime Minister and have secured permission for Lumley to be warned by you that his name has been under consideration and that it would be desirable for him to return by air.

It is obviously a matter of some delicacy to give even a hint of his eligibility to Lumley, but the Prime Minister has agreed that next time you see him you should tell him orally and in complete confidence and as coming from myself and not from the Prime Minister that the situation which led up to your recent extension was that a number of names were under the Prime Minister's consideration among them Lumley's, that for one reason or another several of these candidates could not at the time be spared from their present occupations and for this reason among others a decision was postponed. It is desired that you should add that the Prime Minister has at present not made up his mind even in a preliminary way as between these candidates and that the choice may partly depend on which of them can be spared when the time comes; that I have felt that in the unusual circumstances it is only fair to Lumley that he should know that he is among those who may be considered and it would be unfair to him not to enable him to have had as long a time at home as possible if the choice should fall upon him. It would clearly be convenient in these circumstances that he should not be on the high seas and incommunicado at the time when a decision is being taken, which it is hoped will be during May. I therefore feel that it would be desirable for him to return by air.

[1] No. 255.

I should be grateful if in communicating this you would be careful to emphasise that it comes from myself and is an entirely informal piece of advice and that the Prime Minister is of course quite uncommitted by it.

There is, of course, no immediate urgency about communicating this and it would be much best done orally. I do not know whether you are likely to be seeing Lumley in the next few weeks, but you will no doubt if necessary be able to create some suitable opportunity. I should of course be glad if you would let me know in due course how Lumley reacts to this information.

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *22 December 1942, 3.50 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 22 December, 11.30 pm*

No. 3562–S. Food. I would like you to see the following secret and personal telegram of 20th December which I have had from Lumley as an example of what we are confronted with here:—

Begins. (1) If I am right in expecting that following the Delhi Food Conference decisions will shortly be taken about food by the Government of India I would like to relate the extreme urgency of the position in Bombay.

(2) Bombay City itself consumes 800 tons cereals daily. Stocks here will provide only for following days food for the City. Wheat 20, rice 40, millets 45. But we have already had to send supplies intended for Bombay City to famine districts, and this drain will increase, thereby depleting further the City's food supply. (The above figures do not take into account the 50,000 tons offered to Bombay by H.M. Commerce.)

(3) As regards rice and millets, taking into account all local production we shall still need to import $7\frac{1}{4}$ lakhs of tons to feed City and districts up to next harvest. I am most grateful to the Commerce Member for allotting us 50,000 tons of these grains during his recent visit to Bombay and we are already in touch with the Central Provinces and Berar, Sind and the Punjab regarding purchase. In the past however hopes raised have been disappointed and until their supplies are delivered the danger will exist that the port and its industries will have to close down in a few weeks.

(4) As regards wheat, I would invite your special attention to the position which is extremely precarious. Wheat and wheat-flour consumption in the

City have had to be cut down drastically. This has already led to one strike in a vital war factory and further labour trouble is not unlikely. All exports have had to be stopped affecting Poona, Secunderabad, &c., which are supplied with wheat products from Bombay. Our minimum wheat requirements are 16,000[1] tons a month up till next harvest (May). After that they will rise to about 36,000 tons a month because of the failure of the rabi rains.

(5) I would stress that though the immediate delivery of supplies is vital for the continuance of the work of the port and industry it is no less vital to continue deliveries until next harvest. *Ends.*

2. Following is text of reply sent officially in my absence on tour to Governor of Ceylon's personal telegram dated 15th December,[2] which was repeated to Colonial Office:—

Begins. Dated 17th December 1942. Viceroy has requested Department to reply to Governor's personal telegram to Viceroy, dated 15th December, asking for confirmation of the assurance that Government of India would aim at supplying 20,000 tons of rice a month and would assist as far as possible by releasing for Ceylon a portion of any further stocks which might become available. Government of India regret that owing to failure of south west monsoon over large tracts of the country the foodgrain situation in India itself is causing great anxiety and they are unable to give any assurance of achieving the aim referred to above. While for the present they will continue to assist Ceylon with such quantity of rice as can be spared they can give no guarantee as to the quantity that will be available or that they will be able to continue supply to Ceylon indefinitely. *Ends.*

[1] Deciphered as '1600'. [2] Not printed.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *22 December 1942, 3.50 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 22 December, 7.30 pm*

No. 3566–S. Your personal telegram of 8th September No. 5753[1] and connected correspondence. Fast by Gandhi. I have since had Lumley's letter of 22nd October[2] (copy by bag of 27th October) and his further letter of 4th November[3] (copy by bag of 24th November). I have considered these letters which contain very careful analysis of position with Maxwell, and in the light of

[1] This should read '15753', i.e. Vol. II, No. 714. [2] No. 111. [3] No. 143.

his views and those of Home Department, I fear that with regret I must accept Lumley's objections to suggested procedure as fatal. We do not think it would be justifiable to force Lumley to take the very grave risks which he anticipates as likely to result from that policy and it is tolerably clear from his letter that there would be almost insuperable difficulties in working it in the manner proposed or in securing the advantages for which I had hoped from it.

2. If that view is accepted, we are I fear though with very great reluctance driven back to contemplating Gandhi's release before his fast becomes fatal. Situation is to some extent altered by the Surgeon-General's opinion mentioned in paragraph 8 (*e*) of Lumley's letter of 22nd October, that Gandhi would probably not recover from a fast lasting more than three or four days. That to some extent reduces difficulties of the situation since there would be less time to whip up popular excitement before the critical stage is reached, and it is arguable that in those circumstances no really useful object would be served by concealing fast from the public as I suggested to Lumley in my telegram of 31st October[4] (copy by bag of 24th November) unless of course circumstances were such as to make this course essential. In his present state of health it is always possible that on such a plan we might be caught out by a sudden collapse when we should be blamed for not having let the public know.

3. It will I think be necessary to retain Gandhi at the Aga Khan's palace when the fast starts rather than attempt to transfer him to Wardha or any other place since his possible death on the journey would be to say the least of it embarrassing. Procedure as we conceive it would be to remove guards from the palace and inform Gandhi that he was a free man.

4. I am myself rather inclined to agree with Lumley's view that Gandhi is not at present intending a fast. Its attractiveness will be considerably lost if he knows, as he probably does, that he could not last for more than a few days, and I am told on good authority that he got a real fright on the occasion of his last fast when he was released only after he had himself given up hope. It is impossible to be certain what he may do, particularly if anything happened specially to upset him. But there seems at least some ground for hoping that the situation may not arise. If it does, in the light of my correspondence with Lumley, I think we are now driven to releasing him from custody when medical advice tells us that the danger point is approaching. If he subsequently stops fast and recovers—both doubtful hypotheses—his re-arrest would have to be considered, and with possibility of further fasts. But we need not take that fence now.

5. My own feelings in this matter as you know have been consistently in favour of taking a stiff line with Gandhi. But we have to consider repercussions both here and outside, and in the light of Lumley's views I hope that Cabinet

will feel able to reconsider. I am assured that Gandhi's release when in danger of his life has never been publicly regarded as a victory over Government in the past and my advisers see no reason to believe that it would be so regarded[5] on the present occasion. The moment for his release would depend on circumstances and, perhaps, on the grounds for his fast; but in any case I should propose to announce the release in a suitable communiqué, drawing attention amongst other things to Gandhi's own condemnation of hunger-striking and hinting at the undue advantage he was taking of the fact that he had always been treated by Government with special personal consideration. I should also propose to bring out the point that he had been detained in order to prevent him from leading the mass movement and that the need for such detention no longer existed when he was physically incapable of doing so. Indeed detention after reaching that stage would be punitive rather than preventive in character.

[4] No. 129. [5] 'regarded' deciphered as 'if'.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 610

L/P&S/13/998: ff 237–9

India

Indian States: Request by Chamber of Princes for a Statement of Policy by His Majesty's Government

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, *22 December 1942*[1]

I circulate herewith (as Annexure A) a copy of the telegrams which I sent to the Viceroy in pursuance of the decision of the War Cabinet at their meeting on the 6th October (W.M. (42) 132nd Conclusions, Minute 2),[2] and a copy of the reply which I have now received from him (Annexure B). The terms of the draft reply which he now proposes are, in my view, suitable and I would propose, if the War Cabinet approve, to authorise the issue of the letter forthwith. In view of the recent public asseveration, the text of which is appended (Annexure C), of the treaty rights of the Princes in the question asked and the reply which I made in the House of Commons on the 3rd December, I submit that publication of the reply to the Chancellor is no longer required; and I share the Viceroy's view that, in present circumstances, it would be undesirable.

L. S. A.

[1] Dated 22 December but not circulated until after receipt of telegram noted in No. 285, note 3.
[2] No. 72.

Annexure A to No. 290

TELEGRAM FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA TO THE CROWN REPRESENTATIVE, DATED OCTOBER 7, 1942

[*There follow the first three paragraphs of No. 79.*]

TELEGRAM FROM SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA TO CROWN REPRESENTATIVE, DATED OCTOBER 7, 1942

[*There follows the text of No. 80.*]

Annexure B to No. 290

TELEGRAM FROM THE CROWN REPRESENTATIVE TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, DATED DECEMBER 14, 1942

[*There follows the text of No. 273.*]

TELEGRAM FROM THE CROWN REPRESENTATIVE TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, DATED DECEMBER 14, 1942

[*There follows the text of No. 274 as amended by No. 285.*]

Annexure C to No. 290

QUESTION NO. 26 (DECEMBER 3, 1942)[3]

Mr. Astor: To ask the Secretary of State for India whether the offer of the present Minister of Aircraft Production took full notice of the treaties between the Crown and the Princes of India; whether these treaties remain valid in their integrity; and whether he will undertake that they will not be changed by any constitution-making body without the assent of the parties concerned?

ANSWER

Mr. Amery: The honourable Member is no doubt referring to the various Treaties, Engagements and Sanads defining the relations of the Crown with Rulers of Indian States. The interpretation of the original terms of certain of these engagements has, as is well known, been affected over a long period by usage and sufferance; but, subject to that qualification, the answer to all three parts of his question is in the affirmative.

Mr. Astor: Thank you very much.

Mr. Granville: Does that answer indicate that there has been any change in the offer which was made by the late Lord Privy Seal?

Mr. Amery: No, Sir.

[3] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 385, cols. 1281–2.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *22 December 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Many thanks for your letter of the 27th November,[1] which has just arrived and which I was very glad to get. I think that our private correspondence has resulted in clearing the air as regards the reply to be given to the Jam Saheb's letter. I have just had your private and personal telegram of the 19th December No. 1476,[2] commenting on the drafts which I had sent you officially. I do not anticipate any serious difficulty about any of these amendments, and hope to get a telegram off to you in a day or two. I need not say that I read with interest what you say on the whole subject in paragraph 1 of your letter of 27th November.

2. I would not be a bit surprised if your conclusion as to the probable future of the Centre as indicated in paragraph 2 of your letter is prophetic. I fear that I have gone slow about this suggestion of a statement setting out the nature and functions of the Governor-General in Council, but I will hope to get something together early in the New Year. The one thing I am a bit afraid of in putting out a White Paper setting out the functions of the Government of India and the India Office in too great a detail is that it may stimulate rather than soothe interest. Incidentally I was so glad to hear from Bradfield, who has just arrived here with the Medical Mission after a very considerable Odyssey, of the extremely helpful and friendly relations which exist between him and the India Office, and the invariably co-operative and cordial assistance which he has had from everyone during the time that he has been working there.

3. I have had your telegram[3] about the Home Membership, and I had a talk with Maxwell about it today. I think that on the whole, though there is a very great deal to be said on both sides, I shall probably come down in favour of making a change in the spring. But I propose to turn this over in my mind a little longer and to telegraph to you in the course of the next few days. Many thanks for what you say in paragraph 4 of your letter about Mudaliar and his attitude on the general Indianisation issue. You may be pretty certain that it is likely to be strongly supported by Zafrulla, who is also likely to push for further Indianisation of the services, the High Courts, &c. I am bound to say that I am extremely sceptical as to the wisdom (unless, that is, a clean cut is to be made) of forcing service Indianisation in present conditions.

[1] No. 225. [2] No. 285. [3] No. 268.

4. I know the keen interest you take in this business of preparatory work, and your anxiety to see my Executive Council more closely associated with it. And I fear that you must think me sadly unresponsive! But I fear that unresponsive I quite definitely am. I am not prepared to bring my Council in or to set them on to this sort of work. For they have neither the time nor the competence; and apart from that were they to be got on to it we should in a very short interval indeed find ourselves tied up in a tangle of constitutional niceties and possibly in discussion of a variety of constitutional issues which in my opinion had much better be postponed. It is going to be difficult enough to get people to sit round a table and to hammer out conclusions even when they have had longer experience of the difficulties of this problem. To try to get these people down to it now would, I am certain, attractive as the idea may seem in theory, be the greatest possible mistake.

* * *

7. Many thanks for what you say in paragraph 9 of your letter about Zafrulla. I am quite familiar with certain of these arguments which Zafrulla has used to Swinton so far as India is concerned: and I have touched on them, in so far as they deal with the Indianisation of the Services above. The fact is that here as elsewhere people are extremely anxious as to the position of their community, their friends or part of India, &c. in the event of our clearing out: and that is what lies at the bottom of a good deal of this type of suggestion. But I am sure that you will be at pains to see that Zafrulla is not allowed to run away during his London visit.

8. I wholly agree with what you say in paragraph 10 of your letter. I am delighted that you have dealt with the Archbishop about Rajagopalachari. The Archbishop, poor man, has had little experience of this Indian problem, with which his predecessor was of course profoundly familiar; and I have no doubt that he is under pressure from the Metropolitan, about whose quality you and I have commented in our private correspondence at any [an?] earlier stage, and who himself, alas, does not understand what he is dealing with or its complexities! I am certain that your explanations to the Archbishop will have been of the greatest value, and of course if at any time there is anything you think that I can do to supplement or support what you say, you have only to let me know.

* * *

10. I shall look forward to seeing Phillips when he arrives here, and I am sure in the light of what you say about your conversations with him and of a private telegram[4] which I have had from Edward Halifax strongly commending him, that he will be of real assistance to us. I am encouraged in that connection by what you say in paragraph 2 of your letter of the 25th November.[5] We have

not yet heard the probable date of his arrival, and I am of course away from Delhi from the 26th December to the 7th of January: but I hope very much that he may not be due here until after my return. As it happens, Lumley is coming to stay with me from the 8th to the 13th: and I should much like both to be in the house together, while Lady Mary Herbert is likely to be here from about the 11th.

* * *

16. I flew to Calcutta on the morning of Wednesday, the 16th December, leaving here after breakfast and arriving there in time for early lunch—covering the best part of a thousand miles. We had a very good passage though a cold one. I then spent three very strenuous days there. I saw Fazlul Huq and the Ministers, and had long conversations with Herbert and his principal officials, and was also able to renew contact with the Defence authorities—G.O.C. Eastern Army—whom I brought back to Delhi with me to see Wavell, the Air Officer Commander, Bengal, &c. I found Calcutta in very good trim. I had not been there since I visited it when there was imminent threat of attack last May, and it was obvious that a very great deal had been done since. The streets were full of British soldiers and airmen, there was any quantity of military transport, jeeps, &c. about; and in the centre of Calcutta one of the principal avenues has been made into a runway. I thought this last point of particular value since, though one was deafened all day by the noise of planes rising and returning, the crowds of thousands of people on the *maidan* on Saturday afternoon watching the planes take off and return made one feel that the surprise and terrorising value of a Japanese air attack was likely to be infinitely less than would have been the case a few months ago before the local population were familiarised with planes and the noise they make, &c. This has been fully borne out by the two air raids that have since taken place—the first of them on the night of Sunday after I had returned to Delhi; the second last night. Casualties in both cases have been very slight, and damage also: and I doubt (though one speaks with all reserve) if they are very much more than token raids. What is so extremely encouraging is that they appear to have had no effect on local morale, and that people have stayed at work. There are no signs as I write of any urge in the direction of evacuation or of any kind of panic. Nothing could be better than that.

17. I sent you by the last bag copy of my speech on the 17th[6] to the Associated Chambers. As you will see I thought it well to be definite on one or two things—our national passion for public self-depreciation; the part which the European community could reasonably expect, and might indeed be expected, to play in the commerce of the future India; and in the constitutional field the fallacy that India's troubles arise from our reluctance to hand over power when

[4] No. 241. [5] No. 219. [6] See No. 277, note 6.

in fact they arise solely and entirely from the fact that we have offered to do so. All that went down very well. I also somewhat deliberately raised the unity issue, though I was anxious to do so (and I think succeeded in doing so) in terms which could not reasonably give offence to Jinnah and which also made it clear to the other side that if India was to achieve unity there must be a readiness on the part of political parties to make sacrifices. I have been more than satisfied with the reactions both on this point and to the speech as a whole. Jinnah is far from pleased with what I have done and in his new morning paper *Dawn*, which describes my speech as a whole as "putrid", he takes strong exception to what he suggests are my endeavours to queer the Pakistan pitch. Equally, Rajagopalachari, whose position really becomes more difficult to understand every day, warns the public against my endeavours to pull the wool of unity over the eyes and comes back to the point that an Ulster must be at any rate a preliminary. How he reconciles that with the general attitude of Congress and the feeling of the Mahasabha goodness knows. But it is clear that he is playing a very lone hand. The Hindu Press as a whole is well pleased that the unity issue has been brought up again, and there is a general disposition to take my speech as indicating certainly an openness of mind (and even a change of heart as compared with the Cripps proposals) so far as His Majesty's Government and the Viceroy are concerned. That is all to the good. But I am no more hopeful than before of people getting together. Everyone here wants someone else to do the work and carry the responsibility, and as you and I know so well if political leaders had only been prepared at earlier stages in this business to take a few chances themselves, the Indian political position would be completely different from what it is. As it is, and given the extreme improbability, as I would judge it, of any change in the psychological make-up of these people, I fear that we are set for a long period of *status quo*.

18. I continue to be greatly exercised about the food position, as you may well imagine. Not only of course is it a question of vital importance from the security and war effort point of view, but it is also potentially as important politically as any of the constitutional business. I am not entirely satisfied that Sarker has the energy and drive to pull it through, and I may have to take it on myself, though goodness knows I have too much on my shoulders as things are. Holdsworth, my Food Secretary, is good as far as I can judge, and he has a competent staff. But we are terribly hampered by the absence of personnel with expert experience in this line, and by the quite lamentable statistical position: while we have of course been extremely unlucky in this failure of the rains in certain areas, coupled with the demands which we have to try to meet from outside, and the cutting off so far as rice is concerned of a great proportion of our normal supply with the loss of Burma. I suspect, too, that the Provinces are all frightened, and so are being a good deal more conservative in their

estimates of what they have than they need be. That is only to be expected. But the general picture is a nasty one, and though I fully appreciate the difficulties about making shipping available which you set out in your official telegram,[7] we may be driven to ask that those difficulties should be faced—indeed as I write I see little alternative to our doing so. I hope very much that you may be able to borrow for me a man from the Ministry of Food. I think for the reasons given in my personal telegram[8] of a day or two ago that it may well make all the difference if we could get him.

[7] No. 275. [8] No. 284.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *23 December 1942*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 3581–S. Warmest thanks for your kind message[1] on my speech. It has gone down pretty well here, though Jinnah's organ thinks it "putrid"!

[1] No. 283, note 1.

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Sir H. Lewis (Orissa) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/84

D.O. No. 2254–G.O. GOVT. HOUSE, CUTTACK, *23 December 1942*

REPORT NO. 23

5. For many here as in other parts of India the war situation is in fact summed up in high prices and short supplies. The solution is not easily found and it is impossible not to regard the situation without grave anxiety. I found in the cyclone areas that quite apart from damage directly due to the storm the conversation was nearly always brought back to food prices due to the war. Our main political and economic issue (for it is both) turns on the export of rice from the province. After having been almost unduly cautious during the autumn and having in general been against export, the Ministers suddenly swung almost too far in the opposite direction and wanted recently to abolish permits entirely in order to get the cultivator as they thought a better price for his crop. It needed quite a strong pull in the Cabinet meeting to bring them to accept the manifest need for maintaining permits as the only means by which,

apart from other reasons, control of the middlemen could be secured. On the other hand, Congress and Communists are loud in demanding a complete ban on export which would certainly pauperize the province. The general situation as I would see it is that in spite of the considerable damage done by the cyclone in the fortunately limited areas affected by the storm the favourable crop prospects over the greater part of the province have been fairly well maintained. In some of the storm affected places grain stocks are short and this shortage requires to be remedied by pushing in supplies urgently from other parts of the province. But that situation should, I hope, be temporary. Though the harvesting of winter rice is now nearly complete, threshing will take about another month. Thus the new crop has not yet really made its effect. The trouble as always comes from the unscrupulous middleman out for profits. Drastic action has been necessary in Cuttack to prevent the merchants from sitting on stocks urgently needed for local consumption.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *23 December 1942*

I am glad to think that your staying on for six months gives Brigadier Robert Law a little time in which to mature further! Indeed, if you could manage to hang on till 1945 it would enable him to attain his 90th birthday before going out. It was, as you surmised,[1] Dick Law who at one moment was thought of by Winston.

2. Phillips came to say good-bye to me two or three days ago. He told me his idea was, after some little stay in Delhi and making the acquaintance of your Executive, to go and see something of the self-governing provinces and their Ministries and, so far as possible, to avoid showing any anxiety to meet Congress or other political leaders at the outset, waiting rather to make their acquaintance in one way or another in the course of time. His whole attitude struck me as eminently sound and judicious and I think he ought to be really helpful to you and the kind of man whom you can be thoroughly frank with. It is true that, through Winant's introduction, he seems to have had a long talk with Krishna Menon since I saw him; but I don't suppose he could have refused to see him, as Menon seems to be, unfortunately, on rather close terms with Winant, and I dare say Phillips was able to size him up.

[Paras. 3 and 4, on relations between the army and the Burma civilian administration, omitted.]

5. I have been much concerned by your recent telegrams about the food situation. So many telegrams are passing backwards and forwards, while discussion is also going on with Leathers and the War Transport people, that I won't attempt to go into the problem now. But you will realise how serious the repercussion of so big a demand for the diversion of shipping to India may be on the one hand upon actual munitions production here, and on the other upon the situation in Turkey for instance, to whom the F.O. have been anxious to supply 150,000 tons of wheat and had all but definitely committed themselves when your telegrams began to come in. Judging by the use which the Congress people have made of the Midnapore disaster they are no doubt capable of doing their utmost to aggravate the food situation by encouraging hoarding on the one hand and on the other denouncing the Government for deliberately starving the people.

6. Miss Agatha Harrison came in to see me this morning, and asked me to send on to you the enclosed letter for Gandhi. I told her that I thought it extremely unlikely that you would see anything in the letter which would justify the Government of India from going back on the general rule laid down with regard to correspondence. I also added that, for one thing, Congress had put itself out of court and was not entitled to be consulted until it had definitely shown signs of a change of heart, and, for another, that in my opinion consultation with Gandhi would never in any case lead to practical results.

Enclosure to No. 294

Miss Harrison to the Marquess of Linlithgow

2 CRANBOURNE COURT, ALBERT BRIDGE ROAD, S.W.11,
21 December 1942

Dear Lord Linlithgow,
I venture to send you this letter that I have written to Mr. Gandhi. I realise that there are strictures placed on correspondence; in spite of this fact I hope that some way may be found for it to reach Mr.Gandhi.

Yours sincerely,
AGATHA HARRISON

2 CRANBOURNE COURT, ALBERT BRIDGE ROAD,
LONDON, S.W.11, *20 December 1942*

Dear Gandhiji,
A few weeks ago a batch of Indian papers arrived and it was possible to get *some* picture of what took place at Bombay and the events that followed. I spent a day going through these papers. During a sleepless night that followed, the

[1] See No. 233, para. 22.

strong conviction came to me that I must try and get a letter to you. Carl Heath encouraged me to do this; I consulted no one else. For three weeks I have pondered over the matter; here is the result. I send it in the faith that it will reach you.

* * * * * *[2]

I recall what you said to me when I came to Rajkot at the time of your Fast. You said you were glad I had come as I could help you to understand Mr. Gibson's mind. For by then, contact between you and the Resident had ceased.

I cannot come to you in this great crisis. If I could, I should want to ask you the same question as then: "What can be done *now*?" Also, to share with you the difficulties that face those of us who unceasingly try to find the answer.

We follow the efforts—at present unsuccessful—of Indian leaders to end the deadlock. We note the Viceroy's recent speech in Calcutta, and his statement about the Government's willingness to transfer Power under certain conditions. We are watching with expectancy Sir Tej Sapru's efforts to secure an All Parties' Conference. *But*—to secure any fundamental change it is clear that consultation will be necessary. At this point we are faced with the Government's answer in India and here when Rajaji asked for facilities to talk with you. The vicious circle is complete. How can it be cut?

You, with a full knowledge of all that transpired at your end—will reply "The answer is simple; it is for the Government to take the initiative". In the path of any initiative are many stumbling blocks. One—that lies in your power to deal with—is in regard to Civil Disobedience.

As soon as the terms of the Bombay Resolution[3] were cabled over, reaction was swift and relentless. Little attention was paid to the first part (some people did not even seem to realise that there was a first part). All attention was concentrated on the final paragraph and its grave implications in time of war. A tide, like a flood, set in; it circled mainly around you. It is impossible to describe those days—they were, and still are a nightmare to those who share your views on non-violence.

It was useless to argue that you never launched the campaign; to point out your avowed intention of taking no step until the reply from the Viceroy had been received; to cite what you had said in your speech, or to quote the strictures you had laid on your followers; to stress that all our letters from India prior to the arrests served to show that the last thing you wanted to do was to implement that final paragraph of the Resolution.

As each day passed, tension increased; the news of violent outbreaks accentuated the tension. Then came the publication of a document that detailed plans of instruction[4]—plans, that did not exclude violence. Fruitlessly one pointed out that such acts would never have your sanction—that you always repudiated them; that you could never have seen that document; that, were you free these tragedies would be halted. Back came the answer—"Mr. Gandhi knows

quite well from past experience what happens in his campaigns; he must have envisaged all this when the Resolution was passed; on former occasions, he has called off his movement when acts of violence occur. Why does he remain silent now?"

We seem to be caught in a hopeless circle. Is this to remain until the end of war? If so—then the situation may well be beyond remedy.

But over and above the immediate present lies the future. When war broke out you made a striking statement about the part you wanted India to play when the nations meet to settle the Peace terms. If things drift much longer—how can your dream come true?

In the last letter I received from you—you spoke of C. F. Andrews. I note too that in your serious speech at Bombay you had reference to him and his spirit. It is in that same spirit I write this letter. Political limits seem to have been reached. But you have always had an understanding of other possibilities that are "limitless". For this reason I bring this "circle" to you—Gandhiji.

AGATHA HARRISON

[2] These asterisks are reproduced from MSS. EUR. F. 125/11. [3] Vol. II, No. 470.
[4] Instructions for the mass movement issued by the Andhra Provincial Congress Committee (summarised in Vol. II, No. 407) were published in a Madras Government communiqué on 29 August.

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Sir T. Stewart (Bihar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/49

SECRET *23 December 1942*

No. 960 G.B.

5. The supply and price situation in this Province has become particularly acute in the past two weeks. Until the end of November, while we cannot claim that our price control machinery was by any means perfect, we had managed to exercise to a considerable extent that retarding force to which Your Excellency referred in your speech to the Associated Chambers. But when the price of rice in Bengal, just over our borders, shot up in the course of two weeks from Rs. 7–8 per maund to Rs. 15 and our eastern districts were permeated by rumours, probably false and put about of set purpose, of enormous purchases being made by Bengal, the Army and private speculators the situation became critical. New crop supplies which should now be coming in the market in considerable quantity are being withheld and I have most reluctantly been compelled to prohibit the export of any food-stuffs from Bihar except under permit. We have tried very loyally to support the Central Government's policy in regard

to restrictions on the movement of food-stuffs and we have so far refrained, in accordance with their wishes, from attempting to build up a "stock pile". I am still opposed to entering the market with a view to creating a Government reserve since by doing so we should only intensify the panic. I trust that something useful will emerge from the Food Conference which has just been held. By conviction I hold with Adam Smith but in a crisis like this I am prepared to accept 100% control. . . .

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Miss Mira Ben to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

DETENTION CAMP, AGA KHAN'S PALACE,
POONA, *Christmas Eve 1942*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

My only excuse for writing you this letter is the deep pain I feel, as one born of English parents, over the falsehoods, regarding Gandhiji and the Indian National Congress, which seem to have appeared in certain English papers without being officially contradicted.

Within the limits of the newspapers that reach me here, I have been watching the ever-growing volume of anti-Congress propaganda in the British Press. Of the various untruths that are being circulated, I want, in this letter, to deal with only one, namely, the assertion that Gandhiji and the Congress are pro-Japanese. For samples of such propaganda that has come to my notice I would refer you to the *Bombay Chronicle Weekly* of November 29th 1942, page 22, and to the *Hindu* (Dâk Ed) of December 19th, 1942, page 4, column 3.

Amongst the quotations and facsimilies given in the *Bombay Chronicle Weekly* is a photograph of the first page of the London *Daily Sketch* of August 5th, 1942, showing a full-page headline "*Gandhi's India–Jap Peace plan Exposed*", and lower down on the same page, a photograph of myself with the sub-heading, "*English Woman Gandhi's Jap Peace Envoy*". The *Punch* cartoons, of which facsimilies are also given, are, if possible, even more disgraceful. In the *Hindu* there is a protest by Shri K. M. Munshi from which it would appear that this libellous propaganda has spread even to the London *Daily Herald*.

Now the reason for my bringing this matter before you is that I have in my possession correspondence that passed between Gandhiji and myself, while I was in Orissa, *after* the April Meeting of the A.-I.C.C. at Allahabad, which proves, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that Gandhiji is cent per cent. anti-Japanese.

The correspondence, of which I enclose copies, consists of a Confidential Report with questionnaire, regarding the then anticipated Japanese invasion, which I sent to Gandhiji by special messenger from Orissa where he had deputed me for helping the Congress workers generally, especially as a Japanese attack on the East Coast was hourly expected. The Report which I have with me is the original draft written in my own hand. It is not dated or signed, as these things I affixed to the typewritten copy which was sent; but it must be just about 3 to 4 days previous to Gandhiji's reply, dated 31st May 1942, which he dictated to the late Shri Mahadev Desai, and forwarded to me at once by the returning special messenger. Of this I have the original in Shri Mahadev Desai's own handwriting, and signed "Bapu" by Gandhiji. The interview referred to in the first paragraph of the letter, was one I had on 25th May 1942 with Mr. Wood, then Chief Secretary to the Government of Orissa, at which Mr. Mansfield was also present.

Seeing that no God-fearing Ruler could, with any peace of mind, allow the above-mentioned slanderous propaganda on the part of his own people, against those whom he had rendered unable to reply, to continue unchecked, once he had had unchallengeable proof of its falsehood, I put trust in the belief that you will publish the enclosed correspondence, together with this covering letter and refute the assertions of these British journals.

I may add that, since I am personally acquainted with the members of the Working Committee and have freely discussed these matters with them, I can say with confidence that their feelings have been unequivocally anti-Japanese and anti-Fascist throughout.

Believe me,
Yours sincerely,
MIRA BEN

Enclosure 1 to No. 296

QUESTION OF INVASION AND OCCUPATION BY THE JAPANESE

We may take it that the Japanese will land somewhere along the Orissa coast. Probably there will be no bombing or firing at the time of landing, as there are no defence measures on the coast. From the coast they will advance rapidly across the flat, dry rice fields, where the only obstructions are rivers and ditches, now mostly dry and nowhere unfordable. As far as we are able to make out there will be no serious attempt to hold the Japanese advance until the hilly and wooded regions of the Orissa States are reached. The army of defence, whatever it is, is reported to be hidden in the jungle of those parts. It is likely to make a desperate attempt to defend the Jamshedpur road, but the chances of its being successful must be very small. That means we may expect a battle to be fought in the North-West of Orissa, after which the Japanese army will pass

on into Bihar. At that time the Japanese are not likely to be broadly distributed over the country, but concentrated on their lines of communication between the sea and their advancing army. The British administration will have previously disappeared from the scene.

The problem before us is: in the event of these things happening how are we to act?

The Japanese armies will rush over the fields and through the villages, not as avowed enemies of the population, but as chasers and destroyers of the British and American war effort. The population in its turn is vague in its feelings. The strongest feeling is fear and distrust of the British, which is growing day by day on account of the treatment they are receiving. Anything that is not British is therefore something welcome. Here is a funny example: The villagers in some parts say—"Oh, the aeroplanes that make a great noise are British, but there are silent planes also, and they are Mahatma planes". I think the only thing possible for these simple innocent people to learn is the attitude of neutrality, for it is, in reality, the only position which can be made logical to them. The British not only leave them to their fate without even instructing them in self-protection from bombing, &c., but they issue such orders as will, if obeyed, kill them before the day of battle comes. How then can they be ready enthusiastically to obstruct the Japanese who are chasing this detested *Raj*, especially when the Japanese are saying, "It is not *you* we have come to fight". But I have found the villagers ready to take up the position of neutrality. That is to say they would leave the Japanese to pass over their fields and villages, and try, as far as possible not to come in contact with them. They would hide their foodstuffs and money, and decline to serve the Japanese. But even that much resistance would be difficult to obtain in some parts, the dislike of the British *Raj* being so great, that anything anti-British will be welcomed with open arms. I feel we have got to try and gauge the maximum resistance which the average inhabitants may be expected to put up, *and maintain* and make that our definite stand. A steady, long-sustained stand, though not cent per cent. resistance, will be more effective in the long run, than a stiff stand which quickly breaks.

The maximum sustainable stand which we may expect from the average people is probably—

1. To resist firmly, and mostly non-violently, the commandeering by the Japanese of any land, houses or movable property.
2. To render no forced labour to the Japanese.
3. Not to take up any sort of administrative service under the Japanese. (This may be hard to control in connection with some types of city people, Government opportunists and Indians brought in from other parts.)
4. To buy nothing from the Japanese.

5. To refuse their currency and any effort on their part at setting up a *Raj*. (Lack of workers and lack of time make it very hard, but we have to strive to stem the tide.)

Now as to certain difficulties and questions which arise—

1. The Japanese may offer to pay for labour, food and materials in British currency notes. Should the people refuse to sell for good prices or work for a good wage? For long sustained resistance over many months it may be difficult to prevent this. So long as they refuse to buy or take "service" the exploitation danger is kept off.

2. What should be done about the re-building of bridges, canals, &c. which the British will have blown up? We shall also need the bridges and canals. Should we therefore set our hands to their re-building, even if it means working side by side with the Japanese, or should we retire on the approach of Japanese bridge-builders?

3. If Indian soldiers, who were taken prisoner in Singapore and in Burma, land with the Japanese invading army, what should be our attitude towards them? Should we treat them with the same aloofness as we are to show the Japanese, or should we not try to win them over to our way of thinking?

4. After the exodus (before the approaching Japanese) of the British *Raj*, what shall we do about currency?

5. After battles have been fought, and the Japanese armies will have advanced, the battlefields will be left strewn with dead and wounded. *I think we must unhesitatingly work side by side with the Japanese in burning and burying the dead and picking up and serving the wounded?* The Japanese are likely to attend to the lightly wounded of their own men, and take prisoner the lightly wounded of their enemy, but the rest would probably be left, and it will be our sacred duty to attend to them. For this we are from now planning the training of volunteers under the guidance of local doctors. Their services can also be used in case of internal disturbances, epidemics, &c.

6. Besides dead and wounded on the battlefield, a certain amount of rifles, revolvers and other small arms are likely to be left lying about unpicked up by the Japanese. If we do not make a point of collecting these things they are likely to fall into the hands of robbers, thieves and other bad characters, who always come down like hawks to loot a battlefield. In an unarmed country like India this would lead to much trouble. In the event of our collecting such arms and ammunition, what should we do with them? My instinct is to take them out to sea and drop them in the ocean. Please tell us what you advise.

Enclosure 2 to No. 296

Mr Gandhi to Miss Mira Ben

SEVAGRAM VIA WARDHA, C.P., *31 May 1942*

(Mira whom God may bless),
I have your very complete and illuminating letter. The report of the interview is perfect, your answers were straight, unequivocal and courageous. I have no criticism to make I can only say, "Go on as you are doing". I can quite clearly see that you have gone to the right place at the right time. I therefore need do nothing more than come straight to your questions which are all good and relevant.

1. I think we must tell the people what they should do. They will act according to their capacity. If we begin to judge their capacity and give directions accordingly our directions will be halting and even compromising which we should never do. You will therefore read my instructions in that light. Remember that our attitude is that of complete non-co-operation with Japanese army, therefore we may not help them in any way, nor may we profit by any dealings with them. Therefore we cannot sell anything to them. If people are not able to face the Japanese Army, they will do as armed soldiers do, i.e. retire when they are overwhelmed. And if they do so, the question of having any dealings with Japanese does not and should not arise. If however the people have not the courage to resist Japanese unto death and not the courage and capacity to evacuate the portion invaded by the Japanese, they will do the best they can in the light of instructions. One thing they should never do—to yield willing submission to the Japanese. That will be a cowardly act and unworthy of a freedom-loving people. They must not escape from one fire only to fall into another and probably more terrible. Their attitude therefore must always be of resistance to the Japanese. No question therefore arises of accepting British currency notes or Japanese coins. They will handle nothing from Japanese hands. So far as dealings with our own people are concerned they will either resort to barter or make use of such British currency that they have in the hope that the National Government that may take the place of British Government will take up from the people all the British currency in accordance with its capacity.

2. Question about co-operation in bridge building is covered by the above. There can be no question of this co-operation.

3. If Indian soldiers come in contact with our people we must fraternise with them if they are well disposed, and invite them, if they can, to join the nation. Probably they have been brought under promise that they will deliver the country from foreign yoke. There will be no foreign yoke, and they will be expected to befriend people and obey national Government that might have

been set up in place of British Government. If the British have retired in an orderly manner leaving things in Indian hands the whole thing can work splendidly and it might even be made difficult for Japanese to settle down in India or any part of it in peace, because they will have to deal with a population which will be sullen and resistant. It is difficult to say what can happen. It is enough if people are trained to cultivate the power of resistance no matter which power is operating—the Japanese or the British.

4. Covered by (1) above.

5. The occasion may not come but if it does, co-operation will be permissible and even necessary.

6. Your answer about the arms found on the wayside is most tempting and perfectly logical. It may be followed, but I would not rule out the idea of worthy people finding them and storing them in a safe place if they can. If it is impossible to store them and keep them from mischievous people yours is an ideal plan.

Love,
BAPU

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

IMMEDIATE *26 December 1942*

No. 3599–S. 1. Your telegram No. 21551[1] dated December 15/16th. Food.

Paragraph 2.—It is realised that the assistance for which we have been compelled to ask will entail serious and most unwelcome calls on shipping, but in view of the food situation in this country, as explained in our telegrams No. 9796[2] of December 9th and No. 10045[3] of December 17th, the most liberal and immediate help is absolutely essential.

Paragraph 3.—All possible steps will be taken by us to place maximum food supplies at disposal of Government. A Government purchasing agency for wheat is already established in the Punjab with the co-operation of Provincial Government and transactions with this agency have been exempted from the maximum price fixed for wheat. Similar agencies for purchase of staple foodgrains are to be set up in other Provinces as rapidly as possible. Drastic steps such as widespread requisitioning are, as explained in my telegram No. 9796, not likely to yield results comparable to the panic they would create. Rough systems of group rationing are already in force in many towns and arrangements

[1] No. 275. [2] No. 265. [3] No. 282; the date should be 18 December.

for extension of rationing are being made. This will not appreciably increase supplies and will be of value mainly as securing equitable distribution of the available stocks. There is already an acute shortage of wheat and a great though less acute shortage of other foodgrains in most of the big cities and the opinion has already been voiced by certain commercial associations and in the newspapers that the United Kingdom and U.S.A. which are sending food to North Africa, Iran and other places are under a greater obligation to come to the assistance of India.

Paragraph 4.—Commander-in-Chief is prepared to assist to extent of up to 30,000 tons of shipping capacity per month for three months from U.S.A. This assistance can be given only from any shipping space available in any month in excess of total figure basic minimum monthly tonnage ex-U.S.A. as indicated in telegram No. 21084-G[4] dated August 27th 1942. Form in which such assistance is visualised is to utilize any available shipping to provide earliest possible shipments from Australia, effect being correspondingly reflected later in shipments to India from U.S.A.

Paragraph 5 (*a*).—As we ourselves are short of supplies in respect of cereals and have a particularly large deficit in respect of rice of one million four hundred thousand tons and millets of 650 thousand tons we regret that it is not possible for us to guarantee maintenance of supplies to dependent markets even with the supply of wheat through U.K. Twelve thousand tons of rice a month are being supplied to Ceylon Government and we shall endeavour to continue this supply until alternative arrangements for Ceylon can be made say for a period of two months (January, February 1943). We will similarly continue such supply as we can spare for Arabia, &c., and for the same period.

(*b*) As the next wheat crop will not come on market till April and the only surplus reported as available is one hundred thousand tons in Punjab against 494 thousand tons of civil requirements and 200 thousand tons of military requirements less whatever quantity of the 105,000 tons arranged for from Australia for Army requirements can be secured in the period, the maximum possible quantity of wheat is required by us immediately during the next quarter.

(*c*) 16 vessels of the Scindia fleet and 1 of Mogul line constituting in all 65 per cent. of Indian registered ships are now on requisition. The remainder, though not under full control, are employed on services on which they would normally be employed if on requisition for commercial purposes, being engaged in the transport on the coast or to Red Sea Ports of military stores, relief crews and most essential civil supplies.

Paragraph 6.—Trade enquiries for wheat for India in world markets are not being made at our instigation or with our knowledge. We are prepared to give assuranec that enquiries will not be pursued through commercial channels.

Paragraph 7.—Any export embargo on rice will not extend to rice already purchased for Ceylon and other colonial Governments.

2. Replies to your telegram No. 21576[5] dated December 16th are as follows:—

Paragraph 1 (*a*).—In view of situation in India we cannot see how we can continue indefinitely any supply of cereals to Saudi Arabia and Aden and it is necessary that M.E.S.C. should assume entire responsibility for this.

(*b*) We cannot suggest any alternative arrangement for supplies to Arab tribes in Persian Gulf.

Paragraph 2.—We agree to continue present supplies for two months until new arrangements are made.

Paragraph 3.—It is not yet possible to form an estimate of the quantity of sugar we are likely to produce during this season but it seems that we shall not have any surplus production. We shall try to supply both Arab States and Saudi Arabia though we may have to cut down the supplies in proportion to the cuts imposed on Indian consumers.

[4] Not printed in Vol. II; but see No. 332 in this Volume. [5] The India Office file has been destroyed.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (42) 593

L/P&J/8/537: ff 41–2

India

Discussion in the Governor-General's Executive Council on the Indian Constitutional Position

memorandum by the secretary of state for india

india office, *28 December 1942*

During August last the Viceroy, having heard that certain of the Members of his Council were anxious to see further changes in the constitutional position in India, and were endeavouring to gain the support of all Members of the Council for certain proposals to this end, decided to invite a general discussion of these matters in the Council itself. At a series of special meetings the various Members gave their views, though the Viceroy was careful to make it clear that these matters were outside the legal authority of the Council.

Before very long I expect to bring before the War Cabinet the question whether further Indianisation of the Viceroy's Council is desirable, in connection with the appointment of a successor to Sir Reginald Maxwell, the

Home Member, who is due to retire in April. The views expressed in the recent discussion by Members of the Executive Council are relevant to the decision which will then have to be taken, and I therefore circulate a précis of them for the information of the War Cabinet.

L. S. A.

Enclosure to No. 298

PRÉCIS OF DISCUSSION IN THE VICEROY'S EXECUTIVE COUNCIL[1]

The Viceroy explained at the outset that the discussion was necessarily on an informal basis and without prejudice to existing constitutional arrangements, and then examined briefly and objectively the three directions in which he understood an advance to be desired—

(*a*) The complete Indianisation of his Council;
(*b*) The elimination or reduction of the powers of control and interference of the Secretary of State; and
(*c*) Mitigation of the purely official nature of the administration in the Section 93 Provinces. The general discussion was then opened.

Sir Reginald Maxwell (Home Member) pointed out the danger of taking short cuts in attempts to appease Congress. The Government of India could not be severed from Parliamentary control unless it could derive power from some new sovereign authority. A transfer of power in present circumstances would be unnecessary and rash, and he would be strongly opposed to any initiative in that direction being taken by the present Government. In the S. 93 Provinces he saw difficulties in minority ministries or in Executive Councils, but would be ready to agree to non-official advisers.

Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar (Member without Portfolio) agreed that for the duration of the war it was essential that the Secretary of State should be the final authority. On that postulate one must assume that no suggestion could be made that could satisfy Congress, or, indeed, the Moslem League, but nevertheless certain changes were desirable. He thought that S. 93 Provinces were losing confidence in the Governors and their advisers, who were cut off from public opinion, with the result that a difficult and dangerous position was arising. He would prefer to meet it by introducing Executive Councils composed of non-officials, even though that meant a reversion to the system operating 1909–20 under the Morley–Minto reforms. In the Centre, he felt that Government should bid more fully for the support of moderate opinions. There was growing criticism that, despite the expansion of the Council, Indian non-officials had failed to secure really substantial control. In his view, it was very desirable to introduce at once what was an inevitable change and give every Department to a non-official Indian member.

Sir Hormasji Mody (Member for Supply) agreed with Sir R. Mudaliar. The Council's position had been destroyed by the Cripps Mission, and it had been ignored in the constitutional discussions of last March and April. Complete Indianisation was the very least that was now expected. If nothing could now be done with Congress and the League, at least let Government try to placate the others. As for the S. 93 Provinces, the present system was archaic, autocratic and intolerable; the Provinces were subject to no control or supervision. He would like non-official Executive Councils, or else non-official advisers. As regards the Secretary of State's control, the direction of affairs should pass by convention or otherwise from the Secretary of State to the Government of India.

Sir Sultan Ahmed (Law Member) agreed with Sir R. Mudaliar's views. External Affairs, as well as Home and Finance, should be transferred to an Indian Member. Government in the S. 93 Provinces was a political scandal; he would like to see non-official Executive Councils introduced, or, failing them, non-official advisers with the powers of an irremovable executive.

Mr. Aney (Member for Indians Overseas) thought that Congress might reconsider their position if a real popular Government with real power were set up. The existence of the Secretary of State's powers was humiliating; could they not be transferred to the Viceroy? He would rather have India governed by an autocratic Viceroy than a distant and intangible Secretary of State. He favoured complete Indianisation of the Executive, and would even have an Indian non-official member by whose advice the Governor-General would be guided in the discretionary field. In the S. 93 Provinces he preferred minority ministries, with provision to rule out votes of confidence being moved by persons who were not prepared to take office.

Mr. Sarker (Commerce Member) agreed with Sir R. Mudaliar. Complete Indianisation of the Council was the very minimum. The Congress leaders had been put in jail by Indians; Indians alone really understood how to handle these matters. As regards the Secretary of State's control, he saw difficulty in the propositions put forward: if the Secretary of State were replaced by the Viceroy the members of Council would be advisers to the Viceroy, and not his colleagues. He saw that the Council must be responsible to someone acting on behalf of Parliament. In the S. 93 Provinces he favoured non-official advisers.

Sir Firoz Khan Noon (Defence Member) agreed in favouring non-official advisers in the S. 93 Provinces, but thought the possibilities of alternative ministries in certain Provinces (e.g. Bombay) had not been fully explored.

[1] The full account of this discussion which Lord Linlithgow gave Mr Amery in his letter 17-H.E./42 of 12 October 1942 is in L/P&J/8/537: ff 50–63. He had previously sent Mr Amery 'sketch notes' of his opening and closing remarks; see Vol. II, Nos. 554 and 666.

As for the Centre, he was opposed to further change without the assent of the two major communities or adequate safeguards. Muslim India was already aggrieved at having only three seats in a Council of fifteen. He was entirely opposed, from the minority point of view, to the removal of the Secretary of State's authority.

Sir Edward Benthall (Member for War Transport) saw no need for uniformity in the Provinces. As for the Centre, the essential thing was a strong Government for the prosecution of the war and for the transition period, to act as an anchor in the coming period of great uncertainty. A strong Government must be based on a final authority, which must be the Secretary of State and Parliament; there was no alternative, since there was no legislature to which the Government of India could be responsible without a change of the Act. Complete Indianisation would not really strengthen the Council and the effect would be very temporary and limited. The disappearance of the official members would mean the loss of experienced colleagues at a critical time. The wise course now was to build up the status and the prestige of Council for the war and the transitional period. He thought something could be done to strengthen the hands of the Governor-General in Council without any change in the Act; could the Secretary of State not say, consistently with his responsibility to Parliament, that he would ordinarily be guided by the Governor-General in Council?

Sir Mohammad Usman (Member for Posts and Air) preferred in the Provinces to add non-official to official advisers. As for the Centre, complete Indianisation would give no greater satisfaction than had the previous expansions. Any change in the Centre would be strongly resented by the Moslem League, and the effect on the police would be bad; it was particularly important not to antagonise Mr. Jinnah at a time when the Moslem League were, in fact, unofficially co-operating in the war effort. He was clear that consideration of constitutional questions must be left till after the war and no change of any sort made at present.

Dr. Ambedkar (Member for Labour) was opposed to any change unless it was in accordance with the Declaration of August 1940[2] (providing for consultation with important minorities). Subject to that, he was in favour of change, since what was needed was a strong Government, i.e. one with public opinion behind it. In the Provinces, ministerial government was best, even if merely a minority ministry. An Executive Council would be better than advisers. As for the Centre, Indianisation by itself would not placate Congress and might merely irritate them; and were non-Congress elements worth placating? Before Indianisation took place the communal composition of the Council must be settled, and that by Indians themselves. Congress had shirked this problem; they had not the will to solve it. His suggestion was to take the Cripps pro-

posals as a basis and try for a national Government composed of Congress, the Moslem League, Depressed Classes, Sikhs and Christians. The Indian members of Council ought to sit down and prepare a scheme for communal representation. Though he preferred an autocratic Viceroy to a distant Secretary of State, he would not press for interference with the Secretary of State's powers.

Sir Jwala Prasad Srivastava (Member for Civil Defence) said that constitutional change was necessary because of the universal desire for some major political advance. We might have stayed where we were had His Majesty's Government held to the line that no constitutional change was feasible during the war. The whole trouble arose from the Cripps offer. Why should we refuse to implement it because the two major parties would not co-operate? Congress and the League never had accepted anything offered by His Majesty's Government and never would; neither would face the unpopularity of conducting government in war time. Public opinion would be satisfied, especially after subsidence of the present bitterness, with the immediate introduction of the changes proposed by Sir R. Mudaliar. But it must be left to the Governor-General to work out the communal proportions. As regards the S. 93 Provinces, he favoured Executive Councils.

Sir Jogendra Singh (Member for Education, Health and Lands) was weary of hearing of Moslem League and Congress, the Depressed Classes and the Sikhs. We must keep faith with the army and the fighting men. The right course would be for the Secretary of State to transfer all power to the present Government of India and the Governor-General; he was in favour thereupon of implementing the federal sections of the 1935 Act, less those clauses repugnant to self-government. As for the Provinces, he preferred Executive Councils.

The Commander-in-Chief doubted the value of further changes on Indian opinion as affecting the conduct of the war; he was not in favour of any change. In the Provinces, uniformity was not essential; practically the order of preference might be non-official advisers, Executive Councils, ministerial governments, the reverse of the ideal order of desirability.

Sir Jeremy Raisman (Finance Member) wished to get on with the job of winning the war; further changes in the Council would have an unsettling effect. Failing a thorough-going political settlement the present Government must remain within the terms of the Act and responsible to Parliament. In the circumstances what advantage was there in pretending to be a national government? The transfer of the powers of the Secretary of State would solve no problems. As for the Provinces, he would favour a combination of official and non-official advisers. Executive Councils would be a retrograde step and the arguments against minority ministries were very strong.

[2] Vol. I, Appendix I.

The *Viceroy* summed up the discussion and made the following points.

He was proud of the Council as it stands; it is the strongest Government that India has had.

The reference to minorities showed that no one imagined that the balance of communal or minority representation in a provisional wartime Government was not going to affect the extent of representation accorded to the communities in the permanent post-war settlement. But this is the most vital and controversial of all the difficult problems that the constitution-making body will have to solve. It ought not, and cannot, be settled while hostilities continue, and the attempt to solve it now would only exacerbate communal difficulties and prejudice the post-war settlement.

One consequence of the Cripps Mission was to reduce the stature of the Council; but the hurt was largely temporary. The prestige of the Council in India and abroad stands high.

The basic principle that until the Indian executive can draw its ultimate authority from an Indian Parliament it must derive its ultimate authority from the British Parliament, is not, and cannot be, successfully challenged.

The extent of the Secretary of State's alleged interference with the Government of India is greatly misrepresented.

The Indianisation of the Home and Finance portfolios would not have the slightest effect on Congress or the Moslem League; and it would soon be discounted and lead to an attack on the Governor-General's veto. It would raise, too, the communal issue, particularly over the appointment of the Home Member. Complete Indianisation would necessitate an amendment of the Act if it means the appointment of only non-official Indians, and Parliament would be very critical of the proposal.

There are special objections, partly arising out of the communal issue, to the appointment of a Member for External Affairs.

As for the S. 93 Provinces, it is improbable that either minority ministries or Council government would be easy, comfortable, or in the long run beneficial; and Parliament would be reluctant to sanction the retrograde step of introducing Executive Council government. S. 93 administration is provisional and has the saving grace that everyone is anxious to end it. The most practical expedient was probably that of non-official advisers; and the authorities primarily concerned in this respect were the Governors themselves.

At the end of the discussion Sir Hormasji Mody asked that the Secretary of State might be told that quite half the Council had been in favour of Indianisation and elimination of the official element in the Council; and also that they felt strongly that neither expansion had resulted in the transfer of some of the most important portfolios. The Viceroy undertook to communicate the views of his colleagues to the Secretary of State.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PERSONAL VICEROY'S CAMP, DEHRA DUN, *28 December 1942*

Many thanks for your letter of 4th December[1] which has just reached me at Dehra Dun, to which I have come out for a week's change. I have had little time yet to consider it, and may comment at greater length later. But there are one or two points with which I might deal at once.

2. As for Auchinleck, as you will have gathered from the telegram[2] from me and from copies of correspondence[3] sent last week, he is quite happy to carry on as before, and wait and see what turns up. I will turn over in my mind what you say about the possibility of using him in connection with any Indianisation enquiry. But my judgment at this stage would be that whoever examines this problem from the military angle would have either to be appointed by His Majesty's Government *or* be subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief in India. Auchinleck, as an unexpired Commander-in-Chief, would I fear be in a very difficult position *vis-à-vis* of Wavell, and I can see possibilities in any event of some embarrassments even were he appointed by His Majesty's Government. I do not in these circumstances think the scheme would work, and while I will consider it further, I doubt my being able in the outcome to advise you differently.

3. Baldwin seems to me a very good man with a distinguished record, and is easy to work with as we have found all the Air Force people out here. I agree with you as to the importance of the R.A.F. inspectorate proposal which you mention in paragraph 5 of your letter, and I need not say that we are at one as to the future importance of the air in defence.

4. I have been interested in what you say in paragraphs 5 and 6[4] of your letter about these ideas of Cripps. But I fear that social and economic reform in this country is never going to divert people's minds from political changes; while any financial contribution by His Majesty's Government which could hope to make the slightest difference would have to be on an immense scale. I should have thought myself that Mudaliar had made the general objections to this sort of business pretty clear, and while I cannot prevent Owen working out his bright ideas for Cripps' benefit I would not like you to think that unless the United Kingdom tax-payer foots the bill, or even then, they are likely to have a very long life out here. In any case, any scheme must come before my Government; and if (which I hope will not be the case) there is any likelihood of these ideas being pressed, I think it would be well if I had early advance information so that I could consider with them (or with the individual

[1] No. 251. [2 and 3] Not printed. [4] This should read '6 and 7'.

Members most directly concerned) our attitude towards them. I would suggest that Grigg's experience and familiarity with this problem, from both ends, might be very valuable to whoever is examining it. Let me only add that I quite agree with you as to the objections to anything in the nature of detailed or specific instructions to my successor to take a particular line in these matters, either at the Centre or in the Section 93 Provinces, while as you point out such instructions could only be framed after consultation with my Government. I should be very surprised if whoever does succeed me is not fully alive himself to the importance of making as much progress as practicable: but if my own experience is any test, he will find also that the difficulties are a good deal greater than one might have expected.

5. I shall be interested to hear what happens to the scheme for an Indian centre in London, though I am, I fear, profoundly sceptical as to anything of this nature making any difference that matters to relations with India.

6. I am so glad that you have formed this good impression of Azizul Haque. As it happens he has been much in my mind lately in connection with possible reshuffles in the event of Maxwell handing over in the spring and of my choosing Usman to succeed him; and while I cannot yet say what proposals I shall be making to you, I am glad to know that Aziz himself would be not reluctant, should the circumstances arise, to consider returning to India even after so short a time as High Commissioner. The above for your own eye only at this stage, for I have a very difficult series of moves to consider, and of course the return of Azizul Haque to India would mean that we shall have to find a new High Commissioner, who this time will clearly have to be a Hindu.

7. You mention Spens' appointment in paragraphs 12 to 15 of your letter. And I for my part am extremely sorry that *you* should have had so much trouble! The fact is that Gwyer has shown a somewhat surprising degree of pique over the whole business; and while I was seriously uneasy in the light of what he said lest the appointment should have a bad reception, given the possibility that Gwyer might indiscreetly comment adversely on Spens to some of his Indian friends, it was a real relief to me to find that (apart from a little gossip on the first day which was reproduced by Holburn in his message to the *Times*) no notice whatever has been taken of it. I am also relieved that Zafrulla should have taken it so well. I am sure from what you say that Spens will do us very well. I doubt very much if it would in fact have made any difference to Gwyer's attitude if we *had* consulted him earlier—it might indeed have placed us at a disadvantage since he would have been in a stronger position to raise objections.

* * *

10. There is nothing much doing in the political field. I send you by this bag copy of today's weekly article from the *Statesman* which reflects Muslim

opinion in that paper. I do not know who the writer is, but he is sufficiently well seen by Jinnah's party for his articles to be reproduced in *Dawn*. In any case the present article is an extremely good statement of the Muslim point of view and contains some pretty shrewd hits at the Non-Parties conference and the like, and you may be amused to see it.

11. The real tragedy of the last couple of days has been the sudden death of Sikander. He had his faults, as you and I well know. He was rather a difficult person to rely on in a really tight corner, and on more than one occasion he had caused me serious embarrassment. But he had a really remarkable record of achievement, and his services both to the Punjab and to India were very great indeed; while I had always felt even when one was rather provoked by some defection or the like on his part, that he had an extremely difficult hand to play in the Punjab and that was the most probable explanation of his apparent weakness. He has with great skill for a number of years kept together a delicate political mosaic and I am by no means easy as I write at the thought of what may happen, for Sikander was well known to be very non-communal in temper and outlook, and he had conciliated a far greater degree of general support in that most important Province than anyone whom I can think of as a possible successor is likely to manage to do. I cannot yet judge how the succession is likely to go. If a Hindu were the answer, Chhotu Ram is a tough if somewhat combative character. But there may be very strong pressure from the Muslim elements to retain this as a "Muslim" Province, and there is the possibility no doubt in that event that I might be asked to make Firoz Khan Noon available, which would be a bore from the point of view of my Council, where I am certain that he would be likely to be more useful than as Premier of the Punjab. But it is idle to speculate about these things at this stage.

* * *

13. Looking through my correspondence I do not seem to have sent you any answer to your letter of 17th November.[5] I quite agree with what you say in paragraph 3 about the danger of sending out Cripps at a time when the Japanese were on us hard and when our stock was sinking, and I said so at the time, as you will see from one of my U telegrams to Winston. If the Cabinet had only taken the advice which you and I had given them last January, we should have had in many ways a much easier situation, though in fairness to Cripps and to the Cabinet, I do always feel bound to say that the value from the American point of view and from that of Left Wing opinion at home of his visit with these extensive proposals, and of their rejection by various Indian parties, has been considerable.

14. I will certainly give your message to Holburn. He has been most useful, and I am in close touch with him.

[5] No. 194.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/PO/8/6: f 4

29 December 1942

48–U. Your private letter of 4th December[1] (corrupt groups). The net seems to have been cast pretty wide! Lumley comes to stay with me on January 8th. I have no doubt I can, without in the least degree committing anyone, ascertain what his reactions would be. But there is a great difference between Viceroyalty after 6 months' leave and additional 6 months in Bombay to meet Dill's convenience and in any case (?Lumley's) sense of public (?duty) is high and I would hope (two corrupt groups).[2]

[1] No. 250.

[2] Mr Amery replied in telegram 44–U of 2 January 1943 as follows: 'Your 48–U. After consulting Prime Minister I wrote further on 21st December asking you to explain situation informally to Lumley. Following is essential part of that letter in case it is not received by 8th January. *Begins* [*There follow the second and third paras. of No. 287*]. *Ends.*' L/PO/8/6: f 2.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *29 December 1942*

The Jam Saheb has again been staying the week-end with us and that has given me an opportunity for a quiet talk. I have strongly stressed with him the necessity for dealing with the problem of the minor and unfit States, by pooling arrangements, whether among themselves or by attachment to major States, or even, in the last resort, in the case of small States with no geographical or other affiliations, by being bought out and absorbed into the neighbouring Province. He said that he was entirely in agreement with that policy as essential for the major States themselves and was anxious to use his influence to whatever extent he could in helping you forward that policy. But it was not at all easy to press the matter too far with his fellow-Rulers, especially as his Deputy Chancellor was unhelpful in this matter. I had already talked with him before about the desirability of progress in the major States, by no means necessarily on British lines, and will do so more definitely as soon as the Cabinet have approved of your letter to him which I hope they may do this week.

2. I also asked him about the Committee of the Chamber which is discussing the future constitutional situation, and whether it was studying the problem from the point of view of the best constitution for India as a whole, or mainly from that of the Princes. He admitted that it was perhaps more the latter, but added that he wished to make it the former and had suggested to you the possibility of their getting in touch with political leaders over the question, but that you had thought the time not quite ripe for that.[1] I told him that I agreed with you on that point, because I felt that the really important thing for them was to have the problem fully studied in the light of constitutions elsewhere as well as of India, though from the point of view of India as a whole, and to have a fairly clear idea of their own solution, so that at the appropriate moment they could enter upon discussions, knowing what they wanted and exercising a dominating influence in virtue of their knowledge and preparation. I thought that as a preparatory in that process of study they might perhaps make use of British-Indians like Reddy, outside active politics, who had really given some thought to the problem. I told him something about the case of South Africa, where not only the Union itself, but the particular constitutional form of it, had been entirely due to the fact that a few men like Curtis and Lothian had worked away at the subject from every angle and had progressively convinced Smuts and other leaders, British and Dutch, of their particular solution.

I do not recall this. Have we letters or a note?

L.

3. If the Princes would take that trouble and really work out a constitutional solution of the problem, they might take a lead in the whole business far more effectively than we can, or than can be taken either by extremist party leaders or by mugwumps of the Sapru type, and I am all for their taking that lead provided that they really take the trouble to equip themselves properly for the task by previous study.

4. In this connection the Jam Saheb also expressed to me a little alarm at what may be read into your Calcutta speech, namely that you were in favour of going back to the actual scheme of 1935. I pointed out to him that all that your speech insisted upon was the necessity for some kind of federal union for India. I added that in my opinion a close examination of any project for retaining India as one in its relations to the outside world would probably not in fact depart very greatly from the 1935 scheme, so far as the allocation of powers was concerned, though it might stipulate for the concurrent powers being mostly allocated to the Provinces and States and that these should have the residuary powers and, like the Australian States, claim sovereignty within the sphere of their powers. Where I felt the real objection to the 1935 scheme

[1] See Vol. II, Nos. 242 and 338.

came both from the Muslims and from the States was not so much in the division of powers as in the exercise of the central powers by a party government subject to a majority in the Legislature and, in fact, to a party caucus outside, and that some form of government would have to be found in which the Executive would be definitely independent of the Legislature, at any rate to the extent that the Viceroy is at present, or the President in the United States, and in which the Executive would be so constituted as to be outside party control. I suggested, as a possible solution, for instance, a permanent Executive nominated one by each Provincial Government and a certain number by groups of States, with a six years' individual tenure of office, one-third retiring every two years. Something of that sort would give a strong Executive whose members would stand fairly definitely for the rights of the units against centralisation and would be unaffected by day-to-day party influences.

5. I had a telegram[2] the other day from Malcolm MacDonald to say that all our team in Canada had done admirably and created the very best impression. On top of that I have just had a personal telegram[3] from Mackenzie King to say that Mudaliar's address over the radio and his speech to the Canadian Club at Ottawa were well delivered, and most helpful. He adds that his presentation of the situation in India was exceptionally good, fair and just to all concerned, and most convincing in its appeal. He goes on to say that "I personally much enjoyed the talk I had with him and feel certain that what he has in mind by way of immediate steps in personnel of Indian Government would meet with hearty approval throughout Canada and also in the United States." That of course refers to further Indianisation of the Council on which Mudaliar evidently talked very freely to Mackenzie King. How far he has gone in that direction at the confidential meetings of the Quebec Conference or in his public utterances I cannot say.

6. It all of course has a bearing on the immediate question of the succession to Maxwell on which we have been exchanging telegrams. As I pointed out, the change to an Indian in that particular instance gives me a good ground of defence in the House against immediate Indianisation of all posts and also enables you at your end to get in an extra Muslim without actually precipitating the issue of communal proportions. The death of Sikander may of course also affect the situation in your Executive if it means that Noon becomes Provincial Premier. I don't know enough about the Punjab situation to judge whether there is anyone else in the field who could hold the position there as well as Noon could. On the other hand, I imagine you would find it very difficult to spare him.

7. Since dictating the above I have seen Halifax's telegram to you of December 17th[4] dealing with Mudaliar's doings at the Quebec Conference.

Personally I am not very much worried about that. He no doubt had to suggest something to show that he was not a mere standpatter, and it is all to the good that Americans should be a bit "bewildered" by discovering that there are other points of view than that of Congress and other solutions besides the elementary one of being kicked out of India by Gandhi. I would certainly agree entirely with your criticism of any suggestion of turning the Executive into a constitution-studying body enlarged by political and other outsiders, and I cannot in fact imagine anything of the sort coming off. On the other hand, I do feel still the importance of somebody producing concrete material and thinking on the constitutional problem, and if you think it undesirable that the initiative in appointing any sort of study-committee or commission should come from the Executive, that seems to me to reinforce the view that the initiative might advantageously come from the Princes. I am not without hope, too, that Coupland's third volume, when it does appear, which now is not likely to be before the spring, will also help to set people thinking. The second volume, of which I have seen the proofs, should be out pretty soon and gives a very good picture of the course of political developments since 1935.

Pray for Him!

L.

8. Azizul Haque has just been in and tells me that he hopes to have completed his study of the very unsatisfactory Indian student question here in the next few weeks and that he would like to go on leave some time in February with a view more particularly to talking that question over with University Vice-Chancellors as well as generally to refresh himself with the Indian situation before coming back here. I am all for a High Commissioner keeping in frequent touch with India, whether his appointment is long or short, and in normal times I am not sure that a Viceroy ought not to come home every second year, the Secretary of State going out on alternate years, so that the thing would become entirely normal and not open to any comment as portending some

2 and 3 Not printed.

4 See No. 76, note 2 and No. 217, note 1. Tel. 332 from Lord Halifax to External Affairs Department, New Delhi (repeated to Foreign Office No. 6111) transmitting a message from the Secretary to the Indian group to Mr Caroe. This reported that there was reason to believe that some members of I.P.R. secretariat and of certain delegations had planned to manipulate the Conference for a pro-Congress demonstration. This was thwarted by Sir R. Mudaliar who analysed the impediments to talks with Congress and turned the discussion from criticism of British policy to discussion of the following proposals: (*a*) complete Indianisation of Executive Council, (*b*) constitution of Council plus members nominated by political parties as exploratory constitutional commission, (*c*) foreign experts, e.g. Americans, Chinese, Canadians, Australians and British to advise this commission. Sir R. Mudaliar felt that 'by offering some token conciliation to the demand for intervention by the United Nations the sting would be taken out of American agitation' and 'the suggestion for drastic and dangerous changes in the Government of India during the war' averted. 'His proposal was received with sufficient favour to break up the critical front and has left Americans in complete bewilderment.' See also No. 354. L/I/1/1090: f 122.

startling constitutional development. However, that will not take place in the time of either of us. Meanwhile, to return to Azizul Haque, I believe you will get better value out of him in India now that he has had his mind, naturally receptive, broadened by a year's contact with this country and its problems. That would at any rate give you another Muslim. For the further one, if you have to spare Firoz Khan to the Punjab, you may possibly be obliged to bring back Zafrullah? I notice in your letter of the 8th,[5] just received, that there is an impression that his heart is still more in politics than in the law.

Thank goodness for small mercies!
L.

9. I am glad to learn that the weary Titan, in spite of the immense load on his shoulders, can still bring up his gun quickly enough to slay his duck at the rate of three a minute. The only thing not quite clear from your note is, when you say that you flew back to Delhi, whether you didn't do that with your own wings or had to condescend to be carried by a machine!

[5] No. 263.

302

Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/56

CONFIDENTIAL GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, *30 December 1942*

REPORT NO. 116

My dear Linlithgow,

This report covers the month of December.

1. *General Situation.*—The food crisis overshadows all other events, and is causing the most acute anxiety both to my Government and the public. The place which it occupies in the public mind was exemplified at a recent meeting of the Provincial War Committee. The discussion which followed the opening statement was confined almost entirely to the food situation, only a little attention being given to the disturbances in the Province, and none at all to the war. So far as the civil disobedience movement is concerned, several serious incidents have marred what would otherwise have been an improved month. It is, I think, an accurate appreciation of the position to say that the movement has ceased to be a public movement, and has become a criminal movement, which is being carried on by a number of gangs and underground organisations.

2. *Food.*—I have kept you in touch with the position in this Province, and our representatives attended the Conference at Delhi held in the middle of the month. Our position remains extremely serious. There is now wheat for a few days only in Bombay, and in Poona all the bakeries are likely to close down, due to a lack of wheat, in a day or two. Supplies of other cereals in Bombay City will last for a few weeks longer, but they are dwindling, and we have to send from our stocks sufficient to keep the Districts of Bijapur and Sholapur from starvation. Bijapur has an almost complete famine, and faces the most serious position. Up till now, nothing at all of the 50,000 tons of cereals allotted to us has reached this Province, but I am hopeful that a good proportion of it will come in during the next fortnight from the Punjab and Sind. We have, however, been disappointed so often in the promises made to us that, until the food actually arrives in Bombay, I cannot feel certain about it. There is already some reluctance on the part of the Central Provinces to let us have the 15,000 tons which they were to give us, and I understand that there is pressure from public opinion in that Province to stop exports. The same thing appears to be occurring in Hyderabad, where certain small supplies which the State Government had purchased for us were prevented from moving. It is this anxiety, that public opinion in other Provinces and States should be effective in preventing the despatch of supplies, that causes me to remain extremely doubtful about the position until supplies actually reach us.

I do not wish to be alarmist, but I must not disguise the extreme seriousness of the position. We are reviewing this week the state of our stocks of food, and in a few days will make a further representation to the Commerce Department based on that review. The best that I can hope for is that, if we receive the 50,000 tons promised to us, we shall last till the end of February, but that hope is not yet certain, and there is a very real danger that we shall not be able to feed the population of Bombay City, and may have to advise large sections of the population to leave the City and distribute themselves over the country Districts. That ought to be avoided at all costs, but it is a contingency which may become unavoidable. I will keep you informed of the position which, I must repeat, is very serious.

303

War Cabinet W.M. (42) 174th Conclusions, Minute 1

R/30/1/3: ff 54–5

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 30 December 1942 at 12.30 pm were: Mr Churchill (in the Chair), Mr Attlee, Mr Anthony Eden, Sir John Anderson, Mr Ernest Bevin, Mr Oliver Lyttelton, Mr Herbert Morrison

Also present during discussion of item 1 were: Viscount Simon, Viscount Cranborne, Mr Amery, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Sir Stafford Cripps

INDIA

Request by Chamber of Princes for Statement of Policy by His Majesty's Government.

(Previous Reference: W.M. (42) 132nd Conclusions, Minute 2)[1]

At their meeting on the 6th October, the War Cabinet had agreed that the Viceroy should be given an opportunity of commenting on the draft of the assurance which it was proposed to give to the Chamber of Princes.

The War Cabinet now had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (42) 610)[2] covering an exchange of telegrams with the Viceroy. The latter still held the view that, in place of a short statement designed for publication, it would be preferable to send a longer explanation in the form of a private letter from his Political Secretary to the Pro-Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA said that, since this question was last discussed by the War Cabinet, he had taken advantage of a Parliamentary Question by Mr. W. W. Astor, M.P., on the 3rd December to make a public declaration to the effect that the obligations of His Majesty's Government, by treaty or otherwise, towards the Indian States remained unaffected by the negotiations conducted by Sir Stafford Cripps during the course of his Mission to India. (The text of the Question and Answer were reproduced in Annexure "C" of his Memorandum.) The need for a public declaration on this point having thus been met, he saw no reason to dissent from the view taken by the Viceroy; and he therefore recommended that the further explanations and assurances desired by the Chamber of Princes should be given in a private letter on the lines of the Viceroy's draft.

It was agreed that, in the changed circumstances, the matter could appropriately be dealt with on these lines. It would, however, be necessary that the private letter should be linked up with the public statement made by the Secretary of State for India in the House of Commons; and further, that the letter should be an expression of the Viceroy's views and should not purport to be an expression of the policy of His Majesty's Government.

"A" Thus paragraph 1 of the Viceroy's draft should include a reference to the statement by the Secretary of State for India, and should omit the concluding words: "and to make it clear at the outset that the terms of this letter have been expressly authorised by His Majesty's Government".

The War Cabinet:—

Invited the Secretary of State for India to authorise the Viceroy to arrange for a letter to be sent to the Pro-Chancellor of the Chamber of Princes on

the lines of the draft set out in his telegram No. 3500–P dated the 14th December, subject to amendments designed to meet the points mentioned at "A" above.

[1] No. 72. [2] No. 290.

304

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/23

31 December 1942

No. 22572. Every possible good wish for 1943 and for a triumphant romp home over the last lap.

305

Mr Gandhi to the Marquess of Linlithgow[1]

MSS. EUR. F. 125/124

PERSONAL DETENTION CAMP, *New Year's Eve 1942*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

This is a very personal letter. Contrary to the biblical injunction, I have allowed many suns to set on a quarrel I have harboured against you, but I must not allow the old year to expire without disburdening myself of what is rankling in my breast against you. I had thought we were friends and should still love to think so. However what has happened since the 9th of August last makes me wonder whether you still regard me as a friend. I have perhaps not come in such close touch with any other occupant of your *Gadi* as with you.

Your arrest of me, the communiqué you issued thereafter, your reply to Rajaji and the reasons given therefor, Mr. Amery's attack on me and much else I can catalogue go to show that at some stage or other you must have suspected my *bona fides*. Mention of other Congressmen in the same connection is by the way. I seem to be the *fons et origo* of all the evil imputed to the Congress. If I have not ceased to be your friend why did you not, before taking drastic action, send for me, tell me of your suspicions and make yourself sure of your facts? I am quite capable of seeing myself as others see me, but in this case I have failed hopelessly. I find that all the statements made about me in Government quarters in this connection contain palpable departures from truth, I have so

[1] Lord Linlithgow transmitted the text of this letter to Mr Amery in telegram 22–S.C. of 3 January 1943. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

much fallen from grace that I could not establish contact with a dying friend; I mean Prof. Bhansali who is fasting in regard to the Chimur affair,[2] and I am expected to condemn the so-called violence of some people reputed to be Congressmen, although I have no data for such condemnation save the heavily censored reports of newspapers. I must own that I thoroughly distrust these reports. I could write much more but I must not lengthen my tale of woe. I am sure that what I have said is enough to enable you to fill in details.

You know I returned to India from South Africa at the end of 1914 with a mission which came to me in 1906, namely, to spread truth and non-violence among mankind in the place of violence and falsehood in all walks of life. The law of *Satyagraha* knows no defeat. Prison is one of the many ways of spreading the message, but it has its limits. You have placed me in a palace where every reasonable creature comfort is ensured. I have freely partaken of the latter purely as a matter of duty, never as a pleasure, in the hope that some day those that have the power will realise that they have wronged innocent men. I had given myself six months. The period is drawing to a close, so is my patience. The law of *Satyagraha* as I know it prescribes a remedy in such moments of trial. In a sentence it is "crucify the flesh by fasting". That same law forbids its use except as a last resort. I do not want to use it if I can avoid it. This is the way to avoid it, convince me of my error or errors and I shall make ample amends. You can send for me or send someone who knows your mind and can carry conviction. There are many other ways if you have the will. May I expect an early reply? May the New Year bring peace to us all.

I am,

Your sincere friend,

M. K. GANDHI

[2] Professor Bhansali's fast, begun at Wardha on or about 12 November, was to put pressure on Government to order a public enquiry into alleged outrages (including allegations of rape) by British and Indian troops and policemen at the village of Chimur. These allegations followed the murder of a magistrate and a policeman at Chimur. The Central Provinces Government were satisfied that they were false and, to support the claim that statements by the villagers did not justify the presumption of truth, cited the comments on the quality of their evidence of the special judge and reviewing judge for the trials of certain of the villagers for murder and arson. L/P&J/8/611.

306

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/11

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *31 December 1942*

The long deferred question of the answer to the Princes came up yesterday.[1] I briefly stated the case and there was universal assent. Then suddenly Winston

said that he saw no necessity for any answer to the Princes beyond the answer I had given in the House. So the discussion was resumed, and, although I convinced him that some answer would have to be given, the result was the insistence on the insertion of a reference to my Parliamentary answer and the excision of the sentence laying stress on the letter as being expressly authorised by the War Cabinet. This last is, in fact, a matter only of emphasis. For obviously a reply which has been submitted to the War Cabinet, and indeed discussed with them over months, cannot be otherwise than expressly authorised by them. It does not of course make any difference to the sense in which I shall have my further talk with the Jam Saheb.

2. I have just despatched a further telegram[2] to you about the Jam Saheb's visit to America, taking advantage of a hint in your last telegram that you would welcome a suggestion as to the line to be taken in your telegram to Halifax. I hope that will meet with your views.

[Para. 3, on the commendation of the Indian Tea Association in General Wood's report on evacuation of refugees from Burma, omitted.]

4. In view of all the attacks in America and elsewhere on the British Empire, you may possibly care to read the enclosed copy[3] of the Christmas Bulletin of the Empire Industries Association, which I wrote for them the other day. It was originally somewhat more strongly worded, but toned down in deference to Anthony Eden, who lives in terror of anything that could conceivably offend a single American.

[Para. 5, on Kowloon, omitted.]

6. In the last war there was a Cabinet Committee, of which I was Secretary, which considered the possibility of post-war exchanges of territory with France which might get rid of such anomalies as Chandernagore and concentrate all the French colonies in India in one spot, or even buy them out altogether. We had worked out some very satisfactory exchanges, but when the Foreign Office approached the matter after the war they found the French very unwilling to discuss matters and the whole idea was dropped. I should imagine that after this war France might be much more amenable to reason in this matter. If you think it worth raising again it might not be a bad thing if you sent me a letter or a telegram which I could submit to Cabinet and thus afford a pretext for reviving the report of the old Committee and perhaps getting something done this time.

Foreign Sec. may dig out this old chestnut & speak, or let me have a note.

L.

[1] No. 303. [2] and [3] Not printed.

307

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *1 January 1943*

No. 9–S.C. Your No. 22572.[1] Many thanks. Our best wishes for the New Year. I will be as frolicsome as you please so long as you don't again move the winning post!

[1] No. 304.

308

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Churchill (via India Office)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *1 January 1943*[1]

PERSONAL

No. 11–S.C. Following for Prime Minister. I have telegraphed[2] to Amery at some length on your telegram[3] to Dominion Prime Ministers about future colonial policy. I fear you may think much of what I say heretical. But while I know that you can carry this through, and that Roosevelt while he is there will probably co-operate quite admirably with us, what I fear is the remoter future. A weak Prime Minister here and an indifferent, hostile or electioneering President in the United States might put us badly at a disadvantage. This is only indirectly my responsibility, since India is hardly affected.[4] But from the Empire point of view, I would very strongly urge the considerations set out in my telegram to Amery which I hope despite its length you will do me the favour of perusing.

[1] L/PO/5/42 gives the date as 2 January. [2] No. 310. [3] No. 271.
[4] Deciphered as 'vulnerable'.

309

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/13/998: ff 228–9

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *2 January 1943, 12.20 am*

64. Your telegram of 14th December 3499–P.[1] Cabinet have now considered draft private letter to Pro-Chancellor proposed in your 3500–P[2] and they

approve its issue subject to following changes which are considered necessary in the light of my public statement on 3rd December in reply to Astor's question regarding validity of treaties etc. which Cabinet consider sufficient formal indication of H.M.G.'s policy. Texts of question and answer were given in my personal telegram 26 November 20393.[3]

2. (1) In paragraph 1 omit words from "and to make it clear that" to end of paragraph and insert instead the following *Begins* and to begin by inviting your Highness' attention to the statement made by the Secretary of State for India in reply to a question in Parliament on 3rd December last, a copy of which I enclose. *Ends.*

(2) In paragraph 2 second sentence after "In reply I am to" insert *Begins* refer to the terms of the public statement made on 3rd December by the Secretary of State and to *Ends.*

3. On confirmation from you of date of issue, address, heading, marking (private, secret or otherwise) and signature of letter to Pro-Chancellor[4] I will arrange for communication of copy to Chancellor and when I see him will speak generally in the sense suggested in para. 9 of your 3499–P warning him that the Princes may expect from you before you demit office a public reference on the lines you suggest.

4. You will no doubt arrange for issue of a similar letter to H.E.H. the Nizam's Government.

[1] No. 273. [2] No. 274. [3] See Annexure C to No. 290.

[4] In his telegram 15–P of 4 January, Lord Linlithgow informed Mr Amery that the letter to the Pro-Chancellor with the changes suggested by the Cabinet had issued over Sir K. Fitze's signature as secret demi-official letter No. F. 376–P/42, dated New Delhi, 4 January 1943, with no heading. He also intimated that Sir A. Lothian had been addressed as in No. 313. MSS. EUR. F. 125/29.

310

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE DEHRA DUN, *2 January 1943, 1 am*
PERSONAL *Received: 1 January, 11.35 pm*

No. 12–S.C. Your personal telegrams of 13th December Nos. 21405[1] and 21406.[2] Colonial policy. I have read them with the greatest interest, and am grateful for opportunity of commenting on them. They are matters on which I have thought it better not to bring in my Government, and comment which follows represents my personal view. I have seen Dorman-Smith's comments

[1] No. 270. [2] No. 271.

in his telegram of 17th December No. 944,[3] as affecting Burma, and I am sending him copy of my present telegram.

2. My own general feeling is as follows: I agree that we must take account of misunderstandings, jealousies and prejudices on the part of the United States, and that it would not be wise to leave our colonial record merely to speak for itself. We must therefore be prepared to support it both by indirect propaganda and to some extent by endeavouring to establish a common front with the United States in regard to it. I would myself see very great advantage in indirect propaganda if that could be arranged (value of speeches such as Cranborne's recent speech in the Lords is very great from that point of view) though I think it essential to avoid adopting an apologetic attitude and equally essential to avoid allowing the United States to come in on field of which they have no experience (save in the Philippines) for which they have no responsibility, and from entry into which they may stand to gain very substantial political and commercial advantages.

3. I feel next, that we must take account of the entirely mistaken feeling existing in the United States (compare Richard Law's recent report of his visit there)[4] that whether in India, the Colonies, or elsewhere in the Empire we are merely anxious to hand over, and that we regard ourselves as past our best, and exhausted by our existing responsibilities. Nothing is further from the case, though where we are dealing with highly developed and wealthy countries with substantial reserves of manpower, and great commercial assets, such as India, which might be capable of standing on their own feet with some assistance from us, it has been and still is our policy to place responsibility on the shoulders of those countries. But Great Britain is going to be pretty tightly squeezed after the war with loss of export markets, liquidation of foreign investments, and the like, and the importance to our trade of the colonial empire is clear. War breeds strange superstitions but I am not myself able to share the confidence of those who appear to think that by some act of faith or financial legerdemain it will prove possible after the war to sustain standards of living in the United Kingdom from sources other than the annual harvest of our national wealth. My very strong disposition therefore would be to give nothing to any Foreign Power in the colonial or the imperial field that we can possibly hold on to consistently, that is, with the maintenance of our general relations with the United States.

4. So far as the mother country is concerned we have got to watch her interests in relation even to the Dominions. Smuts' recent speech on the colonial question, while I have the most profound respect for his character, disinterestedness and record, is consistent with the view that we should shed our interest in our very valuable colonies, which we alone have built up, and

which we alone (with some help from the Dominions) are at the moment responsible for defending, to the nearest Dominion. I am quite conscious that South Africa has always had ambitions to absorb as much of the pre-1900 British Empire in that continent as she can. But the structure of her polity has about it much that must remain brittle until her internal synthesis is completed. Nor will she ever be capable either financially or in terms of man-power of carrying defence and other obligations to such areas by herself. Those obligations will fall back on us substantially, and so long as that is so, we must remain in my judgment senior partner in those areas and watch the interests of the Mother country as much against Dominions when a clash of interest comes as against[5] Foreign Powers such as the United States.

5. I examine next to what extent by compromising with the United States (who are the only people who matter for the present purpose) we shall buy off ill-feeling, misunderstanding and prejudice in that country. With great respect, I do not myself believe, subject to your better judgment, and that of the Cabinet, that we shall do anything of the sort. The Midwest has a high opinion of the capacity of the United States. So have the United States as a whole. The element in that country which has any real understanding of European or major colonial problems is very small: the element which is jealous of, and prejudiced against, Great Britain is very large. It is too easy for a great industrial country which contains its own granary and meat and milk-producing areas as well as an extensive range of natural resources to contemn the colonial system out of which our Dominions have grown. Good relations with the State Department, the White House, or the President of the day (such as the present President to whom our debt is incalculable) are important. But it is fair to point out that we are not dealing with a dynasty or with an autocratic Ruler. Electoral changes may render completely out of tune a policy which we have made great sacrifices to support in the hope that it would suit us on a long view. I suggest that we ought to be extremely cautious in tying ourselves up in certain areas of colonial and foreign policy. Nor can I feel confidence that the United States will not return to isolation at, or shortly after, the end of the war, while I am familiar with, though I do not accept, the argument that in certain circumstances it would necessarily be to our complete disadvantage that they should do so.

6. I agree that the question of Defence[6] is relevant to the propositions contained in my preceding paragraphs, for to the extent that we might regard ourselves as incapable of defending certain areas, and might have to call in, in normal conditions, the help of any other great power, we should to that extent give that power a claim to come in. So far, however, as major operations

[3] L/PO/5/42: f 114. [4] Enclosure to No. 178.
[5] 'against' deciphered as 'pre-occupation of'. [6] 'Defence' deciphered as 'country'.

of a world character are concerned we shall no doubt always have to test the position as regards first-class points such as Singapore in terms of support we can secure from our allies at the time as part of a common defence policy. Other areas may in a major conflict assume abnormal temporary importance such as to necessitate general allied control, or substantial allied assistance, for period of emergency. But in the ordinary course I would have hoped that Great Britain would be able to man and equip the colonies adequately from her own resources. And I suggest that there is much to be said against giving anything substantial, in terms of a right to foreign countries to butt in, in return for undertakings of interest in our colonial defence which either may never have to be implemented, or which the course of events would oblige our allies of the time to give us anyhow, whether there are previous understandings or not. I think we can claim too that the conditions in which we are fighting at the moment are completely abnormal, and that arrangements such as those for lease-lend on one side, assuming a satisfactorily decisive victory, and for the making available, with the impact involved on our sovereign rights, of naval bases, &c. to the United States in the West Indies, &c., on the other, are wholly special in character.

7. Finally, in the economic and commercial field, the American objective in the post-war period is likely to be free-trade for all. That is a proposition which can be argued both ways. But the people likely to benefit most by it are the Americans. It would be contested with extreme vigour so far as India is concerned, and it would not necessarily be at all to our advantage or to the advantage of colonial territories under our control. But it is only to be expected that the urge of big business (and to some extent of the State Department as representing United States feeling) will be strongly in the direction of reducing so far as possible the trade slump, and the immense unemployment that in the United States as in other countries of the world will follow the conclusion of the war and the demobilization of the armies. We have already had ample evidence of American anxiety to dig in on air routes, to establish an exclusive claim in such matters as building of transport aeroplanes, &c. I do not blame them for that, but we are entitled to take account of it betimes, and look after ourselves.

8. On the specific proposals put to the Dominion Prime Ministers in general I would comment that while accepting the advantage of trying to remove misunderstandings, &c., I see in certain circumstances some danger in general declaration of this type. The Atlantic Charter, great as its advantages and importance have been, has in it the seeds of severe controversy in the Indian field. Any general declaration that we may make in the colonial field ought, I would urge, [to] be most carefully worded. Once it is on paper we are tied to it. And while we may have agreed it with our friends, our friends may not be in office in another couple of years, and we must in its wording protect ourselves,

and our successors, against any construction in excess of the maximum we ourselves had in mind in concluding the declaration.

9. I would comment secondly that the Peace Treaty ought not to be a post-mortem on the British Empire attended by relatives and debtors. We have borne a major burden of this war, and we must be prepared as I see it to fight our corner at the Peace Treaty and elsewhere and to surrender nothing that we can possibly hold on to. That is a further argument for care in the wording of any declaration such as the present.

10. Subject to the above, I agree that there would be some advantage in a joint declaration. I note, and agree, that[7] it is vital that it should be specifically laid down that each Parent State should have the unquestioned right to administer its own territories without interference from other partners in the general colonial board. I also agree that it is of extreme importance that India should be excluded from the purview of these proposals (our own interests apart extreme offence would be given in this country by any suggestion of interference either by the Americans or Chinese in its internal affairs). Nor could we accept, given the internal divisions in this country and the substantial delay which may yet elapse before full self-government or Dominion Status can be attained, that she should be recognised as entitled to speak as a Parent State. (I am uneasy on that point at the statement by Hull quoted in your No. 21406 that general statement would make it plain that attainment of freedom involved not only mutual responsibility of "Parent States" but "of those who aspired to it", and I think that point ought to be most carefully watched.)

11. As regards misconceptions about British colonial policy, I would strongly advocate that we should try to deal with these by indirect rather than by direct methods. Latter have far too much appearance of acceptance on our part of validity of criticisms levelled against us, a validity which I do not myself accept.

12. I am shy about welcoming *sans phrase* American interest in the British colonial empire (Paragraph 5 of telegram to the Dominions). Proposition unless qualified may have more read into it by the U.S.A. than will suit us. Americans have neither a colonial empire nor experience of one. We have both, and on a large scale. I agree in that connection that it is of great importance to make it clear that no arrangement that could be come to would be merely an Anglo-American agreement,[8] and that any such arrangement would be the equal concern of all Powers with overseas possessions. We need to bear in mind possible reactions of that position on Africa (West Africa and the Sudan) so far as France and Germany, or any other Great Power, which in the remoter future, in which we shall be bound by this declaration, may establish a position

[7] 'I note, and agree, that' deciphered as 'Strictly, and (?it may be)'.
[8] Deciphered as '(?control)'.

in these areas. And I should be wary of paying too high a price for a hypothetical American undertaking to take a share in the defence of areas which hitherto we have held with exceedingly light forces, and the fate of which will always in practice be likely to be subordinated to the policy of the Great Powers.

13. As for the line of declaration suggested in penultimate paragraph of the telegram to Dominion Prime Ministers, I have touched above on the possible violent conflict between the United States and Imperial and Indian interests in the tariff and economic field in the post-war period. I would urge most strongly that it is a point of first-class[9] importance. On a further important point I note that it is suggested that colonial policy is to be "in the best interests of the peoples concerned and of the world as a whole". I would urge that we should not tie ourselves to so broad a proposition, for we may take it that the United States will regard themselves as likely to be the best judges of what the "best interests" are. In the event of any general pooling of colonial interest, such as is now under consideration, I would leave judgment of that matter with the senior partner in each area. Thus the Americans would be senior partners as regards the Philippines, and we, e.g. as regards the West Indies and those African territories in which our interests predominate over those of any other country. The same is true of the Sudan though it is not of course a colony.

14. I have not attempted to do more in this telegram than comment generally, for the co-ordination of the views of the Dominion Prime Ministers and my own must be done in London. But the issue is of very great importance, and I should be grateful if I could continue to be kept in touch with it. If there is any aspect of this matter on which you would like me to comment further, please telegraph.

[9] 'first-class' deciphered as 'potential'.

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Sir H. Twynam (Central Provinces and Berar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/64

SECRET CAMP, *3 January 1943*

No. R.–131–G.C.P.

2. Your Excellency's letter[1] under reply referred to the paragraph of your speech to the Associated Chambers of Commerce in Calcutta touching on the importance of India's unity. My Central Intelligence Officer records that only the more uncompromising Hindu elements were pleased, that the Muslims were

displeased and that moderate Hindu opinion feels that the hands of the all-India Hindu Mahasabha leaders who were working for communal settlement have been weakened. Personally, I should doubt the capacity of Hindu Sabha leaders ever to effect a settlement and the way in which the speech has been twisted from a simple statement of an obvious truth to one which is represented as having some esoteric significance is another instance of the way in which political commentators in this country seem incapable of balance when it comes to the communal issue.

3. Satyamurti, one of the Madras security prisoners, who is about to be transferred back to Madras but is at present in the Irwin Hospital, Amraoti, wrote to the Chief Secretary requesting permission to address a letter to Gandhi suggesting that the Calcutta speech offered a suitable basis for settlement and that avenue should be explored, "especially in view of the events in India during the last few months, which must make all Congressmen unhappy and uneasy". We have sent the letter on to the Home Department.

I expect that this is just the tip of the olive branch which, we may expect, will be exhibited to an ever increasing extent as the months pass by and the futility of the Congress rebellion, and the harm which it has done to the Congress as a party, become more and more apparent.

[1] Not printed.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *4 January 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 14–S. My private and personal telegram of yesterday.[1] Gandhi's letter I think shows uneasiness and some uncertainty as to his position to which steady improvement in allied prospects and equally steady loss of ground by Congress since last August no doubt contribute. His object will naturally be to regain the initiative if he can, to put us on our justification, to try to ascertain how far we are likely to stand firm and be tough, and if he calls off the movement to be able to claim that he has done so as a result of explanation of our action tendered by us. He realises fully of course that any resumption of correspondence or discussions with him will again at once concentrate the spotlight here, at home, and abroad on Congress; with corresponding rise in Congress stock, despite all that has passed, and corresponding irritation, depression and uncertainty among the loyalists, the Muslims, the services, &c. And his policy

[1] See No. 305, note 1.

must inevitably be to aim on getting out of his present fix on terms that can plausibly be represented by Congress as having been so framed by us as: (*a*) to get Congress back at any price (*b*) to give that body a getaway, and which will in addition if possible, (*c*) secure immunity for those who have broken the law during the Congress rebellion, and (*d*) afford a platform for resumption of inconclusive discussions in the constitutional field with Congress which would, at worst, keep the pot boiling pending the conclusion of the war and the Round Table Conference, and at best manœuvre Congress back into a stronger bargaining position.

2. You notice the pains at which Gandhi has been to hint at his readiness to be "convinced" by us, and to avoid any suggestion that true Congress followers are responsible for these excesses, and to make the alleged absence of reliable information a cover for his failure, and that of the Working Committee to condemn or call off the movement and/or the violence associated with it. I note too that contrary to normal practice between him and me he marked his present letter "personal" in addition to stressing its "very personal character". Our policy of course must be to keep the ball in Gandhi's court. The reply to be given will need careful thought. I do not propose to hurry myself unduly over it, and it will take a few days more before I decide what line to follow. I must on the one hand avoid the appearance of closing the door and precipitating a crisis for which we could plausibly be made responsible, and on the other the exposing of surface, or to giving Gandhi the excuse of starting a desultory correspondence.

3. As I have said above in the light of past experience I am certain that we shall be unwise to hurry or to show any particular concern at Gandhi's move. I think we had better keep the existence and terms of his letter very confidential at this stage. I have not yet decided whether to inform my Council about it, and will postpone decision on that until I have made up my mind as to terms of my reply.

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Sir K. Fitze to Sir A. Lothian

L/P&S/13/998: f 198

POLITICAL DEPARTMENT, NEW DELHI, *4 January 1943*

D.O. No. F. 376–P/42

Policy regarding constitutional Reforms in Indian States.

My dear Lothian,

I am desired to refer to your predecessor's demi-official letter No. 2419–C[1] dated the 4th September, 1942 with which he forwarded a representation from

His Exalted Highness the Nizam's Government regarding a statement[2] made in Parliament by Sir Stafford Cripps after his return from India.

2. His Exalted Highness's Government are doubtless aware of the view to which the Crown Representative has already given public expression, (and which is fully endorsed by His Majesty's Government not so much in their own interest as in that of the Princes themselves) that effective machinery should be established in all States whereby the legitimate wants and grievances of their subjects can be brought to notice. But I am to make it clear that it is for the Rulers themselves to devise what precise form of machinery is best suited to achieve that object and that there is nothing in Sir Stafford Cripps' speech to indicate a change of policy in regard to abstention from the imposition upon States of constitutional reforms.

3. I am to request that His Exalted Highness the Nizam's Government may kindly be informed accordingly.

Yours sincerely,

K. S. FITZE

[1] Vol. II, No. 692. [2] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 379, 28 April 1942, col. 834.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (43) 5

L/P&J/8/600: ff 492–5

India

Treatment of Gandhi if he Undertakes a Fast

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, *4 January 1943*

By Minute 3 of W.M. (42) 121st Conclusions[1] dated the 7th September, 1942, the War Cabinet approved arrangements (as set out in my Memorandum W.P. (42) 394)[2] to be followed by the Indian authorities in the event of Gandhi declaring a fast. Briefly the intention was that he should not be released, but be informed that Government would not interfere; that he should be provided with all medical facilities, and allowed the company of his eldest son and visits from a limited number of friends from outside subject to such restrictions as would effectively limit his freedom to communicate with the outside world. I now circulate as Annexures A, B and C respectively copies of the Viceroy's telegram of the 22nd December[3] and of the Governor of Bombay's letters of the 22nd October[4] and 4th November,[5] referred to therein.

[1] Vol. II, No. 706. [2] Vol. II, No. 679. [3] No. 289. [4] No. 111. [5] No. 143.

2. Sir R. Lumley's objections to the arrangements contemplated are as follows:—

(*a*) He and his officers are convinced that though the precautionary dispositions of military and police would have to be on much the same scale whether Gandhi was released or kept under detention after beginning to fast, in the event of his dying while under detention there would be very serious demonstrations in the Province of an uglier temper than in the other case calling for the employment of strong military forces.

(*b*) If his fast were to coincide, for example, with a Japanese invasion, there would be no alternative to keeping Gandhi in detention. On the other hand, if the fast were to be staged now, with the object of whipping up the diminishing vigour of the revolutionary movement, the adverse consequences of his release, considerable though they might be, would not be so great or so prolonged as those which would follow his death under detention. The reaction to his death from a fast while under detention is going to be so formidable that it should not be allowed to happen except under extreme circumstances.

(*c*) Even if Gandhi's son accepted the rôle proposed for him, which seems very improbable, no reliance could be placed on undertakings by visitors to abstain from publicity about Gandhi's condition. There is no prospect whatever of Gandhi not becoming front-page news if he fasts, still less if he dies.

(*d*) As to the possibility of flying Gandhi to a place outside India should he choose the moment of attempted Japanese invasion to fast, his death under detention outside India would produce equally unfavourable reactions there, while the risk of his dying while fasting *en route* would, in the condition of health mentioned in (*e*), be considerable.

(*e*) Gandhi's decision to fast might possibly be concealed from the public for three to four days provided outside specialists were not called in, but owing to his high blood pressure medical opinion doubts his being able to survive three days' fasting.

3. Under pressure of these objections the Viceroy feels obliged to revert to his view that Gandhi should be given his liberty as soon as his fast reaches a danger-point. This, it will be recalled, was the view also of the great majority of Provincial Governors[6] and of the Viceroy's Council.[7] It is supported by the consideration that the unconditional release of Gandhi on previous occasions when he has prosecuted a fast to the danger-point has not been publicly regarded as a victory over Government and that there is no reason to believe that the public's reaction would not be the same in the present (up-to-date hypothetical) case.

4. My own feeling, and that of the Viceroy personally, would favour taking a firm line with Gandhi. But it is the Governor-General in Council that we have to deal with, and apart from the difficulties involved in overruling the Council, it is the Viceroy and the Governors who would have to face the consequences in India and we must accept their view of what the consequences are likely to be. I submit therefore that the Viceroy's present proposals should be accepted, should the issue be forced upon us.

5. As this memorandum is sent to print a telegram[8] has just arrived from Lord Linlithgow transmitting the text of a letter to him from Gandhi which ends with a clear hint that he finds it expedient to stage a fast—and that soon. I shall inform my colleagues further as soon as I have the Governor-General's views on this development.

L. S. A.

[6] See Vol. II, No. 488. [7] See Vol. II, Nos. 490 and 621. [8] See No. 305, note 1.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (*Extract*)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *5 January 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

I received your letters of the 9th, 16th and 18th December[1] just before leaving Dehra Dun yesterday. My best thanks for them and for all the interesting comment which they contain. I am most grateful.

2. The Viceroyalty is out of the way for the moment. On the whole I think the extension has settled down pretty well. The essential thing is for us now to keep up the pressure on Winston; but I know you will be doing that, and from what I have had from you by telegram I feel pretty confident that we ought to be able to get the answer by May. I could not myself believe, given the dates of our personal correspondence, that there was anything in the suggestion that Archie Sinclair had been offered the Viceroyalty and had refused. It seemed obvious to me at the time that this was a gloss by the Press on the fact that his movements and Winston's had coincided about the critical moment. I dare say the temptation to the *Guardian* at one stroke to inflate the importance of the leader of the Liberal Party, and to damage Winston's Indian policy by making it appear that no statesman could be found to work it, was too great to be resisted. But I am glad to have it confirmed by you that there is nothing in the story whatever.

[1] Nos. 264, 280, and 283.

3. You mention in paragraph 2 of your letter of the 9th December my promised communication about the work done by the Executive Council. I will get on with that, though, as I have suggested in a letter[2] which has crossed yours, I am myself rather doubtful at the moment as to the wisdom of publishing anything about either the Government of India or the India Office. There is no particular trouble in the air just now (people here are far too busy thinking about food to be deeply concerned on the constitutional side or even about the war!), and I am always a little afraid that when we do put out material of this sort it may play into the hands of our enemies by giving them some more material with which to shoot at us. My instinct therefore is to leave well enough alone, at any rate for the time being; but that is no reason why I should not let you have the material for an answer to a non-oral Parliamentary question to be arranged at the shortest of notice if signs develop of a revival of pressure, and that I will certainly do.

4. As for the questions which you mention in paragraph 3 of your letter of the 9th, I quite agree with you as to their nuisance importance. But so long as Parliament is constitutionally responsible I do not see how you are going to cut it out. The position is quite different, at any rate at the present stage of India's constitutional development, from the position of the Dominions. The worst of it is that while reasonable questions can serve a very useful purpose and have indeed a definite value as a means of keeping the Government of India on its toes now and then, questions in practice tend to be used by the Left Wing almost exclusively, and then as a means of discrediting or embarrassing us and you. I think therefore that we must take the bad with the good and let things carry on as at present. And I doubt if there is a great deal to be done by way of stimulating our supporters to be as active as our critics.

5. I have practically made up my mind about the Home Membership, viz., Maxwell to be relieved by Usman, and Usman by Azizul Haque. I will have telegraphed to you before you will have received this letter. What bothers me at the moment is firstly, the question of the High Commissionership which must go to a Hindu this time, and secondly, the question whether I should dig out someone to fill the Information Membership. My inclination, though I have not yet made up my mind, would be to offer the High Commissionership to Sir Bijoy Prasad Singh Roy, who has excellent manners, many years experience as a Minister, and who, though not a very forceful character, is a very agreeable person whom I should expect to represent India with dignity and competence. But if my choice fell upon him, I should find it far from easy to pick a really suitable Hindu for appointment to my Council—there are a good many names, but there are arguments of more or less weight against most of them, and I may have to put up with a second best. However, I will not dilate on that, as I shall be telegraphing to you. Maxwell

will be an immense loss to me, for his sanity of judgment, and his complete fairness of mind and balance have been quite invaluable; and there is no one among the senior civil servants here to whom I could turn as I have turned to him, whether over general political issues or over service cases. My successor and I will have to make the best showing we can, but this is an additional argument for the new P.S.V. being someone with wide Indian experience and of sufficient standing out here.

6. Before I pass on from that subject, let me say that I am not much bothered about Jinnah's feelings, and Jinnah will of course be concerned to make as much trouble over anything we do, and to be as bad as he can. But I do not want to present him with a grievance, and would have liked to have taken him with me if I could.

* * *

8. I would like to think over the interesting suggestion, which you mention in paragraphs 8 and 9 of your letter, about the use of the British Council. I suspect that anything of this nature will get into the hands of the Left Wing. And in any case I should think there would be a pretty good chance of certain of the lecturers at any rate who come out going back with completely false ideas as to the position in this country; while, from all I hear, educational and disciplinary standards in Indian universities in present conditions, thanks to the removal of British personnel and the introduction of politics, will come as a severe shock to them! But I will think it over. I am sure that your memorandum and the material which you were kind enough to promise me in paragraph 12 of your letter will greatly help me in reaching a conclusion.

* * *

10. Many thanks for the letter mentioned in paragraph 5 of your letter.[3] I do appreciate and agree with every word you say about it.

* * *

13. We are already taking action about Government grain shops, &c. on the lines you mention in paragraph 10. This whole food business is one of the greatest gravity; and as you will have gathered from our telegrams I am very seriously concerned as to the probable effect. Not only is it bad on the civil side, but the Chief is gravely concerned on the military side, and the point has already been reached when rations have had to be cut for men and draught animals. I am doing all I possibly can to keep it on the right lines, but I fear I get no assistance at all from Sarker, who is quite useless on this sort of business (nor would I expect many of my other colleagues to be any better). We are very short of good men, and short of people with experience, and I do hope you will be able to help me in getting a man from the Ministry of

[2] No. 291, para. 2. [3] No. 280.

Food. I shall be sending you a reminder about that. I hope also that you will press with all the vigour that you can the case for importation: for it is going to be quite vital to get a certain amount of wheat into the country if we are to hold the position at all. Meanwhile I am considering whether I should not still further strengthen the food organisation, and I am telling Sarker, who is down in Calcutta addressing meetings about statistics and fiddling about with the observance of his faith, that he must come back here and stay here while the food problem remains as it is today.

14. I have every sympathy with the Depressed Classes, and I am pushing ahead on Ambedkar's memorandum.[4] I think there is a good deal in the point you make as to the political importance of recognising so great a minority as the Depressed Classes undoubtedly are. One of the troubles about that is of course that they are so extraordinarily short of personnel of any quality. Ambedkar himself is outstanding. Little Rajah from Madras is not bad but not striking. Siva Raj, whom we have sent to America, has a good deal of edge to him and might come on very well. But there are precious few others whom one has heard of in the community.

* * *

16. I am glad to say that the famous reply to the Jam Saheb's letter has now issued and is out of the way.

* * *

20. His Exalted Highness has been kind enough to send me an English translation of his Christmas Persian Poem, and I send you a copy of it by this bag.[5] It might be a good deal worse! His Exalted Highness' reputation as a poet will be familiar to you. I was given not long ago by someone who was present an engaging account of a ceremony in Hyderabad a few months back, of the Eisteddfod type, at which the Nizam was present, and at which the poet laureate, a gentleman aged 88, and suffering from paralysis agitous [agitans], at the end of the day's proceedings advanced to the throne, and with shaking hands read an address culminating in an appeal to the Nizam to accept the title "King of Poets", to which His Exalted Highness was graciously pleased to assent.

[4] See No. 125. [5] Not printed.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *5 January 1943*

I hope to bring your reasoned conclusions as to what should be done with Gandhi if he starts to fast,[1] as well as Gandhi's letter[2] to you, before the Cabinet in a couple of days' time, and will then telegraph such views as I am able to form at this end in the light of the Cabinet's conclusions. Personally, you and I both believe that on merits the right policy would be to stand firm and call Gandhi's bluff. On the other hand, you have to take into account the views, not only of the various Governors most affected, but also of your own Executive. After imposing on them in August the responsibility of arresting the Congress leaders, and after having then discussed with them the question of what to do if Gandhi fasted,[3] it would make it a matter of extreme difficulty for you either to ignore or to override them. That is a point which I shall certainly have to bring before the Cabinet, who might otherwise be very much inclined to stick to their guns and insist on your retaining him under detention as previously agreed upon. The point of course also applies to the suggestion at the end of your own last telegram,[4] that you might not consult your Executive before sending your reply to Gandhi.

2. As regards Gandhi's letter, it is typically ambiguous, though I confess I was amused to find him using Hitler's phrase that "my patience is running out". His excuse for not disavowing the campaign of violence and terrorism is apparently that he cannot trust the highly-censored newspapers and wishes to be convinced of the error of his ways by a personal interview with yourself or someone whom you may send to discuss the matter with him. I certainly see no reason for your doing that. On the other hand, you may perhaps think it useful, in your reply, to recount briefly and forcibly the case against the Congress. With so incalculable a creature it is just conceivable that he might then, as after Rajkot,[5] cry "Peccavi!".[6] What is more likely, of course, is that he will send you a long-winded reply confusing the issue. But there is no reason

[1] See No. 314. [2] No. 305. [3] See Vol. II, No. 490. [4] No. 312.

[5] In March 1939, as part of a Congress campaign to bring about responsible government in the Princely States, Gandhi undertook a fast in Rajkot, a State in the Kathiawar peninsula. At his request Lord Linlithgow intervened, and the Chief Justice of India was asked to arbitrate between the Thakor Saheb of Rajkot and Gandhi, who thereupon broke his fast. He later issued a statement apologising for his action in attempting to put pressure on the Thakor and the Paramount Power by undertaking a fast, which he now realised had been coercive and therefore not in accordance with the principles of non-violence.

[6] 'I have sinned.'

why you should take any notice of that, and there may be advantages in your having met his request, whatever he does afterwards. His six months' grace to you expires, I suppose, on February 9th, so there is obviously no great haste for an immediate reply, and no harm in keeping him guessing for a week or two.

3. I am delighted to get your long telegram No. 12–S.C.[7] on the subject of Colonial policy, and only hope that in spite of its length Winston will read it carefully from beginning to end. For my part, I entirely share your views as to the danger of weakening our position in any part of the Empire, either from the point of view of defence or of trade, on the very improbable hypothesis of the United States continuing on its present line of policy. As a matter of fact I also agree with you in having the gravest doubts as to whether that line of policy, if continued, really would suit us. General free trade, with the Most Favoured Nation clause enforced as between different parts of the Empire, may be a policy that would have suited us 60 or even 40 years ago, and may suit American export industries today. I cannot imagine it suiting us, whether from the point of view of this country alone or from the point of view of the Empire as a whole. No one knows what sort of underpaid or subsidized competition we may have to meet in the next generation from China, Japan, Russia, and Europe, as well as from the United States. Under those conditions each part of the Empire may find itself compelled to pursue, both a protectionist policy as regards its own domestic market and a policy of very definite preference with others who are prepared to give preference in return. Moreover, in the world as it is developing, we shall hear little more, I fancy, of the 19th Century conception that trade is something entirely divorced from and regardless of defence and foreign policy. People are going to trade with and strengthen those who are either pledged, or likely to support them in the hour of danger, and not with those who are likely to be their enemies or at best neutrals. Even India, however strongly the present tide may be setting towards an exaggerated protectionism without imperial preference, may, after the war, find that the practical advantages of special economic relations with the countries upon whose help she may have to rely in war are worth considering.

4. Meanwhile, there are plenty of straws to show that the wind in America is going to blow away from the New Deal and all its works towards something not so very far removed from the isolationism which followed on the last war. Personally, like you, I am by no means convinced that this would necessarily be a disaster from our point of view. I have never been an enthusiast for the idea that we and the Americans should undertake for an indefinite period of time the policing of the world and of Europe in particular. The only result, I believe, would be to justify, in European eyes, the Hitler propaganda of a Europe enslaved to Anglo-American-Judaeo-Plutocracy. There is much to be

said for America confining her activities to her own Continent and to the Northern Pacific, while we make sure of our own Empire responsibilities and the need for Empire development, endeavouring in the Peace Settlement to create such a European situation as will be inherently self-balanced and not calling for continuous intervention on our part, with the equally continuous armed preparation and distraction from our own Empire work which that would imply.

5. It is really curious how little nations ever learn their lessons. We entered into the last war unprepared, in spite of the danger which had been becoming increasingly obvious for years and in consequence paid ruinously in blood and treasure for our unwisdom. Twenty years later we repeated the same mistake in exactly the same way. During the last war we nursed every kind of illusion about a millennium which was to come about mainly by American support, on the assumption that Woodrow Wilson could speak for America not only while he was President but indefinitely. One might have thought that this would have taught us our lesson. But today everybody talks, and what is worse, seems really to believe, that this time the millennium will come about by calling the League, the "United Nations" and by assuming that the Atlantic Charter and Roosevelt's Fireside Talks have some magic power of permanence denied to Wilson's Fourteen Points and his typewriter. Wonderful is the power of wishful self-deception!

6. My own conviction is that, after a period of general exhaustion during which everybody will be chiefly busy licking their wounds and attending to their own convalescence, the world is going to be one of more strenuous international competition, whether from the point of view of trade or of defence, than in the past. All that may coincide with a tremendous revival of prosperity, but it is not going to be a world in which there will be much room for the small or the weak unit. I include India, as well as the United Kingdom, each regarded by itself, in the latter category. Even the British Empire as a whole, while potentially the strongest unit of all, will be for a generation or two a relatively weak unit and one which would have to rely on extra effort, extra sacrifice, extra ability and prudent diplomacy to be given a chance of surviving. We shall only see the beginnings of that chapter, but it will be an immensely interesting one, whether regarded as the beginning of the end, or as the opening of a greater chapter than any before.

[Para. 7, on military promotion for the Jam Saheb, omitted.]

8. There is a point in connection with the food situation which I ought perhaps to mention to you in your capacity as Crown Representative. I have

[7] No. 310.

noticed in the "special footnote" to the Kolhapur Residency fortnightly report, dated the 21st November, a reference to the dependence of the Deccan States on supplies from the Bombay Presidency, and no doubt other States are in a similar position elsewhere. I presume that the Political Department is keeping an eye on this matter, and that if the need arises you will yourself intervene to ensure that there is fair distribution between British Indian and State territory.

We are doing our best to be fair to all.

L.

317

Lieutenant-Colonel Bhandari to Mr Iyengar

L/P&J/8/600: f 456

INSPECTOR GENERAL OF PRISONS, PROVINCE OF BOMBAY,
POONA, *5 January 1943*

My dear Iyengar,
I visited His Highness Aga Khan's Palace on last Sunday. I had a talk about the Detenus with Khan Bahadur Kately. He has written some notes which I enclose herewith for information of government.

Yours sincerely,
M. G. BHA[N]DARI

Enclosure to No. 317

On 27–12–42 during some conversation with Mrs. Naidu, she informed me that Bapuji (Mr. Gandhi) remarked that after 8–2–43 there would be some different circumstances. I asked Mrs. Naidu the meaning of it and she said that Bapuji is going to give us some trouble. I asked what kind of trouble. She said that Mr. G. intends to go on fast from 8–2–43. I asked why this date has been selected. She said on 8–2–43 he completes a period of his six months detention. In the morning of 28–12–42 I saw them talking and discussing among themselves. From their behaviour I understood that a letter was under preparation. In the evening I learnt that M. K. G. intends to write a letter to H.E. the Viceroy informing him to go on fast from 18–1–43 for 21 days, which will bring it to 8–2–43, the date of completion of six months detention.

In the morning of 31–12–42 Mrs. N. informed me that he is not sending that letter but another would be soon ready and this letter will be a friendly letter and written very nicely. Same evening at 6.15 p.m. a letter[1] addressed

to H.E. the Viceroy was given to me with a request to send it immediately, which I accordingly did it. As there was no time left for registration it was sent by ordinary post. From the talk with other members, I gather, that Mr. Gandhi has mentioned in the letter about the suppression of news about Mr. Bhansali and bombing of Calcutta and also his intention about fast.

[1] No. 305.

318

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE *6 January 1943*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 37–S. My private and personal telegram of 4th January No. 14–S[1] and 3rd January No. 22–S.C.[2] Gandhi's letter. I propose to send him reply contained in my immediately following telegram. That reply as you will see deliberately misses his main points, and is designed to make him show his hand a little further. It also leaves him to draw his own conclusions though he can have no difficulty in drawing them. I am clear after much experience of Gandhi that this is the wisest course to take, and Maxwell (who is the only person I have taken into my confidence) agrees.

2. There can be no question of allowing Congress to take the line that they find they have made a mistake and want to be taken back into grace again. Essential pre-conditions of any arrangement would be formal and public withdrawal of the resolution of last August from which their incarceration flowed, no indemnities, no enquiries (though we should I think be wise not to suggest by raising that point that we have anything to conceal), and some understanding (wording of which would not be easy to draft) as to the future. That however can wait until we get Gandhi's come-back, and I will of course consult you as to terms of my reply. In addition it would in my judgment be well when I send that reply to make it clear to him that we do not intend that, if he does fast, he shall die on our hands; that he will die as a free man; and (though here again I shall have to consider my words carefully) that we have no intention of allowing Congress or anyone else to pursue illegal ends without interference, but intend so to handle any arrangement (if we get to the stage of considering one) as to leave Gandhi no room for complaint if he subsequently departs from it and has to be re-arrested. Important thing is to avoid parleying with him or giving him an excuse for that hair-splitting correspondence at

[1] No. 312. [2] No. 305, note 1.

which he is so expert. But I do not think my present draft gives him much room to move, and I have it in mind to be more specific (subject to his reply) in the next one.

3. I have carefully considered whether it would be better to face the issue now, in the hope that if he understands that we do not propose to be blackmailed it may defer [deter?] him from fasting. But I see much advantage in playing for time, and am strongly averse from presenting him with an obvious target in the first round.

4. I am keeping this correspondence entirely secret save from Maxwell. I am not mentioning it to my Council at this stage and feel no obligation to do so, since apart from its purely personal character I am not conveying a final decision to him. When time comes I will let my Council know that I had from Gandhi an entirely personal approach which he described as very personal and which I did not feel at liberty to communicate to them; that not being certain what he really wanted I had replied to him on the same personal basis; and that from his reply the position emerges that, &c. &c. If my Council get to know at this stage of this correspondence its existence is bound to leak out and we shall get a campaign working up to prevent Gandhi fasting, which is the very last thing we want. I should judge that there was quite a chance that the old man might think better of his threat to resort to these tactics if he found that we were quite prepared to see it through.

5. It is important that I should reply without delay, and I shall therefore despatch my letter as drafted on the 9th morning unless by then I hear from you that you have any amendments to suggest.

319

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE *6 January 1943*

No. 38–S. Following is draft marked "Personal" referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

Begins. Thank you for your personal letter of December 31st,[1] which I have just received. I fully accept its personal character, and I welcome its frankness. And my reply will be, as you would wish it to be, as frank and as entirely personal as your letter itself.

2. I was glad to have your letter, for, to be as open with you as our close relation[s] justify, I have been profoundly depressed during recent months

first by the policy that was adopted by the Congress in August, secondly, because while that policy gave rise, as I knew it must, throughout the country to violence and crime (I say nothing of the risks to India from outside aggression) no word of condemnation for that violence and crime should have come from you, or from the Working Committee. When you were first at Poona I knew that you were not receiving newspapers, and I accepted that as explaining your silence. When arrangements were made that you and the Working Committee should have such newspapers as you desired I felt certain that the detail those newspapers contained of what was happening would shock and distress you as much as it has us all, and that you would be anxious to make your condemnation of it categorical and widely known. But that was not the case; and it has been a real disappointment to me, all the more when I think of these murders, the burning alive of police officials, the wrecking of trains, the destruction of property, the misleading of these young students, which has done so much harm to India's good name, and to the Congress Party. You may take it from me that the newspaper accounts you mention are well-founded—I only wish they were not, for the story is a bad one. I well know the immense weight of your great authority in the Congress movement and with sympathisers with that movement, and I wish I could feel, again speaking very frankly, that a heavy responsibility did not rest on you, little as I like to think it. (And unhappily, while the initial responsibility rests with the leaders, others have to bear the consequences, whether as lawbreakers, with the results that involves, or as the victims.)

3. But if I am right in reading your letter to mean that in the light of what has happened you wish now to retrace your steps and dissociate yourself from the policy of last summer, you have only to let me know and I will at once consider the matter further. And if I have failed to understand your object, you must not hesitate to let me know without delay in what respect I have done so, and tell me what positive suggestion you wish to put to me. You know me well enough after these many years in which our contacts have been so close and friendly to believe that I shall be only too concerned to read with the same close attention as ever any message which I receive from you; to give it the fullest weight, and to approach it with the deepest anxiety to understand your feeling and your motives. *Ends.*

[1] No. 305.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: ff 483–6

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *6 January 1943, 2.15 am*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL
SECRET

14. I was on point of circulating[1] to Cabinet your telegram 3566–S and Lumley's letters regarding treatment of Gandhi in event of his fasting, when your private and personal 22–S.C. of 3rd January containing text of his letter was received. I added a few words to warn my colleagues that question of release or detention in view of fast may quite shortly be acute and this issue will be discussed in Cabinet probably on Thursday.[2]

2. Having referred to it in above connection I have now circulated text of Gandhi's letter without comment pending receipt of your considered views as to nature of reply. I have *not* yet circulated your 14–S of 4th.[3]

3. I am reluctant to embarrass you with suggestions while you are weighing up pros and cons of various courses open, but it may not be unhelpful to let you know my reaction to perusal of Gandhi's letter. It seems to me to afford you wide opening (we have to remember that it may become necessary later on to publish correspondence) to state briefly but forcibly and authoritatively case against Congress under Gandhi's influence. This would deprive him of plea that he only has unreliable press reports by which to guide himself. If he should argue back against such a statement there would be no need for you to reply further: he could be left to fast or not as he thinks fit. But if, as is very unlikely, he is sincere and ready to be convinced by plain statement of facts that it is up to him to make ample amends, he would thus have his chance to do so. Question would then arise what are ample amends: Gandhi's view and ours may differ. I think we need to make up our minds what we should be prepared to accept, and I think too we must be prepared to state it at right juncture for if Gandhi professes to be convinced of his errors we may be involved in auction about amends, with Gandhi starting the bidding too low. To some extent of course that question has been affected by the fact that Government has broken back of rebellion and is not in need of help in this respect, whereas Gandhi and his colleagues and dupes have had their punishment in varying degrees. Gandhi's making amends would not cover other Congress leaders unless they followed suit.

4. I agree with you that there is no need to be rushed over our reply. On Gandhi's own showing we have a month left before he is due to fast though I suppose it is not impossible that a firm reply from you might

precipitate matters). But as Cabinet are likely to require some days at any rate to consider what you have in mind as your reply I should be glad to have early indication of your views. Question however arises whether it is expedient to put yourself *vis-à-vis* your Council in position of sending a reply which they have not seen. I realise that they may be less ready now to take in cold blood such a strong line as they took in August, but on other hand we should be in much better position in eyes of the world at large if firm reply to Gandhi had been approved by your Council. After all, you did put the responsibility on their shoulders in August, a responsibility they fairly took, and did then discuss with them what should be done in the event of Gandhi fasting. To leave them out of the picture now seems a little difficult.

Prior approval by your Council of a strong line would of course improve chances of its speedy approval by Cabinet here where also there may be some elements requiring conviction. These are not, I am afraid, constructive suggestions, but it may not be unhelpful to point out difficulties which occur to me from home angle of procedure as well as substance.

[1] See No. 314. [2] 7 January. [3] No. 312.

321

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: ff 479–80

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *6 January 1943, 2.30 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL
SECRET

17. Your private and personal telegrams 37–S and 38–S.[1] Gandhi. I am myself in general agreement with the line you propose to take in your reply but I propose to inform the War Cabinet of this development and line you propose to take at a meeting to-morrow evening, 7th January, and will telegraph their views thereafter. I shall not circulate or refer to your 14–S[2] or my reply[3] to it.

2. In the meantime I should be glad if you would consider the following points of wording of your draft of which those in (1) are [of] minor importance:

(1) Paragraph 2, first sentence, for "close relation justifies" substitute "previous relations justify".

For "as I knew it must" substitute "as it was obvious it must".

Penultimate sentence, for "Congress movement and with sympathisers of that movement" substitute "Congress Party and those who follow its lead" and omit last seven words which seem unnecessary.

[1] Nos. 318 and 319. [2] No. 312. [3] No. 320.

(2) Paragraph 3. Omit from "You have only" to "wish to put to me" inclusive and substitute "You will no doubt let me know what you propose to do to make this clear to the Government of India and H.M.G. and to all those with whom you have so much influence and to the world at large."

In following sentence omit "in which our contacts have been so close and friendly."

3. I feel that it would be mistaken in a letter which may have to be published later to over-emphasise personal friendship with Gandhi, and that it is desirable to let him draw inference from omission of friendly sentiments that former personal relationship is not unaffected by what has happened. I also feel that it may be better to bring it home to him at once that we expect him to make it clear to his followers and the world that he recognises his policy to have been misguided.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE *7 January 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 47–S. Your private and personal telegram of January 6th No. 17.[1] Gandhi. I readily accept amendments proposed in your paragraph 2. I am quite prepared, as regards amendment in paragraph 3, to omit the words "in which our contacts have been so close and friendly", but would prefer to retain the first sentence of that paragraph as drafted.

2. As regards last paragraph of your telegram I quite realise your point, and had it myself in mind. But the tone of my letter and the references to friendly relations in the past between me and Gandhi were quite deliberate for if anything in the way of a settlement emerges[2] we may, however little we may want to, have to deal with him again. In that event there is value in maintaining[3] this link to which he appears to attach some importance and to which Hindus generally appear to attach quite disproportionate significance. But as you will see I am quite ready to accept the amendments on this point which you have suggested, since I do not think that they materially impair the character of the letter. You may take it that the letter as a whole has been most carefully balanced by me in the light of my experience of Gandhi and of this business, and I trust that the Cabinet will authorize the issue of it in the form I

recommend (subject of course to the minor amendments which I have now accepted on your suggestion).

[1] No. 321.
[2] 'in the way of a settlement emerges' deciphered as 'in the way (sic) seems compatible with emergencies'.
[3] 'maintaining' deciphered as 'doubting (sic)'.

323

War Cabinet W.M. (43) 4th Conclusions, Minute 2

L/PO/6/102b: ff 430–1

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 7 January 1943 at 6 pm were: Mr Churchill (in the Chair), Mr Attlee, Mr Anthony Eden, Sir John Anderson, Mr Ernest Bevin, Mr Oliver Lyttelton, Mr Herbert Morrison

Also present were: Sir Kingsley Wood, Viscount Simon, Viscount Cranborne, Mr Amery, Colonel Stanley, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Sir Stafford Cripps, Mr Brendan Bracken

INDIA

Detention of Gandhi

(Previous Reference: W.M. (42) 121st Conclusions, Minute 3)[1]

When it was decided in the summer of 1942 that Gandhi should be detained, it was agreed that, if he declared a fast, he would not be released: special arrangements were to be made with a view to relieving the Government of India of responsibility for safeguarding his life and health and, if he chose to fast, he was to be left to take the consequences.

The War Cabinet now had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (43) 5)[2] covering copies of communications from the Viceroy and the Governor of Bombay. These showed that the latter now took the view that, if the procedure previously authorised were followed, the reactions on public order in Bengal [Bombay?] and probably throughout India would be so serious that he was unwilling to agree that Gandhi should be detained beyond the point at which his fast would endanger his life. This had previously been the view of the majority of the Provincial Governors and of the Viceroy's Council; and in the view of the considerations now urged by Sir Roger Lumley the Viceroy felt obliged to revert to his earlier view that, if Gandhi began to fast, he should be released as soon as his life was endangered.

The War Cabinet also had before them three telegrams from the Viceroy (Nos. 22–S.C.,[3] 37–S[4] and 38–S[5]) from which it appeared that Gandhi might

[1] Vol. II, No. 706. [2] No. 314. [3] See No. 305, note 1. [4] No. 318. [5] No. 319.

be contemplating a fast. In a personal letter to the Viceroy he had said that he had given himself six months (which would expire on the 9th February) and was now nearing the end of his patience.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA said that, while he would have preferred to adhere to the original decision, he felt that this was primarily a matter for the Government of India and that there were no sufficient grounds for overriding the views formed by the responsible authorities on the spot.

Points made in discussion were:—

(*a*) If it were decided now that Gandhi would be released as soon as his life was endangered, the medical officers in charge of him would be so informed and it must be assumed that they would in practice recommend his release almost as soon as he began to fast. In fact therefore such a decision would mean, not release when he was at the point of death, but release very soon after he first refused food. He would thus be put in a position to obtain his release at any moment he chose. If he were so released, and then broke his fast, it was unlikely that the Government of India would bring him back into detention unless he began to stir up fresh trouble.

(*b*) The view was expressed that it would be an act of weakness on the part of the Government of India to decide in advance that Gandhi should be released as soon as he began to fast. If his detention had been justified, it was unjustifiable to allow him to decide when it should be brought to an end.

On the other hand, it was urged that the situation had changed during the six months of his detention. The movement of revolt which he had sought to instigate had been broken. Though the position of the Government of India would have been fatally weakened if they had given way to him at that time, there was now no risk that his release could be acclaimed as a victory for Congress.

(*c*) It was not suggested that any of the other Congress leaders under detention should be released if they declared a fast. Was it reasonable to give this preferential treatment to Gandhi?

Some members of the War Cabinet felt that a distinction could be drawn in this matter between Gandhi and the other Congress leaders—partly on the ground of his great age and failing health, and partly because he was a great religious figure in India.

The general feeling of the War Cabinet was that, if circumstances were now such that Gandhi could be released without serious risk of reviving unrest, it would be preferable that the Government of India should release him as an act of State, rather than be forced into doing so by his own decision to begin to fast.

The War Cabinet—

Invited the Secretary of State for India to remind the Viceroy that he [it] had been clearly understood from the outset that, if Gandhi were detained, he should not be allowed to secure his release by a threat to fast unto death. The War Cabinet attached great importance to preserving the principle involved. If conditions were now such that Gandhi could be released without serious risk, they would prefer that he should be set at liberty on compassionate grounds (e.g. his age, health and the fact that he had already been detained for nearly six months) rather than be able by fasting to secure his release at any time.

The War Cabinet would be glad to have the Viceroy's views on this suggestion before any further action was taken, and in the meantime no reply need be sent to the personal letter which Gandhi had addressed to the Viceroy.

The draft of this telegram to the Viceroy should be submitted to the Prime Minister before despatch.

324

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 477

IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL
SECRET

INDIA OFFICE, *7 January 1943, 11.10 pm*
Received: 8 January

23. Please do not send proposed reply to Gandhi pending receipt of Cabinet view which I expect to send you within 24 hours.

325

Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/P&J/8/600: f 474

INDIA OFFICE, *8 January 1943*

Secretary of State's Minute: Serial No. P. 2/43.

Prime Minister

I attach a draft telegram[1] to the Viceroy to give effect to the decision of the War Cabinet in regard to the detention of Gandhi as recorded in Minute 2,

[1] See No. 326.

W.M. (43) 4th Conclusions.[2] It is important to get this off to the Viceroy at once and I should be glad to know as soon as possible whether you approve the draft.

L. S. AMERY

[2] No. 323.

326

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow[1]

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 470

MOST IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL
SECRET

INDIA OFFICE, *8 January 1943, 7 pm*
Received: 9 January

27. War Cabinet considered last night both your revised proposals for dealing with Gandhi if he should fast (your personal telegram 3566–S and Lumley's letters were before them)[2] and your proposed reply[3] to Gandhi's letter.

They wished me to remind you that from the outset it was understood that if Gandhi were detained he should not be allowed to secure release by threat of a fast unto death. They attach great importance to preserving principle involved and if conditions are now such that he could be released without serious risk they would prefer that he should be set at liberty on compassionate grounds, for example his age, health, and fact that he has already been detained for nearly six months *and that the crisis has lessened*, rather than that he should be able by fasting to obtain his release at any time. They would be glad to have your views on this suggestion before any further action is taken and in the meantime desire that no reply be sent to Gandhi's letter to you.

[1] Mr Turnbull noted: 'app[rove]d by P.M. with addition in ink' [printed in italics here].
[2] No. 314. [3] No. 319.

327

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: ff 427–8

MOST IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL
SECRET

INDIA OFFICE, *8 January 1943, 7.55 pm*
Received: 9 January

28. My private and personal telegram 27[1] conveys Cabinet's views. Cabinet discussion was brief and confused and the more definitely and emphatically

you can now state your conclusions whatever they may be the more likely you are to affect final decision.

2. Cabinet were seriously concerned at suggested going back on decision to retain Gandhi, if he decides to fast, under detention on conditions approved in September. They felt difficulty of justifying such a course if Bhansali is allowed to die under detention or if it is intended to allow this in case of other Congress leaders if they should follow Gandhi's example. One point which was raised in discussion was that release when "point of danger" was reached might in fact mean that doctor would certify this the moment a fast begins, so that, if released at once he might recover in a few days and resume mischievous activities having bluffed us all.

3. I would suggest that your reply should cover the following points which obviously arise. If we were to decide to see it through and not release Gandhi if he fasts, which logically no doubt is the right course, do you think that you could carry your Council with you? Or if you rejected their advice on this would they be likely to accept it as your responsibility and refrain from resignation? If decision is to see it through would you still wish to send a temporising preliminary letter as proposed? If Gandhi were released now would it not become known at once that we had done so at mere hint of threat to fast and would that not be even clearer tactical victory for him than if we let him out admittedly only to avoid his dying on our hands? Also if thus released before he fasts how could you keep him quiet? On what grounds would it be possible to release him and keep the others confined? Would he not be likely to fast to secure their release too, particularly as he would not have been convinced of his errors (which his letter indicates to be condition for refraining from fast).

4. I do not propose to circulate this telegram and your reply for Cabinet should refer only to my private and personal telegram No. 27.

[1] No. 326.

328

Viscount Simon to Mr Amery

L/P&J/8/600: ff 472–3

HOUSE OF LORDS, S.W.I, *8 January 1943*

My dear Leo,
I have ventured to send the enclosed note across to No. 10 Downing Street. I hope your telegram will press the Viceroy *strongly* to take the course there

indicated in preference to composing a subtle reply about fasting. In a competition of subtleties, the Oriental will beat the Scotsman.[1]

Yours ever,
JOHN

Enclosure to No. 328

HOUSE OF LORDS, S.W.1, *8 January 1943*

The Prime Minister

Gandhi

I think you indicated at the Cabinet last night that you would be seeing the terms of Amery's telegram to the Viceroy before it is sent. There is one thing which I suggest the Viceroy should be urged to do which was not mentioned.

Gandhi has written a personal letter to the Viceroy in the course of which he casts doubt on the reports of Congress violence, and suggests that as he has been shut up he has not had the means of testing these accounts. I would urge that the Viceroy, in his reply to Gandhi, should set out in precise terms some samples of these outrages with date and place, selecting those in which Congress authorship and instigation are most evident. The Viceroy might then add that these are only instances; that the authenticity is beyond all question and is acknowledged on all hands, and that whatever Gandhi might have intended, they show the actual result of his attitude and leadership.

Gandhi is one of the very few individuals in public life who ever feels moved publicly to profess to repent. He did so some years back on the very ground that he was the apostle of non-violence, but that the people to whom he had been preaching had been led into excesses. It is at least possible that something of the same kind might recur. At any rate, it would be very valuable to have Gandhi faced by the Viceroy with the facts, for Gandhi will not justify the outrages on merits, and at best can only say that he does not believe they happened, or that they were not his fault. If he is let out without a challenge on this point, he will soon be inducing his dupes to believe that the stories about outrages are an invention.

The Viceroy's letter should, of course, contain no reference at all to fasting. Linlithgow, as I understand, has not mentioned the letter to his Council or to anyone except the Home Member. The more I think of it the more I am convinced that, if Gandhi is to be released, the *only* safe line is to release him because his internment was necessary as a means of preventing further mischief and that the vigorous action that has been taken in the meantime has suppressed the outbreak and restored order. *Vis-à-vis* the public, here and in America, this is a good reason, and not an abject confession of weakness.

SIMON

[1] Mr Amery acknowledged this letter in his letter of 8 January, adding that he had telegraphed to Lord Linlithgow as in No. 326 and was sending him a separate telegram as in No. 329. L/P&J/8/600: f 471.

329

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: ff 468–9

MOST IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL
SECRET

INDIA OFFICE, *8 January 1943, 6.40 pm*
Received: 9 January

29. My p. and p. telegram No. 27.[1] Point has also been made that reply to Gandhi should include passage setting out in precise terms some samples of the outrages committed with details, selecting those in which Congress authorship and instigation are most evident, and adding that authenticity is beyond question and that whatever Gandhi's intention may have been, these incidents, which are only instances, show actual result of his attitude and leadership. It was suggested that if Gandhi were released in whatever circumstances without having been challenged on this point he would be the more free to foment belief that stories of outrages were, if not invented, at least not attributable to Congress.

[1] No. 326.

330

Memorandum by Mr Amery

L/E/8/3297: ff 225–6

THE INDIAN DEMAND FOR IMPORTED FOOD GRAINS

undated[1]

I attach copies of telegrams[2] exchanged with the Viceroy about the food situation in India.

My telegram of 15th December 21551 sent after consultation with the interested departments in London drew as clear a picture as possible of the difficulties to be expected in finding shipping for anything like the quantity of grain for which the Government of India are asking and more especially the obstacles in the way of any early landing of supplies in India. Notwithstanding the terms of this telegram the Viceroy has come back with a renewed statement of India's needs, unreduced in quantity and with special emphasis laid on the need

[1] The letter under cover of which Mr Amery sent this memorandum to Lord Leathers (with copy to other Ministers concerned) requesting that the Indian demand should be urgently considered, was apparently sent on or about 8 January.

[2] Nos. 242, 265, 266, 275, 282, and 297.

for early supplies. No definite period has been stated during which the supplies are wanted though the maximum possible quantity of wheat is asked for in the next quarter, and I am disappointed by the absence of any effective offer to provide shipping from India's own programme.

In face of this reiterated statement of the Indian need, I am obliged to press for the earliest and fullest possible consideration of the case. The Government of India has asked for 600,000 tons of wheat of which the maximum possible quantity is required immediately, that is to say during the first quarter of 1943, and I cannot ask for less. This quantity in fact is only calculated to cover the statistical deficit of wheat which will arise before the new crop comes on the market in April—494,000 tons for civil requirements and 200,000 tons for military—after allowing for what remains to be supplied out of 105,000 tons for defence services arranged for supply between September last year and April 1943. No account is taken in it of the statistical shortage of 1,400,000 tons of rice and 650,000 tons of millets which is the background against which the Government of India have to view their wheat difficulties. These shortages, serious as they are, would not from the statistical standpoint bear a catastrophic proportion to the total Indian cereal crop of 60/70 million tons. It is necessary, however, to consider how the shortage developed and the aggravating factors which have brought about the present critical situation.

The cereals crop of India is in the neighbourhood of 70 million tons for a normal year. No great part of that quantity is exported, but there is a constant import of rice from Burma in normal times amounting to 1,200,000 to 2 million tons. This was imported into Calcutta, and into Western and Southern India while Burma also fed Ceylon and other colonies. Loss of the Burma rice crop has been one of the chief disturbing factors because though not large in relation to the whole supply, it represents an uncomfortably large proportion of the rice available for marketing within India which does not in any case exceed 6 million. It will be realised that a large majority of the population of the Indian countryside consumes food grown by themselves and their neighbours which never comes on any market. It is the urban population, dependent as they are on the marketable part of the crop, who are first to experience any shortage and, since it is the urban population on whose labour the Indian munitions and supply industries depend, any marginal shortage of food tends to reduce the output of those industries; such a shortage may have the effect of driving labour from factory centres back to the country where they may be lost to industry and constitutes a threat to law and order with a possibility of food riots.

Rice	29,000,000
Wheat	10,000,000
Millets	10,000,000
Barley	2,500,000
Maize	2,500,000
Gram	4,000,000
Other Grains	2,000,000
Pulses	10,000,000

As far back as early April 1942, the food situation in India was causing some anxiety. Notwithstanding a good rice crop and the anticipation of a fair crop of wheat and other cereals, there were certain adverse features. The requirements of the Army for wheat and flour constituted a substantial addition to normal requirements, Congress propaganda was discouraging the ryot from selling his crop, difficulties of internal transport and the loss of Burma rice reduced the available supplies both locally and overall, the supply of rice to Ceylon, then promised, constituted a further prospective drain equal to about 2% of the total rice crop, while the depressing war outlook was regarded as certain to lead to hoarding. Nevertheless measures then taken by the Government of India such as the fixing of a high maximum price for wheat, the licensing of dealers, assistance from the banks and a "grow more food" campaign were expected to keep the situation in hand as it was supposed that difficulties would be local and temporary rather than all-India. If the monsoon proved favourable the Government of India hoped to secure an increase of over a million and a half tons of food.

Thus at the beginning of the 1942/3 crop year India's outlook was not unfavourable and in view of it, India accepted obligations to supply rice for Ceylon, Arab States and elsewhere in excess of normal exports to those districts, but as the year went on one province after another ceased to be able to export and increasing difficulty was found in meeting the obligation to Ceylon, and there was a more or less continuous flow of requests and demands on India throughout the summer pressing to send more rice to Ceylon. India did not succeed in performing much more than a half of her original undertaking in this respect, but as late as mid-November it was anticipated that overall supplies of food grains taken together would not merely fill the gap caused by the loss of Burma rice imports but would cover the needs of Ceylon and others of Burma's usual customers. In the meantime the supply authorities in India put in a request, based on shortage of wheat for the Army, for imports beginning about September and continuing at the rate of 15,000 tons a month till April, 105,000 tons in all. This demand was accepted by the Ministry of Food and Ministry of War Transport and though there has been some delay in supply, its fulfilment is now in process. In October this demand was increased by a further request for 100,000 tons for the army over the same period, and by a demand for half a million tons for civil needs, but I pointed out in reply how great were the obstacles to the provision of shipping and India ultimately agreed to drop the demand in excess of the original 105,000 tons. This reply was the outcome of consultation with Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar based in [the] main on his view that insufficient co-operation was being received from the Punjab, which is the principal wheat granary of India. At this stage, having reached the conclusion that pressure in favour of further supplies to Ceylon from the old crop was likely to prove infructuous, I urged India to concentrate all her

efforts upon making new and more effective arrangements for the new crop. The chief factor in this effort was to be the formation of a separate food ministry, suggested from London[3] and established at Delhi simultaneously.[4]

How far this might have proved effective in more fortunate conditions it is impossible to say. In fact the new department was hardly formed when it became apparent that the position had become much worse than it had been supposed to be up to this point. At the beginning of December total failure of the millets in Bombay with the loss of three-quarters of a million tons, coming as a climax to the losses resulting from the Indus floods in Sind and the cyclones in Eastern India extinguished the Government of India's hopes of adequate supplies in spite of the loss of Burma. The Viceroy in his telegram of 3rd December conveyed a warning that it would in all probability be necessary to stop all exports of food grains from India and to ask for additional imports of wheat to a substantial amount. Less than a week later the Government of India telegraphed explaining further the difficulties of their position and asked explicitly for an additional 600,000 tons of wheat without close specification of the period within which it was required. After preliminary consultation with the Ministries of Food, Production and War Transport the Government of India were informed in plain terms of the obstacles, from the shipping point of view, in the way of satisfying their demands for imported grain. While considering their reply the Government of India supplemented their case for help by further statements arising out of a conference of the Provinces and States from which it appeared that the situation was even more serious than it had appeared up to this point, while a later representation[5] from the Governor of Bombay, where the shortage had become most acute, were added to the representations already received.

Concurrently with the shortages in supplies there have been, especially in the towns, acute increases of price. Official prices for wheat stand at 230% of those of September 1939 and other grains are correspondingly high, but even so these prices do not suffice to draw out supplies and much higher prices are undoubtedly being paid.

The correspondence makes it clear that the causes of the trouble are not only, perhaps not mainly, shortage of all-India supply, but that the position is greatly accentuated by difficulties of distribution arising from the strain put upon the railways by military and other loadings, by a succession of local calamities such as the Indus floods in Sind in the summer, the cyclones in Bengal and Orissa in October/November, and the failure of the millet crop in Bombay, and not least by the unwillingness of producers and merchants to part with supplies which have in fact been hoarded both for profit and personal use. What the Viceroy hopes to achieve by importing wheat is firstly to maintain supplies to the Army, secondly to feed the urban population on whose labour the war effort mainly depends, thirdly to maintain supplies to those

areas where for one reason or another there is an unsatisfied deficiency of food grains, and fourthly to convince holders of supplies that holding for a major shortage is not good business. What he fears if supplies are withheld is a falling off in the war effort with the graver threat of serious internal trouble if urban supplies are not maintained. He sees no possibility of meeting the needs by means of requisitioning or rationing, while his governments' efforts to grow more food have proved ineffective in the face of a series of misfortunes.

The question clearly arises how far this need could be met at the expense of the other import requirements of India, and with this in view I endeavoured to obtain from the Government of India an appreciation of the possible consequences. It will, however, be seen that the only offer made by them towards meeting the large tonnage involved is a figure of 90,000 tons, to be spread over a period of three months and to come out of any *additional* tonnage that might become available over and above the current shipping programme. The greater part of India's imports, military and civil, is covered by the "minimum" programmes from North America and the United Kingdom which were agreed upon in October. From other areas, such as Australia, and Africa, the tonnage is relatively small; and though I am not prepared to say that no part of it could be utilised for wheat shipments, I should have to consult the Government of India further before a figure could be settled and in any case the contribution that could be made would not be very significant. As regards the North American and United Kingdom shipping programmes, it should be mentioned that the C.-in-C. *was* prepared to accept, over a period of six months only, about 20% (or say, 30,000 tons a month) *less* than was ultimately included in the minimum programme, though he pointed out that this would have certain deleterious effects upon the expansion and preparedness of the Army in India. It is at all events clear that the issues arising from any possible inroads into the current programme for the purpose of shipping wheat are primarily strategic. The whole question is at present under consideration in pursuance of the Prime Minister's direction that the effects of halving the Indian Ocean Area programmes should be investigated, and it is difficult as yet to anticipate what the outcome will be. Plainly that enquiry and the present submission are closely related.

A further aspect of the matter which will require careful consideration is the question whether the capacity of the ports in India and of internal communications is such that the tonnage now in question (say 100,000 tons a month, or nearly half of the current import programme from all areas) even allowing for the spreading of deliveries considerably beyond the arrival of the new wheat crop could possibly be handled in addition to the existing volume of imports. The conclusions of the Joint Anglo-American Shipping and Ports Mission which recently visited India suggest that there are serious grounds for doubting

[3] No. 181. [4] No. 177. [5] No. 288.

this especially if labour difficulties at Calcutta, due to Japanese bombing, continue.

I am obliged to ask that consideration should be given as a matter of urgency to what steps can be taken to provide shipping for the satisfaction of this most urgent need.

L. S. A.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir A. Hope (Madras), Sir R. Lumley (Bombay), Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces), Sir T. Stewart (Bihar), Sir H. Twynam (Central Provinces and Berar) and Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *8 January 1943*

My dear ——

You will remember the correspondence[1] which passed between us in September last about non-official advisers, and in particular my circular telegram to the Section 93 Governors of 11th September 1942 No. 2759–S, which set out the views then held by the Governors concerned.

[Para. 2 repeats in similar though briefer terms the summary of the Governors' views (except those of Herbert) given in No. 65, para. 6].

3. I repeated the text of all these replies to the Secretary of State, and he and I had some further discussion[2] as to the line that might wisely be taken in the event of the matter being pressed in Parliament. I felt myself, while I was conscious of the importance attached to this matter both by Madras and by the Central Provinces (by you and by the Central Provinces/by you and by Madras),[3] that very great weight, more particularly given his (your) local situation, must attach to Lumley's (your) views; and the Secretary of State and I agreed that in the event of strong pressure developing in the debate it would probably be wise to temporise a little further. In the event he informed me, however, that nothing had emerged from the debate as regards non-official advisers to suggest that he ought to press for further consideration of this matter; that in all the circumstances he shared my doubts whether the political advantages would be sufficient to justify introducing in some provinces a mixed team of official and non-official advisers; and that in view of the difficulties mentioned by Lumley (you), and the possible difficulties referred to by Stewart (you), he thought the matter might be let rest there for the present.

4. At that point matters now stand. I think the issue is one on which as in the past, it would be wise for us to keep an open mind, and it may be that cir-

cumstances will so develop as to make the case either for a general introduction of a combination of non-official and official advisers, or the like, a very strong one, in which event I should of course be perfectly prepared again to consider it with the Secretary of State. But, while I realise that Madras has in its situation factors peculiarly favourable to an experiment of this nature, and while I am aware also that there is pressure of some little importance in the Central Provinces in the same direction, my own conclusion is still that we shall do better to continue to mark time for the present; and while I am fully alive to the political advantage that might result from the trying of this experiment, I think we must also give weight to the risk that that experiment might have political disadvantages, not the least in relation to the Muslim League so long as Jinnah maintains his present policy of non-co-operation in the political field. But I should welcome it if, as in the past, you (and the other Section 93 Governors to whom I am writing in similar terms) would be kind enough to continue to keep me in touch with your own mind in this matter, and also with any developments and opinion in your province that may be relevant to it: for as I have said above it is important that we should remain sensitive to the situation, and that the Secretary of State and I should be fully aware of how the wind may be blowing, whether over the Section 93 provinces as a whole or in individual provinces.

Yours ——,
LINLITHGOW

[1] Not printed; but see No. 65. [2] Nos. 65 and 113.
[3] In this para. the different wording appropriate in certain cases is given in brackets.

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Government of India, Food Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/E/8/3297: f 222

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *10 January 1943, 4.40 pm*
Received: 10 January, 10 pm

217. In continuation of our telegram No. 10045[1] dated December 17th and Viceroy's telegram No. 3599–S[2] dated December 26th 1942, we have to emphasise that the wheat situation in India has become even more acute. The wheat reserves of Q.M.G. in India are completely exhausted. All that remains forward with troops is approximately 30 days' supply. The Army needs 30,000 tons a month to meet its day-to-day requirements without any provision for rebuilding exhausted reserves. Supplies for the civil population are also extremely short and we are seriously concerned about workers in essential

[1] No. 282; the date should be 18 December. [2] No. 297.

services. Imminence of strikes among cranemen and port workers in Bombay is feared and food shortage at collieries is affecting supply of labour and coal raisings. In Calcutta flight of port and other essential labour is in part due to scarcity of supplies. The normal consumption of the civil population outside major wheat producing areas even when reached (sic) by $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent amounts to 38,000 tons a month and unless this quantity can be provided there is no doubt we shall have not only strikes and labour shortages in essential services and war industries but also food riots amongst general population of the cities.

2. To meet above necessities we have only (1) the balance of 105,000 half of 2 (? 10,000) tons arranged for army from Australia as requested in Supply Department telegram 2783[3] dated July 21st and (2) whatever can be purchased in Punjab.

Of the wheat from Australia 13,500 tons have already been taken over by Defence Services. Of the balance of 91,500 tons, 17,100 tons are already in India but not yet passed to Defence Services. 16,500 are in transit between Australia and India. Shipping space has been allotted from our January Australian quota for 30,000 tons. There are therefore 27,900 tons still in Australia and tonnage should be provided to lift whole of this quantity in February. It is of most vital urgency that whole of these January–February shipments should be despatched to India with the utmost expedition possible and it is urged that orders may issue at once for immediate release of wheat and for despatch of shipments.

3. These consignments will, however, keep the army going only until the end of March and will not assist in present problem of feeding civil population outside the Punjab. For this purpose Government of India have only what they can purchase in Punjab and Punjab States. Despite steps referred to in paragraph No. 3 of Governor-General's telegram No. 3599–S dated December 26th purchases in Punjab have proved most disappointing, and it would be unwise to reckon on more than 10,000 tons a month from this source until after May when new crop will come in. Assuming that figure of 10,000 tons a month is realised, the country will be 28,000 tons a month short of its minimum civil requirements, making a total shortage of 140,000 tons for five months January to May which added to military requirements of 60,000 tons for April and May makes a total of 200,000 tons. This quantity must reach India before the end of April. It would be obvious from the above that the need for a substantial portion of this wheat is immediate, and it is requested in addition to shipments referred to in paragraph No. 2 above, utmost possible quantity of wheat should be shipped to India from Australia at once and whole quantity of 200,000 tons supplied before end of April. The vital necessity for expedition cannot be exaggerated as we have to carry on with practically no supplies for civil population till some of these shipments arrive. It will be of considerable value

to us, however, if an immediate promise of assistance on above lines can be given. A public announcement that such an arrangement had been made would do something to facilitate the purchase of wheat in the Punjab and might also enable us to borrow for immediate use from the Punjab Government small reserve of about 37,000 tons (intended for Punjab cities) and so keep a slight supply going for other cities and industrial areas which would fend off serious troubles until some of required 200,000 tons arrives. For the purpose of facilitating transport of 200,000 tons we are prepared to restrict our minimum requirements of general cargo from Australia for February to 15,000 tons and to 20,000 tons for months of March and April and from (? North America) to 79,000 half of 158,000 tons basic minimum for 3 months as stated paragraph No. 4 Governor-General's telegram 3599–S of December 26th 1942. It is requested that shipping may therefore be arranged to ensure delivery of 200,000 tons by end of April.

4. In addition to above quantities which must be provided and provided immediately if internal trouble and dislocation of war effort are to be avoided, we require wheat to

(1) restore army's reserves amounting to 60,000 tons,

(2) assist in meeting army's requirements in 1943–44 which cannot be met on their present scale from Indian crops, without trenching severely on supplies for civil population,

(3) offset in part the heavy rice and millets shortage due to adverse seasonal conditions in 1942 estimated at about 2 million tons, and

(4) provide if possible a small holding reserve to keep prices steady and induce a freer flow of stocks.

It is not possible to estimate the requirements under these heads with accuracy until prospects of next wheat crop are known, but they will certainly amount to as much as 400,000 tons which is balance of 600,000 tons asked for in our telegram 9796[4] dated 9th December and may easily exceed this figure. We (? strongly) urge that an immediate promise should be given of a substantial quantity of not less than 200,000 tons (representing two months bare supply plus a small margin for market manipulation to prevent stocks going underground) in addition to 200,000 tons referred to in preceding paragraph. Such promise will enable us to make a public announcement which we consider to be of utmost importance to allay panic, create confidence and thus facilitate release of such stocks as have gone underground.

[3] L/E/8/3297: f 223; the date should be 22 July. [4] No. 265.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE *11 January 1943*
SECRET
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 80–S. Your private and personal telegram of 8th January No. 28.[1] I am most grateful for this background and I am sending you separately a reply which I hope will help with the Cabinet. But I trust Cabinet appreciate that this is not a matter that can be handled in detail from London, and that if they wish me to go on with it they must be prepared to take my judgment as to best method of handling Gandhi, and as to the terms in which any communication is to be framed. I have long and close experience of the man, and greater familiarity with the position than any member of Cabinet, and you will I am sure be able tactfully to hint that and to convey the strength of my feeling on this matter, on which I am entitled to expect my advice, even in matters of detail, to be accepted. I have fortunately had the advantage of discussion with Lumley, who is directly concerned and who is staying with me, and am reinforced in my earlier recommendations by that discussion. If you think that reply which I am separately sending is not sufficiently firm or that I ought to indicate more clearly my feelings above that the handling of this matter must be left to me, I hope you will let me know.

[1] No. 327.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE *11 January 1943*
SECRET
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 81–S. Your private and personal telegram of 8th January No. 27.[1] Gandhi. I am grateful to Cabinet for consideration they have given to this difficult business. I realise importance they attach to it. But my considered view, after careful weighing of their points, is that we should go ahead on the lines, and in the terms, that I originally recommended. While I appreciate considerations weighing with Cabinet, they will not overlook that I have very close familiarity

with Gandhi and his tactics; that immediate responsibility for handling of the situation falls on me; and that equally general position is one which I have handled for a good many years. Before putting forward my earlier recommendations, to which I adhere, I had given the fullest weight to the points taken in the Cabinet discussion. I remain clear that the draft, in the light of their views, and the course I have already recommended is the right one.

2. On specific points:—

(*a*) I fully realise attitude of Cabinet towards letting Gandhi fast to death. As you know I have myself had every sympathy with that course which I consistently pressed at earlier stages. It was only in the light of Lumley's views which have been before the Cabinet, and which carried conviction to me, that however reluctantly I have had to advise a different course, those views have the general support of Governors, and the full support of my Home Member, who has great experience. I have again discussed situation with Lumley. He reaffirms his earlier view, to which I must attach great weight since he is my most experienced Governor and responsible for the Province in which Gandhi is confined, that local reaction to letting Gandhi die as a prisoner would be far more dangerous and far-reaching than to his dying as a free man of his own choice, restraint having been removed. Point assumes additional importance in view of grievous food shortage in Bombay and increased tenseness of atmosphere there.

To consider releasing Gandhi on basis suggested in your telegram No. 27 now that he has hinted at a fast would in my judgment be impossible. It would be a great tactical success for Gandhi, and for us a humiliating surrender. It would leave us in a much weaker position for rearresting him if he started to give trouble again, and we should be no further forward if he subsequently resorted to this weapon. And he is quite unpredictable: whether released or not he is quite capable of fasting on any excuse that he thinks will be tactically sound.

On the other hand I see no difficulty about keeping him in prison until a fast endangers his health (though that would probably be only two or three days at the most after a fast began) and then setting him free on health grounds. I can arrange to make sure that he is not released until there is real danger. If he is released when in immediate danger of death and thereafter recovers and starts to make himself a nuisance again I shall have no hesitation in putting him back in jail the moment he infringes the law.

(*b*) Bhansali case is not in point: Bhansali is not a prisoner or under detention. He is indulging in a private fast in his own house which we cannot stop unless we buy him off by promise of an enquiry. I have no intention of agreeing to that. If he wants to die I am perfectly prepared to let him die. No analogy can

[1] No. 326.

be drawn between his case and Gandhi's. As for the Working Committee, I see little risk of their resorting to a fast: that is not their technique.

3. Attitude of my Council is also relevant. As already explained, I am treating my present correspondence with Gandhi as wholly personal and have not communicated it to them. No hint of it has therefore got out. If I definitely put to them now the issue of letting Gandhi fast and die at this stage news is bound to get out and a press agitation to develop, while I would certainly not anticipate united support and might very well have a majority against me. Resignation of Hindus on such an issue would have most unfortunate effect and I doubt certain of them being willing to shelter behind fact that responsibility was mine. They will probably be most difficult to handle and I shall be in a much better position to deal with them if I follow course I have already indicated.

4. As regards terms of my letter, it is based on close acquaintance with the working of Gandhi's mind and I attach great importance to its issuing as it stands, without strengthening or modification. Its object is to get him to show his hand, in which I hope, though I may be disappointed, that it will succeed. Reliable report[2] received since I telegraphed to you is to the effect that he originally decided on a 21 days fast from 18th January to 8th February but subsequently decided to send me a friendly letter. My letter gives him no change, but puts it on him to come back if he has further justification. Its second paragraph brings out quite sufficiently clearly to Gandhi, who has had the newspapers, my judgment of Congress responsibility (his sensitiveness and that of his entourage on this point is well illustrated by fact that I have yesterday received a letter[3] from Miss Slade, his companion in jail, protesting vigorously against suggestion in Indian and European and American Press that Gandhi and/or Working Committee are pro-Japanese, and sending documents designed to show that they are not).

5. If Cabinet are in doubt over any point I hope that they will let me know, but I repeat in the strongest terms possible that my advice to them is that I should reply to Gandhi in the terms of the letter I have communicated to you, and with the minimum of delay, and that we should consider the matter again when we receive reply.

[2] Evidently No. 317. [3] No. 296.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (43) 16

L/P&J/8/600: f 465

INDIA

PROPOSED REPLY TO MR. GANDHI AND TREATMENT IF HE UNDERTAKES A FAST

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, *11 January 1943*

I circulate for consideration by the War Cabinet the Viceroy's reply[1] to my telegram No. 27[2] of the 8th January conveying the views of the War Cabinet. The handling of this situation seems to me essentially a matter in which the responsibility is that of the man on the spot and in which we must be guided by his judgment. In any case some answer to Mr. Gandhi's letter is now a matter of some urgency.

L. S. A.

[1] No. 334. [2] No. 326.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *11 January 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

I am sorry you have had this trouble with the Cabinet about the terms of the reply to be sent to Gandhi's letter to me. It really is very hard that a matter of this complexity on which you and I can reasonably claim to be the experts should be handled (as inevitably it had to be) at very short notice as one item on a long agenda at the end of a rather tiring day with the result that we get these references back. I have not a shadow of doubt as to the course which I recommended being the right one and indeed I felt some qualms (shared by Lumley when he looked at the correspondence) about even your own suggestion that I should omit certain of the more friendly references in my original draft. But I should be quite content if I could get a draft off in its present form as amended in agreement with you. Correspondence with Gandhi is a technique all of its own and the ordinary standards cannot wisely be applied. And it is essential to avoid giving him any handle on which to hand [hang?] an

argument, while he is better than most people at divining one's intentions from what one does *not* say. I send you by this bag a corrected copy of his letter to me—the original which I telegraphed to you was taken down by telephone from Bombay and there are one or two minor corrections as you will see made but nothing that in any way affects its sense. I was however much gratified when I got the original to find that it was headed not "31st December 1942" but "Detention Camp, New Year's Eve": and were the situation a little easier I should have been very tempted (and for good reason) to head my reply to him "Detention Camp, New Delhi" or possibly even, by way of balancing the fact that he is in the Aga Khan's Palace, "Detention Palace, New Delhi".

2. It has been very useful to have had Lumley here just at this moment for I was able to verify my own impress on by his. He gave me also the interesting note[1] by the jailer at the Aga Khan's Palace of which I send you a copy by this bag and on which I have briefly touched in my telegram. That suggests to me very strongly that this is all a matter of tactics so far as the old man is concerned. I have just received also from Miss Slade (Miraben) a long letter[2] protesting against the injustice that is done to Gandhi and Congress in the press of the world (and even in the Indian Nationalist press such as the *Bombay Chronicle*) by suggestions that they are pro-Japanese. That suggestion she repudiates with great vigour and begs me to inform the world of what she has said. I fear I cannot take on that responsibility, though I shall have to consider carefully in what terms to reply, as all this may be designed to work up to a point of grievance at which the Mahatma could feel that he had a legitimate complaint against us which would go down well outside if he resorted to a fast. But as you will see from the papers, of which I send you copies, whatever the attitude of Congress towards the Japanese may be, her Orissa memorandum clearly shows that at the time when these enquiries were on foot, Congress expected the Japanese to win, and that precisely conforms to my own feeling that one of the really strong reasons actuating the rebellion of last autumn was the conviction that the moment was a good one at which to move.

3. While on these matters, I have been well content to receive today a telegram[3] from Twynam—the gist of which I will repeat to you—from which it appears that Bhansali is likely to call off his fast having come to the conclusion (or rather Munshi having come to the conclusion) that there was nothing doing this round. Twynam, of whose capacity I have a very high opinion, has handled this business very well, and if in fact the fast is called off, it will be a very substantial achievement and one for which we may well be thankful. It would relieve the position in the Central Provinces and also relieve the Mahatma of a possible grievance. What has struck me most in all this Bhansali business has been the extraordinary strength of character and firmness of purpose of Aney. Aney has been under immense pressure from all quarters, but has stood quite

firm, and deserves the utmost credit for the resolution he has shown: I have great respect for the little man and this last episode has, if possible, increased it. He is thoroughly honest and straightforward, and has a fund of resistance within himself not too usual in this country.[4]

4. Phillips arrived here a couple of days ago. He could not have had a better press, and it is impossible to imagine a greater contrast to Johnson. He has admirable manners, is most friendly, and seems to me better really than anything we could reasonably have hoped for. I found him very agreeable, and I propose to keep in as close touch with him as possible and to see him at regular intervals. He and his Military Assistant are spending their first four days with us in the house here: and they have arrived at rather a good moment, as first Glancy, then the Lumleys and Metcalfes, and in a day or two Clow are all staying with me for shorter or longer periods. Glancy has asked Phillips to visit the Punjab as soon as convenient, which he has I gather accepted. That is all to the good, and it will give him the opportunity of seeing a most important agricultural Province, which is running the constitution smoothly and well, and the source of the bulk of our Indian Army recruitment. Phillips, who was very adroit in dealing with pressmen on arrival told me that he would like to keep out of Indian politics in the earlier stages. I told him that I thought he would find that pretty difficult, and I should be surprised if he succeeds. I am arranging for him to meet tonight at dinner Sarker, Firoz Khan Noon, Maxwell and Raisman, by way of giving him a first cut at my Council, and no doubt after he leaves me he will elaborate his Indian contacts pretty rapidly.

5. I send you an interesting letter[5] from Glancy dealing with the manœuvres in the Punjab that led up to the selection of Khizar Hyat Khan as Prime Minister in succession to Sikander. As perhaps I mentioned when I last commented, I am not perfectly certain that Khizar is quite the ideal man to carry this burden or that he has all the quality of Sikander. But he has substantial backing, and Glancy is now well in the saddle and in a position to give him a great deal of assistance, and I dare say, and certainly trust, that it will work out all right.

[1] No. 317. [2] No. 296. [3] Not printed.

[4] See No. 305, note 2. Following the intervention of Dr Khare, Professor Bhansali agreed to break his fast (which he did on 12 January) and drop his demand for a public enquiry into the alleged outrages at Chimur. In return, the Central Provinces Government agreed to lift the ban on press reports relating to Chimur and Professor Bhansali's fast, and the latter was assured that Mr Aney would accompany Dr Khare and himself on a visit to Chimur to meet the people. Mr Aney, who came from the Central Provinces, was involved because Professor Bhansali had originally come to Delhi at the beginning of November to ask him to intervene in the Chimur affair. On Mr Aney's refusal, Professor Bhansali had attempted to fast in Mr Aney's house but had been removed. L/P&J/8/611.

[5] Of 2 January. MSS. EUR. F. 125/92.

6. I have just had your telegram[6] about the Food expert, and am most grateful to you and to the Ministry of Food. It sounds to me as though Vigor was exactly the type of man that we needed, and I hope it will be possible to get him. I think it would be wise also to get an underling of some sort who is thoroughly familiar with the technique of rationing—possibly one of the more junior Food officers, for we may have to consider rationing in certain of the big cities (it is obviously not practical politics in the countryside) and we are of course very innocent here of any of the practical experience of handling that problem at home which would be so very valuable. The situation is a very grave one and does not improve. By way of strengthening the Department I have taken Major-General Wood, whom I had designated as Director-General of Munitions Production in succession to Guthrie Russell at Calcutta and who was just about to take over that job, and who, as you will remember, did excellent work in connection with the evacuation from Burma, to be Additional Secretary and work with Holdsworth. That will give me a strong team, and the qualities of the two men are such as to complement one another very usefully; while the situation is so acute that the burden falling on Holdsworth as Secretary (even though he has a substantial team underneath) is greater I think than it was reasonable to expect him to carry. But the vital thing now is that we should get 200,000 tons[7] of wheat imported into this country by April, and more important still, that we should without any delay and preferably in the course of the next few days, be able to make a public announcement to the effect that that is the position, for could we but make such an announcement it would immensely ease the strain and soothe the nerves of the rather disturbingly numerous people who are now beginning to be seriously alarmed.

[Para. 7, on labour for rubber in Ceylon; and para. 8, on air passages for Lumley and family, omitted.]

9. I have had a further memorandum[8] from Ambedkar about the Depressed Classes and the Cripps proposals. I send it to you in original by this bag. It deals, as you will see, entirely with the question of a Constituent Assembly. I do not think I need assure you that no one has (or will) get any change out of me, in any reply of mine to hypothetical questions about a Constituent Assembly! You will no doubt consider what message you may wish me to pass back to Ambedkar in reply to the request in his covering letter. The memorandum is another good illustration of the type of difficulty that lies ahead.

[Paras. 10–13, on the Orissa States; and para. 14, on Kotah, omitted.]

All the best!

[6] Not printed. [7] See No. 332. [8] See No. 125, note 2.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *11 January 1943*

The Gandhi discussion was, as most Indian discussions are, hopelessly confused, because Winston, without giving one time ever to explain the situation, or ever really reading the papers himself, sails in with a monologue, and nobody else gets a chance of really setting out their point of view. My impression is that the Cabinet, with a little reluctance, would have accepted your conclusions. As it is, someone, at the end of half-an-hour's confused discussion, suggested that it might be better to let Gandhi out altogether as an act of grace, not realising that if that were done at all, it should have been done before he wrote his letter threatening a fast, nor realising what the effect would be in relation to the other prisoners. I am afraid we shall go through the usual process of time wasted over confused and unreal discussion to humour Winston, ending in your getting your own way if you are firm enough.

2. I have had several good talks with Zafrulla, who is most interesting on the subject both of American views on India and on Chinese conceit and imperialism. He thinks that the Chinese quite seriously, in their present swollen-headed mood, think of reacquiring suzerainty not merely over Tibet, but over Nepal, Bhutan and Upper Burma! On the other hand, he is also very doubtful whether China will not relapse into civil war between the Communists and Kuomintang very soon after this war is over. On the subject of the Indian political situation he told me that it would have been quite impossible for Mudaliar not to have put forward some positive policy such as that of Indianisation and of opening up an enquiry into the future constitution.[1] Certainly his move seems to have thrown confusion into the ranks of those who had never thought of any solution except on Congress lines, and to that extent it may have been all to the good. I don't know whether the conference eventually passed anything in the nature of a resolution on the subject—the Jam Saheb has just told me that he believes something of the sort did take place.

3. He had just come into my room with the sad news of his father's death and I agreed with him that he had much better fly back at once. This would incidentally fit in with what he had told me only an hour or two before of a telegram he had received from Bikaner hoping that he might be back for a meeting of the Chamber in February or March. The United States and Canadian trip could no doubt be fitted in equally well for May and June if the Jam

[1] See No. 301, note 4, and No. 354.

Saheb can get away from India again some time early in April. He has done very well indeed here and I hope when you see him you will tell him how highly I have appreciated his work, not only as a colleague, but also in going about the country talking to troops, &c. I shall no doubt have an opportunity before he goes, of again resuming strongly what I have already said to him about the necessity of bringing the small States into order.

* * *

5. To return to Zafrulla. He and Spens met at Lunch at our house today and clicked very happily, both personally and in their conviction that the Lord Chancellor is wrong in trying to prevent the extension of the functions of the Federal Court at the present moment. They are coming to have a full-dress talk with me on the subject one day next week.

* * *

7. I gather you feel something of the same sort about Auchinleck's studying the future of the Indian Army while Wavell is conducting operations. Personally I should have thought the difficulty was less in this case as it would be concerned entirely with matters of post-war organisation—you describe it as Indianisation, but of course it would include a good deal more than that, e.g. the extent to which air and mechanisation would supersede the present basic organisation. I do not wish to press you unduly on the subject, but I think it might be worth while your giving it further thought from that point of view.

8. I am glad to say that we have got you a really first-rate man for the wheat question in Vigor,[2] and I hope that he will be able to fly out before the end of the month.

Most grateful.
L.

9. Your telegram[3] on the subject of a proposed Colonial declaration inspired Winston to a most fervid harangue against giving away the Empire and from that point of view was all to the good. As a matter of fact, the declaration as now whittled down is quite harmless in itself and indeed beneficial, in so far as it definitely asserts that only the parent or trustee State is going to be responsible for administration, while these regional councils ought to give us an excuse for getting rid for good and all of the mandatory system.

Good!
L.

[2] See No. 284. [3] No. 310.

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War Cabinet W.M. (43) 7th Conclusions

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 12 January 1943 at 12.30 pm were: Mr Churchill (in the Chair), Mr Attlee, Mr Anthony Eden, Sir John Anderson, Mr Oliver Lyttelton

Also present were: Viscount Simon, Viscount Cranborne, Mr Amery, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Sir Stafford Cripps

INDIA

Minute 1

L/PO/6/102b: f 418

Detention of Gandhi

(Previous Reference: W.M. (43) 4th Conclusions, Minute 2)[1]

The War Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (43) 16)[2] covering copies of the telegram sent to the Viceroy in pursuance of the War Cabinet's decision of 7th January, and of the Viceroy's reply, on the question of Gandhi's detention.

The Viceroy had given full consideration to the War Cabinet's views, but still favoured the course which he had recommended in the correspondence previously circulated with W.P. (43) 5.[3] He added that in his judgment it would be an act of weakness to release Gandhi on compassionate grounds at this stage, now that he had hinted that he was contemplating a fast. He also made it clear that, if the course which he recommended were adopted, Gandhi would be kept in detention until his fast was actually endangering his health (possibly two or three days after his fast began); and, further, that if after his release he recovered his health and again began to stir up trouble, he would be brought back into detention the moment he infringed the law.

The Viceroy also reaffirmed his view that Gandhi's personal letter should be answered without further delay in the terms of the draft set out in his telegram (38–S)[4] dated 6th January.

The general view of the War Cabinet was that, having made their views known, they must leave the final decision in this matter to the responsible authority on the spot.

The War Cabinet—

Invited the Secretary of State for India to inform the Viceroy as follows:—

That the War Cabinet's views on this matter had not changed but that they did not wish to interfere with the considered judgment of the

[1] No. 323. [2] No. 335. [3] No. 314. [4] No. 319.

Viceroy—on whom lay the immediate responsibility for handling the situation—that the matter would best be dealt with on the lines he had proposed both as regards (*a*) the terms of the reply to be sent to [Mr.] Gandhi and (*b*) the action to be taken if Mr. Gandhi undertakes a fast.

Minute 2

L/E/8/3301: f 283

Food Situation

Reference was made to recent telegrams from the Viceroy reporting the development of a serious food shortage in India.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA outlined the action taken by the Government of India to secure a greater measure of centralisation in the control of food supplies, through the establishment of a new Food Ministry at Delhi. In view of the increasing gravity of the situation, arrangements had now been made to send out as an adviser to the Government of India an experienced official of the Ministry of Food.

The War Cabinet—

Invited the Secretary of State for India to ask the Minister of State if he could also arrange to send to India an official who had had experience in the Middle East in overcoming the tendency of producers of cereals to withhold supplies from the market during periods of shortage.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: f 417

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *12 January 1943, 1.50 am*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

43. Your p. and p. telegram 81–S.[1] Gandhi. Cabinet have just considered the matter again and while not entirely convinced felt they must leave handling of this matter to you. Effect is that you can send your proposed reply to Gandhi. I will telegraph formal Cabinet conclusion later to-day.

[1] No. 334.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: f 416

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *12 January 1943, 7.25 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 13 January*

44. Your p. and p. telegram 81–S[1] of 11th January. Gandhi. War Cabinet have considered matter again in light of your further views. They requested me to inform you that their views had not changed but that, as the immediate responsibility for handling the situation is yours, they do not wish to interfere with your considered judgment that the matter would best be dealt with on the lines you have proposed both as regards the terms of the reply to be sent to Gandhi[2] and the action to be taken if Gandhi undertakes a fast.

[1] No. 334.

[2] Lord Linlithgow's letter to Mr Gandhi issued on 13 January 1943 as at No. 319 with those amendments suggested by Mr Amery in No. 321 to which Lord Linlithgow agreed in No. 322. Mr Amery's amendment to the penultimate sentence of para. 2 was altered to read: 'Congress movement and with the Party and those who follow its lead.' MSS. EUR. F. 125/125.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

L/P&S/13/998: ff 216–19

INDIA OFFICE, *12 January 1943*

My dear Linlithgow,

I have just had a good talk with the Jam Sahib before his departure on the matters raised in your official letter[1] to him. He was evidently very much reassured by the letter as a whole, though he did suggest that some of it was a little bit in the nature of a lecture. I said that it was precisely for that reason, because you wished to be able to be perfectly frank with him and his fellow rulers, that it had been decided that your letter, like his,[2] should be a private and confidential one and not, as had at one time been suggested by the Cabinet, a public document, the matter of public reassurance being sufficiently covered by my answer[3] to Astor's question. He readily accepted the force of that argument.

2. On the general question of the States putting their house in order I took it to some extent in two parts. First of all, there was the danger to the major States involved in their being associated with the discredit of a multitude of

[1] No. 274 as amended by Nos. 285 and 309. [2] Vol. II, No. 115.

[3] See Annexure C to No. 290.

small units quite incapable of ever providing decent administration. On this I urged that it was his duty to make his major fellow-Rulers realise that their direct interest lay in the solution of that problem. On that point, as in our previous talk, he expressed entire agreement with the principle, and specified the smaller Kathiawar jagirdars and States as an instance of a part of the problem that really required urgent dealing with. Without telling him explicitly how far we have got in connection with the Shattock Report,[4] I said that I knew from our correspondence that the problem of these States was very much in your mind as one of the very first to tackle in that connection, and that I was sure that he would give all the help he could. That enabled me incidentally to discuss the question of improving the administration of such smaller States, attached to larger ones, by grant-in-aid, even if certain functions were not actually transferred. He quite agreed in principle, but pointed out that it would be a little difficult for him to tax his own people for the benefit of attached jagirs unless they in their turn made some contribution to the general revenue of the whole and so enabled him to feel, on behalf of his people, that their bread, if cast on the waters now, would presently come back to them.[5]

3. Having dealt with the question of the smaller or non-viable States, I then added that it was no less essential that the major States themselves should keep abreast of what the conscience of the time demands and that I hoped there would be a collective feeling on their part that bad patches had an effect in prejudicing their case in the eyes of the world, as well as in those of India, quite disproportionate to the number of States affected. I made it clear that what I was thinking of was not only a decent standard of administration, but also reasonable means of contact with their peoples which would enable the views and interests of their peoples to be represented. I expressly disclaimed any idea on our part of wishing to force parliamentary institutions of the British type upon them: they might for all I knew prefer to experiment in the direction of functional representation or of representative gatherings of a more local character, which the Ruler would, with his ministers, visit in turn; in fact, we were not at all concerned with method, which was their own affair, but with the broad general result of peoples who were satisfied and who had good reason to be satisfied. With all this he expressed entire agreement. I made it very clear that I regarded the matter as one of the first importance, adding that I felt it all the more because I was convinced that the Princes could yet play a very big part in the development of the whole Indian constitutional system. I said that you felt no less strongly yourself and would undoubtedly before leaving, whether at the Chamber or in some other manner, take the opportunity of summing up to them your views on this matter.

4. As regards the question of terms of adhesion dealt with in paragraph 5 of your letter, I made it clear that the Princes approached the question of union

with an entirely free hand. It was open to them, individually or collectively, to stipulate that any Indian union to which they adhered must be a union under the Crown and to reserve to themselves explicitly the right of secession from such a union if that union seceded from the Crown. Similarly, they were free to decide in respect of what functions they still wished to remain in relationship with the Crown Representative, rather than with the new Government of the Union, giving such a matter as inheritance and adoption as an instance. He was, I think, really entirely satisfied with the paragraph itself, but rather harked back to the things Cripps seems to have said either to the Princes or in the House (he quoted Cripps' commendation of Indore as an instance of this).[6] I told him that he really should not worry about *obiter dicta* whether made in India or in the House, and the position in your letter was perfectly clear.

5. On the question of a possible States Union, I said that while your letter made it clear that we certainly do not deny to the States, as a matter of principle, rights which were admitted in the case of the Provinces, it was essential that he should remember that the object of the provincial concession was not any desire or belief on our part that it would, or even could, in fact be exercised, but as an intimation to the majority that they must be prepared to compromise and come to terms on the type of constitution under which the different elements of India's national life could work in harmony together. It was, of course, in any case a question of degree. Even if the Cripps method of constitution-forming were adopted and, say, Assam and Orissa decided to stand out, we should not regard an arrangement between them as constituting a dominion or an independent union outside the Empire. Similarly, I had no doubt that he would not propose to claim such a position for a union between Nawanagar and Porbandar, supposing the other States entered an Indian Union. Further, as you pointed out, the question teemed with practical difficulties. If such a union were constituted it would, I imagine, be one under the Crown—to this he assented very vigorously. That would mean that certain functions now exercised by the States individually and so in their relationship to the Crown Representative, would then be transferred to and exercised by the new Union in relation to the Crown Representative: in other words a States Union, no less than a general Union of all India, would of course affect the local sovereignty and also the local relationship to the Crown of each State. In any case, I gathered that he is not thinking of this matter, apart from its importance as an effective bargaining counter with Congress. As he said, pointing to the map of the States behind me, it is almost easier geographically for the States to form an effective working union than it is for the provinces of British India. I did not

[4] J. S. H. Shattock, 'A Report on the Future of the Smaller States and Estates of Gujarat and Kathiawar'. Dated 1 November 1940 and received in the India Office 30 March 1942.

[5] Ecclesiastes xi, 1.

[6] Cf. Vol. II, No. 678, para. 19.

go into the question that, geography apart, psychologically the States are going to be just as shy of combining under each other as of coming under an all-India Government.

6. I said to him that in this matter the States, while conscious of their complete freedom of choice and of their immediate responsibility for the welfare of their own subjects, would also never lose out of sight the greatness and welfare of India as a whole and their share of responsibility for India's future. This led to the subject of their enquiry into the future Indian constitution, as to which I repeated, what I had said before, namely that I thought you were right in discouraging them[7] from trying to bring in to their investigations British-Indian political leaders in their present infructuous and sterile mood, and that what was important was that they should really be masters of their subject and come to their own conclusions, well documented and well supported by statistics, of what they felt was the proper all-India constitution. Fortified in this way they would exercise a very powerful influence, and I quoted the example of what a little body of men did in South Africa both to pave the way for Union and to settle the type of constitution.

7. I think our talks have been very useful. I certainly have not failed to impress him with the importance of the States bringing themselves more up-to-date and freeing themselves from the charges now so often with justification brought against them. But I have also equally encouraged him to feel that I do regard the States as an element of the first importance in the shaping of the future India and as an element on whose sense of responsibility the future development of India must very largely depend.

8. If he finds on his return that it will be compatible with his obligations as Chancellor and with the position in his State, there seems much to be said for his coming back in April for a short visit here before going to spend May and June in America. He was prepared to consider this when he left. I know originally we considered the possibility of changes, but I am not sure that in view both of his very successful personality and of his position as Chancellor of the Chamber, it would not be better for him to come back at any rate to carry out the visits to America and Canada. I realise however that such an arrangement may be dependent on who succeeds Bikaner as Pro-Chancellor. In certain circumstances it might not be easy for the Chancellor to absent himself. Should it prove impossible for him to come back we should have to consider his relief here, say by Bhopal. But there perhaps need be no objection to some months intervening before the arrival of a new representative at the War Cabinet.

Yours ever,

L. S. A.

[7] Vol. II, No. 338.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *13 January 1943*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL
No. 101–S. Your private and personal telegram of 12th January No. 43.[1] Gandhi. I am most grateful and hope you had not too rough a passage. I am glad that we have got Cabinet approval for policy to be adopted as regards a fast. I am also much relieved that they approved my draft letter. We may of course fail to get what we want as a result of tactics represented by that letter but I am sure it is the right first move, and we can consider matter further when I get Gandhi's reply.

[1] No. 339.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *13 January 1943*
No. 102–S. Your private and personal telegram of 12th January, No. 44.[1] Gandhi. I am most grateful to the War Cabinet.

[1] No. 340.

344

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/5/41: f 47

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *13 January 1943, 12.5 am*
PERSONAL
MOST SECRET
698. Approach to U.S. Government regarding Colonial Policy.

Matter has been reconsidered by H.M.G. and draft of joint declaration was revised as in my next succeeding personal telegram. Subject to consideration of any further observations by Dominion Governments Halifax is to be instructed to approach Hull on these lines forthwith.

2. Declaration is not intended, and from its phraseology could not be held, to apply to countries like India and Burma as "Colonial territories". When once the area of S.E. Asia to be covered and the functions of the Commission have been defined it can be decided as a matter of fact whether India and Burma have a major economic or strategic interest in the region and could with advantage have representation on the Commission. The existence of a considerable Indian population in one of the territories would not of itself constitute a major economic interest.

3. I think that in view of the above the revised draft if accepted by U.S. Govt. is not open to objection so far as India and Burma are concerned.

4. Please repeat this and succeeding telm. to Governor of Burma as telegrams Nos. 23 and 24.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/5/41: f 48

IMPORTANT
PERSONAL
MOST SECRET

INDIA OFFICE, *13 January 1943, 6.40 am*
Received: 14 January

699. My immediately preceding telegram. Following is revised text.

Begins. The immediate object of the United Nations is to defeat the present aggression and to render future aggression impossible. This requires for its successful achievement the establishment of conditions under which security, prosperity and equal opportunity can be assured to all peoples.

2. This then is the aim of those nations which have, owing to past events, become charged with responsibilities for the future of Colonial peoples. But it is evident that while some peoples are far advanced along this road, the development and resources of others are not yet such as to enable them to achieve security and prosperity by themselves. It is therefore the duty of "Parent or Trustee" States to guide and develop the social, economic and political institutions of the Colonial peoples until they are able without danger to themselves and others to discharge the responsibilities of Government.

3. Freedom from fear and want should be the assured possession not of some but of all peoples. It is the clear responsibility of the "Parent or Trustee" States to enter into general defence schemes designed to secure the safety of all peoples. The duty of guidance[1] must be discharged in the general interest of all nations as well as in the particular interest of the peoples of the territories

concerned. In pursuance of this policy, the natural resources of Colonial territories should be organised and marketed not for the promotion merely of commercial ends but rather for the service of the people concerned and of the world as a whole.

4. The "Parent or Trustee" States will remain responsible for the administration of their territories. But the policy embodied in this Declaration cannot successfully be pursued without a large measure of co-operation between nations. We accordingly propose the establishment for certain regions, as soon as circumstances permit, of Commissions comprising both the "Parent or Trustee" States concerned in the region and other states, which have a major strategic or economic interest there. The machinery of each Commission should be designed to give the people of the territories an opportunity to be associated with its work. These Commissions will provide effective machinery for consultation and collaboration, so that the States concerned may work together to promote the advancement of the Colonial peoples and the general welfare of mankind. *Ends.*

Repeated to Governor of Burma.

[1] 'duty of guidance' deciphered as 'duty guide'.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/5/41: f 50

PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *13 January 1943, 10.30 am*

MOST SECRET

700. My personal telegram No. 698[1] dated 13th January repeated to Governor of Burma and your personal telegram of 2nd January No. 12–S.C.[2] I was greatly obliged by this clear exposition of your views which correspond with my own on the general question. H.M.G. had your telegram before them in considering revised draft which seems to me, as I hope you will agree, an improvement on the previous one.

[1] No. 344. [2] No. 310.

347

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *13 January 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Many thanks for your letter of 23rd December.[1] You may be sure that I will keep a close watch on Brigadier Richard Law!

2. My last letter[2] will have given you my first impressions of Phillips. He has now left us and is settling down in his own house: but the very favourable first impression which he has created is valuable and I hope that he too may have been satisfied as to our friendliness here and our anxiety to work with him. He must of course make his own contacts, and the wider they are the better, for the wider they are the more they will impress him both with the extreme difficulty of harmonizing the different pieces in this pattern and, I hope, with the sincerity of the endeavours that we have made, however little our success, to do so.

* * *

4. Before this letter issues I shall probably hear from you about the food situation: but I would like to thank you at once for your telegram[3] of 12th January. I got off a reply[4] last night to various questions which you put to me in that telegram, and I hope that those replies may strengthen your hand a little. At any rate your telegram very clearly shows the anxiety of the India Office and of yourself to get other people to help us over this, and I am very grateful. I have sent Wood, who has just taken over as Additional Secretary in the Food Department, up to the Punjab from which he expects to return on Monday, and I am not without hope that he may be able after further discussion with Glancy, to suggest additional means of trying to get some of the wheat which is in that Province out of it a little more quickly than at present.

5. I quite sympathize with Agatha Harrison's anxiety to get the Mahatma on to the right lines and there is nothing very controversial in her letter,[5] a good deal of which indeed is sensible enough. But I would not feel justified in making a special exception at this stage, and I propose therefore to mark time. I suggest that you say nothing to her for the present beyond that you have sent her letter on to me: nor do I think there is any occasion for me to reply to her. We must now see on the general position as between Gandhi and ourselves what reply the old man sends to my letter to him which I despatched yesterday. As I said in my personal telegram[6] to you, we may of course find the reply disappointing when it comes. But I am certain that the method of approach is the right one and that it would have been a mistake to have been any more

positive than my draft. I would not be at all surprised if the Mahatma should be considering a sort of pincer movement against us! one arm of the pincer represented by his overture (if his letter to me can be considered an overture!): the other by Miraben's document[7] suggesting that we should make it clear to the world that on the evidence supplied by the Congress themselves that body and its leaders were as anti-Japanese as anybody could be. Our failure to do so will be represented as evidence of our ill-faith, and the impossibility of Congress making the position clear to the world so long as its leaders were behind prison bars. We shall see.

15 January

6. I have telegraphed[8] to let you know the conclusion of the Bhansali case, and to add that while I agreed with Twynam that it left something to be desired, I also accepted his view that it was well worth getting it settled on these terms. The terms, as you will remember, included a statement in a letter from Khare to Bhansali that Aney would accompany Bhansali to Chimur. I naturally (and Twynam also) assumed that so positive a statement as that on so important a matter could only have been made as a result of some contact between Khare and Aney until I saw Twynam's official telegram to my Home Department making it clear that that statement was made on Khare's own authority only. You may judge my surprise when Aney came to see me next morning to say that he took very strong exception to that statement, that he had never had any intention of visiting Chimur with Bhansali and had authorized nothing to be said to that effect; that he had always been opposed to a visit by himself to Chimur in such circumstances, and that his objection remained as strong as ever since it went without saying that he could not possibly go there with Bhansali without something approaching a private enquiry taking place or the suggestion being made that he had been party to private enquiries on the spot from which he was wholly averse. I told him after checking up what Twynam had said that I sympathised entirely with him and wholly shared his view; that it seemed clear that Khare must have gone much further than he had any right to go, but that at the stage things had reached all I could advise Aney about it was to play for time (since Bhansali would certainly not be fit to visit Chimur for some time to come) and in due course make excuses for not going there in his company in the hope that this business would blow over. Relations between

[1] No. 294. [2] No. 336, para. 4.

[3] Tel. 690, sent as the result of discussion of the Indian request for wheat supplies in the Shipping Committee of the War Cabinet. It raised various possibilities of economy in the consumption and distribution of cereals and in the use of Indian registered tonnage, and suggested that the shipment of civil supplies from Australia should be eliminated entirely over the next three months. L/E/8/3297: ff 218–20.

[4] Tel. 105-S of 14 January. L/E/8/3297: f 217. See also No. 350, note 2.

[5] Enclosure to No. 294. [6] No. 342. [7] No. 296.

[8] Not printed; but see No. 336, note 4.

Khare and Aney are not, I would judge, likely to be improved by this incident. Through the whole business Aney has been quite astonishingly stout-hearted and I told him how well I thought he had behaved.

7. Talking of Aney reminds me that *à propos* of some correspondence we have been having with the Burma Government about arrangements for the return to Burma of Indians domiciled in that country or temporarily resident, but now evacuees in India, he told me that the whole question of the future of Burma had been very much in his mind and that he had reached certain views himself which he thought he had better let me know entirely privately. Those views were, he said, entirely the product of his own reflection; as he had had no discussion with anyone, nor had he been prompted. But what had occurred to him must be occurring to others: and it was as well perhaps that I should know how his own mind was working. The feeling was now quite definitely so far as the natives of India were concerned, that India could not allow any to go back to Burma until a settlement had been reached with Burma as to the future. He was quite clear that in the light of what had happened complete autonomy for Burma would be highly prejudicial to the independence of India. Burma had shown quite clearly during the campaign and previously that her inhabitants were prepared neither to fight nor to work; and he for one could no longer contemplate complete separation. The new Central Government of India envisaged in the declarations made by His Majesty's Government would of course be entirely Indian in composition, and that Government would be justified in demanding that the whole problem should be reopened and re-examined from the point of view of India. If Great Britain wanted to insist, as she could of course at this time insist, on the separation of Burma he was quite certain that the problems that would without delay arise between Burma and India would be such as to result in a permanent estrangement and deep and bitter feeling between those two countries.

8. I replied to Aney, whose honesty and straightforwardness is one of his many attractive qualities, that all that was and had been in my mind; that the problem, as he well realised, was far from an easy one; but that if India were to take the line that he suggested he would recognize that there was the risk that Burma might say that India did not take that line when Great Britain wanted rights in India for her defence and that of her Empire. Aney replied that the cases were in his judgment quite different. Burma was next door to India; she was another Oriental country; that the defence interests of the homeland certainly required the consideration of India's interests: and that India must have, and certainly will insist on having, a major say in the future position of Burma. Great Britain on the other hand no doubt wanted her foothold in India for Imperial purposes not all of which were necessarily good: that was neither here nor there. I might however take it as quite certain in the judgment of his

countrymen and of political feeling in this country that India would fight very hard for an effective voice in the disposal of Burma and the settlement of her future status. After seeing the collapse of Burma in the fighting line and realising from the difficulties that had arisen over immigration, &c. that Burma was prepared neither to work nor to fight and seemed to be dependent entirely on capital, labour and defence from outside, India, more particularly after Indian soldiers had gone back into Burma, would beyond any question insist most strongly that there must be modifications in any plan for the future of Burma so as to take account of Indian interests. We left it at that. But my Council are aware that Raisman also was invited by His Majesty's Government when he was home last autumn to pay for the campaign in Burma on the ground that India was interested in Burma's future. I foresee, as I have hinted to you before, very grave trouble in the future over this matter of Burma, but that will be for His Majesty's Government to face. It would however be very dangerous to underestimate the difficulties which our successors are likely to have here over it: and I think it only fair that you should have quite frankly at this stage what Aney has said to me, for his straightforward and vigorous mind has set out very clearly a point of view which I have good reasons to believe is in fact widely held and likely to reaffirm itself with the development of the campaign. On all these matters affecting Burma, I am particularly anxious not to appear to be lecturing Dorman-Smith or trespassing on his preserves: and I propose therefore to say nothing to him of this conversation, though I have no doubt that he and his advisers are fully alive to the battle that is likely to ensue on this whole issue.

* * *

10. I shall be telegraphing separately to you about this business of elections to Provincial Legislative Councils[9] on which I am most grateful for your help. I discussed it with Lumley, whose is of course one of the provinces affected. He had no very strong view and on the whole thought he could manage. But my own feeling is, and he did not disagree so far as Bombay was concerned, that the wise course, in the light of the views of the various Governors, will be to let Bengal and Assam have their elections, and in the remaining Section 93 Provinces concerned to postpone by an ordinance under Section 93 the necessity for election. I quite agree that if we adopt that course we may have to legislate[10]

[9] In the Provinces where Legislative Councils existed (Government of India Act 1935, Sec. 60) elections for approximately one-third of the seats were due to be held early in 1943. Some of the Governors concerned had enquired whether, in view of the war and the disturbances, these elections should be postponed. In the Section 93 Provinces this could be effected by a proclamation under that Section, but in Ministerial Provinces an amendment of the 1935 Act would be necessary. In telegram 22481 of 30 December Mr Amery had inclined to the view that the elections should be held in all the Provinces affected. L/P&J/7/4005.

[10] To enable normal working of the Councils to be resumed; see Lord Linlithgow's telegram to Mr Amery 138-G of 17 January, para. 4. *Ibid.*

if and when a Ministry comes back to power in those Provinces. But I fear I regard the prospect of any stable Ministry being achieved for a very long time as, in present circumstances, remote in the extreme, and I doubt therefore if that need very seriously affect our calculations.

11. I also discussed again with Lumley the matter of non-official advisers (I am sending you by this bag copy of a circular letter[11] which I have sent to the Governors concerned consequent on our discussions in the late autumn). He told me that he was increasingly opposed to their employment.

12. Lumley, like others, finds himself pretty hard pinched in terms of service personnel. His team is a very moderate one, and on the whole strong neither in quality nor in numbers. That is a tale with which I am only too sadly familiar from so many Provinces; but there is nothing for it but to make the best of what we have.

13. I was a little pressed in putting together my letter of the 12th January,[12] and did not, I fear, thank you for your very kind letter of 18th December,[13] and for what you were good enough to say in it about my speech at Calcutta. Now that I have had the *Times* of that period I note that they made no editorial comment on what was unquestionably a most important pronouncement, and recognized as such out here. I had much rather that they said nothing than that they should be critical! but they seem under the new dispensation a little anxious to have it both ways.

* * *

17. You will remember that in paragraph 11 of your letter of 16th December[14] you touched on the position of the Scheduled Castes. I made some interim comment in paragraph 14 of my reply of 5th January,[15] and I have since discussed the matter with Maxwell. He tells me that apart from the provision of special educational facilities, your proposal that we should lay down a proportion to be attained at the end of a given number of years with a smaller initial proportion does not differ very materially from a scheme which has been suggested by the Home Department and which is now under reference to the other Departments of the Central Government who would be affected by it. In making that reference, the Home Department have laid down the proportion of vacancies to which the Scheduled Castes would be entitled on a population basis (12·75 per cent.), but have suggested the reservation of only 5 per cent. of the vacancies in the first instance until suitable candidates in larger numbers are forthcoming. The reason for this was that to reserve a proportion of vacancies which the Scheduled Castes could not possibly fill would to some extent discredit their claims and exhibit them in an unfavourable light if the vacancies had subsequently to be treated as unreserved. Ambedkar subsequently suggested to Maxwell that the initial proportion might be raised to 7 per cent.

and this and other suggestions made by him will be discussed further with him after the departmental replies have been received. It is of course part of the essence of your proposal that special educational facilities should be provided in order to accelerate the process by which the Scheduled Castes will be able to fill vacancies in proportion to their population. It is quite possible, Maxwell tells me, that something might be worth doing on these lines, but it would require the co-operation of the provinces, or else large subsidies from the Centre, and as a long-term proposition it might not survive the changes in view in the Constitution. Ambedkar in these circumstances is, it appears, naturally more interested in what he can get immediately, and thinks that the reservation of vacancies at the present time will in itself act as an incentive to the Scheduled Castes in improving their education especially as it will be combined with a relaxation of the age limit for candidates and a reduction of their examination fees. You will see from this that we are fully alive to the position, and you will not require any assurance of my own great sympathy with the Scheduled Castes and my anxiety to see anything done that properly can be done to help them forward.

18 January

18. Many thanks for your letter of the 29th December.[16] I have read with great interest the account of your talks with the Jam Saheb, and I am most grateful for all your help with him. I am sorry that after all the trouble you and I have been to to get his visit to the United States on to the right lines, his father's death should have upset our plans. As a result of course I shall be seeing the Jam Saheb a great deal earlier than I otherwise should have expected. I shall be much interested to see what his reactions are to the interesting time that he has had at home. The conversations with you bring out well what one has found so much of a difficulty; that neither from the Jam Saheb nor from any of these "progressive" Rulers can one hope for as much assistance as one might reasonably expect over the smaller Rulers. I am very glad too that you said to him what you did about Federation. The Princes, as in the past, will be anxious to get the best of both worlds. But if they are to survive they will find that they will have to make some sacrifices, however intolerable those sacrifices may be. I agree with you in thinking that the scheme of 1935 has most substantial advantages.

19. But I fear I see little or no prospect of the Princes making the running in the general constitutional fields; the fact is that no one is anxious to make the running here and it will be quite hopeless to expect any of them to get down, here, to that preliminary work which is so essential if they are to clear their own minds for the post-war constitutional discussions. I shall be very surprised if

[11] No. 331. [12] No. 336; the date should be 11 January. [13] No. 283. [14] No. 280.
[15] No. 315. [16] No. 301.

those discussions (if they ever come into being) do not turn essentially on issues of policy of the widest character. But there is little to be gained by speculating at this stage as to what line they are likely to take.

20. I am so glad that our I.P.R. team should have made so good an impression, and Mudaliar, of course, is admirable at setting out a case objectively, and at conveying an impression of balance and lack of prejudice; while he has the other great merit of being able to deal without hesitation with hecklers over cross-examination.

21. I hope to let you have something in a few days about the succession to Maxwell. I do not expect that it will be any different from what I have already foreshadowed, viz., Usman to succeed Maxwell; Aziz-ul-Haque to succeed Usman; Bijoy Prasad Singh Roy, if willing to serve, to succeed Aziz-ul-Haque. But I am still a little held up by the problem of finding another Hindu portfolio, and I have toyed a little with the idea of bringing back Mudaliar, who has now been about long enough at home, and setting him to work here possibly in some position in which he could get further experience of the working of the Finance Department.

22. All this is for your own eye only, and I would prefer that nothing should be said to Aziz-ul-Haque. I hope to be able to let you have a recommendation sufficiently early to fit in with his anxiety, which you mention in paragraph 8 of your letter, to go on leave some time in February. I am very glad indeed to have your judgment of the improving effect upon him of the time that he has been at home. Let me only add while we are on this point that Zafrullah can't have it both ways: though he is as anxious, as most Indians, to do so! He must make up his mind whether he wants to sit on the bench or to be a politician. He was an intolerable nuisance about the bench until he got firmly settled in there. But now it looks as though he would like to have the status, emoluments and pension of a Federal Court Judge, while being free to wander abroad promoting political understanding of India's point of view. I think he had better stick to the Law once his present journeyings are over.

* * *

28. As you may well imagine I have been seriously concerned about the inflation problem, and some little time ago I set the War Resources Committee of my Council working on it. We have had some very useful discussions, and as one important step active measures have been taken to investigate constructional and staff expenditures and see what we can do to keep the budget down under all those heads. I send you by this bag copies of a Circular which I sent to Governors and of their replies,[17] and I have found the Air Force and military authorities most ready to co-operate. It has been of great value in this connection to have had Gregory's wide experience available to us.

29. I am, as you know, very badly placed so far as Hindu vacancies in my Council go by the extreme shortness of suitable personnel. It occurred to me the other day that Khare, who in 1937–1938 was Prime Minister in the Central Provinces and to whose anxiety to get back into office you will have seen from time to time references in letters from Wylie and afterwards Twynam, might be worth considering: and I wrote to Twynam to ask for his judgment of him. I send you a copy of Twynam's reply[18] by this bag. As you will see he thinks well of the idea. But since I made my enquiry of Twynam, Khare has been deeply involved in this business about Professor Bhansali and his fast, and may well prove to have gone rather further than the facts justified in what he said to Bhansali about Aney: while apart from that, the fact that he has been so prominently associated with the calling off of the fast might, in the event of his subsequent selection for my Council, carry a significance in the eyes of the public which it certainly would not merit. It may be wiser therefore to keep him as a possibility in reserve until a later date.

30. In your letter of the 11th November[19] you referred to Patiala's representation that he ought to be kept more generally informed about what is going on outside his State, in India as a whole. He is well served, as he admits, with news from neighbouring administrations; and the Political Department, in May 1940, impressed upon all Residents the necessity for maintaining close liaison with Governors' Secretaries of neighbouring Provinces, so that both Governors and Residents might be kept constantly informed of events and tendencies in neighbouring territories. As a result of what Patiala said to me, however, Political Department and Home Department decided that, as I indicated to you briefly in my letter of 1st/2nd November 1942,[20] the best way of meeting this requirement was for Political Department to prepare suitable extracts from Provincial Governments' fortnightly reports and send them to selected States. All Provincial Governments have agreed to furnish their reports direct to the Political Department for this purpose, and the system is working so that a compilation is sent out shortly after the end of each fortnight. This compilation is sent to all States whom the Residents concerned think sufficiently trustworthy to receive so confidential a document, Patiala of course being one. Residents have all welcomed this innovation.

31. As for supplying States with authoritative information about the Home Department's plan of campaign, during the recent disturbances the Political Department were in the closest touch with the Home Department in connection with the arrest of Congress leaders. All Residents were secretly informed beforehand of the proposed arrests; they were warned that no preliminary information whatsoever should be disclosed as regards the intentions of the

17 and 18 Not printed. 19 No. 165. 20 No. 131, para. 42.

Government of India, but that as soon as the Congress Resolution had been ratified and the programme of arrests put into operation, it would be for them to arrange for the arrest and detention in the States concerned of any really important local leaders or organisers whose continuance at liberty was likely to endanger the all-India policy of averting the anticipated movement; and also of any British Indian leaders who might happen to be in State territories and whose arrests were desired by the Central or any Provincial Government. Action on these lines was duly and comprehensively taken in States immediately after the arrests in Bombay had occurred.

32. As for what you say in paragraph 8 of your letter of the 11th November, it is of course one of the principal policies of the Political Department to encourage and stimulate States to maintain forces adequate to ensure law and order within their territories either individually or, in the case of the smaller States, by a pooling of resources.

* * *

19 January

34. Thank you so much for all your help[21] about Food. I do fully realise the difficulties of His Majesty's Government and the sacrifices which are involved in helping us here. But you may be certain that we should not press you as we have done were the position not one of the greatest seriousness, and though the demands we have made must involve some interference with the general war effort, I am perfectly clear on the best judgment I can form that failure to meet them would be likely to result in a still more serious interference in war effort, in other ways. I have put Major-General Wood, whom I had previously designated as Director-General, Munitions Production, and who is one of my most active men, into the Food Department; for in agreement with the Commander-in-Chief, I think the Food situation at this moment is, in its defence, as well as in its civil, repercussions the most difficult fence we have to take. And the Chief's own judgment was that supply and war production could more wisely suffer than our arrangement for the organisation of the food position. Wood has just been to the Punjab, and I saw him today. I am very glad to say that certain further proposals carried by him to Lahore look like producing some little improvement in relation to the apply [supply?] of cereals by that most important Province, and I am sending him off tonight to the United Provinces to see what can be done there. You may be certain that no effort will be spared to screw production and organisation for distribution up to the highest pitch practicable. I have just had your telegram[22] about food in Ceylon, and I will of course be advised by you on that. As for the Persian Gulf and the Arab States, they are very much on my mind given our relations with them, and my sympathy for them is very real. But our own position has looked like being so desperate that I was clear I could take no chances.

35. There have been further developments, as you will see from the copies of telegrams[23] which I send you herewith, over the Bhansali case. But the case itself fortunately seems now to be attracting practically no newspaper attention. I have, of course, passed on to Aney what Twynam has told me. There seems no question that Munshi has tried to have the best of both worlds!

36. The Turkish Mission arrived in India yesterday, and reached Delhi this morning. I had them to lunch today and found them most friendly, and their reactions very interesting. I gathered with some amusement that they had been given to understand that this country lay under the yoke of a British despotism of unparalleled severity. They had been surprised in view of that to be welcomed at Karachi by a series of friendly and polite British Officials, Military and Civil, not one of whom had said a word to them about politics, and by a crowd of Hindu (by which of course they probably mean merely *Indian*) journalists who had besieged them with enquiries as to what they thought about India's independence; whether they were going to see Gandhi; whether they were going to see Nehru; their opinion of the Congress, &c. &c. From Karachi they had gone to Gwalior, an Indian State, as they said, as large as Belgium, where again they had been courteously received by officials entirely mum about politics; but the Press had not been in evidence. How, said they, did it come about that in Indian India without a word of protest from anyone they were free from these Press activities, while in British India the officials stood aside and allowed the utmost licence to Press enquiries from the nationalist point of view! I dare say that as they continue to journey around India they will find a good many inconsistencies of this type to ruminate over. But I need not say how pleased I am that their first reactions should apparently have been as friendly as they seem to be.

Best Luck!

[21] See No. 350. [22] The India Office file has been destroyed.

[23] See para. 6 above. The new developments principally concerned the assurance which Mr K. M. Munshi (acting on Professor Bhansali's behalf) stated in a letter of 13 January to Mr Aney had been given by Sir H. Twynam to see that Mr Aney would go to Chimur. On 15 January, Mr Aney sent Mr Munshi's letter to Lord Linlithgow commenting that it seemed to show 'that Dr Khare only carried to Prof. Bhansali the assurance which he had got from H.E. the Governor', and adding that, in view of the pledge given to Professor Bhansali, he would go to Chimur in April when the forthcoming session of the Legislative Assembly would be over. On 16 January, Lord Linlithgow informed Sir H. Twynam who replied on 18 January that he had given no such assurance and that his only concession had been that he 'would put no obstacle in the way of Aney, Khare and Bhansali visiting Chimur' provided the visit was not used for propaganda purposes. He had no objection to Mr Aney visiting Chimur in April, provided the 'visit would be *pro forma* only to give Bhansali an excuse for ceasing his fast'. L/P&J/8/611.

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Sir T. Stewart (Bihar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

CONFIDENTIAL CAMP, *14 January 1943*

No. 48–G.B.

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

I take an early opportunity to comment on Your Excellency's letter of 8th January[1] on the subject of non-official Advisers in Section 93 Provinces. I would again put on record that, having regard to this Province, it would be a mistake to introduce non-official Advisers. Whatever the political advantage that might accrue from such a course—and [a]part from the views which I have already expressed—the attitude during the recent rebellion of the class from which non-official Advisers would be drawn is not such as to encourage me to think a second uprising would be treated by them with resolution.

Yours sincerely,

T. A. STEWART

[1] No. 331.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *15 January 1943*

I attended the War Cabinet on Tuesday morning[1] prepared for a long discussion and resolved to be calm but firm in your support, however vehemently Winston might harangue us all. But Winston opened the proceedings by saying, with a cherubic and puckish smile, that he thought there was nothing for it but to accept your point of view and the whole discussion did not take ten minutes. We then discussed your urgent food situation for another ten minutes or so and the whole Cabinet lasted less than half-an-hour. Winston was so full of internal glee that I felt sure that there was something in the wind entirely unconnected with India. In fact, I wondered whether he had not decided to wing his way on another voyage of negotiation or energizing, either to North Africa or to Washington, and my suspicions were confirmed a few hours later when the poor Jam Saheb was turned back at Paddington and informed that the Liberator which had been fixed up for him the day before was no longer available. He is now going out via Lagos and I only hope he got away

yesterday morning from Bournemouth, though there has been a strong gale in the channel. It is very disappointing for him, both because of his own affairs in Nawanagar and because of Bikaner's critical condition. As for the new Winstoniad, you will know all about it[2] before you get this letter.

2. We had a Government lunch to Zafrulla on Wednesday, to which most of the War Cabinet and other Ministers came, how far induced by eagerness to see and hear Zafrulla (whom most of them already knew) or by the prospects of solid food and even wine, I cannot say. Anyhow, they were rewarded by an admirable little impromptu speech of Zafrulla's in which he touched lightly on the Indian situation, affirming his conviction that it was vital for India to stay in the British Commonwealth and that the danger of her going out would only arise if we appeared to be coercing her to stay in or to be going back on our promises. On China he was more restrained than in his private talk to me, but quite sufficiently illuminating, and equally so in his comments on the United States attitude over India. The whole thing was a great success and Bracken at once collared him for a broadcast. A further suggestion that he should meet the Press we agreed to head off as unsuitable for one in his judicial position.

3. In a talk with me yesterday he urged in general terms the importance of progressive Indianisation, not only in the Executive, but in the services, judicially [judiciary?] &c., so as to have trained and moderate men available for India purposes and forestall the places of Europeans being filled with ignorant and head-swelled political retainers. He did not raise the question of the Supreme Court, but said that in the High Courts some of the recent appointments from home had been weak and that while he was entirely in favour of really able men like Harries, there was much to be said for only bringing out the best Europeans and otherwise extending the scope for Indians. With regard to the fighting services he similarly stressed the importance of utilising to the full the young Indian Officers who had done well in the War and not bringing out fresh British juniors to replace them; also the importance of bringing more Indians in on the actual staff side. On the diplomatic side he urged the case for Bajpai's being made a full Minister, the arguments for which I need not repeat. So far as his own position at Chungking was concerned, he was quite content; for there the Chinese had treated him with every consideration and as senior to Ministers appointed after his arrival.

4. As regards himself, he is very anxious to be allowed to do useful public work of one sort or another during the five months of the law vacation. The only thing he has suggested in that connection was that he might revisit the

[1] No. 338.

[2] Mr Amery's telegram 2–U of 21 January informed Lord Linlithgow that Mr Churchill and President Roosevelt were meeting secretly to discuss plans for 1943. L/PO/10/34: f 165.

States and do what he found more effective than anything else, namely, meet quietly small groups of the academic and professional classes, whose opinions count for most in America. It has occurred to me, though he certainly did not hint at it, that there might be something to be said for Mudaliar renewing his contact with India and the Council, say from the beginning of June onwards, and having Zafrulla here as, so to speak, India's summer representative at the War Cabinet. He would certainly get on very well and I imagine there would be no insuperable difficulty in making him representative, even though not actually a member of the Council. The Australian representative, after all, is not actually a member of the Australian Cabinet, and in fact Earle Page was actually a member of the Opposition. My impression is, though I have not attempted to verify it, that Rufus Isaacs went on his first important financial and diplomatic mission to the United States in the last war while still Chief Justice. On the other hand, I am sure that Zafrulla would do admirably useful work in the States on the lines suggested at the beginning of this paragraph, and of course his status as a member of the Supreme Federal Court is a thing that deeply impresses Americans.

P.S. V.—
Speak. I find this hard to accept. He is a judge. I hardly think L.C.J. of England a parallel.
L.

5. In that connection Spens and Zafrulla are coming to see me one day next week about the enlargement of the functions of the Court. Spens is, I think, at first blush, very much in favour of that, but I have sent him the whole of the papers to study carefully. My own inclination, I must say, is definitely in that direction. I see no reason why a greater measure of independent status in the legal sphere should not precede political independence. Nor do I attach the kind of superstitious reverence for the Privy Council as a Bond of Empire which is held by a certain number of lawyers and above all by the Judicial Committee itself. My own feeling is that while it has served a very useful function in the development of a more or less unified legal system, that is a comparatively small matter if, on political grounds, or on grounds of practical convenience, any important part of the Empire wishes to settle its own legal disputes at home. I dare say the simplest solution in practice, even if illogical, may be to begin with optional recourse to either final court and see how far Indian litigants prefer one court to another.

6. We had a meeting this morning under John Anderson's chairmanship, on the Indian food question. The shipping people were inclined to be sticky and the various British Departments pleaded earnestly against surrendering any British shipping in view of our own import situation here. However, my more earnest pleading weighed with Anderson and the War Cabinet members present, and the Departments concerned were instructed to release 40,000 or

50,000 tons from the Plate or West Coast of America, as well as to see what could be done with the Middle Eastern and Persian Gulf shuttle services in order somehow to let you have at any rate 140,000 out of the 200,000 tons for which you have been appealing for the next few months. On the other hand, the committee felt that it was essential, in order to justify this effort on the part of the United Kingdom, that you should make a further effort in one way or another to extract further tonnage for wheat purposes from the Mogul Line and other Indian coastwise traffic. There was also general agreement that there should be an announcement of our intention to see that India does not go short in respect of wheat, but equally general agreement against announcing a figure beforehand. However, the telegrams[3] will have dealt with all this long before this letter reaches you.

7. With regard to the enquiry into the future organisation of India's defensive services,[4] I feel increasingly that the idea is worth pursuing from the point of view of thinking out now what the nature of those services should be. In that enquiry, Indianisation, though it necessarily must play a considerable part, seems to me to be only a secondary part, and possibly one which could be dealt with separately and later, as compared with the really big problems raised by modern technical developments. There is to begin with the whole question of the extent to which the air fighting services of one kind and another should displace relatively both ground troops and navy from the point of view of Indian defence. There is secondly the whole question of mechanical warfare, how far the tank is really the weapon of the future or likely to be kept within compass by the development of the anti-tank gun and self-propelled field artillery. Lastly, but possibly the most important factor of the lot, is the extent to which both ground troops and the ground equipment of air fighting services are going to depend upon air transport. My own view is that the airborne and air supplied division is going to be the really governing factor in the later stages of this war and still more in future wars. That would be the case even in countries with dense railway and road networks like Western Europe. But it will be even more the case in a country like India and still more countries like Persia, Afghanistan, Burma, &c., which surround India. I doubt if any serious invasion of India could take place by ordinary ground troops if India were in a position to land powerful ground forces on their lines of communication behind them, or were able to anticipate them in seizing vital strategic points on their line of advance. There are investigations in active progress which are likely to result in a very great lightening of the weight of artillery and that will correspondingly increase the power of comparatively small airborne detachments to hold ground which they have seized. I enclose a copy of a letter[5] which I am writing to Wavell on this subject.

[3] See No. 350. [4] See No. 251. [5] Not printed.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/E/8/3305: ff 236–42

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *16 January 1943, 10 pm*
Received: 17 January

1002. Your telegram 105–S[1] dated 14th January. Wheat supplies. H.M.G. are very gravely concerned by the necessity of finding tonnage for your wheat requirements in the shipping situation as it stands at present and it is only the belief that your difficulties between now and the harvest constitute a vital emergency that has induced them to agree to find some ships out of the U.K. programme. Recent drastic cuts in the Indian Ocean area programme from North America and the U.K. will have indicated to you how seriously the shipping position is regarded here. In letting you know that H.M.G. have in fact agreed to release tonnage from the home programme I must lay the strongest emphasis, firstly, on the fact that the total so released cannot possibly be such as to permit the import even of the quantity of wheat which you have asked to be supplied before the end of April; secondly, H.M.G. have been induced to make this concession on the clear understanding that you have already agreed to make available a substantial part of the tonnage normally allotted for the carrying of non-cereal cargo from Australia to India and that you are to be strongly pressed to divert to the carriage of wheat imports the maximum amount of Indian registered tonnage now employed on commercial services; thirdly, they wish me to stress the heavy sacrifice that is being made in the programme of food and material shipments to the U.K. to enable ships programmed for these services to be made available for the carriage of wheat to India in the present emergency. I trust that the acceptance of this additional burden by the U.K. at a time when imports into this country had to be reduced to a seriously low level will stimulate India to further efforts in her own behalf which will justify the imposition of this burden elsewhere.

2. Following are measures approved by H.M.G. in addition to substitution of cereals for other cargo in ships normally loading from Australia to India in accordance with sub-paragraph (*e*)[2] of your 105–S. (It is assumed in this connection that if the full saving of 15,000 tons is not effected in January you will endeavour to reduce non-cereal shipments in one or more of the following three months to correspondingly less than 7,500 tons.) (*i*) A total tonnage not exceeding 40/50,000 tons to be diverted from ships shortly becoming available in Australia or elsewhere at the expense of U.K. import programme; (*ii*) Diversion of maximum amount of Indian registered tonnage to carriage of wheat from Australia. To this end you are requested to institute measures, including

stricter export licensing, which will enable at least one Mogul[3] ship to be withdrawn from her present commercial employment and to assist in devising means whereby some of the ships now engaged in Indian coastal trade may by removal and re-arrangement be substituted for others suitable for the carriage of wheat from Australia. H.M.G. have not yet received views of Commanders-in-Chief on the possibility of diverting Indian requisitioned ships from Indian/Persian Gulf shuttle and the Middle East coal shuttle services but they hope that a few ships may be made available by this means. It is assumed that steps to be taken by you, as supplemented in this way, might make available some eight ships.

3. The maximum tonnage thus to be made available up to and including April is (*a*) from ships on the normal Australia/India run, say, 35,000 (half of 70,000) tons; (*b*) from diversion at the expense of U.K. from Australia or elsewhere, not more than 40/50,000 tons; and (*c*) from other measures indicated at (*ii*) above, at best some 50,000 (half of 100,000) tons. Say, a total of 125/130,000 tons in all. You will no doubt consider what other measures you can take for yourselves such, for instance, as the reduction of ration scales, which I understand you have in hand. The measures I have outlined will I trust go far, though not the whole way, to cover your civil and military deficiencies of wheat prior to the next harvest which I understand promises well.

4. The above quantities are additional to the amount of some 30,000 tons still to be provided for out of 105,000 tons already promised for military requirements from Australia.

5. H.M.G. regret that they find it impossible at this stage in view of the heavy sacrifices already assumed on behalf of India and of the present pressure from all sides on our shipping, to consider your further request[4] for 400,000 (half of 800,000) tons additional to the initial demand for 200,000 (half of 400,000) tons.

6. As regards your desire to make a public announcement I agree that you should make every use that you can by way of publicity of the ready assistance which has been given and of the heavy cost at which it is to be made. You should not, however, make any mention of the tonnage thus made available though it might be helpful to refer to the transfer of substantial amounts of Indian registered tonnage from other services when arrangements to that end are complete. I should be glad to see the text of any announcement contemplated.

7. I shall telegraph further on the question of supplies for the Arab States.

[1] See No. 347, notes 3 and 4.

[2] Agreeing to cut non-cereal imports from Australia, both civil and military, to 7,500 tons per mensem for the months of February, March, and April; and to utilise for wheat all the remaining available shipping quota for January (a maximum of 15,000 tons) provided that certain articles totalling 4,745 tons had been or would be shipped during the month.

[3] Deciphered as 'Indian'. [4] See No. 332.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Field Marshal Wavell

MSS. EUR. F. 125/125

MOST SECRET THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *16 January 1943*

My dear Commander-in-Chief,

Amery, in a recent private letter,[1] told me that he was inclined to think that it was already time for us to give serious consideration to what sort of an Indian Army, or rather Indian fighting services, we were to have after the war. He recognized that there were many uncertain factors, the first the date from which any new Constitution could actually come into effect; the second the question of Indianization. So far as the first is concerned, we are all of us of course a little in the dark as to the time-table: but I imagine that it would be a pretty safe assumption that if the requisite agreement could be reached, it would certainly be two or three years after the war before the new Constitution resulting from it could come into effect; and that any government that then became responsible for India would naturally want to have as efficient fighting forces as possible. As to the second point, the question of Indianization, Amery suggested a more rapid Indianization immediately after the war, and a progressive but practical scheme, i.e. something that could be effectively defended against political pressure to recast the whole army system immediately British control is removed—for further Indianization in subsequent years. It goes without saying that it is tied up with the question of the extent to, and the terms on which by mutual agreement British forces were retained in India. And it goes without saying equally that the standard to be expected of the Indian Army during the years to be covered by any such agreement would be a very relevant question for consideration and settlement. Amery suggested that there would be a good deal to be said for the first investigation of this very big problem being made in India by a Committee which would examine it and report to the Governor-General in the same way as the Modernization Committee which was appointed by the Commander-in-Chief before the investigation of the Chatfield Committee.

2. I have let you have Amery's comments (which are expressed in very general terms as they came in the course of a private letter) more or less as they stand. I think that there is probably a good deal to be said for going ahead with the consideration of this problem, not of course merely as a question of Indianization, but also of the whole nature of the organization, the relative scale of aviation to ground forces, air transport for the latter, &c. I dare say that you have yourself already had the point in mind, and we might perhaps discuss it at your leisure, though if in the meantime you care to let me have your first

reaction which I could pass back to Amery, I should, I need not say, greatly welcome it.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

[1] No. 251.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to President Roosevelt

MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *18 January 1943*

Dear Mr. President,

Mr. William Phillips has presented to me your letter of the 3rd December,[1] and I write to tell you how cordially we welcome among us so distinguished and widely experienced a diplomatist as your new Personal Representative to India.

Mr. Phillips' charm of manner has already made a deep impression on all those who have met him here. I am sure that our common war effort will derive fresh impetus from him, and we take the deputation to this country of a man of his personality and eminent attainments as further indication of the high regard you have for India.

Yours very sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

[1] No. 244.

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Mr Gandhi to the Marquess of Linlithgow[1]

MSS. EUR. F. 125/125

Cover marked—Personal/Immediate DETENTION CAMP, *19 January 1943*
Letter marked—Personal.

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I received your kind letter of 13th instant[2] yesterday at 2.30 p.m. I had almost despaired of ever hearing from you. Please excuse my impatience.

Your letter gladdens me to find that I have not lost caste with you.

My letter of 31st December[3] was a growl against you. Yours is a counter-growl. It means that you maintain that you were right in arresting me and you were sorry for the omissions of which, in your opinion, I was guilty.

[1] Lord Linlithgow transmitted the text of this letter to Mr Amery in telegram 199-S of 26 January 1943 (MSS. EUR. F. 125/24). On page 518 'examples' in the twelfth line from the foot was deciphered as '(omission)s', and in the penultimate line 'restored' was deciphered as '(omission)ed'.

[2] See No. 340, note 2. [3] No. 305.

The inference you draw from my letter is, I am afraid, not correct. I have re-read my letter in the light of your interpretation, but have failed to find your meaning in it. I wanted to fast and should still want to if nothing comes out of our correspondence and I have to be a helpless witness to what is going on in the country, including the privations of the millions owing to the universal scarcity stalking the land.

If I do not accept your interpretation of my letter, you want me to make a positive suggestion. This, I might be able to do, only, if you put me among the members of the Working Committee of the Congress.

If I could be convinced of my error or worse, of which you are evidently, I should need to consult nobody, so far as my own action is concerned, to make a full and open confession and make ample amends. But I have not any conviction of error. I wonder if you saw my letter to the Secretary to the Government of India of 21st September 1942.[4] I adhere to what I have said in it and in my letter to you of 14th August 1942.[5]

Of course I deplore the happenings which have taken place since 9th August last. But have I not laid the whole blame for them at the door of the Government of India? Moreover, I could not express any opinion on events which I cannot influence or control and of which I have but a one-sided account. You are bound *prima facie* to accept the accuracy of reports that may be placed before you by your departmental heads. But you will not expect me to do so. Such reports have before now often proved fallible. It was for that reason that in my letter of 31st December, I pleaded with you to convince me of the correctness of the information on which your conviction was based. You will, perhaps, appreciate my fundamental difficulty in making the statement you have expected me to make.

This however I can say from the house-top, that I am as confirmed a believer in non-violence as I have ever been. You may not know that any violence on the part of Congress workers, I have condemned openly and unequivocally. I have even done public penance more than once. I must not weary you with examples. The point I wish to make is that on every such occasion I was a free man.

This time, the retracing as I have submitted, lies with the Government. You will forgive me for expressing an opinion challenging yours. I am certain that nothing but good would have resulted if you had stayed your hand and granted me the interview, which I had announced, on the night of the 8th August, I was to seek. But that was not to be.

Here, may I remind you that the Government of India have before now owned their mistakes, as for instance, in the Punjab when the late General Dyer was condemned,[6] in the United Provinces when a corner of a mosque in Cawnpore was restored[7] and in Bengal when the Partition was annulled.[8] All these things were done in spite of great and previous mob violence.

To sum up—

(1) If you want me to act singly convince me that I was wrong and I will make ample amends.

(2) If you want me to make any proposal on behalf of the Congress you should put me among the Congress Working Committee members. I do plead with you to make up your mind to end the *impasse*.

If I am obscure or have not answered your letter fully please point out the omissions and I shall make an attempt to give you satisfaction.

I have no mental reservation.

I find that my letters to you are sent through the Government of Bombay. This procedure must involve some loss of time. As time is of the essence in this matter, perhaps you will issue instructions that my letters to you may be sent directly by the Superintendent of this Camp.

I am,
Your sincere friend,
M. K. GANDHI

[4] Vol. II, No. 779. [5] Vol. II, No. 553.

[6] On 13 April 1919 troops under the command of General Dyer fired on a crowd at Amritsar, killing some 379 people and wounding over 1,200. A commission of enquiry with Lord Hunter as chairman produced a report (Cmd. 681) which censured General Dyer; and the British Government required him to resign from the Army.

[7] In 1913 there was rioting in Cawnpore owing to the demolition of part of a mosque in order to widen a street. The agitation spread beyond the United Provinces, and Lord Hardinge, the Viceroy, visited Cawnpore and announced a settlement which involved rebuilding what had been demolished.

[8] When Bengal was partitioned in 1905, Western Bengal with the areas of Bihar and Orissa (then still parts of Bengal) became one Province, while Eastern Bengal was joined to Assam to form the Province of Eastern Bengal and Assam. Dissatisfaction with this arrangement led to unrest, and in 1912 Bihar and Orissa were constituted a separate Province, while Eastern Bengal was separated from Assam and rejoined to Western Bengal to form a reunited but much smaller Province of Bengal.

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Viscount Halifax to Mr Eden

L/I/1/1090: ff 73–6

CONFIDENTIAL WASHINGTON, *20 January 1943*
No. 35 *Received: 3 February*

Sir,

With reference to my despatch No. 17[1] of the 9th January, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of a report on the Conference of the Institute

[1] Not printed.

of Pacific Relations held at Mont Tremblant in Quebec last month. This report was prepared by Sir George Sansom.

2. The report notes that the conference, which was originally designed to some extent as a forum for an indictment of British policy, eventually moved to a more realistic and appreciative attitude towards that policy. I am informed by those who attended the conference that this was due in no small part to Sir George Sansom's own wisdom and powers of conciliation.

3. I would draw your particular attention to Sir G. Sansom's paper on post-war policy in regard to Japan, which appears to me to contain valuable and illuminating ideas on this peculiarly difficult subject.

I have, &c.

HALIFAX

Enclosure to No. 354

Notes on Institute of Pacific Relations International Conference, Mont Tremblant, December 1942 (Extract)

My chief impression of the conference was that it was conceived in the minds of the promoters (the members of the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, and particularly its secretariat) in the first place as a forum for the discussion not only of Pacific problems, but also of the British Empire in general and of India in particular; and in the second place—but by no means incidentally—as a court of justice in which the United Kingdom would be arraigned. I think it may be said that the plot—if it was a plot—miscarried, and that the United Kingdom delegation moved from the dock to the witness box, and even occasionally took a seat upon the bench. But the fact that in a discussion of Pacific problems India was included and the U.S.S.R. was an absent member shows clearly enough that the American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations in its conceptions of its functions is not without prejudice.

It was insinuated by some Americans and Canadians that the United Kingdom delegation was "packed," that it "played with its cards close to its chest," and that generally it had come prepared to take an unprogressive imperialistic stand, to give away no points. As the conference proceeded, it became clear, at any rate to the more reasonable American delegates, that this charge was unfair. In the early stages of discussion, when the more general topics were raised, there was, it is true, a contrast between the noble philanthropic sentiments expressed on the American side and the more reserved language of the United Kingdom delegates. It was not difficult for the Americans, and indeed the Canadians and Australians, to give an impression of high ideals and lofty purpose so long as they were not required to define in exact terms the meaning

of "freedom," "democracy," "racial equality," "the common man," "imperialism," "colonialism," and other popular abstractions. Here the United Kingdom delegates were in a sense on the defensive, since they found themselves in the ungrateful position of having to seek precise meanings for these notions in their relation to concrete issues. Lord Hailey's opening statement, though it was, in fact, a most able exposition of the application of Liberal principles, was unpalatable to the enthusiasts because it did not sweep aside dangers and difficulties, but descended to the particular and the practical. Indeed, his great experience, his air of authority without condescension, and his lucid speech, though admired by the Americans, seemed at the same time to cause them misgivings. One could almost hear them saying to themselves: "Here is one of the British ruling class at the old game of fooling the simple citizens of our republic."

But when the discussion moved on to specific questions at the round tables, this attitude of suspicion was moderated, though it never entirely vanished. The hostile elements began to perceive that it was not sufficient merely to denounce the British, but that there were facts to be ascertained and honest differences of opinion to be reconciled.

The general line taken at first by most American and some dominion delegates was that Great Britain did not intend to apply the principles of the Atlantic Charter to its future policy in the Pacific. They would not accept the United Kingdom delegates' reply that the United Kingdom had anticipated the charter by at least a generation and was already applying its principles in India and in colonial territories. When the United Kingdom delegates stood firm the critics of British policy changed their ground, and protested that, even granting some degree of progress in colonial reform in recent years, it had been made grudgingly, slowly, and with no real intention of ultimate surrender of British rule over subject peoples. What was needed, they said, was that liberation should proceed at a much greater speed, and that Great Britain should testify to the sincerity of her intentions by more startling and substantial acts of abnegation.

To this the United Kingdom delegates replied in substance that, if Great Britain were asked to accelerate her programme of colonial reform, and to commit herself in advance to action which must be taken after the war in material and moral conditions which could not now be predicted, she would be entitled to enquire what guarantees could be expected from the United Nations in general, and the United States in particular, against the strategic and economic risks which would accompany a sudden and drastic change in the political status of British or other dependencies in the Pacific area.

This difference of outlook produced what was called at the conference "the vicious circle". The British said: "We can go ahead if we are confident that the United States will bind itself to an internationalist policy." The Americans

said: "The American people will not agree to an internationalist policy unless the British Government promises to go ahead."

But what the Americans did not, and could not, say was that, if Great Britain promised to go ahead, then the American people would definitely abandon isolation and would play a decisive part in international arrangements for security and for economic collaboration.

This was the doubt which pervaded the conference throughout, although it must be said that nearly all American delegates were expressing a fear, and not a wish, when they stated that American participation in post-war security measures could not be counted upon. Most of them were anxious for a break with isolationist tradition, but felt uncertain as to future trends of public opinion in the United States. Some of them were willing to distinguish between the views of the public and those of the Administration, which had a more realistic understanding of the nature of colonial problems. They felt that the Administration should give the public a lead. But the general sentiment of the American delegation was that the best chance of securing the support of the United States in post-war security arrangements was for the colonial powers to persuade the American people that they intended to carry out under the supervision of some international authority (to quote one American delegate) "a liquidation of the pre-war colonial system, and the abandonment of all kinds of imperial preferences," in other words, that the American people should be assured of moral and material benefits to dependent peoples, and perhaps to themselves, in return for their own collaboration.

While we members of the United Kingdom delegation were not unnaturally pained by an American attitude which seemed to derive from a passion to extract assurances of good behaviour from the British Empire and a determination not to believe them, it would, I think, be a mistake to dismiss this attitude as entirely prejudiced. Some of the Institute of Pacific Relations Secretariat are inexperienced young men and women whose livelihood depends to some extent on their being professionally pro-Chinese or pro-Indian, and who are therefore obliged to take an anti-imperialist and consequently an anti-British line: but many of the American delegates, though by tradition disposed to criticise British policy and to relish doing so, were genuinely concerned by the dilemma in which they found themselves, and by the end of the conference had realised both that they were not adequately informed as to past United Kingdom policy and present sentiment in Great Britain, and that the problems which they thought they had already solved out-of-hand to their own satisfaction were far more difficult than they had realised.

This feature of the conference was brought out most clearly by the discussions on India. Before the meeting it had been supposed by some American and Canadian members that the Indian representatives were poor, deluded "stooges" of the British, who would welcome advice and comfort from their

American friends. These friends were soon undeceived when they discovered that the Indian delegation included men of high calibre and independent mind who had great experience of affairs and were quite capable of holding their own. It was made very clear that the Indian situation was much more complex than Americans in general supposed, and that it was not one in which they could meddle without risk. Opinion did not swing in favour of the British, but at least it became more reserved and cautious and, let us say, unassuming.

Other interesting points which emerged during the conference were the attitude of the Dominions delegates and the marked preference of most of the American delegates for discussions which evaded practical issues but proceeded on almost evangelical lines. It is only fair to add that the officials, and most of those academic members whose interests were more technical than political, did not fall into this category. It was the professors of International Relations and suchlike amorphous studies who displayed an irritating combination of ignorance and prejudice.

The Dominions' delegates, particularly those from Canada, were almost as critical and as uninformed on matters of United Kingdom foreign and colonial policy as were the Americans; and it would appear that there is room for a great deal of educational work in this respect in Canada as well as in the United States.

The American delegates seemed to suspect and dislike any statement from the United Kingdom delegates which was precise and lucid but not heavily charged with feeling. Even at the round tables, which were supposed to deal with practical problems, I noticed that the speeches which were most applauded were those of an almost demagogic character. It so happened that one of the most successful of speeches at the final plenary session was a very earnest statement by Sir John Pratt to the effect that he was disappointed to have come so far from his own country only to find that the Americans would not believe the things he told them. Sir John was not deliberately appealing to their emotions, he was merely saying sadly what he felt; but he contrived to strike a very appealing note and the audience was much moved. On the other hand, as I have noted above, the statements of Lord Hailey might have been more persuasive if they had been less finished in manner, less reasoned in content, but more evangelical in tone. It wanted, I am sure, but very little effort of imagination for some of the audience to see him addressing the mob from a tumbrel in 1789—a most unjustified impression, but not at all improbable.

The truth is, I am afraid, that the traditional American attitude towards Great Britain—compounded of suspicion, envy and hostility—is in some quarters almost ineradicable. I have seen a letter from a prominent Canadian delegate at the I.P.R. Conference in which he says that the Indian delegates were so outstanding and convincing that he fears a reaction against them in some American and Canadian circles. In other words, the stronger the argument the less effective, if it tends to support the United Kingdom view!

There was throughout the conference an intractable group (both Canadian and American, with at least one Australian) who utterly refused to believe that the England of 1942 was not the England of 1842 or even of 1920. To believe it would have deprived them of their chief pleasure and occupation. At one of the last plenary meetings Brooke Claxton, a Canadian delegate, made in maudlin language a statement that the United Kingdom must now make sacrifices in the common cause. I took an early opportunity of saying to his Canadian colleagues that no well-fed and stimulated delegate from the North American continent could justifiably talk of sacrifice to an audience including Englishmen. His colleagues very sensibly reported this to him, and I must admit that he endeavoured to make amends later in the evening.

I hope that nobody who reads these notes will conclude that I take a jaundiced view of the American scene or that I am suffering from a fit of prejudice against American liberals. I do not want to over-emphasise the numbers or importance of these people at the conference. I think that they are of a special type—the kind of people who attend such conferences as others might attend revival meetings or take part in flagellation rites. I hope and trust that they are not representative.

What has been said about the American delegates should be qualified by adding that some of the United States officials who attended the conference (notably Dr. Hornbeck and Mr. Max Hamilton of the State Department and officials dealing with technical matters) together with a few academic persons, showed themselves much more aware of practical difficulties, must [much?] less disposed to sit in judgment, than other speakers. At the last session Dr. Hornbeck even found himself defending the past record of the British Empire and pointing out the contribution made by Great Britain to the world's stock of progressive ideas and liberal institutions. Moreover, he and some of the more balanced American delegates were inclined to take a less pessimistic view of the prospects of American participation in co-operative schemes for security and economic welfare throughout the world.

Turning to the discussions of specific regions and topics at the Round Tables, they may be briefly summarised as follows, with the qualification that, as I was present at only one table in each group I can give only an imperfect account (which other United Kingdom delegates will no doubt correct and supplement) of the others, based upon subsequent conversations with members and a study of the unsatisfactory versions of the *rapporteurs*:—

* * *

(C) India

This was regarded as the most important Round Table, and was, according to the *rapporteur*, remarkable for the tension and the concentrated attention of its participants.

The Indian delegates, in particular Sir R. Mudaliar, made a deep impression by their sincerity and skill. After some preliminary discussion of India's place in the general strategy of the war, came the main topic, that of the effect of present political conditions in India upon the war as a whole. The leader[2] of the Indian delegation made a long statement, which emphasised the difficulties of an immediate settlement, and called attention in particular to the main obstacle, which is the non-co-operation policy of Congress, based ultimately upon Mr. Gandhi's doctrine. He propounded one possible solution—the complete Indianisation of the Viceroy's Executive Council; the Council thus "Indianised" to form itself into an Exploratory Commission, co-opting Indian leaders of all parties or, if the Congress party refused to nominate a leader, ex-members of the party who could faithfully represent its views. The commission would then study all questions requiring consideration in framing a new constitution, and could invite the assistance of foreign experts—Chinese, American or others—who could give valuable advice. An Allied Advisory Committee was suggested for this purpose.

American and Canadian delegates who were hoping for formal mediation or arbitration by the United Nations designed to suspend civil disobedience and secure the release of Congress leaders, did not at first like this idea; but they began to see the danger that their own plan would arouse Moslem hostility, because it would be regarded as an attempt to appease Congress. This was a useful part of the discussion, because it showed the Americans and Chinese that the Moslems are annoyed by their partiality for Congress.

Further discussion centred upon the sincerity of British promises regarding India and this Round Table, like others, ended on a note of doubt as to the degree of responsibility which would be accepted by the United States in matters of security, upon which progress towards a new world order is contingent.

The discussion of India was on the whole much more satisfactory from the point of view of the British delegation than had been anticipated. There was in both American and Canadian delegations an intransigent group which did not like being persuaded that the Indian problem was far more complex and the materials for settlement far more refractory than they had supposed. They did not abandon their prejudices, but at least they began to feel that intervention by third parties was dangerous. The Chinese delegates took very little active part in the debate.

It was interesting to see that most of the Indian delegates felt surprised and somewhat displeased by the extent of anti-British feeling, while they were inclined to resent (and said so quite plainly) the condescending attitude of some Americans who assumed that they were the people who could really settle India's difficulties because of their great political wisdom and their superior philanthropy. At least one Indian delegate suggested that America had better

[2] Sir R. Mudaliar.

solve her own communal problems before proffering advice to others. Others suspected American motives, and saw in them imperialistic designs. They were careful to insist that they meant to industrialise their country in their own way.

The Indian Round Table report brought out very clearly a serious defect in organisation. The *rapporteur's* account of the discussions was so partial and imperfect that it had to be recalled and amended. It became clear that in future conferences it will be necessary to arrange that the *rapporteurs* submit their reports to the members of their respective Round Tables for discussion and approval before they are taken to plenary sessions.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

INDIA OFFICE, *20 January 1943*

Zafrulla spent the week-end with us and we had some quite good talks. He is very definitely convinced that India must not only remain united for broad purposes of external relations, but that even so she cannot possibly hold her own in the world, for a long time yet to come without the co-operation of this country and of the British Commonwealth. His experience at Chungking and what he gathered there of China's nationalist ambitions, have no doubt strengthened that conviction. He told me that what he would like to do would be to create unobtrusively behind the scenes something in the nature of the nucleus of a party of moderates who could throw their weight into the scale effectively when the moment comes for the establishment of an Indian Constitution and when India has to decide whether to stay in the Commonwealth or not.

2. I suggested to him that the bringing together of people on so broad an issue and one, in a sense, so negative as that of not breaking with the Commonwealth, might not be enough unless it were coupled with a more definitely constructive programme with regard to the Constitution itself and pointed out to him that what none of the political parties had yet attempted to do was even to begin thinking about the structure of an Indian Constitution that could meet the needs of the complex Indian situation. All they did was each to clamour for power on the assumption that the British Parliamentary Executive system is the only possible one. He agreed and said that he himself had never thought that that system could apply at the Centre and that what was needed was a system in which the Central Executive was more independent of the Legislature, and also more directly dependent on the Provinces and

States, in a somewhat looser confederation than that of the 1935 Act. But clearly his constructive thinking had not got beyond that and when in conversation I threw out ideas as to various ways in which this might conceivably be achieved, he was keenly interested and anxious that I should put them down for his benefit. I declined to do this on the ground that I had deliberately refrained from constitution-making myself, knowing that anything I produced, or that was attributed to me, would promptly be prejudiced in Indian eyes and that the solution must come from Indians themselves.

3. I pointed out in that connection that whenever it did come to the business of agreeing on a Constitution, the whip-hand lay entirely with those who had really given serious thought to the problem and were able to base their conclusions not only upon the wide study of Constitutions elsewhere, but upon a mastery of every statistical and economic fact bearing upon India's own problem, and cited the case of Curtis and Lothian and the little handful who worked with them in South Africa between 1906 and 1909 and not only brought about South African union but gave it its particular shape, simply because the politicians readily accepted their conclusions, not having worked out any for themselves. An unobtrusive group of moderates who were able by virtue of their sheer constructive work to impose on the rest of India their conclusions as to the type of Constitution would be in an infinitely stronger position also to get their way with regard to the future relationship of India to the Commonwealth.

4. He said that in his view it was very doubtful whether in fact Indians would ever agree upon a Constitution unaided. His idea was that at the end of hostilities, we should give them a year in which to devise their own Constitution and, if they failed, impose a provisional constitution of our own, which would contain within itself provision for its own amendment or recasting. I pointed out that if such a constitution was to receive any measure of acceptance in India or indeed by the House of Commons here, that would be far easier if it was based on something that a body of thoughtful Indians, not identified with extreme parties, have themselves worked out, in other words if it were an Indian constitution, though not necessarily one agreed by the Indian parties.

5. I dare say I may have a further talk with him on this theme. But at first blush it does look to me as if he might possibly be more usefully occupied in the task of stimulating constructive thought and bringing together a group of men to really work out the problem than in doing anything else. The whole trouble in this matter has been the difficulty of starting anything from the Government and [end?] which would not be looked at with suspicion by India or which would not, as you pointed out in the case of your Executive, affect the work and harmony of Government itself. Naturally I have not enough

knowledge of Zafrulla's character to know how far he would be likely really to see through a task of this character or what other fellow-workers he would be likely to enlist. But he certainly is a man of real intelligence and with a certain fervour of conviction towards constructive ends—based in part I dare say on his deep religious beliefs—which encourage me to think that he might be of very real help.

21 January

6. Panikkar blew in yesterday, very anxious to be allowed to fly on to India in view of Bikaner's condition. His story is that the heir and other Ministers are not on very good terms and that he can help keeping things straight, but I dare say he is also naturally concerned with his own future position. He talks volubly, but not very audibly, about the position of the Princes. In his view, the whole pressure for cleaning up the smaller units will have to come from the Crown Representative. The Chamber of Princes was, he thinks, a mistake, in so far as it includes much too large a proportion of little States who are definitely obstructive to reform—that I felt was also rather the Jam Saheb's view. He seems to have been converted to the necessity for accepting Pakistan and wants the States to keep out of British India as well, his notion, so far as I could gather it, being that of some loose triune defensive arrangement between Pakistan, Hindu India and the States. He did not, however, enter upon a discussion of the Federation or grouping of the States among themselves. He also dwelt on the importance of better cultural relations between Britain and India. On the whole, I was not very much impressed by him.

[Para. 7, on scheme for joint administration of Baraundha and other places in Central India, omitted.]

8. To return to Zafrulla. I have just been presiding over a talk which he gave to the Empire Parliamentary Association. What he said about India was simply to the effect that it would be a disaster for India and for ourselves if the partnership between us were not maintained in face of the new international conditions which would arise after the war; that there was no hope of any settlement between the parties during the war, but that we should be wise to go forward boldly, rather than wait for agitation in bringing into effective partnership those who were prepared to work with us, and so training a body of responsible men who could exercise a steadying influence afterwards. All this was said with great tact and discretion and made a good impression. The same applies also to what he said about China, a judicious blend of appreciation and apprehension. I shall no doubt have further talk with him about his general ideas. Meanwhile, if he is to do anything one of these days on the lines which I have referred to earlier in this letter, it is essential that nothing should be known of it prematurely and, above all, that there should be no idea that he was in any way working with us behind the scenes. I am sure, therefore,

it will be best if you keep what I have told you about his ideas entirely to yourself and not discuss it with anyone, even with himself unless he actually approaches you on the subject. For one thing, he may not really be ready himself, when he looks further into the matter, to do anything positive just yet, or even at all. It may well be, for instance, that when he gets back to India he may find things not ripe enough, or that confidential talks to two or three friends may convince him that he is not going to get enough support to make it worth while. If on the other hand he really is serious and going to get any support, it would be very much better that he should get some way ahead before either you or I should know anything about it, even *sub rosa*.

Noted.
L.

What about his Judicial work.
L.,—18-2.

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Mr Amery to Mr Bevin

L/E/8/2527: f 218

INDIA OFFICE, *22 January 1943*

My dear Bevin,

You will remember that when you, Kingsley Wood, Cripps and I met on 29th September[1] to discuss the proposals for a forward policy in regard to social legislation in India set out in Cripps' note to the Prime Minister of 2nd September,[2] it was agreed that I should have prepared a note summarising what had already been done on these matters in India. I sent you a copy of the note on 23rd November.[3]

Subsequently Cripps prepared a note showing what, in the light of the information in my note, he feels might be done. At his request, I now send you this note (dated 10th December)[4] together with a further note giving my own views on the proposals it contains. The scope of Cripps' note is more limited than that which he sent to the Prime Minister in September, and the proposals in it could not, I think, be regarded as likely to fulfil the broad political objectives outlined in his first note.

My view is that, for the reasons outlined in my own note, we cannot proceed further with these proposals without having them examined in India by those who have modern and up-to-date knowledge of what is already being done,

[1] See No. 46. [2] Vol. II, No. 678.
[3] See No. 114, note 1; the date should be 23 October. [4] Enclosure to No. 276.

and what is projected in the post-war reconstruction plans which are under consideration by the Government of India's advisers. I understand that Cripps' view is that our aim should now be to prepare some basis for the guidance of the new Viceroy when he takes over in the autumn.

My suggestion is, therefore, that I should now report briefly to the Prime Minister that we have reached the conclusion that for a variety of reasons—including financial obstacles—a large scale policy of social improvement is not practicable, at any rate during the war; that Cripps feels that a programme on the lines of his second note should be practicable; that we are agreed that this should be examined by the authorities in India and their views be asked for during the summer so that the results will be available when the new Viceroy takes office; and that in the meantime I should prepare in consultation with the Treasury and the Ministry of Works and Buildings a project for an Indian and Oriental Cultural Centre in London to which effect might be given after the war.

I should be glad if you would let me know whether you agree with these suggestions, or would like to have another meeting to discuss the position.

I am sending a similar letter to Kingsley Wood, and a copy to Cripps.

Yours sincerely,

L. S. AMERY

Enclosure to No. 356

L/E/8/2527: ff 221–6

21 January 1943

NOTE BY THE S/S FOR INDIA

Social and Economic Policy for India

I do not think I need comment at much length upon the very interesting and stimulating memorandum circulated by the Minister for Aircraft Production. It would be possible to draw a somewhat different picture, as India resembles the U.S.A. in being a country of which almost anything is true. But the picture drawn by Sir Stafford Cripps appears to me to be one which would easily be recognised in its outlines and in many of its details by most of those who have devoted any considerable amount of attention to Indian questions.

The Minister's memorandum recognises in its first sentence that during the last 40 years great advances have been made in the social and economic life of India, advances summarily described in a note already circulated by me. It is important always to bear this in mind, because the magnitude of what patently remains to be done is apt to obscure the progress which has been and is being achieved, and to imply that the situation presenting itself to us is a static one, which is far from being true. If it ever was static that has certainly not been the case since the time of Lord Curzon, who set himself a programme

very similar to that which Sir Stafford Cripps proposes that H.M.G. should entrust to the next incumbent of the Viceroyalty. But the opportunity presented nowadays to a single man, even in so high an office, of effecting improvements in India in the field of social and economic welfare is not the same as it was in Lord Curzon's time, and we should do well to remember the extent to which these matters are now within the responsibility of Indians themselves and, indeed, have been for the past 20 years.

So far as agriculture is concerned—and there could be no example of greater practical importance—it will be realised that the present Viceroy entered upon his office with a knowledge not only of Indian constitutional problems, acquired as Chairman of the Select Committee of both Houses, but also of agricultural questions, gained as Chairman of the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India. No other man could have done as much to promote the development of Indian agriculture as Lord Linlithgow has done, and his successor can hardly be expected to do more than follow in his footsteps.

The centre of gravity in regard to this work lies, under the Act of 1935, and lay to almost the same extent under the Act of 1919, in the Provinces rather than at the Centre. That is not to say, however, that the Centre no longer has any useful function to perform in regard to what are known as "Provincial Subjects". To some extent the Centre has concurrent jurisdiction for the purpose of maintaining general standards and principles as, for example, in the case of labour conditions. And in the Provinces in which responsible Ministries no longer function under the Act of 1935 a measure of responsibility has reverted to the Centre, represented, however, for this purpose, by the Governor-General rather than by the Government of India. Over and above this, even when the constitutional responsibility is entirely Provincial and Ministerial, the Centre can, with the goodwill and co-operation of local governments, in the States as well as in the Provinces, perform the very useful and practically necessary function of co-ordinating local activities and providing something of the nature of a clearing house for information, experience and advice, which function it has been possible for the Centre to fortify in some cases and to a limited extent with practical assistance, financial and otherwise.

The leading example of this latter type of activity on the part of the Centre is the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research. It became evident during the currency of the Act of 1919 that the provincialisation of the greater part of the social and economic fields of government resulted in a degree of decentralisation which, though justified as a means of providing scope for political responsibility, had disadvantages on the practical side. One of the primary achievements of Lord Linlithgow's Agricultural Commission was the establishment of the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research as an organ to promote co-ordination and co-operation in agricultural matters, and this organ has proved to be

fruitful both in its own field and as an example to be followed in other fields of administration, a process which may still be susceptible of further beneficial development.

There is nothing to be gained in this connection by speculating as to the nature of the future Constitution which Indians are to devise for themselves, or how soon it may be in working order. It would certainly not be safe to assume that that Constitution will be more centralised than that of 1935. I am sure, however, we shall all agree that we should not act upon the principle that as we shall soon be relieved of such responsibility as still remains with us for promoting social and economic progress in India, matters can in the meantime be left to look after themselves.

I do not suppose there can be much doubt that the problem, which in greater or less degree is fundamental to all the others, is that of education and of primary education in particular. It is difficult, I am afraid, to share the optimism of the Minister of Aircraft Production where he says that a programme of the kind he suggests in paragraph 13 "could be started tomorrow if the necessary impulse were given from the Centre". Education in India has a long history behind it and a great deal of endeavour has been put into it. Yet the results in the field of primary education are of the order that the Minister indicates, though I think his figure of 11 per cent. in paragraph 1 relates to *male* literacy in 1931. According to the figures of the Census of 1941 which have lately been received, literacy had risen in 1941 to 12·2 per cent. (males 17·4 per cent., females 4·7 per cent.) of the total population, including the States, as compared with 6·9 per cent. in 1931 (males 11·7 per cent., females 1·9 per cent.), and this increase is all the more notable because the total figure for the population itself has risen by 15 per cent. in the same period. We may hope for greater progress in the next decade, but I doubt whether it can be greatly affected by the waving of the Viceregal wand. It is not merely a matter of money and personnel, nor of an impulse such as the Minister suggests. A much wider recognition among the people at large of the advantages of education is required, and in that connection it may be observed that Hinduism as a system, even if it does not actually stand in the way of the assimilation of the lower to the higher grades of society by education or any other means, does not exactly provide a very favourable atmosphere for the development of that process. Primary education is not in my view a subject upon which we British can expect to be able in the conditions of today and tomorrow to make any very spectacular contribution. But I agree that there may well be scope for the development of some organisation at the Centre, upon the lines of the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research, and I am attracted by the idea, which needs to be further explored, that there are lessons to be learnt from the experience of other countries in the development of new techniques for the primary education of large rural populations.

The population problem, including that of birth control (para. 7), is one which needs to be approached with circumspection. It has hardly ceased to be a delicate question among ourselves and, quite apart from the general conservatism of popular opinion in India, there is a special delicacy attaching to the idea of restricting the growth of the population in a country where productivity has a high place among the religious tenets of the people. The matter also has obvious possibilities of communal misunderstanding. By all means let us sound the Indian authorities on this subject, but we should hesitate to put strong pressure upon them.

I welcome the reference to small savings in paragraph 28 (*c*). Nothing would be more opportune than a thrift campaign at the present time. One of the most serious problems of the Government of India just now arises from the combination of a superfluity of money to spend and a deficiency of commodities available for consumption. Moreover, it would be highly advantageous from the point of view of the post-war situation, as well as an alleviation of present difficulties, if the small man could be induced to put aside as much as possible of his present comparatively abundant income and keep it for a time when he will be able to make much better use of it. Inflation would be moderated, post-war reconstruction would be facilitated, and the grip of the moneylender would be weakened. I am sure that the Indian authorities are being active in this matter, but there may be scope for an intensification of their efforts which we should do well to encourage.

In paragraph VII (*c*) reference is made to a proposal for holding in India an Eastern Regional Conference of the International Labour Organisation, to discuss some of these subjects. This stands on a somewhat different footing, so I understand, from the other proposals in the Memorandum, for the reason that arrangements for giving effect to it are already being discussed in another sphere, namely, that of the Governing Body of the I.L.O., upon which the High Commissioner for India represents the Government of India and is the channel of communication with the Indian authorities. This is a sphere in which India has achieved virtual independence and upon which we should not, I think, be well advised to intrude. But subject to that, the proposal is one to which, if the Government of India and others concerned can in present conditions make the necessary practical arrangements, I would unhesitatingly give my support.

As long as the war lasts there will be little, if any, resources available in India, whether of personnel or of money, for intensified activities unconnected with the war effort. I am not sure if it is realised to what an extent the Indian administrative system, both at the Centre and in the Provinces, (which, in its higher ranges, is never more than barely adequate for its normal purposes) has been strained to cope with the special burdens imposed upon it by the war. And as regards finance, it has already become and will increasingly become a matter

of serious anxiety to provide for war expenditure in rupees, including that part of the cost of the war in India which is chargeable to the United Kingdom. Even if we were prepared to set aside what would have to be a very large sum of money for a welfare programme in India, it would only go to swell the accumulation of Indian sterling balances in London and would do nothing, either now or in the post-war reconstruction period, to assist the financing of measures in India itself.

My provisional conclusion upon Sir Stafford Cripps' memorandum is that the new Viceroy, when appointed, might be charged by H.M.G. to devote as much of his attention as he can to social and economic progress and thereby to do what lies in his power to redress the balance in Indian affairs between politics on the one hand and social and economic progress on the other. This is particularly desirable at a time when reconstruction is so much in the air. I should regard this not so much as the establishment of a new social and economic policy for India as an endeavour to intensify activities inherent in the policy we have always pursued in that country and not least in the recent pre-war period.

But before taking any formal decision, and particularly before setting it out in concrete terms we should fortify ourselves with the views of the Indian authorities. This seems advisable not only because of their general responsibilities within this field but also because whatever we do should be in line with their own plans for post-war reconstruction, which are under active consideration. Accordingly, my suggestion is that I might be authorised to send a copy of those memoranda to the Viceroy and to ask him to furnish us in good time with any comments or suggestions that they may elicit from his colleagues and advisers, together with his own.

Finally, there is an idea in which I myself am keenly interested. The circumstances are such that we ourselves are precluded from substantial measures of interest or benefit to India that cannot be financed in sterling. We are already committed to certain measures which can be so financed, for instance, the provision of hostels for Indian seamen in the U.K. and the granting of a site for a Mosque in Regents Park. These will go a certain distance in the right direction. But there is a glaring deficiency, to which attention has been called in the past by such men as Lord Zetland and, more recently, by Lord Hailey,[5] that I think we ought to remedy as soon as may be. The U.K., and London in particular as the Capital of a great Oriental Empire, is very poorly equipped as a centre in which Oriental literature and art can be studied and appreciated. Invidious comparisons which are detrimental to our political prestige are continually drawn and drawn justifiably between the U.K. and other European countries in this respect, and we have presented our critics and enemies with a handle against us, which they have not failed to use, by our neglect to maintain suitable institutions for the study of Oriental art and learning. What is

necessary to create a centre of Indian and Oriental culture could, I believe, be done at a relatively moderate cost.

If my colleagues who have been engaged with me in considering the social problem, are agreed in principle on the desirability of action on some such line, I should like to set up a small committee to study the question and report to us in the near future.

[5] See No. 114, note 2.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/630: f 46

INDIA OFFICE, *23 January 1943, 7.30 am*
Received: 24 January

1344. I note that your Dominions Appreciation telegram of 18th January 141–G[1] states that total number of persons in jail in connexion with Congress movement is a little over 20,000. This is presumably based on figures given in Home Dept. telegram of the 13th January, 274.[2] But statistics recently telegraphed direct by Provincial Governments show that total number of persons in jail on 1st December was slightly under 40,000. I should be glad to know the explanation of the difference in these figures.

[1] L/P&J/8/787. [2] L/P&J/8/666.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Gandhi[1]

MSS. EUR. F. 125/125

PERSONAL THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *25 January 1943*

Dear Mr Gandhi,

Many thanks for your personal letter of the 19th January,[2] which I have just received, and which I need not say I have read with close care and attention. But I am still, I fear, rather in the dark. I made clear to you in my last letter that, however reluctantly, the course of events, and my familiarity with what has

[1] Lord Linlithgow transmitted the text of this letter to Mr Amery in telegram 200–S of 26 January 1943 (MSS. EUR. F. 125/24). In the sixth line of para. 1, 'empowered' was deciphered as 'instructed'.

[2] No. 353.

been taking place, has left me no choice but to regard the Congress movement, and you as its authorised and fully empowered spokesman at the time of the decision of last August, as responsible for the sad campaign of violence and crime, and revolutionary activity which has done so much harm, and so much injury to India's credit, since last August. I note what you say about non-violence. I am very glad to read your unequivocal condemnation of violence, and I am well aware of the importance which you have given to that article of your creed in the past. But the events of these last months, and even the events that are happening today show that it has not met with the full support of certain at any rate of your followers, and the mere fact that they may have fallen short of an ideal which you have advocated is no answer to the relations of those who have lost their lives, and to those themselves who have lost their property or suffered severe injury as a result of violent activities on the part of Congress and its supporters. And I cannot I fear accept as an answer your suggestion that "the whole blame" has been laid by you yourself at the door of the Government of India. We are dealing with facts in this matter, and they have to be faced. And while, as I made clear in my last letter, I am very anxious to have from you anything that you may have to say or any specific proposition that you may have to make, the position remains that it is not the Government of India, but Congress and yourself that are on their justification in this matter.

2. If therefore you are anxious to inform me that you repudiate or dissociate yourself from the resolution of the 9th August[3] and the policy which that resolution represents, and if you can give me appropriate assurances as regards the future, I shall, I need not say, be very ready to consider the matter further. It is of course very necessary to be clear on that point, and you will not, I know, take it amiss that I should make that clear in the plainest possible words.

3. I will ask the Governor of Bombay to arrange that any communication from you should be sent through him, which will I trust reduce delay in its transmission.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

[3] Vol. II, No. 470; the date should be 8 August.

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Sir A. Lothian to Sir K. Fitze

L/P&S/13/998: ff 195–6

CONFIDENTIAL THE RESIDENCY, HYDERABAD, *25 January 1943*

No. 3479–C–1

My dear Fitze,

Please refer to my official letter No. 3479–C[1] dated the 25th January 1943 forwarding a copy of a letter from the President, H.E.H. the Nizam's Executive Council, stating the attitude of H.E.H. the Nizam's Government to post-war constitutional changes. I have thought it advisable to offer my comments separately in this demi-official letter.

2. I understand that preparation of the draft has been going on for almost a year. At one stage His Exalted Highness directed that the views of Mr. Jinnah in his capacity as a constitutional lawyer should be taken on what was proposed. Nawab Ali Yavar Jung took the draft accordingly to Delhi and placed it before Mr. Jinnah, who after retaining it some time remarked that it was too verbose, but does not appear to have made any positive contribution to it. It was also intended to consult Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, but it was decided later that as he had been briefed by other States, it would not be advisable for him to see the Hyderabad case. At one time also it is believed that the draft included a pro-Masulipatam argument, emphasising that Hyderabad, strengthened by the possession of that port, would furnish the British Government with a *pied-à-terre* in that part of India which might be of considerable strategic value. Later on however this was omitted.

3. It does not appear necessary at this stage to comment at length on the political aspects of the letter, as it is more a "caveat", showing the direction in which the views of the Hyderabad Government are tending, than a firm policy. It is apparent that its tenor has largely been affected by the aspirations fomented by Bahadur Yar Jung with the tacit support of the Nizam, for Hyderabad to be restored to the position of a practically independent unit, connected with British India and the British Crown solely by treaty and not subject to paramountcy. It concerns itself moreover exclusively with Hyderabad, and not with the position of Indian States in general. For it has always irked the Hyderabad Government that Hyderabad, although admittedly the premier Indian State, should be regarded as in the same category as the other States. The letter, as it stands, is innocuous in its claims and phraseology, but I believe in its original form, before it was toned down, it raised more contentious and challengeable issues regarding the independence of Hyderabad and the position

[1] Enclosing No. 286 and enquiring what reply should be given.

of the Nizam. It was felt however by the wiser heads in Council that if Hyderabad were to become an independent unit as envisaged, it could not hope to survive in the midst of a hostile Indian Union as an island with a Muslim minority ruling an enormous Hindu majority, if it also antagonised the British Government to whom alone it could look for support.

4. The two principal points emphasised are—

(1) that Hyderabad should be a separate entity, organically unconnected with any British Indian Union and in the enjoyment of direct treaty relations with the British Crown, the existing treaties being suitably modified by mutual consent;

(2) the objection of the Hyderabad Government to the existing cessions and assignments of territory made with the British Government for the purpose of getting military assistance, being transferred to any other Government, even if the military guarantees were continued by the British Crown, on the ground that such a transfer would be repugnant to the spirit of the treaties concerned. The first is interesting as it shows that Hyderabad conceives its salvation to lie in its isolation. It does not want to be associated either with any provincial units which remain aloof from the central Indian Union, whether of the nature of a Pakistan or otherwise, or with the other Indian States. This contrasts with the views held by the latter, as during and after the Cripps negotiations I found that the feeling was current amongst some of the leading Rajput Princes that if the proposals then made led to the establishment of an Indian Union from which Muslim provinces like the Punjab stood out, and if the formation of a separate union by themselves was out of the question, it would be to their interest, to enter into union with the Punjab, even although it were in effect a Muslim controlled Pakistan, as they completely distrusted the willingness of a Congress controlled Indian Union ever to give them a square deal. As regards the second point, if the Hyderabad proposition is accepted, the difficulty of future adjustment that will be occasioned in those provinces into which ceded territories have been incorporated, needs no emphasising.

5. Although it is clear that the Hyderabad attitude cannot be reconciled with the proposals put forward last Spring by His Majesty's Government for India's future constitutional development, nevertheless inasmuch as these were rejected by India's largest political organisation and some new line of advance is presumably necessary, the views expressed in their letter will no doubt be given due consideration when this is being devised, as it is obvious that in the event of a hostile Indian Union, a friendly allied government in the heart of India would be an asset of no mean strategic value.

Yours sincerely,

A. C. LOTHIAN

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Field Marshal Wavell to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/125

MOST SECRET NEW DELHI, *25 January 1943*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I have received your letter of January 16th,[1] telling me of Amery's ideas about consideration of the future of the Indian Army after the war. It is a matter to which we have already given some thought; and we have, as you probably know, a Directorate of the A.G.'s Branch which is considering the problems of demobilisation. I should hesitate to recommend a Committee on the future of the Army in India after the war which was in any way likely to come to public notice by taking evidence from outside sources. We want the officer and the soldier to be thinking entirely now of how to win the present war and not of their future after it; and I am sure it would have an unsettling effect if it became known that we were considering the future of officers and men. So that I think a Committee on the lines of the Modernisation Committee, the one that met before the Chatfield Committee, which Amery appears to suggest, would be premature. This Committee, I understand, took outside evidence, and its existence must have been fairly generally known.

Before we can undertake any serious examination of the future of the Indian Army, we must have some ideas of both the strategical and political position in India after the war. We can, I think, make some appreciation of India's strategical position, since this is largely dependent on certain constant factors, such as geography and the general characteristics of the adjoining nations. I will have a general appreciation of India's strategical position drawn up at an early date. The political factors will be much harder to determine. We may assume that some form of Indian National government is likely to be in power within a year or so from the conclusion of the war; but what form that government will take, i.e. whether it will include the whole of India, or whether some Provinces may secede; whether it will include the Indian States; what its attitude towards British assistance will be, and so forth, will be difficult matters on which to make assumptions. Perhaps you could assist us here by giving us what you consider would be a reasonable basis on which to work; or perhaps it should be for His Majesty's Government to say what assumptions should be made. On these assumptions will depend a whole variety of questions, i.e. whether we are to consider complete Indianisation at once or a period during which British personnel gradually disappear; what troops are to be allotted for internal security; what is to be the future of the Gurkhas, and so on.

[1] No. 351.

We have also to consider such questions as whether Indian troops will be required for post-war garrisons, whether His Majesty's Government will endeavour to obtain permission from the Indian Government to station Imperial troops in India, and so forth.

I suggest that I should have as a first step an appreciation made of India's probable strategical position after the war, and the approximate size of the naval, land and air forces necessary for her defence. Meanwhile, possibly His Majesty's Government could give us some ideas of what they considered was the probable political situation. By combining these two appreciations, we might be in a position to get down to further details. But I consider absolute secrecy vital at this stage, if we are not to unsettle the Army before the war is over.

We are doing what we can to further future Indianisation by increasing the number of Indians at the Staff College and by placing Indians in command of units.[2]

Yours sincerely,

A. P. WAVELL

[2] Lord Linlithgow acknowledged this letter in his letter of 26 January, adding that he was sending a copy to Mr Amery, was grateful for the interim action which Sir A. Wavell had in view, and entirely agreed as to its advantage. MSS. EUR. F. 125/125.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *26 January 1943*

PERSONAL

No. 198–S. My immediately following telegrams[1] contain reply I have now received from Gandhi and further reply which I have sent to him. He continues to want to have it both ways and to be free to fast whether in or out of jail, and possibly, as you will see, in connection with food situation if he is deprived of an excuse for fasting on political grounds. And he remains concerned to shift the burden of responsibility from Congress to Government.

2. I have avoided most of his direct questions. My letter will have made it clear that we cannot accept his suggestions as to the responsibility of Government and that preliminary to any arrangement must be abandonment of the resolution of last August and its policy, and assurances as regards the future. I have said nothing about fasting, but if he positively tells me that he is going to fast I shall then make it clear to him in unmistakable terms what our policy on that point is going to be.

3. I have still said nothing to my Council. If Gandhi, when he replies, definitely asks to see the Working Committee I shall certainly have to let them know how matters stand. That will equally be the case if in his reply he tells me that he proposes to fast. I should be most anxious myself if possible to avoid his seeing the Working Committee, since once such discussions begin it will be very difficult to set a term to them, or avoid news of his contact with the Working Committee getting out. But I recognise that there are circumstances in which we have to consider this if we were to avoid the suggestion that we were deliberately blocking a settlement. Pending Gandhi's reply any comment you may have on this point would, of course, be most welcome.

[1] See Nos. 353, note 1, and 358, note 1.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *26 January 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

I have no letter from you to answer this week, but there are one or two things which I might perhaps mention.

2. The most important development of the last few days has been our decision about the control of the price of wheat and the communiqué[1] which has been issued about the food position generally. It is too early yet to be certain what the general reactions will be, but I was encouraged to find that the wheat price at 5 o'clock last evening (the communiqué having been in the morning papers) was about Rs. 9—in other words about Rs. 2 less than I should have been quite prepared to find it, for purchases when the control was operative had been going on at prices like Rs. 7–8, &c. But it will take a day or two before

[1] The communiqué stated that the Government of India believed that the food shortages were mainly due to hoarding. It admitted that attempts to control prices had been only partially successful. H.M.G. had 'undertaken to arrange for the use of the people of India of substantial shipments of wheat to be made during the next three months', which it was expected would sell appreciably below free market prices. A Government Purchasing Agency had been set up in the Punjab and similar agencies would be set up in other surplus areas to meet the requirements of deficit areas and of the defence services. The export of food grains beyond Provincial and State boundaries on private account would be prohibited. 'The Government of India believe that by thus eliminating competition between exporters in producing markets and by increasing available supplies in markets by imports from abroad, they will be able to exercise a more effective influence over prices than has hitherto been secured by means of statutory maximum prices.' The wholesale price of wheat was therefore to be decontrolled. L/E/8/3297: f 198.

we can really judge what the effect has been. I need not say how profoundly I hope that it will be satisfactory, and I would like to thank you again most warmly, and through you His Majesty's Government for your prompt and ready assistance. But I am sure that if we do manage to keep the price at a reasonable level, a very important contributory factor will have been the knowledge that, as stated in our communiqué, substantial imports of wheat under the arrangements[2] made by His Majesty's Government may be expected.

3. In the political field there have been one or two minor developments during the week. I send you by this bag the texts of statements[3] by Jinnah, Rajagopalachari and Sastri, as well as the text of an earlier statement by Ambedkar. Jinnah's statement, while as usual cautiously worded and so drafted as to produce the maximum appearance of reasonableness and a readiness to meet other points of view, in fact does not represent, so far as I can make out, the very slightest change of attitude which might be summed up by saying that if the Congress accept his terms in full, he would treat them kindly. There is no prospect of their accepting his terms in full, or committing themselves as I see it in any way to the Pakistan doctrine. Rajagopalachari, on the other hand, repeats with even greater emphasis than before his conviction of the wisdom of a compromise under which Congress would in fact commit themselves on the Pakistan issue in the sense desired by Jinnah. I would only repeat that, as I have said above, I do not believe that that proposition is ever really going to carry Hindu feeling in this country. The Mahasabha are up against it, and I suspect that general feeling inside Congress substantially supports the Mahasabha on that issue. But at first sight Rajagopalachari would seem to have secured the support of Sastri, and though Sastri is now a little of a back number, his name still commands respect, and he has in the past been a person of great prominence. To the extent that he is prepared to lend his voice to Rajagopalachari's suggestion that Jinnah and the Muslims should be met half way, it is of interest. But you will observe that he couples with that suggestion the demand for a strong Central Government which is precisely the sort of rock over which any of these compromises are bound to split, since the vital issue is the communal composition of that government. Ambedkar's speech is chiefly interesting for its somewhat crude but very telling realism.

4. In general I think that I sense, though I may be wrong, an increasing conviction in the country that no progress is going to be made, and I can see with a good deal of interest first the increasingly friendly references to the federal plan, and even greater demands in the Press that I should put the federal plan into being without delay for the interim period: secondly, suggestions that it is too early to dispense with the presence of Great Britain in this country and that she should have to stay here for a good deal longer. And those indications of a more realistic approach to India's problems are of value, and I

continue to keep a very close watch on the possibilities of finding at any rate an interim solution by the adoption of the federal plan.

5. You will remember our correspondence[4] about the possibility of setting up a Committee to consider the future of the Indian Army. I consulted the Chief[5] about that without saying anything about Auchinleck being considered for the actual Chairmanship, but passing on otherwise the gist of what you have said to me on various occasions, and I send you by this bag a copy of his reply[6] which is self-explanatory. As you will see a great deal has already been done on the purely military side. But the Chief is perfectly right in saying that the vital factor in any calculations, and one that can be supplied only by His Majesty's Government, is the political status of India after the war. On that let me only say that while I wholly agree with the Chief that it is vital, I do not envy His Majesty's Government in their task in framing the answer and that I think it is of the first importance that that answer should be highly conservative. I am inclined to be pessimistic, as I made clear on various occasions in our earlier correspondence, about the prospect of any solution coming out of the post-war constitutional discussions. I am very doubtful indeed whether we shall ever get the main parties even to meet round the table. I am quite certain that any conclusions that did emerge can be implemented, and any scheme held together, only by the continued and effective presence of Great Britain. I should be very surprised if the post-war Cabinet was prepared to play the altruist either in India or elsewhere in the Empire and to accept kicks without being regarded as eligible for any of the compensations; and here, as in the colonial field (and the same is even more true of Burma), I think we are entitled to bear in mind that it is we who have created and developed these great territories, given them peace and good order and held them together, and that there are limits to the sacrifices that we can reasonably be expected to make. Burma, India, and certain of the Colonies which are the products of British rule and British security must be prepared to pay for them and give certain guarantees, and I would say again how much I hope that His Majesty's Government will not bind themselves any further than they are already bound, and that if and when it comes to a settlement, they will make it clear that their assistance and support is available on certain terms only which it will be for them to lay down. Those are views that I should be quite ready to express before the Cabinet at some appropriate time but which I have every intention of placing formally on record for the Cabinet's information before I hand over at the end of this year: and I trust that you will make as much use of them as is proper in connection with this very important enquiry, though in any event I assume that I shall be consulted

[2] See No. 350. [3] L/P&J/8/512.
[4] Nos. 251, paras. 3–5, 299, para. 2, and 337, para. 7; see also No. 349, para. 7. [5] No. 351.
[6] No. 360.

about the form of any guarantee or pronouncement which His Majesty's Government propose to make in connection with it over the post-war political position of India.

[Para. 6, on the future of one of the Secretary of State's Advisers, omitted.]

7. I sent you by the last bag copies of the revealing, and to my mind very damaging correspondence between Rajagopalachariar and Gandhi which has come out in this defamation trial in Madras.[7] I have asked Laithwaite to telegraph to Joyce suggesting that all possible use should be made of this. It clearly brings out the conflict of points of view, and of great significance also is Gandhi's advice to his friends that there may be worse enemies than the Japs. It all goes to confirm my own feeling that the Congress thought in the middle of last year that the Japanese had a good deal more than a sporting chance; that the wise course was to compromise with them if not to welcome them; and that the rebellion was timed very much with an eye on developments in the eastern theatre of war.

8. I had a friendly talk with Fazlul Huq of Bengal yesterday and found him in very good form. He repeated his anxiety to be employed on some sort of "diplomatic" mission overseas. You and I have corresponded at length on that subject. It would be difficult in the first place to find any really suitable opening for him, and the most we have ever been able to contemplate has been a rather spurious mission to the Holy Places or the like to see how conditions from the pilgrimage point of view went, on a fairly substantial rate of pay. That is still the only solution that seems at all practicable, but I have been unable to get ahead with it because of the volatility of Fazlul Huq and the rapidity with which he changes his stance. One is never perfectly certain where he is or when he may not say something rather embarrassing. In any case I am not at all sure that a sort of Cook's tour of this type, which could at best only cover a few months, would really meet the case. He is very unlikely (and would be very unwise I think) to abandon the substance of the Premiership of Bengal for the shadow of a brief outing in the Middle East; and I have no doubt that what he really wants is a highly paid post of a semi-permanent character, which it would be exceedingly difficult for us to concoct for him.

9. Mindful of our difficulties about food I told him that he simply *must* produce some more rice out of Bengal for Ceylon even if Bengal itself went short! He was by no means unsympathetic, and it is possible that I may in the result screw a little out of them. The Chief continues to press me most strongly about both rice and labour for Ceylon. I have every sympathy with him, and will give him all the help I can in Council, particularly over rice. As for the labour side, you will have seen the propositions that we put to Jayatilaka, which I telegraphed to you.[8] It is not nearly so easy a problem as the rice problem,

since both parties are profoundly suspicious of one another and most anxious to entrench themselves so far as possible. I should say that that is just as true of Ceylon as of India, and I am in a position of some little disadvantage when the suggestion is made that His Majesty's Government are not prepared to bring any pressure to bear on Ceylon, though they do consistently make appeals to India to meet Ceylon. However I hope things will have advanced further before you receive this letter.

10. In your personal telegram of the 4th December No. 20805[9] you referred to a possible misunderstanding by my Council of a statement alleged to have been made by you in the House. I am grateful for the information you gave me in your telegram, and will keep it in reserve in case the point comes up again. But there has been no sign of any reversion to it, and I think it better in these circumstances to let sleeping dogs lie. If and when anyone returns to the charge I shall, thanks to your telegram, be fully armed.

11. In that connection you will remember that I suggested at an earlier stage (my letter of 1st/2nd November)[10] that there might be something to be said for a more or less formal answer by you, in the shape of a message which I could pass on to Council, to my report[11] on the constitutional discussions that took place last July and August; when you were kind enough to suggest that I might let you have a draft. I have in fact marked time, for here again there has been no reversion to the subject over the last two or three months, and I have come to the view that, given that fact, and the fact that the energies of Council have been turned to a considerable extent, temporarily at any rate, from the constitutional field to matters such as Food, &c., it might be better to leave well enough alone. What I propose now to do is to let individual members know in the course of their weekly interviews that while I have not thought it necessary to mention the matter in Council you had asked me to let members individually know (since the matter was not one within Council's official purview) that you had read with great interest and appreciation the very full account which I had given you of the discussions that had taken place during last summer. It is conceivable that somebody like Mody may ask me to mention that in Council, and if so, I will do so. But if they press for anything further I shall remind them again that in discussing this matter at all they were off their beat, and all that can be expected is a courteous acknowledgment from the Secretary of State who, I can assure them, has given full attention to the discussion, and to the various points of view revealed by it.

7 See No. 365.

8 Telegram 184-S of 23 January 1943. The Government of India sought the Ceylon Government's agreement to certain proposals safeguarding the rights of unskilled immigrant Indian labour in Ceylon, before it would permit the emigration of 20,000 persons to supply the labour shortage on Ceylon's rubber plantations. L/P&J/8/205.

9 No. 248. 10 No. 131, para. 6. 11 See No. 298.

12. Peace seems to reign in the Bhansali Camp. But Jinnah's paper *Dawn* has had a series of amusing and damaging leaders about the fast, accompanied by captions in which Bhansali figures regularly with his pot of Glucose, and culminating in a series of photographs clearly designed to suggest, what I have no doubt is the case, that the fast has been a sham, and that Bhansali was not much less fit on the day of its conclusion than he was when he commenced it. That is all to the good, for the more we can show up these sham fasts, and cast doubt, or even ridicule, on the whole technique of fasting the better, though if the Mahatma moves in that direction he will, no doubt, restore it to fashion as a method of political blackmail.

13. I send you by this bag copy of Gandhi's letter,[12] and of my reply.[13] I have telegraphed the texts to you. This business of a possible approach to the Working Committee is an awkward one, for once the old man starts to discuss with them there will be no end to it. Apart from that we shall not be able to conceal the fact that he has left Poona permanently, if he were to do so, and the Fortress of Ahmednagar is a very much worse address than the Aga Khan's Palace at Poona. Finally, while our friends would, no doubt, take the opportunity of these discussions to concert the next move from the Congress point of view, I have not the slightest confidence that anything constructive would come out of meetings between them and Gandhi so far as the solution of the attitude towards Government is concerned. But we must face the possibility that Gandhi may come back with a positive request to be allowed to see the Working Committee or even that my Council (though I think that unlikely) may urge that he should be allowed to do so; and one must be at great pains to avoid putting ourselves in a position in which opinion, whether in the Labour Party, or in the United States, or in "Intelligentsia" circles at home, could be moved by the plausible suggestion that by declining what would be represented as a perfectly reasonable request on the part of the Mahatma we had precipitated a crisis. My experience of Gandhi is however that it is unwise to take one's fences until one has to, and while I may have to think quickly when I get his answer on my present letter, and may well have to ask you for urgent comment, I am not too disposed to be hurried in the meantime.

[Para. 14, on question of Sir M. Gwyer remaining in India as Vice-Chancellor of Delhi University; and para. 15, on Medical Mission, omitted.]

16. I shall probably be telegraphing[14] to you in the next day or two about indemnity legislation, for which Bihar and the United Provinces are anxious consequent on incidents in the recent rising. I sent you by the bag of 12th January copy of a letter which I sent to the two Governors concerned on the 23rd December. You will also, before this letter reaches you, have had copies of their replies. There would have been advantage in legislation on a central basis,

since central legislation would not be liable to be overturned by a Ministry coming into power; and its reassuring value from the service point of view (military as well as civil) would have been greater. But Council was pretty equally divided, and it is not the sort of thing on which I would judge it wise to overrule them, more particularly if, as appears to be the case, the necessary desiderata can be secured by provincial legislation. That legislation admittedly admits of being reversed by a subsequent Ministry; but I am bound to say that I see no early prospect of any Ministry which would reverse it coming into power; and the mere fact that it has been passed will be an earnest to the services of our anxiety to safeguard their position.

17. I send you by this bag copy of a secret letter dated 22nd January[15] from Hallett, with an interesting note by one of his Deputy Inspector-Generals of Police. I send you also a copy of my reply[16] to him. It is obvious to me that Congress are trying to shuffle from under the burden of responsibility, which they have in fact, for the violent and revolutionary character of the rising last autumn, and it would be of very great value if we could, without compromising the source, publicly fix that burden on them fairly and squarely, in such a way that they could not escape it. I am discussing further with my people here the competence of our case in that regard.

[Para. 18, on the pay and conditions of lascars; para. 19, on the Mysore subsidy; and para. 20, on an individual I.C.S. case, omitted.]

PS.—You will be gratified to read the following United Press message, dated Jubbulpore, January 25th, which has just reached me—not perhaps altogether inopportune, and the combination of personalities is one that one would judge to be likely to have a very definite film appeal!

. . . "Mahatma Gandhi is the first and Greta Garbo the second person to be rescued, should ever half-a-dozen world-known personalities be stranded on a desolate island, was the opinion of the public of Jubbulpore.

"The other day President of the Nitakarini College Union received a 'S.O.S. to the effect that Sir Stafford Cripps, Mahatma Gandhi, Generalissimo Chiang

[12] No. 353. [13] No. 358. [14] L/P&J/8/612.

[15] Sir M. Hallett wrote that the incidents quoted in this note by the D.I.G., Southern Range 'show the criminality of Congress and support his theory that Congress has been building up a party machine, an essential ingredient of which is the "gangster" or predatory section of the Hindu community'. L/P&J/8/617: f 117.

[16] In his reply, dated 24 January, Lord Linlithgow wrote that 'few things are more important in this country than that we should show to India, and to the world, that Congress was responsible for the rebellion. The weight of evidence is steadily growing, though it is true that we have not yet got the link between the campaign of violence and the Working Committee—though we have very nearly got it in the case of Patel. What I do feel is that the outside world is not getting the facts, and that it is essential that we should take steps to publicise the best case we can put together.' *Ibid.*: f 116.

Kai-shek, Greta Garbo, Bernard Shaw and M. Stalin have been stranded in a desolate island due to shipwreck. There was no food and tongues were parched.'

"The President, thereupon, proceeded to consult the citizens at an open meeting and each six speakers were asked to make out a case why he wanted a particular personality to be rescued first.

"On conclusion of the debate votes were taken with the above result."

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Sir S. Reed and Sir G. Schuster to Mr Amery

L/P&J/8/515: ff 14–16

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL HOUSE OF COMMONS, *27 January 1943*

Dear Amery,

1. Some weeks ago the India Conciliation Group,[1] through Carl Heath, approached some Members of Parliament with the request that they might be given an opportunity to discuss with them certain aspects of the present Indian situation which were causing them grave concern.

The desired meeting was held on January 20th.

There were present:

On the Parliamentary side:

Mr. Vernon Bartlett
Sir Edward Cadogan
Mr. Edmund Harvey
Mr. Pethick-Lawrence
Sir Stanley Reed
Mr. Wilfrid Roberts
Lord Samuel
Sir George Schuster
Mr. Sorensen

On behalf of the Conciliation Group:

Mr. Gerald Bailey
Mr. D. Elwin [H. H. Elvin?]
Miss Agatha Harrison
Mr. Carl Heath
The Rev. W. Paton
Miss Dorothy Woodman

2. There were differences of opinion on a number of matters discussed: but it is not necessary for our present purpose to record these in detail. What we

wish to put before you now is that there did in fact emerge a clear measure of agreement on some points of fundamental importance and that it was the unanimous desire of all who attended the meeting that we should ask you to give them an opportunity to discuss these points with you.

3. There was agreement—

FIRST: That the feature in the present situation which ought to cause us all the most serious concern is the danger that it may lead to such permanent embitterment both as between British and Indians and also as between the various sections of Indian opinion as to make any peaceful ultimate solution of the political problem utterly impossible.

SECOND: That, since, owing to the failure of the negotiations for a true National Coalition Government including representatives of the main political parties, the responsibility for carrying India through the war rests undivided on British shoulders, it is of paramount importance that this responsibility should be worthily discharged.

Under these two main heads there are four distinct questions which those present at the meeting desire to discuss with you.

4. *Arising under the First Main Head*—viz: *the danger of irreconcilable embitterment* —the members wish to discuss the following questions:—

(i) *Are the Home Government and the Government of India giving thought to the question as to how and when a fresh attempt might be made to restore contact with the imprisoned Congress leaders?*

British statesmen (including yourself) have clearly recognised that there can be no real Indian political settlement without the participation of the recognised Congress leaders. Therefore at some time or other this question *must* be faced. Although some of those present at the meeting urged that attempts should be made immediately to restart political negotiations (e.g. by allowing Mr. Rajagopalachari to have access to Mr. Gandhi in prison) the general view of the meeting was that success for a move of this kind will depend essentially on *timing*, and that a suitable time might be after some signal British success in the war—something which would on the one hand enhance Indian esteem for British friendship and, on the other, make it clear that the desire for a political rapprochement was not to be construed as a sign of weakness on the British side.

Is any thought being given to the preparation for such a move when the time is ripe?

[1] Formed in 1931 on Gandhi's visit to London for the Round Table Conference of that year by members of the Society of Friends and others.

(ii) *What, if any, steps can be taken to keep alive feelings of goodwill between British and Indians?*

Is it not to be hoped that the administration of generous measures for relieving the shortage of food offers opportunities for co-operation between Government officials and supporters (both British and Indian) on the one side, and Indians of all parties on the other?

Is sufficient thought being given by the Government of India to making the most of this and other opportunities of a similar kind?

Has enough prominence been given in India to the recent announcement[2] of British policy on this matter?

(iii) *As a further move which might help to keep the situation fluid could not something even now be done to encourage the starting of serious study work such as must be necessary as a preliminary to constitutional discussion?*

Such a move would help

(*a*) to release genuine and healthy political impulses in India and thus prevent the suffocating growth of suppressed bitterness,

(*b*) to make it clear that the British Government does not want to see constitutional advance put into indefinite cold storage.

The difficulties are fully recognised; but the meeting would like to know whether any constructive thought is going on on these lines.

There was a general feeling that the fresh air of new thought needs to be let in again on this vitally important matter. It is not enough to think only in terms of British political experience—two-Party Parliamentary democracy, Ulster etc. etc.

5. *Under the Second Main Head:—viz: the discharge by the British Raj of its responsibility—*

it is desired to discuss:—

(i) The position of the Viceroy;

(ii) Efficiency in executive policy e.g. in the handling of the food situation, war production etc. etc.

6. *Summary*

Here then are the four main questions:

(1) The possibility of a well-timed move for a rapprochement between the Government and the Political Party leaders as well as between the leaders themselves;

(2) The possibility of keeping goodwill alive by bringing the Government and all political parties together in handling the food crisis;

(3) The possibility of breaking down what is in effect a political moratorium by starting serious "pre-Constituent Assembly" study work on forms of constitution.

(4) Present British leadership in India.

Yours sincerely,

STANLEY REED

GEORGE SCHUSTER

[2] The Economic and Overseas Department of the India Office commented on this paragraph: 'the meaning is not very clear. In their published communiqué [see No. 362, note 1] India certainly gave credit to H.M. Government and was ready to give more.' The reference may have been to *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 386, 21 January 1943, cols. 278–9.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir B. Glancy (Punjab)[1]

MSS. EUR. F. 125/92

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *27 January 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

My dear Glancy,

I have seen Abell's letter[2] of the 25th January to Laithwaite, and am delighted that Phillips is going to stay with you: for it is most valuable that he should get his first impressions of India outside Delhi from a Province such as the Punjab; and your own great experience in the States and of British India should be most helpful to him.

2. I deal below with the political situation. I think it would be a very good thing if he could be got out into the country (I do not know if a man like General Haughton could be of assistance in taking him to some Sikh area; but on all that and on how best to bring him in touch with Muslim sentiment, you are of course far better placed to say than I can be). I think, too, that it is of first class importance that we should take the opportunity of his visit to try to bring home to him the reality of the Muslim position; the impossibility of treating it lightly; the substantial character of the Muslim cultivator; and the dangers of looking at India too much through the spectacles of Congress and its well-wishers, or even through the spectacles of certain political Muhammadans.

3. I get the impression from my conversation with Phillips that he is disposed to think that the Indian problem is very much more simple than it

[1] Lord Linlithgow sent a copy of this letter to Sir R. Lumley under cover of his letter of the same date. MSS. EUR. F. 125/57.

[2] Not printed.

actually is, and that it admits of a much more radical solution than you or I, with our greater experiences, would regard as practical politics. He has of course only been here for a fortnight, and he came out with the strong feeling that governmental and newspaper circles (*The Times*) at home were very liberally inclined. He has met a number of my Colleagues individually, and has also seen, considering the time he has been here, a very large number of Indian politicians of various types; and from our most recent conversation, I think that he is impressed with the possibility of settling the Indian dispute by the immediate formation of a provisional government. Devadas Gandhi, for your own information, seems to have told him that the Mahatma would be very ready to make liberal concessions in the event of such a government; while he seems also to have got the impression from Muslim circles that the Muslim League would be only too delighted to meet the Hindus if asked to do so! It is not unfortunately so simple as all that, as you and I know only too well. On the other hand, I am satisfied as to Phillips' integrity and honesty of purpose. He has been very discreet and cautious in his handling of his situation here *vis-à-vis* of the Press, &c.; and whatever views he may have formed (as indicated above) he has been at pains not to give them publicity, and has been perfectly frank with me; and apart from that, one does not want to give him the feeling that we are stiff-necked reactionaries or that we want to keep him in leading strings. The fact is that his experience here has been too short yet to enable him to sum up the position with real justice, and that he has not therefore tumbled to the fact that while provisional governments sound easy on paper, the real difficulty comes when one gets down to detail; that clearly no provisional government worthy of the name could be set up unless Congress and the Muslim League were both participants in it, since otherwise there could be no hope of that essential, the cessation of party and communal strife. On the other hand any provisional government, to embody these two major parties could be brought into being (I say nothing about the States' aspects) only after the fullest negotiations and examination of communal composition, powers, &c.—in a word, of all those questions that we are all agreed, who are familiar with this subject, must be left over for the post-war conference and cannot possibly be taken in hand and settled during the war.

4. But I need not amplify on this theme, for you know every argument as well as I do. Let me only say again that I have been anxious that you should know the direction in which Phillips' mind seems to be moving, and that I would be most grateful for anything you can do, either indirectly or, if he gives you the opportunity, more directly, to try to keep him on the right lines, and to shake any confidence that he may be developing that a provisional government could be easily set up in present circumstances or would be beneficial in its operations if so set up. I repeat that, given Phillips' quality and honesty of purpose, I am

most anxious to treat him with every possible consideration; while apart from that, the fact that he is a man of this standing and experience is bound to give whatever conclusions he may form in regard to the future of this country some weight at Washington. It is therefore of material importance that if we can tactfully contribute to a balanced judgment on his part, which will take account of the true facts of the position, we should do so.

5. He tells me that he thinks of visiting Calcutta and Bombay. He wishes to see South India if he can, and has Mysore in mind as a possible State. I will say a word privately to the other Governors whom he is likely to meet, on the lines of my present letter.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

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Sir G. Laithwaite to Mr Joyce

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMPORTANT *28 January 1943*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 227–S. Joyce from Laithwaite. I understand that full text of letter from Rajagopalachari, Santhanam, S. Ramanathan and Dr. Rajan, dated 18th July 1942,[1] and of Gandhi's reply dated 20th July 1942,[2] both of which have appeared in the press consequent on publication in the Rajagopalachari defamation case[3] now in progress has been cabled both to Secretary of State and to Washington. Letters seem to His Excellency to be very damaging indeed, and he would be

[1] The signatories criticised the Congress Working Committee resolution of 14 July on the ground that British withdrawal without a Hindu–Muslim settlement would lead to anarchy. Despite this, since the British would not in fact withdraw, they might have supported the movement as simply one of protest were it not for the critical international situation. It was not even remotely probable that the movement would be able to install a National Government capable of resisting Japanese aggression. Instead it would only produce more intense and large-scale repression and suffering which would facilitate Japanese invasion and occupation. The authorities would not allow the movement to proceed under central direction, and the enemy might take advantage of the lack of proper control to convert it into fifth column activity. L/I/1/755.

[2] Mr Gandhi invited 'all four to come here and pour out your love and argument to wean me from what appears to be an error'. He asked 'why don't you form a League with your Muslim friends, and propagate your idea of settlement? . . . Do you accept his [Mr Jinnah's] definition of Pakistan? What is the common idea regarding independence? Surely you should have a common understanding on the fundamental before you come to an agreement. Do not let your fear of the Japanese betray you into a worse state of things.' *Ibid.*

[3] Mr Rajagopalachari had filed a defamation case against the *Sunday Observer* of Madras (a paper opposed to Congressmen and Brahmans on Justice Party lines) for alleging that he had deliberately broken away from the Congress on the Pakistan issue in order to be available to help the rebellion from outside.

grateful if utmost possible use could be made of them. Gandhi's remark with reference to Pakistan "Let not your fear of the Japs betray you into a worse state of things" is also definitely significant.

2. Could you let me know what use has been made or is being made in London or through London in the United States of the correspondence and if there is any further comment that we can help you with by letting you have from here?

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMPORTANT *28 January 1943*
SECRET
PERSONAL

No. 232–S. As you will remember I was at pains to make it clear that while I should keep very close touch with Phillips, Roosevelt's Personal Representative, I did not contemplate that he would play the sort of part in the political field which was played by Johnson, and had I not been satisfied that that was the case I should never have agreed to his appointment.

2. Phillips has now settled in here. He is personally most attractive and he has been discreet and well-mannered in his contacts with the press and Indian political leaders. Of his integrity and anxiety to be of assistance I have a high opinion.

3. I was however somewhat embarrassed when last night, at the close of an interview with him on another subject, he broached the political situation. He has of course been in this country little over a fortnight, and I told him at an earlier stage that I should be interested to check his impressions with him when he had been here for some time and had formed them.

4. Phillips informed me that in London he had found the attitude in Cabinet and parliamentary quarters towards Indian aspirations very liberal indeed. That was the strong impression he derived from his conversations with Anderson, with yourself and with the Editor of the *Times*; and that you gave him to understand that you would welcome anything he could do to bring the parties together. He had been concerned in these circumstances to form a just impression of the Indian situation and, in the light of his conversations over the last fortnight, he was now inclined to the view that a point had been reached at which a definite advance and possibly a settlement could be reached, probably

in the direction of the establishment of a provisional government. Devadas Gandhi had told him that his father would take a liberal view in such circumstances and could be relied upon to make considerable concessions. The Secretary of the Muslim League had given him to understand that the Muslims could be relied upon to be most reasonable if the Hindus would come and see them. He thought that it would be an excellent thing if progress upon a provisional basis could be achieved as soon as possible and before the end of war brought us up against our pledges.

5. I told Mr. Phillips that I was grateful to him for letting me know his mind; that my own judgment would be that it would be well to take a little longer to check his impressions; that I should be very glad to discuss these matters in general, and give him what help I could after the tour which he is now contemplating. He was not however satisfied, and repeated that you had told him that you hoped that he might prove to be of some assistance to me and would be very grateful if he could. Feeling, he said, that he was entrusted in these circumstances with a mission to perform this function he was very anxious to go ahead. I temporised with him but gave him no satisfaction.

6. My estimate of Phillips is contained in paragraph 2 above. I am sure he is honest and well-meaning. I find it impossible to believe that you can have made any such statement to him or that he can have been given either by you or by any other Member of Cabinet any indication that in coming out here he had any mission, or that I would be prepared in any way to share responsibility with him or to be guided by his views. A very serious situation would clearly arise were there to be any attempt on his part or that of the American Government to come in on this stage. My own position would, as you and Cabinet will understand, be quite impossible if there was the least misunderstanding about it.

7. It will probably be necessary for me to make clear to Phillips that he is under a misapprehension; that while I should welcome any well-meant suggestions, I am not prepared to share my responsibilities for handling this situation or to agree to any intervention by him either independently[1] or on behalf of the American Government. I should like to be able to say that I had put the matter to the Cabinet in the light of his statement to me since that statement was markedly at variance with my own instructions, and that I felt sure that it must be the result of a misunderstanding. While I shall of course be delighted to keep in touch with Phillips so far as I think it right, and will do so, it would not be possible for me to share with him the least responsibility over matters which are now in my charge. Nor do I propose to suffer any interference of any sort with my conduct[2] of affairs, or with the authority of my

[1] Deciphered as 'personally'. [2] Deciphered as 'authority'.

government, in the constitutional field. You may be certain that I will make this clear in the gentlest possible terms. But as you and Anderson have been quoted I must be in a position to speak with the full authority of the Cabinet which I shall be glad if you will obtain. I regret as much as you will that this situation should have developed so shortly after Phillips' arrival particularly with a man whom I like as much as Phillips. But he is quite clear that he regards himself as charged with a mission; that he is doubtful of our policy here; and that he is anxious to get on with getting it on the right lines; and that is not a position which we can accept or acquiesce in.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/613: f 123

IMPORTANT — INDIA OFFICE, *28 January 1943, 4.45 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL — *Received: 29 January*

104. In reply to question in Parliament to-day whether I will "reconsider raising existing ban on contact between non-Congress representatives and Congress leaders in order that they may discuss possible political developments"[1] I am replying as follows: *Begins.* "The decision in this matter was taken by the Government of India, and I see no reason to ask them to reconsider it." *Ends.*

[1] By Mr Sorensen. *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 386, 28 January 1943, col. 597.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: ff 409–10

IMMEDIATE — INDIA OFFICE, *28 January 1943, 8.45 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL
MOST SECRET

106. Your private and personal telegram 26th January 198–S.[1] I have circulated this together with 199[2] and 200[3] to Cabinet for information and without any comment.

2. Gandhi's letter seems to indicate that failing to draw you into making some admission or suggestion or concession which he could twist into a score for

himself[4] he intends to have recourse to fast in order to focus limelight on himself again. It is possible therefore that his reply to your last letter may take form of starting fast without further warning.

3. I agree that you are justified in keeping the issue as personal matter between you and Gandhi up to present stage and even until he replies to your 200–S. If his reply is immediate fast or decision to fast from specified date it will be necessary as you say to bring your Council in forthwith. If it is a further letter it will I should judge depend on its contents whether to lay it before Council, but I should agree that if it amounts to definite request to be put in touch with Working Committee Council must be consulted. As to line to be taken with them I am on general grounds opposed to any such concession, but much will turn on professed purpose for which he seeks contact with Committee. You have deliberately avoided asking him to abjure August Resolution on behalf of anybody but himself and there is no obvious reason so far as that issue is concerned for him to consult anybody except himself. But he may indicate some reason for contact with Committee which your Council would find it difficult to reject, though the only one I myself would consider valid would be a definite assurance of his intention to persuade the Committee to abjure their previous policy. In that event my suggestion would be that concession should be limited at the initial stage and till it is clear that some useful result is in prospect to consultation by letter. Neither visit by Committee to Gandhi at Poona nor by Gandhi to Committee at Ahmednagar could be kept dark and speculation possibly reviving Congress activity in dangerous degree would be inevitable. Similar considerations would apply to contact by telephone. Question would arise whether communication by letter should be permitted under seal and decision of that would seem likely to depend on nature of reason afforded for request for contact.

[1] No. 361. [2] See No. 353, note 1. [3] See No. 358, note 1.
[4] 'himself' was received corrupt.

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Mr Gandhi to the Marquess of Linlithgow[1]

MSS. EUR. F. 125/125

DETENTION CAMP, *29 January 1943*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I must thank you *warmly* for your prompt reply[2] to my letter of 19th instant.[3] I wish I could agree with you that your letter is clear. I am sure you do not wish to imply by clearness simply that you hold a particular opinion strongly. I have pleaded and would continue to plead till the last breath, that you should at least make an attempt to convince me of the validity of the opinion you hold that the August resolution of the Congress is responsible for the popular violence that broke out on 9th August *last* and after, even though it broke out after the wholesale arrest of principal Congress workers. Was not the drastic and unwarranted action of the Government responsible for the reported violence?

You have not even said what part of the August resolution is bad or offensive in your opinion. That resolution is in no way a retraction by the Congress of its policy of non-violence. It is definitely against Fascism in every shape or form. It tenders co-operation in war effort under circumstances which alone can make effective and nation-wide co-operation possible. Is all this open to reproach? Objection may be raised to that clause of the resolution which contemplated civil disobedience. But that by itself cannot constitute an objection since the principle of civil disobedience is impliedly conceded in what is known as *the* "Gandhi–Irwin Pact".[4] Even that civil disobedience was not to be started before knowing the result of the meeting for which I was to seek from you an appointment.

Then, take the unproved and in my opinion unprovable charges hurled against the Congress and me by so responsible a Minister as the Secretary of State for India.

Surely I can say with safety that it is for the Government to justify their action by solid evidence not by mere *ipse dixit*.

But you throw in my face the facts of murders by persons reputed to be Congressmen. I see the fact of the murders as clearly, I hope, as you do. My answer is that the Government goaded the people to the point of madness. They started leonine violence in the shape of the arrests already referred to. That violence is not any the less so, because it is organised on a scale so gigantic that it displaces the Mosaic law of tooth for tooth by that of ten thousand for one—not to mention the corollary of the Mosaic law, i.e. of non-resistance as enunciated by Jesus Christ. I cannot interpret in any other manner the repressive measures of the all-powerful Government of India.

Add to this tale of woe the privations of the poor millions due to India-wide scarcity which I cannot help thinking might have been largely mitigated, if not altogether prevented, had there been a *bona fide* national government responsible to a popularly elected assembly.

If then I cannot get soothing balm for my pain, I must resort to the law prescribed for Satyagrahis namely a fast according to capacity. I must commence after the early morning breakfast of the 9th February a fast for 21 days ending on the morning of the *2nd* March. Usually, during my fasts, I take water with the addition of salts. But nowadays my system refuses water. This time, therefore, I propose to add juices of citrus fruit to make water drinkable. For, my wish is not to fast unto death, but to survive the ordeal, if God so wills. This fast can be ended sooner by the Government giving *the* needed relief.

I am not marking this letter personal as I did the two previous ones. They were in no way confidential. They were a mere personal *appeal*.

I am,

Your sincere friend,

M. K. GANDHI

PS.[5]—The following was inadvertently omitted:—

The Government have evidently ignored or overlooked the very material fact that the Congress by its August resolution asked nothing for itself. All its demands were for the whole people. As you should be aware, the Congress was willing and prepared for the Government inviting Q.-A. Jinnah to form a national government subject to such agreed adjustments as may be necessary for the duration of the war, such Government being responsible to a duly elected assembly. Being isolated from the Working Committee except Shrimati Sarojini Devi, I do not know its present mind. But the Committee is not likely to have changed its mind.

[1] Lord Linlithgow transmitted the text of this letter to Mr Amery in telegram 33–S.C. of 1 February, adding that 'I shall be in Delhi on Wednesday morning and will take matter in Council that day [3 February], and will thereafter telegraph to you'. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24. In the penultimate sentence of the 2nd para. 'But that' was deciphered as 'Manifesto' and in the 4th para. 'safety' was deciphered as 'suavity'.

[2] No. 358. [3] No. 353.

[4] Clause 1 of the statement by the Governor-General in Council published on 5 March 1931 (and known as the Gandhi–Irwin pact) stated that 'consequent on the conversations that have taken place between His Excellency the Viceroy and Mr. Gandhi, it has been arranged that the civil disobedience movement be discontinued, and that, with the approval of His Majesty's Government, certain action be taken by the Government of India and local Governments'; and clause 5 stated that 'civil disobedience will be effectively discontinued and reciprocal action will be taken by Government'. The statement proceeded to define the 'effective discontinuance' of the civil disobedience movement and to lay down the action that Government would take thereupon.

[5] Stated on the copy sent to the India Office to have been in Mr Gandhi's handwriting. L/P&J/8/600: f 228.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *29 January 1943*

Your letters of January 5th,[1] 8th[2] and 11th[3] have all come in together. They cover a great many interesting points, most of which, however, are more for information than calling for any immediate answer.

2. I was glad to see from the letter of the 5th that you had definitely made up your mind about Usman and Azizul Haque, though I have not yet actually received the telegram which you said would reach me before your letter. Since then I have sent you Azizul Haque's request for leave in order to get into contact with the Universities with regard to students, as well as to deal with various other matters arising out of his experience here. I have not had your answer, but in view of the appointment you have in mind he obviously ought to get his free air passage out in any case, whether on the basis of his leave being on official duty, or of what is going to happen to him soon after he gets there. I hope he may in any case have time to launch his student scheme on the Universities. The general line of it is that Universities, with representation by the Provincial Governments, should form Provincial Committees to consider what students, both in respect of quality and numbers, are likely to do best in England and to put those on a recommended list which would ensure them priority of consideration for places at Universities here, &c., and to some extent act as a deterrent to the type of student who turns out a failure here.

3. Your letter of the 8th deals with the interesting and important suggestion of inaugurating an all-India Police Service of a military character. No doubt I may get some comments from the Department, but my first impression certainly is that this is something urgently needed, not only for the present war situation, but for the possible unrest that may develop after the war.

4. In your letter of the 11th you mention your very favourable first impression of Phillips and I confess I was a little surprised to get this morning your telegram[4] in which he seems to have given you an entirely false impression of what Anderson and I said to him. I am quite clear in my own mind that I took the opportunity to make it very clear that he was there to inform the President and not to act in any sense as a mediator and indeed he emphatically disclaimed this. Nor did I in any way suggest that he should mediate between the Indian parties. What I did say when he asked me if I had any advice as to what he should say to Indians when they talked to him was that he should remind them of the way in which the American and Dominion constitutions had come about,

viz. by discussion and agreement among the parties directly concerned. I cannot conceive that he took this at the time as in any way a suggestion that he should himself take part in bringing them together. But it does look to me a little as if his memory, possibly influenced by some hint from Washington, may have played him false and given him in retrospect a very different impression of what I said to what I actually did say. My own feeling is that the best way for you to handle this awkward business is to make it clear that you naturally welcome any information he could give you as a result of his contacts, and to treat his last conversation with you as having been of that nature, and at the same time make it quite clear that neither you nor I nor the Cabinet would for a moment appreciate any intervention on his part whether between Indian parties themselves or between them and His Majesty's Government. I should be inclined to take the line of frankly welcoming his views of the situation and equally frankly giving him your reasons for holding that nothing can come out of inter-party negotiations at the present time, and that you know that I share that view.

5. My own view indeed is crystallising progressively against any chasing after party politicians. In that I am influenced not only by the futility of doing so under present circumstances and the bad effect upon your Executive, whose authority and confidence in themselves is the most important thing we have to go upon in the immediate future. It is also based on the fact that I do not believe that a Parliamentary Executive can ever function at the centre of an Indian federation. Indeed, it is the Parliamentary Executive, much more than the existence of necessary central powers, which frightens the Muslims and Princes. The eventual Indian constitution must I think be one in which the executive remains as independent of the Legislature as it is at present, or as the American executive is, and that its national responsibility can only be an indirect one, e.g. an executive whose members are nominated by Provincial Governments and States or conceivably elected for a longer period of years by proportional representation by the Legislature. If, then, India is likely to have a constitution more of the American type, with executive and legislators largely separate and very rarely the same kind of people—in America it very rarely happens that a member of either House ever becomes President or member of the President's Cabinet—then it seems to me a mistake to go on negotiating with Parliamentarians from the point of view of their forming a provisional government, and that our right course should be to build up a body of Executive Ministers with a tradition of administrative responsibility and let the Parliamentarians know that their business is to consider the framing of a future constitution and their activities in the Parliament of that constitution.

[1] No. 315. [2] Official letter 1-H.E.-43. MSS. EUR. F. 125/14. See para. 3 of this document.
[3] No. 336. [4] No. 366.

From the talks I have had with them I imagine that this is the sort of conception of the future which would appeal not only to Mudaliar and Zafrulla individually, but to a great many able and competent men all over India.

6. I shall be very interested to see what Gandhi's reply to your last letter[5] will be. I should not be surprised if he fenced yet once again with another letter before committing himself to the unpleasant prospect of a fast. The older people are the less inclined they are to shorten what is left to them of life, at any rate by deliberate action. I certainly see no reason why your Government should allow Gandhi to get into touch with the other Congress leaders, unless it were with the avowed object, and on explicit assurances, that he wishes them to abjure the whole policy of last August and makes it clear that he himself has already done so.

7. Zafrulla gathered from a talk he had at lunch with Simon the other day that the latter would be quite agreeable to appeals going to the Federal Court instead of to the Privy Council on an optional basis, and Spens and he and Kemp had a good talk over it with me the other day. I am all in favour of that as something which should help to keep the Federal Court from falling into contempt during the years that may intervene before any constitution is framed, and so enable it to weather the storm when such a constitution comes about. I wrote to Simon to find out what he really thinks and am waiting for his answer.

[Para. 8, on an honour for Mr Spens; para. 9, on correspondence with Mr Shinwell on attitude of Europeans in India to British soldiers; and para. 10, on letter from Lord Birdwood about land held by ex-army officers on 'horse-breeding' terms, omitted.]

[5] No. 358.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMPORTANT *30 January 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 249–S. Home Membership. We have discussed this informally at various points and I have now reached the conclusion that the right course would be—

(*a*) to allow Maxwell to retire in April on completion of his normal term;
(*b*) to appoint Usman to succeed him;
(*c*) to appoint Azizul Haque to succeed Usman as Member for Posts and Air;

(*d*) to appoint Sir Bijoy Prasad Singh Roy of Bengal as High Commissioner to succeed Haque;

(*e*) I have under consideration the possibility of appointing a Hindu to the vacant Information portfolio, which would keep the communal balance sound in my Council: but I am not yet in a position to make a recommendation.

2. I shall be grateful for your reaction before going any further. (*a*) Usman, I know to be most strongly opposed to further Indianization of Council and as you are aware, we may have some trouble on that point with Jinnah. But I would tell Usman (if that is our decision) that you and I have decided that the wise course would be to appoint an Indian as Home Member and that, with his 9 years' experience as Home Member in Madras, he is the obvious man. I have no doubt that he would accept if he knows that the post is going to be Indianized anyhow.

(*b*) I feel no doubt myself that Azizul Haque will accept "Posts and Air". But I would prefer nothing to be said to him until I have sounded Usman.

(*c*) I cannot be quite sure that Bijoy will take High Commissionership, and will have to take private soundings through Herbert on that point.

3. I am particularly anxious to keep all these secret for the longest possible time. As regards the High Commissionership I shall also have to consult my Commerce Member. I would be grateful for earliest possible reply so that you and I can get on with time-table and if necessary approaches to persons concerned.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *30 January 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Many thanks for your letters of 31st December[1] and 5th January[2] which arrived almost simultaneously. I am relieved to have got the matter of the answer to the Princes settled. I shall probably have a word about it with the Jam Saheb who has now arrived safely back and who is coming to stay with me as at present arranged on 6th February for a few days. I will tell him how sorry we are that his visit to America should have come to nothing, and indeed I am sorry, given all the trouble we had taken over it and Halifax's co-operation, that it should have had to fall through.

* * *

[1] No. 306. [2] No. 316.

3. My best thanks for the Christmas bulletin of the Empire Industries Association which I was very glad indeed to read. I only wish that the Foreign Office were less terrified of Americans in any shape or form. I am relieved at any rate that the Foreign Office should, as you say in paragraph 5,[3] have been strong-minded enough to call the Chinese bluff over Kowloon.

4. In paragraph 6 you mention possible exchanges of territory with the French, and you may remember that the point has come up once or twice in our earlier personal correspondence.[4] It is conceivable that the French may be a little more open-minded after the present war, though I confess to feeling far from optimistic. But I will send you a line about this in one of my later letters.

5. Turning to your letter of 5th January the comments in its first couple of paragraphs on Gandhi's letter[5] are very apropos, as I have just received the old man's reply[6] to my latest[7] to him (let me take the opportunity to thank you for your helpful telegram[8] of comment on our latest exchange). I think I shall probably have to take the matter in Council on Wednesday as soon as I return from Lucknow, for which I leave to-night. Unfortunately, so far as I can judge Council will not then be a particularly large body, as Srivastava, Noon, Jogendra Singh and Sarker will all of them be on tour, and just conceivably Aney also. However I must do what I can. As you will see, the Mahatma is now somewhat anxious to extend the scope of his grumbles and to make such publicity use as possible of the food situation, his readiness to see a National Government formed, and his readiness to see it formed by Jinnah—all good red herrings, and our object must be to keep him to the point. Nor can he reasonably suggest that the Congress attitude is to be tested merely on a careful reading of the precise words of the August resolution, or claim that his own earlier description of what was in view as open rebellion, &c. can be lost sight of. However I will not worry you with any more detailed comment now, as I must think a little more over the line of my reply; and much will depend also on what is going to happen in Council. The ideal would clearly be a very polite answer thanking him for his letter, repeating that the onus of justification was on the Congress and not on Government and that the facts already reported spoke for themselves; and reminding him possibly of his reference to open rebellion and of the type of speech and preparation for offensive action that had been made; going on to say that on personal as well as on other grounds I greatly regret that he should contemplate the step at his age and in his state of health which he now apparently has in view; that I still trust that wiser counsels may prevail with him; that should he in fact decide to carry out his intention, he may rely on all possible attentions—medical, dietetic and other, being constantly at his disposal; that we do not propose to give publicity to the fact that he is fasting, and that he should know that if his fast is carried on

to a point at which he is reported by the doctors in attendance to be in immediate danger of death, he will then be enlarged. But I think that my colleagues will probably find it extremely difficult to agree to keep the news of his fasting entirely secret, though they would take an immense burden off themselves if they were to do so, since the moment the old man starts to fast, however flimsy the justification, he will of course be in the centre of the news again. But I must see how their minds run and I will of course keep you in the closest touch by telegram.

6. Talking of fasts reminds me of Bhansali, about whom I wrote to you in my last letter.[9] Aney has just told me that he has now heard from Bhansali who, after 62 days fast, is apparently as brisk as a young lamb, suggesting that he should pay his visit to Chimur at once in company with Bhansali. I have consulted Twynam by telephone. He tells me that his present policy is not to place any restriction whatever on people who want to visit Chimur, his Government's attitude being that the case is cast-iron and that there is nothing to conceal, and that while he would have preferred Aney's visit to have been deferred until later, he would not feel justified in these circumstances in asking him to postpone it. He asked that publicity should so far as possible be avoided and that Aney, if he decided on a visit, should come and have a talk with him at Nagpur on his way to Chimur. Aney is agreeable to those conditions, and I understand leaves here tomorrow, Sunday, for Nagpur. But the photographs on which *Dawn* commented so acidly apart, it is pretty obvious that no man could do a fast of 62 days and within a fortnight be so fresh as to contemplate pilgrimages of this nature, and I hope that if it comes out, as it must come out, that Bhansali and Aney have been to Chimur, the Press will pay some attention to that side of the matter.

* * *

8. I leave here to-night for Lucknow for a 3-day tour—I have not been there since 1936. They have been doing very good work in the United Provinces over war effort, and I particularly want to see what I can of it and to make contact with the local people, military as well as civil. I expect to leave Lucknow after a rather strenuous programme on the evening of the 2nd and to return here for breakfast on the morning of the 3rd. I shall have a further opportunity of talking things over with Hallett later in February for he is coming here for 3 or 4 days towards the end of the month to receive his G.C.I.E., and I am also expecting Hope and Twynam to stay from the 13th to the 18th, while the Herberts are to come at the beginning of March. A trickle of Chinese guests of varying importance lies ahead—Dr. Soong; the Chinese

[3] Not printed. [4] See Vol. I, No. 7, para. 17 and No. 22, para. 7. [5] No. 305.
[6] No. 369. [7] No. 358. [8] No. 368. [9] No. 362, para. 12.

War Minister, General Yo, and finally at the end of February the Chinese Educational Mission.

* * *

10. Talking of Phillips,[10] I have telegraphed[11] to you at some length about him and intend to add nothing here, for the difficulty of the points I have raised will be apparent to you. As I have said in my telegram, no one could be pleasanter or generally more friendly; but we have of course got very definitely to draw a line and there could be no question of sharing or of a division of responsibility in this very important field.

11. I was so glad to have your comments[12] on colonial policy, and I think that there is a very great deal in what you say on this subject.

* * *

13. As for what you say in paragraph 8 of your letter about the food situation, we are doing our best to be fair to all, and to keep the balance as between States and Provinces. As I write, though prices are rising now that the control has gone off, the position does not look too bad. There are signs that wheat is beginning to come out, though it is really impossible to judge with any confidence, and is not likely to be possible for another week or fortnight.

14. Begum Shah Nawaz has just got back. I found her excellent company. Her opinion of men in American public life does not seem to be too high—in fact she told me that no one except Roosevelt and one or two others could claim to be statesmen at all, and that she despaired of the future if nothing better than that was being thrown up by the great Republic. Wendell Willkie I gather figured fairly high on her list of disappointments! As for the general position, people, she said, were anxious rather for information than for propaganda, and the most tiresome and in a way dangerous people were those who were ignorant but thirsting for knowledge. If we could only get facts across to them, that was the best answer: but she thought Indians would be much better than Europeans for putting the facts across. The Wendell Willkie–Luce group probably had their eyes on trade openings in India and were very anxious to keep a foot in here in case they should be pushed out of China and thought that there was a good deal to be said for being friends with the Congress party first for the trade reasons she had just mentioned; secondly so as to score incidentally off Great Britain. The Begum was delighted with her own operations, which I have no doubt have been extremely successful, and is pleased in particular by her conversation with Louis Fischer who told her that she had done her country more harm in a few weeks than anyone else could claim to have done in an indefinite period!

15. She gave me one or two other points which I must look into. There was, she said, very great delay indeed in getting mails to the Indian soldiers at Aden and the effect on them was very bad and depressing. She had been struck by the frigidity of relations between British and American personnel serving together and commented that those relations seemed for practical purposes non-existent and the individuals concerned to resemble bears in cages more than anything else. She had found the Indian troops whom she had visited very anxious for news of internment or prisoner-of-war camps in which Indian prisoners of the Italians were kept, and anxious if possible to send them comforts, &c. I must ask the Chief if he can make enquiries on this point, and we may have to bother you about it. She thought the Indian army personnel in Egypt rather tired and depressed. They were no longer very much in the fighting. They were not sufficiently strongly represented on the Staff, &c. I am having a word with the Chief, who may help over some of that. Finally she mentioned that in Egypt and certain other places in the Middle East she had been given to understand that South African and Australian officers had refused to sit with Indian officers in clubs, &c. I told her that on that point I had the completest possible sympathy with her point of view and that I would never myself be prepared to enter a club of which that could be said, but that this was the first that I had heard of any such complaint.

* * *

LUCKNOW, *31 January*

21. In the earlier part of my letter I have discussed the latest developments in the Bhansali–Aney case. Just as I got on the train for Lucknow last night, Aney rang up to say that he had decided after all not to go to Chimur, at any rate now. So that is the end of that for the time being; though it has meant a good deal of time wasted.

22. I find Hallett in very good form, and look forward to my discussions with him.

Best luck.

[10] The para. omitted referred to Mr Phillips' offer to arrange air passages in U.S. aircraft to take Sir R. Lumley and his family to the U.K.

[11] No. 366. [12] No. 316, paras. 3–6.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery


Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE LUCKNOW, *1 February 1943, 9.5 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 1 February, 11 pm*

No. 32–S.C. I am telegraphing separately text of Gandhi's reply.[1] As you will see he holds to his ground which is briefly that responsibility for Congress rebellion rests not on him or on Congress but on us, because of my decision not to wait until he asked to see me last August, and indignation of his followers at repressive action taken by Government of India consequent on resolution of 9th August. He repeats his officer [offer] to be convinced of his error (with its corollary that it is up to us to justify ourselves to him) but repeats equally his refusal to condemn anything for which he is not first satisfied that full responsibility rests with him or with Congress.

2. In his letter of 19th January[2] he introduced for the first time the food situation. His present letter adds to the food situation the national government issue (touched on also in his letter to me of 14th August[3] and to Home Department of 23rd September last[4]) and his readiness to see a government formed by Jinnah. Both of these are ingenious[5] red herrings designed in the event of publication to deflect public attention from weakness of Congress case in face of public opinion, and it will be essential to keep him to the point.

3. As regards his threatened fast, you will observe that it is now not to be a fast to death if that can be avoided, and that he proposes to take water and fruit juices. It is quite conceivable I suppose that he might hold out even for 21 days on that diet. Difficult question which I shall have to discuss with my Council is that of publicity: for the moment that it becomes known that he is embarking on any sort of fast, however unsubstantial the reasons, we shall of course have the press campaign which, as I mentioned in my telegram of 6th January No. 37–S[6], I always anticipated. But I shall have to see how feeling in Council goes, and shape my course accordingly. I will telegraph again after meeting on Wednesday. My own clear view is that: (*a*) Gandhi must remain in jail until he is in imminent danger of death, and cannot be released under a threat. (*b*) If I could get my colleagues to stand for no publicity at any rate at this stage, there would be a great deal to be said for that. If publicity has to be given to fact of a fast, then we should be prepared to use censorship to control press references to it. (*c*) It will still be desirable to warn Gandhi in terms even though he now says that he does not contemplate a fast to death but a "fast to capacity" that if his fast brings him within immediate danger of death, he will not be



The Indian representatives at the War Cabinet in the garden of 10 Downing Street, 9 September 1942. See Document 2. Left to right: Mr Amery, Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar, the Maharaja Jam Saheb of Nawanagar, Mr Churchill, Lord Cranborne




The Viceroy's Executive Council, February 1943

Front row, left to right: Sir H. Mody, Sir J. Raisman, Field Marshal Sir A. Wavell, Lord Linlithgow, Sir R. Maxwell, Sir Sultan Ahmed, Mr M. S. Aney. Back row: Sir G. Laithwaite (P.S.V.), Mr N. R. Sarkar, Sir Firoz Khan Noon, Sir E. Benthall, Sir M. Usman, Dr B. R. Ambedkar, Sir J. P. Srivastava, Sir Jogendra Singh, Sir G. Spence (Secretary)



The Aga Khan's Palace, Poona



THE EMPTY CHAIR

From the Daily Worker, *25 May 1943. See Document 733*

allowed to die as a prisoner. While if I could but get my colleagues to agree, there would be everything to be said for telling him also that no publicity or the minimum publicity would be given to his fast. But I doubt my being able to carry that point, and if my doubts are well based we shall have to face a great deal of public excitement and even possibly interruption of war effort during the three weeks following the 9th February.

[1] No. 369. [2] No. 354 [3] Vol. II, No. 553.
[4] Vol. II, No. 779; the date should be 21 September. [5] 'ingenious' deciphered as 'solid'.
[6] No. 318.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2754: ff 186–8

IMPORTANT
PERSONAL
SECRET

INDIA OFFICE, *1 February 1943, 8.45 pm*
Received: 2 February

114. Your 232–S.[1] Have discussed with Anderson who is quite clear that he could have given Phillips no encouragement but the very reverse to any idea of his intervening in any way as a mediator. You will have had summary enclosed in my letter of November 25th[2] of my talk with him which shows line I took. I certainly gave him no encouragement whatever to take on the role of mediator though I did say that the best advice he could give Indians was to get together themselves as American and Dominion statesmen had in the past. As to what Barrington-Ward or Professor Carr may have said to him we naturally have no knowledge nor responsibility. Phillips surely does not believe that *Times* is mouthpiece of Government? I should see no harm in your letting him know that *Times* attitude of late on Indian question has been a sore puzzle and burden to us. Clearly it must be explained to him that there is no foundation for his belief that either I or Anderson or the Cabinet here would favour his acting as intermediary whether between you and Indian parties or between those parties and that if he acquired that impression he was under a misapprehension. I am sure you can explain that on the basis of these assurances from Anderson and myself far better and more tactfully on your own than by bringing in Cabinet—I do not think it necessary at this stage at any rate to bring the matter before them. You can I am sure make it clear to him that you welcome any information or impressions he may give you as the result of his contacts, adding, if you think it desirable in order to give him an opening to withdraw from his misapprehensions, that I too would be

[1] No. 366. [2] No. 219.

glad of such assistance as he could give you in that respect. If he accepts this you might I suggest treat the talk referred to in your telegram as having been of that nature, and take opportunity of warning him of the danger of being drawn into any position which would lead Indians to think that he could mediate between them let alone between them and H.M.G., emphasising that former which looks harmless and even helpful[3] inevitably leads into latter.

There is no reason why you should not let him know why neither you nor I believe that anything can come out of Indian inter-party negotiations in present conditions, for the simple reason that there can be no real agreement on a provisional government until there is full agreement on the nature and even the details of the future constitution, and why we regard the strengthening of the authority of the existing predominantly Indian Executive as the most hopeful immediate line of progress. My impression is that I did convey that to him but cannot be quite sure as I did not cover it in my brief summary immediately afterwards.

If Phillips shows any sign of claiming that he is officially authorised by his Government to mediate it would seem justifiable to refer to fact that Halifax made it clear to State Department in his interview with Welles that we desired that any such intention should be disclaimed (see my telegram 17164[4] dated 2nd October to External Affairs Department and my private and personal telegram 1208[5] dated 7th October), and that it was publicly stated by President at time appointment was announced that Phillips had no special instructions of this sort (Washington telegram 326[6] of 11th December).

[3] 'helpful' deciphered as 'tame'. [4] See No. 42. [5] No. 78. [6] No. 267.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

PERSONAL LUCKNOW, *2 February 1943, 1.35 pm*
Received: 2 February, 3.15 pm

No. 38–S.C. I suggest that you do not circulate my personal telegram of 1st February[1] about Gandhi until I have telegraphed again. I will take case in Council to-morrow afternoon. Meanwhile I have discussed with Hallett and find him very strongly in favour of my own earlier view from which as you know I have never wavered that Gandhi, if he desired to do so, should be allowed on his own responsibility to starve to death. I have now thought it well to consult all Governors again as to reactions to allowing him to fast unto death in confinement, releasing him when in immediate danger of

death, or cat and mouse,[2] and will telegraph gist of their replies. I have also let Lumley know of Hallett's attitude in case he wishes to reconsider. Fact that fast is not in terms of a fast unto death but "to capacity" and for a period of 21 days only during which Gandhi will take water and fruit juice is of course relevant.

[1] No. 373.

[2] i.e. releasing Gandhi as soon as his life was in danger in order to avoid possibility of his dying as a prisoner. Under this plan, if after release, Gandhi 'abandons his fast and recovers his health, he will again be arrested unless he publicly disowns any intention of promoting a mass movement'. Government of India, Home Department Circular 4/3/42—Political (I) of 2 August 1942 to all Provincial Governments and Chief Commissioners (summarised in Vol. II, No. 393). L/P&J/8/597: ff 305–8.

376

Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/57

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *2 February 1943, by secraphone*

1. I shall no doubt receive in due course the Government of India's decision as to the policy to be adopted in Gandhi's threatened fast. Meanwhile it may be useful if I raise certain points now.

2. If it is decided to release him as soon as the danger to his health, it seems almost certain that that would have to be in three or four days at the most, and possibly, if no risk is to be run, in one or two days. There will therefore be very little time for communications and there would be much advantage in deciding beforehand that he would be released on a certain day, e.g. the 11th unless before then his condition became serious. Failing that I suggest it should be left to me to decide when the time has come for release.

3. I do not think fruit juices will make much difference. The Inspector-General of Prisons tells me that he learns from Mrs. Naidu that Gandhi proposes only to take enough juice with his water to make the taste palatable. There would be little nutritive value in this. The Surgeon-General who was in charge during his 1933 fast does not consider that fruit juice would materially alter the power of his resistance which he considers will be small.

4. The question of publicity will present difficulty. I have consulted certain of my officers very confidentially, and our conclusion is that it will be almost impossible to prevent a leakage once the fast has begun. The most we could expect is to preserve secrecy for one or two days. My view is that it would be best to issue a Government communiqué very early.

5. If he is to remain in detention for a few days it would be desirable to let him have a non-official doctor of standing. Gilder who has experience of several of his fasts would be the best choice, and he is easily available as he is in Yeravda Jail. From the same place it would be possible to supply one or two lady detenus for nursing.

6. Inspector-General of Prisons informs me that Mrs. Naidu's opinion is that Gandhi does not intend to die but that she and the others in the Aga Khan's Palace think that he overestimate[s] his capacity to fast at his age.

7. We see no difficulty in releasing all the other inmates from the Palace at the same time as Gandhi. We would also be prepared to release Gilder and anyone who is brought in for nursing.

8. We think it probable that Gandhi would decide to go to Lady Thackersey's House, Poona, if he is released.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir R. Lumley (Bombay)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/57

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *2 February 1943*

No. 39–S.C. I repeat separately extract from a circular telegram earlier part of which is narrative I am sending to Governors. I should be most grateful for your further views. You should know that Hallett with whom I have discussed in detail is most strongly opposed to enlarging Gandhi even at the point of death because of adverse reactions on services, &c. I told him of your own apprehensions and asked him whether if that was his feeling, he would be prepared to take custody of Gandhi. He said that he would. Things are unlikely to come to that point, but you should know his view. I should be grateful for your further comment most immediate as I shall have to let His Majesty's Government know reactions of all Governors.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to all Provincial Governors[1]

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *2 February 1943*

No. 40–S.C. I have had in the last month two letters[2] marked personal from Gandhi gist of which is that it is not Congress but Government, thanks to its

precipitate action in arresting Congress leaders last August without waiting for Gandhi to ask for interview with me, which has been responsible for recent campaign of violence, wholesale arrest of leaders having enraged the people to the point of losing self-control; that Congress remain as strong believers in non-violence as ever, and their resolution of last August was quite consistent with that view; that Gandhi cannot be expected to condemn alleged outrages by reported Congress merely on the basis of one-sided departmental reports unless convinced of their correctness; that if convinced of his error or worse he would be ready so far as he himself is concerned to make full confession and ample amends "but I have not any conviction of error"; and that if I wanted him to act singly I must convince him that he was wrong when he will make ample amends, while if I wanted him to make any proposal on behalf of Congress I should put him among the Working Committee. His first letter contained a threat that failing satisfaction he might fast.

2. I sent him polite replies[3] conceding nothing whatever and bringing out positively that the onus of justification is not on Government but on Gandhi and Congress. In a letter of 29th January[4] just received he returns to the charge, adding references to the food situation and to the desirability of a National Government with a reference to Congress readiness that Jinnah should form such a government responsible to a duly elected Assembly subject to such agreement as may be necessary for the period of the war. He goes on that if I cannot convince him of the validity of my opinion that the August resolution was responsible for the rebellion, he must resort to a fast "according to capacity" for 21 days from 9th February to 2nd March. He adds that he normally takes water with the addition of salts; that nowadays his system refuses water, and this time therefore he proposes to add juices of citrus fruit to make water drinkable "for my wish is not to fast unto death, but to survive the ordeal if God so wills. This can be ended sooner by the Government giving immediate relief." This letter is not marked personal.

3. So far I have kept our correspondence strictly personal, and it has not been mentioned to my Council or to anyone except the Secretary of State. Point has now been reached at which I shall be formally consulting my Council (probably tomorrow). Gandhi's main proposition is of course entirely unacceptable, but it leaves the impression that he is fighting a rear-guard action. For all that we may have a good deal of trouble before we get over the next stage.

4. Question of degree of publicity to be given to his fast will have to be considered. That will largely be a matter for my Council and I do not propose

[1] Only paras. 3–6 were transmitted to Sir R. Lumley. [2] Nos. 305 and 353.
[3] No. 340, note 2 and No. 358. [4] No. 369.

to trouble you about it. I should however be grateful for your view as to reactions you would anticipate (and your own feeling) as between the following alternatives:—

(*a*) Gandhi to be retained in confinement until his death;
(*b*) Gandhi to be released when in immediate danger of death;
(*c*) Application to Gandhi of cat and mouse procedure.

5. It goes without saying of course that all medical and other comforts and assistance will be made available to him, and we should take no responsibility for his decision to fast which is entirely a matter for him. One has to consider on the one hand possible reactions on services, loyalists, &c. of Gandhi being released even in imminent danger of death without any undertaking for the future: on the other hand, full weight has to be given to violence of popular emotion (which will bear no relation whatever to strength or weakness of his case and would be moved merely by fear of Gandhi's death); possible misrepresentation in Left Wing press at home and in the United States; and finally (a point of substantial importance) reactions inside my own Council.

Fact that fast is not in terms of a fast unto death but "to capacity" and for a period of 21 days only during which Gandhi will take water and fruit juice is of course relevant.

6. If you could let me have your view by tomorrow morning by most immediate telegram, I should be most grateful. Please treat as most secret as I am very anxious that no hint of what is happening should get out.[5]

[5] Paras. 3–5 repeated to Secretary of State as telegram 40–S.C.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir R. Lumley (Bombay)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/57

IMMEDIATE *2 February 1943*
PERSONAL

No. 44–S.C. I am sure you will agree with me as to importance of keeping censorship on Aga Khan's Palace as tight as possible in present circumstances so as to prevent any information about threatened fast getting out.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 450

MOST IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, *2 February 1943, 8.30 pm*
Received: 3 February

2030. Your 32–S.C.[1] of 1st February. Gandhi. I note that you are consulting your Council on correspondence particularly with reference to restriction of publicity regarding Gandhi's intentions. It would be helpful if in reporting discussion you would let me know whether in your opinion disclosure of correspondence to your colleagues will in itself necessitate some very early publicity and if so whether you recommend publication of correspondence (including such reply as you make to Gandhi's last letter) and whether in full or summary. Sooner or later I shall no doubt have to make statement in Parl[iamen]t and if pressed for corr[esponden]ce would naturally wish to support whatever line you take.

Your 38–S.C.[2] just received. I have stopped circulation of telegrams 32–S.C. and 33–S.C.[3] pending further from you.

[1] No. 373. [2] No. 375. [3] See No. 369, note 1.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, *3 February 1943, 7.55 pm*
Received: 3 February, 9.15 pm

No. 277–S. My personal telegram of 2nd February No. 40–S.C.[1] Replies[2] so far received from Governors are as follows: Madras and Punjab favour course (*b*). Clow favours (*c*). Hallett, Twynam and Dow favour course (*a*). Lumley (whose telegram I repeat separately)[3] remains strongly of opinion that right course is in effect (*b*) or conceivably (*c*).

2. I will discuss in Council this afternoon. My own personal leaning is still to (*a*), but after exhaustive discussion today with Maxwell in the light of

[1] No. 378, see note 5.
[2] These replies (except that of Sir R. Lumley) were not repeated to Mr Amery. The full texts are in MSS. EUR. F. 125/111.
[3] No. 382 which, contrary to Lord Linlithgow's summary, appears to favour course (*c*).

Governors' views reported above I feel little doubt that answer may be as previously agreed that Gandhi should be released if and when in immediate danger of death. I propose however to put matter to Council on the basis of keeping him in confinement until he dies and only to go down to release in the event of immediate danger to his life if that is their definite view.

3. Information from Lumley is to the effect that Surgeon-General (Candy, an experienced officer) doubts if he can carry on for more than three or four days, while Mrs. Naidu appears to have informed the detention authorities that while Gandhi was very confident of his strength she thinks herself that he has much overestimated his powers of resistance at his present age. But I shall make it clear if decision is in favour of release in the event of immediate danger to his life that those instructions must be interpreted very strictly indeed and that there must be no question of any release before danger is very real and quite immediate.

4. As regards publicity, what I have in mind is a public announcement once Gandhi begins his fast (pending which I would ask my colleagues and endeavour in all other respects to keep possibility entirely secret). That will be accompanied by pre-censorship instructions of all messages about his condition, &c., which would be strictly enforced whatever the difficulties with the Press. I would probably arrange, if he looks like lasting for some time, for bulletins every fourth day.

5. I contemplate a reasoned statement by my Government to issue simultaneously with announcement referred to in paragraph 4 if and when fast materialises. I shall be telegraphing to you separately text of reply I am sending to his latest letter which I have framed so as to make it suitable for publication. I may have to get his concurrence in publication of our earlier correspondence since it was marked personal, though his letter of 29th January[4] shows that no difficulty is likely to arise over that.

6. Gandhi's endeavour to bring in food, national government and possibility of agreement with Jinnah are complete red herrings of the very obvious type. I do not propose to expand on those in my answer to him.

[4] No. 369.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *3 February 1943, 7.55 pm*
Received: 3 February, 7 pm

No. 278–S. Following is Governor of Bombay's telegram dated the 2nd February referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

Begins. Your private and personal telegram No. 40–S.C.[1] dated February 2nd.

I remain of the view that reactions would be very serious and of a long-term nature if Gandhi were retained in confinement until his death.

2. To release him only when in immediate danger of death would give rise to great clamour for his release and probably to disturbances since, as I have indicated in my telegram[2] telephoned today, I do not think it will be possible to preserve secrecy and fast will very soon become known.

3. Cat and mouse procedure would cause least reaction of the three alternatives suggested in your paragraph 4.

4. My own feeling is that best course will be to release him within a day or two of commencement of fast on the ground of danger to his health. I would not wait until there is a danger of death because at his age it is unlikely he will recover once acidosis becomes marked which would be the case very soon. If object is, as I think it should be, that Government should incur the least possible odium if he dies, we should run no risk of releasing him too late for recovery. A middle course would have much risk and little advantage. Whether he will give up fast if he is released early is by no means certain. If he does, I would wait and see his course of action and detain him again if he is bent on mischief.

5. Apprehension of any adverse effect here on Services and Loyalists if Gandhi is enlarged. On the contrary the great bulk of them would be immensely relieved. I am strongly of the view that to let him die in detention would be very bad tactics and would permanently solidify opinion against us. With movement now moribund and with Gandhi's fast not intended to be unto death there is a possibility that release, though made purely on tactical grounds, would be received as a generous act and would not provide Gandhi, in India or elsewhere, with an easy platform for further trouble.

6. I have noted Hallett's views. I do not think it would make much difference to reaction whether scene were staged in Poona or the United Provinces. *Ends.*

[1] No. 378. [2] No. 376.

383

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir R. Lumley (Bombay)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/57

3 February 1943, telephoned

No. 279–S. Your secraphone message[1] of 2nd February. I have since had your telegram.[2] I will communicate further as soon as possible. Meantime of replies I have so far received Madras and the Punjab favour (*b*): Bengal, United Provinces, Central Provinces and Sind favour (*a*).

2. I should be very strongly opposed to letting Gilder have anything to do with Gandhi. He is bound to press for release and will be terrified at the risk of Gandhi dying; and I am sure that we ought to concentrate on the Surgeon-General and best European doctor we can find. Gandhi is taking certain risks in this business and must face consequences. Equally I should be reluctant if that could be in any way avoided to releasing any detenu for nursing purposes.

[1] No. 376. [2] No. 382.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/11/5b: ff 168–70

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *3 February 1943, 4.5 am*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

122. Your private and personal telegram 30th January, 249–S.[1] Home Membership. As I indicated in paragraph 2 of my telegram of 12th December 1447,[2] I must seek Cabinet approval for a decision to Indianise this key post. I do not think they would feel concerned in consequentials (*c*), (*d*) and (*e*) which could be dealt with in light of decision of main issue.

2. Though your conclusions are fully in accord with my own views as to the policy to be adopted in regard to appointments to your Executive, it may be that in some quarters in Cabinet the retention of Maxwell for another twelve months may be suggested as more helpful to your successor, particularly if he has no previous experience of India and Indians, and it may therefore be as well for you to give your reasons for not recommending such an extension.

3. I should expect that members of the Cabinet familiar with Joint Select Committee Report[3] will certainly wish to know your views on the two ques-

tions raised in paragraph 3 of my 1447 as to the control of the Intelligence Bureau and the handling at the highest level of Service cases.

4. Though we are dealing now only with the case of the Home Membership, it obviously raises the question of whether an Indian should be appointed to the Finance Membership when that falls vacant 12 months later, and I think it would be useful to the Cabinet to have your views as to the bearing of the one on the other. My own view would be to leave the matter to the judgment of your successor on the experience of the step now proposed.

5. There is no use seeking a Cabinet decision on this question until the P.M. is back and able to turn his attention to this sort of matter, so we will not be wasting time by discussing these related issues. I think, however, it would be convenient if your reply to this telegram were cast as a self-contained recommendation as to Home Membership which I could circulate to Cabinet, not referring to previous correspondence nor to the consequential points (*c*), (*d*) and (*e*) but covering points raised above.

[1] No. 371. [2] No. 268.

[3] *Joint Committee on Indian Constitutional Reform*, vol. I (part 1), *Report. Parl. Papers*, vol. VI, 1933–4. See e.g. paras. 94–7, 289–93.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/617: f 130

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *3 February 1943, 8 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 4 February*

130. Home Department telegram 744[1] dated 30th January. In view of probable early developments regarding Gandhi I should be glad if preparation of material regarding Congress responsibility could be proceeded with urgently and best possible brief telegraphed. If as is quite possible leakage occurs I may have to make statement in Parliament next week. In any event I have to meet deputation of M.Ps. on 12th and if developments are then public shall have to justify our position. I think in those circumstances we may well have to be prepared to use at any rate such secret material as can be used without destroying [disclosing?] source.

[1] Saying that the Government of India, Home Department, were themselves preparing papers on various aspects of disturbances for official use during session of Legislature including one on Congress responsibility so far as this could be assessed without using secret material. It would bring together published writings or statements by Congress leaders, extracts from judgements against them, and a selection of Congress bulletins. L/P&J/8/627.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to all Provincial Governors

MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *3 February 1943*

My dear——,
The Food Department of the Central Government has, I understand, recently placed before your Government the details of a scheme for the procurement of foodgrains in this country. In this connection I should like to put to you certain general points that are in my mind concerning this crisis that faces us all.

2. I may say at the outset that the Central Government regard the position more seriously than might be supposed from their communications to the general public which have been framed as optimistically as possible in order to avoid aggravating the tendencies to hoard which are largely responsible for our present difficulties. While it is true that our statistical deficits represent only five per cent. of the total foodgrain production, it has to be recognized that the demands made on our production are considerably increased not only for the Defence Forces and certain neighbouring countries but also owing to the increased purchasing power now present in India generally. It has also to be remembered that the deficit cannot be spread over the whole body of consumers and will fall in its entirety on the fraction of the production that comes to market, a fraction which there are indications to show is not as large as it used to be.

3. On the gravity of the internal food situation I need make no further comment, but I feel that you ought to be made fully aware of the situation revealed by our request to His Majesty's Government for assistance in the form of wheat imports and the cost at which this is being afforded. As you are doubtless aware His Majesty's Government have for some time past been shipping wheat from Australia for the use of the Defence Forces; a programme that will be completed by the end of February. These imports however unless supplemented by purchases in India would not sustain the Defence Forces based on this country after the end of March. Since December last it has been almost impossible to purchase wheat at the controlled price. It was in these circumstances and having regard also to the extreme shortage of supplies for the civil populations in many important areas in India that His Majesty's Government were addressed for further supplies. We have now been promised substantial assistance up to the end of April and although not fully adequate for the Civil as well as Army needs, the shipments will represent a very substantial contribution to the solution of our immediate wheat problem. It has

been made clear however that this effort by the Allied Nations has not only been made to the jeopardy of the strategical situation but that it involves a very drastic cut of the stores and equipments required by the Defence Services in India and may also affect the food ration in the United Kingdom. In these circumstances I am fully confident you will agree that if we can save, by our own efforts in India, even one of the ships, then we shall have made a significant contribution to easing the burden on those responsible for directing the war.

4. As for the rice problem no help can be expected from outside the country and we are forced back on our own resources.

5. With these factors before us it is hardly necessary to stress how extreme our efforts must be to see that every administration makes the utmost of its available production. It is imperative that deficit areas should make every effort to get control of as much of their produce as possible so as to make it go as far as possible before they can expect any help from others. The corollary is also true that the areas that are normally in surplus must make every effort to secure the maximum surpluses that are possible and indeed must attempt to reach the same standard of austerity that it is reasonably clear must fall, in some measure, on the areas that are normally in deficiency.

6. There is one thing that is clear from the outset. It is that we can scarcely hope for the fullest measure of success in the complicated business that lies before us unless there is given to the common effort the most generous measure of willing co-operation by the District Officers all over India allied with a personal sense of responsibility in playing their part in solving what is indeed a very grave situation. Indeed, they are now called upon to participate in what is very vital war effort.

7. In particular, I ask for your personal assistance in guiding and helping your Government in the matter of taking the most energetic steps in your Province to secure whatever supplies are available and surplus before the next *rabi* crop is harvested, and with special reference to the harvest from the last *kharif* crop much of which is now finding its way into the markets. A very special effort is required particularly in those Provinces where rice and millets are now coming or have recently come into the markets. The Food Department have recently addressed your Government on this particular point and I should be most grateful for an assurance that every energetic step will be taken in this very important direction.

8. Another and extremely important connected matter is adequate crop planning for the next *kharif* and *rabi* harvest. On this matter the Education, Health and Lands Department have addressed your Government in their two letters of the 6th and 13th January[1] and I hope the financial assistance offered

[1] Neither printed.

will be fully availed of. Millets for cotton, rice in lieu of jute and substitute crops for any surplus oil seeds appear to require thorough and early examination if the maximum potential additional grain crops are to be secured.[2]

Yours——,
LINLITHGOW

[2] Replies from eight of the Governors, giving the assurance asked for in para. 7 and some information of measures being taken, are in MSS. EUR. F. 125/111.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *4 February 1943, 7.20 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 4 February, 7.30 pm*

No. 287–S. My personal telegram of 3rd February.[1] Gandhi. Position was discussed at great length in Council last night. I made the case for keeping Gandhi in confinement till death and was supported by Chief. While no final decision was taken it was quite clear however that remainder of Council were very strongly in favour of release once danger point was reached, though general feeling was in favour of deferring actual decision until it was seen whether Gandhi in fact started his fast and if so how he looked like standing it. Discussion is to be resumed this evening, but I have little doubt that their conclusion will be as stated, and I should not myself feel justified or think it wise to go against them.

2. Council agreed also (*a*) that it would be desirable to make public announcement of fast once it started; (*b*) simultaneously to issue a short statement by the Government of India commenting; (*c*) that I should now reply to Gandhi's latest letter.

3. I hope to get my reply off today or tomorrow and will telegraph its text. I will also ask Gandhi's permission to publish in due course the personal correspondence between us copies of which have already been telegraphed to you. Some time ago I asked departments here to get together most telling case possible against Congress with a view to publication. All possible steps are being taken to expedite completion of this, so that if practicable it can appear as a pamphlet or official statement before the 9th February.

4. Since telegraphing yesterday I have had views of Bihar, Bengal and Orissa. Lewis appears to favour (*b*), (*c*) and (*a*) in that order. Rutherford

who has only just taken over favours (*a*) on the advice of his local officers. Herbert also favours (*a*).[2]

[1] No. 381.

[2] Sir G. Cunningham, who was on tour, did not reply until 6 February (telegram C.A–5 repeated by Viceroy to Secretary of State, No. 337–S of 7 February). He favoured (*a*). MSS. EUR. F. 125/111.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *4 February 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 288–S. Your private and personal telegram of 3rd February No. 130.[1] I am doing my utmost to arrange completion of preparation of this material and will in any event see that you are fully briefed before your meeting. I quite agree as to desirability of making discreet use of secret material, and have so informed Home Department.

[1] No. 385.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to all Provincial Governors[1]

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

MOST IMMEDIATE *4 February 1943 (to Bombay by telephone)*

PERSONAL

No. 294–S. Gandhi's fast. While majority of Governors are in favour of allowing him to fast to death (a view with which I myself entirely sympathise and which I have consistently supported in Council) an important minority are in favour of release when in immediate danger of death. That is also the view of the great majority of my Council, and I had been prepared in those circumstances, though with reluctance, to commend it to His Majesty's Government. Further discussion tonight has produced the suggestion, for which there was unanimous support from my colleagues (the Chief, Sarker and Jogendra Singh being absent), that Gandhi should best be dealt with and deflated by intimation on evening before fast was due to begin that (*a*) Government could have nothing to do with this form of political blackmail for which they had the utmost abhorrence; (*b*) that they could be no parties to his applying coercion by means of fast; (*c*) that he would therefore be released, on starting a fast,

[1] The passage in brackets in para. 3, and para. 4, were sent to Sir R. Lumley only.

for the period of the fast, viz. 21 days (or less) on the understanding (*d*) that on its completion he would return to detention.

2. No conditions would be imposed. He would be allowed to be accompanied by those persons at present attached to him; there would be no restraint during period of fast; his position in relation to government during that period would in effect be that he would be on ticket of leave. Government would not take part in discussions of any sort with him.

3. I cannot say whether Cabinet will be prepared to accept this plan, but would welcome earliest possible communication of your own reaction. My service colleagues do not anticipate serious service reactions. Matter is of course now of very great urgency. I have impressed need for absolute secrecy on all concerned. (It would be convenient if your own reactions could be in form which I could if necessary repeat to Secretary of State for Cabinet's consideration.) I think there is a great deal to be said on both sides, but sense of my colleagues was that while this solution may be revolutionary it was best calculated to throw Gandhi out of his stride and secure us desired results, while avoiding certain of the difficulties that would have to be faced in connection with a fast.

(4. It would of course be most important that Gandhi should conduct his fast away from the Aga Khan's Palace. But if this solution is approved we shall have to take our chance about that, and leave it to his own sense to decide to do so.)

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: f 392

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *4 February 1943, 1.20 pm*

PERSONAL

2141. Your personal telegram 3rd February 277–S.[1] I think reasoned statement by Government of India as contemplated in paragraph 5 is most important and from point of view of striking first blow in publicity even more valuable than correspondence though I regard disclosure of that as inevitable.

2. It seems to me most important that Mudaliar and Bajpai should be fully briefed particularly former in view of his official position as member of your Government. I presume that you have this in mind but sufficient advance warning for them to prepare themselves and to take any preparatory action that may be necessary is essential.

[1] No. 381.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *5 February 1943, 6.30 am*
PERSONAL *Received: 5 February, 4 am*

No. 293–S. Gandhi's fast. Discussion was resumed in Council this evening. I again affirmed my own preference for allowing him to die in prison, but (in absence of the Chief) found no support, Council unanimously favouring release when in danger of death. Consequent on suggestion by Firoz matters then took a wholly unexpected turn. Suggestion was put forward and unanimously accepted by my colleagues that best way of dealing with Gandhi was to deflate him by informing him on evening before fast was due to begin that (*a*) government could have nothing to do with this form of political blackmail for which they had the utmost abhorrence; (*b*) that they could be no parties to his applying coercion by means of fast; (*c*) that he would therefore be released on starting a fast for the period of the fast, viz. 21 days (or less) on the understanding, (*d*) that on its completion he would return to detention.

2. No conditions would be imposed. He would be allowed to be accompanied by those persons at present attached to him; there would be no restraint during period of fast; his position in relation to government during that period would in effect be that he would be on ticket of leave. Government would not take part in discussions of any sort with him.

3. As regards publicity, statement would be issued by Government of India as originally contemplated dealing with circumstances of his fast; correspondence between Gandhi and myself would also be released, and no endeavour would be spared to get Government of India pamphlet about Congress responsibility for disturbances published by time fast was due to begin or as soon as possible afterwards.

4. Chief was absent from tonight's meeting at which all other members were present save Jogendra Singh and Sarker. Maxwell and Raisman both support this proposition. Maxwell does not think that reactions on services will be unfortunate. Sense of Council was unanimous that revolutionary as this solution might seem it was best calculated to throw Gandhi out of his stride and to secure us desired results, while avoiding certain of difficulties that would have to be faced in connection with a fast.

5. On a minor point of detail, Council were agreed that it was most desirable that fast should be conducted away from Aga Khan's palace.

6. I am consulting Lumley and other Governors and will telegraph their reactions as soon as possible.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

PERSONAL *5 February 1943*

No. 300–S. Your personal telegram of 1st February No. 114.[1] Phillips. I am grateful for your telegram and for information about conversation between Phillips and Anderson and yourself. I quite agree in the light of it that it will be best for me to deal with Phillips on the lines you suggest, and I will take a convenient opportunity of doing so.

[1] No. 374.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *5 February 1943, 7.55 pm*

PERSONAL *Received: 5 February, 6.45 pm*

No. 302–S. Following is text of Lumley's comment on revised proposals set out in my telegram, dated 4th February No. 293–S[1]:—

Begins. Private and personal. 1. I think this new proposal offers a better method of dealing with the problem than any of the others hitherto propounded.

2. It appeals to me as better tactics, and in my view we should keep this business on the level of tactics and not principles. Gandhi, I would guess, wants to revive the emotional atmosphere of August the 9th, and as he well knows a fast is the best method of doing it. It is our business, I hold, to see that he has the least possible success. If we keep him in and he dies, he will achieve the maximum effect not only temporarily, but for a long time, for in certain circumstances Gandhi dead will be a greater menace than Gandhi at large. The objection to keeping him in until imminent danger of death is that at his present age he will probably die and we would have much the same reaction

as if he died in prison. The new proposal avoids all the difficulties of a fast in prison, and removes the affair from the plane of emotional tragedy and brings it down almost to the level of a farce. It will be Gandhi and not Government who will lose most by this.

3. It is not easy to forecast what his next move would be: but I think Government's action would command considerable support and the chances of Gandhi making a successful emotional appeal would be less.

4. The proposal could be criticised as illogical as well as revolutionary: but I consider it is well worth trying.

5. I would expect the Services in this Province, the great bulk of whom are Hindus, to be in no way upset by this proposal, whereas I am sure that a decision to keep him in detention till he died would be a shock to many and a considerable strain though I would expect them to do their duty as in the past. *Ends.*

[1] No. 391; the date should be 5 February.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *5 February 1943, 7.40 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 5 February, 3.40 pm*

No. 303–S. My immediately following telegram contains text of my reply to Gandhi. He should receive it on Sunday morning.[1] While my Council are aware that I am sending a reply and that it will be published I do not intend to show them the text.

[1] 7 February.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Gandhi[1]

MSS. EUR. F. 125/125

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *5 February 1943*

Dear Mr. Gandhi,

Many thanks for your letter of 29th January[2] which I have just received. I have read it, as always, with great care and with every anxiety to follow your mind

[1] Lord Linlithgow transmitted the text of this letter to Mr Amery in telegram 304–S of 5 February.
[2] No. 369.

and to do full justice to your argument. But I fear that my view of the responsibility of Congress and of yourself personally for the lamentable disorders of last autumn remains unchanged.

2. In my last letter[3] I said that my knowledge of the facts left me no choice but to regard the Congress movement, and you as its authorised and fully empowered leader at the time of the decision of last August, as responsible for the campaign of violence and crime that subsequently broke out. In reply you have reiterated your request that I should attempt to convince you that my opinion is correct. I would readily have responded earlier to that request were it not that your letters gave no indication, such as I should have been entitled to expect, that you sought the information with an open mind. In each of them you have expressed profound distrust of the published reports of the recent happenings, although in your last letter, on the basis of the same information, you have not hesitated to lay the whole blame for them on the Government of India. In the same letter you have stated that I cannot expect you to accept the accuracy of the official reports on which I rely. It is not therefore clear to me how you expect or even desire me to convince you of anything. But in fact, the Government of India have never made any secret of their reasons for holding the Congress and its leaders responsible for the deplorable acts of violence, sabotage and terrorism that have occurred since the Congress Resolution of the 8th August declared a "mass struggle" in support of its demands, appointed you as its leader and authorised all Congressmen to act for themselves in the event of interference with the leadership of the movement. A body which passes a resolution in such terms is hardly entitled to disclaim responsibility for any events that followed it. There is evidence that you and your friends expected this policy to lead to violence; and that you were prepared to condone it; and that the violence that ensued formed part of a concerted plan, conceived long before the arrest of Congress leaders. The general nature of the case against the Congress has been publicly stated by the Home Member in his speech in the Central Legislative Assembly on the 15th September last, and if you need further information I would refer you to it. I enclose a complete copy[4] in case the press versions that you must have seen were not sufficient. I need only add that all the mass of evidence that has since come to light has confirmed the conclusions then reached. I have ample information that the campaign of sabotage has been conducted under secret instructions, circulated in the name of the All-India Congress Committee; that well-known Congressmen have organised and freely taken part in acts of violence and murder; and that even now an underground Congress organisation exists in which, among others, the wife of a member of the Congress Working Committee plays a prominent part, and which is actively engaged in planning the bomb outrages and other acts of terrorism

that have disgusted the whole country. If we do not act on all this information or make it publicly known it is because the time is not yet ripe; but you may rest assured that the charges against the Congress will have to be met sooner or later and it will then be for you and your colleagues to clear yourselves before the world if you can. And if in the meanwhile you yourself, by any action such as you now appear to be contemplating, attempt to find an easy way out, the judgment will go against you by default.

3. I have read with some surprise your statement that the principle of civil disobedience is implicitly conceded in the Delhi Settlement of the 5th March 1931, which you refer to as the "Gandhi–Irwin Pact". I have again looked at that document. Its basis was that civil disobedience would be "effectively discontinued" and that certain "reciprocal action" would be taken by Government. It was inherent in such a document that it should take notice of the existence of civil disobedience. But I can find nothing in it to suggest that civil disobedience was recognised as being in any circumstances legitimate. And I cannot make it too plain that it is not so regarded by my Government.

4. To accept the point of view which you put forward would be to concede that the authorised government of the country, on which lies the responsibility for maintaining peace and good order, should allow subversive and revolutionary movements described by you yourself as open rebellion, to take place unchallenged; that they should allow preparations for violence, for the interruption of communications, for attacks on innocent persons, for the murder of police officers and others to proceed unchecked. My Government and I are open indeed to the charge that we should have taken drastic action at an earlier stage against you and against the Congress leaders. But my anxiety and that of my Government has throughout been to give you, and to give the Congress organisation, every possible opportunity to withdraw from the position which you have decided to take up. Your statements of last June and July, the original resolution of the Working Committee of the 14th July,[5] and your declaration on the same day that there was no room left for negotiation and that after all it was an open rebellion,[6] are all of them grave and significant, even without your final exhortation to "do or die". But with a patience that was perhaps misplaced, it was decided to wait until the resolution of the All-India Congress Committee made it clear that there could be no further toleration of the Congress attitude if Government was to discharge its responsibility to the people of India.

5. Let me in conclusion say how greatly I regret, having regard to your health and your age, the decision that you tell me that you now have it in

[3] No. 358.
[4] Not printed; see *The Legislative Assembly Debates*, vol. III (Delhi, 1942), pp. 141–51.
[5] Vol. II, No. 265. [6] Vol. II, No. 275.

mind to take. I hope and pray that wiser counsels may yet prevail with you. But the decision whether or not to undertake a fast with its attendant risks is clearly one that must be taken by you alone, and the responsibility for which and for its consequences must rest on you alone. I trust sincerely that in the light of what I have said you may think better of your resolution; and I would welcome a decision on your part to think better of it, not only because of my own natural reluctance to see you wilfully risk your life, but because I regard the use of a fast for political purposes as a form of political blackmail (*himsa*) for which there can be no moral justification, and understood from your own previous writings that this was also your view.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *5 February 1943, 6.55 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 5 February, 7.45 pm*

No. 305–S. Your personal telegram of the 4th February No. 2141.[1] I quite agree as regards paragraph 1 and a draft is under preparation.

2. Your paragraph 2. Again I quite agree, but I propose to hold my hand until we are finally settled as to our policy.

[1] No. 390.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE[1] NEW DELHI, *5 February 1943, 11.55 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 6 February, 12.15 am*

No. 316–S. Gandhi. Following is Hallett's reply No. G.–314 dated 5th February 1943:—

Begins. Your telegram No. 294–S[2] of 4th February. (1) Personally I still support Your Excellency's view that he should be kept in confinement till death; release when in danger of death has little advantage; there would be difficulty of deciding stage at which he was (in?) danger and there would

be constant demands for immediate release; it is fact of release that is important not time of it. (2) Fact that alternative now suggested has unanimous support of your (Council?) also does affect decision and this unanimity is of importance. Conditions proposed are appropriate but (*a*) or (*b*) should be amplified by categorical statement that Government will have no discussions with him and also that no discussions with Congress detenus or prisoners will be allowed. As regards (*c*) and (*d*) there is possibility that he might try to continue fast for more than 21 days and of course prolongation of fast would be most dangerous. There is also possibility that during 21 days or longer period of fast there might be revival of rebellious activities. It should therefore be made clear that Government maintained the right to subject him to detention at any time during period revival occurred.

2. I venture to refer to publicity and to last sentence of my note of February 2nd.[3] It is very necessary to stop undue news or comments by means of pre-censorship. Also if large crowds flock to see him it will be necessary to stop them and I should make it clear to my officers that there must be no relaxation in action against Congress and that demonstrations, &c. must be dealt with firmly.

3. Thus though with reluctance I accept alternative. *Ends.*

Further telegram from Hallett in continuation of paragraph 1 of above is as follows:—

Begins. I recognise that prolongation of fast whether he is under detention or on ticket of leave will undoubtedly make our position more difficult, for it will have a cumulative effect, and specially an emotional effect. The point which I wish to emphasise is that if he is allowed to establish contacts when under ticket of leave, which it will be difficult to stop, this, combined with the emotional effect of a prolonged fast increases the danger of a revival of the movement, and his re-arrest on revival is essential. *Ends.*

[1] Priority mark taken from decipher. [2] No. 389. [3] Not printed.

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War Cabinet W.M. (43) 24th Conclusions, Minute 2

L/PO/6/102b: f 385

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 5 February 1943 at 12.30 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Mr Anthony Eden, Sir John Anderson, Mr Ernest Bevin, Mr Oliver Lyttelton, Mr Herbert Morrison

Also present during discussion of item 2 were: Mr S. M. Bruce, Viscount Simon, Viscount Cranborne, Mr Amery, Sir James Grigg, Sir Archibald Sinclair

INDIA

Detention of Mr Gandhi

(Previous Reference: W.M. (43) 7th Conclusions, Minute 1)[1]

The War Cabinet had before them telegrams from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, Nos. 32–S.C.,[2] 33–S.C.,[3] 287–S[4] and 293–S.[5] These telegrams reported that Mr. Gandhi had decided to start a "fast to capacity" for three weeks on the 9th February. This meant that he would take water and fruit juices. The telegrams contained a report of the views expressed at two meetings of the Viceroy's Council as to what action should be taken.

The Council had given favourable consideration to a proposal that Gandhi should be released for the period of this fast, on the understanding that on its completion he would return to detention. This suggestion was put forward on the ground that it would be the best way to deflate Gandhi. It was not clearly explained whether it was proposed to re-arrest Gandhi if he refused to return to detention at the end of 21 days.

The War Cabinet were of opinion that they could not appropriately reach any decision on this matter until they had been informed of the considered views of the Viceroy.

The War Cabinet asked that when they next considered the matter they should be informed whether the action to be taken in this matter fell within the discretion of the Governor-General, or was a matter for the Governor-General in Council.

[1] No. 338. [2] No. 373. [3] See No. 369, note 1. [4] No. 387. [5] No. 391.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMPORTANT *6 February 1943, 4 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 326–S. Your private and personal telegram of the 3rd February No. 122.[1] Home Membership. I had assumed, it now seems incorrectly, from your private letters to me that pressure from home would be in the direction of immediate Indianisation. But from your present telegram this is not apparently necessarily the case, and if that is so it would make a substantial difference to my view. Let us therefore clear the position between ourselves before I make a formal recommendation.

2. Main argument for Indianisation of Home Membership on expiry of Maxwell's term has in my judgment been that it is evidence of our policy of progressively filling important vacancies as they occur by duly qualified Indians. That argument is of course essentially political. But if political pressure is not of decisive and immediate importance then we are entitled to decide on merits. From that standpoint all the arguments are in favour of an extension, and I cannot exaggerate value to my successor in his opening days of Maxwell's great experience and wise and balanced advice whether in the political or in the service field. There are indications, too, that Hindus would prefer Maxwell or even another European to a Muslim; while Jinnah though he may criticise an extension is likely from what Usman says to prefer the *status quo*. I would myself in these circumstances, if I could be sure of Cabinet's support, much prefer to postpone Indianisation of this post, and to extend Maxwell for another year (any extension would have to be for a year so as to give the new Viceroy a chance to settle in). Extension would provoke criticism from the usual quarters (and possibly from the *Times*) but I would not take that seriously, while an extension of a year for Maxwell to take him over the change in the Viceroyalty would be regarded as an entirely different proposition from the making of a fresh appointment of any other service European.

3. Nor can we overlook the danger that Mudaliar and Zafrulla, &c., concerned as they are to eliminate the European element, may leave my successor with an exceedingly difficult hand to play, and with very little material of any quality to help him to play it. I should in any event be opposed to Indianising the Finance portfolio when Raisman's present term ends, and propose to say so in making my formal recommendation to you about the Home portfolio.

4. If on the other hand Cabinet either attach great importance for political reasons to immediate Indianisation of the Home portfolio or anticipate extreme difficulty at home if it is not Indianised, I would not press my view, and in that event would recommend the chain of appointments discussed in my private and personal telegram No. 249-S[2] of 30th January. I have no doubt that Usman as Home Member would be stout-hearted and staunch, though he would contribute little in Council, and neither he nor any Indian I can think of could give my successor the objective and experienced advice which I have enjoyed from Maxwell.

5. I am not unduly bothered about the D.I.B. side, nor is Maxwell. We both think that in the event of Indianisation we should have to take a chance over that. On the service side, again, I am clear that we should have to take a chance. But if the Home Member of the time is the right man, and if he is well served by good Secretaries in the Home Department, and the Governor-General is vigilant, I think all should be well. I do not believe that with the

[1] No. 384. [2] No. 371.

present constitutional machinery at the Centre we should be able to work in a service adviser: he would have practically nothing to do in the ordinary course, and if any matter came up he would ten to one be likely to be in direct conflict with the Council.

6. Would you let me have your reactions as early as possible and I will send you a formal recommendation. I repeat that my own judgment against background as I now see it would be for a year's extension for Maxwell.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: f 369

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *6 February 1943, 3.15 pm*
PERSONAL

2291. Your personal telm. 5th Feby. 305–S.[1] I am most reluctant to appear to rush you in the midst of this difficult business but you will realise that with zero hour for action in India fixed for night Monday–Tuesday it is essential if I am to hold Press here by advance guidance that statement should reach me before repeat before Monday morning[2] so as to be used during that day. Much same applies to needs in Washington.

[1] No. 396. [2] 8 February.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: f 370

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *6 February 1943, 1.45 pm*
PERSONAL

2298. Gandhi. I do not of course yet know what is final view of your Council and yourself in light of various practical considerations adduced by Governors.[1] I notice however that they and also you in your last letter to Gandhi use term "fast". If policy recommended is to try to deflate this blackmail effort on lines suggested by Firoz is there not advantage in avoiding this word and consistently use in its place some more accurate and telling phrase such as "restricted diet", provided of course that it is plain that this action is taken on Gandhi's own volition and not on medical advice due to six months' detention.

[1] In their replies (summarised in No. 403) to No. 389.

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War Cabinet Paper W.P. (43) 52

L/P&J/8/600: f 426

INDIA

CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S COUNCIL IN RELATION TO THE DECISION REGARDING MR. GANDHI

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, *6 February 1943*

At their meeting on 5th February (W.M. (43) 24th Conclusions, Minute 2)[1] the War Cabinet asked to be informed whether the action to be taken in regard to Mr. Gandhi fell within the Governor-General's discretion or was a matter for the Governor-General in Council. The position is as follows:—

1. The detention of Mr. Gandhi was authorised under Defence of India Rule 26 (1) (b)[2] by the Central Government, i.e. in the present transitional period (by virtue of the Indian General Clauses Act)[3] the Governor-General in Council.

2. These rules were made under the Defence of India Act—an Act made by the Central Legislature by virtue of the powers conferred by section 102 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which empowers that Legislature, if the Governor-General has declared a Proclamation of Emergency, to make laws for a Province in respect to matters in the Provincial Legislative List—which include Public Order (within the range of which the whole matter of course lies).

3. The detention was therefore properly ordered by the Governor-General in Council and it follows that any revoking order would properly be made and any other relevant decision properly be taken by the same authority.

4. The present issue having thus properly been brought before the Governor-General in Council Section 41 of the 9th Schedule applies, viz:—

> (1) If any difference of opinion arises on any question brought before a meeting of the Governor-General's Executive Council, the Governor-General in Council shall be bound by the opinion and decision of the majority

[1] No. 398.

[2] Rule 26 (1) (b) empowered the Central Government or the Provincial Government to detain any particular person if it was necessary so to do 'with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of British India, the public safety, the maintenance of public order', relations with foreign or Indian States, 'or the efficient prosecution of the war'.

[3] The effect of Sec. 3, sub-secs. (8 ab) and (18a) of the General Clauses Act 1897, as amended, was that, before the establishment of the Federation, 'Central Government' should mean the Governor-General in matters where the Government of India Act required him to act in his discretion, otherwise the Governor-General in Council.

of those present, and, if they are equally divided, the Governor-General or other person presiding shall have a second or casting vote.

(2) Provided that, whenever any measure is proposed before the Governor-General in Council whereby the safety, tranquillity or interests of British India, or of any part thereof, are or may be, in the judgment of the Governor-General essentially affected and he is of opinion either that the measure proposed ought to be adopted and carried into execution, or that it ought to be suspended or rejected, and the majority present at a meeting of the Council dissent from that opinion, the Governor-General may, on his own authority and responsibility, adopt, suspend or reject the measure in whole or in part.

N.B.

The phrase "in his discretion" which is used in various provisions of the Act of 1935 as a term of art implying action to be taken without consultation of Ministers is not used in that sense (and indeed would be meaningless) in the 9th Schedule which reproduces such sections of the old Act as are still in force. Where it is intended in the 9th Schedule that action should be taken by the Governor-General on his own authority the phrase used is "the Governor-General" *tout court.*

L. S. A.

403

War Cabinet Paper W.P. (43) 57

L/P&J/8/600: f 427

INDIA

SUMMARY OF THE VIEWS OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS ON THE ALTERNATIVE PLANS FOR DEALING WITH MR. GANDHI IF HE FASTS

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, *6 February 1943*

I: Three alternatives were under consideration at the beginning of February,[1] viz:

(*a*) retention in confinement until his death.
(*b*) release when in immediate danger of death.
(*c*) application of cat and mouse procedure.

II: Alternative proposed and unanimously supported by the Viceroy's Council,[2] viz:

release on starting fast for the period of the fast on the understanding that on its completion he would return to detention, Gandhi being informed on the

eve of the fast that Government could have nothing to do with this form of political blackmail and could be no party to his applying coercion by means of a fast.

The views of the Governors regarding these alternatives are summarised in columns I and II. Column I gives the alternative favoured under I. Column II summarises the view taken regarding the Council's proposal.

Governors	I	II[3]
Assam	c	Supports.
Bengal	a	"Best possible proposal in the circumstances."
Bihar	a	Regards as surrender to blackmail; will give Gandhi full opportunity for contacts and publicity. Complete control impracticable, but imperative that press should keep silence after official announcement.
Bombay	c or b	See telegram 302-S[4] separately circulated. Best proposal yet made. Gandhi, and not Government, will lose most by it.
Central Provinces	a	Thinks plan will overreach itself and will not succeed in deflating Gandhi. Immense local publicity inevitable which it may be difficult to prevent from spreading. Doubts if anything will be gained by release from detention. Publicity should be denied as long as possible.
Madras	b	Strongly opposed. Would be interpreted as sign of weakness which would be disastrous. Although in favour of I (b), would prefer I (a) to II. Death in prison less dangerous than immediate release.
North-West Frontier Province	No reply.[5]	No reply.[6]
Orissa	b, c, a in order of preference.	Prepared to accept, despite objections to release and possible difficulties regarding return to detention afterwards.
Punjab	b	Sees no objection.
Sind	a	Does not like it—would leave Gandhi's movements unrestricted. Less objection if Gandhi were left at liberty within restricted area and debarred propaganda.

[1] See Nos. 378, 381, 382, and 387. [2] See No. 391.

[3] The full texts of these replies are in MSS. EUR. F. 125/24. [4] No. 393.

[5] See No. 387, note 2.

[6] Sir G. Cunningham replied on 8 February (telegram not repeated to Secretary of State) that, while there would be 'no immediate effect on our people here', he felt that in the long run Government's position would be weakened by adoption of 'cat and mouse' procedure. MSS. EUR. F. 125/111.

Governors	I	II
United Provinces	a	See telegram 316-S[7] circulated separately. Still prefers I (a); but Council unanimity is important, and accepts II with reluctance. Conditions of release should however be tightened up—publicity, control of crowds, power to re-impose detention at any time. Danger of prolongation of fast.

L. S. A.

[7] No. 397.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, *7 February 1943, 3.40 am*
Received: 7 February, 12 midnight

No. 332–S. My personal telegram No. 293–S,[1] Gandhi's fast. Matter has again been discussed at great length in Council (Sarker and Jogendra being now present, the Chief the only absentee) in the light of Governors' views, all of which have been repeated to you as received. As you will see Governors are divided. While Bombay, Bengal, United Provinces (though with reluctance), Punjab, Assam and Orissa support course of action accepted by Council, Madras, Bihar, Central Provinces and Sind are strongly opposed. No reply has yet been received from Cunningham who is out of touch on tour.

2. Certain of apprehensions felt by dissenting provinces are based on the assumption that fast, if it takes place, may be prolonged. Lumley, however, tells me that given the conditions contemplated, his Surgeon-General, Candy, estimates that by the fifth day Gandhi's life will be in danger, and his condition fairly critical. Candy estimates that Gandhi will survive his fast for ten to twelve *days* only. This estimate is based on Candy's general clinical knowledge and his experience of Gandhi's fast ten years ago. He comments that the use of fruit-juice will be harmful as it increases acidosis. Difference therefore between release on danger and present plan is only about a week. It has to be recognised too that whatever solution we find, much popular excitement and local difficulty is inevitable at one stage or other. As regards press control we can, and intend to, go a very long way to meet Governors' wishes.

3. On the position as a whole, Council, after full consideration of Governors' views, and with full appreciation of the fact that we are taking certain chances and that there is much that can be said against solution, remain of opinion with

the majority of the Governors, that it is worth trying. That is their unanimous view and (while I again reminded them of my own view that the wise course was to let Gandhi take consequences of his decision) I should not feel justified in opposing it.

4. We are therefore going ahead on these lines. I telegraph separately text of Statement approved by Council for release in the event of fast. I will also telegraph to you text of communication to be made to Gandhi on behalf of Government of India on evening of Monday, 8th February. I am particularly anxious that there should be no leakage or advance communication to press either at home or here. It would be most unfortunate, if Gandhi were by any chance to call off the fast, if it were to get out on Tuesday that he had in fact contemplated or even started one. My arrangements here have been so devised as to prevent any communication or warning of any sort to press until after zero hour for fast on Tuesday morning.

[1] No. 391.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, *7 February 1943, 3.21 am*
Received: 7 February, 12.45 am

No. 333–S. My personal telegram No. 332–S[1] represents the outcome of exhaustive and at times definitely rather tense discussions in Council. I do not pretend to regard that outcome as ideal and I would have been very glad to have been able to go much further to tie Gandhi down as regards political activity during his period of freedom if it materialises. But it is of very great importance indeed, both politically here and I should imagine from the point of view of the left wing at home and of the U.S.A., to have the unanimous support of Council for this policy, and to have them unanimously behind the statement of which I am telegraphing the text separately. And, whatever my own preferences for letting Gandhi starve to death if he wants to, and whatever my sympathy for the views expressed by the minority of Governors, I would not, and did not, feel justified in pressing them against opposition so decided. Nor could I have hoped, had I done so, to have the requisite support.

2. That applies also to the question of imposing conditions on Gandhi as regards abstention from political activity while in freedom. View of all of my colleagues with personal experience of him (and my own experience I fear

[1] No. 404.

supports it) was that he would in no circumstances accept any conditions. I doubt very much myself whether he will be prepared to accept arrangements now proposed. But if he refuses to do so, we are in a much stronger position *vis-à-vis* of Indian and general world opinion; and if he insists on fasting, there will be no question of where responsibility lies, or of fact that he is anxious to make political capital out of this procedure. I do not believe that he has scored many points in his correspondence with me (indeed my letter to him of 5th February,[2] which he will receive tomorrow, is likely to be almost indigestibly strong meat for certain of my colleagues, and will not be palatable to Gandhi, whom it is certain to provoke to argument—not least on the question of his attitude towards fasting as a political weapon, my remarks on which, based on statements in *Harijan*, he may well contend overstate his attitude).

3. But main thing is, I still feel, that Government of India as at present composed should be ready with unanimity to take as strong a line as they have done in a matter so closely touching susceptibilities religious and political, and affecting an individual of Gandhi's unquestioned eminence and popular appeal; and while I would gladly have seen him handled still more firmly, I am well content, on a balancing of all *the factors, and other full appraisement of the*[3] disadvantages, with this result. That we may have a great deal of trouble to face, however things go, I do not overlook. But that would equally have been the case whether we had favoured (*a*) letting him fast to death (*b*) releasing him when in immediate danger, and I am sure that it is sounder (and support of so many Governors confirms me in that) to be able to face trouble[4] with Council solid behind me. I will do my best to keep the dissentient Governors' minds at ease. I will also telegraph, probably tomorrow, comment and information for Bajpai and Mudaliar.

[2] No. 395. [3] The words in italics were omitted in decipher.
[4] 'trouble' deciphered as 'matters'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *7 February 1943, 3.21 am*
PERSONAL *Received: 7 February, 1.15 am*

No. 334–S. My immediately following telegram gives text of statement agreed today by Council for issue in event of a fast by Gandhi. If he declines to accept our proposal to set him free to fast, it will be necessary to make an addition to cover this at end of paragraph 1, text of which I will telegraph separately.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *7 February 1943, 3.20 am*
PERSONAL *Received: 7 February, 5 am*

No. 335–S. Text of statement is as follows:—

Begins. Mr. Gandhi has informed His Excellency the Viceroy that he proposes to undertake a fast of three weeks' duration from the 9th[1] of February. It is to be a fast according to capacity, and during it Mr. Gandhi proposes to add juices of citrus fruit to water to make water drinkable, as his wish is not to fast to death, but to survive the ordeal. The Government of India deplore the use of the weapon of fasting to achieve political ends. There can in their judgment be no justification for it, and Mr. Gandhi has himself admitted in the past that it contains an element of coercion. The Government of India can only express its regret that Mr. Gandhi should think it necessary to employ such a weapon on this occasion, and should seek a justification for it in anything which Government may have said or done in connection with the movement initiated by him and his co-workers in the Congress party. The Government of India have no intention on their part of allowing the fast to deflect their policy. Nor will they be responsible for its consequences on Mr. Gandhi's health. They cannot prevent Mr. Gandhi from fasting. But if he decides to do so, he must do so at his own risk, and under his own arrangements. *They have accordingly decided to release him*[2] for the duration of the fast and any members of his party living with him who may wish to accompany him.

The Government of India propose to issue, in due course, a full statement on the origin and development of the movement which was initiated in August last, and the measures which Government[3] have been compelled to adopt to deal with it, but they think this is a suitable occasion for a brief review of the events of the last few months.[4]

Mr. Gandhi, in his correspondence with the Viceroy, has repudiated all responsibility for the consequences which have flowed from the "Quit India" demand which he and the Congress party have put forward. This contention will not bear examination. Mr Gandhi's own statement, before the movement was launched, envisaged anarchy as an alternative to the existing order, and referred to the struggle "as a fight to the finish in the course of which he

[1] Amended to read '10th' by telegram 397–S of 9 February (repeated to Agent-General, Washington). MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

[2] The decipher omits the words in italics and continues the same sentence.

[3] The decipher has '(?omission)' instead of 'Government'.

[4] 'months' deciphered as 'weeks'.

would not hesitate to run any risk, however great". As much has been made of his offer to meet the Viceroy, it is necessary to point out that at a Press interview on the 14th of July after the Working Committee resolution was passed, Mr. Gandhi stated[5] that there was no room left in the proposal for withdrawal or negotiation; there was no question of one more chance; after all, it was an open rebellion which was to be as short and as swift as possible. His last message was "do or die". The speeches of those most closely associated with Mr. Gandhi have been even more explicit, and have given a clear indication of what the Congress High Command had in mind in launching their attack against Government as by law established, and against the agencies and services by which the life of the country was being conducted in a period, be it noted, of exceptional stress and strain, and of grave danger to India from Japanese aggression.

The instructions issued by the various Congress organisations, contained in leaflets which were found to be freely circulating in almost every part of India—and which, on the evidence, cannot all be disowned as unauthorised—gave specific directions as to the methods which were to be employed for bringing the administration to a standstill. The circular of the 29th July emanating from the Andhra Provincial Congress Committee[6] is an instance in point. It is noteworthy in this connection that in widely separated areas all over the country, identical methods of attacks on railways and other communications were employed, requiring the use of special implements and highly technical knowledge. Control rooms and block instruments in railway stations came in for special attention, and destruction of telegraph and telephone lines and equipment was carried out in a manner which denoted careful planning and close knowledge of their working. If these manifestations of rebellious activities are to be regarded as the result not of Congress teachings, but as a manifestation of the popular resentment against the arrest of Mr. Gandhi and the Congress leaders, the question may well be asked to which section of the public the tens of thousands of men engaged in these violent and subversive activities belonged. If it is claimed that it is not Congressmen who have been responsible, it would be extraordinary, to say the least, if the blame were to be laid on non-Congress elements. The country is, in effect, asked to believe that those who own allegiance to the Congress party have behaved in an exemplary non-violent manner, and that it is persons who are outside the Congress fold who have registered their resentment at the arrest of the leaders of a movement which they did not profess to follow. A more direct answer to the argument is to be had in the fact that known Congressmen have been repeatedly found engaged in incitements to violence, or in prosecuting Congress activities which have led to grave disorders.

That political parties and groups outside the Congress party have no delusions on the subject may be judged from the categorical way in which they have

disassociated themselves from the movement, and condemned the violence to which it has given rise. In particular, the Muslim League has, on more than one occasion, emphasised the character and intentions of the policy pursued by the Congress party. As early as the 20th of August last,[7] the Working Committee of the League expressed the view, reiterated many times since, that by the slogan "Quit India" what was really meant was supreme control of the Government of the country by the Congress, and that the mass civil disobedience movement had resulted in lawlessness and considerable destruction of life and property. Other elements in the political life of the country have expressed themselves in a similar vein, and if the followers of the Congress persist in their contention that the resultant violence was no part of their policy or programme, they are doing so against the weight of overwhelming evidence.

Mr. Gandhi in his letter[8] to the Viceroy has sought to fasten responsibility on the Government of India. The Government of India emphatically repudiate this suggestion. It is clearly preposterous to contend that it is they who are responsible for the violence of the last few months which so gravely disorganised the normal life of the country—and, incidentally, aggravated the difficulties of the food situation—at a time when the united energies of the people might have been devoted to the vital task of repelling the enemy and of striking a blow for the freedom of India, the Commonwealth and the world. *Ends.*

[5] See Vol. II, No. 275. [6] Vol. II, No. 407. [7] Vol. II, No. 598. [8] No. 369.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, *7 February 1943, 4.50 am*
Received: 7 February, 3.15 am

No. 336–S. Your personal telegram of 6th February No. 2291.[1] I quite realise your feeling. But zero hour here is early morning of Tuesday, and I am ensuring that nothing shall reach Press unless and until after fast has actually started. You will receive well in advance from me text of anything that will be issued to Press in that event, and will be in a position in advance to make provisional arrangements. But I attach for reasons you will appreciate particular[2] importance to keeping the whole thing dark in the unlikely event of Gandhi calling off the fast; and to avoiding premature rumour or publication, if he does

[1] No. 400. [2] 'particular' deciphered as 'even more'.

decide to fast, until we know his reaction to proposition we are putting to him. I fully recognise the Press problem, but we must also give full weight to other aspects. I may by Monday morning be able to judge better how things are likely to go, and will then telegraph further most immediate to let you know our Press plans here and make suggestions for handling at the London end. I shall be repeating separately my telegram to Bajpai.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *7 February 1943, 3.20 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 7 February, 12 noon*

No. 339–S. Your personal telegram of 6th February No. 2298,[1] Gandhi, has crossed my telegram to you of last night No. 332–S[2] and which I hope makes the position clear. I quite realise importance of your point but I do not think we can get away from the word "fast". There is of course no question that the action is taken of Gandhi's own volition and not on medical advice. We shall just have to make the best of the phrasing.

[1] No. 401. [2] No. 404.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *7 February 1943, 9.45 pm*
PERSONAL

No. 342–S. My personal telegram of 7th February, No. 335–S.[1] Please amend last sentence of paragraph 1 of statement to read as follows:—

Begins. They have accordingly decided to release him for the purpose and the duration of the fast, and any members of his party living with him who may wish to accompany him. *Ends.*

2. Should Gandhi decline to co-operate and insist on regarding himself as a prisoner despite our decision, the following three sentences will be added at end of paragraph 1 of statement after the words "accompany him":—

Begins. Mr. Gandhi has informed the Government of India that he is not willing to take advantage of their decision or to regard himself as a free man for

the purpose of his fast. That must be for him to decide. The arrangements made will however stand; all restrictions on Mr. Gandhi's liberty during the period of his fast are being withdrawn, and he will be free to arrange as he wishes for medical and other attention and comforts. But the responsibility for his decision will remain exclusively his own. *Ends.*

[1] No. 407.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *7 February 1943, 10.53 pm*

PERSONAL

No. 344–S. To avoid any misunderstanding I had better let you have list of material to be published if Gandhi does not call off his fast. It is as follows:—

(*a*) Statement by the Government of India (text telegraphed to you in my personal telegram No. 335–S[1] of February 7th).

(*b*) Addition at the end of paragraph 1 of that statement to cover the contingency of his refusing to recognise or take advantage of our decision. I am telegraphing text separately.[2]

(*c*) Correspondence between Gandhi and myself or Government of India; that, if Gandhi agrees to publishing of all personal correspondence between us, will consist of following:—

(i) His personal letter to me of December 31st, 1942,[3] and my personal reply, dated January 13th, 1943,[4] (copies sent to you in my telegrams No. 22–S.C. of January 3rd and No. 38–S of January 5th) with amendments[5] which I am telegraphing in my immediately succeeding telegram No. 345–S.

(ii) His personal letter to me of January 19th[6] and my personal reply of January 26th[7] (copies telegraphed to you in my telegrams of January 26th, Nos. 199–S and 200–S).

(iii) His letter to me of January 29th,[8] and my reply of February 5th[9] (copies telegraphed to you in my telegrams of February 1st and February 5th, Nos. 33–S.C. and 304–S).

[1] No. 407. [2] No. 410, para. 2. [3] No. 305. [4] See No. 319.

[5] Namely those amendments suggested by Mr Amery in No. 321 to which Lord Linlithgow agreed in No. 322 except that the amendment to the penultimate sentence of para. 2 was altered to read 'Congress movement and with the Party and those who follow its lead'.

[6] No. 353. [7] No. 358; the date should be 25 January. [8] No. 369. [9] No. 395.

You will observe that his personal letter of January 19th also refers back to his letter to me of August 14th[10] (copy sent to Turnbull by bag of August 18th) and his letter to the Home Department of September 23rd[11] (copies sent to Turnbull by bag). I discussed in Council whether it would be wise to publish everything, and while fully accepting propaganda value of some of this material, and particularly the letter of August 14th, from Gandhi's point of view, we felt that it was better on the whole to keep nothing back, since if we did suspicion would at once be engendered that something material was being concealed, and agony would be prolonged, while we would certainly in the last resort have to yield to demand for publication. If Gandhi does not want his personal correspondence with me published, then no difficulty would arise on the part of the letters of August 14th and September 23rd, since the reference to them occurs in that correspondence, and in that event only items to be published would be items in paragraph (*c*) (iii) above. If, as I assume, he raises no objection I propose in releasing correspondence here, to print the letters of August 14th and September 23rd in small type as Appendices.[12]

[10] Vol. II, No. 553. [11] Vol. II, No. 779; the date should be 21 September.

[12] In telegram 361–S of 8 February Sir G. Laithwaite informed Mr Turnbull that the correspondence, together with No. 421, was being released under covering slip as follows: 'The following correspondence which has passed between His Excellency the Viceroy and Mr Gandhi is published for information. Mr Gandhi has agreed to the publication of his personal letters of 31st December 1942 and 19th January 1943.' He added that Mr Gandhi's letter of 14 August 1942, Lord Linlithgow's reply of 22 August (Vol. II, No. 611) and Mr Gandhi's letter of 21 September 1942 to Home Department (with a footnote 'a formal acknowledgement was sent to this letter') would be printed in small type as an appendix. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *7 February 1943, 10.55 pm*

No. 346–S. Following is text of confidential letter from Home Department to Gandhi, which will be delivered to him at 6 P.M. Monday, February 8th:—

Begins. 7th February. Dear Mr. Gandhi. The Government of India have been informed by His Excellency the Viceroy of your intention as communicated to him of undertaking a fast for 21 days in certain circumstances. They have carefully considered the position, and the conclusions that they have reached in the light of such consideration are set out in the statement[1] of which a copy is enclosed, which they would propose, in the event of your maintaining your present intention, to release in due course to the press.

2. The Government of India, as you will see from their statement, would be very reluctant to see you fast, and I am instructed to inform you that, as the statement makes clear, they would propose that, should you persist in your intention, you will be set at liberty for the purpose, and for the duration, of your fast as from the time of its commencement. During the period of your fast there will be no objection to your proceeding where you wish, though the Government of India trust that you will be able to arrange for your accommodation away from the Aga Khan's Palace.

3. Should you for any reason find yourself unable to take advantage of these arrangements, a decision which the Government of India would greatly regret, they will of course suitably amend the statement of which a copy is now enclosed before it issues. But they wish me to repeat, with all earnestness, their anxiety and their hope that the considerations which have carried so much weight with them will equally carry weight with you, and that you will not pursue your present tentative proposal. In that event, no occasion will of course arise for the issue of any statement of any kind. Yours sincerely, R. Tottenham. *Ends.*

We do not at this stage contemplate publishing that letter, but it may of course be necessary to do so later.

[1] No. 407.

413

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *7 February 1943, 11.50 pm*

PERSONAL

No. 348–S. Gandhi's fast. Press arrangements. I have asked Lumley to let Governors, Chief Commissioners and Residents know by code word[1] whether Gandhi (*a*) calls off his fast, (*b*) accepts our proposals, (*c*) insists on ignoring our proposals and fasting. They are to do their best to take Press with them and arrange meeting of Provincial Press Advisory Committee[2] and/or editors on

[1] 'All clear' in the event of (*a*); 'lime juice' in the event of (*b*) or (*c*). Telegram 351–S to all Governors of which this document is a summary. MSS. EUR. F. 125/111.

[2] Following conversations in November 1940 between the Government and the Press regarding the lines on which the latter might voluntarily co-operate in avoiding the publication of reports which might impede the war effort, the Government accepted a suggestion from the Press that a small advisory committee of Press representatives in Delhi should be set up to advise it on any matter affecting the Press and recommended the constitution of similar committees in the Provinces. L/P&J/8/791: ff 190–1.

day on which news breaks for a time five hours after receipt of code word in events (*b*) and (*c*) above.

2. Conference to be told that while bulletins about Gandhi's health and reasonable editorial comment will be allowed, we do not, for security reasons, intend to allow publication of statements by or interviews with Gandhi or playing up of situation so as to enlist public sympathy for Gandhi or work up feeling against Government, &c., and if necessary orders under Defence Rules will be passed to that effect.

414

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces), Sir A. Hope (Madras), Mr Rutherford (Bihar), Sir H. Twynam (Central Provinces and Berar), Sir H. Dow (Sind), and Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province)[1]

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

IMMEDIATE *7 February 1943*

350–S. Your telegram of 5th–6th February.[2] Many thanks. I fully realise your feeling and have indeed great sympathy with it. As I made clear to [in] my earlier telegram I have myself been in favour of letting Gandhi fast to death if he desires to do so. But there is no support, save from the Chief, from Council for that, whereas they are unanimous in their support of the alternative put to you in my telegram No. 394–S.[3] That is a fact of great political importance for there is bound to be great deal of trouble whatever happens, and the solid support of Council may be of very real value. You should know also that a clear majority of Governors were in favour of accepting the policy now accepted by Council. Moreover, as for apprehensions based on assumption that fast if it takes place may be postponed [prolonged?] Lumley's Surgeon-General, Candy, thinks that Gandhi will be in danger and his condition fairly critical by fifth day, and that he will survive his fast from ten to twelve days only. Difference therefore between release and on present plan is only about a week. But I have repeated your telegram to the Secretary of State so that he and the Cabinet may have before them in full your views on this most important and delicate subject.

2. On the assumption that Cabinet finally approve this policy, I am telegraphing separately to you about censorship, &c., and as you will see, propose to arrange for a gap, should Gandhi not (repeat not) call off fast, between zero hour and any communication to the press. If you want to give any warning at an earlier stage to officials I suggest that you take the line that you anticipate trouble on 9th February being the six months anniversary of the imprisonment

of the Working Committee, but give no detail whatever. If it is necessary for you to give in the strictest secrecy to a very limited number of officials on evening of Monday details of what is happening I should have no objection. But I am anxious that utmost secrecy should be maintained so long as there is the slightest hope of Gandhi repenting and of our therefore being able to cancel all the arrangements made.

3. It is also of real importance that any instructions or explanations sent to District Officers should be drafted with the consciousness that those instructions, &c. may leak; and that they should be so framed as to avoid playing in any way into the hands of Congress or Gandhi. I have also, as you will appreciate, to consider in that regard the attitude of my own Council. I should personally have been glad to have been much more specific as to what is to be done in various contingencies if Gandhi does take advantage of our offer to release him; but I am clear that it will be better to deal with such contingencies as they arise. My own strong disposition is to think that Gandhi will decline to avail himself of the arrangements made and will insist on continuing to regard himself in every way as a prisoner and to fast in the Aga Khan's Palace.[4]

[1] A similar telegram (349–S of 7 February) was sent to other Governors except that the first paragraph read as follows: 'Very many thanks. This is a chancy business and there is much to be said on both sides. But further exhaustive discussion in Council has left my colleagues unanimous behind the policy suggested and I am certain that in those circumstances it is the wisest one to adopt.'

[2] i.e. the Governor's reply (summarised in No. 403) to No. 389.

[3] This should read 294–S; i.e. No. 389.

[4] Repeated to Secretary of State in telegram 372–S of 8 February. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

415

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *7 February 1943, 10.45 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 352–S. I must apologise for deluging you with telegrams and repetitions about Gandhi's fast; but it is so delicate and difficult a matter that I am sure you will not misunderstand. Could you let me know most immediate whether there are still any points about which you are uncertain or about which you would like further comment from me, either as regards arrangements which we contemplate or as regards publicity, &c?

2. I will repeat to you separately copy of telegram[1] I have sent to Governors, designed as you will see to meet uneasiness felt by those who do not support

[1] No. 414.

policy now to be implemented. As I said in my personal telegram[2] of today I think it quite likely that very stiff tone of my final reply[3] to Gandhi may annoy certain sections and even individuals in my Council. But (my own feeling in the matter apart) I do attach very great importance to dissipating any feeling in the minds of the dissentient Governors or of the services, that we take a light view of this business, or that we have merely succumbed to blackmailing pressure. And my hope is that any ill-effect in Hindu or Congress circles will be offset by reassuring effect on services and in non-Congress circles.

[2] No. 405. [3] No. 395.

416

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: ff 352–3

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *7 February 1943, 1.35 pm*
PERSONAL

2358. I have been asked whether phrase "on the understanding, (*d*) that on its completion he would return to detention" at end of 1st paragraph of your telegram 293–S[1] dated 5th February means (*a*) that proposals involve agreement of Gandhi to this, or (*b*) that it will be made plain to Gandhi as a decision and is understood between you and your Council as a decision, that Gandhi will be taken into detention again on conclusion of fast. I have no doubt myself that the second interpretation is correct, but should be glad of assurance that that is so, as anything savouring of coming to terms with Gandhi would be felt here to be objectionable.

[1] No. 391.

417

Sir D. Monteath to Sir G. Laithwaite

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: f 355

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *7 February 1943, 3 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 8 February*

144. Laithwaite from Monteath. It is evident in light of Viceroy's 336–S[1] that there is possibility that statement contained in 335–S[2] may be released and get world-wide circulation before Press can be adequately guided. Statement treats matters in issue predominantly and rightly enough from purely internal angle but it would be great advantage for purpose of handling left wing opinion here and in U.S.A. if it contained in itself clear indication of

danger to United Nations involved by Congress movement in autumn. Would it be possible to bring this point out clearly by addition at end of third para. of statement of some such words as "which would if realised have most seriously imperilled the whole cause of the United Nations"?

[1] No. 408. [2] No. 407.

418

War Cabinet W.M. (43) 25th Conclusions, Minute 1

R/30/1/3: ff 44–6

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 7 February 1943 at 5.30 pm were: Mr Churchill (in the Chair), Mr Attlee, Mr Anthony Eden, Sir John Anderson, Mr Ernest Bevin, Mr Oliver Lyttelton, Mr Herbert Morrison

Also present were: Mr S. M. Bruce, Viscount Simon, Viscount Cranborne, Mr Amery, Mr A. V. Alexander, Sir James Grigg, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Mr Brendan Bracken, Sir Dudley Pound, Sir Charles Portal, Major-General Kennedy

INDIA

Detention of Mr Gandhi

(Previous Reference: W.M. (43) 24th Conclusions, Minute 2)[1]

The War Cabinet had before them the following documents:—

Memoranda by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (43) 52 and 57).[2]
Telegrams from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, Nos. 302–S,[3] 304–S,[4] 316–S,[5] 332–S,[6] 333–S,[7] 335–S.[8]

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA said that the telegrams now before the War Cabinet showed that the Viceroy's Council were of the opinion that the right course was that Gandhi should be released on starting his "fast to capacity" for a period of 21 days, on the understanding that on its completion he would return to detention. Telegram No. 335–S contained the text of a statement which it was proposed should be issued in India as soon as Gandhi began his fast. In telegram No. 333–S the Viceroy said that he would gladly have seen Gandhi handled more firmly, but that he was sure that it was sounder to be able to face matters with his Council solidly behind him.

The Secretary of State for India said that the Viceroy clearly felt that he had achieved a good deal in getting the Council to agree unanimously on the course of action proposed. He thought that it was impracticable for the issues involved to be handled from this end, and that the War Cabinet should support

[1] No. 398. [2] Nos. 402 and 403. [3] No. 393. [4] See No. 395, note 1.
[5] No. 397. [6] No. 404. [7] No. 405. [8] No. 407.

the Viceroy in the line of action which he proposed. He added that he thought that, if the War Cabinet did not now approve of action being taken on the lines proposed, the Viceroy might well be faced with the resignation of most of his Council.

In discussion, various criticisms were raised of the line of action proposed by the Viceroy and his Council:—

(1) The War Cabinet had agreed, with some reluctance, to the view that, if Gandhi fasted, he should be let out of detention as soon as the doctors advised that this must be done in order to prevent his dying in detention. But the War Cabinet had never agreed to the present proposal, which was that Gandhi should be let out of detention on a threat to fast.

(2) The present proposal seemed to involve an undertaking by Gandhi to return to detention after his fast was over. Strong objection was seen to any arrangement or understanding being arrived at with Gandhi.

(3) Furthermore, the proposal was open to practical objections. What would happen if Gandhi, after his release, at once stopped his fast: was he to be redetained at once? Moreover, if Gandhi refused to give the undertaking referred to, and started his fast in detention, was the Viceroy's Council then prepared to let him fast to death in detention?

(4) Again, there were risks that Gandhi, if released from detention, would re-establish contacts, and that this would lead to a revival of agitation in India. (See, for example, the points raised by Sir Maurice Hallett and summarised in telegram No. 316–S from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State.)

(5) It was also pointed out that the new proposal involved what might be described as "cat-and-mouse" procedure, i.e. it was proposed that Gandhi should be let out for a period and later put back into detention again without fresh cause. The Cabinet saw strong objections to this. Hitherto the utmost they had contemplated had been that Gandhi, if released on grounds of health, might be redetained if he gave fresh cause for such action.

(6) Strong objection was taken to the terms of the draft announcement (telegram No. 335–S). This draft seemed to contain an admission that the Government felt bound to yield to Gandhi's threat to hunger-strike. It was thought that it would create an impression of great weakness.

For these reasons the War Cabinet were gravely disturbed by the Viceroy's proposals. While realising that the Viceroy had proceeded a long way on the basis of these proposals, the War Cabinet reached the conclusion that it was essential that he should be informed of their misgivings and asked for a further expression of his views before action was authorised. In particular, it should be made clear to the Viceroy that he would have effective support from the

War Cabinet if he decided to adhere either to the line of action for which the War Cabinet had themselves expressed a preference in previous discussions, or to the line of action on which they had previously agreed that the Viceroy should have authority to proceed, i.e. release only at the point when danger to life was involved.

The War Cabinet accordingly—

(1) Gave directions for the immediate despatch to the Viceroy of a telegram informing him that the War Cabinet did not feel able to approve action on the lines proposed without further consideration, and asking him to suspend action on these proposals until further notice.

(A telegram in this sense was drafted and despatched during the Meeting as No. 2360 to the Viceroy of the 7th February.)[9]

(2) Invited the Lord President of the Council, the Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State for India to draft a telegram to the Viceroy in the light of the discussion. This telegram should be submitted to the Prime Minister, who would authorise its immediate despatch unless any point arose which, in his opinion, called for consideration by the War Cabinet.

(This telegram was later sent as No. 2361 to the Viceroy of the 8th February.)[10]

NOTE.—In the result, action proceeded on the basis of the plan favoured by the Viceroy's Executive Council, without the further expression of the Viceroy's views desired by the War Cabinet (*vide* telegrams Nos. 362–S[11] and 356–S[12] from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India—printed as Nos. 28 and 29 in W.P. (43) 62).[13]

[9] No. 419. [10] No. 422. [11] No. 427. [12] No. 426.

[13] War Cabinet Paper W.P. (43) 62 of 11 February read: 'By direction of the Prime Minister the attached telegrams [*See Nos. 289, 306 note 1, 318, 319, 326, 334, 340, 343, 353 note 1, 358 note 1, 369 note 1, 373, 378 note 5, 381, 387, 391, 393, 395 note 1, 397, 404, 405, 407, 412, 413, 419, 421 note 1, 422, 425, 426, 427, 440, 442, and 443*], which have already been circulated separately, have been printed for the War Cabinet and are circulated for convenience. L. S. A.' R/30/1/3: ff 16–39.

419

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: f 351

MOST IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, *7 February 1943, 7.40 pm*
Received: 8 February

2360. Your personal telegrams 332–S,[1] 333–S,[2] 335–S[3] and earlier telegrams were considered by Cabinet this afternoon immediately on Prime Minister's

[1] No. 404. [2] No. 405. [3] No. 407.

return. After full discussion the Cabinet decided that they could not approve action on lines proposed without further consideration.

Please therefore suspend action proposed until you hear further from us. Telegram setting out War Cabinet's views and putting certain urgent questions will follow shortly.We have not yet received text of proposed communication to Gandhi.[4]

[4] See No. 412.

420

Mr Gandhi to Sir G. Laithwaite

MSS. EUR. F. 125/125

DETENTION CAMP, *7 February 1943*

Dear Sir Gilbert,

I was delighted to see your signature after such a lapse of time.[1] When I said[2] that the two personal letters were not confidential, I certainly meant what you say. But I meant also that though they were not confidential on my part, if His Excellency wanted to treat them as such, being personal, he was free to do so, and therefore equally free to regard his two replies also as such. In that case, he could have four letters withheld from publication. So far as I am concerned, my request of course is that the whole correspondence, beginning with my letter of 14th August last,[3] and including my letter[4] to the Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department, should be published.

Yours sincerely,

M. K. GANDHI

[1] Evidently Sir G. Laithwaite had written to Mr Gandhi about the publication of his two personal letters (Nos. 305 and 353) to Lord Linlithgow.

[2] See No. 369, last para. [3] Vol. II, No. 553. [4] Vol. II, No. 779.

421

Mr Gandhi to the Marquess of Linlithgow[1]

L/P&J/8/600: ff 217–20

DETENTION CAMP, *7 February 1943*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I have to thank you for your long reply dated the 5th instant[2] to my letter of 29th January last.[3] I would take your last point first, namely, the contemplated

fast which begins on 9th instant. Your letter, from a Satyagrahi's stand-point, is an invitation to fast. No doubt the responsibility for the step, and its consequences, will be solely mine. You have allowed an expression to slip from your pen for which I was not[4] unprepared. In the concluding sentence of the second paragraph you describe the step as an attempt "to find an easy way out". That you, as a friend, can impute such a base and cowardly motive to me passes comprehension. You have also described it as "a form of political blackmail". And you quote my previous writings on the subject against me. I abide by my writings. I hold that there is nothing inconsistent in them with the contemplated step. I wonder whether you have yourself read those writings.

I do claim that I have approached you with an open mind when I asked you to convince me of my error. "Profound distrust" of the published reports is in no way inconsistent with my having an open mind.

You say that there is evidence that I—I leave my friends out for the moment —"expected this policy to lead to violence", that I was "prepared to condone it", and that "the violence that ensued formed part of a concerted plan conceived long before the arrest of Congress leaders". I have seen no evidence in support of such a serious charge. You admit that part of the evidence has yet to be published. The speech of the Home Member, of which you have favoured me with a copy, may be taken as the opening speech of the prosecution counsel and nothing more. It contains unsupported imputations against Congressmen. Of course he has described the violent outburst in graphic language. But he has not said why it took place when it did. You have condemned men and women before trying them and hearing their defence. Surely there is nothing wrong in my asking you to show me the evidence on which you hold them guilty. What you say in your letter carries no conviction. Proof should correspond to the canons of English Jurisprudence.

If the wife of a member of the Working Committee is actively engaged in "planning the bomb outrages and other acts of terrorism", she should be tried before a court of law and punished if found guilty. The lady you refer to could only have done the things attributed to her after the wholesale arrests of 9th August last, which I have dared to describe as leonine violence.

You say that the time is not yet ripe to publish the charges against the Congress. Have you ever thought of the possibility of their being found baseless when they are put before an impartial Tribunal? Or that some of the condemned persons might have died in the meanwhile, or that some of the evidence that the living can produce might become unavailable?

[1] Lord Linlithgow transmitted the text of this letter to Mr Amery in telegram 355-S of 8 February. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24. The final word in the fifth para. was deciphered as 'available'.

[2] No. 395. [3] No. 369.

[4] Sir G. Laithwaite's telegram 371-S of 8 February to Mr Turnbull asked him to delete the word 'not'. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

I reiterate the statement that the principle of civil disobedience is implicitly conceded in the Settlement of 5th March 1931 arrived at between the then Viceroy on behalf of the Government of India and myself on behalf of the Congress. I hope you know that the principal Congress men were discharged before that settlement was even thought of. Certain reparations were made to Congressmen under that Settlement. Civil disobedience was discontinued only on conditions being fulfilled by the Government. That by itself was, in my opinion, an acknowledgment of its legitimacy, of course under given circumstances. It therefore seems somewhat strange to find you maintain that civil disobedience "cannot be recognized as being in any circumstances legitimate" by your government. You ignore the practice of the British Government which has recognized this legitimacy under the name of "passive resistance".

Lastly you read into my letters a meaning which is wholly inconsistent with my declaration, in one of them,[5] of adherence to unadulterated non-violence. For, you say in your letter under reply that "acceptance of my point of view would be to concede that the authorized government of the country on which lies the responsibility for maintaining peace and good order, should allow movements to take place that would admit preparations for violence, interruption of communications, for attacks on innocent persons, for murders of police officers and others to proceed unchecked". I must be a strange friend of yours whom you believe to be capable of asking for recognition of such things as lawful.

I have not attempted an exhaustive reply to the views and statements attributed to me. This is not the place nor the time for such a reply. I have only picked out those things which in my opinion demanded an immediate answer. You have left me no loophole for escaping the ordeal I have set before myself. I begin it on the 9th instant with the clearest possible conscience. Despite your description of it as "a form of political blackmail", it is on my part meant to be an appeal to the Highest Tribunal for justice which I have failed to secure from you. If I do not survive the ordeal, I shall go to the Judgment Seat with the fullest faith in my innocence. Posterity will judge between you as representative of an all-powerful Government and me as a humble man who has tried to serve his country and humanity through it.

My last letter was written against time, and therefore a material paragraph went in as postscript. I now send herewith a fair copy typed by Pearey Lal who has taken Mahadeo Desai's place. You will find the postscript paragraph restored to the place where it should have been.

I am,

Your sincere friend,

M. K. GANDHI

[5] See No. 353.

422

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow[1]

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: ff 345–6

MOST IMMEDIATE PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *8 February 1943, 2.55 am*

2361. See my telegram 2360.[2]

Following are the views of the War Cabinet.[3]

1. War Cabinet are greatly disturbed by certain features of your new scheme. In the first place, while we agreed with reluctance[4] to your proposal endorsed by your colleagues that Gandhi should be let out of detention as soon as the doctors advised that this should be done to prevent his dying in detention, we have never agreed to a proposal that he should be let out of detention on a mere threat to fast; and moreover a threat to fast to capacity and not to death. We feel that this new proposal will result in grave embarrassment.

2. Our anxieties are increased because as we understand it the new suggestion involves an undertaking by Gandhi to return to detention after his fast is over. You do not tell us what you propose to do if he refuses to give the undertaking. Are your[5] colleagues prepared in that event to let him fast to death in detention? Again if after release he stops his fast is he to be redetained at once? What steps would you propose to take to implement Hallett's conditions in his 316–S?[6]

3. War Cabinet see very strong objection to any arrangement or understanding with Gandhi. Whatever action is taken should be action taken by the Government of India without regard to Gandhi's consent or acquiescence.

4. War Cabinet also greatly dislikes any form of cat and mouse i.e. the idea that Gandhi should in any circumstances be let out for a period and then put back again without fresh cause. This is quite a different thing from re-detaining on fresh grounds a man who has been released because of his state of health, which is the very utmost we ever contemplated as possible.

5. We have noted that your own view, supported by several Governors, is that Gandhi should not get released by merely threatening to limit his diet to citrus juice or actually starving himself, and that if he chooses to do this he should not on that account alone be released. You can rely on receiving effective support from the War Cabinet if you were to maintain this view, or

[1] Sir E. Bridges sent this telegram from the War Cabinet Offices to Mr Turnbull under cover of a note, dated 8 February 1943, 1 a.m., informing him that it had been approved by Mr Churchill, Sir J. Anderson, Lord Simon and Mr Amery and should be sent off at once. L/PO/6/102b: f 344.

[2] No. 419. [3] See No. 418. [4] See No. 338, Minute 1.

[5] MSS. EUR. F. 125/24 has 'Are you or your' instead of 'Are your'. [6] No. 397.

as stated in my telegram 44[7] of 12th January if you contemplated a release only at point when danger to life is involved.

6. The question which troubles the War Cabinet most is the public reaction to the release of Gandhi because of his threat. The draft in your 335–S[8] of a public announcement, though naturally framed in the light of its probable reception in India, appears to us to be equivalent to a statement that the Government feels bound to yield to Gandhi's threat, and would surely convey to the world a most unfortunate impression of weakness.

7. We realise that you feel pressed for time. But surely it is better to have a day or two's delay, rather than to rush a decision on a new idea which is so full of difficulties both present and prospective, even though this means that Gandhi starts his threatened capacity fast in detention. We ask you to send us your further observations urgently in the light of this telegram.

[7] No. 340. [8] No. 407.

423

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: ff 341–2

8 February 1943

3–U. Views of Cabinet now being sent you are result of Prime Minister's return and telegram[1] conveying them mainly a Simon–Anderson draft.[2] My own part has been confined to urging Cabinet to disregard question of relative merits of various ways of dealing with so very special[3] a problem and to concentrate on the one question of whether at this eleventh hour you can reopen with your colleagues matter already agreed by yourself and so raise directly the issue of considered view of Governor-General in Council being overridden from here.

I hope you can clear up uncertainty in Cabinet mind as to what your proposal really means and how far you have thought out further steps and what your colleagues will then be prepared to stick to. In any case if you think you can at this stage persuade your colleagues to go back to[4] their earlier decision well and good. If on the other hand you feel that overriding them now would involve serious consequences on whole Government of India and conduct of war then say so as briefly and emphatically as you can. You can count on my all out support of whatever course you may now take.

[1] No. 422.

[2] 'a Simon–Anderson draft' deciphered as 'A — (blank gp. ?Grigg) draft'. In Delhi, Anderson was guessed but not Simon.

[3] 'special' deciphered as '(?difficult)'. [4] 'to' deciphered as 'on'.

424

Mr Churchill to the Marquess of Linlithgow (via War Office and Commander-in-Chief)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/158

MOST IMMEDIATE *8 February 1943, 11 am*
MOST SECRET *Received: 8 February, 5.20 pm*

50774. Officer Decipher. Private for Field Marshal Wavell. Deliver personally to Viceroy for his eye only. *Begins.* From Prime Minister to Viceroy of India. Personal and private. I earnestly hope you will weigh very carefully the overwhelming opinion of the War Cabinet and other Ministers concerned before consenting to a step which is contrary to your own better judgment and that of the Commander-in-Chief on the merits and which I fear would bring our whole government both in India and here at home into ridicule and thus cloud the magnificent work which you have done in these seven anxious years. I ask this as a friend and also because I am convinced that such an episode would be a definite injury to our war policy all over the world which is now moving forward victoriously after so many perils have been surmounted by British resolution. For these larger interests I bear the chief responsibility.

425

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *8 February 1943, 5.30 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 8 February, 3.15 pm*

No. 359–S. Hallett's telegram of 5th February No. G.–314.[1] There is not the slightest hope of Gandhi accepting any conditions such as these. My Council, after full discussion, are clear that they cannot be imposed. We have got to take certain risks in this business, and I am quite prepared to take risks involved in leaving this matter open. If Gandhi is going to fast he will not be able to do much in the way of discussion.

[1] No. 397.

426

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *8 February 1943, 5.30 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 8 February, 4 pm*

No. 356–S. I should greatly regret it if trouble were to arise over this business of Gandhi's fasting. But I trust that Cabinet to whom I hope you will show this telegram will believe that I have done my utmost[1] to cover the points raised by them, and that in my considered judgment, overruling of my Council on this matter would have disastrous consequences here and might indeed damage our whole war effort. My own views have always been clear. They are that Gandhi should be allowed to fast to death. That has been brought out consistently in my telegrams (I do not understand suggestion in paragraph 1 of your telegram of 8th February No. 2361[2] that this is "my" proposal). My entirely personal view is that Gandhi is likely to insist on starving himself to death in the Aga Khan's Palace, and tone of his reply[3] to my letter of 5th February[4] which I am telegraphing separately confirms that. That makes immediate action here all the more necessary and I trust that even if Cabinet do feel some doubts as to wisdom of course that has been adopted I can look for their support over it.

[1] See No. 427. [2] No. 422. [3] No. 421. [4] No. 395.

427

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *8 February 1943, 5.30 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 8 February, 8.25 pm*

No. 362–S. Your personal telegram[1] of 8th February. I fully appreciate feeling of War Cabinet, and have most carefully considered their proposal. I have again discussed the matter in Council.

2. Council remain entirely firm in support of their proposal. They fully recognise and have given weight to the considerations advanced by the Cabinet. They remain however quite clear that their decision is the wise one, and that is their considered advice to the Cabinet. While I have consistently made clear that I would myself prefer to allow Gandhi to take the consequences of his decision I would not feel justified in differing from the unanimous view of my Council on this matter, and I support it.

3. I think that certain of the Cabinet's doubts are due to obscure drafting here.

(*a*) There will be no arrangement or understanding with Gandhi. His release, after fast begins, will be our countermove to the fast, and he will be left no choice.

(*b*) There is no question of release on a threat. He will only be released if and when he actually commences the fast.

(*c*) Gandhi's return to detention. We have carefully phrased our communication[2] to make it clear that he is released at the outset of his fast for the purpose and duration of his fast. Release will be merely an interruption of his confinement for a specific period. If consequent on that decision he leaves the Aga Khan's Palace and survives the fast, neither I nor any of my colleagues with experience of him have any doubt that he would return to detention on its completion. Physical reasons might of course make a short delay inevitable. But he becomes a prisoner again once his fast ends, and we can make necessary arrangements in advance according to[3] whether he is in the Aga Khan's Palace or not.

(*d*) If he is not prepared to leave the Aga Khan's Palace, that is his affair, as our statement[4] makes clear. In that event he will be allowed to remain there; but technically during the period of his fast as a *free man*, and any restrictions on his liberty will be removed. If in that event, he refuses to make his own arrangements for doctors, miscellaneous comforts, &c., we will of course make them for him.

(*e*) My colleagues are entirely satisfied that public reaction is likely to be as good and probably better to this solution than to any other. They fully recognise that serious difficulties will have to be faced whatever solution we adopt, but they are solidly behind this one.

4. Finally we are not masters of the time-table in this matter. Gandhi is likely to start his fast at 5 a.m. Indian time tomorrow. Our letter to Gandhi is scheduled to be handed to him at 6 p.m. Indian time this evening. My colleagues are unanimously of opinion, and I agree with them, that we should be in an exceedingly weak position if, once his fast starts, we appear to the public to have no scheme ready for dealing with it despite the warning that had been given us, and if we have to try to catch up a couple of days later by which time the advantages of the scheme favoured by my Council might have been sacrificed.

5. My considered view is therefore as stated above. Given the time-factor, my colleagues and I feel and trust that the explanations we have given will meet the Cabinet's difficulties, and in that confidence, and given the difficulty about timing referred to above, we propose to go ahead.

[1] No. 422. [2] No. 412. [3] 'according to' was received corrupt. [4] No. 410.

428

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/158

IMMEDIATE *8 February 1943*

3–U. Your telegram 3–U.[1] Best thanks. I hope my reply[2] will satisfy the critics. Most grateful for your support. No wise skipper, particularly an ex-Civil Lord trained by you,[3] would choose to put the helm hard over in weather like this.

[1] No. 423. [2] No. 427.
[3] Lord Linlithgow had been Civil Lord of the Admiralty 1922–4, when Mr Amery was First Lord.

429

Sir G. Laithwaite to Sir D. Monteath

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE *8 February 1943*

No. 363–S. Monteath from Laithwaite. Your No. 144.[1] Council readily agree. Please insert after word "attack" in last sentence of paragraph 3 words "an attack which would, if realised, have most seriously imperilled the whole cause of the United Nations". I am informing Bajpai.

[1] No. 417.

430

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery[1]

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *8 February 1943, 7.50 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 8 February, 4.50 pm*

No. 366–S. My telegram No. 348–S[2]/340–S/358–S.[3] I have now arranged that Governor of Bombay shall telegraph direct most immediate appropriate code word according to my telegram No. 348–S/340–S/358–S dated 7th February. We are ensuring that no message shall leave this country either by wireless or cable until you/Washington/Chungking shall have had time to receive Lumley's telegram and that no reference is made in A.I.R. before 9.10 p.m. Indian time transmission.

2. Please ensure that no reference is made by B.B.C. before news received here at 9.30 p.m. Indian time.

[1] Para. 1 was also sent to Agents-General, Washington and Chungking. [2] No. 413.
[3] Telegrams 340–S (to Agent-General, Washington, repeated to Secretary of State) and 358–S (to Agent-General, Chungking) informed them of Gandhi's intended fast, of proposals for dealing with it, and of Press arrangements. Lord Linlithgow would telegraph the word 'codex' if Mr Gandhi accepted the Government's proposed arrangements for his fast; 'repudiation' if he rejected them and decided to fast in captivity; and 'all clear' if he called off the fast. MSS. EUR. F. 125/130.

431

Sir G. Laithwaite to Mr Irwin

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/57

8 February 1943, by telephone

No. 369–S. Our telephone conversation of last night. Viceroy is clear that fast should be regarded as starting from after Gandhi's early breakfast. He will probably himself indicate that that is the case, and there may be some sort of ceremonial confirmation of that such as the singing of a hymn by one of his entourage or the like. Once that happens there should be formal intimation to him that he is now at liberty for the purpose and for the duration of his fast.

2. As regards Gilder we should not be prepared to agree to his release. Clearly best possible medical attention of every sort in case of need must be in waiting in case Gandhi wishes to avail himself of it: but we see no reason for acceding to a request such as you mention.

3. As regards time-table, on assumption stated above that fast is to be regarded as beginning immediately after his early breakfast, we agree to synchronisation throughout the country of Press Conferences, but they must not of course be summoned until fast has actually commenced and even then no indication of nature or object of conference must be given in advance. We suggest that you should try by most immediate call to put your "lime juice" message[1] through by telephone to Sind, Central Provinces, Madras, Punjab, United Provinces, North-West Frontier Province once you have informed me, and despatched your telegrams[2] to Secretary of State, Washington and Chungking in interests of expedition. We will arrange to inform Chief Commissioner, Delhi, Bihar and Bengal. You should telegraph to Assam, Orissa, Chief Commissioners, Baluchistan and Ajmer, and to Residents. Instructions in my earlier telegram as regards telegrams to be sent to Secretary of State, Washington and Chungking stand.

[1] See No. 413. [2] i.e. the telegrams mentioned in No. 430.

432

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir R. Lumley (Bombay)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/57

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *8 February 1943*

PERSONAL

No. 373–S. Gandhi's fast. We have to consider what will happen if Gandhi declines to regard himself as a free man and insists on starving in the Aga Khan's Palace. Logically, if he takes that line, he ought to decline *to receive visitors and equally to decline*[1] to make his own arrangements for medicine, servants, &c.

2. I think wise course will be to leave all our material, whether staff or equipment, entirely at his disposal, and if he does decline to take any action himself, to continue as hitherto to give him medical comforts, care, servants, &c. Would it be possible, do you think, to get e.g. Mrs. Naidu to co-operate by taking charge of arrangements generally in the event of his accepting our offer? If he will *not* accept it and is not prepared to see visitors, we shall have to announce publicly that that is the case, and that will be our justification for refusing to allow visitors to enter the compound. But even if he does not accept it our policy must be to regard him as completely free in all respects for the purpose and duration of his fast, and while preventing him being surrounded by crowds, &c., to be guided by his wishes in all these matters.

3. Suggestion has also been made that we might be able to make contact with some prominent individual (e.g. Lady Thackersey or the like) whom he might be willing to stay with in the event of his availing himself of our offer. Would you consider that, though I am anxious as you know to keep this business completely secret to the last possible moment so that if by any chance Gandhi does call off his fast we can try to suppress the fact that there has ever been a threat of one.

Repeated to Secretary of State.

[1] The words in italics are included from the repetition to the Secretary of State. The printer presumably omitted them from MSS. EUR. F. 125/57 in error.

433

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *8 February 1943, 11.55 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 9 February, 12.30 pm*

No. 374–S. Your private and personal telegram No. 130[1] dated February 3rd. Home Department paper on Congress responsibility, which is now almost ready and which will be sent to you by first available fast Air Mail, will bring together very large number of known facts bearing on previous intentions of Congress leaders and subsequent performance of their followers. As such, it will run into many pages and cannot be summarized or telegraphed. Our official statement[2] to be issued on commencement of Gandhi's fast, which has been sent to you separately, sets forth main grounds for holding Congress leaders responsible without giving evidence for those grounds in detail. Following is rather more expanded statement of these grounds as brief for your meeting with M.Ps. on February 12th:—

(1) The speeches, writings and utterances of Mr. Gandhi and the members of the Working Committee, both before the latter's resolution of July 14th[3] and between that date and August 8th, show that they did not shrink from speaking in terms of anarchy and rebellion. They made no secret of the unusual nature of the coming struggle and the possibility that it would be violent; and they made special efforts to incite students to take a leading part in it.

(2) The terms of the A.-I.C.C. resolution of August 9th[4] left "every man and woman to function for himself or herself" without restriction if the leaders were arrested. Any body which passes a resolution in such terms can hardly disclaim responsibility for anything that happens afterwards.

(3) The view that the disturbances were not spontaneous but deliberate rests on a number of known facts—

(*a*) the attacks on communications started simultaneously in widely separated parts of India, but not until two or three days after the arrests;

(*b*) the attacks themselves displayed technical knowledge and must have needed tools and preparation. They were largely led by that section of the educated youth of the country which is most amenable to extremist views and least tolerant of the Gandhian doctrine of non-violence;

(*c*) the worst disorders occurred in the areas of greatest strategic importance and covered the centre of the coal industry, paralysis of which would have paralysed all transport and industry;

[1] No. 385. [2] No. 407. [3] Vol. II, No. 265.
[4] Vol. II, No. 470; the date should be 8 August.

(*d*) labour did not generally give trouble, except under political pressures and even then there was little or no sabotage of important plant or machinery;

(*e*) generally speaking, the actions of the mob were not those that one would expect from people venting indignation at the arrests of their leaders. It was not a question of demonstrations or *hartals* or indiscriminate attacks on *all* Government property, but of deliberate attacks on certain limited and selected objectives.

(4) After the arrests, the members of the A.-I.C.C. left in Bombay drew up a programme very similar to the well-known Andhra Congress Committee's programme[5] which was issued before the arrests and which has already been published. Copies of this and similar programmes appeared in many different parts of India, and while some of them continued to enjoin non-violence, they and the many circulars since issued in the name of Congress have formed the basis of the violent sabotage campaign that subsequently took place. Many of the A.-I.C.C. members also went underground for reasons that can only be explained on the hypothesis that they intended to organize and support this campaign.

(5) Finally, there have been many cases in which known Congressmen have participated in the disturbances and have been convicted of acts of violence, or incitements thereto, by courts of law. Indeed, if the contention is that Congressmen did not take part in the disturbances, it is impossible to believe that they were the work of non-Congressmen in spontaneous indignation at the arrest of the Congress leaders.

2. If further detail is required to support this brief, I suggest it could be prepared for you from information available in[6]

(1) Home Member's statements to National Defence Council in September, November and January, all of which have been sent to you though last may not yet have been received.

(2) Home Member's speech in Assembly on September 15th; and

(3) the two reviews by Intelligence Bureau sent with Home Department letter of December 15th, 1942.

In the nature of the case, volume of fresh evidence bearing on Congress responsibility has been limited during the last few months and consists mainly in—

(*a*) conviction of known Congressmen for participation in disturbances, and

(*b*) unpublished statements given to police by persons arrested on suspicion.

As regards (*a*), total number of persons convicted by courts up to end of 1942 was over 26,000, of which it would be safe to say that many were known

Congressmen. It would not serve your purpose to give names and details, but you could mention case of Jaglal Choudhry, ex-Congress Minister of Bihar, who was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment under Section 395, I.P.C., and of Jagat Narain Lal, Parliamentary Secretary of Bihar Congress Party, who was sentenced to three years imprisonment for fomenting disturbances in Patna District and who was found to be in possession of quantities of objectionable literature issued in Congress name. Among those convicted for Ashti and Chimur outrages were number of well-known members of the local Congress organization.

Point (*b*) above raises question to which you refer of disclosing secret information. You will realise that Maxwell's statements to National Defence Council contained some secret material but I suggest you could use anything in those statements for your meeting, results of which, I gather, will not be published. The Intelligence Bureau reviews naturally contain much more secret stuff derived mainly from intercepted letters and source reports, disclosure of which to public even in England would be strongly deprecated by my Home Department. I would see no objection, however, to your disclosing certain items of secret information in strict confidence to selected individuals. Following is list of what Home Department would regard as most important items of this nature together with indication of their source—

(1) secret report of private meeting of Congress workers at Delhi on July 17th. Abul Kalam Azad was asked "Will Gandhi call off movement if Chauri Chaura incidents[7] are repeated"? His reply contained words "we will not be responsible for the masses who may turn violent";

(2) secret report of meeting of socialist workers and students at Poona on July 25th at which Yusuf Meherally, the Congress Socialist leader, said, after advocating attacks on communications, "Lastly, don't consult Gandhi on each and every detail. He is wise enough to connive at these things if the movement is going to be made a success";

(3) secret report of Rajagopalachari's interview with Gandhi at beginning of August when former is reported to have said "I tried my best to convince him that a mass movement now, almost coincident with a probable Jap attack, was the worst folly. I am afraid I made little impression on Gandhiji. He said 'Let there be red ruin; every country has to face that some time or other' ";

(4) secret report of private meeting of Congress workers at Ahmedabad on July 27th when Vallabhbhai Patel is said to have made it clear that Congress

[5] Vol. II, No. 407.
[6] The documents mentioned can be found in L/P&J/8/598 and 627.
[7] See No. 57, note 10.

would not be deflected from pursuing its new line to the bitter end by occurrences of the type of Viramgaum[8] and Chauri Chaura, murder of Englishmen, or communal and other violent disturbances;

(5) secret report of meeting of Provincial Congress Committee at Lucknow on July 20th when Nehru is said to have stated that Gandhi's intention was to permit persons, revolutionaries and others, to use weapons of their own selection and that even if the methods employed by the people included diverse forms of violent action, Gandhi would not regard his decision as "Himalayan blunder" or deviate from his elected course;

(6) intercepted letter[9] from niece of Jawaharlal Nehru to a girl friend "You ask about the non-violence question. Gandhi's instructions are to completely paralyse Government in any way possible, short of murder. No specific instructions have been given but each town is supposed to have sufficient brains to think up ways of embarrassing Government. No one should attack and bodily injure anyone else but short of that you can do anything else";

(7) extract from statement to police of an arrested underground Congress worker of Punjab who had previously worked in Gandhi's Secretariat at Wardha. "On August 5th, 1942, an emergent meeting of the Standing Committee of the All-India States' People[s] Conference was held at Birla House, Bombay. In the course of his address Gandhi said 'as to the question of violence and non-violence, I must say it is not my non-violence that I demand of you. What I want from you is exactly the same as you have so far been doing all these years. Good or bad is immaterial. You have only to decide what you can do in this struggle' ";

(8) extract of statement to police by arrested Congress worker of Delhi involved in sabotage activities. "At about 9 P.M. on September 23rd there was a gathering at my place. Dr. Keskar explained that the present programme of the Congress of dislocation of means of communication, &c. was not incompatible with the principle of *Ahimsa* because it involved no violence to life. He further explained that if the Government could not be brought to its knees by acts of sabotage and outrage then diplomacy demanded that they should so arrange their programme as to coincide with the Japanese invasion of India. He added that this was not merely a theory and that the programme could be given a practical shape by means of scientific appliances in their possession by which a man could cut 300 telegraph poles in a night and by which Jail doors and industries could be blown up in no time";

(9) extract of statement by arrested student[10] worker of Delhi. "We went straight to the house of Devadas Gandhi (son of Mr. Gandhi) and discussed the new programme of violence with him. Devadas explained that the policy of the

Congress had changed into violence and it was essential for the workers to take to it".

[8] During the campaign of civil disobedience against the Rowlatt Act, there were serious disturbances at Ahmedabad and Viramgaum where the worst incident was the burning alive of an Indian magistrate on 12 April 1919. These outbreaks of violence led Mr Gandhi to advise the temporary suspension of civil disobedience. He stated that though his faith in Satyagraha was as great, if not greater, than ever, he had underrated the forces of evil. He did not think Satyagraha was the cause of the tragedies at Ahmedabad and Viramgaum which were rather the result of government suppression.

[9] See Vol. II, No. 668, note 2. [10] 'student' deciphered as 'state'.

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Sir H. Twynam (Central Provinces and Berar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

MOST IMMEDIATE *8 February 1943*

No. 441–M.S. Your telegram No. 350–S[1] dated February 7th. I fully realise difficulties of situation *vis-à-vis* Your Excellency's Council and the desirability of securing their support.

2. My Chief Secretary and Inspector-General of Police suggest communiqué should be issued early emphasising that there is no condonation of August rebellion and no change of attitude but that release is being allowed only in view of old age and state of health. I support this suggestion because although morale of superior services will not be affected provincial and subordinate services may be shaken by inevitable demonstrations by students and other representations of release as a victory for Congress.

[1] No. 414.

435

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Phillips

MSS. EUR. F. 125/125

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *8 February 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 24–S.

Dear Mr. Phillips,

Since I saw you yesterday evening and told you how matters stood in relation to Mr. Gandhi, there have been further developments. I will not trouble you with the detail of them now, save to say that he has expressed himself as not prepared to take advantage of the proposals which I told you we had made to him, and that he has postponed his fast for 24 hours to enable us to consider his

reply.[1] That we are doing with all urgency, and a decision will be taken in the course of the day, of which I will send you details for your secret and personal information. You will remember that I mentioned to you last night that I was deeply concerned to ensure that the completest possible secrecy should be maintained so that no hint should leak out of the existence of the situation, still less of the means that we have in mind for dealing with it. I would only repeat now what I then said on that point, the significance of which you will of course, I know, immediately appreciate. I hope, as I have said above, to let you have further information as to how matters stand in a few hours' time.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW

[1] No. 440.

436

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

L/PO/8/9a: ff 122–3

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *8 February 1943*

PRIVATE AND SECRET

My dear Amery,

Many thanks for your private and secret letter of the 21st December 1942[1] about the Viceroyalty, and for your telegram 44-U.[2] The Lumleys stayed with us here from the 8th to the 13th of January and I was able to put across the position in precisely the terms authorised by you, while Lady Lumley was able to talk things over with my wife.

I cannot say that I found Lumley very enthusiastic. He urged strongly that the importance of the post, and the difficulty of the post-war position here, were both so great that the strongest possible candidate should be found, and I thought I sensed a certain uneasiness (natural enough in the circumstances) lest if he were invited to serve and decided to do so, he might prove unequal to the burden. I told him that I myself had no doubts as to his capacity, and I added that this was not a bird that tended to roost twice in the same tree, and that were he to have the offer now (as to which of course I could hazard no prophecy) and to decline it, I thought he would regret it for the rest of his career. He said finally that he would be willing to go home by air, though he attached to that conditions about transport by air for his wife and family which may prove unrealisable, but would not commit himself further.

I still think Lumley could do this job well: and I expect that he may feel more interested when he has got away from India (where he has had after all $5\frac{1}{2}$ years without a break) to a fresher climate. At the same time, a hesitant acceptance would not be very encouraging. I do feel very strongly myself that

in present circumstances, and given what lies ahead, we ought to take no chances: and that the new Viceroy ought to be a man in middle life with either a considerable experience of India (like Lumley), or considerable experience in the Cabinet. I very much doubt people like Law, Rab Butler etc. being the right choice at a highly critical moment or in conditions such as these. Cranborne, Oliver Stanley or Oliver Lyttelton would in my judgment on the other hand have done perfectly. I notice that they are not available—and of course I know that the selection is none of my business. But I will think again, and if any name does occur to me, may venture to telegraph it to you. Might not Billy Gore, whom you mentioned once before, be a possible?

So far as the Private Secretaryship, which will be of vital importance to the new man, is concerned, I gather that if Lumley were to be selected he would take Jenkins, and I am sure that that is the right answer.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

[1] No. 287. [2] See No. 300, note 2.

437

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *8 February 1943*

I brought the Gandhi question up before an emergency Cabinet meeting with Attlee in the Chair last Friday.[1] At an early stage of the meeting it seemed as if they were all agreed that the only thing to do was to accept your decision whatever it might be. Then Grigg of all people started a hare as to whether you were acting as Governor-General in Council or in a discretionary capacity and then others began suggesting, as you had not actually sent in your conclusions, that they had better have another meeting when they arrived. As they did not arrive on Saturday no meeting could be held. On Sunday morning Attlee thought that Winston, who was arriving at one o'clock, might be going down to Chequers and would be agreeable to the matter being settled by the Cabinet without him. Not at all! Winston insisted on having a Cabinet himself and launched out on the Gandhi subject at once. At first he continued, as is often his habit, muttering away his dissatisfaction, but giving me the impression that he was going to agree with a shrug of the shoulder. Presently, however, he warmed up and worked himself into one of his states of indignation over India. I made efforts to try and bring him to the point that whatever might or might not be the best method of handling so peculiar a situation as the Gandhi one, the issue was not that, but whether you were to override your Council and

[1] No. 398.

run the risk of resignations. That point he simply brushed aside by saying that it would not matter if they did all resign: we could carry on just as well without them and this our hour of triumph everywhere in the world was not the time to crawl before a miserable little old man who had always been our enemy. In face of that mood the Cabinet generally, instead of facing the issue, began looking round for minor points of criticism or uncertainty, Attlee alone making a very mild attempt to suggest that imprisoning or releasing Gandhi was not the same thing as dealing with an ordinary criminal in this country. No opinions were taken—that indeed never happens in this Cabinet—but eventually Simon and Anderson were told to draft, together with myself, a telegram to you conveying the War Cabinet's views, while an interim telegram[2] was sent telling you to suspend action.

2. So presently, after dinner, we met and I found a document already drawn up by Simon, to which we added a few questions, but which I was not able to induce the others to alter substantially and which Winston, towards one o'clock in the morning, accepted.[3] I made it clear to him that I did not agree and that while your Council's plan might be wise or foolish, there was a sufficient consensus of opinion to warrant thinking that there was something in it and that after all, while you would have preferred another solution, you were prepared to accept that rather than break with your Council, which to my mind was the only issue that mattered.

3. So there we are. The Cabinet meets again this afternoon and it is just possible that by then we may have your reaction to last night's telegrams. If you feel that you can persuade your Council to go back on their idea and revert to release when life is endangered, I shall certainly not complain. But if you feel that you cannot do that now and stick to your guns, or even act in disregard of the Cabinet's request, you may be sure that I shall support you all out, even if it means my breaking with the Government. I confess I get very fed up at times with a Cabinet which has no mind of its own and whose members are all terrified of saying anything which would draw Winston's displeasure upon their heads.

Many thanks though it's now all over & not too badly.

L.

4. That also raises the issue in your last telegram,[4] just received, about the succession to Maxwell. I should indeed be sorry if I had in any way misled you as regards the position. What I thought I had made plain in my letters was that from the Parliamentary point of view my position would certainly be much easier to hold if I could point to Indianisation as being carried out step by step and on the basis of continuity and efficiency and not as a gesture, for which most of the critics are clamouring. Similarly, I have no doubt that the members of the Cabinet would individually mostly favour such a policy. But I doubt

very much their standing up to Winston unless that policy were definitely recommended by yourself as desirable on merits. If on merits you are convinced that it would be a better thing to prolong Maxwell for a year then certainly I should have very little chance of carrying the Cabinet against Winston over your previous suggestion, and I doubt if I should even feel disposed to push it.

5. I was greatly interested to read Ambedkar's further memorandum[5] on the Cripps proposals. Logically his criticism is, I fear, unanswerable. The protection given to a minority by treaty may be a very illusory thing. Not only the Irish Treaty, but even more the Minority Treaties in the last Peace Settlement, bear witness to that. On the other hand, there may be conditions in which a treaty may contain within itself effective leverage for the enforcement of its provisions. This is particularly the case where the party which has pledged itself to good behaviour is very much dependent on the other party for financial or military help. The Egyptian and Iraq Treaties, for instance, have not been without value in enabling us to have a say in the conduct of the Governments concerned and so of course have our treaties with the Indian States. What I regretted about Cripps' handling of the treaty business was that he seemed to imply that it was concerned entirely with minorities, whereas of course the main object of the treaty conception as discussed at this end was to cover such matters as the continuance of our military assistance, the position of the services, the position of the Crown Representative, &c., all of which Cripps I fear slurred over. Also it was always the idea at this end that the treaty protection of minorities should only come in if the constitution itself failed to afford them effective protection. That means, of course, not only that the constitution in its first form should afford that protection, but also that the possibility of changing the constitution should be so hedged round with safeguards as to make the abrogation of such protection practically impossible.

6. Protection of the Scheduled Castes is of course impossible on any geographical basis, such as the right of non-accession gives the predominantly Muslim Provinces. The only protection they might secure would be in a constitution in which it was provided that each main element, including the Scheduled Castes, should be represented in the Executive, and that Executive itself reasonably independent of the Legislature. Possibly too, after Gandhi's death, it might be worth considering whether the present anomalous electoral arrangements for the Scheduled Castes should not be altered and a direct communal basis substituted, as originally suggested, but revised up to date in accordance with the census figures.

7. The fundamental weakness of the Scheduled Castes is that they are neither one thing nor the other. If they had the courage to turn Christian or Muslim *en bloc* it would be much easier to legislate for them. But so long as they

[2] No. 419. [3] No. 422. [4] No. 399. [5] See No. 336, para. 9.

remain a part of the Hindu system, with no separate religion or basis of organisation as such, and continue to regard themselves as Hindus, it does look as if their only chance of betterment lay, not on the political side, but on gradually winning their way socially in the Hindu community. At present it looks as if, apart from Ambedkar and handful of others, they have no real notion of what they want to be or of how to organise themselves.

8. * * * * * * *[6]

9. As regards any study now of the future Indian Army problem, I entirely agree with Wavell[7] that it would have to be a confidential enquiry, and it had never occurred to me that there would be anything in the nature of an enquiry to which witnesses would be invited. I also agree with him that the first step is to consider India's defence problem from the point of view of her geographical and strategical position and of the possible dangers which might confront her in the next 20 or 30 years. From that, I should be disposed to go on to the next question, which is: how far India's existing resources, financial, industrial, or in trained personnel, are capable of meeting those requirements unaided at the end of the war. That leads up to two further questions: (*a*) how far those resources can be developed by general increase of financial strength, by industrialisation, and by progressive Indianisation in the higher ranks of the services; and (*b*) pending progress in these matters, to what extent India will have to continue to rely on provision from here and on the continuance of the British element in those forces. This latter point would naturally form the subject-matter of a treaty for a relatively short period of years, say for 10 or 15 years, during which at any rate substantial progress could be made with (*a*), the treaty being followed by a more limited treaty if necessary to cover deficiencies still existing at the time of the termination of the first treaty. I would myself certainly strongly take the view that the whole problem should be worked out like that on merits and on the assumption that whatever Government was in power at the end of the war would be anxious, on the one hand, to develop India's defensive resources, material and human, as rapidly as possible, and on the other also prepared to be reasonable and not wreck India's defence in order to get rid prematurely of experienced leaders in the higher ranks. I think it would be a mistake to make the enquiry dependent in any way upon any political forecast or objective other than the general objective of making India more self-dependent, whatever her constitution. It seems to me that only an enquiry of that type can produce results which can apply usefully if the Indian constitution situation remains unchanged and if there is a new constitutional body with which a treaty can be negotiated. So I would certainly bid Wavell tell the men who are working at this job to ignore the political problem entirely.

This brings us hard up against the naval & air positions.

L.

10. As regards that problem I certainly share the view expressed by you in recent letters and not least in paragraph 5 of your letter of January 26th,[8] that an early constitutional solution after the war is now extremely unlikely. The people who are not prepared to meet each other and work out a constitution now, as they have been free to do for the last two or three years, may not be much more likely to get down to business immediately after the war. But certain general conclusions have been increasingly shaping themselves in my mind for a long time past. The first, which I have often expressed to you and indicated in my speeches, is that while I believe some form of federal union for India is essential, it cannot be under a Central Government subject to the control of an all-India Legislature. The real objection to federation on the part both of Muslims and Princes is not the excessive range of federal powers (though these could be somewhat reduced perhaps) as the fear of Hindu or Congress majority Government. I see no way of meeting that except making the Executive (*a*) independent of the Legislature to the extent that it is today or that it is in the United States; and (*b*) making it look more directly to the several units, i.e. Provinces and States than to the Legislature. The sort of thing that seems to me possible is a permanent Executive consisting of a representative nominated by each province, 4 or 5 by the States, and say three by the Viceroy himself, for a longish period of years, with one-third, say, retiring in rotation every two or three years. This would be a body responsive over a period of years to the general opinion of India, would not attempt to encroach on provincial or State rights and would not be under the continuous thumb of Wardha or any other party executive. Its members, like the American Ministers, ought not to be actual members of any Legislature except for the purpose of attending and explaining policy. What I am thinking of in fact is to try and get away from the British tradition of legislative politicians also being the Executive, and following the American tradition in which the members of the Executive, from the President downwards, are hardly ever selected from the ranks of Congressmen or even ex-Congressmen.

11. If that is the objective, then I think we ought definitely to make up our minds to cease chasing after the party politicians and magnifying their importance, but on the contrary play them down and as against them magnify the members of the existing Executive and build up a body of men who would provide the material for the Executive of the future. It is from that point of view that I believe the only important interim progress we can make lies in recognising increasingly the authority of the present Government of India and recognising its responsibility for the Government of India. So far as the letter of the law goes, India is, after all, a Government by the Governor-General and a majority of his Council, but with the support of Cabinet and Parliament to

[6] These asterisks are reproduced from MSS. EUR. F. 125/12. [7] See No. 360. [8] No. 362.

Governor-General if he differs from his Council on matters of vital importance to the safety or welfare of India. The logical corollary of that is that where the two agree there should be no interference from this end, and that is the point that with no little difficulty I am gradually trying to bring home to the Cabinet. After all, if a Viceroy cannot be trusted to overrule the Executive on the right sort of issue, then he is the wrong man for the place. Nothing has convinced me more than the Cabinet meetings of the last three years of the fundamental incapacity of a British Cabinet to try and govern India.

12. From that point of view I am also convinced that it will be right to Indianise the whole Executive by stages sooner or later, and not too much later. I do not believe that you will ever get Indian politicians settling down to a reasonable discussion of their own internal problems so long as they can shirk them by putting the blame on an alien Government. To that extent there really is something in Gandhi's plea that Indians can only agree once we are out of the way. Obviously that cannot happen on "quit India" lines. But the situation would be much more favourable to a settlement if when the time came the discussions took place under the auspices of Government already Indian in composition and frankly recognised both at this end and at the Indian end as free from all detailed interference by the Secretary of State. It might well be that such an interim Government would be the only kind of body that could come to practical treaty arrangements with His Majesty's Government over defence matters and even over minority questions. Such arrangements could be for a short period like 10 years, to be superseded later on by new treaties with a new Government once properly established. The idea that treaties could be made with a constitution-making body enjoying no real authority, and then worked into the constitution, has never struck me as really practicable. It would be far better if a new Government entered into existence subject to treaty arrangements already in being, though with the knowledge that those arrangements could before very long be modified.

i.e. with the nominees of the S/S & the G.G.! That does not sound very likely to my ears.

L.

13. All this is in the nature of thinking aloud. But I do feel very strongly that unless we have a definite policy for the transition from the situation as it exists to the situation to which we are pledged, we may possibly delay the fulfilment of our pledges, but only at the risk of increasing general anti-British feeling and of a breakdown which might risk not only British rule in India, but any rule in India. I have no doubt that the train of thought after this war is not going to be either democratic or extrava-

Perhaps it will emerge that it is in fact a matter of British rule or *no rule!*

L.

gant on the subject of giving everybody self-government. The Atlantic Charter is essentially an exposition of 19th Century and not of 20th Century ideals, whether in economics or in politics. On the other hand, that doesn't alter the fact of the growing intensity of nationalism in the oriental world. It is Indian nationalism and not Indian pseudo-democracy that somehow or other we have got to meet. And I can think of more absurd suggestions than that of an Indianised Executive with the Jam Saheb as Viceroy, which someone suggested to me not long ago!

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *8 February 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Thank you very much for your most useful letter of the 12th January[1] about your talks with the Jam Saheb. It arrived very apropos, as he has just been staying with me. He is in tremendous form and has clearly enjoyed his time at home immensely; and his conversation, never sluggish, is brisker now than ever. I think he is thoroughly well pleased with the way he has been treated and with all that has been done for him. Owing to Bikaner's funeral, which he thinks he ought to attend (though he has not yet made up his mind whether to do so or not), and pressure of other business here in connection with Gandhi, &c., I have not had a chance to get down to the general States issue with him. If he goes off to the funeral, he will come back to stay here a little later on, and I will tackle him then. It will be of the greatest possible assistance to have had the very full account given in your letter of the 12th January of your talks with him. As regards his return to England, I had rather hold my hand for the moment. I agree with you that if the Jam Saheb does *not* return there is everything to be said for sending Bhopal. I am sure he would like to go himself, and he and others have reminded me on occasion that it is hardly satisfactory that both India's representatives at the War Cabinet should be Hindus.

2. Now for a word about your letter of the 15th.[2] Your account of Winston's attitude towards India, I read with amusement after a Council meeting to approve my draft reply[3] to you of this afternoon, about the apprehensions entertained by the Cabinet as to our method of handling Gandhi! I hope you will not have too rough a passage, and that they will not feel that they have been bounced. But it really is impossible to expect a Council here, or even the Viceroy—well disciplined as he may be—to hold up action when it has got as

[1] No. 341. [2] No. 349. [3] See No. 427.

far as this and zero is only a few hours off, while points of this type are discussed with London. I made it pretty clear earlier in January[4] that Cabinet really must be prepared to take a chance with me over this and let me go ahead—after all I have to carry at least as heavy a burden as the Cabinet, and a very much more direct one. My own attitude has been consistent throughout—I have favoured letting the Mahatma starve himself to death if he wants to. But, save from the Chief, who has been on tour during these last few Councils, I have had no support for that view; and it is quite obvious that while Governors are sharply divided, some important and experienced men, Parliamentary and Civil Servants alike, are very definitely against it. I have tried to bring out in a telegram[5] I sent you yesterday the extreme importance of our being able to point to a united Council behind whatever policy we do adopt for dealing with Gandhi: for we may be quite certain that he is going to give us a great deal of trouble one way or another; that the strain on my colleagues—but of course especially my Hindu colleagues—will be very considerable and that a run out is to be avoided if that is humanly practicable. They have, I must say, been very good indeed, and I am prepared to enter the fray with greater confidence than would have been the case had I not been able to keep them together.

3. I have of course also got to bear in mind throughout that our concern is not to make things easy for Gandhi, but to handle the problem with which he has presented us in a way that will cause the least embarrassment to His Majesty's Government, and to the Government of India consistently with not shaking the faith of the Services, the Muslims, or the loyal conservative elements in this country. For that reason, largely, I was at pains to make my letters to Gandhi very direct indeed; and my latest letter of the 5th February[6] was a very great deal more direct than any of its predecessors; while, as is quite clear from his reply, it has touched him on the raw on one or two points. I anticipate that the tone, or the content, of my letters will inevitably give a certain amount of offence in Hindu circles—it is of course bound to do so in Congress circles. But I am very ready to take my chance on that, if only because the mere fact that it produces that reaction is in a sense a reassurance to the other elements whom I have mentioned above that I am not out to appease Gandhi, and that I am all for facing up to this sort of problem. Had I been able to have my way and allow him to starve to death if he so desired, that would have been still more the case. But on that point I have been beaten, and the fact that I have been beaten cannot of course be known to the outside world. We must now await reactions. As I write I find it impossible to believe that Gandhi will play, and I am very much inclined to think, given the tone of his reply of 7th February[7] to my latest letter, that he may be insistent on pushing matters to extremes. We shall have an infinity of trouble if he does, but we shall have to face it. And, from the general point of view of India, I am I fear convinced

that there will be little progress of any sort in the Mahatma's lifetime: for, though he has very many likeable qualities, and my personal relations with him have always been extremely good, he is, I suspect, an insuperable obstacle to progress of the type that His Majesty's Government and we here have been trying to bring about for so long.

4. Many thanks for your news of Zafrulla and his activities. He is in very bad odour with Gwyer at the moment! For, according to Gwyer, Zafrulla has never even written to him since he went abroad, and the delays in his return (about which again he has said nothing to Gwyer) have caused extreme inconvenience in the Federal Court, and we may have to appoint an acting Judge to hear one or two outstanding cases. I think myself, despite Zafrulla's valuable qualities, that he has now had about enough of foreign travel, and I should be opposed to any suggestion that he should visit America or visit England, or break away again for some considerable time to come from his judicial work. And, though he is very able, he is as anxious in the political field as other people to see us out of the way as early as can comfortably be arranged: and while that is very natural, it is not an ambition that I am necessarily too anxious to further! And apart from that, I am conscious of a growing volume of criticism here of the impropriety of a Judge serving in these political posts such as Chungking, and delivering political speeches, such as he has done in America. Zafrulla has got to make up his mind one way or the other: either to go back into politics and leave the Bench, or to concentrate on his judicial work. I would not myself regard the parallel of Reading, which you mention, as exact. My own recollection agrees with yours—that Reading went to America in 1918 when he was Lord Chief Justice, and returned subsequently to that office; but that was a specific mission of a very highly technical character, for which Reading's previous experience at the Bar and his financial acumen made him peculiarly well suited. I think it would be overstating Zafrulla's position to suggest that he was so outstanding a figure or his work of such national value and significance.

5. Progressive Indianisation is a familiar story with him, and I think I remember commenting on it in an earlier letter.[8] Apropos of which, I have sent you a telegram[9] about the Home Membership, and am grateful to you for giving me the opportunity of clearing the ground with you before I make a formal recommendation.

[Para. 6, on certain appointments, omitted.]

9 February 1943

7. Since I drafted the earlier part of this letter a good deal has happened! We have had Gandhi's reply[10] to the Government of India's communication[11]

[4] Nos. 333 and 334. [5] No. 426. [6] No. 395. [7] No. 421. [8] No. 291.
[9] No. 399. [10] No. 440. [11] No. 412.

to him of our decision, and I have telegraphed the full text of that to you. I thought that the best thing to do was to get my Council together in immediately, and with great difficulty I collected them shivering from their warm beds, and very diversely dressed, for a Council at 12.30 a.m. this morning. Council went on for about three hours. It was incredibly difficult to pin Srivastava to anything. Ambedkar was absent; the Chief was away. The division either way was fifty-fifty—between holding Gandhi, and releasing him if immediate danger; and having cleared the ground to some extent I adjourned until 10.30 this morning. When we resumed Ambedkar was present, and it was quite clear that reflection had had some effect on certain of my other colleagues. I am telegraphing to let you know that in the outcome, after an extremely difficult meeting, subject to clear indications of possible resignations from Mody, Sarker, Aney, Jogendra Singh, and conceivably Sultan Ahmed, over the issue of letting Gandhi die in confinement, Council agreed that we could not be blackmailed by Gandhi, and by a majority agreed that if he insisted on going through with his fast he must be left to take his chances. But there was immense pressure to make some small concession as regards his having his own medical attendants and as regards the visits of friends with the permission of Government (our original suggestion had been "approved by Government", but that proved to have no chance of getting through). I dislike both these concessions, but I again thought that we had done well to get Council unanimously behind so highly important a decision of principle, and I thought it worth making them to a minority. My own feeling was that the position of the Government of India was in fact strengthened by Gandhi's reply. But at the back of it all there remains the fact that there is a percentage which hates the idea of his dying to their discredit, and that most careful handling is essential. And I am very much afraid that the old man (to whom incidentally I give full marks for his reply, which was a masterpiece of the usual type!) will force us to face up to that issue. If he does I may have very serious trouble, and a very major issue of policy will arise. But I am in no hurry to consider it.

8. Phillips, who arrived back yesterday morning from Lahore, asked, as it happened, to see me last night. He could not have chosen a better time from my point of view, and I am telegraphing[12] to let you know of our interview. That went very well, and Phillips' reaction was all that could be desired. Whether we shall hear more of it I cannot, of course, say; but the first stage of any difficulties with him has been taken, to all appearances, successfully, though there may be a good deal more to follow. I was very glad indeed to have the opportunity not only of clearing with him the position *vis-à-vis* His Majesty's Government and myself, but of making clear to him what I was very glad to be able to tell him in reply to a question from him—that in no circumstances would we agree to his seeing Gandhi while Gandhi was under detention—

and thereafter to be able to put him in the picture as regards the Mahatma's fast. He could not have been better in his general reaction. I only hope I shall be able to keep things sweet with him, but you may be certain that I will do my utmost to do so.

Best luck.

[12] No. 455.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/10/34: f 161

9 February 1943

5–U. Your telegram 3–U.[1] Please transmit following signal for Admiral Nelson from Hyde Parker.[2] Congratulations. *Ends.*

[1] No. 428.

[2] Sir Hyde Parker was the Commander-in-Chief of an English fleet sent to the Baltic in 1801. Lord Nelson was his second in command. Early in April a detachment under Nelson went into action against the Danish fleet anchored off Copenhagen and came under heavy fire. Hyde Parker signalled an order to discontinue the action to Nelson who thereupon put his telescope to his blind eye and declared he could not see the signal.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE
MOST SECRET
PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, *9 February 1943, 9.40 am*
Received: 9 February, 7.15 am

No. 383–S. Following is report from Governor's Secretary,[1] Bombay, of developments as regards Gandhi:—

Begins. I delivered Sir Richard Tottenham's letter[2] to Mr. Gandhi at 6 P.M. today. It was a day of silence, and he gave me a written note asking me to call again at 9 P.M. As Mr. Gandhi observes old time, this meant 10 P.M. Accordingly I called on him at 10 P.M. when he handed me a written reply addressed to Sir Richard Tottenham. The terms of the reply are as follows: Detention Camp, 8th February 1943. Dear Sir Richard, I have very carefully studied your letter. I am sorry to say that there is nothing in the correspondence which has taken place between His Excellency and myself or your letter, to warrant a recalling

[1] Mr Irwin. [2] No. 412.

of my intention to fast. I have mentioned in my letters to His Excellency the conditions which can induce prevention or suspension of the step.

If the temporary release is offered for my convenience, I do not need it. I shall be quite content to take my fast as a detenu or prisoner. If it is for the convenience of the Government, I am sorry I am unable to suit them, much as I should like to do so. I can say this much, that I as a prisoner, shall avoid as far as is humanly possible, every cause of inconvenience to the Government, save what is inherent in the fast itself. The impending fast has not been conceived to be taken as a free man. Circumstances may arise, as they have done before now, when I may have to fast as a free man. If therefore I am released, there will be no fast in terms of my correspondence above mentioned. I shall have to survey the situation *de novo* and decide what I should do. I have no desire to be released under false pretences. In spite of all that has been said against me, I hope not to belie the vow of truth and non-violence which alone makes life liveable for me. I say this, if it is only for my own satisfaction. It does me good to reiterate openly my faith, when outer darkness surrounds me, as it does just now.

I must not hustle the Government into a decision on this letter. I understand that your letter has been dictated through the telephone. In order to give the Government enough time, I shall suspend the fast, if necessary, to Wednesday next, 10th instant.

So far as the statement[3] proposed to be issued by the Government is concerned, and of which you have favoured me with a copy, I can have no opinion. But if I might have, I must say that it does me an injustice. The proper course would be to publish the full correspondence and let the public judge for themselves. Yours sincerely, M. K. Gandhi. *Ends.*

I drew Mr Gandhi's attention to the sentence regarding a possible suspension of his fast till Wednesday next; and after a brief discussion recorded the following note in which Mr. Gandhi concurred:—*Begins.* Mr. Gandhi agreed to postpone his fast for twenty-four hours on my indicating that I thought this course would assist the Government of India in considering his reply. *Ends.*

2. Matter was considered in Council for three hours early this morning and will be further considered at 10.30 A.M. I will then telegraph further. But Gandhi's response has materially altered position inside Council, voting (the Chief and Ambedkar were absent) was fifty-fifty as between retention till death and retention until danger point. But I think latter is likely to prevail at the further meeting mentioned above. Meanwhile, as you will have seen,[4] I have warned Chungking and Washington, and also Governors that Zero hour has [been] postponed for 24 hours.

[3] No. 407; see also No. 410.

[4] Lord Linlithgow's telegram 380-S of 9 February. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, *9 February 1943, 5.45 pm*
Received: 9 February, 2.45 pm

No. 385–S. Following is text of Home Department reply dated 9th February to Gandhi's letter to Tottenham of 8th February[1]:—

Begins. I am instructed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 8th February 1943, which has been laid before the Governor-General in Council. The Government of India note your decision with great regret. Their position remains the same, that is to say, they are ready to set you at liberty for the purpose and duration of your fast. But if you are not prepared to take advantage of that fact, and if you fast while in detention, you will do so solely on your own responsibility and at your own risk. In that event you will be at liberty to have your own medical attendants, and also to receive visits from friends with the permission of Government, during its period. Suitable drafting alterations will be made in the statement which the Government of India would, in that event, issue to the press. *Ends.*

[1] See No. 440.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE

NEW DELHI, *9 February 1943, 6 pm*
Received: 9 February, 2.35 pm

No. 386–S. I have telegraphed Gandhi's reply to Government of India letter of 7th February. Matter was discussed at great length in Council this morning following on equally lengthy Council meeting at midnight last night.

2. In the result, after very considerable discussion and marked divergence of opinion Council approved amendment of Government of India's statement in terms which have been telegraphed to you in my telegram No. 387–S.[1]

3. I put to Council in terms issue of (*a*) releasing Gandhi when in danger of death; (*b*) holding him. By a majority decision was in favour of holding him now that he had refused our offer to enlarge him for period of fast. Mody, Sultan Ahmed, Aney, Sarker, Jogendra Singh were the minority. Commander-in-Chief was away; otherwise full attendance. Once vote showed them to be

[1] No. 443.

in a minority dissenting members indicated that they might have to consider their position. I told them that that must be for them to decide, but that there could be no question of reopening of decision which had been taken by clear majority of Council and that I could not delay going ahead with my instructions to Province[s], &c. (I had earlier emphasised extreme importance of united front by Council, whatever our internal differences of view.) I rather doubt myself, though I may be wrong, if we shall hear much more of this for the moment. But if and when Gandhi is reported to be critically ill and in danger of death, we may then be faced with the possibility of resignations on the ground that Government of India are not prepared to set him at liberty unconditionally. We do not (repeat not) propose to say anything in our statement about our intention to hold him or release him.

4. Solidarity of Council which was exceptionally marked in support of our previous decision had as you will see been considerably shattered by Gandhi's reply.

5. In the interests of getting Council unanimously behind our present policy, it proved necessary (*a*) to agree to reference in the statement to Gandhi being allowed to have his own medical attendants if he fasts, and also visits from friends with the permission of Government. That proviso, if he cares, which I doubt, to take advantage of this facility, will enable us to control undesirable visitors. I made it clear that I could not agree to any person under confinement being made available to go to see him. (*b*) It was also necessary, though somewhat illogically, to maintain the facade that Government of India's position is unchanged, and that if he wishes to be at liberty for the purpose of his fast, he still can be. I see little likelihood myself of his taking advantage of that.

6. New decision is a great deal tidier, and has solid majority support behind it. But the division was rather on communal lines, and I should not be surprised if we had a good deal of trouble later, unless Gandhi, on receipt of our acknowledgment, text of which I am telegraphing to you separately, of his letter of yesterday decides to call off fast, it may be assumed that original time-table will operate as from tomorrow morning with modification that I gather fast is now likely to start about 8 a.m. Indian time. I will telegraph separately about press. Arrangements for despatch of code word[2] remain as before. Pending its receipt it is of vital importance to maintain complete secrecy (which would be equally important in very improbable contingency of Gandhi calling off fast at last moment). I do not (repeat not) propose to publish Tottenham's letter to Gandhi of 7th February,[3] Gandhi's reply of 7th February,[4] and Tottenham's reply to that reply of 8th February.[5] In both cases letters from the Government of India have been marked confidential.

[2] See No. 430. [3] See No. 412. [4] See No. 440; the date should be 8 February.
[5] No. 441; the date should be 9 February.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *9 February 1943, 7.20 pm*
Received: 9 February, 4.45 pm

No. 387–S. Following are amendments approved by Council today in Government of India statement draft of which[1] you have already received.

In paragraph 1 omit from words "But if he decides to do so" to words "exclusively his own" being the concluding words of that paragraph.

Substitute: "It was their wish however that if he decided to do so, he should do so as a free man and under his own arrangements, so as to bring out clearly that the responsibility for any fast and its consequences rested exclusively with him. They accordingly informed Mr. Gandhi that he would be released for the purpose and for the duration of the fast of which he had notified them, and with him any members of the party living with him who may wish to accompany him. Mr. Gandhi in reply has expressed his readiness to abandon his intended fast if released, failing which he will fast in detention. In other words it is now clear that only his unconditional release could prevent him from fasting. This the Government of India are not prepared to concede. Their position remains the same: that is to say, they are ready to set Mr. Gandhi at liberty for the purpose and duration of his fast. But if Mr. Gandhi is not prepared to take advantage of that fact and if he fasts while in detention, he does so solely on his own responsibility and at his own risk. He would be at liberty in that event to have his own medical attendants, and also to receive visits from friends with the permission of Government during its period."

Repeated to Washington.

[1] Nos. 407 and 410.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to all Provincial Governors

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

MOST IMMEDIATE *9 February 1943*

No. 388–S. My telegram No. 351–S[1] of 7th (for Governors), No. 340–S[2] of 7th (for Washington), No. 358–S[3] of 8th (for Chungking). Gandhi has replied to communication of Government of India decision to the effect that there is

[1] See No. 413, note 1. [2] See No. 430, note 3. [3] *Ibid.*

nothing either in his correspondence with the Viceroy or in the Government of India letter to warrant a recalling of his intention to fast. He adds that if he is released (without conditions, it would appear) "there would be no fast in terms of my correspondence above mentioned. I shall have to survey the situation *de novo* and decide what I should do."

2. Matter has been further considered in Council, and he is being informed that Government of India regret his decision; that their position remains the same, viz. that they are prepared to release him for the purpose and duration of his fast, but that if he is not prepared to take advantage of that fact and fasts while in detention, he does so solely on his own responsibility and at his own risk. In that event he would be allowed however to have his own medical attendants and to receive visits from friends with the permission of Government. Government of India statement which is being published is being amended accordingly. Arrangements as regards code word telegram from Bombay mentioned in my telegram No. 351–S of 7th (to Governors), No. 366–S[4] of 8th (to Washington and Chungking) stand. Unless at the last moment he changes his mind you will be informed, as already arranged, by Bombay at commencement of fast tomorrow, and should proceed on lines already laid down with modification that fast is now likely apparently to start about 8 A.M. and that Press Conference should therefore be about mid-day to 1 P.M. No detail of exchange of letters referred to above with Government of India will be published beyond a brief reference (terms of which are being telegraphed separately as amendment)[5] in the Government of India statement. Pending receipt of code word strictest secrecy should be maintained.

3. Decision of Council was, by a majority, that in these new circumstances Gandhi as he did not wish to take advantage of our decision, should not be set free if and when he fasts and is in immediate danger. We are however keeping that strictly secret, and I beg that you will do the same.

4. The principle of the instructions regarding control of publicity remains unaltered, but you will, of course, have to adjust your action to the altered circumstances. For instance, if fast materialises in detention there will now be little question of news of its progress from any except official sources (which will be dealt with by Bombay Government) and no question of interviews with Gandhi except with official permission, or of communications by Gandhi himself to Press. Applicants for interviews should be referred to Government of India and one condition of all interviews will be that interviewer must submit for official approval any account he proposes to publish.

Repeated to Washington and Chungking.

[4] No. 430. [5] Words in brackets to Washington only.

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Sir D. Monteath to Sir G. Laithwaite

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE *9 February 1943*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 155. Laithwaite from Monteath. Reference Viceroy's telegram No. 383–S.[1] It is difficult for Secretary of State to comment without consultation of Cabinet which takes valuable time. But to us spectators it seems that Council have all but won their primary purpose which was to deflate Gandhi for they made him show that purpose of his declaration of intention to fast is to get liberty and nothing else. If Council stick to their bluff that it is all one to them seeing [if he?] fasts or not and that they will open the doors when, but not before, he starts fast and for just so long as fast continues have they not called his raising bid?

[1] No. 440.

446

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE *10 February 1943, 2.20 am*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 398–S. Governor's Secretary, Bombay, reports by secraphone 11 p.m. that letter[1] was delivered to Gandhi at 7-30 p.m. tonight. Gandhi said it was quite clear and did not seem to require an answer. He enquired about Irwin's movements, and said that if he was at Poona tomorrow and he, Gandhi, had anything to reply, he would give it to him. He would have something to eat at 7-30 a.m. Irwin will look in at 8 a.m. in case Gandhi has anything for him. Irwin reports that Gandhi fully realized implications of his action and fact that it was his own risk and responsibility, Gandhi said he had his own doctor, and also Colonel Shah and would probably not require outside help. If anything was wanted, he would ask for it. The name of Dr. Gilder was mentioned by[2] Dr. Sushela Nair, but Irwin was not called on to comment on this. Irwin said that all the medical resources of Government were at Gandhi's disposal and if outside help was wanted that the proper officer should be informed. As regards other visitors from outside Gandhi said he would see about it. Irwin said he, Gandhi, could give the name to the Superintendent if there was anyone he wanted to see. Irwin

[1] No. 441. [2] 'by' deciphered as '(?and)'.

comments that the whole atmosphere was pleasant and cordial to a degree, that Gandhi expressed his confidence that he could manage this, and that age increased the prospect of survival. He apparently tends to regard the business as a medical problem and an experiment in endurance.

2. It seems quite clear that Gandhi is going ahead with his fast, and apparently in the best of tempers.

447

Sir G. Laithwaite to Sir D. Monteath

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE *10 February 1943*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 399–S. Monteath from Laithwaite. Your No. [155].[1] His Excellency thinks this absolutely hits the bull! I am no poker player or would use the right technical terms. You will see from His Excellency's report[2] of Irwin's talks that the old man is enjoying himself thoroughly.

[1] No. 445. [2] No. 446.

448

Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 376

MOST IMMEDIATE BOMBAY, *10 February 1943, 9 am*
EN CLAIR *Received: 10 February, 4.25 am*

Repudiation.[1]

[1] See No. 430, note 3.

449

Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/57

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *10 February 1943*

No. 648. One matter relevant to Gandhi's fast is that Phillips is due to visit Bombay soon. He is to stay with me for a day or two, and then for a short time under auspices of U.S.A. Consul. No date fixed, but he hoped to reach Bombay from Calcutta between February 15th and February 20th.

2. It is probable that excitement over the fast will be high by then. His arrival in Bombay at that time would certainly be interpreted widely as a mission of intervention. Attempts would be made to put pressure on him to intervene. While I would be greatly disappointed if his visit fell through, I feel that he might find it most embarrassing to be in Bombay during the fast.

3. If you agree with my view, would you wish me to suggest that he postpones his visit or would you prefer to do it? I am not clear where he is at present.

450

Mr Attlee to Mr Mackenzie King, Mr Curtin, Mr Fraser and Field Marshal Smuts (via British High Commissioners in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa)[1]

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 322

IMMEDIATE DOMINIONS OFFICE, *10 February 1943, 9.30 pm*

Z. No. 16. My telegram 7th August Z. No. 96.[2]

Please communicate following to Prime Minister for his most secret information. *Begins.*

A possibly dangerous situation has developed in India as result of a decision by Mr. Gandhi to undergo a fast. Gandhi, who has been under detention since 9th August consequent on passing of resolution by All-India Congress Committee, made personal approach to Viceroy at end of December, apparently with the object of getting the Government of India to acknowledge responsibility for the disturbances last autumn on the ground that they had acted precipitately, had enraged Congress followers by arresting the leaders and had not waited until Gandhi had sought interview with Viceroy. Ensuing correspondence with Viceroy has had no effect in moving Gandhi from carrying out threat made in his first letter to embark on a fast, which he has declared is to be a fast for 21 days "according to capacity", adding that he did not wish it to be a fast unto death. The fast began on morning of 10th February. The Government of India informed Gandhi beforehand that he would be released for the purpose and the duration of the fast, but Gandhi expressed his readiness to abandon his fast if released, otherwise he would fast in detention. Thus it became clear that only his unconditional release could prevent him from fasting, and this the Government of India are not prepared to concede. They have accordingly informed Mr. Gandhi that if he fasts while in detention he does so solely on his own responsibility and at his own risk. Every medical attention

[1] This telegram was repeated to Lord Halifax for information.

[2] Vol. II, No. 454, note 1.

will of course be at his disposal. In a statement published along with the text of the correspondence between the Viceroy and Gandhi the Government of India deplore the use of the weapon of fasting to achieve political ends and declare that they have no intention of allowing the fast to deflect their policy. They emphatically repudiate the suggestion that responsibility for the disorders lies on them and not on Congress and in proof of this they briefly review the statements and activities of Gandhi and the Congress leaders before their arrests and the evidences of organisation in the campaign of sabotage and violence. A fuller report on the origin and course of the disturbances will be published later.

In order to control the outburst of mass hysteria which may follow the news of the fast the Government of India propose to exercise a rigorous censorship over the publication of news relating to it. You will however be informed if any development of importance occurs in connexion with the fast which is not reported through press channels. *Ends.*

451

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Churchill (via Commander-in-Chief and War Office)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/158

MOST IMMEDIATE *10 February 1943*

37868/C. OFFICER DECIPHER. Private and Most Secret from F.M. Wavell to General Brooke. Following message from Viceroy for Prime Minister's eye alone. *Begins.* Private and Personal. Thank you for your kind telegram.[1] I am not surprised that our flank march gave you some uneasiness. Such manœuvres are apt to look more alarming from a distance. But we are fronting him now, and in pretty good shape. I know you would wish me in handling such an emergency to have proper regard for the future of government here, and that you would think it unwise that I should altogether disregard feeling in my Council. They are not precisely the troops I would choose for a close encounter, but I think we shall manage well enough. May you never have to handle a Cabinet of NO-men. Love and good hunting. HOPIE. *Ends.*

[1] No. 424.

452

Mr Phillips to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/125

10 February 1943

Dear Lord Linlithgow,
I wish to express to you my sincere appreciation of your kindness in keeping me so promptly informed[1] of developments. With all you had on your mind I appreciate this the more.

With warmest thanks,
Sincerely yours,
WILLIAM PHILLIPS

No. 435.

453

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/158

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *11 February 1943, 1 pm*

4–U. Aney came to see me this morning and told me that he felt he could not remain in office in face of Gandhi's fast. We had won our point; Gandhi was so damaged by what had passed that there was now little in it; we ought to release him at once and unconditionally. He was an old man who might make a mistake and die suddenly.

2. I told Aney I would hear his argument at greater length this afternoon and would deeply regret the loss of a colleague who had shown such courage while he had been with me. Meanwhile I could not accept it. I added that if he or any of his friends who felt that they ought to go were unable to persuade us as a Council to reverse our decision then they ought to go at once. To wait until Gandhi began to sicken would be intolerable.[1]

3. Since drafting the above I have seen Srivastava. It appears that most determined efforts are being made by Birla, Purshottamdas etc. to make Hindu members plus Jogendra plus Ahmed resign. Srivastava is still standing firm but made it clear that if he was left as the only Hindu in Council his position would be almost impossible.

[1] Para. 2 was received very corrupt and Mr Turnbull asked Sir G. Laithwaite to check and repeat it (Tel. 164 of 11 February). The repetition omitted the words 'Meanwhile I could not accept it' though they were in the first version received. L/PO/6/102b: ff 245, 253.

4. I feel sure we must stand firm and if no non-official Hindu will take the place of those who resign I shall have to put in a few service members. I will telegraph further as soon as possible.

454

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *11 February 1943, 4.40 pm*
Received: 11 February, 1 pm

No. 412–S. We think it well now to publish (*a*) Home Department letter to Gandhi of 7th February, text repeated in my telegram No. 346–S[1] of 7th February. (*b*) Gandhi's reply dated 8th February, text contained in my personal telegram of 9th February No. 383–S.[2] (*c*) Home Department reply dated 9th February, text contained in my personal telegram of 9th February No. 385–S.[3]

I am releasing to press this evening. I shall repeat text *en clair* today to Hennessy.

[1] No. 412. [2] No. 440. [3] No. 441.

455

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *11 February 1943, 2.30 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 11 February, 1.20 pm*

No. 413–S. My personal telegram of 5th February, No. 300–S.[1] Phillips. Phillips returned from Lahore on morning of 8th February and asked to see me that evening. Nothing could have been more *à propos*, as I had been anxious to give him advance information about Gandhi. Our conversation was of some importance and you had better have the full detail of it. He told me in the first place that he had had a most useful tour in the Punjab; had made further extensive contacts; that he had now seen a very large number of representative people in the political world; and that the question which was invariably put to him was when he was going to see Gandhi. Could he, that being so, see Gandhi? It would be better that he should do so early rather than late, as he, Phillips, wanted to see Gandhi before he got his scheme into his mind. He could then tell the President that before reaching his conclusions he had seen

leaders of all parties. He was anxious of course that his contact with Gandhi should be managed very quietly and entirely secretly. I asked him what he intended to do with his scheme when he had framed it. He replied that his intention was of course to report to the President, but that if he could be of any help to me he would be only too glad to be so.

2. After thanking him I told him that he would remember that when we first met he had told me that he was looking forward to helping me; that at our last interview he had told me that he had been encouraged by you and by Anderson rather to direct his activities to bringing the parties together and finding a solution, &c.; that this raised a rather important issue on which I was anxious to clear my mind as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government; that I had thought it well therefore to report fully to you our conversation and ask you what in fact the position was; and that I had made it clear at the same time that nothing could be better or more friendly than our personal relations and that I was most anxious to maintain our present very close contact, &c. I went on to say that I had now received your answer, and I read him out the appropriate sections of your telegram of the 1st February.[2] He at once saw how the wind was blowing and said that there had never been any question of intervention or mediation in his mind—a position which he developed a little.

3. I said that that was very satisfactory and had cleared up this point. I would now turn to his request to see Mr. Gandhi. He would like me to be perfectly direct in that matter, as our relations were relations of complete frankness and confidence. Following from that I would tell him at once in the politest but most definite language that the answer to his request was No. I and my Government would never allow him to see Gandhi while he was detained under existing conditions. Here again he took this very well, and made no attempt to contest my conclusion.

4. Having thus got the issue of principle out of the way, I then told him how matters stood about Gandhi's fast, and added that in my judgment G. would not be prepared to accept our offer to release him for its period, and that it was quite likely that he would die in prison. I then gave him the Government of India's draft statement to read. He was greatly concerned by this news, and said that that was of course incidentally a further answer to his request for permission to see Gandhi. I said that that was so, and repeated that I and my Government would be greatly disturbed if Phillips were to go to see Gandhi, even if he were a free man during the period of his fast. He said that he would not think of doing so.

5. I told him in conclusion that I would let him have an advance copy of our communiqué and of the material being released the moment I was sure

[1] No. 392. [2] No. 374.

that Gandhi was going to fast. It was vital in my judgment that there should be no mention that the fast had been threatened if it did not come off, and he would appreciate that. He expressed his appreciation of this advance information. I subsequently let him know Gandhi's reply to our offer and sent him advance copies of the documents being released.

6. I think this had [has] cleared the air and without so far as I can judge any impairment of the cordial relations existing between us. It is obvious that it was not a moment too soon to disabuse Phillips of any misconceptions he may have had about his work here. I dare say there will be some attempt on his part to return to the charge later, but we shall be better placed to deal with it in the light of my talk reported above.

456

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/158

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *11 February 1943*,[1] *6 pm*

5–U. My 4–U.[2] I have again seen Aney. He could only urge that there was little between open offer of release for the purpose and duration of the fast and unconditional release at this stage. I said I saw all the difference in the world. After hours of discussion and by a considerable majority, we had by a Government statement which made it plain that nothing but unconditional release would stop a fast, said that we could not agree to that. We had burnt our boats and could not go back without becoming a laughing stock. And if the Hindu members generally resigned, they would do irreparable damage not merely to the possibility or idea of a national government, but to the whole practicability of parliamentary government on a democratic basis or constitutional progress for India. I should be sorry to lose Aney and any who felt with him. But I should be even sorrier for the irretrievable injury Indian constitutional progress would suffer. How would it look if the Hindus collapsed and Jinnah came in on the basis of two or three Hindu officers plus the existing Moslems other than Sultan Ahmed. Aney was badly shaken by all this but is so terrified by fear of responsibility for Gandhi's death that that obliterates all other considerations.

2. Meanwhile I have seen Jogendra, who says he will not resign. Firoz doubts whether these threats will come to anything. He may be right. But I will make it clear to all concerned, and I have done so very specifically to Aney,

that I must have definite decisions within a couple of days at the outside, and that I cannot wait for them while public feeling rises as Gandhi's fast proceeds.

[1] MSS. EUR. F. 125/158 gives the date as 13 February. The date given here is taken from L/PO/6/102b: f249; see Nos. 453, para. 2 and 457, note 1.

[2] No. 453.

457

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: f 246

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *11 February 1943, 4.10 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 12 February*

163. Cabinet meets tomorrow and I shall wish to report latest developments. Please let me have by 10 a.m. our time and if possible earlier report of further conversation referred to in your 4–U.[1]

[1] No. 453. Lord Linlithgow's reply (telegram 422–S of 12 February) referred Mr Amery to No. 456. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

458

Secretary of State to Government of India, Home Department

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 363

INDIA OFFICE, *11 February 1943, 9.40 pm*

2634. Home Department. Gandhi's fast. I rely on you to keep me very promptly informed of any important reactions and developments.[1]

[1] The Home Department replied in telegram 1123 of 12 February by repeating the report on Gandhi's health received that day from Bombay, and adding that they intended to send the Secretary of State daily telegrams. L/P&J/8/600: f 362. These are not printed except for No. 465 which contains other matter besides a bulletin on Gandhi's health.

459

Mr Anwarul Hasan to Sir G. Laithwaite

MSS. EUR. F. 125/138

Serial No. 5454 *11 February 1943*

Dear Sir,

The Council of the United Provinces Provincial Muslim League in its meeting, dated 7th February 1943, has passed the following resolution, a copy of which is being sent to you for your kind perusal and information:—

Copy of the Resolution

This meeting of the Provincial Muslim League Council, United Provinces strongly protests against the speech of His Excellency Lord Linlithgow, Viceroy of India, made in Calcutta on 24th December 1942[1] visualising a Federal Constitution for the whole of India on the basis of his new discovery that India was geographically one. The speech indirectly conflicts and is inconsistent with the policy outlined in the Cripps proposal, and has created a wide-spread resentment in the minds of the Muslims of India who regard it as another attempt to perpetuate the present political deadlock. The Council of the League demands that the British Government should immediately reiterate its adherence to the broad principles of division of India as outlined in the Lahore Resolution of the All-India Muslim League and partially accepted in the Cripps proposals.

Yours faithfully,

ANWARUL HASAN

Office Secretary, Provincial Muslim League, U.P., Lucknow

[1] Speech to the Associated Chambers of Commerce; the date should be 17 December. The Marquess of Linlithgow, *Speeches and Statements* (New Delhi, 1945).

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *12 February 1943, 9.20 pm*

PERSONAL *Received: 12 February, 11 pm*

No. 429–S. I saw today Sultan Ahmed, Sarker and Mody. I would judge that there is not now much risk of any resignations at any rate unless and until Gandhi's condition becomes critical. Mody says he is most anxious to stay in office, and so I believe are they all, though strain on them may yet prove too great. Fast is falling rather flat; there has as yet been no adjournment motion

on it; and I gather there is some doubt as to whether there would be general Hindu support for one while Muslims would almost certainly be opposed. Position has been made ridiculous by Professor Bhansali starting a fast again today to keep Gandhi company. My Hindu colleagues, while very uneasy at thought of what will happen if Gandhi dies, are in a hopelessly weak position logically given fact that our policy was approved by Council after fullest discussion and realise that, and also risk of Jinnah jumping their claim if they run out. I have made it clear to the wobblers that if they feel any doubts they must make up their minds without delay and that I am not prepared to wait. I have brought out that the policy is either right or wrong: if they dislike it they can go, and they ought to go, now; that the mere fact of Gandhi's physical condition is quite irrelevant: that if they do like the policy they ought to be prepared to stand by it whether he lives or dies. Situation is not without its amusing aspects which I will describe by letter. There is no sign of any excitement either in the country or locally or with Assembly. I have in the last two days seen the Central Intelligence Officers from all the Provinces. All are perfectly confident of the ability of the Police to hold the position.

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/6/102b: f 242

INDIA OFFICE, *12 February 1943*

S/S's Minute: Serial No. P. 3/43

Prime Minister

The Gandhi business seems to have gone very satisfactorily so far. The Viceroy, having allowed his colleagues to have their way over giving Gandhi an opportunity to fast at liberty, was able to persuade them to take the responsibility of seeing it through. It is possible that Aney and some others who were in the minority may still resign. If they do so they will be resigning against the decision of their own Council and showing their unfitness to govern in face of popular hysteria; but they will not be resigning against being overridden from here, which would have been a much more serious matter and might have united Indian public opinion, regardless of community, against us.

The way in which the matter has been handled has also led to the very minimum of interest and excitement here, and when Sorensen asked me for a statement yesterday he and the House were evidently quite satisfied by my referring them to the published statement issued by the Government of India.[1]

[1] See *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 386, col. 1433.

462

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

PRIVATE AND SECRET INDIA OFFICE, *12 February 1943*

I confess I was greatly relieved, so far as the Indian situation is concerned, when I heard that you had put your telescope to your blind eye and sailed in. On the other hand, I was prepared for a real row with Winston and possibly even for a general adverse attitude of the Cabinet. Happily, Winston was deep in the preparation of his speech for yesterday, and the Cabinet were more exercised by the Conservative revolt against Bevin's Catering Bill than by a declaration of independence on the part of a distant Viceroy! Meanwhile, the whole thing has gone off very smoothly, at any rate at this end. Even Sorensen, when he asked me for a statement, was completely satisfied by my referring him to the fact that your full statement and all the correspondence were available in the Library and nobody even asked whether the Government of India had acted with Cabinet approval from here, still less on Cabinet instructions. Certainly from my point of view—and I think the Cabinet will increasingly recognize it—the more matters of that sort can be dismissed in Parliament here as within the ordinary competence of the Government of India, the better.

2. I am sorry for poor Aney, who seems an honest and courageous fellow. The struggle between his duty and communal sentiment must be very strong indeed. It seems to me, judging from your telegram,[1] that you handled him most wisely by making him face the fact that this sort of surrender to mere hysterical sentiment would make Indian Self-Government impossible. Anyhow, if he, or any of his colleagues, resign, it will be in opposition to the majority of their own Council, and not in opposition to dictation from here. The one thing that neither you nor I can afford is to have your executive resign in a body on an issue which would seem to involve either unnecessary arbitrary interference in internal matters from this end, or an overriding of India's interests for the sake of a purely British advantage. So long as interference from here or support from here to your authority is concerned with the good of India or India's part in the war, we can, I am sure, get away with it, even if you have to face resignations. But not otherwise.

13 February

[Para. 3, on Mr Churchill's House of Commons speech on the war situation, omitted.]

4. What I did regret in the speech was Winston's scathing description of the state of the Middle Eastern Army when Alexander and Montgomery took

over. I fear Montgomery has prejudiced him very much against Auchinleck and I doubt now whether the proposed offer of the Persia–Iraq Command to Auchinleck will materialise. I still believe that no one could deal better with the problem of the study of the future of the Indian Army than he could and, so long as the study is carried out purely in private and on the lines I suggested in my last letter,[2] I do not see why Wavell should entertain any objection to Auchinleck's doing it.

P.S.V.—

Perhaps I had better pump Wavell. I don't think I have mentioned Auchinleck to him yet, have I?

L.

[1] No. 453. [2] No. 437.

463

Mr Churchill to the Marquess of Linlithgow (via War Office and Commander-in-Chief)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/158

MOST IMMEDIATE *13 February 1943*
Received: 14 February

52444. Following Personal and Secret from Prime Minister to Viceroy of India (through General Wavell).

1. I have heard that Gandhi usually has glucose in his water when doing his various fasting antics. Would it be possible to verify this.

2. There seems to me to be no disposition in America to do otherwise than ridicule his conduct.

464

Maulana Azad to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/125

AHMEDNAGAR FORT, *13 February 1943*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,
My colleagues and I have read in yesterday's and the day before's newspapers the recent correspondence that has passed between you and Mahatma Gandhi. In the course of your letters to Mahatma Gandhi, numerous references have been made to the Congress and repeated and far-reaching charges have been

made against the Congress organization. In your letter of January 13th[1] you express your regret that no word of condemnation for the "violence and crime" should have come from the Working Committee.

Ordinarily, we would refrain from saying anything while we are kept in detention, cut off completely from our people and the outside world. Even our place of detention is supposed to be a secret which may not be mentioned or whispered to anyone. Our sources of information here are strictly limited and consist only of some newspapers which, under existing Rules and Ordinances, publish only censored news and are prohibited from giving publicity to many kinds of news which are of vital importance to us and the Indian people. In these circumstances it is obviously improper for us to give expression to any views in regard to events with which we are so ill-acquainted, especially when the only method of doing so, open to us, is to address the Government of India.

We have, therefore, avoided any such expression of views and have refrained from addressing you or any member of the Government of India, even though at times the most fantastic charges have been made against us and the organization we have the honour to represent. These charges have now been made even more explicitly and in an aggravated form in the course of your recent letters to Mahatma Gandhi. The tone and contents of these letters, more especially your letter of February 5th,[2] are such that it will perhaps serve no useful purpose for us to address you on the subject. Yet we cannot ignore the fact that the head of the present Government of India has made these charges. I am venturing, therefore, to write to you.

Your correspondence with Mahatma Gandhi raises a large number of issues, many of which have great importance. Normally, we would have our say in regard to them, but, at the present moment, it is not my desire to discuss all these. I wish to confine myself more especially to one issue, and to make it clear that, so far as we are concerned, both as individuals and in our corporate capacity, speaking on behalf of our organization, your charge that the Congress had organized a secret movement of violence is wholly false and without foundation.

There is a vital difference of opinion between you and us in regard to many matters and, unfortunately, this difference brings us into conflict. But, even so, as an English patriot and a lover of British freedom, it should not be impossible for you to appreciate how Indian patriots and lovers of India's freedom might feel; and it should be possible for some element of fair-play and square dealing to be kept up in our relations with each other. To make serious charges against those who are prevented from replying to them; to make those charges without producing evidence; to support them by the vast propaganda machine of a powerful Government and, at the same time, to suppress news and views which are contrary to them, are not evidence either of fair-play or a strong case.

In your letter of February 5th you refer to the Home Member's speech in the Central Legislative Assembly for the charges made by him against the Congress. Further you say that "all the mass of evidence that has since come to light has confirmed the conclusions then reached". This procedure of reaching conclusions, and later to seek evidence to justify them, is not usually considered judicial or proper.

In this letter of February 5th you further say that you "have ample information that the campaign of sabotage has been conducted under secret instructions circulated in the name of the All-India Congress Committee". What your information is we do not know, but we do know and can state with authority that the A.-I.C.C. at no time contemplated such a campaign, and never issued such instructions, secret or other. The A.-I.C.C. was declared an unlawful association at the time of our arrest and practically all prominent and responsible Congressmen, including the members of the A.-I.C.C., were arrested at the same time. The A.-I.C.C. office and other Congress offices were seized by the police. Since then the A.-I.C.C. cannot obviously function.

You mention that an underground Congress organization exists now and that the wife of a member of the Congress Working Committee is a member of it. We know nothing about such an organization and are not in a position to find out. But we are convinced that no Congress organizations and no responsible Congressman or Congresswoman can be "actively engaged in planning the bomb outrages and other acts of terrorism". Congressmen, no doubt, consider it their duty to carry on civil resistance, under certain circumstances, to the best of their ability, but this has nothing in common with the charges you have made. It is possible that in the mind of the average official or policeman, there is no particular difference between civil disobedience and bomb outrages, &c. But we have no doubt in our minds, knowing our people as we do, that responsible Congressmen cannot possibly encourage in any way bomb outrages and terroristic acts.

A great deal is said about secret evidence which the Government claims to possess but which it does not produce. May I draw your attention to the public speeches delivered by Mahatma Gandhi at the last meeting of the A.-I.C.C. on August 8th, a few hours before his arrest, wherein he emphasized with all solemnity his appeal for non-violence? The Congress adopted this policy of non-violence twenty-three years ago and, despite popular lapses occasionally, has met with a great measure of success in regard to it. This will be evident from a comparison of the Indian National Movement with national movements in other countries, which have often openly based themselves on violence. You have, no doubt, yourself approved of violence in many forms when you have considered that it was used for a right cause. The Congress, however, has adhered to its creed and practice of non-violence and has for these twenty-three

[1] See No. 319. [2] No. 395.

years preached this method to the people. If the Congress decides to change its policy and method and to function in this matter like other nationalist organizations, it would do so openly and deliberately by changing its creed to that effect. There would be no secrecy for, apart from other valid reasons, a conflict between public and secret advice weakens and stultifies an organization which is based essentially on action and constructive endeavour. The Congress may have many faults, but it has not been accused of lack of courage in the pursuit of its objectives and ideals.

I would suggest to you to consider what the result in India might have been if the Congress had deliberately instigated and encouraged violence and sabotage. Surely the Congress is wide-spread enough and influential enough to have produced a situation a hundred times worse than anything that has so far happened.

In the summer of 1940, when France fell and England was facing dire peril, Congress, which had previously been thinking in terms of direct action, deliberately avoided this, in spite of a strong demand for it. It did so entirely because it did not want to take advantage of a critical international situation or to encourage Nazi aggression in any way. Nothing could have been easier than for the Congress, during these critical days, to produce a situation of the utmost embarrassment to the Government.

For many months prior to our arrest we had been pointing out in Working Committee resolutions and otherwise, that public feeling in the country had grown exceedingly bitter against the British Government in India. Not only we, but many moderate leaders stated publicly that they had never previously known such bitterness. Responsible Congressmen tried to divert this feeling into peaceful channels and largely succeeded in doing so. They would have succeeded even more if events had not taken place which suddenly exasperated the public and, at the same time, removed all prominent and well-known leaders who might have been [able?] to control the situation. These events are better known to you than to us, situated as we are, but we have learnt enough to realise what the shock to the public must have been. Wholesale arrests were followed immediately by the prohibition and prevention of all public activity or public expression of opinion, by *lathi* charges, tear-gas bombs and shooting. Well-known leaders were spirited away and their destinations were kept secret. Rumours of death and illness spread and added to the public excitement and resentment. This apparently was the background of happenings during the second week of August last.

I do not wish to deal here with subsequent events, for an adequate consideration of them would require fuller knowledge than we possess here. But I would like you to consider what the effect on the Indian people must have been of all that has been done to them, on behalf of the Government, since our arrest, and how large numbers of people must have been driven to desperation.

Reference has been made in the Government communiqué, accompanying the recently published correspondence, to a certain circular which is said to have been issued by the Andhra Provincial Congress Committee.[3] We know nothing of this and cannot believe that improper instructions, against the fundamental principles of the Congress, could have been issued by any responsible Congress authority. It is worthy of note, however, that even official references to this circular contradict themselves. The first mention of it was made in a press note issued by the Government of Madras on August 29th. In this it was stated that the circular contained instructions, *inter alia*, for the removal of rails. Two weeks later, Mr. Amery, speaking in the House of Commons, stated that this circular expressly said that "rails should not be removed and that there should be no danger to life".[4] This is an instructive and significant instance of how evidence is made up and used to influence people.

In your letter of February 5th, in referring to the A.-I.C.C. resolution, you draw attention to the concluding part in it which authorised all Congressmen to act for themselves in the event of interference with the leadership of the movement. This has appeared significant to you and you have drawn certain conclusions from it. You are evidently unaware that similar instructions were given when previous civil disobedience movements were started. Even during the individual civil disobedience movement of 1940–41, these instructions were repeated by me on many occasions. It is of the essence of civil disobedience or *Satyagraha* that individuals should become self-sufficient units, should need arise, as leaders are always likely to be removed and isolated at an early stage. In the present instance the phase of civil disobedience was in fact not reached.

It is curious that in a fairly lengthy correspondence, and in various official statements, nothing is said about the merits of the resolution passed by the A.-I.C.C.,[5] which dealt with the national and international situation and made it clear that a free India would not only resist invasion to the utmost, but would throw all her resources into the world struggle for freedom and align herself with the United Nations. This was made perfectly clear in the resolution itself; it was further emphasized by me, speaking as President, and by many other speakers. It must be known to you that ever since the early beginnings of Fascist, Japanese and Nazi aggressions in Africa, Asia and Europe, the Congress has consistently condemned them. No organization in India or elsewhere has been so clear and emphatic on this subject. The Congress was anti-Fascist and anti-Nazi when the British Government under Mr. Chamberlain's leadership

[3] See Vol. II, No. 407.

[4] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 383, 11 September 1942, col. 608. When Mr Amery made this speech, he had not yet seen the revised Andhra Congress Committee circular (No. 58), para. 2 of which authorised the removal of rails.

[5] Vol. II, No. 470.

was openly friendly to these régimes. The A.-I.C.C. resolution of August last was especially based on this anti-Axis policy and, in particular, on the urgent necessity of strengthening India's defence against invasion. It was made clear, and I emphasized this on that occasion, that an acid test of the change was this defence of India and strengthening of the United Nations.

It may also be known to you that several members of the present British Government have in the past repeatedly supported or welcomed Fascist and Japanese aggression.

You conclude your letter to Mahatma Gandhi by saying that the charges against the Congress will have to be met sooner or later.[6] We shall welcome that day when we can face the peoples of the world and leave the verdict to them. On that day others also, including the British Government, will have to meet and answer charges. I trust they will also welcome that day.

I apologise for the length of this letter. I felt that I owed it to you, as well as to myself and my colleagues, to be perfectly frank and to deny with all vehemence the false charges that have been repeatedly advanced against the Congress.

This letter has been written on Saturday afternoon, February 13th. I am told that, like all other communications sent from here, it will have to be despatched under registered cover to the Government of Bombay. As registration is not possible on Sunday, it will thus have to be sent on Monday and it may not reach you for some days. I regret this delay.

Yours sincerely,
A. K. AZAD

[6] No. 395, para. 2.

465

Government of India, Home Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 359

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *14 February 1943, 1.50 am*
Received: 14 February, 2.45 am

1156. Following is to-day's report about Gandhi.

Begins. He is in good spirits and there is little change in his general condition. Nausea has appeared. In consequence he had a night of broken sleep and is somewhat weaker to-day. Acetone is present in urine. Blood pressure is 195/104. He has not been weighed to-day to avoid fatigue. Nausea had led to diminution in amount of fluid taken, 92 ounces against 120 yesterday. *Ends.*

Doctor Gilder, ex-Congress Minister and prominent physician, has been transferred from Yeravda Jail (? where he) was under detention to Aga Khan's Palace for attendance on Gandhi. He and Miss Nair, Gandhi's lady doctor,

have sent report in similar terms. Bombay Government are issuing short press note to the effect that Gandhi has had some trouble with nausea and broken sleep but that his general condition is as satisfactory as can be expected on the fourth day of his fast.

2. Gandhi was informed on 12th that Government proposed to leave initiative regarding visitors to him that they would communicate to him names of applicants to whom they saw no objection that interviews would take place in the presence of official and that accounts would not be published without official approval. The (sic) elicited letter from Gandhi to Inspector-General of Prisons which was telephoned to us by Bombay Government to whom (? Gandhi's) message has been sent. Text of this letter of Gandhi's is being telegraphed to you separately.

3. We are informing Washington and Chungking that Bombay Government will issue communiqués as necessary regarding Gandhi's health that Bombay will telegraph text of such communiqués direct to them *en clair* and that (? absence) of communiqué means nothing special to report.

466

Government of India, Home Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 360

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *14 February 1943, 1.50 am*
Received: 14 February, 11 am

1161. Following is text of Gandhi's letter to Inspector-General of Prisons referred to in my immediately preceding telegram. *Begins.*

It is not fair to leave the initiative to me. In present state of my mind I have no initiative about such visits. If therefore Government wish that I should receive visits they should inform the public but (sic) [that?] if any member of the public specially desires to see me they will give him or her the permission. Their names need not be referred to me for I will not thwart wishes of any friends to see me. It is highly probable that my children and other relatives as also inmates of Ashram and other friends who are intimately connected with me through one or more of my activities may want to see me. If Rajaji for instance who has already applied to Government for permission wants to see me about that matter or any other I should be glad to see him but even regarding him I will not take initiative of submitting his name to Government.

2. If visitors are permitted to see me without any restriction as to matters they might discuss with me the object of discussions will be highly frustrated

if discussions cannot be published. I would of course always and in every circumstance myself rule out without needing any external pressure any discussion that can by any stretch of the imagination be helpful (? to) Fascist powers including Japan. If visit contemplating discussion ought to be allowed the declaration I have suggested to be made by Government should obviously be made forthwith so that such visits may take place in earlier stages of the fast.

3. It is possible that those who have been serving and nursing me within Ashram and those who have been attending on me during previous fasts may want to stay with me to take part in nursing. If they should so wish they should be permitted. I see difficulties in the way of making public announcements on this point. If my proposal commends itself to the Government I suggest their addressing Shrimati Janaki Devi widow of the late Shri Jamnalal Bajaj telling her that if anyone desires during my fast to take part in serving me they will be permitted to do so on her submitting their names to the Government. She knows all those who have served me before.

4. (Here follows a paragraph in which Gandhi asked for information as to health of a close (? relative) of his and Governor of Bombay is dealing with this.)

5. The other thing is in connection with news that appears in *Bombay Chronicle* received here today that Professor Bhansali has embarked on another fast this time out of sympathy with me. I would like in order to save time the Government to convey (? the) following message to him by express wire or through telephone whichever may be quickest way. Here is message:—

"I have just read about your sympathetic fast. You have just ended your very long fast over Chimur. You have made that your special task. You should therefore quickly re-build your body and fulfil the self-allotted task. Leave to (? God) to do with me as He likes. I would not however interfere if you had not just risen from a fast that might have proved fatal and if you had not imposed on yourself a special duty."

6. If Government would comply with my request on this point I should like them to send the message without any alteration and further to let me correspond with him if my message does not produce the desired result. *Ends.*

Following is text of reply sent to Bombay Government. *Begins.* Paragraph No. 1. If Mr. Gandhi has no initiative about visits it is equally true that Government have no wishes in the matter. They therefore regret that they cannot see their way to making any public announcement beyond that which is already contained in their communiqué of 10th February[1] which made it clear that he would be at liberty to receive visits from friends with permission of Government during period of his fast. They adhere to their original decision which is

that they will communicate to him for his information the names of those who ask for interviews as his friends provided that they see no objection to any particular individual and it will be left to him and for his advisers to take such action as they think fit.[2]

Paragraph 2. Government gladly note the assurances given in this paragraph but regret that they must adhere to their original decision that no account of any interview that may take place shall be published without their specific approval.

Paragraph 3. If the Inspector-General of Prisons considers one or two extra nurses are in fact required, the matter will certainly be considered sympathetically.

Paragraphs 5 and 6. The Government of India regret that reference to Chimur in Mr. Gandhi's draft message to Professor Bhansali and the implication that the latter is to continue his agitation on that subject makes it impossible for the Government of India to communicate the message as it stands. They would, however, be prepared to inform Professor Bhansali that Mr. Gandhi wishes him to abandon his second fast in view of the fact that he is only just recovering from his first one, or that they would be prepared to consider an alternative message in Mr. Gandhi's own words. *Ends.*

[1] See No. 443.

[2] Home Department telegram 1192 of 15 February, which transmitted doctors' reports and a Bombay Government Press note on Mr Gandhi's health, added that 'Bombay Government today communicated to Gandhi names of seven friends who had applied for permission to see him with the intimation that Government had no objection if he himself wished to receive them. He replied that he would see them all. Dr. Gilder and Government official will be present at interviews and the former will do his best to shorten them in the interests of Gandhi's health. We felt it important that the names should be communicated however bad it may be for Gandhi to see visitors in order to protect the Government against possible charges later that, in spite of their communiqué, they had not allowed friends to see him.' L/P&J/8/600: f 356.

467

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, *15 February 1943, 1.50 pm*
Received: 15 February, 10.45 am

No. 445–S. Gandhi's fast. Muslims continue to stand apart, and Jinnah's paper *Dawn* to ridicule and criticise. Hindu Press expresses deep concern and there is clear evidence of anxiety in Hindu circles to bring strongest possible pressure to bear on Hindu members of my Council to secure unconditional release. There are suggestions of a very large gathering of Hindu moderates to meet here on

17th, or possibly 20th February, and thereafter ask me to receive a deputation which would urge unconditional release as first step to solution of political deadlock, and probably urge also formation of "national" government. Practical obstacles to latter remain as decisive as ever, and *Dawn's* leader today is critical of Gandhi's suggestion in his letter to me of 29th January[1] that he was ready to see Jinnah form a national government, which is equivalent, it suggests, to "a tenancy-at-will as a favour".

[1] No. 369.

468

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *15 February 1943, 10.5 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 15 February, 7.45 pm*

No. 451–S. I have suggested to Lumley who agrees that time has about come for formal intimation about position of his health to be made to Gandhi by the Surgeon-General and (if he agrees) by Gilder. Lumley and Candy both agree. Candy is now of the opinion,[1] which Gilder shares, that Gandhi cannot manage to last 21 days. Surgeon-General would also propose telling Gandhi that in his opinion (which he expects would be shared by Gilder) he is not likely to do more than (x) days. To this I have agreed, though there seems reason to doubt whether it will make Gandhi change his mind.

[1] Major-General Candy, Colonel Bhandari, and Colonel Shah had reported on 14 February that while Mr Gandhi's condition could not 'be described as critical and dangerous, it is clear that danger is approaching'; and Candy commented that he would reach a critical point the following day. Drs Gilder and Nair also submitted a report giving medical details. G. of I., Home Dept telegram 44-G of 14 February 1943. L/P&J/8/600: f 358.

469

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/158

IMMEDIATE *15 February 1943*

7–U. Gandhi fast. Position inside Council remains uneasy. Very great pressure is being brought to bear by Hindu elements on Aney, Sarker and Srivastava, while Jogendra Singh, Mody and Ahmed are clearly anxious to be progressive. Latest information is that Aney and Sarker may go if unconditional release is

refused and may be followed by certain of the others named, who will be further shaken by latest bulletins repeated to you in Home Dept. tel. of 14 Feb.[1] Complete illogicality of Gandhi's position and risks to the future of politics in this country of submitting to his blackmail are entirely obscured in minds of those mentioned by fear of being held responsible for his death. I myself am quite clear that we must stand firm against unconditional release.

[1] See No. 468, note 1.

470

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Churchill (via Commander-in-Chief and War Office)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/158

MOST IMMEDIATE *15 February 1943*

38548/C. Following Personal, Most Secret from Viceroy for Prime Minister. Your personal, most secret telegram of 13th February, 52444.[1] This may be the case but those who have been in attendance on him doubt it, and present Surgeon-General Bombay (a European) says that on a previous fast G. was particularly careful to guard against possibility of glucose being used. I am told that his present medical attendants tried to persuade him to take glucose yesterday and again today, and that he refused absolutely.

2. Your para. 2. I am delighted that American opinion is so sensible and reactions from home equally seem very good. There is a great deal of heat here at the centre and in political circles, but the country on the whole has taken the news well. Once he begins to go down-hill we may however have more trouble.

[1] No. 463.

471

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 335

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *16 February 1943, 9 pm*

PERSONAL *Received: 17 February*

2988. I should be interested to know whether in view of possibility of Gandhi's death you have thought it necessary to give any fresh guidance to Governors in matter of half-masting of flags and closing of courts. Subject was last referred to in para. 16 of your letter of 28 July 1942.[1]

[1] Vol. II, No. 355.

2. I should also be glad to learn whether in event of his death you would propose to make any statement whether as by G.-G. in C. or as from yourself and if so on what general lines. I would expect to be pressed here for a statement and it is desirable that I should keep in line with you.

472

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *16 February 1943, 7.15 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 16 February, 7.30 pm*

No. 460–S. Two adjournment motions in Upper and Lower houses on Gandhi's fast were taken yesterday.[1] Result was very satisfactory. They were talked out in both houses. Muslim League spokesmen in both houses made it clear that Muslim League stood aside from all this business, and that as they had not the power or authority they could support neither the release or detention of Gandhi, and Liaqat Ali Khan took the point that the Civil Disobedience Movement had been started to achieve Congress domination, &c. What had been going on in this country for the last several months had, Liaqat said, arisen from the unwise decision of the Congress in August. It was the duty of government to maintain law and order and peace in the country and it was their responsibility to decide for themselves whether this could be done by Gandhi's release or detention. "We have every sympathy for the sentimental concern of our Hindu friends. But we are unable to join them in this matter." Gandhi's fast was also condemned by European Group and by Cowasjee Jehangir while Maxwell made a reasoned and very telling attack on it. General effect of debate I would judge to have been definitely deflating.

2. Jinnah has declined invitation to attend proposed conference of prominent leaders at Delhi to discuss situation arising out of Gandhi's fast, and says "the situation is really a matter for the Hindu leaders to consider and advise him accordingly".[2] His statement is a useful one and I am asking Home Department to arrange for full text of it and also full summary of observations made by Liaqat Ali Khan and Maxwell in Assembly to be telegraphed home. There is still no special excitement in the country.

[1] *The Legislative Assembly Debates*, vol. I (Delhi, 1943), pp. 213, 247–65; *The Council of State Debates*, vol. I (Delhi, 1943), pp. 12–13, 31–46.
[2] See *The Times of India*, 16 February 1943.

473

Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow[1]

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/57

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *16 February 1943, by secraphone*

(1) The view of the Surgeon-General, with which the two other Government doctors concur, that Gandhi will probably not last longer than a further five days from February 16th, and that the possibility of a sudden collapse cannot be excluded, has been conveyed to you.[2] This indicates that if there is any question of his release, a decision cannot be further delayed. You will therefore wish to have my estimate of the local situation.

(2) Up to now, there has been practically no public excitement in the Province. The press have been restrained, due largely to our restrictions. But I have seen extracts from a Muslim, a Parsi, and several Hindu papers with Mahasabha views, which have condemned the fast. This lack of excitement is surprising, and must to some extent be due to some decrease in the public estimation of Gandhi. I consider, however, that it is in part due to the fact that Gandhi announced that this was not meant to be a fast to death, and to a belief that as Government offered to release him at one time, he will probably be released eventually. I still expect, therefore, that public excitement will develop, and that his death will come as a considerable shock. But I do not doubt our ability to deal with anything that may arise, and we have for some days been well prepared.

(3) I remain, however, of the view that though we have a strong logical case for keeping him in detention, though he has said and done nothing in the past six months which could lead us to expect that he will retrace his steps, his death in detention would do great permanent damage to Indian sentiment; and would provide a serious obstacle to eventual settlement. That he will be a nuisance if he is released, is certain. But in my view that is likely to be a lesser evil than the long-term reactions which would follow his death in detention. I have not canvassed the views of officials here, but those of European officers which are known to me, support this opinion completely, and I am probably safe in saying that it is the general view of European officers of the I.C.S. and Police in this Province that it would do irreparable damage to British Indian relations.

[1] Lord Linlithgow transmitted the text of this telegram to Mr Amery in telegram 471–S of 17 February (see No. 480). MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

[2] See No. 478.

474

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 334

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *16 February 1943, 1.20 pm*
PERSONAL

180. Your personal tel. 15 Feb. 451–S.[1] It seems to me very desirable (and no doubt you have it in mind yourself) that Dr. Gilder should be associated with Candy in any authoritative medical opinion given to Gandhi as to his prospects, and preferable that it s[houl]d be given by Gilder and confirmed by Candy, if necessary. Formal intimation by Govt. officer alone w[oul]d seem not unlikely just to harden Gandhi in his purpose.

Repeated to Governor of Bombay.

[1] No. 468.

475

Mr Rutherford (Bihar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/50

SECRET *16 February 1943*

No. 125–G.B.

2. So far we have had very little reaction to Gandhi's fast and, if I may venture to say so, the undue publicity that has been given to protests, resolutions and conferences about it. There have been hunger-strikes in some of the jails which have in almost all cases been of very short duration: In Gaya Jail 400 refused food; 399 gave it up after 24 hours and the remaining one said he would fast for a week. In Chapra Jail 100 hunger-struck, 97 called it off after 24 hours. In Patna Camp Jail 90 persons hunger-struck on the 14th and in Dumka 36 persons were reported. I have not yet heard further details. You will doubtless be interested to know that notwithstanding all the attempts at secrecy there was talk in the Patna bazaar as early as the 5th that Gandhi was about to start a fast. Wakely, the General Officer Commanding, L. of C. Area, has been very ready to co-operate in preparations for any possible outbreak of trouble and Irwin readily agreed to let me have two battalions from the reserves at Ranchi. All troops were in position on the 10th at latest mainly in the North Bihar area from Bhagalpur and Patna up to Motihari and Bettiah and I hope we will not be taken by surprise anywhere this time. So far the C.I.D. has not been able to give me any information of any threatened concerted action though they mention

preparations to commit acts of sabotage, murder and violence by organisations of political and socialist extremists and Congress elements who intend to commence operations some time in March.

3. I had a long talk with Chandreshvar Prashad Narayan Sinha, the National War Front leader, on Sunday about the National War Front, economic conditions of Bihar and the causes for the readiness of the population to effervesce into violence, and how Gandhi's fast is to be treated by the National War Front. Chandreshvar who of course is himself a landholder claimed that the unsettled condition among the Bihar peasantry was due to the *Sarker's* policy of undermining the influence of the middle classes since the time of Sir James Sifton and the propaganda of Congress and revolutionary elements for the last 20 years which has been insufficiently checked. He claims that on the whole the *raiyat* gets a fair deal—and so far as I have been able to ascertain till now rentals are only a little higher than the *ryotwari* rates in Madras: at the same time he admits there is a terrible lot of poverty owing to the pressure of the population on the soil and the lack of industrial development to relieve it especially in the northern part of the Province. He tells me that there is general reverence for the old man (Gandhi) amongst the village population and that the National War Front will only do harm by arguing about the rights and wrongs of the fast which would advertise it. He thought all that the National War Front could do was to act as reporters of public feeling and to try to dissuade if they got a warning of any intended violence. He suggested to me that at any rate as regards India it would have been better if no correspondence had been published, but only a very brief communiqué and subsequent bulletins. He suggested that Gandhi should not have been allowed to carry on his fast in custody but should have been dumped down in some place such as Dr. Gilder's house, forgetting that Gandhi had intimated that if he was released he would not fast or in other words he would have attained the object of his coercion. I have sent him a copy of the sensible leader which appeared in the *Pioneer*. The C.I.D. reports that the publication of the correspondence between Your Excellency and Gandhi has aroused keen interest and in political circles some resentment. I understand that the resentment is against the words about Gandhi taking an easy way out.

A lot in this—we have deserted our friends & failed to introduce democracy!

L.

476

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *16 February 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Many thanks for your letter of 20th January[1] which I was delighted to get. The main business since I last wrote has of course been the Mahatma's fast, and I fear that you must have had a good deal of trouble one way or the other in the Cabinet in dealing with it. But I think things are not going too badly, and I am very agreeably surprised by the low temperature in this country. I am quite sure from what I hear from various quarters that while the Hindu community generally would naturally be most reluctant to see Gandhi die, and while general respect for Gandhi in that community is probably nearly as great as ever, there has been a quite considerable undercurrent of private criticism of the wisdom of his action, and the fact that it is not too obvious to anybody for what precisely the old man has decided to fast does not help his cause very much. It is significant that though the Assembly started its session on the day on which the fast began and though an adjournment motion about it was put down without delay, which could quite easily have been reached by the telescoping or the withdrawing of the motions ahead of it on the paper, no endeavour was made to rush it. When the adjournment motion did finally come off yesterday, there was very little excitement in the House. The Muslim League formally indicated their intention of standing aside, and Gandhi's action was severely criticised by Cowasjee Jehangir, and in a very telling speech by Maxwell (I am arranging for the gist of the Muslim League speeches and of Maxwell's to be sent to you, for they may be of value for propaganda purposes). The motion was talked out, and an adjournment motion in the Upper House met the same fate.[2] Jinnah has just declared in a statement[3] which I am also having repeated to you that he is unable to associate himself with the proposed meeting of the political leaders which is scheduled to take place here on the 19th and 20th February to urge Gandhi's release; and his statement, and that of Nawabzada Liaqat Ali Khan in the Assembly have dealt pretty effectively with the suggestion that the Muslims are willing parties either to Gandhi's fast or to his suggestion that a national government can be formed by them with his goodwill in a day.

2. Naturally my Council have had a difficult time over this for intensive pressure had been concentrated on Mody, Sarker, Sultan Ahmed (who normally works with the Hindus in Council), Aney, Srivastava and Jogendra Singh. I have seen them all individually at various times, and I have told those

of them who showed any signs of wobbling that they must make up their minds without delay, for I could not delay indefinitely. I also told most of them that I was ready to fill their places if they wanted to resign which indeed I am. The position is complicated by the fact that certain Members of my Council who are not noted for their capacity to keep secrets, have divulged the nature of the discussion and the way in which the voting went, with the result that Srivastava fears that he would be responsible for Gandhi's death if it takes place, while similar arguments have been addressed to Aney, Ambedkar, &c. I am exceedingly sorry for Aney who is a sincere and honest man, and sensitive to attacks of this nature, and I should very greatly regret it if he found that his conscience obliged him to resign. His position is of course aggravated by the fact that he has been leader of the Congress Nationalist Party, and is well known to have very great respect for Gandhi. But the fact is that I do not believe that any of these people *want* to resign, and I think they will all hold on as long as they possibly can. They have all told me (except Aney, who I know would regret resigning) that they do not want to go: and Mody, . . .[4] added that he himself felt that the Mahatma's demise would be a real contribution to Indian politics! Yet Mody has been for his own political reasons in the forefront of the agitation to let the old man off. This would surprise one were it not that one's experience of this country is now fairly extensive. If Gandhi, which I hope will not be the case, persists in carrying out the fast and is unable to stand it physically and dies, then I would expect a couple of my colleagues to go (certainly Aney, and possibly Sarker). I rather doubt the remainder moving.

3. It is exceedingly difficult to judge what the Mahatma is going to do. He has the best medical attention available, and of course we are seeing to it that no pains are spared to make things easy for him. I only wish he would reciprocate by endeavouring to make things easy for us: but that is the last thing to enter his mind! There is bound to be a progressive deterioration. He is 73 or 74, and though he is being very carefully looked after, there are strains to which no physical frame ought to be exposed at such an age. The bulletins so far issued show that gradual deterioration is beginning. The only thing I am afraid of is, given his arteriosclerosis, which was mentioned in one of the recent bulletins, a sudden heart attack. But he appears to be perfectly obstinate as regards any endeavour to alleviate his condition. He has refused suggestions by Dr. Gilder that he should take glucose, and seems insistent on submitting himself to the full rigour of the game. All we can do in those circumstances is to hope that something may turn up to give him a way out, for he has left himself a loophole by talking of fasting to capacity, though I gather that there is reason now to fear that when he talks of fasting to capacity what he means is

[1] No. 355. [2] See No. 472, note 1. [3] See No. 472, note 2.
[4] Personal comment omitted.

the capacity which he estimated himself to have at the moment of beginning his fast, and that if that estimate was a wrong one it would be bad luck so far as Gandhi is concerned but that he would still have to go through with the fast to the full number of days which he had proclaimed himself as intending to endure.

4. But he cannot be greatly encouraged by the public reaction which has been far from vigorous, and yesterday's debates in the Assembly and in the Council of State may also have some little influence upon him. If they do not, and if he remains quite set in his determination to fast, I shall be driven to the conclusion that he really does intend to kill himself and to get out of his difficulties in that way, for I can see no other possible explanation. I get the impression that the American journalists and others here are very much at a loss to know what exactly his ultimate object could be. They not unnaturally say that the Mahatma, though he may be a bit cranky over fasting and *Satyagraha*, judged by our standards, is an extremely astute and experienced politician, and that it is impossible to think that he merely intends to cause himself this extreme discomfort for this long period, and this risk to his life, unless he has some positive and specific object behind it. They not unnaturally ask also how much better off any of us would be if the Mahatma does survive his 21 days. It is not too easy to put up a plausible reply, for you and I are as much in the dark as anyone else as to what really is in his mind, though quite clearly if, by confronting us with a wave of emotion of immense strength not only in India but outside India he could get us to concede his general demands it would be well worth his while. But the intervention of Jinnah and the Muslim League in yesterday's debate makes it perfectly clear to the world at large, and to India in particular, that those demands can no more be conceded now and under the threat of a fast by Gandhi than they could have been before he started his fast, and that surrender to him would immediately produce most serious and violent reactions from the Muslim League and those other elements in this country which do not agree with Gandhi's view. However, there is little to be gained by speculation, for before you get this letter matters will have reached a crisis one way or the other. But I would like to make it clear again that, as I have said in various of my telegrams, I am entirely satisfied that we ought to stand firm, and I have no doubt that that would be the view of the Cabinet also. If I lose some of my colleagues, that would be a pity: but I should be perfectly ready to replace them, by civil servants if necessary, and I have endeavoured to bring out to the wobblers the very great danger not only to constitutional progress and to the future government of this country, but to the interest and the future of the Hindu community which would be involved if Hindu members of my Council proved themselves unable to stand up to the present strain, and allowed political fasting to be turned into a really decisive and irresistible weapon.

5. Arthur Hope and Twynam are both staying with me at the moment, and both have given good accounts of conditions in their provinces. I have been very glad to have had the chance of checking up with both of them. Hallett comes to stay on the 21st, and Herbert early in March.

6. Herbert has just been faced with a somewhat tiresome piece of work in the shape of a decision on the floor of the House by his Chief Minister to agree to an impartial enquiry into alleged official excesses in Midnapore. That decision was taken without any consultation with the Governor, who is of course directly affected, and is in direct opposition to his known wishes. Jack Herbert, it appears from a telephone message sent by Huq to my Private Secretary last night, therefore addressed a pretty stiff letter to his Chief Minister, pointing these facts out to him and requiring him to turn up with an explanation this morning. The latest news from that battle front is that Huq has made excuses for not turning up, and on being pressed, has taken himself out of reach of the telephone! All somewhat school-boyish, but I propose to let Herbert and Huq fight the battle themselves for a little longer. There can be no excuse for Huq's conduct (I gather this is not the first instance of it) in jumping the Governor in a matter in which his individual judgment[5] was concerned, which clearly ought to have been handled on the basis of a Cabinet decision, and in which the Governor's opposition was well-known to him. As to the case on merits for an enquiry, I urged Governors last August to avoid enquiries so far as possible, and that is still my view. I think they ought to be resisted where they can be. But I get the impression, as you will no doubt have formed yourself, from the situation reports which Bengal has sent us, that given the continued tale of Congress atrocities, &c. in the Midnapore district, if there were to be an enquiry under an impartial High Court Judge, the facts would probably appear to be so extremely damaging to Congress and its supporters in Bengal as possibly to offset the disadvantages: while I have no reason to believe that there is in fact any foundation whatever for these allegations against the Services, who in that event could look for a complete public exoneration and vindication.

7. I have a very slight touch of flu', and may in consequence of it miss Dr. Soong who is passing through. But I will do my best to see him tomorrow morning before he goes off if I can manage to do so. We have had a string of prominent Chinese here of late, and I entertained the other night the Chinese War Minister,[6] a most agreeable individual of distinctly intellectual appearance, who however had to converse through an interpreter. He was accompanied by General Yu Tai We who had been in India last year and who, having been at Harvard, and also a Military Attaché in Berlin, has a good deal of experience of the world and can talk good English. I think they were pleased by their visit. There is no doubt that the visit of the Turkish journalists has been a first-class

[5] Government of India Act 1935, Sec. 52. [6] General Ho Ying Ch'ing.

success, and they have displayed extreme skill in avoiding the pitfalls so plentifully spread before them by all parties.

8. Many thanks for what you have been kind enough to tell me in your letter of 20th January as to your further talks with Zafrulla. He is a good man, but as I said in my last letter[7] he must make up his mind whether he is going to stay on the Bench or do politics, and my own judgment would be that he had better stay on the Bench. I do not want to facilitate further wanderings abroad for him, and think he must return to his profession. He has intelligence and certain firm convictions towards constructive ends. But he is very much of a politician through it all.

* * *

12. You will have had the Chief's reply[8] on this matter of the future of the Indian Army which I sent you by last week's bag. The short point there is that it is impossible to employ an ex-Commander-in-Chief in this country under his successor. The relation between him and whoever is Commander-in-Chief of the time, and the relation equally between the officers who had served under him and those who are now serving under a different Chief becomes impossibly difficult.

* * *

14. As you know, I am most grateful to you for all your help about Vigor, and I am glad to say that as I write wheat under our new scheme seems to be coming out pretty well. We have collected the best part of 70,000 tons since 25th January. Though that rate may not be kept up and though even it is less rapid than I could have wished, it is encouraging.

15. I am delighted to hear that my heresies[9] about the colonial declaration have had the support of Winston. I agree that, whittled down as it is at present, there is no great harm in it.[10] But I do feel most strongly on the whole of the general issue, and I do trust that despite the supine attitude which the Foreign Office always adopt when dealing with America, we shall be able to keep our own end up and maintain a fighting policy on all this sort of business.

* * *

19. I am interested to find in correspondence seen in censorship that Sapru now expresses himself as not very much enamoured of complete Indianisation of the Executive Council, and that his views are shared by Jayakar (and I think, curiously enough, by Shiva Rao). The basis is that experience of the addition of Indians to the Council has not been very encouraging! Jagdish Prasad on the other hand continues full of zeal. This is all relevant to the position in Maxwell's case. I must say that the events of the last few days, and the trouble over Gandhi's fast, leave me with a very strong feeling that the wise course will be

to carry on with him, and that the retention of the European element in present uncertain circumstances has a very great deal to be said for it.

[7] No. 438. [8] No. 360. [9] No. 310. [10] See Nos. 344, 345, and 346.

477

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

SECRET AND PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *16 February 1943*

There has been so much going on this last week that Winston has had no time to bother about India, beyond just enquiring after Gandhi's health at yesterday's Cabinet. But I don't think any questions are now likely to be asked as to whether you did in fact conform strictly to the wishes of the Cabinet, and certainly most of the members to whom I have spoken are grateful to you for the way in which you have handled a most difficult situation. Today's telegrams look as if Gandhi was not very likely to carry on for more than another two or three days without a serious and possibly irremediable collapse. One can only hope that if he does not call off the fast the whole thing may be over quickly and the period of suspense and growing hysteria not be prolonged indefinitely. That may also help with your colleagues, for once the crisis is over one way or the other there can be very little retrospective reason for resignations.

2. What you told me in your letter of January 13th[1] about Aney's views as to the future relations of India and Burma is interesting, but also somewhat disquieting. Are we going to be confronted with an Indian Imperialism that would like to incorporate Burma and Ceylon, possibly also Malaya, in an Indian Empire, on the strength of the importance of the Indian element in those countries? I know the Chinese have some idea of a similar right of control over Burma and Malaya, and naturally Burmese, Ceylonese and Malays will have views of their own! I don't quite know, too, how the incorporation of Burma against its will could be reconciled with the policy of provincial non-accession included in the Cripps proposals. On the other hand, there is, of course, nothing to prevent an Indian constitutional convention inviting Burma, or Ceylon for that matter, to send representatives and discuss the possibility of adhesion, or the Indian constitution being so framed as to enable additional provinces to join. The most likely prospect no doubt is that for the first two or three years at least after the war the existing Government of India, or at any rate some interim government pending the creation of the new Indian constitution, will

[1] No. 347.

have to deal with an interim Burma Government still pretty directly controlled by His Majesty's Government, and the problem then will be how to come to a reasonable settlement between the two Governments on such questions as Indian immigration which will continue to be honoured on both sides after complete self-government has been achieved. It may be that Burmese nationalism will continue to be as aggressive, regardless of economic needs, as it has been in the past. On the other hand experience of the Japanese, plus fears of Chinese immigration, may possibly induce a friendlier outlook towards the Indian whom they have known before. Anyhow, your successor and mine are likely to have a good deal to do in trying to keep the wheels oiled in this connection.

3. Azizul Haque has just been in to see me. He is delighted to have had your telegram authorising his going to India with two months' leave and is full of eagerness both to get his ideas about students over here discussed with University authorities and be able to tell the Midnapore people on the spot something of British generosity and goodwill in every class of society here. On the former point he very rightly says that any new and improved system of dealing with the student problem ought to get started as soon as possible in order to enable it to have taken root and continue working automatically by the time any new constitution comes into force. He did ask me tentatively whether I thought there was any possibility of your having work for him to do in India instead of returning here. I told him that I had suggested the possibility to you in writing some little time ago, and had no doubt that you would be keeping him in mind if anything really suitable occurred, but that I had no idea what might be possible in the near future. This was perhaps not strictly truthful, but after all the present crisis over Gandhi puts things very much in the melting pot. It may of course mean that you will have quite frankly to take a higher proportion of Muslims and so warn the Hindus of the danger of taking too communal a line—I only hope your warning on that point will have prevailed with Aney and his Hindu colleagues.

4. In connection with a possible successor to the High Commissionership here, I suppose it really is the turn for a Hindu. But I wonder whether you have thought of Runganadhan? He seems to have won golden opinions wherever he has been in Canada and the States, and his wife is a most capable and agreeable woman. Appointing him would of course add to the sorrows of poor Suhrawardy, but that couldn't be helped.

[Para. 5, on arrangements for an emergency vacancy in the Governorship of Assam, omitted].

6. In a recent letter from Kirkpatrick, who used to be in the House and formerly in business in India, he tells the story of a high Chinese official who,

accompanied by a British official, was refused accommodation in a rest house in Burma because he was a Chinaman and subsequently neither he nor his British friend could even be served dinner because they had not got dinner jackets. The incident happened in Burma, but Kirkpatrick thinks it possible that similar incidents might happen in rest houses in India and wanted me to write to you about it so that you might take such steps as you think feasible to prevent the same sort of thing happening again.

I never heard such rot & don't believe a word of it.
Rest house; dinner jackets! Bosh! Kirkpatrick must have spent all his Indian time in Calcutta or Bombay.

L.

478

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, *17 February 1943, 1.40 am*
Received: 16 February, 11 pm

No. 464–S. You will be receiving today's bulletins about Gandhi from Home Department. Candy's estimate today is that if no change takes place, there might be a collapse consequent on the fast at the end of 5 days (the risk of heart collapse is of course always present). There is no sign as I understand it of any relaxation of Gandhi's determination to proceed with the fast. I mentioned in my personal telegram of yesterday No. 451–S[1] that I recommended formal warning to Gandhi by the doctors once he reached the danger point, &c. Lumley informs me that this has now been discussed by Candy with Gilder and Roy. The two latter think that more harm than good will be done by such communication. Their reasons are that they would not tell any patient in his condition of a prognosis of this kind; that Dr. Nair had already told Gandhi that he could not last for 21 days; and that Candy's opinion to the same effect had also been conveyed to Gandhi by Governor's Secretary. Candy thinks this view not unreasonable especially as in his own opinion there is more danger of death from heart attack than of a slow petering out from starvation. In view of Candy's opinion Lumley thinks the proposal should be dropped, and I have agreed. Argument that weighs with Lumley, force of which I accept, is that if Candy's prognosis that death may result from a sudden heart attack is correct and were to follow immediately or soon after the declaration, we should lay ourselves open to the charge of precipitating the end and would be in a most embarrassing position.

[1] No. 468.

479

The Marquess of Linlithgow to all Provincial Governors (except Bombay)[1]

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

MOST IMMEDIATE *17 February 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 465–S. You will have been following progress of Gandhi's fast from Press notes released daily by Bombay Government. You should know for your confidential information that General Candy and Colonels Bhandari and Shah report tonight that his general condition is serious, and I understand that Candy's estimate is that collapse might come after about 5 days if there is no change. Please treat that as for your most secret and personal information. Commander-in-Chief is informing Army Commanders (but not (repeat not) of the possible 5-day period), and you will no doubt keep in touch with them.

[1] Sir G. Laithwaite transmitted the text of this telegram to Mr Irwin in telegram 466–S of 17 February by secraphone. MSS. EUR. F. 125/57.

480

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *17 February 1943, 1.25 pm*

Received: 17 February, 9.35 am

No. 470–S. My immediately following telegram repeats a telegram, dated 16th February,[1] from Lumley. I think he is entitled to have his view placed before you, and I give full weight to what he says. But I would see great difficulty in accepting his view.

[1] No. 473.

481

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/158

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *17 February 1943, 3.15 pm*

PERSONAL

8–U. Last night's Bombay communiqué,[1] as you will have seen, reported a further deterioration in Gandhi's health, and I informed my Council (in the light

of the full bulletin by Candy)[2] that his condition was now serious. This has led to a letter this morning from Mody, Aney and Sarker tendering their resignations on the ground that "the majority decision not to release Gandhi unconditionally, even when danger to his life accrued from the fast he had undertaken, is one which we cannot possibly support", and going on to say that "if our differences had been less fundamental, we would have deemed it our duty to submit to the vote of the majority, as, individually,[3] we have done on several occasions."

2. I propose to accept these resignations (for I see no alternative if we are not to surrender to Gandhi's blackmail) subject to anything that may happen when I see the three Members concerned this afternoon,[4] and I will consider what arrangements to make for filling the vacancies at greater[5] leisure. For the moment we can carry on with the departmental secretaries.

3. I have also however informed the three Members that they are bound by their oath of secrecy from which I am not prepared to release them, and that I am not prepared to agree to any reference to majority or minority decision. I have asked them to redraft their letter in the light of this.

4. Srivastava, who is being pilloried as having given what is alleged to have been the deciding vote, is also wobbly. I am seeing him later this evening.

[1] This read 'During the past 24 hours Mr Gandhi's condition has further deteriorated'. G. of I., Home Dept telegram 1238 of 17 February 1943. L/P&J/8/600: f 353.

[2] The bulletin signed by General Candy and Colonels Bhandari and Shah concluded, after giving medical details, that Mr Gandhi's 'general condition is serious'. *Ibid.*

[3] 'individually' deciphered as '(corrupt group)-ly'.

[4] In telegram 476–S of 17 February Lord Linlithgow informed Mr Amery that he had seen Aney, Sarker and Mody that afternoon, when they had tendered their resignations which he had accepted. A communiqué announcing their resignations was published in the morning papers of 18 February, and the three ex-members issued a brief statement explaining that they had resigned on what they regarded as the fundamental issue of the action to be taken on Gandhi's fast. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

[5] 'greater' deciphered as '(? corrupt group) H.M.G.'s'.

482

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, *18 February 1943, 6.20 pm*
Received: 18 February, 7 pm

No. 481–S. Gandhi's fast. Srivastava is under a good deal of pressure but I hope may stay the course: Sultan Ahmed though under extreme pressure looks like doing so, and I hope to keep Jogendra Singh straight and expect him to survive.

2. I think it quite likely that I shall have a deputation from these various moderate leaders, from people like the Metropolitan, &c. who are meeting here in the next couple of days. If I do I propose to deal with them with extreme directness, assuming as I do that I have the full support of the Cabinet in refusing to release Gandhi unconditionally. I do not propose to trouble you in advance with the line of my reply which in any event must to some extent turn on the actual terms of any representations which may be made to me by the deputation.

3. I do not overlook the fact that Gandhi's death, if it takes place, may have considerable emotional reaction, and give us a good deal of trouble. But I am perfectly clear, as I have explained before that we must stand up to it and that I propose to do. We have at least eight months before India can become the base for extensive operations. By then we shall be the better for having faced the music whatever the outcome. Hope and Twynam who have both been staying with me are quite confident of their capacity to manage the situation so far as their provinces are concerned, and I have no doubt but am confirming, that that remains the view of other Governors also. Congress and their friends are in an extremely tight corner.

483

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir R. Lumley (Bombay)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/57

IMMEDIATE *18 February 1943*

No. 482–S. I have sent following telegram[1] to all Governors:—

Begins. Gandhi's fast. Your Government will have received the Bombay Government's telegram warning them of approach of danger-point, and you will also have had my telegram of February 16th[2] giving the official medical opinion that his condition must be regarded as serious. We cannot tell how things will go but we must be fully prepared for Gandhi's death and must be ready to take common action to deal with the ensuing situation in that event.

2. It has now been arranged that my Home Department, after consulting the Bombay Government, will send your Government any further warning that may be necessary, but Bombay Government will send all Provincial Governments, Chief Commissioners and Political Residents a most immediate *en clair* telegram containing the code word "RUBICON" if death occurs. At the same time, Bombay Government will arrange to stop all trunk telephone calls and telegrams (except official) from Poona and neighbourhood for two hours after despatch of "RUBICON" telegram. Bare announcement of death will then be given to Press by Bombay Government and we ourselves shall probably issue statement terms of which are under separate consideration.

3. I feel that, if death occurs, public feeling, or at any rate so much of it as is spontaneous, will be based even more on religion than politics and that it will be both useless and bad policy to attempt to stifle or prohibit all manifestations of national mourning. Our correct course, therefore, should be to make the preservation of the public peace the single touch-stone by which all our action should be tested and, on that basis, allow as much freedom as possible for reasonable public mourning by whatever means may be customary. In that view it may be best to permit some relaxation of any existing restrictions on public meetings, orations and processions for a few days after death occurs and then to reimpose restrictions after this period expires. But I agree that you and your local officers must have the fullest discretion to act as local circumstances may dictate within the framework of this general policy. Similarly I do not think it would be desirable to restrict publicity for news of the death or the funeral, but it will be important to restrain anti-Government comment on the same lines as in the case of the fast itself, and I have no doubt you will be prepared to deal with your local press accordingly.

4. Bombay Government propose to allow a public cremation subject to such regulation in the matter of route, place of cremation, &c. as may be necessary to preserve order. I feel sure that this is the right course. Thereafter the more difficult problem of the disposal of the ashes is bound to arise. Something may depend on the wishes of those who are entitled to express them in such a matter, but I think it is obvious that if the ashes were to be conveyed forthwith by train to some distant place or places, e.g. Hardwar or Benares or even Sevagram, and the news were to spread, as it would be bound to do, there would be grave danger from crowds *en route*, both at stations, and on the lines, with serious risk of disorder. On the other hand a blank refusal to allow the ashes to be deposited in some sacred place might have even more serious results and if they were not taken to some such place one result would be to create a new centre of pilgrimage in Poona. I have therefore asked Lumley to explore the possibility of having the ashes conveyed by air to whatever destination is desired and also of having the actual transfer postponed until the situation permits. I shall of course address you again if there is any prospect of sending the ashes through your Province.

5. I am clear that, considering Gandhi's position as our prisoner and a declared rebel, there can be no question of half-masting flags or sending official messages of condolence to his widow. But it has been suggested that we should lose nothing after having stood firmly to our declared policy and that it might reduce the resentment resulting from his death in custody and help to keep

[1] Telegram 483–S of 18 February. MSS. EUR. F. 125/111. Repeated to Mr Amery as tel. 498–S of 19 February.

[2] No. 479; the date should be 17 February.

large numbers of Government Servants steady, while at the same time having a good effect on public opinion and thus possibly reducing risk of disorder, if there were to be some official recognition of the death of an outstanding personality, e.g. by closure of public offices for a day or half a day. It has also been suggested that some Ministerial Governments may wish to do this in any case and that, if so, it would be difficult to stop them doing so. I keep an open mind on this suggestion, although my Home Member and both Hope and Twynam, whom I have consulted here, think that it would have no value and be undesirable and my own judgment is inclined to agree with them. But I am clear that in this particular respect we must all show a united front and I should be glad if you would let me have your views immediately on this point.

6. For various reasons that you will appreciate I am sending you this personal communication in preference to an official telegram from the Home Department, but you must of course use your discretion in passing on its contents to such of your (Ministers and)[3] officials as you consider necessary. I think it would be wise however to restrict circulation to narrowest possible limits and defer it until latest possible moment, and also to be most careful to enjoin secrecy and avoid alarmist impressions in any communication you may think it essential to make to your District Officers. *Ends.*

2. The arrangements referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 have I know already been the subject of some discussion between your Home Department and mine. I gather from your secraphone message of last night that they represent your views correctly, and I hope that you will be able to make the necessary arrangements about the "Rubicon" telegram. I think it is important that your announcement of the death from Poona should be postponed until that telegram has had time to reach and warn other provinces. As regards the ashes, although there will be some advantage in not consulting the family in advance about their wishes, since this will give us more justification for delay when the time comes, I think it is most important that the possibilities should be investigated (*a*) of postponing the removal of the ashes from Poona until things quieten down, if this can be done without offending religious sentiment, and (*b*) of conveying the ashes and the party accompanying them by air to the required destination. As regards (*a*), delay would of course entail necessity for keeping ashes in some suitable place in Poona until they are removed, which is another point that requires investigation. As regards (*b*) I recognise that it would hardly be possible to carry through the proposal if the accompanying party were to refuse to travel by air, but I would see no harm in making the suggestion.

[3] To Ministerial Provinces only.

484

The Marquess of Linlithgow to all Provincial Governors

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

IMMEDIATE *18 February 1943*
PERSONAL

No. 484–S. I am telegraphing to you separately[1] about various points in connection with arrangements if Gandhi's fast proves fatal. I quite accept that in those circumstances, assuming that he declines to take advantage of our offer to fast in freedom and that he allows matters to proceed to a point at which there is no remedy and dies, we may have quite important reactions affecting law and order and internal security. I assume that you are in fact entirely satisfied that your plans for dealing with any such emergency are all in order, that there are no additional precautions that need to be taken, and that you are satisfied that with the forces at your disposal and in consultation as may be necessary with military authorities you can deal with anything that may happen. I should be grateful for your formal confirmation that that is the case or any suggestions for dealing with any weak points which you may be conscious of in your arrangements and which we might be able to help over from outside.

2. I am telegraphing in similar terms to other Governors.[2]

[1] See No. 483.

[2] Replies from six Governors, giving the confirmation requested, are in MSS. EUR. F. 125/111. The Governor of Bihar had asked the local Army Commander for another British battalion to reinforce danger points.

485

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *19 February 1943, 2.55 am*
PERSONAL *Received: 19 February, 3 am*

No. 487–S. Gandhi's fast. I have kept Phillips in touch with developments, and have given him, e.g. advance notice of Gandhi's decision to fast, of the Government of India's statement, and of resignation of my three colleagues yesterday. This morning he asked to see me, saying that he had a message. I agreed and saw him this afternoon.

2. On my receiving him he handed me a message signed "Hull" in the following terms:—

Begins. President Roosevelt and I suggest that you seek an informal interview with the Viceroy and convey to him an expression of our deep concern over

the political crisis in India. Please express to His Excellency our hope that a means may be discovered to avoid the deterioration of the situation which would be almost certain to occur if Gandhi dies. *Ends.*

My immediately following telegram contains a report of our conversation.

3. I feel that situation is becoming serious as regards Phillips' position, and I must ask that Prime Minister, if he has not already seen, should be shown my personal telegram No. 232–S[1] of 28th January, your reply No. 114 of 1st February,[2] and my personal telegram No. 413–S[3] of 11th February as well as this telegram and the report of my conversation with Phillips: for I am sure that this can only be handled at the very highest level.

4. I, as you and Cabinet are aware, am handling here an exceedingly difficult situation for which I am responsible to His Majesty's Government. India has no independent diplomatic relations with other countries; her diplomatic relations are handled exclusively through His Majesty's Government. I would never have agreed to any personal representative of Roosevelt, or to an American Commissioner here, save on the understanding that his functions were strictly limited. That has proved not to be the case with Johnson. In the case of Phillips I was at particular pains to make my position clear before agreeing to accept him. I do not blame Phillips himself. He has been most courteous and considerate. But he has to obey his instructions, and those instructions, as in the present case, may involve interference by the U.S. Government in something that is none of their business; at a critical moment; and through a wholly improper channel.

5. I must ask that it be made clear formally, though of course with all possible courtesy, to the U.S. Government that any communication of this nature must in future be made through the diplomatic channel, viz. the Ambassador at Washington and the Foreign Office, and that it be made clear to them with equal courtesy that His Majesty's Government are not prepared to accept Phillips as a direct diplomatic intermediary with the Viceroy. It is obviously impossible for me to say anything to him that really matters on this policy without committing His Majesty's Government, and it is most essential that I should say nothing which can commit them. One's position is the more difficult when as in the present case one has no previous warning of what the nature of the communication is to be. The Prime Minister will I am sure appreciate difficulty of position I have to hold, and I trust I can look for his and your full support with Foreign Office in getting this position cleared up.

6. I should wish to be able to inform Phillips myself of definition of his functions which I have suggested above, and of fact that I do so with full authority of the Cabinet. It is essential, equally, that State Department be simultaneously made aware of situation that is arising, and of fact that we are not prepared to

agree to intervention in handling situation already exceedingly difficult and delicate and bound to be aggravated by the very slightest suggestion of interference, however well-intentioned, from outside.

7. Meanwhile, as you will see, though taken at a disadvantage, I have endeavoured to give Phillips a polite though firm reply.

[1] No. 366. [2] No. 374. [3] No. 455.

486

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *19 February 1943, 2.50 am*
Received: 19 February, 2 am

No. 488–S. Mr. Phillips handed me Mr. Cordell Hull's telegram[1] which I read. I thanked him and asked him whether Lord Halifax had received a parallel representation. Mr. Phillips would of course be aware of the ultimate responsibility of His Majesty's Government in a matter of this kind. Did he know whether Lord Halifax had been approached at all? Mr. Phillips replied "Not that I am aware of, but I might not have heard".

2. I said that I too hoped that a way out of this position might be found. But I should be less than frank with Mr. Phillips if I suggested that my Government was likely to concede Gandhi's main point, viz. unconditional release. He, Mr. Phillips, knew the full position, from my letters and the Government communiqués. I thought that there was little to add unless indeed I expounded the whole position of our domestic politics at length, which I expected he would not wish me to do. Mr. Phillips said that that was certainly the case. But could I give him something to help the position at Washington. The President was naturally deeply concerned with the position in India.

3. I replied that I was a war Viceroy. Every step in policy taken by me was first of all measured by the test whether it would aid an Allied victory. That was the approach that I and my Government made to this problem. We were most positively of opinion that to rehabilitate Mr. Gandhi at the expense of Government at this stage would be disastrous. There was not the slightest sign that any settlement between the main communities was within reach at this time. Certainly none could be achieved under threat of a fast. I drew his attention to the recent public statements in the Assembly by the Muslim League

[1] See No. 485.

representatives[2] and also at Bombay by Jinnah.[3] I added that the services had to be considered. They, civil, police, and military, had had a shocking time last year and over many weeks. If Mr. Gandhi, a man detained for his part in an attempted rebellion, were to emerge triumphant over Government it was a question whether the position here could be held. It might comfort the President to know that an overwhelming majority of my Governors held that view, and that my professional advisers were unanimously behind the policy of my Government.

4. Mr. Phillips asked me what would happen if Gandhi dies. I replied, six months[4] unpleasantness steadily declining in volume; little or nothing at the end of it. After it was over—as it would be over before India was wanted for a major operation of war eastwards—India would be far more reliable as a base for operations. Moreover the prospect of a settlement would be greatly enhanced by the disappearance of Gandhi, who had for years torpedoed every attempt at a settlement. Finally, I must be allowed to repeat that I could not overstate the conviction with which I hold the view that in the interests of the war effort, we should not yield to Mr. Gandhi at this stage.

5. Mr. Phillips thanked me for this communication.

[2] See No. 472, note 1. [3] See No. 472, note 2.
[4] 'six months' deciphered as '(? in addition to)'.

487

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *19 February 1943, 2.50 am*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 489–S. My personal telegram of today.[1] Phillips. This is really becoming an intolerable situation, and I have deliberately asked that the Prime Minister should see this correspondence, for I suspect that it is only on the Roosevelt level that you and I will be able to get things straight. I am sure that we cannot go on as at present, and I am sure that I can look for your full support and help. It has been a great mistake ever to have agreed to a representative of this nature or standing coming to this country, and I must regret that I waived my objections to it in deference to your view and Eden's.

[1] No. 485.

488

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE
SECRET
PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, *19 February 1943, 1.5 am*
Received: 18 February, 11.15 pm

No. 490–S. Today's communiqué issued to press on Gandhi's condition shows that the position is now definitely serious. In the event of his death I am asking Governor of Bombay to telegraph to you code word "EXTRA". I shall be telegraphing separately as to terms of announcement (which will be as brief as possible and of most objective nature) which will be issued here if the worst unhappily happens.

Repeated to Governor of Bombay and Agents-General, Washington and Chungking.

489

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, *19 February 1943, 1.40 pm*
Received: 19 February, 11 am

No. 493–S. My personal telegram of 18th February.[1] Phillips. Phillips this morning informed me by telephone through my Private Secretary that he was under very strong pressure indeed from the American and other press correspondents here as to whether he was or was not going to take any steps in the matter of Gandhi's fast. His own disposition was to say nothing, but the pressure even by his own press was so "ugly" that he felt he should say at any rate that he had seen me.

2. I have had a reply sent to him by telephone thanking him for his courtesy, and telling him that I quite appreciate his difficulty but that I am clear that the effect of any suggestion that he or the United States Government were intervening or coming [in] in any way on this matter, or that there had been any representation of any kind, would be disastrous, and that I could not myself agree to it. That that would equally be true of any suggestion that he had been to see me on the subject. I suggested in those circumstances that following on what Phillips had already said at various times to the press about his work here

[1] No. 485; the date of despatch was 19 February.

that he might take the line that his function here was to keep in touch with things; that I had myself kept him in the closest personal touch in this matter, but that he had nothing more to say.

3. Phillips expressed his thanks, and said that his position was very awkward, not so much because of the local press, to which he attached no importance, but because of the American press, by which he was being besieged. He thought he must let Washington know. Laithwaite on my instructions did not (repeat not) tell him that I had repeated to you the message I received from him yesterday, or make any reference to it or to its disposal.

490

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *19 February 1943, 6.30 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 19 February, 4.30 pm*

No. 497–S. Your personal telegram of 16th February No. 2988.[1] Gandhi. I am repeating separately, as I think this will best put you in the picture, my personal telegram of 18th February[2] to Governors. As you will see I have made it clear that I would not agree to half-masting and that I am myself against closing of courts though I keep an open mind on that last point pending their replies.

2. As regards paragraph 2 of your telegram, my own view is that any message on the part of Government must contain no unction, no excuse for or explanation of Government's part in Gandhi's end; no word of recrimination against the man himself, while on the other hand any eulogy would equally jar. My own view therefore favours something to the effect that "The Government of India regret to announce that Mr. Gandhi died while in detention at Poona at . . . hours on . . . from collapse/heart failure following a self-imposed fast". Maxwell shares my view and comments that the only thing that might be added, *if anything were to be added*, would be an entirely objective recapitulation of the facts, viz. that Gandhi started his fast on 10th February and refused to conduct it under his own arrangements outside the Palace. Government therefore put all medical resources available at his disposal and allowed him to have his own doctors and nurses. It had earlier become apparent that at his age he could not stand the 21 days' fast he had imposed upon himself and he was warned to that effect by his medical advisers. However, he persisted in it with fatal results.

3. I cannot myself feel as regards the addition mentioned by Maxwell that a recital of our actions designed to help the fatal fast would do us any good,

and would myself leave it quite simple and bare. My own view is therefore in favour of my original draft as set out above. But if it is to be a Council announcement, it is conceivable that my colleagues might wish to make some modification in its terms. I would be grateful if you would therefore regard it as wholly provisional.

[1] No. 471. [2] See No. 483.

491

Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/57

19 February 1943, by secraphone

This morning Purshottamdas Thakurdas asked if he could bring to see me Mr. Amritl Thakur who had seen Gandhi on Wednesday morning.[1] There was a suggestion that he would be able to throw some fresh light on Gandhi's attitude to sabotage. I thought it best not to refuse to see them. Mr. Thakur repeated to me the substance of Gandhi's talk to him. It was to the effect that though he was blamed for arson and sabotage and the violence which were said to have gone on, he could assure Mr. Thakur that he had not planned it, that it had never been in his mind, and that he could never countenance it. Sir Purshottamdas drew from this the deduction that if Gandhi were released he would be certain to condemn the campaign of sabotage, and possibly ask those carrying it on to surrender to Government. He asked me to convey this to you. I said I would do so but that I could give no indication of its value. I requested them not to publicize their interview with me which they agreed to.

[1] 17 February.

492

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2754: f 163

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *19 February 1943, 12.55 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL
MOST SECRET

190. Your personal telegrams 487–S,[1] 488–S,[2] and p. and p. 489–S[3] received 19th Feby. I have not yet had opportunity to speak to P.M. who is laid up nor

[1] No. 485. [2] No. 486. [3] No. 487.

Eden who for your very private inf[ormatio]n is shortly visiting U.S.A. In meantime please see in my immediately following p. and p. telm. text of message from Halifax dated 16 Feby. but despatched 18th and received in I.O. 19th Feby. I am glad you answered Phillips so firmly.

493

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2754: f 164

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *19 February 1943, 2.25 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 20 February*

191. My immediately preceding telegram. Following is text of telegram No. 787 from Washington to F.O. *Begins.* 1. Secretary of State touched on India this afternoon, being careful to say he was doing so off the record adding that he had not received any communication of importance from Phillips and that he knew too well how heavy were the imponderables to make anything of the nature of a suggestion.

But he was nevertheless rather disturbed as to what might happen if Gandhi died. He wondered whether there was anything we could do to forestall possible trouble.

2. I told him of the clearly expressed attitude of the Government of India before the fast had begun, as recorded in their published statement, which left no doubt of the impossibility of accepting Gandhi's suggestion of unconditional release. For the rest I could assure him that both the Government of India and His Majesty's Government were fully alive to everything that was involved. Meanwhile, as I had no doubt he would agree, it was of the utmost importance that Phillips should take no action that would in any way suggest he was seeking to intervene on behalf of the United States.

3. The Secretary of State warmly agreed and said that he had with the President's approval drafted Phillips's instructions with cautions and double cautions in this sense so that if we had seen them we should not have wished to change a word. He went on to give a not uninteresting indication of his mind. He thought it might help if as far as possible we took the offensive in public presentation. The war was the only thing that immediately mattered. Gandhi's record in regard to the war could only lead to one opinion. To let him have the leadership that he sought would be fatal to any Indian war effort. If his attitude was a sample of the majority of those he sought to lead at this time of the greatest fight for freedom in all history, God help India! *Ends.*

494

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2754: f 157

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *19 February 1943, 10 pm*
PERSONAL

3245. Your personal telegram 493–S.[1] Phillips. My next succeeding telegram repeats telegram sent by Foreign Office to Washington. I hope this will help you. Prime Minister is unwell but has been sent copies of all your telegrams.

2. Eden's departure for Washington is slightly postponed owing to Prime Minister's indisposition but he has agreed to take matter up when he gets there. He will I hope emphasise in strongest terms our objection to U.S. intervention in this matter, the impropriety and unwisdom of which would have been just as great, though less embarrassing to yourself, if it had been made to H.M.G. here or at Washington.

3. If the facts do get out to the Press the immediate effect on Anglo-American relations will, like Gandhi's death on the Indian situation, be very serious. The long term effect of a public show-down may in each case be all to the good. But we must try and keep the story dark if we can just as we have done our best to save Gandhi's life.

4. Comparing dates I conclude not only that Hull's message[2] to Phillips was dictated by President subsequent to Hull's warm repudiation of any idea of intervention but that the real source of it was Madame Chiang Kai-shek who is staying at White House and over whom all America has gone crazy. *Cherchez la femme.*[3]

5. You could not have handled Phillips better. I pity the poor man.

[1] No. 489. [2] See No. 485. [3] See Vol. II, No. 532.

495

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2754: f 156

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *19 February 1943, 9.35 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 20 February*

3246. Following is telegram referred to in my immediately preceding telegram:—

Begins. Your telegram No. 787[1] of 18th February. Gandhi. I have repeated to you Viceroy's telegrams Nos. 487,[2] 488[3] and 493–S,[4] which show that

[1] See No. 493. [2] No. 485. [3] No. 486. [4] No. 489.

subsequently Mr. Hull sent instructions from President and himself to Mr. Phillips to make informal intervention.

2. Secretary of State for India and I agree with the Viceroy that effect of any suggestion that Mr. Phillips or U.S. Government were intervening in any way might be most serious. It seems that Mr. Phillips has reported to Washington: please see Mr. Hull and ask him to instruct Mr. Phillips to make no statement which will indicate that he has made any approach to the Viceroy on the subject of the treatment of Gandhi.

3. If U.S. Government wish to express their views on our handling of the Indian situation they must do this through H.M.G. in London. Secretary of State for India and I entirely endorse language that you held to Mr. Hull. We share Mr. Hull's view—as does the Viceroy—that the war is what immediately matters. *Ends.*

496

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/11/5b: ff 157–8

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *19 February 1943, 5 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 20 February*

192. Your private and personal telegram 326-S[1] of 6th February. Home Membership. I delayed replying until repercussions of Gandhi's fast on your Council could be gauged. It is to be hoped that there are no more to come, but evidently we must now consider Home portfolio in relation to three additional portfolios (over and above Information) now vacant.

2. I am indeed sorry if I have misled you in any way on the background here. What I intended to convey was that from a Parliamentary and publicity point of view position would be much easier to hold if I could point to Indianisation being carried out step by step on basis of continuity and efficiency and not as a gesture. It would also accord with my own conception of the right path for us to follow. I have no doubt that a number of my colleagues would in principle and on the above basis favour Indianisation of the Home Membership but issue now is one rather of expediency than principle.

3. What I should like therefore is that you should send me a personal telegram without reference to our private discussion raising the issue against new background and giving your considered judgment as to best course to adopt on merits. If your view should be in favour of Indian your telegram should cover the D.I.B. and Service points raised in my private and personal telegram 122[2]

as these will be present to minds of Ministers who were associated with 1935 Act discussions.

3. [4.] Zafrullah though at pains to find plausible reasons for resignation of Aney, Sarkar and Mody, is evidently much shaken by event. Mudaliar has not yet returned though expected daily. I realise that in new situation he may be of more value to you at Delhi than here especially with his added experience and enlarged horizon, leaving representation here unfilled for the moment.

[1] No. 399. [2] No. 384.

497

Viscount Simon to Mr Amery

L/PO/6/102b: f 228

HOUSE OF LORDS, S.W.1, *19 February 1943*

My dear Leo,

GANDHI

There is one thing about the Viceroy's telegrams as to medical reports on Gandhi's condition which I do not understand. Gandhi announced that he was going to fast "to capacity", but that he was not going to fast "to death". Then why do not the doctors tell him that capacity is now reached, and that he ought to stop? If that is their view, and if he does not then chuck his fast, he is no longer carrying out the programme which he announced.

Yours ever,
JOHN

498

Mr Rajagopalachari to Sir G. Laithwaite

MSS. EUR. F. 125/125

28 FEROZSHAH ROAD, NEW DELHI, *19 February 1943*

Dear Sir Gilbert,

The Conference of Leaders invited to consider the situation arising out of the fast declared by Mahatma Gandhi met this afternoon and they appointed a Committee to draft a Resolution to be adopted by the Conference. The Committee consisted of the following persons:—

Right Hon'ble Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru; Dr. M. R. Jayakar; Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukerji; Sri Rajagopalachariar; Mr. Allah Bakhsh; Mr. G. L. Mehta;

Mr. K. M. Munshi; Sir Jagdish Prasad; Mr. N. M. Joshi; Mr. Bhulabhai Desai; Sir Maharaj Singh; Master Tara Singh; Sir Ardeshir Dalal; Pandit H. N. Kunzru; Sir A. H. Ghuznavi; Mr. Kasturbhai Lalbhai; Mr. K. C. Neogy; Raja Maheshwar Dyal; Dr. Bannerji; Mr. H. A. Lalljee; Mr. N. C. Chatterji; Mr. Randive; Dr. Moonje; Mr. Kiron Shankar Roy; Khwaja Hasan Nizami; Muhammad Zahiruddin; Mrs. Sarala Chaudhurani; Dr. Shaukat Ansari; Mr. M. A. Kazmi; Mr. Zafar Hossain; Mrs. K. Sayani; Mr. Abdul Halim Siddiqi and Mrs. Hanna Sen.

They have unanimously adopted the enclosed Resolution for being placed before the Conference tomorrow morning. But, in view of the alarming reports received about the condition of Mahatma Gandhi, the Committee resolved to send the Resolution to His Excellency, in advance, for immediate action. I, accordingly, do so, with the request that you may kindly place it before His Excellency.

Yours sincerely,
C. RAJAGOPALACHARI

Enclosure to No. 498

[*There follows the text of Enclosure 1 to No. 506.*]

499

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

PRIVATE AND SECRET INDIA OFFICE, *19 February 1943*

Cherchez la femme remains ever up to date![1] I may be wrong, but comparing the dates of Cordell Hull's talk with Halifax, when he warmly endorsed Halifax's view that it would be a mistake for America to intervene in any way in the Indian situation,[2] and Phillips' receipt of a telegram[3] as a result of which, obviously at the President's direction, Phillips intervenes to ask you a [to?] release Gandhi unconditionally, I am irresistibly drawn to the conclusion that Madame Chiang Kai-shek and Mrs. Roosevelt between them have got at the President. Obviously there was only one possible answer that you could give and I am glad you gave it so firmly and definitely to poor Phillips, who must realise the embarrassing position in which he has been put. This is, of course, made much worse by the press and if he cannot put them off the scent and it once leaks out that the President has intervened and that we have turned him down—which we must do whatever happens—the result will be most unfortunate: unfortunate, at any rate, like Gandhi's death, in its immediate

consequences; in the long run it may be a very good thing if the United States and the world know that we have definitely told America to keep off the grass.

2. I have of course immediately sent on your telegrams to Winston urging him to take the matter up at once with the President. The trouble is that the poor man is in bed with a really bad chill: his temper[ature] was 102 last night; and I don't know whether he will feel up to doing anything in the matter for the next few days. On the other hand, Anthony is off for America very soon and I think he can be trusted to handle the matter firmly as well as tactfully. He has expressed his entire agreement with our point of view here and with the line which you have taken. So we must hope for the best.

3. I am not altogether sure that I agree with you in putting the main cause of trouble on the appointment of a representative at Delhi. The trouble lies in the President thinking that it is part of his business to interfere in our internal affairs. Whether that interference is communicated to our Ambassador at Washington, to the Foreign Office here, or to you in Delhi, it is equally intolerable. It is not so long ago that a British Ambassador had to be withdrawn from Washington because in a private letter he expressed opinions which were considered to favour one party in a forthcoming American election.[4] I am not sure indeed that the position might not in some ways have been better if Phillips had been quite avowedly a diplomatic representative and not a personal one, for diplomats are generally recognised as having to obey a certain code in the countries to which they are accredited, and I had hoped that Phillips' long experience in that field would have imbued him with that code. Possibly, after the initial correction of his misunderstanding, that might have been so so far as he personally was concerned; but I assume that it was just because of the supposed

S./S. misses one point. It is the effect on the Indian mind of the new U.S.A. diplomatic machine in India. No Indian knew or cared what Wilson did or said. Again, it is my view that we have been unwise to allow any strong ambassadorial flavour to be injected into U.S.A. representation in India in face of the constitutional position and international status of India.

L.,—14.3.43.

[1] See Vol. II, No. 532. [2] See No. 493. [3] See No. 485.

[4] The Editors are indebted to Mr Hugh Brogan for the following comments: 'the 1888 Presidential election was a close one. In order to win it the Republicans tried to pin the pro-British label on President Cleveland. One of their number wrote to the British Minister, Sackville-West, posing as a recently naturalised American of English birth, and asking how he should vote. Sackville-West very foolishly told him that Cleveland was more desirous "of maintaining friendly relations with Britain" than the Republican, Benjamin Harrison. At the height of the campaign the Republicans published the letter, making Cleveland seem a pro-British stooge. Cleveland asked Salisbury to recall Sackville-West, but was refused (so characteristic of Salisbury's relations with Cleveland!—cf. 1895) so he was obliged to dismiss Sackville-West himself. Nevertheless, he lost the election.'

urgency of time as regards Gandhi, that led to the telegram being sent direct to Delhi. Anyhow, I am sure that we should be making a mistake if we based our case against the United States on the channel of communication and not on the intrinsic impropriety of the action actually taken.

No one suggested we should be as stupid as all that.

L.

23 February

4. *The Times* had a helpful letter on Gandhi this morning, but the *News Chronicle* and *Manchester Guardian* continue to be thoroughly mischievous, though so far with not much effect on public opinion. The House of Commons seems singularly unmoved, though I may have to face a certain amount of hysterical indignation, if Gandhi dies, from a little handful of Congress adherents.

5. I am asking the Cabinet to agree to Maxwell's extension for another 12 months. In view of what has happened on your Executive it seems to me the obviously right course, glad as I would have been in other circumstances, if you could have recommended Usman. I told Mudaliar yesterday that the resignations on your Executive had obviously set back the policy of Indianisation in which he is so interested, at any rate for a time. I also realise that you may have to fill up partly with officials, and from all I have heard Hydari ought to do very well. On the other hand I should be sorry if you did not fill up all the posts somehow, even if for the moment you are leaving some to be handled by Secretaries or doubled up. I hope to telegraph to you about these matters in the course of the week.

[Para. 6, suggesting that statements to the Indian Legislature on the military situation might be made in secret session; and para. 7, on a request for a contribution from the Viceroy's War Purposes Fund to the Officers' Families Fund, omitted.]

PS.—I imagine that you still have some names in view with whom you could fill up, e.g. Azizul Haque, Krishnamachari, Runganadhan, &c. And I see no reason why you shouldn't somewhat increase your proportion of Muslims.

500

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *20 February 1943, 4.20 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 20 February, 2 pm*

No. 503–S. Your personal telegram of 19th February No. 3245,[1] and connected correspondence. Phillips. I am most grateful for all your help and support. I too had noticed the discrepancy in dates, and I dare say that your explanation is the right one! I have great sympathy for Phillips whose position is very difficult, and I will of course spare no pains to keep what has happened wholly secret. I do not anticipate any difficulty in doing so.

[1] No. 494.

501

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *20 February 1943, 6.25 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 504–S. Your private and personal telegram of 19th February No. 192.[1] Home Membership. I fully understand position and am grateful for your help. I have no doubt myself now in the light of recent events that we must stick to Maxwell (and I would indeed, were he not available, be prepared to recommend a further service appointment). These recent resignations have shown very clearly the dangers involved in further Indianization at this stage and the essential necessity for the Viceroy (particularly as my successor might not have my personal familiarity with the Centre) having solid support until a later stage in development here.

2. I propose to put Firoz in charge of Supply, and he is quite ready to take that on. For the moment I contemplate temporarily combining Law and Defence, though Sultan Ahmed, who is in no way outstanding, would clearly like to go to Commerce. I think myself that there would be great advantage in bringing Mudaliar back, but would be grateful if we could leave this over for the moment. If I have to replace him, somebody like Sultan Ahmed might do, and I am pretty certain that we would be pressed, as the first two appointments to War Cabinet were of Hindus, that their successors, if and when selected, must be Muslims. I propose to be in no hurry whatever about the filling of

[1] No. 496.

these vacancies: and it would be most unwise, other things apart, to do anything in the first instance until the issue as regards Gandhi's fast in [is] finally settled. I can carry on perfectly well with Secretaries for the time being.

502

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *20 February 1943, 6.40 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 20 February, 6.15 pm*

No. 505–S. Term of office of Maxwell, my Home Member, expires on April 4th, and we must now take a decision as to what is then to be done. Alternatives are to extend or reappoint Maxwell for a further period, or to select a non-official.

2. I have had this much in my mind for many months past and I have been open as regards the selection of a non-official, Sir Mohammad Usman having occurred to me as a possible. He is reliable, stout-hearted, and would, I am certain, give full support over matters of Intelligence and Services, as well as being entirely sound in the constitutional field.

3. On the other hand, Usman has himself most strongly urged me against any further Indianization. It would, he says, too, be very ill seen by Jinnah (not that that matters very much) and deprive us of one of very few remaining cards in our hand: and I have myself been greatly shaken by the failure of Members of my Council of such standing as Mody, Aney and Sarker to stand up to opposition over Gandhi's fast and by their running-out in face of a threat of this nature. It is too early yet to judge of the long term consequences of that failure or of any other resignations that may follow in the event of Gandhi's death. But I am quite clear in my own mind that I could not advise His Majesty's Government in face of it to take the risks involved in appointing a non-official to be Home Member in present circumstances.

4. My own judgment is that we should reappoint Maxwell on the understanding that he will not be asked in the normal way to stay on for more than a year. I have reason to believe that he would be ready to serve if it was put to him as a matter of public duty, and I shall be ready so to put it. He has great experience and much wisdom, and while his health has always been frail I would hope that he could stand the extra term. But were he to refuse or to be unable to stand the extra term I should then feel it my duty to advise His Majesty's Government that he should be succeeded by a European member of the I.C.S. We need not however examine that contingency at the present stage.

5. I ought perhaps to add in case question is raised in the Cabinet that while Raisman's tenure as Finance Member does not expire until April 1944, so that the appointment of his successor would take place during the next Viceroyalty, my own considered view is that that portfolio also ought to continue to be held for a further term by an official, and preferably, I would have said, by the re-appointment of Raisman who has done very well in it.

6. I would be grateful for earliest reply that you can with convenience let me have as Maxwell's arrangements will of course be affected.

503

The Marquess of Linlithgow to all Provincial Governors

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

IMMEDIATE *20 February 1943*

No. 507–S. Reference my telegram No. 483–S[1] dated 18th February, 1943. I have little doubt that in the event contemplated therein students would, as in last August, provide the most inflammatory element in the situation. I assume that your Government has reckoned on this possibility and will take all special measures which previous experience has suggested to be desirable to control educational institutions from the outset.

[1] See No. 483.

504

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *20 February 1943, 9.50 pm*

PERSONAL *Received: 20 February, 9 pm*

No. 509–S. A meeting of "Leaders", most of them Moderates, has been convened here to discuss the situation arising out of Gandhi's fast.

2. I am reuterbucking[1] text of resolution[2] passed by them and of reply[3] sent on my instructions to Sapru.

3. As you will see there is nothing whatever fresh in the resolution. It is simply an appeal *ad misericordiam*. Rajagopalachari took the line in his speech

[1] Abbreviation signifying to send to London by Reuter. [2] Enclosure 1 to No. 506.
[3] No. 507.

that Gandhi's fast "to capacity" represented his own estimate of the period for which he would fast; that it seemed almost certain to be excessive; that it was impossible for Gandhi to revise his calculations; and that in those circumstances it was for Government to release him. There is no single fresh argument. I am reuterbucking to you separately text of a Muslim article in today's *Statesman* which forcibly brings out the weakness of the case.

505

The Marquess of Linlithgow to all Provincial Governors

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

IMMEDIATE *20 February 1943*

No. 511–S. Gandhi's fast. It is obvious from today's bulletin that Gandhi's condition is increasingly serious, though it is of course impossible to say how much longer he will last. But we must clearly be prepared for a collapse.

2. I have now had replies[1] from all Governors except Bengal and Orissa to my circular telegram No. 483[2] of 18th February. Some divergence of view manifests itself but principally in details; and in the light of their replies received I am clear: (*a*) that there should be no closure of offices, though Governors will naturally use a wise discretion as to casual leave on or immediately after Gandhi's death, and will probably be disposed to turn a blind eye to unimportant absences without leave.

(I trust that you will have no difficulty with your Ministers over closure of offices, and appreciate their attitude as described in your telegram No. 190–C of 19th February.)[3]

(*b*) No half-masting or other formal official signs of mourning. (*c*) As regards processions, meetings, &c., I recognise that circumstances differ in different Provinces, and feel that I can but leave discretion to each Governor to handle his local situation as he thinks best, subject to the interests of security.

3. As regards disposal of the ashes; one Governor[4] has very strongly urged that complete secrecy as regards method of disposal, route, &c. should be observed so as to prevent organisation of demonstrations, &c. *en route*. I sympathise entirely with this but we shall have to wait until death has actually taken place and we have been able to ascertain wishes of relatives. I will however arrange, in any event, that publicity as regards arrangements for their conveyance shall be kept from coming over All-India Radio.

4. It is most important to keep proper restraint over the Press. We shall inevitably have to allow a certain degree of liberty in the days following

Gandhi's death for commemorative articles, &c. But general principles regarding censorship set out in my circular telegram of 18th February to Governors will apply. In other words, we must try to take Press with us so far as practicable. But matter must in the last resort rest with Governors. You will I know bear in mind that what may be unobjectionable in the special circumstances of your own Province may have embarrassing effects in a neighbouring Province where conditions are different.

5. You will see in Press, Resolution[5] by Leaders' Conference here, and reply sent to it.[6] There is of course no fresh argument in the Resolution, and I have avoided entering into detail in my reply.

(6. Please give copy of this telegram to Governor of Madras if still with you.)[7]

Repeated to Secretary of State, Assistant Private Secretary to Governor of Madras and Military Secretary to Governor of Central Provinces.

[1] Not printed; see MSS. EUR. F. 125/111. [2] See No. 483.
[3] To Sind only. Sir H. Dow had reported that his Premier and Home Minister favoured closure of public offices (with which he himself agreed) but would not attempt to act against Lord Linlithgow's advice. MSS. EUR. F. 125/111.
[4] Sir M. Hallett. [5] Enclosure 1 to No. 506. [6] No. 507. [7] To Bombay only.

506

Sir T. B. Sapru to Sir G. Laithwaite

MSS. EUR. F. 125/125

28 FEROZSHAH ROAD, NEW DELHI, *20 February 1943*

Dear Sir Gilbert,

I send you herewith a copy of a Resolution unanimously adopted by the Conference at its today's Session. I also send herewith a list of persons who moved and supported the Resolution. I further send herewith a list[1] of a few prominent persons who either attended the Conference or have associated themselves with it. I shall thank you to place the letter and the enclosures before His Excellency the Viceroy.

Yours sincerely,

T. B. SAPRU

Enclosure 1 to No. 506

"This Conference representing different creeds, communities and interests in India, gives expression to the universal desire of the people of this country that, in the interests of the future of India and of international goodwill, Mahatma Gandhi should be released immediately and unconditionally. This Conference

[1] Not printed.

views with the gravest concern the serious situation that will arise if the Government fail to take timely action and prevent a catastrophe. This Conference, therefore, urges the Government to release Mahatma Gandhi forthwith."[2]

TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU

Enclosure 2 to No. 506

LIST OF PERSONS WHO MOVED AND SUPPORTED THE RESOLUTION

[*There follow names and descriptions of the following: Dr M. R. Jayakar, Dr S. P. Mookerjee, Raja Sir Maharaj Singh, Sir Suleiman Cassum Haji Mitha, Master Tara Singh, Reverend J. Mackenzie, Srimati Saraladevi Chaudhurani, Allah Bakhsh, Sir Vijaya of Vizianagram, Sir A. H. Ghuznavi, Maulana Ahmed Sayeed Saheb, N. M. Joshi, Abdul Qaiyum, G. L. Mehta, Zahiruddin, Humayun Kabir, Pandit H. N. Kunzru, K. M. Munshi, Sardar Sant Singh, B. T. Randive.*]

[2] On 20 February Sir T. B. Sapru sent the following telegram to Mr Churchill and Mr Amery: 'Leading Indians from all parts of India met in Conference today New Delhi and adopted following resolution moved by Right Honourable Dr. Jayakar lately member Judicial Committee and supported by other important representative citizens in India. *Resolution begins*: [*There follows the text of Enclosure 1 to No. 506*]. Tej Bahadur Sapru President.'

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Sir G. Laithwaite to Sir T. B. Sapru

MSS. EUR. F. 125/125

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *20 February 1943*

Dear Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru,

His Excellency asks me to say that he has received and considered the resolution adopted by the Conference under your Chairmanship, of which you were good enough to send him a copy today.[1] The attitude of the Government of India in the matter of Mr. Gandhi's fast is set out clearly and in detail in the communiqué which they issued on 10th February, a copy of which I enclose for convenience of reference. No new factor has emerged since that date, and, as the Government of India's communiqué brings out clearly, responsibility in connection with his fast rests solely with Mr. Gandhi, with whom, and not with Government, the decision to bring it to an end must rest.[2]

Yours sincerely,

J. G. LAITHWAITE

[1] No. 506.

[2] In a further exchange of letters of the same date, Sir G. Laithwaite informed Sir T. B. Sapru that he proposed to release this reply to the Press, to which the latter saw no objection. MSS. EUR. F. 125/125.

508

Mr Amery to Viscount Simon

L/PO/6/102b: f 227

INDIA OFFICE, *20 February 1943*

My dear John,

The possibility of warning Gandhi that he had now reached the danger point[1] was considered a few days ago and you will see from telegrams No. 451–S[2] and 464–S,[3] which were circulated, that in the end it was decided not to give a formal warning. Gandhi's own doctors were against giving such a warning on the ground that they would not tell any patient in Gandhi's condition a medical prognosis of the kind suggested. The unofficial medical attendants have already made it quite clear to Gandhi that they do not think he can last 21 days and the Surgeon-General's opinion to that effect has also been conveyed to him. I think myself that there would be some objection to the Surgeon-General giving a warning of this kind unless the non-official medical attendants on Gandhi were associated with him, as there seems to be a possibility that a communication of this kind might precipitate a heart attack, which is the greatest danger to Gandhi's life.

I do not think it is quite correct to say that Gandhi announced that he was not going to fast to death. What he said in his letter to the Viceroy of the 29th January[4] was "My wish is not to fast unto death, but to survive the ordeal of the feat if God so wills." I should read the phrase "to capacity" to mean that he had modified his usual regimen during a fast to bring a 21 days' fast within what he considered his powers; but I should doubt if he can be read as meaning that if this proves beyond his powers he will give up the fast rather than die.

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

[1] See No. 497. [2] No. 468. [3] No. 478. [4] No. 369

509

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/158

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *21 February 1943*

9–U. Your P&P telegram of 19th February 192.[1] I have telegraphed[2] separately[3] about Maxwell. But I would like your reaction to what follows. My

[1] No. 496. [2] Nos. 501 and 502. [3] 'separately' deciphered as 'scruples'.

own instinct is that this is the moment to hit pretty hard. I have no one very outstanding in the way of Europeans, except Jenkins, in the departments.[4] Hutchings is a good runner-up but he is still very junior. But I feel that the more we bring home to the Congress and their supporters and to these weak-kneed moderates that if they are not able to carry this burden the wind will change, the better. I am therefore much inclined to make a service appointment to one of the vacant portfolios when the time comes. Omitting Jenkins and excluding Hutchings on the grounds of his juniority, it might be worth considering Hydari. He has done well as acting Chairman of the Supply Council; he is senior as a Secretary; he is tactful and a competent negotiator; we should have little if any criticism from Muslim quarters; and the Moderates would have got what they have asked for, while less criticism would be created by appointment of an Indian service member, and Hydari might very well give us a useful reserve for use whenever Maxwell's term ended. My mind is open, but I am very much attracted by this possibility and I would hope that Cabinet would support if I came down in favour of a recommendation of this order. I would like you however if you would be so kind to consider the matter in terms of the appointment of a service Member and possibly a European rather than with reference to a specific individual. While Jenkins' claim to selection is outstanding and his ability unquestionable, I attach such importance to the other possibilities which I have discussed with you for him and to avoiding spoiling him for them, that I would regard it as more important that he should remain at this stage as a departmental secretary than that he should become a Member of Council which would make it difficult to employ him in the manner that I have put to you in our correspondence.[5] But there remains much to be said in favour of strengthening Council for the next five or six critical years by the appointment of one so outstanding as Jenkins.

2. There is no great hurry for I do not propose to rush over filling these vacancies. But it would much help me to make up my mind to have your reactions. I would repeat that I think this is the time to hit hard and make it clear to these people how much they have lost, and I would like to regain a good deal of the ground which the persuasions of people like Mudaliar and Zafrullah have resulted in our losing of late.

[4] 'the departments' deciphered as 'Deolali'.

[5] i.e. that he should become the next Viceroy's Private Secretary.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2754: f 153

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *21 February 1943, 7 pm*

3366. Following from Washington to F.O. No. 868, 20 Feb. *Begins.* Dedip.[1] Your telegram No. 1137[2] and Viceroy's telegrams to which it refers.

I saw Mr. Hull this morning and began by speaking to him in the sense of your telegram No. 1137 emphasising particularly the request in last sentence of paragraph 2 and the constitutional position as expressed in first of paragraph 3.

2. Mr. Hull, who at this point was called to the telephone and returned saying that it had been the President speaking to him on this subject, began by reporting messages from Phillips, giving account of his interview with the Viceroy and communication to the Private Secretary to the Viceroy, which coincided very closely, so far as I could judge, with the Viceroy's reports of these contacts as contained in his telegrams No. 488–S[3] and 493–S.[4]

Mr. Hull said that Phillips, while appreciating all the difficulties of the situation, felt extreme embarrassment at the prospect of the creation of public impression that United States and he, as the President's representative, were sitting with hands folded doing nothing on an issue that was likely to have grave international reactions. For these, United States Government must inevitably in part be held responsible.

3. The President had discussed matter fully with Mr. Hull who had done his best to state both sides of the case.

The President however was impressed by the undesirable consequences on public opinion in the United States and elsewhere if Gandhi died, and wondered whether less harm would not be done if Gandhi was released before he died.

4. I asked him what degree of official character this suggestion should be held to carry. Without answering this question directly, Mr. Hull said that the President's thought as expressed to him, was that he wished the British Government to know "our biggest desire is not to see the fellow die in prison".

5. I said that the situation appeared to resolve itself into the (group undecypherable ?single) question of whether or not Gandhi should be released, or events allowed to take their course. Mr. Hull agreed, and expressed no positive opinion beyond saying that it might be a case whether damage of

[1] i.e. to be deciphered by a member of the diplomatic staff.

[2] Presumably the telegram repeated in No. 495. [3] No. 486. [4] No. 489.

what would be represented as martyrdom would not be greater than anything else.

6. I then read him the Viceroy's telegram No. 488–S, and said that the present situation had to be viewed against recent back history on which the Government of India had made their position quite clear and that great weight must attach to the Viceroy's considered judgement as to the effect of one course or other on the Indian situation.

My own judgement for what it was worth would be that the effect of Gandhi's death would be less serious now than it would have been six months ago, and that it might even be possible that the effect in India would be less difficult to handle than the effect on emotional public opinion elsewhere.

7. I undertook to transmit the President's feelings at once, and again urged him to send message as requested in your telegram under reference to Phillips. This on double grounds [of the] situation in India and to avoid misunderstanding on the realities of constitutional position.

With this Mr. Hull though not giving definite undertaking, appeared to agree and concluded by asking me what would be the best line for him or the President to take when they could not avoid questions by the press. To this I replied that the vital point seemed to be the avoidance of appearance of intervention. Let them say they were naturally watching all events closely that might arise affecting the war in any area, and that they were constantly in receipt of the latest information from India about Gandhi. I hoped they would also add that matter that interested them, as it interested us, was the war.

8. Mr. Hull appeared to assent to this kind of line and will I hope put it to the President. He also agreed it was possible to exaggerate the importance of worked up sentiment in this country, though he is clearly uneasy about it. The President is plainly the same.

They clearly feel that from point of view of agitation outside India, release of Gandhi when his situation becomes critical would avoid obvious dangers. At the same time they are not insensible of the dangers on the other side. But I anticipate that as anxiety about the issue of fast grows, so also will grow the tendency to question the wisdom of the policy of letting him die on our hands.

511

Mr Churchill to the Marquess of Linlithgow (via War Office and Commander-in-Chief)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/158

IMMEDIATE

21 February 1943
Received: 22 February

54642. Following personal and secret from Prime Minister to Viceroy of India (through Field Marshal Wavell).

It is a great comfort to me as the Gandhi episode approaches its climax to feel that we can count on your steadfast and unflinching action.

512

Sir T. B. Sapru and others to Mr Churchill

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 247

21 February 1943, 8.25 pm

Three hundred public men from different parts of India representing various communities, creeds and interests including commerce and industry, landed interests, workers, communists, Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Parsis and British missionaries met yesterday at New Delhi and unanimously passed a Resolution urging immediate and unconditional release of Mahatma Gandhi whose condition is fast approaching a crisis. We fear that unless immediately released he will pass away. We wish to explain to British public opinion that the Mahatma is fasting only to be able to review the situation as a free man and to advise the people accordingly and not on the issue of independence. We are convinced that the terms of his letter of twenty-third September[1] recently published by Government amount to an unequivocal disapproval on behalf of himself and the Congress of all acts of violence. The Chairman of the Conference, Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, submitted the resolution to the Viceroy yesterday afternoon[2] and immediately afterwards he received a reply[3] from the Viceroy declining to interfere as no new factor had arisen to alter the previous decision and enclosing the official communication of 10th February. We deeply deplore that the advice of so many representative and responsible men should have been summarily turned down by the Viceroy. We firmly believe that if the Mahatma's life is spared a way will be opened to the promotion of peace and goodwill as surely as his death as a British prisoner will intensify public embitterment.

[1] Vol. II, No. 779; the date should be 21 September. [2] No. 506. [3] No. 507.

The charges brought by Government against the Mahatma do not rest upon an examination by any impartial tribunal or independent body of men. We firmly believe that much of the trouble which has arisen was preventible by timely action on the part of Government last summer and that the Mahatma should have been allowed to see the Viceroy to find a solution as he desired. Millions of our countrymen feel that the responsibility for saving the Mahatma's life now rests only with the Government. We therefore urge that the Mahatma should be forthwith released. As under the existing constitution the ultimate responsibility is of the British Parliament for the peace and tranquillity of India we request that this cable may be brought to its notice in order that it may do justice in the matter. We are convinced that wise and liberal statesmanship will solve the Indo-British problem more speedily and effectively than stern repression.

[*There follow names and descriptions of these signatories: Sir T. B. Sapru, C. Rajagopalachari, Allah Bakhsh, N. C. Chatterjee, Sir A. H. Ghuznavi, Mrs Saraladevi Chaudhurani, Dr Ashraf, Dr S. Ansari, B. T. Randive, Dr S. P. Mookerjee, Dr B. S. Moonjee, Raja Maheshwar Dayal Seth, Bhulabhai Desai, Dr P. N. Banerjee, Pandit H. N. Kunzru, Mrs Hannah Sen, P. Subbarayan, J. R. D. Tata, N. M. Joshi, Sir Ardeshir R. Dalal, Dr Sachchidananda Sinha, G. L. Mehta, Kiransankar Roy, Qazi Mohammad Ahmad Kazmi, Sewa Singh Gill, Humayun Kabir, Dr M. R. Jayakar, K. M. Munshi, Sir Jagdish Prasad.*]

513

Viscount Halifax to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2754: f 149

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, *21 February 1943, 4.8 pm*
Received: 21 February, 10.10 pm

No. 870. My telegram No. 868.[1]

Press mentions this morning that the subject of India figured in my conversation with the Secretary of State yesterday. It is made plain that United States Government expressed concern about the position arising from Gandhi's fast, but pains are taken that this expression of concern should not be interpreted as American intervention.

2. This goes further than the suggestion I made to the Secretary of State, reported in paragraph 7 of my telegram under reference, but I doubt whether the bulletin could well have said less once he admitted to having discussed India with me in view of the state of public opinion in this country, and especially of

negro interest (vide message[2] to the Prime Minister from National Association for Advancement of the Coloured People).

Repeated to Viceroy, New Delhi, telegram No. 8.

[1] See No. 510. [2] Not printed.

514

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *22 February 1943, 12.10 am*
PERSONAL *Received: 21 February, 9 pm*

No. 520–S. The Committee of the Leaders Conference met today and decided after four hours discussion to send to the Prime Minister, Greenwood and Harris a telegram[1] an advance copy of which I have just received. The telegram contains no argument which I and my Council have not already considered at length and I hope that any reply will make it plain that His Majesty's Government are in full accord with the Government of India in their decision not to release Gandhi unconditionally and not to yield to this form of coercion. The terms of whatever reply is sent will be of the greatest importance as strengthening our position here and also, as I think you will agree, at Washington.

2. I hope it may be possible for you to persuade Greenwood and Harris to take a similar line.

[1] Presumably No. 512.

515

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *22 February 1943, 9.50 am*
PERSONAL *Received: 22 February, 6.45 pm*

No. 523–S. My telegram No. 520–S[1] of 21st February. In view of the state of Gandhi's health, it would help our position here if Prime Minister's reply to the Leaders Conference telegram could be in our hands as soon as possible, and I hope that you will do all that you can to press for this. The leaders have not ventured to suggest a deputation to me, no doubt being aware of the weakness of their case. Rajagopalachari and Birla have asked to see me, but in present conditions I am not giving any private interviews.

[1] No. 514; the date should be 22 February.

2. My impression is that as, day after day, Gandhi unexpectedly lives on, there seems to be a slight reduction in the tempo of public excitement. Srivastava and Sultan Ahmed are still under considerable pressure to resign, and I am seeing both of them this evening. I am also trying to arrange that Srivastava shall leave Delhi on tour as soon as possible. I gather that the Mahasabha are now disposed to leave the question of resignation to Srivastava's discretion. Ambedkar is reported to be firm.[2] Jogendra Singh has retired to bed with influenza.

3. Rajagopalachari is, I hear, advising the leaders not to try to stir up too much sympathy in America over this business fearing that if the Americans take a hand, that will only harden opinion at home.

4. I am repeating to you separately a message from Lumley's Secretary which at first sight does not appeal to me at all but I will think over my reply. Alexander asked to be allowed to act as intermediary in the early stages of this business and was politely turned down.[3]

[2] Deciphered as 'alien'.

[3] Mr Alexander had written to Sir G. Laithwaite on 10 February 1943 offering to make himself available if Lord Linlithgow thought he could be of any service. Sir G. Laithwaite replied on 14 February that Lord Linlithgow fully appreciated the spirit of Mr Alexander's offer and its good intentions but did not wish to trouble him in the matter. L/P&J/8/600: ff 200–1.

516

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 311

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *22 February 1943, 10.50 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 22 February, 10.30 pm*

524–S. Following message from Lumley's Secretary. *Begins.* Mr. Horace Alexander and Mr. Symonds of the Society of Friends came down from Poona this morning having seen Devadas Gandhi yesterday. His Excellency the Governor has just given these two gentlemen an interview.

2. Devadas and Miss Slade have reached apparently independently the conviction that if the following action were taken Mr. Gandhi would call off his fast. The suggestion has not been put to Mr. Gandhi as yet, but if it is accepted Mr. Alexander felt that he as a personal friend of Mr. Gandhi might prove a better intermediary than any other channel. Mr. Gandhi has already expressed a desire to see Mr. Alexander and Mr. Symonds, and Mr. Alexander could add what personal knowledge he has of violence done in Bengal, particularly in Midnapore District, in the name of Congress.

3. His Excellency the Governor sees no objection to this proposal and would welcome it as providing a possible way out.

4. The proposal is that a personal and friendly message should be sent to Mr. Gandhi by His Excellency the Viceroy giving Mr. Gandhi a clear assurance that evidence on which the Government relies for its charges against Congress would be placed before him as soon as possible. If when Mr. Gandhi has studied this he comes to the conclusion that further consideration is called for, he will be given an opportunity of consulting with Working Committee. Emphasis is made on approach coming in a friendly and personal manner from His Excellency the Viceroy.

5. If His Excellency the Viceroy agrees to take action on the lines of this proposal His Excellency the Governor wishes that his message should be sent with the utmost expedition to me by telephone. The written communication might follow in the ordinary way. *Ends.*

6. This afternoon an almost precisely similar suggestion (but without suggesting Alexander as intermediary) emanating from Devadas Gandhi was conveyed by Rajagopalachari via Gwyer.

7. I gather that Alexander has seen the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal who showed him certain of the evidence against Congress in that Province and undertook, I understand, to make a suggestion similar to the above to the Government of India. Alexander also had telegraphed to Shiva Rao in Delhi asking that the same suggestion might be put to me through any suitable intermediary. Lumley feels quite strongly that the idea is worth pursuing.

8. I have replied to Lumley that I have given this message very careful consideration, but that I am quite clear that I am not able to take any action on the lines of this proposal.

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Mr Attlee to Mr Mackenzie King, Mr Curtin, Mr Fraser, and Field Marshal Smuts (via British High Commissioners in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa)

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 307

IMPORTANT DOMINIONS OFFICE, *22 February 1943, 2.5 pm*

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

Z. No. 21. My telegram of the 10th February Z. No. 16.[1] Please communicate following to Prime Minister for his most secret information. *Begins.*

You will have already gathered from press reports that Gandhi's condition becomes increasingly serious. Fast is not yet reported to have reached a stage

[1] No. 450.

from which recovery is impossible, but heart action is affected and death might result at any time from heart failure.

Government of India are of course exposed to great pressure by Hindu elements for unconditional release but do not propose to give way. This firm attitude is endorsed by H.M.G. in the United Kingdom. As reported in press Viceroy has accepted resignations of three members of his Council, two Hindus and a Parsee from Bombay. They felt unable to support the decision to refuse unconditional release in face of the emotional strain caused by the fast and the danger to Gandhi's life. Council however still includes seven non-official Indians.

If death should occur Viceroy expects considerable emotional reaction and possibly a good deal of trouble but he is confident in light of replies so far received from Governors whom he is consulting that situation can be kept under control.[2] Initial news of fast created less excitement in India than was expected.

In informal discussion with H.M. Ambassador on 18th February,[3] U.S. Secretary of State expressed his own and President's concern at the possibility of Gandhi dying. He remarked that we should present our case to the public more insistently on the lines that the war was the only thing that immediately mattered, and Gandhi's record made it obvious that his leadership would be fatal to any Indian war effort. At further talk on 21st February[4] Mr. Hull appeared nevertheless to be somewhat uneasy about sentiment in the U.S. and indicated that President, with whom he had discussed the matter, shared this view and wondered whether less harm would not be done if Gandhi were released before he died. H.M.'s Ambassador anticipates that as anxiety about issue of fast grows so will tendency to question wisdom of letting him die on our own hands.

[2] See Nos. 482 and 484. [3] See No. 493. [4] See No. 510.

518

Sir J. Herbert (Bengal) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/43

22 February 1943

2. So far, public opinion in Bengal does not appear to be unduly excited over Gandhi's fast. The Legislative Assembly here adopted a motion recommending his unconditional release which is probably on its way to your Government; but public demonstrations are nowhere in evidence. At the same time, Press publicity appears to me to go considerably beyond what was contemplated in the correspondence which has passed between ourselves. As explained in that

correspondence the strict legal position in this Province is that, as Gandhi is fasting while under detention, all references to him or to his fast are automatically prohibited. As the Central Government, however, preferred modified publicity to a complete blackout, our Press Adviser told the Press that any comment which went beyond certain broad limits stated by him in conformity with our correspondence would be dealt with strictly in conformity with the law, while comment within those limits could be submitted for advice or published at peril. The results show how difficult it is to adopt a half-way policy in these matters.

3. Incidentally, my two caste Hindu Ministers, Basu and Banerjee, thought of going to Delhi to attend the conference to discuss Gandhi's fast; so I made it clear in Cabinet that, whatever "private members" might do, it was in my view most improper for Ministers to associate themselves with any actual censure of yourself or of your Government. Basu and Banerjee did not go to Delhi. Huq, on the other hand, seemed (rather strangely, in view of his recent *démarche* to which I refer later)[1] pleased at my homily and told me roundly that *he* would not go to Delhi, but would remain "at my side".

[1] In paras. 5 and 6, Sir J. Herbert referred to Mr Fazlul Huq's agreement (without consulting him) to an enquiry into alleged excesses by officials in Midnapore (see No. 476, para. 6).

519

Sir H. Dow (Sind) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/99

D.–o. No. 86–F.R. GOVT. HOUSE, KARACHI, *22 February 1943*

6. There has so far been little local reaction to Mr. Gandhi's fast. He has done it so often that there is a general expectation either that he will survive it or will find reasons for breaking it off without fatal effects. The principal point of interest is, I should say, whether the Government of India will give way and release Gandhi unconditionally as a preliminary step to a general jail delivery of Congressmen. There is no great confidence that this will happen, but there does not seem anything else to try. Gandhi's death would, of course, be a great shock, but it would not be likely to create here very serious problems of public order.

520

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *23 February 1943, 1.10 am*
PERSONAL *Received: 23 February, 1.45 am*

No. 527–S. Your telegram No. 3366[1] of 21st February. Phillips is reported to have handed out without any comment the following statement to press correspondents on 21st February:—

Begins. Phases of the situation in India requiring discussion are being handled by the high officials of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain. *Ends.*

2. This clearly follows on talks between Hull and Halifax. I have received no further communication from Phillips who is reported to have given a long interview to Dr. S. P. Mookerjee, President of the Hindu Mahasabha, on 21st February.

Repeated to Ambassador, Washington.

[1] No. 510.

521

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *23 February 1943, 1.10 am*
PERSONAL *Received: 22 February, 11.45 pm*

No. 530–S. You will receive separately official telegram repeating today's bulletins regarding Gandhi's health. Candy has informed the Bombay Government that the seizure which affected Gandhi on the 21st of February[1] was the sort of attack which Candy had been expecting all along and is of the opinion that it is impossible to say when there will be a recurrence, possibly with fatal results. There has in his opinion been no real change for the better today. "Sweet lime juice" in the bulletin refers to the juice of a sweet lime as opposed to a sour lime. There is no suggestion that any glucose is being taken.

2. Mrs. Naidu has written to her[2] daughter commending in the most glowing terms the attention Mr. Gandhi is receiving from his doctors and

attendants, official and unofficial alike. All his wants "possible and impossible" receive, she says, instant attention.

[1] 'After a restless day on 21st Mr Gandhi entered a crisis at 4.0 pm. He was seized with severe nausea and almost fainted and pulse became nearly imperceptible. Later he was able to take water with sweet lime juice. He rallied from crisis and slept for about 5½ hours during the night. Today is his day of silence. He appears comfortable and is more cheerful. The heart is weaker.' Bulletin signed by Mr Gandhi's six doctors and published by Bombay Government. G. of I., Home Dept telegram 1433 of 22 February 1943. L/P&J/8/600: f 309.

[2] Deciphered as 'his'.

522

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *23 February 1943, 10.10 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 536–S. Today's bulletin[1] shortens the odds against a fatal end to the fast. A report from the Bombay Government says that medical opinion in Bombay (not the doctors in attendance at Poona) is that Gandhi will pull through, and Ram Das Gandhi is reported to have said that the entourage is now "very confident" in his ability to survive. All this must however be taken with caution and meanwhile our preparations in case death should result suddenly are well in hand.

2. Rajagopalachariar saw my Private Secretary today and I will repeat to you separately the substance of their talk. No business was done but negatively it may be of some value to have made our point of view clear to him. He and Bhulabhai Desai have asked for and have been granted permission to see Gandhi (provided the doctors agree) and are leaving Delhi tomorrow morning.

[1] 'Mr Gandhi had only broken sleep during the night but has dozed off and on during day. He appears comfortable. There is no appreciable change to record.' Bulletin signed by Mr Gandhi's six doctors and published by Bombay Government. G. of I., Home Dept telegram 1467 of 23 February 1943. L/P&J/8/600: f 304.

523

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 251

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *23 February 1943, 4.15 pm*

PERSONAL *Received: 24 February*

3465. My next succeeding telegrams contain Prime Minister's reply to and text of telegram from Sapru dated 20th February. No telegram signed by other leaders has been received.

524

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: ff 252–3

MOST IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, *23 February 1943, 4.55 pm*
Received: 24 February

3466. Your telegram 523-S.[1] Please convey following reply to Sapru from Prime Minister to telegram dated 20th February[2] communicating text of resolution moved by Jayakar requesting Gandhi's immediate and unconditional release at recent conference of leading Indians. *Begins.* The Government of India decided last August that Mr. Gandhi and other leaders of Congress must be detained for reasons which have been fully explained and are well understood. The reasons for that decision have not ceased to exist and H.M.G. endorse the determination of the Government of India not to be deflected from their duty towards the peoples of India and of the United Nations by Mr. Gandhi's attempt to secure his unconditional release by fasting.

The first duty of the Government of India and of H.M.G. is to defend the soil of India from the invasion by which it is still menaced, and to enable India to play her part in the general cause of the United Nations. There can be no justification for discriminating between Mr. Gandhi and other Congress leaders. The responsibility therefore rests entirely with Mr. Gandhi himself. *Ends.* Prime Minister wishes this reply given full publicity here and in India. My next telegram[3] repeats text of Sapru's communication to which this is a reply. Please arrange for both to be sent here through Reuter.

[1] No. 515. [2] See No. 506, note 2. [3] Not printed.

525

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 249

MOST IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, *23 February 1943, 7.45 pm*
Received: 24 February

3490. My personal telegram 3466.[1] Further telegram[2] from Sapru and numerous other signatories to Prime Minister dated 21st just received. Unless already transmitted please convey reply in my telegram under reference as being Prime

Minister's reply to this later telegram of which I presume text is available to you. If not I can repeat it for you.[3]

[1] No. 524. [2] No. 512.

[3] On 24 February, Mr Christie sent the message contained in No. 524 to Sir T. B. Sapru in reply to No. 512. He added that Lord Linlithgow presumed that Sir T. B. Sapru would have no objection to publication of his telegram and Mr Churchill's reply on 25 February. Sir T. B. Sapru replied that he had no objection. MSS. EUR. F. 125/125.

526

Mr Fraser to Mr Attlee

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 281

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL *23 February 1943, 11.50 pm*
Received: 24 February, 4.45 am

No. 52. Your telegram Z. No. 21.[1] I cannot help feeling considerable uneasiness over the situation with regard to Gandhi. I know that those on the spot must have good grounds for taking the heavy responsibility of their decision, but viewed from this distance it still appears to me that less harm would be done at this critical time to the cause of Britain and the United Nations by a gesture of clemency and generosity on the part of the Government of India than by the maintenance of an inflexible attitude, however just, which must inevitably lead to the charge of responsibility for Gandhi's death. I cannot help feeling that there is far more to be gained by Gandhi's release than there is by maintenance of a course which will bring about the most violent reaction and the deification of Gandhi by the whole of India as a martyr in what they hold is their struggle for freedom.

[1] No. 517.

527

Sir H. Lewis (Orissa) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/85

GOVT. HOUSE, CUTTACK, *23 February 1943*

D.-o. No. 128–G.O.

REPORT NO. 4

2. As I write Gandhi's fast has now reached its thirteenth day. The bulletins widely published on the wireless have not minimised the deterioration of his general condition and the dangerously weak state of his health; but, while we

can understand that there is anxiety, there are still surprisingly few outward signs of excitement. I think this may partly be explained by a general belief that whatever else happens Gandhi will not die, and that, as on previous occasions, something or other will happen to end the fast before collapse is reached particularly since it is described as a fast to capacity only. If this fast ends fatally the first effect in the minds of the people here would I think be that they would be stunned by the news and almost unable to believe it. The reaction would then quickly follow.

528

War Cabinet Paper W.P. (43)81

L/PO/11/5b: f150

INDIA

HOME MEMBERSHIP OF GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S EXECUTIVE COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, *23 February 1943*

I circulate for the consideration of the War Cabinet the Viceroy's personal telegram No. 505–S[1] of the 20th February, which raises the question of the succession to Sir Reginald Maxwell, Home Member of the Government of India, whose normal tenure of office expires on the 4th April next. Sir Reginald Maxwell is one of the three remaining official members of the Governor-General's Council.

Since August 1940 our policy has been, as opportunity arose, to appoint unofficial Indians to the Executive Council. The vacancy in the Home Membership in April next raises the question whether this policy should be continued to the point of selecting an Indian to fill the key position of Home Member. This could be done within the existing statutory requirement[2] that there shall be three Members who have served for 10 years under the Crown in India as Sir Muhammad Usman has recently acquired that qualification. It would, I think, in any case have been open to question whether the Indianisation of the Home Membership was desirable when we are within 9 months of the arrival of a new Viceroy. But, in view of the resignations of three Indian non-official Members of the Viceroy's Council and of the fact that there may be difficult issues to be faced in the sphere of Law and Order during the next 12 months, the Viceroy feels that the best course will be to offer Sir Reginald Maxwell an extension of one year until April 1944. I am satisfied myself that in the circumstances this is the right course, and I support the Viceroy's recommendation for the approval of the War Cabinet.

The Viceroy has not yet made up his mind as to how the three portfolios which have been vacated would best be filled. It may be possible, for a time, to combine one of them with one of the other existing portfolios, but even so it may be necessary to appoint an official to one of these vacancies.

L. S. A.

[1] No. 502. [2] Government of India Act 1935, Ninth Schedule, Sec. 36 (3).

529

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMPORTANT *24 February 1943, 9.10 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 546–S. My private and personal telegram No. 536–S[1] of the 23rd of February. My Private Secretary saw Rajagopalachari yesterday at the latter's request. He repeated the suggestion, which I mentioned in my telegram No. 524–S[2] of the 22nd of February that Government should send an emissary with evidence of complicity of Congress to Gandhi (as he felt that such a course might appeal to Mr. Gandhi's legal mind), and afterwards should grant facilities if required for meeting the Working Committee. It was made clear to Rajagopalachari that this course could not be contemplated and that there could be no question of unconditional release, nor of putting Gandhi into the position of investigating the evidence, and saying whether he was satisfied with it or not, when it was he and Congress who were on their defence. To this Rajagopalachari said he thought we were making a profound mistake; and he added that he thought there was no prospect, as things stood, of moving Gandhi while Government had in their power the alternative of releasing him, and should take advantage of it. Gandhi was not an ordinary individual but a leader of men who should be treated as unique. He felt that unconditional release would be very well seen throughout the country and did not consider there were risks involved in letting him out.

2. Of the Working Committee he said (emphasising the strictly personal character of the conversation) that the only person who mattered at all was Jawaharlal Nehru. There was no hope whatever of getting him into position as a future leader except with Gandhi's help and guidance; and only Gandhi could keep his excessive vanity in order. Such work as was to be done in the future must be done with Nehru and that was also a strong argument for releasing Gandhi.

[1] No. 522. [2] No. 516.

3. It was made clear to him that there was nothing doing on this basis and in his statement[3] to the Press last night he seems to recognise this. Prime Minister's reply[4] to Sapru should make it still clearer that we intend to stand firm.

[3] This described Mr Rajagopalachari's proposal in para. 1 above and added 'We have failed to persuade the Viceroy'.
[4] No. 524.

530

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *24 February 1943*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 549–S. Today's bulletin on Gandhi shows a definite improvement,[1] and there is reason to believe that even this represents a conservative view. My conviction grows that Gandhi will survive. At Council this evening Srivastava who has been having a very rough time made a very unconvincing appeal that we should go back on our decision and release Gandhi before he died on our hands. I am afraid I deflated his speech by reading out beforehand to my colleagues the bulletin which I had just received and which Srivastava admitted took all the point out of what he had to say.

2. I am asking Home Department to let you have the reactions so far apparent to their Congress complicity pamphlet.[2] I understand that it had a good effect, on the whole, on American correspondents here. I think full use ought to be made both here and at home of the fact that the nationalist press—*Hindustan Times*, &c—in which the demand for such "evidence" had been insistently voiced, boycotted it when it appeared. I hope to let you have some material on this shortly.

3. I have been interested to hear from the official present during Gandhi's interview with Alexander[3] it appeared that Gandhi was lukewarm to Alexander's suggestion that he might break his fast if the evidence against Congress were made available to him. I gather that his general attitude was "I have said I will fast for 21 days, and I fully intend to do so".

[1] 'Mr Gandhi's general condition shows a slight improvement. The uraemic symptoms are less prominent. He is cheerful and his strength shows no further deterioration.' Bulletin signed by Mr Gandhi's six doctors and published by Bombay Government. G. of I., Home Dept telegram 1516 of 24 February 1943. L/P&J/8/600: f 282.
[2] *Statement published by the Government of India on the Congress Party's responsibility for the Disturbances in India 1942–43*. Cmd 6430.
[3] See No. 516.

531

Chairman,[1] Executive Committee of the National Christian Council, to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/125

NAGPUR, *24 February 1943*

In the conviction that the present circumstances demand a fresh effort to solve India's political problem and that the time is favourable the Executive Committee of the National Christian Council now in session appeal to Gandhiji to abandon his fast so that his influence and service may be available for this purpose. They appeal at the same time to the Government of India to release Mr. Gandhi as a courageous act of faith and in the hope that a new start will now be made. They appeal also to leaders of all parties to join together in conference with the determination to reach a settlement. Copy sent to Gandhiji.

[1] The Right Reverend V. S. Azariah.

532

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/10/34: f 160

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *24 February 1943*

6–U. Your private and personal telegram of 21st February No. 9–U.[1] I have circulated to Cabinet your personal telegram 505–S[2] in regard to Home Membership and have commended proposal to retain Maxwell for twelve months. I regard this as a special problem for which impending change in Viceroyalty together with continuance of internal tension justifies special treatment.

For the other existing vacancies, to which I have made no more than passing and non-committal reference in short covering memorandum, I should myself deprecate any marked departure from the broad lines of policy we have been following. I fully sympathise with your disappointment at the poor showing of Aney, Mody and Sarkar, but after all the last was a sick man, Mody has never shown much backbone and Aney, though his defection is the greatest disappointment, was, I suppose, subject to exceptional pressure. I should not despair therefore of your being able to fill your vacancies with just as good or better non-official Indians than you have lost, but I should agree that there is no need to rush the matter and rather every reason to go carefully about the business of selection. It is hardly for me who have very limited knowledge of

[1] No. 509. [2] No. 502.

the field to suggest names but you have Azizul Huque in view, Mudaliar valuable but not indispensable here (incidentally he has just returned and is quite stalwart on the Gandhi issue) and Runganadhan, of whose quality I have a high opinion and whose horizon will have been much broadened by his service here and by American visit, is well worth considering. Appointment of an Indian Christian would have incidental merits of its own and in any case I feel that recent developments make it rather easier for us, while still pursuing policy of reliance on non-official Indians according to their individual capacity, to ignore communal balances, party affiliations and such handicaps to free selection. Nor would I see any great objection to inclusion of an Indian official (and Hydari is by all accounts good) but I should be disposed to treat that more from the point of view of completing your team than as first choice.

I have endeavoured as you will see to treat the question as you asked in terms of appointment of service members against non-official members; but turning to individuals I should be disposed, having regard to my views on the main question, to think that Jenkins would be of better value to your successor in the position you have suggested than in the Council where he might be rather submerged; moreover I very much doubt whether it is now either desirable or practicable having regard to opinion both in India and outside to aim at any process of de-Indianisation.

533

Field Marshal Wavell to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/125

NEW DELHI, *24 February 1943*

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I have received a letter from Christie (No. 414/G.G./42 dated 22nd February 1943)[1] in which he tells me that you would like to have my views as to the effect on the Indian Fighting Forces of the situation created by Gandhi's fast and the position in the event of his death.

2. So far we have had no indication that the attitude of the V.C.Os., N.C.Os., and men of the "fighting" portion of the Indian Defence Forces will be any different from that hitherto consistently adopted in these matters.

That attitude can be described as either complete indifference or the feeling that the matter does not concern the Armed Forces.

In the event of Gandhi's death, I have no reason to think that there will be any material change in that attitude. I have, in fact, reason to believe that Gandhi's departure from this world would not be unwelcome to some,

particularly senior V.C.Os., in that a source of embarrassment which showed signs of interfering with the vested interests of the "Martial" classes had been removed.

As regards I.C.Os., so far we have only had the one case of the officer at Ambala who, after the August disturbances, indicated that his political views made it impossible for him to carry out orders involving action against Congress activities.[2] We have seen nothing to indicate that I.C.Os. as a class have been affected, or are likely to allow the political situation to affect their attitude.

There is no doubt, however, that an increasing number hold strong nationalistic views; but our impression is that they realise the necessity for defeating the Axis before India's "freedom" can be fully achieved.

Some of them have undoubtedly joined the Army to gain social status with a view to taking part ultimately in politics; but we feel that as long as our control is firm, these are not likely to react openly to the present situation. One cannot, however, exclude the possibility that the individual I.C.O. who holds really strong personal views may not follow the lead of the Ambala gentleman; but I do not think that these will be other than isolated cases.

In the event of Gandhi's death it is of course possible that more may come to light who feel that they can no longer reconcile their personal views with military service; but I do not anticipate they will be in any great numbers.

3. The element that presents the greatest problem and is the most uncertain factor is the large number of personnel, such as clerks and technicians, recruited recently from the "educated" politically-minded classes.

Here again, we have had no definite indications, except among civilian clerks in the Secretariat, many of whom are obviously Congress sympathisers.

Both commissioned and subordinate personnel of the Indian Medical Service in particular are in this category and need watching.

4. What I have said above is based on the information available; and this warrants us regarding the situation on the whole as so far satisfactory.

It does not suggest that any serious deterioration is likely to follow Gandhi's death.

If there is deterioration it may follow within the next few months; but it is not likely to affect the rank and file and V.C.Os. of the fighting units of the Indian Armed Forces.

Yours sincerely,

A. P. WAVELL

[1] Not printed.

[2] See Vol. II, No. 672, para. 12; also, in this volume, No. 69, paras. 6–7, and No. 187, paras, 14–15.

534

Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/78

CONFIDENTIAL

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE GOVERNOR'S REPORT NO. 4, DATED THE 24TH FEBRUARY 1943

Gandhi's fast has attracted little sympathy here. One or two Hindus have approached me, rather diffidently, on the subject. I have not met one Muslim yet who has a word to say for Gandhi's present attitude, and if he dies as a result of his hunger-strike the prevailing comment will be that he deserved it. Latterly, Congress activities have almost disappeared, and for some days they were unable to raise even the daily quota of four or five men to offer themselves for arrest. Dr. Khan Sahib had decided to go to Delhi last week, in the hope—I think—of going to see Gandhi, but changed his mind at the last moment. I had sent him word that he was running the risk of arrest if he made a foolish speech anywhere.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *25 February 1943, 7.50 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 561–S. You will have by now seen yesterday's bulletin[1] regarding further improvement in Gandhi's condition. Srivastava tells me that he has it on reliable authority that G. D. Birla in Delhi has received a telephone message from Dr. B. C. Roy at Poona informing him that Gandhi is now in no (repeat no) danger. I have little doubt that this is correct. There are in fact signs suggesting that Gandhi's physical crisis on Sunday, the 21st, was deliberately arranged to coincide with the Leaders Conference, and that so soon as it became apparent that we had no intention of giving way, this was communicated to Poona and steps taken to give Gandhi the essential pabulum.

2. We are not out of the wood yet, but I shall be astonished if Gandhi does not complete his fast without further serious difficulty. I am considering the line that should be taken should that be the case, and will telegraph further about it.

[1] See No. 530, note 1.

536

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *25 February 1943, 11.55 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 562–S. Latest bulletin shows that Gandhi's improved condition is maintained but difference between official detailed version[1] and version for publication[2] indicates how tendentious even bulletins can be.

2. Alexander has reported to Lumley that Gandhi now seems very confident that he will survive fast "and even refers to it playfully as a fraudulent fast, since he is now, under medical advice, taking rather more orange juice".

3. I am causing it to be put about circumspectly, particularly among our American friends, that those who lately so fondly allowed their heart-strings to be plucked had better begin preparing themselves for realisation that it was really their legs being pulled.

[1] 'Mr Gandhi is comfortable and cheerful. There has been no recurrence of abdominal pain. He took 54 ounces of fluid including 12 ounces of sweet lime juice. He passed 37 ounces of urine. The blood pressure is 156 and 100.' Report signed by Mr Gandhi's six doctors for information of Government. G. of I., Home Dept telegram 1549 of 25 February 1943. L/P&J/8/600: f 269.

[2] 'Mr Gandhi has made no further progress. There is no appreciable change of condition. Following the crisis on Sunday 21st, nausea compelled him to drink sweet lime juice and water. This was continued on Monday and Tuesday and good results were manifested. Yesterday he reduced the quantity considerably as he wishes [to] take minimum quantity enabling him to drink water.' Bulletin published by Bombay Government. *Ibid.*

537

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Churchill (via Commander-in-Chief and War Office)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/158

IMMEDIATE *25 February 1943*

39775/C. Following for Prime Minister personal and secret from Viceroy of India (through General Brooke). *Begins.* I am much obliged for your heartening message.[1] I now feel that Gandhi may well survive the twenty-one days. But come what may I am clear we must not give way. I hope you are better. *Ends.*

[1] No. 511.

538

Mr Churchill to the Marquess of Linlithgow (via War Office and Commander-in-Chief)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/158

IMPORTANT — *25 February 1943*
MOST SECRET — *Received: 25 February*

55547. Private and Personal from Prime Minister to Viceroy of India (through Field Marshal Wavell).

Cannot help feeling very suspicious of *bona fides* of Gandhi's fast. We were told fourth day would be the crisis and then well staged climax was set for eleventh day onwards. Now at fifteenth day bulletins look as if he might get through. Would be most valuable my (any?) fraud could be exposed. Surely with all these Congress Hindu doctors round him it is quite easy to slip glucose or other nourishment into his food. How lucky we were not (not) sucked in. Let me know what you think.

539

Field Marshal Smuts to Mr Attlee (via British High Commissioner in South Africa)

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 241

IMMEDIATE — *25 February 1943, 6.9 pm*
Received: 25 February, 7.50 pm

No. 287. Following is secret and personal message from General Smuts to you. Gandhi's death should be avoided by all means if possible, and it is worth considering whether forcible feeding by injections or otherwise should not be applied to him, as in previous cases in English practice. His attempt to force his release would thus be defeated without the risk of death.

540

Mr Attlee to Mr Fraser

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 271

DOMINIONS OFFICE, *25 February 1943, 10 pm*

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL

No. 42. Your telegram No. 52[1] of 23rd February. Gandhi's fast undoubtedly confronts us, and was intended to confront us, with most difficult issues. We did not fail to weigh the considerations which you urge but our view has

throughout been that in view of the predictable consequences in India neither we nor the Government of India could afford to let Gandhi secure his release by the coercion produced by his fast. As a result of his activities last summer we have been through very serious period of disturbance in India which imposed a very heavy strain on the military, police and other Government services and for a time caused serious dislocation of the war effort. Government success in dealing with these disturbances has much reduced Gandhi's influence and that of the Congress party and his fast is an attempt to recover his lost position.

2. Throughout from August the decisions taken have been taken by the Viceroy's Executive Council which when the fast began included nine Indians among its thirteen members. They decided to reply to Mr. Gandhi's threat to fast by giving him the option of undergoing his fast at liberty. He rejected this offer electing to fast in detention unless released unconditionally. To release him unconditionally now would gravely shake the faith of many elements in India in the Government's supremacy and determination and would be a stimulus to those who are still attempting to prosecute the rebellious campaign against Government by violent means. It is true that three Members of the Executive Council have resigned owing to the decision of their colleagues to resist Gandhi's manœuvres but the fact that the majority of the Indian Members of Council remain in office is symptomatic of the substantial element in India which upholds the action of the Government of India. We have refrained from imposing any views upon the Viceroy and his Council but have been and are ready to express our full support of their decision.

3. The Government of India recognise that if Gandhi were unhappily to die a considerable emotional outburst in parts of India would probably result but are confident that the situation could be held. There is perhaps less ground for confidence that, if Gandhi were to gain what would be regarded as victory over Government by securing his unconditional release and if the activities of last autumn which he has declined to repudiate were renewed, the situation could be held when the military, police and other services, not to mention large sections of the population which are not followers of Congress, would have had their faith in Government badly shaken. In view of his responsibility to secure that India's war effort is not affected, the Viceroy considers it essential to avoid surrender to the coercion exerted by means of this fast by Gandhi whose past utterances and actions make it certain that his influence will never be thrown wholeheartedly into the struggle against the Axis powers. Whether or not Gandhi if he died would be regarded as a martyr in the cause of India's freedom, the immediate dangers attending his unconditional release in existing circumstances are such that the Viceroy is not prepared to face them and we accept his judgment.

[1] No. 526.

541

War Cabinet W.M. (43) 35th Conclusions, Minute 1

R/30/1/3: ff 42–3

Those present at this meeting held in the Prime Minister's Room, House of Commons, S.W.1, on 25 February 1943 at 12.30 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Mr Anthony Eden, Sir John Anderson, Mr Ernest Bevin, Mr Oliver Lyttelton, Mr Herbert Morrison

Also present during discussion of item 1 were: Sir Kingsley Wood, Viscount Simon, Mr Amery, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Sir Stafford Cripps, Sir Orme Sargent

INDIA

Home Member of Governor-General's Executive Council
(Previous Reference: W.M. (42) 107th Conclusions, Minute 5)[1]

The War Cabinet considered a Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India (W.P. (43) 81)[2] regarding the succession to Sir Reginald Maxwell, Home Member of the Government of India, whose normal tenure of office would expire on the 4th April next.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA explained that the policy had been to appoint unofficial Indians to the Governor-General's Executive Council as opportunity arose, and Sir Reginald Maxwell's retirement would ordinarily have raised the question whether an Indian should be appointed as Home Member. As, however, three Indian non-official members of the Council had recently resigned and difficult issues of law and order were likely to arise during the next year, the Viceroy felt that in present circumstances the best course would be to ask Sir Reginald Maxwell to continue in office for another twelve months. The Secretary of State supported the Viceroy's recommendation.

In discussion, the question was raised whether Sir Reginald Maxwell was sufficiently vigorous, in mind and body, to undertake a further year of office. Even if the Viceroy were satisfied as to Sir Reginald Maxwell's present capacity, it might not be necessary to give a full year's extension, particularly as this would extend beyond the period of office of the present Viceroy.

The War Cabinet—

> Agreed in principle that the term of office of Sir Reginald Maxwell, as Home Member of the Government of India, should be extended for a further period (not necessarily for a full twelve months) if the Viceroy were satisfied that he was sufficiently vigorous, in mind and body, to undertake this further period of duty.

[1] Vol. II, No. 451. [2] No. 528.

542

Mr Irwin to Sir G. Laithwaite

MSS. EUR. F. 125/57

GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, *25 February 1943*

My dear Laithwaite,

His Excellency has asked me to send you the attached letter and accompaniment from Mr. Horace Alexander. The message referred to as received from Colonel Bhandari was to the effect that Mr. Alexander's assistance as an intermediary would not be required. In reply to Mr. Alexander's letter I telegraphed him today saying that, having regard to the message sent through Colonel Bhandari, a further interview with His Excellency would be unnecessary.

Yours sincerely,

J. B. IRWIN

Enclosure 1 to No. 542

FRIENDS' AMBULANCE UNIT, INDIA SECTION,
C/O MRS. CAPTAIN, DUNLAVIN LODGE, POONA-5, *24 February 1943*

Dear Sir Roger Lumley,

I am venturing to send you the enclosed note of what Mr. Gandhi said to me yesterday. In view of the message that I received from Colonel Bhandari on my return from Bombay on Monday, I did not know quite how it was best to proceed; but as Mr. Gandhi was expecting me to raise this subject with him, I thought it right to do so, and it was clear that he wished to speak about it. I did not tell him that the proposal had already been put to the Viceroy and as I understood, rejected. But you will note that he himself was speaking, not in terms of possible calling off of the fast before the end of the 21 days, but of possible development later on.

There are two or three further points that I would like to add. First, as to the fast itself, he seems very confident that he will survive it and he even referred playfully to it as a "fraudulent fast", since he is now under medical advice, taking rather more orange juice. I do not think he is much interested in the movement for his release. It is a 21-days fast and he would I rather think only welcome release if he thought it meant that the Government is assured that he, as a free man, will be an asset, not a liability.

The second point is this: he is evidently under the most acute stress of mind at the sense that he, who has devoted his life to the promotion of non-violence, is now suspected—or under accusation—by men whom he respects, as being not merely the unwitting and misguided agent but the deliberate instigator of the violence which is admittedly rampant in some parts of the country today. I believe the main reason why he chose to open up in the way he did (and I

believe he wanted to say a good deal more, but we naturally had to end the talk so as to avoid tiring him) to me was that he felt he must express this distress of mind to some Englishman who still believes in his good faith.

If, as I rather gathered from the message Colonel Bhandari gave me, the Viceroy does not think it appropriate for me to do anything further in this matter, I can only express the hope that someone may be found, as soon as Mr. Gandhi is a little stronger, who could go into the matter further, as he seems so genuinely anxious to find means of restoring goodwill.

In a few days I ought to return to my work in Bengal. Would you feel able, I wonder, to allow me a few minutes of your time before I leave, when I could perhaps give you a rather fuller report?

This house is not on the telephone; but on receipt of a telegram or other message I could come to Bombay at any time.

Yours sincerely,

HORACE G. ALEXANDER

PS.—Although it seemed to me proper to address this to you I realise that, if you think it sufficiently important, it would naturally be forwarded to the Viceroy.

Enclosure 2 to No. 542

NOTES OF A TALK WITH MR. GANDHI, FEBRUARY 23RD, 1943

Revised under the direction of Mr. Gandhi, 24th February 1943; copy kept by the Superintendent at Aga Khan Palace

The question was put—

"If you were assured now, by the Viceroy, that you would be given full opportunity to examine the evidence about your and Congress' alleged responsibility for violence and to discuss it with the Viceroy himself or with someone chosen by him, would you be willing to break your fast?"

I got the impression that Mr. Gandhi did not seriously think of the possibility, now, of ending his fast before the 21 days are ended. He was looking further ahead, as if the question had been, "under what circumstances would you be prepared to review and redirect the whole Congress effort?"

I understood him to indicate that the proposal suggested in the question was good enough as a first step, but it did not go far enough. Supposing that, after his examination of the evidence, he was still unconvinced, what then? A judicial enquiry is needed, which can really decide the case. He is accused of being the very fount and origin of all the violence that has taken place. Surely he can fairly claim that this accusation against him and against other Congress leaders should be judicially considered and decided.

If he was out of detention he would naturally deal with all the forces of violence in the way he knows, and he would also naturally plunge into the

task of bringing relief to those who are suffering from the present scarcity of food and other necessities.

H. G. A.

543

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir G. S. Bajpai and Agency-General, Chungking

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/125

IMMEDIATE *26 February 1943*

No. 568–S. Gandhi seems likely now to survive his fast and it may be advisable to prepare sympathisers for the realisation that their emotions have been unnecessarily worked upon, and that they may even have been deliberately deceived. It would be relevant to point out the remarkable coincidence between the crisis day and the Leaders' Conference in Delhi, and between the rejection of the Leaders' demand and the improvement of Gandhi's condition.

2. If he survives we shall close down on interviews and return as soon as possible to the *status quo ante*, though the outside doctors will have to stay on for a time.

3. There would probably follow a good deal of face-saving agitation on the lines of pressure to take advantage of the universal relief by making some conciliatory move, or allowing Gandhi to meet the Working Committee, and criticism may fasten on the Government's Congress complicity document as being a one-sided statement of the case, but the fact remains that a disingenuous manœuvre to bring Congress and Gandhi back into a strong bargaining position will have failed signally and that both will have lost a good deal of prestige thereby. I consider that, if all goes well that view ought to be emphasised by every possible means.

Repeated to Secretary of State.

544

Mr Bevin to Mr Amery

L/E/8/2527: f 204

MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND NATIONAL SERVICE,
ST. JAMES'S SQUARE, LONDON, S.W.1, *26 February 1943*

Dear Amery,

Stafford Cripps and I have carefully considered your letter and note[1] on the subject of Social and Economic Policy in India and I am afraid that we are

[1] No. 356.

unable to agree that the limited action you suggest meets the needs of the situation. We have prepared a note[2] which states our views.

We think that it is necessary for the Government to give a clear indication of the directions in which in their opinion progress should be made and we should like to have our respective views discussed with the Prime Minister. At the same time, of course, we ought clearly to know how far the Indian Government have got in their reconstruction plans and on this you probably have up-to-date information.

Yours sincerely,
ERNEST BEVIN

[2] The note enclosed by Mr Bevin was the same as the enclosure to No. 276.

545

Sir Stafford Cripps to Mr Amery

L/E/8/2527: f 203

MINISTRY OF AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION,
MILLBANK, S.W.1, *26 February 1943*

My dear Amery,
I am afraid I have taken some time in replying to your letter and note[1] on the subject of social and economic policy in India. I must confess that I was disappointed to find that you took such a pessimistic view of the possibility of taking action along the lines of my memorandum.[2]

I have now discussed the whole matter with Ernest Bevin, who appears to be in general agreement with my views, and I have suggested that, as I am no longer a member of the War Cabinet, he should take the subject up with the Prime Minister. With this in view he is, I understand, preparing an abbreviated version[3] of my document to submit to the Prime Minister with his own observations. If the Prime Minister agrees I hope it will be possible at a later stage for my memorandum and your own commentary on it to be considered by the Cabinet.

Yours ever,
STAFFORD CRIPPS

[1] No. 356. [2] No. 276. [3] See No. 544, note 2.

546

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Churchill (via Commander-in-Chief and War Office)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/158

IMPORTANT
MOST SECRET

26 February 1943

Private and Personal from Viceroy of India to Prime Minister (through General Brooke).

I have long known Gandhi as the world's most successful humbug and have not the least doubt that his physical condition and the bulletins reporting it from day to day have been deliberately cooked so as to produce the maximum effect upon public opinion. The bulletin describing his alleged heart crisis coincided exactly with the meeting of the leaders conference. I have good reason to think, though I cannot prove it, that so soon as it became evident that I was prepared to hold him dead or alive, and that there would be no wobbling, word of this was telephoned through from Delhi to Poona, and enough nourishment immediately given him to check the uremia. I have word that Gandhi's doctor in Poona telephoned to Delhi on Wednesday evening, 24th Feb., to tell Gandhi's friends that he was in no danger. There would be no difficulty in his entourage administering glucose or any other food without the knowledge of the Government doctors. Again the wording of the bulletins is much in the hands of Gandhi's own doctors who, if their draft is criticized, immediately claim the right to issue a separate bulletin. The Government doctors think it wise to compromise, and I dare say they are right, because the public here would in those circumstances heed nothing but Gandhi's own bulletin. The degree of nervous tension and hysteria engendered by all this Hindu hocus pocus is beyond belief. I am suggesting slyly to certain American correspondents here that it has not been so much a matter of having their heart-strings plucked as of their legs being pulled. I think it will be found that we have won an important victory which will help to discredit a wicked system of blackmail and terror, and I am much obliged to you for your staunch support. If I can discover any firm evidence of fraud I will let you hear but I am not hopeful of this. Best luck and a quick recovery.

547

Mr Churchill to Field Marshal Smuts

Telegram, R/30/1/3: f 5

26 February 1943

Prime Minister's Personal Telegram Serial No. T. 228/3

1. I do not think Gandhi has the slightest intention of dying, and I imagine he has been eating better meals than I have for the last week. It looks now highly probable that he will see his fast out. What fools we should have been to flinch before all this bluff and sob-stuff. Opinion here has been very steady, and the Viceroy has been very good. Before the fast began we were assured the crisis would be reached on the fourth day. Then at the eleventh day we were all told that if we did not let him out it would be too late and he would never recover. It is now the sixteenth day. As soon as he understood there would be no weakness here he made his arrangements accordingly. You will excuse me, I am sure, if I do not express plainly on paper all my thoughts upon this topic.

2. I am slowly getting better from a really vicious streptococcal pneumonia, which has been handled on very scientific lines. I am now normal again, which is a great blessing, though M. and B. affects one's appetite and energy.

3. I am quite pleased about Tunisia. We shall come to grips with them before long.

Every good wish.

548

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

PRIVATE AND SECRET INDIA OFFICE, *26 February 1943*

The Cabinet yesterday approved[1] in principle the extension of Maxwell's tenure of office. But they were a little alarmed by Cripps, who drew a picture of Maxwell as failing in mind as well as in body. To this I strongly demurred, saying that while I knew that his health was delicate, I had certainly not got the impression that he had failed in any way in handling the difficult situation of last autumn, and that he had only just made a brilliant defence of your Government's policy in the Legislature. I cannot but suspect that Cripps' account may

Bunk!

L.

have been coloured by what Nehru and others of that type may have told him. It certainly would be awkward if Maxwell were not capable of serving another twelve or even nine months, for I feel strongly the disadvantages of appointing a new European Home Member, with the prospect of his holding the place for five years, while I equally appreciate the disadvantages of appointing another Indian at this moment.

2. On the general question of filling up your Council I have already telegraphed[2] and feel very strongly that you should not let yourself be too discouraged by the defection of three of your colleagues over the Gandhi business. After all, your Council justified itself outstandingly in August and, even under the peculiarly difficult emotional conditions of the present crisis, only three of your battalions actually deserted the field of battle, while others may have wavered a bit but are still holding their ground. Whatever happens, the credit of those who remained will have been increased by their standing fast, while, if Gandhi survives, the quitters will be in an absurd position which will by contrast enhance the credit of those who have stayed.

One of the stayers now out with post fast strain.

L.

3. What I feel is that you are now justified, in filling up your ranks, in looking not so much for a representation of all elements, as for men who will stick together and have the courage of their convictions. The more they become like a Cabinet here in their sense of interdependence and in their determination to present a common front to the outside critic, the better. I realise that increasing solidarity on their part might present your successor with a difficult problem if they decided to resign simultaneously but I believe that if you get the right men, who are willing to work with each other, that is a much lesser danger than having a Council containing weak elements. A man like Azizul Haque could, I feel sure, be trusted to show both loyalty and courage, and no doubt there are others. In my telegram I suggested Runganadhan, and there is something to be said for having a Christian—after all, they are more numerous than the Sikhs—but a possible alternative would be to make him High Commissioner here and yourself take on Roy, whom you had thought of sending here. Krishnamachari too, I believe, is capable, and not so likely to run away as Aiyyar was. Anyhow, you know the field much better than I do.

4. What I do feel, however, in this connection is that you would do well to recall Mudaliar, who strikes me as definitely a strong man and with a personality that will help in keeping your team together. He has always fought Congress and Gandhi, unlike Amery, who after all was at one time closely associated with

Not quite the "single eye" but good.

L.

[1] No. 541. [2] No. 532.

him. Also he has undoubtedly been broadened by his contacts and inside knowledge of affairs here, in the States and in Canada, and this should give him additional authority in the right direction with his colleagues. The work he has done here, while useful, has really been important only from the point of view of India's being represented and from that of his gaining an outlook which is of greatest value if it is speedily communicated to his colleagues. I am all for short "educational courses" here for as many as possible, as regards both Cabinet representatives and High Commissioners, rather than for more intensive prolonged courses for a very limited number.

5. Zafrullah has just been in to bid me good-bye. I have taken a great liking to him and been greatly impressed by his first-class intellectual ability and his sound outlook on the whole Empire problem. Interestingly enough, my boy Julian told me last night that he had been lunching with Sir George Moss, our late Consul-General in Chungking, who said that Zafrullah was the best representative the British Empire had ever had with the Chinese, both from the point of view of the influence he exercised and from that of the direction of that influence. Now he is, as I wrote to you before,[3] very keen on giving the whole of his spare time to working up the nucleus of a party of moderate men who wish to find a stable constitution for India and to secure India's future stability in the world by her remaining a member of the British Empire. I have talked to him a good deal about how a little handful of young men in South Africa, within a few years of the Boer War, and with all the bitterness between Boer and Briton then prevailing, set themselves to studying in a practical fashion the problem of South African union and by the sheer weight of the material produced and the problems thought out gradually convinced political leaders and in effect shaped the fate of South Africa. I have steadily stressed to him the point that a mere moderate party wishing to remain in the Commonwealth would, like the Indian Liberals, be purely ineffective because essentially negative. What he must do if he is to succeed is to work up a practical and growing interest in some definite solution of the internal Indian problem, and with it an equally practical interest in the problem of India's post-war security which must inevitably lead to a recognition of India's interest in remaining within the British partnership, at any rate for a considerable period of years. He is fully seized of that conception and means to go ahead stimulating small groups of friends to study the problem in different centres. He thinks he

P.S.V.—
I cannot feel that it is consistent with the retention by the judicature of their independence and hold on public confidence, that a Federal Court Judge should become an active organiser in national and constitutional politics nor have I much faith in Z.'s discretion or knowledge of where to stop in a matter of that kind.
L.,—25.3

can find from among his Indian friends enough funds to cover the necessary minimum of expenses for organisation and possibly for the production of a small private magazine.

[Para. 6, on two administrative matters raised by Sir Zafrullah Khan, omitted.]

7. It is of course much too early to say whether Zafrullah's efforts will come to anything. But it is a great thing that a man of his ability and independent position should begin to get a move on. As you know, I have always been convinced that there is no solution of the Indian constitutional problem along the lines of the British parliamentary system and that some entirely different type of constitution at the Centre, with a greater independence of the Executive, has somehow to be devised. That can only come about as the result of study of other constitutions as well as of the Indian problem itself, by men who are not concerned with immediate party or communal advantage. The difficulty you have always seen about starting any such study under Government auspices is a very real one, and I am sure that the whole thing has infinitely more chance of success if it is entirely independent of Government and entirely Indian. So I hope earnestly that you will give Zafrullah every encouragement to persevere in his present good intention and make it clear to him that while he must work entirely on his own, you will be always glad to keep in touch with him and will give him such encouragement as can be given without in any way tarring him with the official brush. He is genuinely convinced of the necessity of India's remaining with the Empire and that is equally the case with Mudaliar and Azizul Haque. The last named has in all his speeches here unfailingly given some part of his speech to paying a tribute to our past work in India. I confess I have never seen why the patriotic Indian should not be proud of, as well as grateful for, any contribution that has been made to the life of his country by the elements that have come in—Aryan, Muslim, Mogul, British. The opposite course, that of running down everything that has been done for India in the last 200 years, leads logically to the condemnation of everything post-Dravidian or possibly even post-Toda.

8. Meanwhile, I have been greatly cheered by your latest telegrams about Gandhi. If he pulls through, as now looks likely, he may have the credit of having exhibited unforeseen powers of physical resistance. But that is all. He will have shot the last bolt in his armoury and failed, and his stock and that of all those who have backed him or developed hysteria on behalf of his release will have gone down proportionately.

9. The tone of the House of Commons over all this business has been more than satisfactory. The Labour Party, it is true, began by somewhat half-heartedly

[3] No. 355, paras. 1–5, 8.

pressing for a debate on Gandhi, but rapidly changed their minds and only asked for a debate on the general Indian situation.[4] This I think we can justifiably put off until your broadside[5] against Congress reaches this country and is published. I don't think the critics will have very much of a case after that. I did receive a deputation the other evening, led by Sorensen, of M.Ps. and clerics and others. I spoke to them very straight, and I think that they were really considerably impressed even if unconvinced. As for America, there doesn't seem to be really very much excitement and it looks as if any idea of official intervention has been effectively scotched. Winston did not actually telegraph to the President, but told Halifax to stand quite firm and sent a message through him to Hopkins. So I hope you will have no further trouble from that quarter.

Due to S/S' clever management and readiness in debate.

L.

P.S.V.—

I have affixed some notes, though the paras. above are largely covered by last P. & P.[6] *to S/S.*

L.

[4] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 387, 25 February 1943, cols. 277–8, 305–6.
[5] See No. 530, note 2. [6] No. 476.

549

Government of India, Home Department to Secretary of State

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 267

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *27 February 1943, 8 pm*
Received: 27 February, 6.30 pm

1624. Addressed to Secretary of State for India London, Washington and Chungking. If Gandhi survives his fast, as now seems quite probable, we propose as soon as possible after its termination to withdraw the concessions allowed during its continuance. Extra medical attendance and nursing will be permitted during the critical period that may follow and close relations will be allowed to see him until he is pronounced out of danger but bulletins will be discontinued as soon as possible and all other visits will be stopped as soon as fast is broken. Beyond some announcement to this effect we do not contemplate issuing any further statement.

Repeated to Washington and Chungking.

550

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/11/5b: f 143

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *27 February 1943, 4.15 pm*
Received: 28 February

215. My personal telegram No. 3621.[1] The report referred to was from Cripps who may be biased. Is it necessary to announce definitely that extension is for 12 months? Your successor might if Maxwell's health showed signs of failing be in a position to come to a fresh decision in three months after taking over.

[1] No. 551.

551

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/11/5b: f 142

PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *27 February 1943, 5 pm*
Received: 28 February

3621. Your personal telegram 505-S[1] of 20th February. War Cabinet agree[2] in principle to extension of Maxwell. They are however anxious about reports as to his health and consequent loss of energy and wish to be assured before you announce his extension that you are satisfied that he will be able to stand up to the work.

[1] No. 502. [2] No. 541.

552

Mr Attlee to Field Marshal Smuts (via British High Commissioner in South Africa)

Telegram, L/P&J/8/600: f 231

IMPORTANT DOMINIONS OFFICE, *27 February 1943, 11 pm*

No. 325. Your telegram of 25th February No. 287.[1]

Please give General Smuts following Secret and Personal message from me in supplement of Prime Minister's message of 26th February.[2] *Begins.*

As Gandhi refused offer of liberty for the duration of the fast, Government of India made it plain to him that in these circumstances the whole responsibility

[1] No. 539. [2] No. 547.

must lie with him and the medical advisers of his own choosing whom he was allowed to have. We feel sure that in these circumstances it would not be practicable to apply forcible feeding to Gandhi by any means except with his consent, and in any case forcible feeding of him would be most repugnant to Indian sentiment. For your own information, Secretary of State for India informs me that he has heard from Viceroy, who has it from his Indian colleagues (and they should be in a position to know) that Gandhi is now in no danger and that indeed a few days ago when his condition seemed critical discreet steps were taken to modify his diet by the addition of orange juice in suitable quantities.[3] *Ends.*

[3] See Nos. 535 and 536.

553

Mr Churchill to the Marquess of Linlithgow (via War Office and Commander-in-Chief)

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/158

28 February 1943

56538. Personal from Prime Minister to Viceroy of India (through Field Marshal Wavell).

It now seems almost certain that the old rascal will emerge all the better from his so-called fast. I highly approve of the spirit of your No. 568–S[1] and the weapon of ridicule, so far as is compatible with the dignity of the Government of India, should certainly be employed. I shall be saying something on the subject myself in the near future. How foolish those cowardly Ministers now look who ran away from a bluff and sob-stuff crisis. Your own strong cool sagacious handling of the matter has given me the greatest confidence and satisfaction.

[1] No. 543.

554

Mr Amery to Mr Bevin[1]

L/E/8/2527: f 201

INDIA OFFICE, *1 March 1943*

My dear Bevin,

Thank you for your letter of the 26th February.[2] So far as I can see, the difference between us is one of procedure. I feel that the Government of India's views should be obtained before the Prime Minister considers your memorandum. If this is not done we may send out something to India and receive

from them in reply suggestions and criticisms which cannot be ignored and the whole matter would then have to be considered by the Prime Minister a second time. It is in my view unrealistic to frame a policy of this kind without the advice of those who have experience of these matters. I am very ready to send your memorandum to the Viceroy, and tell him that it represents the line of policy which some members of the War Cabinet would like to see publicly adopted and vigorously pursued and that, while we recognise that Linlithgow cannot in the last six months of his term take up anything of this kind, we should be glad to have the comments of the Government of India's experts and his own views on the memorandum, so that these can be considered and His Majesty's Government can formulate their final views, before a new Viceroy is appointed in the autumn. I should ask for the Government of India's views by June next to give time for consideration before the new Viceroy goes out.

I have no desire at all to delay consideration of the ideas in your note and I hope that it may be found practicable to give them effect, but I think we shall come to firm conclusions most rapidly by the method I have suggested.

I have not got up to date information on India's internal reconstruction plans. I believe that they are still in the stage of formulation on an official level. It is very desirable that the work which is being done out there by experts should be considered in this connection. It may contain some new and important ideas.

Yours sincerely,

L. S. AMERY

[1] A copy of this letter was sent to Sir S. Cripps. [2] No. 544.

555

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *2 March 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

I was laid up for some days last week by an attack of influenza of which there has been a great deal about here, and what with that and the burden under which I was labouring with the Mahatma and his affairs, I thought I might spare you a letter. As it happens not a very great deal has happened, for in the past fortnight or three weeks Gandhi and his affairs have been much the most prominent item in the daily round here, and there has not been a great deal else that has not admitted of being disposed of by telegram between us. As I write we are within about 36 hours of the conclusion of the fast, and I have no reason to believe (subject to any unforeseen event such as a sudden heart collapse

which might overtake him in any event) that he is likely to come out of his 21 days abstinence otherwise than a great deal better for the careful treatment under which he has been. Looking back over the whole period of the fast, I feel all the more satisfaction at having been able to stand absolutely firm over this whether I lost my colleagues or not: and though reverence for Gandhi will always reduce the likelihood of Hindu criticism here on what has taken place, there can be no question that he has suffered a major defeat and that the various efforts of his friends and himself to secure his unconditional release or some climb down on the part of Government have been a complete failure. We have exposed the Light of Asia—Wardha version—for the fraud it undoubtedly is: blue glass with a tallow candle behind it!! I have sent you copy of an amusing letter[1] from Douglas Young to my Private Secretary written about ten days ago which in terms suggests that what the old man has done is neither more nor less than one of these reducing fasts which people used to do at Champneys, and suggests also that even despite Gandhi's relatively advanced age there is plenty of precedent for people of his age having gone through them successfully. I would not be a bit surprised (indeed I think it more than likely that the Mahatma has tried to have it both ways, to get the credit of a fast with the possible abandonment of their position by Government together with the physical advantage to his blood pressure, &c. of a course of severe dieting carried over a period which from experience he felt that he was likely to be able to manage). I cannot say that the Bombay doctors including Candy come out of it all too well. I propose to make that clear to Lumley when I write to him, as I shall in a day or two after the fast ends, to thank him for his help over it and to condole with him on the burden which he and his people have had to carry. Even Lumley himself has not been free from one or two qualms, and you will have noticed a wobble which I did not think a very good one when a few days ago he gave support to the suggestion that we should send someone down with evidence to try and satisfy Gandhi that our case was really watertight. That suggestion, as I made clear in my telegram[2] repeating it home, I was not for a moment prepared to consider, and I am only a little surprised that Lumley should have thought that possible for a moment. But one has of course to make allowance for the additional nervous tension and strain in the case of people who are on the spot, in the very Gandhian atmosphere of Bombay city and Gujarat; and in Lumley's case, too, for the fact that he is at the end of a very heavy Governorship of 5½ years during which he has had no relaxation whatever and in the course of which he has had to face a number of trying and difficult decisions. Anyway all looks like being well that ends well, and I only hope that it may.

2. I have telegraphed[3] to you about the Home Membership, and I was glad to get yesterday your reply[4] and to learn that the Cabinet are agreeable to an

extension for Maxwell. Many thanks, too, for the background which you gave me in your accompanying private and personal telegram.[5] If Cripps had seen Maxwell over the last ten months, he would have had no hesitation in regarding him as perfectly fit to carry on, for Maxwell's intellectual capacity is remarkable, and though his frail body occasionally lets him down for a few days, I have rarely seen such consistent energy, application and sound judgment as he has helped me with during all the time that I have been here. Nor have I detected the very least falling off in its quality or vigour. I am not attracted by the idea of asking him to stay for less than a year. I quite agree that my successor (if he is very lucky—I would not have myself been disposed to make such a judgment though I came out here with very much greater experience and knowledge of India than my successor can possibly have) may be able to make up his mind by, say, January of next year as to whether he really wants Maxwell to stay on till April. But I think myself he would be ill-advised to do so, and I should be reluctant to extend to Maxwell an invitation to accept an extension of less than a year. Knowing him as I do, I am quite certain that my successor will be very lucky if he is able to have him for the whole of that time, while Maxwell equally has never let himself be guided by anything but considerations of the public service, and if he felt before the end of the year that he would be no longer necessary or that he was no longer capable of doing his work, he would be the first man to ask to be relieved.

3. I am also most grateful for your other U telegram[6] about the filling of these remaining vacancies. I do not propose to make any move about that until the fast is over. I am working on it now, and I shall hope to let you have a telegram in the course of a few days. I rather think that I may use Khare whom Twynam continues to commend to me in the warmest terms. I do not overlook the fact that Twynam's enthusiasm may be a little affected by his readiness to see Khare provided for outside the Central Provinces. But thinking as highly as I do of Twynam, I am prepared to accept his praise of Khare as entirely genuine. I do not suppose he would be a real flyer, but we have to make the best use of what we can get. I should much like to get one of these tough Punjabees such as Chhotu Ram. But I must be careful not to upset the balance in Glancy's delicately adjusted Cabinet, and though I shall probably consult Glancy and ask him what his view is about letting Chhotu Ram come here, I would not feel justified in pressing him if he asks me not to take this idea further. Sir Gokal Chand Narang who is I think a Mahasabhite and could certainly be relied on to put the Hindu point of view in Council, is another possible in my mind. I am also very strongly disposed, as I have already hinted to you,[7] to letting Sultan Ahmed replace Mudaliar at the War Cabinet. Mudaliar has been away about long enough and a change at the home end is desirable.

[1] Not printed. [2] No. 516. [3] No. 502. [4] No. 551. [5] No. 550.
[6] No. 532. [7] No. 501.

Apart from that, with the Hindu element in my Cabinet weakened by the withdrawal of men such as Sarker and Aney who have had a good deal of experience, I am anxious that that side should be competently represented, and Mudaliar is unquestionably in a position to be very useful from that point of view. Whether I should ask him to serve as Commerce or as Defence Member, I have not yet quite decided. I dare say in the end it will come back to his resuming his former portfolio as Commerce Member. I am quite clear that Firoz should take Supply. If I did make Sultan Ahmed available, I should have to find a lawyer with the technical qualifications requisite under the Act: but that ought to be possible without too much difficulty. I have not anyone very much in mind; but I should aim at getting a lawyer rather than a practising politician. I dare say that one of the Presidencies might be able to provide a good man with experience as Advocate-General or the like, and I will consult Governors about that once I get the general scheme roughed out. I think on the whole that there is force in what you say about a further European appointment, and I shall probably adopt that. But I am very strongly disposed to put in Hydari in charge of Indians Overseas. It is true that he will be a service Member. He is personally acceptable so far as I know. The Muslims might grumble at not having one of their own politicians selected, but they would be much more offended if I took in a politician from any other party: and looking to the future, Hydari, who has a good deal of general administrative experience and who has done very well as Acting Chairman of the Eastern Group Supply Council, might well give us a useful reserve for the Home Membership at a later date. In considering all this, I have thought a good deal about what you say in paragraph 5 of your letter of the 29th January,[8] and I think there is much force in your suggestion that we tend to overdo this business of chasing after party politicians.

* * *

5. Many thanks for what you say in paragraph 4 of your letter of 29th January about Phillips. Matters have progressed a good deal since that was written. Your very helpful earlier telegrams[9] have cleared the air, and I hope that the possibility of misunderstanding has been reduced. I thought it much better to be perfectly frank with him both in passing the detail you were kind enough to give me of your conversations with Anderson, and with him in London, and again when I was so unexpectedly tackled about Gandhi and the fast.[10] I am not perfectly easy about this mission. They seem to be building themselves up an enormous staff here, and I do not quite know what it is all supposed to be doing, for they have no diplomatic or commercial activities that could not be dealt with by two men and a boy. I suspect it is all part of the American anxiety to dig in in this country with a view to the post-war period, and from that point of view I think it has to be looked at. I have just had from Caroe a request from Phillips to be allowed to post two foreign Service Officers

here with the designation of Counsellor, the first to be senior diplomatic officer, and his staff and the second Commercial Counsellor. You will be familiar with the correspondence[11] that has been passing as regards Phillips' request for a special S.S.O. Mission to work in liaison with our people here. The latest detail I have had about that is that the number of persons to be included in it is to be so large as six. I think we ought politely to set some sort of limit to this sort of expansion. It is not very healthy and I propose to raise the point with you in consulting you about this latest suggestion for expansion by way of Counsellors. We must look to the Foreign Office to protect us over this by quoting precedent: but I am under the strong impression that in dealing with a foreign country increases in staff are looked upon with a somewhat jealous eye and controlled pretty effectively by the medium of the exequatur. We do not want to carry things too far but it certainly would be easier if the Mission were on a more modest scale and if the justification for these large increases were more apparent than I find it at present.

* * *

11. About ten days ago, and before my Council started to disintegrate [a] motion on Federation came up in the Assembly. I was all for this for I thought it an admirable opportunity to ventilate the federal idea and I had a discussion with Aney who was prepared to speak on behalf of Government, and incidentally to trail his coat ever so little as regards Pakistan. Unfortunately his resignation took place on the day before the debate and I had at short notice to put in Sultan Ahmed who for obvious reason was not a bit anxious to back the Pakistan side. In the result, most of the burden was carried by James. There was a very interesting contribution by Nawabzada Liaqat Ali Khan on behalf of the Muslim League. I think you may be interested in both the speeches and I send you press reports of them. The debate[12] went well enough, but in the shifts consequent upon Aney's disappearance, it was not brought out as clearly as I had hoped it would be, that, while Jinnah might claim "Pakistan", he could hardly object to the rest of India, British as well as Indian States, federating on any basis that might seem to them worth while. The difficulties in getting ahead with Federation may be great—may indeed be insuperable. But I am all for keeping it as the one generally constructive idea that is in the field fairly prominently before people's eyes, all the more since it is quite clear to me that there is no other hope of progress. Conflicting parties will not come together and it will not be possible for us to impose a settlement on either of them. In other words, subject to the possibility of something of the nature of a federal scheme emerging, we must look forward to many years of Council Government of substantially the same type as we are experiencing today.

[8] No. 370. [9] Nos. 374 and 494. [10] No. 489. [11] Not printed.
[12] On 18 February 1943. *The Legislative Assembly Debates*, vol. 1 (Delhi, 1943), pp. 377–99.

12. In my last letter I said that Jagdish Prasad seems still to be pretty firmly in favour of further Indianisation at the Centre, but a letter which I have just seen shows that he accepts, though with regret, that public opinion is opposed to further Indianisation on the present lines; and that he is much more anxious to get ahead in the Provinces.

* * *

14. I have been sending you as they come in the replies to my most secret and personal letter of 2nd November[13] about the part played by big business in the Congress programme, and I have just had a very interesting reply[14] from Twynam of which copy goes by this bag. I think the extract from *Indian Opinion*, which he quotes[15] in paragraph 2 of that letter, is of real interest and worth bearing in mind, for it might admit of being used at another juncture. As for what Twynam says in paragraph 4 of his letter about the location of Congress funds, I have for some time felt that we have been too ready to regard as impossible the obtaining of information about Congress funds and the disposal at death of the fortunes of wealthy sympathisers with Congress; and that we are too ready to accept the existence of the "Joint Family System" as an insuperable difficulty. I propose to take the matter up with Maxwell. I think we must try and do better; and for this purpose it is evidently necessary that we should organise complete interaction between Province and Province including Delhi, and perhaps certain of the Indian States used by the Marwaris.

* * *

16. Maxwell was very pleased to get your message congratulating him on the speech he made during the debate on the adjournment motion raised on the issue of Gandhi's fast, and he has asked me to convey to you his thanks for it. I agree with you entirely that it was an admirable exposition.

Fast or no fast, I got out for a shoot over the weekend, when with my youngest daughter and 4 of my staff, we shot the very big total of 415 snipe in one day and 246 the next. Almost a record, I would suppose.

Best luck.

[13] No. 132. [14] L/P&J/8/618; see also No. 132, note 3.

[15] Referring to the penultimate sentence of para. 3 of No. 132, Sir H. Twynam wrote that he had given Sir G. Laithwaite the following extract from *Indian Opinion* (Durban) of 11 December 1942: 'India has no heart in the war, in fact she has set her eyes on Japan. You may today be denuding her of her resources, but they are the resources of an unwilling India. India is thus a corpse—a heavy carcase of which the weight might make your victory impossible. If by some chance England comes to her senses—and the Allies come to their senses—and say let us get rid of this carcase, that single act will give them a power which no military skill or resources and no amount of American help can give them. Gandhiji.'

556

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

PRIVATE AND SECRET INDIA OFFICE, *2 March 1943*

Vive Gandhi! That in the most literal sense, namely that he should live at least another 24 hours and break his fast. I think we—and by that I mean specially you—have come remarkably well out of the whole affair. Your handling of your Council on the one hand and your equally resolute handling of the situation *vis-à-vis* the Cabinet here, just made all the difference and prevented what might easily have been a disastrous muddle. As it is, the Government of India comes out the winner and those at any rate who have not resigned will have the credit for their staunchness. I am sorry for the three who have resigned: you can hardly bring them back just yet, though your successor might do so one of these days. But meanwhile I hope you will continue to keep in touch with them and not let them stray into the fold of the critics, but rather wish to come back into the circle of Government. As for Gandhi, I suppose he will get a certain measure of credit in India for having survived his fast. Otherwise I think most of the public in India as well as outside will realise that he has used the last weapon in his armoury and failed. I see the *News Chronicle* correspondent this morning is already suggesting that the end of the fast offers a wonderful opportunity for "ending the deadlock". Why it should I cannot conceive. After all, the fast was only one more attempt at coercion and to my mind consequently only a justification for continuing his internment and refusing to discuss the situation with him.

2. With regard to the High Commissionership here, I confess I am rather attracted by Herbert's suggestion that you should send us Fazlul Huq and let Sir Hassan [Suhrawardy] join the Bengal Ministry. I believe Fazlul Huq is eloquent and he would no doubt spread himself here quite patriotically, even if he wouldn't put in the honest good work that Azizul Huque has done. On the other hand, Sir Hassan would, I think, bring to Bengal a quite useful outlook acquired while in this office.

3. Azizul Huque is flying off any moment now with Zafrulla and Colville. He is in high spirits at the fact that the Bengal Relief Fund has brought in over £30,000. As most of this was the result of his own excellent broadcast, he has every reason to be pleased. He is particularly anxious to go down to Midnapore himself and read to the people some of the letters he has received from poor working class homes along with their small contributions. I am sure that the more you encourage him to go about meeting University authorities and others

while his enthusiasm about this country is still fresh, and also to broadcast, the better, even if you may wish at an early date to announce the place you have decided for him on the Council.

4. I had a good talk the other day with Lord McGowan of I.C.I. about future industrial development in India. He is all for British firms throwing themselves frankly into that development, rather than creating the impression that they grudge Indian development in the interests of British exports, and also bringing Indians into partnership in local Indian companies as much as possible. One of his ideas was that possibly an Indian Development Commission might be set up both at the Indian and also at the British end, to consider what British Industry could do to help the most rapid development in India, not only of major industries, but also of simple manufactures which could add to local employment and to the general standard of living. Naturally I expressed myself in sympathy with his general ideas—the question of a Development Commission I did not go into as I don't quite know how far you have already gone on the same lines. What I do feel very strongly is that there are two ways in which India can after the war use her accumulated sterling credit. One is the static way of narrow nationalism, namely the buying out of existing British concerns. The other is to use the money for fresh development and even for the encouragement of fresh British capital, trusting to the total development and enrichment of India making the British element in the total industrial capital of India progressively a less important and dominating one.

5. In that connection Cripps and Bevin are once again agitating to get Winston's approval of a general programme of social regeneration for India which one of Cripps' young men has drawn up. I am trying to persuade them[1] that the document had much better be sent out to you first for your comments before Winston is troubled with it. It will have to go out to you anyway, and there is plenty of time for it to come back with your comments before a new Viceroy is given a general line of instruction at this end.

[Paras. 6–8, on reports on evacuation from Burma, omitted.]

9. I am looking forward to your general case against Congress and propose to give it as much publicity as possible, whether in the form of a blue book or otherwise. All the same, when we have a debate, as now seems pretty certain, after the publication of the case, I must try and make it clear that the arrest of Gandhi and the Congress leaders was in any case fully justified by their previous declarations, and would have remained justified if nothing had happened. The detailed case, of course, adds greatly to the justification, but is not essential to it. If a man says he is going to kick you out of the room you are justified in dealing with him, even if he asks you to discuss the matter for a moment while he is lacing up his boots. If you find afterwards that the boots were specially

hobnailed to do you damage that strengthens the case undoubtedly, but is not an absolutely indispensable part of it.

[1] See No. 554.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: f 208

IMMEDIATE *3 March 1943*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL
599–S. Gandhi has broken his fast. My best thanks for your firm support and encouragement.

558

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *3 March 1943, 9.30 pm*
PERSONAL
No. 606–S. Your personal telegram of 27th February No. 3621.[1] Maxwell. I am very glad. Maxwell is not a strong man, but I am satisfied that he would be able to carry the burden, and that is also his doctor's view. As regards period, it would I gather probably be preferable so far as he is concerned that extension should be for 10 months rather than 12. I am quite prepared to support that, though it will leave my successor four months only instead of six to find his feet and arrange for Maxwell's relief.[2]

[1] No. 551.
[2] In subsequent correspondence it was decided that Sir R. Maxwell should be asked to remain in office at least ten months and possibly twelve if Lord Linlithgow's successor so desired; and that an announcement should be made that the King had approved his continuance in office for a further period, supplemented by a Press note to the effect that it was understood the intention was that he should hold office for a further period not exceeding twelve months. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

559

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: f 206

SECRET INDIA OFFICE, *3 March 1943, 3.40 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

235. Congratulations on your most successful deflation of Gandhi.

560

Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/57

CONFIDENTIAL GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, *4 March 1943*

REPORT NO. 118

My dear Linlithgow,

1. This report covers the last three weeks, and, since this has been the period of Gandhi's fast, it will be concerned mainly with that event, which has been, both for my Government and the Province generally, the main preoccupation. I will not, however, attempt to give a comprehensive account of the fast: a full report is being drawn up by my Home Department, and will be forwarded to the Government of India as soon as possible. I have also asked the Surgeon-General to prepare a secret report on the medical aspects of the fast, which I will forward to you as soon as it is received. I have also called for a report, from the Superintendent of the Jail in Ahmednagar Fort, on the reactions to the fast, so far as he has noticed them, of the members of the Working Committee.

2. *The Question of Release.*—The most important and difficult problem arising from the fast has been whether Gandhi should be released or retained in custody regardless of consequences. This problem has been under discussion for some considerable time. As long ago as August the 8th, 1942, on the eve of the arrests, you asked my views in case Gandhi should stage a fast.[1] I expressed, then, the view that to allow Gandhi to die in detention would have very serious consequences, and I have not changed my view since then. I am still of the opinion that the long-term reactions would permanently damage Indian sentiment, and would make very difficult an eventual settlement between Great Britain and India. I expressed this opinion from the point of view of this Province, which is predominantly Hindu, and in which Congress has its

strongest roots. Here, Gandhi is a religion to very large numbers of people, and ordinary standards of logic and reason cannot be applied, where he is concerned, without grave risk. I realise that, in this Province, we do not have the same counter-reactions from Muslims and other communities as may be the case elsewhere, and I would not venture to say that the view, which I feel bound to put forward from the point of view of this Province, should be the one which should govern a decision on all-India policy. Nevertheless, nothing which has happened during this fast has caused me to modify my view that a very big and far-reaching estrangement between British and Indians would result if Gandhi were to die in circumstances for which it could be held, however unreasonably, that Government were responsible.

I was under the impression, after my visit to Delhi in January, that this was the general view amongst Governors, and was also the view of the Home Member. The circumstances which brought about a change of view were, I would judge, that for this fast Gandhi intimated that it was a fast to capacity and not to death, and that therefore it could be expected that he would see to it that, somehow or other, he would get through it: and, secondly, that his refusal to accept the offer of release, for the purpose and duration of the fast, turned it, in effect, into a fast for unconditional release. I did not feel greatly influenced by the first of these considerations, for I thought that he had overestimated his capacity, and that, at his age, he might very soon get into a condition from which he would be unable to recover. I felt, therefore, that we would be running a great risk if we banked on his getting through. He has, in the result, confounded all medical prophets. The most likely explanation of this feat seems to be, first, that he knows more about fasting than any doctor: and, secondly, that one or other of the non-official doctors gave him glucose to help him through, and possibly more fruit-juice than has been admitted.

P.S.V. has my instructions on all this.

L.

With regard to the other consideration, I thought that the offer of release, for the purpose and duration of the fast, was well worth making. In spite of the fact that Gandhi at once torpedoed it, thereby showing that he remains one of the most astute of men, I do think that the offer was good tactics, and that it probably helped to steady feeling in the early stages. But it did have the result, which I admit I never envisaged, but which I have no doubt Gandhi spotted, of making it clear that one way of saving his life was to release him. If the offer had not been made, there would have been no certainty that he would stop the fast if he were released: but his declaration in reply to the offer, that he would not fast if he were released, emphasised the point that release would stop the fast, and probably gave the cue to his supporters to concentrate on the demand for his unconditional release.

[1] See Vol. II, No. 480.

The result of the fast, as it has now turned out, has provided what I have no doubt is the best possible solution, at any rate for the time being. Government obtains all the advantage of your decision to stand firm, and reaps, so long as Gandhi does not die during convalescence, none of the serious disadvantages of his death, which, in this Province at any rate, would have been formidable. What the future holds is not yet clear, but it is a great relief that the result has been so much more favourable than I, at any rate, anticipated: and, if I may venture to say so, this successful result is due solely to your decision to stand firm.

3. *Local Arrangements.*—The fast created many minor problems on which decisions had to be made almost daily, and for which there was little in past history or practice to guide us. Liaison between my Government and the Government of India was greatly facilitated by the Secraphone, and the daily discussions which took place by this means ensured that, over these small problems, the pros and cons could be rapidly assessed and agreed decisions reached. Although many of these small matters had some baffling aspects, I think, on the whole, our local arrangements worked smoothly and in line with the policy of the Government of India. For my part, I felt concerned to see that, even if the event ended in tragedy, there could be no ground for accusations of indifference or of refusal to provide all reasonable assistance, and that a general atmosphere of courtesy should be maintained—and this, I think, was the desire of the Government of India. I have no reason to believe that those objects were not achieved, and Mrs. Naidu's correspondence with her family could provide evidence of that, if it were needed in the future.

It was I think all very well done, and I am much beholden to H.E. and to all concerned.

L.

Prior to the announcement of the fast, it was necessary to convey the Government of India's offer of release to Gandhi, and this task I entrusted to Irwin. He carried out this task with his usual coolness and efficiency, and it was important to have someone with his knowledge of the background, and of the views of the Government of India, on the spot at that time. He was in direct contact by Secraphone with my office, and with Laithwaite, from Poona, and this part of the proceedings seemed, to me, to go very smoothly. One of the impressions which Irwin brought back from the Aga Khan's Palace was of the great interest which Gandhi himself took in the medical side of his forthcoming fast. Indeed, he seemed so bent on trying the experiment of a three weeks' fast at his age, that he would probably have been disappointed if he had not been able to try it out. Mrs. Naidu remarked to Irwin that he had got fasting on the brain, and that he would not be happy until he had got it off his chest. I think there is a good deal in the view that Gandhi is a crank about fasting, and that, once he has got the idea into his head, he cannot resist the experience. I think

it is quite likely that, if he had been released at that stage, he would very soon have found some reason for staging a fast, even when a free man.

The next problem which arose concerned the medical assistance which Gandhi should be allowed. The Government of India had made it clear that, if he fasted in detention, he would be allowed all the medical attention which he required. While Irwin was still in Poona, Dr. Sushila Nair, the lady doctor who is confined in the Aga Khan's Palace, wrote a note to Gandhi to the effect that, after a sleepless night, she had come to the conclusion that she could not alone shoulder the responsibility of looking after him during his fast, and said she would like the assistance of Doctors Gilder, Jivraj Mehta and B. C. Roy. Gandhi handed her note to Irwin without specifically sponsoring the request himself. On Irwin's return to Bombay, he made it clear to me that Dr. Nair, . . .,[2] did not appear to possess strong qualifications or experience, and that someone of high medical reputation, and who would be capable of taking charge of the situation inside the palace, was obviously needed. As Gilder filled the bill well, and had had considerable experience of Gandhi in previous fasts, and otherwise, and as he was *persona grata* to the other inmates of the palace, I obtained your concurrence to his transfer from detention in Yeravda Jail to the Aga Khan's palace. This transfer was effected on the second day of the fast. I do not doubt that this was a good arrangement, and, in addition, it satisfied public opinion that Gandhi was receiving the best medical assistance. I learn from Candy that Gilder behaved well and correctly, which was what I expected, as he is a decent sort of man and I have always found him straightforward. Jivraj Mehta, who was also detained in Yeravda Jail, was a different proposition. It is true that he has had more experience, dating back to 1914, of attendance on Gandhi, but he is a mischievous person, with strong racial prejudices. Moreover, it was clear that Mrs. Naidu, at any rate, was not at all anxious that he should be summoned, on the ground, presumably, that he would not add to smooth working inside the palace. I understand, too, that several people in Bombay, who were much concerned over Gandhi, expressed the hope that Jivraj Mehta would not be allowed to assist. I am quite certain that it was neither necessary nor desirable for him to be added to the team. He wrote a personal letter to me asking to be allowed to go to the palace, and I returned him a formal refusal from our Home Department. Dr. Roy received your permission to attend on Gandhi, and he arrived from Calcutta a few days after the fast commenced. He lived outside the palace, in Poona. I learn from Candy that Gilder and Roy behaved well, and that Roy, in particular, endeavoured to be correct in his dealings with press correspondents, who continually besieged him whenever he went out. His final interview with the Press, which appeared in the *Times of India* on March the 3rd, and during which I believe he was hotly questioned by American correspondents about the amount of fruit-juice taken by Gandhi during

[2] Personal comment omitted.

the fast, has, I think, been useful—unwittingly no doubt—in creating the impression that the fast was, to some extent, fraudulent. The only one of these non-official doctors who, according to Candy, created difficulties, was Dr. Nair.

I also thought it advisable to send Candy up to Poona. He has had experience, while he was Civil Surgeon in Poona, of some of Gandhi's previous fasts, and is a level-headed person, and would see to it that the other two Government doctors were not stampeded by the emotional atmosphere which was likely to prevail, and I gather did prevail, throughout the fast inside the palace. I think Candy succeeded in performing this task very satisfactorily. He realises, of course, that his own prognosis of Gandhi's endurance has been proved wrong, but all the other doctors were of exactly the same opinion, and they must all be feeling rather foolish. Candy, however, suspects, as I have already intimated to you, that glucose was administered at some stage during the fast, and possibly that the quantities of fruit-juice taken were larger than those admitted. He is also considerably puzzled over certain medical features of the fast, and has asked if he could send certain data to General Bradfield, at the India Office, to be considered by experts, to which I have agreed. The other two Government doctors were Colonel Bhandari, I.M.S., our Inspector-General of Prisons, and Colonel Shah. Bhandari has had much experience of Gandhi's fasts when he was Superintendent of Yeravda Jail, but he is an administrative officer rather than a medical specialist. Colonel Shah is a Muslim and a relative of the Aga Khan's. He has retired from the I.M.S. but has been re-employed since the war as Superintendent of the Yeravda Mental Hospital. In addition to these duties, he has been the Medical Officer-in-charge of the Aga Khan's Palace since Mrs. Gandhi began, in September, to give some cause for anxiety and it appeared advisable to have a doctor-in-charge who could be easily available. Colonel Shah is of an imperturbable nature. Colonel Bhandari felt his responsibility very keenly, which I do not find surprising, particularly as, in addition to his trials in the Aga Khan's Palace, he had all our other jails in his charge, in many of which sympathetic fasts were started by prisoners. It was largely to take the responsibility off his shoulders that I sent Candy up to Poona.

In addition to these six doctors, an ear specialist was called in when Gandhi had some pain in the ear. A well-known pathologist from Bombay was also called in to do certain blood tests: and a nature-cure specialist, a Parsi named Mehta, who had attended Gandhi during the Rajkot fast, was called in and administered, I understand, some particular form of massage, and was also responsible for suggesting some other forms of treatment. I do not know of anyone else who has had as many as nine doctors attending him—and this, I think, must add to Gandhi's personal performance in surviving, in spite of them. One of Gandhi's nephews Kanu Gandhi, also was allowed into the palace and helped to nurse him, as did, at various times, several Ashramites who turned up in Poona. Mrs. Naidu can be described as Matron-in-Chief, and

I imagine was the only one of the permanent inmates who retained some humour throughout the proceedings.

The question of issuing bulletins presented some difficulties. We issued none for the first few days, and then for the next few days issued our own very brief summary, based on the doctors' reports. Thereafter, as there appeared to be some demand for more detailed reports, we arranged that the six doctors should prepare a daily bulletin for issue to the public, after our approval, in addition to informing us of further details. I was somewhat reluctant to agree to the issue of a doctors' bulletin, in case it should happen that the non-official doctors and the official ones disagreed; but this did not occur, and I think, on the whole, the arrangements about bulletins worked satisfactorily.

The question of visitors was complicated by the fact that Gandhi himself would not take any initiative in the matter, and would not refuse anyone who wanted to see him. The result was that anyone who could be considered a friend or relative, and who was not deterred by the possibility of causing him additional strain, was allowed to see him. Most of these did little more than receive his *darshan*, and Gilder was, I understand, effective, as Master of Ceremonies, in getting them out as quickly as possible. Rajagopalacharia's last visit, I understand, caused Gandhi to become considerably excited over something to do with non-violence. I am awaiting a report of what transpired from Khan Bahadur Kateli, the Jailor-in-charge of the palace, who was present at all interviews.

At the commencement of the fast, we endeavoured to reach agreement with the Provincial Press Advisory Committee over restrictions on the Press: but agreement did not prove possible, and we issued an order requiring precensorship of everything concerning the fast except objective comments, and of any editorial comments attempting to cause resentment against Government. These restrictions were effective. Our local Press seems to think that they were more severe than in other Provinces. I do not know if that is true, but they served their purpose and, on the whole, the Press remained fairly restrained. There were a few instances of the order not being observed, none of them very serious; but one of them led to the forfeiture, for a time, of a press.

From the beginning of the fast, we took certain precautions for preserving law and order, in case public excitement developed. District Magistrates were instructed to remain in their Headquarters, all police outposts were reinforced, and certain troop movements were made in accordance with arrangements which we had concerted with the Military authorities, some months previously, for this eventuality. These entailed the movement of one British battalion from Poona to Ahmedabad, of two Detachments to the Districts of East Khandesh and West Khandesh, and one unit to a strategical position from which it could operate in several districts. In addition, there were troops in considerable numbers in training areas in the neighbourhood of Bombay, in Poona, and in

Belgaum District, well situated if their assistance had been required. As usual, I received the fullest co-operation of the District Commander in all these arrangements. They will remain in force until Gandhi is pronounced out of danger. None of the troops have been called upon to act, except a small number in Ahmedabad, who took over certain Guards to relieve the police.

When there seemed a possibility that Gandhi would die, I sent Bristow up to Poona to supervise the preparation of arrangements for the funeral and to take responsibility for any immediate decisions which might have to be made. Although the eventuality did not arise, plans, so far as they could be made before the event, were ready, and will be useful if the contingency re-occurs. The main line, with which you agreed, was to allow a public funeral.

4. *Local Reactions.*—For the first few days of the fast, the public appeared to be somewhat bewildered by it, and there were no strong reactions. Some shops and markets were closed, but I heard that this was done with markedly less enthusiasm than on previous occasions and that business continued to go on, on a large scale, by the back door. When Gandhi's condition became serious, emotion began to rise, and feeling was becoming tense until he took a favourable turn. Ahmedabad was the place most affected, and the mills closed for a number of days, while some 10,000 mill-workers left the city for their villages. In Bombay, a few mills came out. There were no disturbances anywhere, and attempts made in Poona, mostly by youths, to march on the Aga Khan's Palace, were on a very small scale and were very easily disposed of. I think, however, it would be a mistake to consider this absence of public disturbances as a true guide to what would have happened if Gandhi had died. The feeling was certainly becoming very tense. People with moderate views and loyal to Government showed much anxiety. Reports from nearly all districts show that this was the case throughout the Province, as well as in the cities. We should have had no vocal support. The absence of Congress leaders and organisation would, I expect, have rendered such outbursts as would have occurred comparatively easy to deal with, but those working underground would have received, I think, much reinforcement, and a terrorist campaign would have been likely. It is significant that some of the more extreme nationalists were saying that they hoped Gandhi would die, as he would be of no further use to them, and his death could be used to work up hatred against the British. As soon as it appeared likely that Gandhi was going to get through his critical phase, tension relaxed very swiftly, and everything is now normal.

5. *The Future.*—Candy tells me that he thinks it will be some fifteen days, from the ending of the fast, before Gandhi will be able to leave his bed, and possibly two or three months before he will be back to normal, provided no permanent injury has been done to his health. He considers that the position is much the same as if he had had a very bad go of enteric. He has been left very

weak. If he were a young man he would recover fairly rapidly, but at his age it will be slower. I think it will be advisable for Gilder to remain on in the palace for a little time longer, and to keep the nephew, Kanu Gandhi, who apparently does the nursing. . . .[3]

I would hope that it will be two or three months before Gandhi will think out his next move. As to what that will be, it is perhaps idle to speculate at this stage. I feel fairly certain, however, that, if he feels fit enough, he will not be content with doing nothing, and will make some further attempt to take the centre of the stage. There is a story, told me by Bristow, that Gandhi told one of his sons, towards the end of his fast, that if he got through this one, he would later try another one, and take nothing, not even water—but I have not yet been able to check up on this. If there is any truth in it, it is very likely due to his sensing the criticism, which was going about very freely in Poona, that this was not a real fast. He appears to have been rather sensitive to this. However, one cannot predict what he will do, and he might just as easily profess to have received a revelation, during his fast, which will lead him to confess his errors and recant. This might provide as many difficulties as another fast. At the moment, we can only feel relief that we have got through this fast with so satisfactory a result.

I shall be found ready to oblige.
L.

6. *Civil Disobedience.*—There has been a marked lull in the civil disobedience movement, even in Belgaum. This may partly have been due to the arrest of a leading underground Congressman for whom we offered a reward of Rs. 5,000 and which has undoubtedly dislocated the movement in Belgaum for a time. It was also probably due, in part, to the underground leaders holding their hand during the fast. I do not expect this lull to continue in Belgaum, since the gangs are now in possession of a number of firearms, and I expect they will use them. I am, therefore, endeavouring to arrange for a more intense concentration on Belgaum.

I have just received news of an affray between a police party and a large number of armed Bhils in West Khandesh District. Fourteen Bhils were killed. I await details, but this does not appear to have had any connection with the civil disobedience movement.

7. *Food Situation.*—Our rationing scheme for Bombay City will probably be introduced in a month's time. Ration cards are now being distributed. It is of some interest to note that the enumeration of the population for rationing has disclosed a very considerable rise since the census in 1940. The census figures showed a population for the City of 1,450,000. The rationing enumeration showed a population of 1,750,000, and that did not include certain categories

[3] Personal comment omitted.

such as troops, homeless, orphans, beggars, &c. These are estimated to number 150,000, so the population is probably not far short of 1,900,000. This rise must be very largely due to the great increase in employment occasioned by the war.

The supplies of food allotted to us have been coming in regularly, and the situation is therefore somewhat easier—except, of course, for wheat, which is still very short. I would ask, however, for further allotments of supplies to be made to us. Our present allotment will last us into April, and I have no doubt that it is the intention to go on giving us more. I make this request particularly for the benefit of Colville. It is an uneasy position, not knowing definitely when further supplies of food will arrive, and I would like to have the position more clearly defined for him when he arrives. Past experience has shown that there must be at least six weeks between the allotment of new supplies and their arrival in Bombay, and if new allotments are not made to us very soon, there might well be a very anxious period in April, just at the time when rationing will have commenced, when we may be very short.

P.S.V.—
Perhaps "Food" will say what they are likely to be able to do. I, too, feel that we ought to remember Colville.
L.

Yours sincerely,
ROGER LUMLEY

I am sorry the Governor has been so much bothered by the little man.
L.

561

Sir A. Hope (Madras) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/71

SECRET GOVT. HOUSE, GUINDY, *4 March 1943*

No. 1.–1943

My dear Linlithgow,

First of all, let me congratulate you on the firm stand which you took over Gandhi, and the results fully justify your policy.

2. For the first time Gandhi has been debunked, and despite the Press efforts to whip up emotion and mysticism and hints that his survival is miraculous, people generally realise that the fast has been a failure and that Gandhi's bluff has been called.

3. There was a good deal of excitement among the students, but nothing serious happened anywhere beyond a few arrests for picketing, &c. There was

however a widespread fear that Gandhi would die—a fear felt even by his most violent political opponents. The Press of course emphasised his "saintliness" and ignored his political antics, and this played on the Hindu mind very considerably. Generally speaking, the fast was condemned, but with typical Indian lack of logic and refusal to face facts, Government were urged to submit to his blackmail; and hardly a soul suggested that if he wanted to live he had the remedy in his own hands.

4. From all I hear, the excitement and emotion was very largely confined to the intelligentsia in the towns, and the villages took little or no interest, which is I think very significant and bears out my previous impression that Congress is rapidly losing ground in the countryside, where the people think much more of food and prices than politics and fasts.

But I am not sure about the next elections, for all that!

L.

5. I am very glad that you are closing down on the interviews, &c. at Poona, and trust that oblivion will now descend on the old man again.

6. If he tries another fast, I suppose this time "unto death", I hope that publicity will be withheld. The Press appeared to have had practically a free hand in Poona, and it was impossible for us to prohibit all the sob-stuff that came from there, when it was allowed in Bombay. The local Congress Press had literally pages of reports, demands, statements, &c. from any persons or bodies who wanted to see their names in print. Certainly the publicity allowed in and from Poona was very much greater than I expected and, as I say, I hope that it will be much reduced next time.

I am arranging for Mr. G. to fast at Madras *next time.*

L.

562

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMPORTANT *5 March 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 621–S. Your private and personal telegram of 3rd March No. 235.[1] Warmest thanks. I think all is going well.

[1] No. 559.

563

Sir A. Clow (Assam) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/36

No. 18. GOVT. HOUSE, SHILLONG, *5 March 1943*

4. The end of Gandhi's fast has come as a relief to many. This includes myself, for I believed for some time that, despite his hot resentment of the suggestion that he was looking for "the easy way out", that was his intention. The general belief among the public, and even among officials, during the first part of the fast was that he would be released if the danger-point was reached; when it was realized that this was not going to be done, there was a little perturbation, but this was quickly succeeded by the belief that he would survive the ordeal, and indeed many think that he never intended to run any risk. Efforts were made in some places to agitate public opinion on the matter; but these aroused little interest. In Shillong the ex-Minister, Rohini Kumar Chaudhuri, organized a meeting under the Chairmanship of the Speaker; but Gandhi cuts no ice with the hill peoples, and has less prestige in Assam generally than in most provinces. It is not yet clear whether the disturbance in Jorhat jail, where most of our important security prisoners are detained, was connected with the fast.

564

Mr Rutherford (Bihar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/50

SECRET CAMP, *5 March 1943*

No. 160–G.B.

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

Thank you for your letter of 1st March[1] commenting on my No. 125–G.B.[2] of 16th February. May I be permitted to offer my congratulations on the stand made by Your Excellency and the remaining Members of your Council against Gandhi's blackmail and the concerted blitz of the Congress press and sentimental politicians of India. They did their best to work up the feelings on which Gandhi really counted for effective coercion of Government and I felt that for us also the motto should be "do or die". Actually in this Province, apart from students' strikes at Patna, some public meetings and prayers, an employer-organised strike at Dalmianagar, a few *hartals* and the abortive hunger-strikes in certain jails there was remarkably little outward manifestation of interest by the general public. Lord Erskine always characterised South Indian politics as

Bedlam and it is a mad feature of the present situation in India that because of the "Mahatmic superstition" we have to employ police and troops all over the country in case the old zealot should die. Now that the threat is over I feel almost ashamed of the precautions taken and properly "Scotch" about the expense. I see that Sarker realises that Congress have lost this round and must try and get back to the position before the break. The question is whether after their recent behaviour anybody can trust them to play the game while this war is on.

2. You will doubtless be interested to know that certain Indian officers of the I.C.S. consulted Godbole as to whether they might put in a "round robin" to Government for the release of Gandhi. Godbole reported this at once, but did not disclose the names. Some of them I can guess. He apparently told them not to be fools and nothing more was heard of it. I let it be known that I would regard it as insubordination.

[1] Not printed. [2] No. 475.

565

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

PRIVATE AND SECRET INDIA OFFICE, *5 March 1943*

It has become increasingly evident to me since Winston's return from North Africa that his talks with Montgomery have definitely convinced him that Auchinleck is not suited for a fighting command and that on the other hand the Persia–Iraq Command, to which Winston was at one moment inclined to appoint him, is now becoming so small a thing as not to be worth while accepting for a man in his position. This has now been confirmed to me by a minute from Winston, saying definitely that he no longer has confidence in Auchinleck as a fighting commander and asking whether there might not be an Indian Governorship for which he was suitable, referring to the fact that I mentioned some time ago that you looked upon Herbert as the weakest of your Presidential team. I have replied pointing out that there are no vacancies in prospect for which Auchinleck would be suitable, and indeed I doubt whether an ex-Commander-in-Chief is quite the right person to make a Provincial Governor in any case. I have, however, put the following point to Winston for his consideration, laying stress on Auchinleck's undoubted fitness for the chief command in India and the understanding

P.S.V.—
I will think this over.
L.

upon which the original exchange between him and Wavell was based, namely, that it was a purely temporary war measure and without prejudice to Auchinleck's chances of getting back.

2. The occupation of Burma will obviously be only a first step in the wider series of operations which will then have to be undertaken. There will not only be the question of reinforcing China through the Burma Road, mainly a matter of supplies and aircraft, but the bigger problem of the conquest or reconquest of Siam, Malaya, French Indo-China and the expulsion of the Japanese from the Dutch East Indies and eventually from China itself. As these operations advance, first Rangoon, then Singapore and Bangkok will become direct and independent bases for Wavell's forces and India become relatively a subsidiary base. The position in fact will be very much that which has happened in the Mediterranean area, where Egypt fell into the position of a subsidiary base as soon as Tripoli was taken. The natural consequence of that was the moving up westwards and northwards of Alexander and the handing over of the Middle East to Wilson. The suggestion which I have made to Winston, following that line of thought, is that at some time or other, possibly not till well on in 1944, Wavell will want to be relieved of Delhi and all its concerns and make his main headquarters at Rangoon or Singapore, and that that would give an opportunity of reinstating Auchinleck in his old post. I do not suppose that he will say yes or no definitely to my suggestion, at any rate for some time, but I think it best to let you know without delay how things stand, as Auchinleck may possibly be asking you one of these days how things stand.

Do they want me to talk to Auk or not?

L.

* * *

5. Colville, Zafrulla and Azizul Huque have at last got away this morning and should be with you at the same time as this letter. I gathered from you that Lumley means to return by sea and frankly, in view of the line he has taken over Gandhi, I don't think Winston is likely even to look at him. Anyhow, that problem is one I shall have to tackle pretty soon.

* * *

7. I am glad all is well about Maxwell's appointment and I think the simplest thing is, as I have suggested in a telegram[1] which is just going off, to announce his extension without a date, but to let the press know informally that it is not likely to be more than a year at the outside. I think it would be generally understood that he is extended in order to enable your successor to look round. For that purpose I dare say four months will be enough and after all, if need be, Maxwell might, when the time comes, be persuaded to stay another two.

8. As for the other places, there is no need for undue hurry. At the same time leaving them unfilled too long might give the impression of going back on our general policy and also convey the further impression that the various new offices created in the last two years are not really taken seriously by us; in other words strengthen the feeling that the offices which we have so far retained are the only ones that really matter. From that point of view I am indeed inclined to feel that there is a certain element of urgency, though not of hurry, about filling up. Have you thought at all of Jamnadas Mehta in that connection? He certainly represents the right kind of Labour attitude, but I understand that there are personal objections on the financial side. How far they are insuperable I cannot of course judge. Have you heard at all, by the way, how Shafa'at Ahmad has been getting on in South Africa? My recollection of him is that he is a man of distinct ability, at any rate as a historian and man of culture, and there might be something to be said, now that he has had two years in South Africa, for moving him on, either here or back to Delhi. I noticed in Colonel Fisher's latest report on Chharkhari that he speaks in terms of enthusiastic praise of the Dewan, Sayyed Ainuddin, as an able and courageous administrator. Is he at all of the kind of standing to be considered either now or later on for an Executive or a High Commissioner somewhere?

[1] 4194 of 5 March. L/PO/11/5b: ff 135–6.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

PERSONAL NEW DELHI, *6 March 1943, 9.45 pm*
Received: 7 March, 1.30 am

No. 626–S. I asked Lumley whether Candy or the other Government doctors witnessed Gandhi's crisis on 21st February. He replies as follows:—

Begins. Neither Candy nor the other Government doctors witnessed the crisis on 21st. Candy however, and I understand all the other doctors, thought Gandhi was dying on the 20th, and he looks upon the crisis on the 21st as a development which conformed to his condition at the time. Candy does not think that the non-official doctors faked it or exaggerated it. On the other hand, he tells me that he does suspect that glucose must have been administered at some time during the latter part of the fast. He can produce no definite evidence, but a somewhat peculiar incident concerning Gandhi's weight which went up, about which there was some attempt at concealment, lends colour to it. I have asked him to send to me personally a secret report on the fast which I will forward to you as soon as received. *Ends.*

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMPORTANT
PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, *8 March 1943, 2.50 pm*
Received: 8 March, 3.15 pm

No. 631–S. Engert, U.S. Minister, Kabul, a friendly person, is here on leave. He told Caroe yesterday, emphasising that the communication was wholly personal, and that he did not want it to get back to his own people:—

(*a*) that on the conclusion of his present tour Phillips was going home to report to the President;
(*b*) that Phillips would be instructed to ask again for permission to see Gandhi;
(*c*) that if it was going to be at all possible for him to see Gandhi, Phillips would certainly greatly appreciate it if interview could be in the course of the tour on which he has now started, and in the course of which he will visit Bombay.

I remain quite clear in my own mind that on no account should Phillips be allowed to see Gandhi so long as Gandhi is detained under existing arrangements, and if he returns to the charge I shall reply politely but firmly that I am not prepared to agree to any visit by him. It would in my judgment be highly improper and open to grievous misconception. I assume that I have your approval and that of the Cabinet in taking this line. I am quite sure that the only possible line to adopt with the Americans over this Indian business is that it is our affair and not theirs, and that we are not prepared to stand for any interference. I have the strong feeling that they are out to curry favour with Nationalist India in order to develop their own business connections with this country later on, and I can see no good reason why we should assist their plans.

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Mr Irwin to Sir G. Laithwaite

MSS. EUR. F. 125/138

SECRET GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, *8 March 1943*

My dear Laithwaite,

Please refer to paragraph 1 of His Excellency's Report to His Excellency the Viceroy, No. 118[1] dated 4th March 1943.

2. I am to send herewith, for the information of His Excellency the Viceroy, the Surgeon-General's secret report on the medical aspects of Mr. Gandhi's fast.

Yours sincerely,
J. B. IRWIN

Enclosure to No. 568

SECRET

NOTE OF MR. GANDHI'S FAST, FEBRUARY 10TH TO MARCH 3RD

5 March 1943

Mr. Gandhi is a man of 74, who is known to have been suffering from high blood pressure for many years. Some of the features noted during his fast may therefore be attributed to these facts either wholly or in part.

He was throughout in charge of his private attendants, and all records and measurements were made by them, except for the presence of the Jail Superintendent at some, but not all, of the occasions when his weight was taken. These records do not appear to be as accurate as might be expected.

Mr. Gandhi started his fast in very good condition. At the time of his arrest he weighed 103 lbs., whilst when he commenced his fast he weighed 109 lbs.

Mr. Gandhi is as "faddy" in regard to taking drugs as he is about food. He takes a lot of salt, and this with various alkaline salts form practically the total of drugs taken by him during the fast. Nothing noteworthy occurred until the fifth day when he was in difficulties with nausea. On this day (February 14th) he took only 29 oz. of fluids by mouth. Up to this time he had been taking Bicarbonate of Soda. This was substituted by Potas Citrate which improved matters. On the 15th he took 28 oz., but on the 16th 47 oz., and except for the 11th day of the fast (February 20th) he never took less. On February 20th he took 42 oz. On February 21st, the day of the crisis he took only 34 oz. by mouth, but he retained 20 oz. per rectum, a total of 54 oz.

He lost weight at an average of 2 lbs. a day for the first five days, $1\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. on the sixth day, and weighed $97\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. on the morning of February 16th.

[1] No. 560.

Thereafter he was too weak to weigh until February 24th, when we were informed that he weighed 90 lbs.

In the meantime his general condition rapidly worsened, ketone bodies were in excess in the blood, the specific gravity of which rose to 1,054. He became apathetic, and drowsy. Headache was fairly constant, and the tongue became dry and furred. On the day of the crisis he passed only 18 oz. of urine.

On the 20th, or 11th day of the fast, it appeared that a fatal result was at hand. I had a private conversation with him as a patient and informed him that he had reached "capacity". I urged him to consider various points. He made no reply, but I think appreciated the position.

On the following day the "crisis" appeared. It should be mentioned that his blood pressure, which in the early days hovered around 200/100, had fallen to 146/92. The crisis was not witnessed by any Government doctor, but was not unexpected and I see no reason to doubt that it actually occurred. It was an attack of a syncopal nature and would be fully explained by a small coronary thrombosis.

On the 13th day (February 22nd) he was in a grave state, but not so bad as on the two previous days. On the 14th day he was a little better clinically, no further blood tests being made. Thereafter he slowly improved. On March 2nd, the last day of the fast we were told that his weight was 91 lbs., that is he had gained one pound since February 24th. This weighing was done in the presence of the Jail Superintendent, whom I had warned of the importance of being present. At the penultimate weighing, he had been sent on some small errand, and was told of the weight when he returned. It would not have been advisable to have insisted on a reweightment in his presence. He had therefore taken possession of the weights, so that he had to be informed on the next occasion, and in fact this last weightment was done as a routine affair. It is hardly conceivable that one pound could have been added on a diet of water and about 9 oz. of lime juice daily. Either therefore the figure of the penultimate weightment is inaccurate, or the diet was not as stated. As however the general condition was improving it is possible that both conditions were present.

Up to the day of the crisis, Mr. Gandhi took nothing except water, salt and alkalies, and small quantities of sour lime juice which probably totalled at the most 2 or 3 oz. per diem. The rapid change in his condition justified the belief that this statement is correct. At the crisis, he took sweet lime juice in his water, perhaps a few ounces on the 21st of February, and on February 22nd, 20 oz., during the day.

This was reduced to 12 oz. on February 23rd, and to an average of 9 oz. daily thereafter. It does not seem possible that a man could maintain his weight much less increase it on such a diet.

I am however convinced that if anything was added to his diet, he was ignorant of the fact. If anybody added anything, e.g. glucose, I think the

culprit was Dr. Sushila Nayar. About the 10th day when it appeared probable that coma would ensue, I asked Dr. Roy and Dr. Gilder if they would inject glucose in the event of Mr. Gandhi becoming unconscious. They said they would not. I asked if they would offer any objection to this treatment being carried out by us.

I gathered that they would welcome it, and all preparations were made. The occasion did not come, in fact drowsiness disappeared after sweet lime juice became part of the diet. Moreover the tongue cleared up, and ketone bodies became much reduced in the urine. In fact all toxic symptoms abated.

Mr. Gandhi was naturally very weak at the conclusion of the fast. He might be compared to a man who has had a severe attack of some serious illness, but he is a man of 74. In my opinion he will be incapable of much activity for some two months.

It is difficult to say what permanent damage may have been caused by the fast. From the speed with which uraemic symptoms appeared and from the knowledge of old standing high blood pressure, there is reason to believe that the kidneys were below par before the fast began. All the organs must have received further damage by being bathed in toxic bodies. Mr. Gandhi also suffers from Arterio-sclerosis a concomitant of high blood pressure. The combination of these factors would make him a bad "life".

During the course of the fast Dr. Roy and Dr. Gilder preserved an irreproachable attitude. They are both professionally men of the highest standing. They were extremely easy to get on with. I formed the opinion that they were puzzled by the upward course of events.

Both of them appreciated their duty to Government as well as their duties as medical men, and their implied duty to the public.

Dr. Sushila Nayar is a young woman, and an ardent admirer of Mr. Gandhi. She always emphasised the bad points of his decline in health, and even when he was clearly improving laid stress on his weakness, low voice, &c., &c. She had enough sense however not to press her views against the majority.

Mr. Gandhi was throughout very pleasant to us. He seemed to have no animus against us, and behaved as any patient would.

I do not think that the improvement in Mr. Gandhi's condition was due to the declaration by Government that he would not be released, or rather that the improvement was occasioned by this announcement. The improvement began, I think, too late for this. The improvement followed the unexpressed, but shared belief, that death was near, it may have started with the administration of sweet lime juice, or something may have been added. I strongly suspect that Dr. Nayar took fright, and sacrificed her principles. This will never be known.

R. H. CANDY
Major-General, I.M.S.,
Surgeon-General, Bombay Presidency

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Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/78

CONFIDENTIAL

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE GOVERNOR'S REPORT NO. 5, DATED THE 8TH OF MARCH 1943

The general comment on Gandhi's emergence from his fast is that once more he has miscalculated his position and that Government, by refusing to submit to his threat, have won a distinct victory over Congress. Even when the chances appeared to be that Gandhi would die, I heard of little sympathy being expressed, though Hindu sentiment began to show itself fairly strongly during the two or three critical days. His death, if it had taken place, would not, I think, have been followed by any repercussions here; the only danger we apprehended was the possibility of individual acts of violence of [or?] terrorism by an excited Hindu.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *8 March 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Very many thanks for your letters of the 8th,[1] 11th[2] and 12th February,[3] all of which arrived together. I am most grateful. What a relief it is to have the Gandhi business out of the way, at any rate for the time being! I fear you must have had a great deal of trouble in the Cabinet, and I am delighted that things finally worked out tidily. I continue to regard the whole business as a great victory for us all, though no pains, you may be certain, will be spared by the nationalist press to conceal that fact. I am most grateful to your Publicity Department and for the home press comment from the *Scotsman*, the *Daily Telegraph*, &c., which they were kind enough to send out. I have had it reproduced in the press here, and I think it has served a very useful purpose. I do think the *Times* have been rather tiresome, and Holburn's very telling despatch, if published, would certainly have been valuable here. Let us be thankful that they seem to have dropped the idea of pressing for a reopening of negotiations and a clean slate. But I cannot feel too happy (looking at the matter from the

general point of view) that the *Times* should continue to carry on in this way, and while you and I of course remember so well all the trouble that arose with Northcliffe in the immediate post-war period (when LL. G. twitted the *Times* about being a third [threepenny?][4] edition of the *Daily Mail*!) leading up to Northcliffe's own physical collapse and the handing over of the *Times* to a Trust, I am not at all sure that the *Times* in the hands of the intelligentsia may not become quite as great a menace as it ever was in the days of Northcliffe. One can but hope that with greater experience and no doubt with some amount of indirect pressure from important quarters at home, it may still be possible to keep Barrington-Ward and Carr on the right track. But I am very uneasy at the thought of the harm that their outlook may do when it comes to peace discussions and the like. They may well do an immense amount of damage before the world, and particularly foreign governments, discover that theirs is no longer the voice of England.

2. I have been delighted in that connection to see that Oliver Stanley has taken so firm a stand about the Colonies, and I hope that we shall stick to that, for I am certain that it is the only possible line for us to take. Equally I am perfectly certain, as you are, and Winston also I think, that we cannot have any American or other interference in the handling of the Indian problem. I have just sent you a further telegram[5] about Phillips based on conversations between Caroe and Engert, the United States Minister in Kabul, who has just been staying here.

3. Thank you so much for your help about the Home Membership. Maxwell has been very good and his doctors seem to think that he is all right. I must however try to persuade him to take a little local leave, for the burden he carries is a very heavy one, and unfortunately he never spares himself. But it will be of the greatest possible value to the new Viceroy to have him in the opening months of his reign.

4. I propose to think further about the filling of the vacancies in my Council this week, and will hope to let you have a telegram in say a week from now, giving my ideas. I think it will probably be wise to announce Maxwell's extension without delay, and to follow up then with the remaining vacancies. I get, on the whole, good confirmatory reports about Khare and I dare say he may be a good substitute candidate. I might want to take soundings of Glancy about the possibility of his sparing somebody like Chhotu Ram. I am told that

[1] No. 437.
[2] On the political activities of two Indian officials in the U.S.A. MSS. EUR. F. 125/12.
[3] No. 462.
[4] In a speech on 16 April 1919 Mr Lloyd George referred to *The Times* as 'a threepenny edition of *The Daily Mail*'.
[5] No. 567.

Asoka Roy, Advocate-General, Bengal, is a lawyer of very high quality, and not too much of a politician (he has I think acted for a short time on the Bench). He might be the answer were I to decide to recommend to you that Sultan Ahmed should go to London in replacement of Mudaliar, and were I in consequence to have to face the filling of the Law Portfolio. For the Muhammadans my mind still inclines a good deal to Hydari, and I think there is a great deal to be said for keeping the service element in the Council going, while making its retention more palatable by selecting an Indian.

5. I was greatly interested in what you say in paragraphs 5 to 7 of your letter of the 8th February, about the Scheduled Castes, and recognize its force. The weakness of the community really is that they have only one or two men. Ambedkar himself is of first-class quality. I think that Shiva Raja whom we sent to America is also of very good quality, though not quite as broad in his outlook as Ambedkar (I dare say that his American journey may have a good effect on him from that point of view). Rajah is nothing very startling; and thereafter there is practically nothing in the community that matters. Yet it does contain very many millions of people—and people very ill-equipped to look after themselves. All we can do is to try to buttress the position of the Scheduled Castes in such ways as we properly can; and I am all the more glad that Ambedkar should be in my Council at this important juncture since with his experience and his robust outlook he should be in a position to influence decisions bearing on the future of his community.

6. I am a little sad at what you say in paragraph 8 of your letter about the Viceroyalty, though I felt myself the moment Bombay showed any signs of wobbling, the effect would be as you describe.

7. I will have a word with Wavell on this question which you mention in paragraph 9 of your letter of the future Indian army problem.

8. I also read with great interest the comments in paragraphs 10 and 11 of your letter about the future constitutional position. But, as indeed you recognise yourself, a reshuffle of the order that you contemplate is going to raise some very major issues. I am not myself unduly moved by the arguments for the Indianisation of my Executive—if we put service people in we cannot discriminate between Europeans and Indians, and I think we may have to continue to put a certain percentage of service people in. Nor if these great responsibilities are going to be placed on the Executive can we take risks over the quality of the persons whom we select. I do not believe myself that there is the least chance of the Cabinet or His Majesty's Government washing their hands of responsibility for India or allowing a future Governor-General and his Executive Council to have free hand so long as for Defence and the effective conduct of Foreign affairs, and in disputes with other parts of the Empire about the

position of Indians overseas, &c., the Government of India remain in the last resort as wholly dependent as they are on the support and goodwill of His Majesty's Government. That is all the more true when one considers the position of the States, and the extreme reluctance of the States to see any diminution in the British connection or any weakening of that connection. And while I agree that the Viceroy if he is worth his salt will be prepared to overrule his Executive when necessary, it is obvious in terms of political wisdom and expediency that his efforts (as mine have been) will have continually to be devoted to endeavouring to turn a situation in which that would be essential, and to avoid a head on collision. I have so far been successful in achieving that, but it has been no easy task; and I have always attached the utmost importance to trying to get Council or a majority of Council behind me on any of these controversial topics, a policy fully justified by the results of the unanimous Council decision as regards the arrest of Gandhi and the Working Committee, and thereafter the decision of Council as regards the fast. My own belief is that we are going to carry on for many years to come with very much the same sort of Central Government as I have to deal with at the moment. In that I may be pessimistic. But I certainly see no sign in the political position here of any such agreement between the parties as might make anything else possible, though I suppose it is always just conceivable that Gandhi and the Congress may allow themselves to be persuaded by Jinnah and his friends into conceding the Pakistan principle of 50:50 in the Central Executive. My conclusion, based on so many years experience, that that is the probable future here runs closely with your conclusion, with which I entirely agree, that the trend of events after the war is quite likely to be definitely anti-democratic and opposed to any suggestion of further delegations or advance of self-government save where the case is abundantly clear: and I cannot feel on experience here that the case is really as clear in India as we had always hoped that experience might show it to be. I have very little doubt that the British public will be found of that opinion, which takes my mind back to the position of the *Times* whose authority is so considerable in India, and whose sustained carping at the policy of the Home Government and the Viceroy might prove to be a serious difficulty for my successor when he takes over.

9. In paragraph 10 of my letter of 26th January[6] I said that I had it in mind to let individual Members of my Council know that I had had a friendly reply to my report of the discussions which took place in Council last autumn on the constitutional position. I had taken no action in this sense when Aney, Mody and Sarker resigned; and now that they have resigned I think the wise course will be to let the whole business drop. Sarker and Mody were both energetic protagonists of those proposals (with Mudaliar as an active runner-up), and

[6] No. 362; the reference should be to para. 11.

with their disappearance I think we can regard the whole business as closed, and I should myself prefer so to regard it.

10. I am sorry to read what you say in your letter of the 12th February, for it certainly does not suggest that the prospect of any early employment for Auchinleck of the type that he would be likely to consider is good. I think however the Jam Saheb, with what justification I cannot say, has buoyed him up by encouraging accounts of the opinion held of him in various quarters at home, and I would not anticipate difficulty with Auchinleck in the near future. I think he recognizes that patience is the wise course.

[Para. 11, acknowledging Mr Amery's letter of 11 February, omitted.]

12. I have now looked up the question of the French possessions in India to which you referred in paragraph 6 of your letter of the 31st December.[7] As I said, the matter has often come up in our earlier personal correspondence, and I now find that the official correspondence on the subject rests with India Office air mail letter No. 17 of the 30th April 1940, in reply to ours of the 11th December 1939, No. F.–339–X–38. The general line then taken was a clean sweep of everything except Pondicherry itself, and that, I am sure, would still be the Department's view, although at the time Bonvin wanted to keep Karikal and we were inclined to play with the idea. But, I confess to feeling a little doubt myself whether it is worth raising this matter again at the present time. Bonvin and the Free French are obviously not in a position to commit anybody, while the Vichy French, even if our relations with them were easier, would, I fear, for obvious reasons, be the last people in the world to consider giving up any territory. While, therefore, we have always welcomed some arrangement which would tidy up these scattered pieces of French territory, I do not feel that the matter is really worth pursuing at the present time or that there is anybody on the French side who is really in a position to let us have a firm proposition or with whom we could even profitably discuss the practicability of such a deal. I should, in any case, be very surprised myself if when we get to the Peace Treaties there is much rounding off of odds and ends such as the French enclaves in India save as part of some general exchange or readjustment of colonial territories.

[Para. 13, on the Turkish Mission's tour of India; and para. 14, on Indian representation on the Imperial War Graves Commission, omitted.]

Best luck!

[7] No. 306.

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Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/106

SECRET *9 March 1943*

No. U.P.–180

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

Though we met only recently, it seems to me suitable to send you another periodical report, the more so because Gandhi's fast having come to an end it is possible to seize [size?] up the reactions to it and to draw some inferences which may be useful in future. I enclose the official report[1] dated February 19th, 1943, which, referring in paragraph 3 to the early part of the fast, says that the news provoked practically no spontaneous reaction; "generally labour appears to be entirely uninterested and no reactions have been reported among cultivators." Later it says: "The great majority of Hindus of course think that Gandhi should be released unconditionally if only on humanitarian grounds." I think the last sentence would be more correct if it had referred to "educated Hindus". The Inspector-General of Police also in a report dated 26th February, says "the reactions to Gandhi's fast have thus far been surprisingly apathetic." Except for my visit to Delhi, I have been on tour pretty continuously during the period of the fast, and I have been very impressed by the lack of interest in the fast; no one talked about it and if I raised the question, everyone seemed to me quite confident that it was nothing serious and that he would survive. That was before my Delhi visit and I think I told Your Excellency of this [these?] views. During that visit the crisis occurred, and I admit that I was a bit shaken in my own view that he would survive by the views held by most people in Delhi that he was bound to die. However, before I left, the bulletins were better and Your Excellency was, I think, prepared to bet on his survival; I certainly was prepared to do so. When I went out to Gorakhpur and Gonda on my return I found that the general attitude was as I have described above.

2. I have quoted the official report above about the first reactions which I think states the position accurately. Some other reports that I have seen seemed to be [me?] to reflect rather the atmosphere of Delhi and possibly of some of the larger towns than the atmosphere in rural districts. A good many generalisations were made and I must admit that I felt rather annoyed when I read Thapar's forty-fourth weekly publicity report to Joyce in which he said that other subjects of domestic interest have been overshadowed by Gandhi's fast. In view of the fact that these reports go to Washington, Chungking and Canberra, they get wide publicity over the world; and I presume that they are intended to give a general appreciation of the position in India, not merely an appreciation

[1] Not printed.

of the Press. Even in regard to the Press, Thapar is wrong in saying that only in British-owned press was resort to fasting as a political weapon unequivocally condemned. This overlooks the very useful articles and cartoons which appeared in the *Pioneer* which is now entirely Indian-owned. In his further report a week later he again refers to only the British-owned press as urging Gandhi to give up the fast; but this was a point raised forcibly by the *Pioneer*. Thapar's report also again stressed the point that public opinion was engrossed in the fast to the exclusion of almost everything else. That no doubt represents Delhi but Delhi is not, I venture to suggest, entirely representative of India.

3. Thorne's appreciation for the Dominions was far more correct when he says that the news of the fast, and of the consequent deterioration in Gandhi's health, have stirred the Hindu public but scarcely to the extent that might have been expected. Pilditch was also right when he says: "While Gandhi's fast has remained the all-absorbing topic in political circles, popular interest has latterly tended to decline as medical reports become less alarming." He was also right in saying that it was Nationalist leaders and the Hindu Press which have done their best to exploit the emotional appeal of the fast, but active demonstrations of public sympathy have been strikingly feeble and confined to a few localities only. He also rightly pointed out that "outside Nationalist circles, Government's determination not to depart from its declared policy has caused satisfaction and even in quarters sympathetic to Gandhi, there is some unacknowledged appreciation of the line taken by Government".

4. One of the reasons why the Gandhi fast was rather a flop was of course that all Congress agitators have been removed from the scene of their activities; if we had had numerous people going about shouting "Mahatma Gandhi ki jai", as they did at the time of the elections, the reactions would have been very different. Apart from that, many in this country are vicars of Bray:[2] they support a government which has shown itself determined to govern and which gives them a fair deal, and my general impression is that the villagers are very friendly, though possibly a bit worried over salt and cloth; the loyalists, of whom I have of course seen a lot on tour are pleased with our policy. A minor reason for lack of interest was that students were occupied with their examinations and kept quiet. The behaviour of some students in the Benares Hindu University was not entirely satisfactory and if Gandhi had died, they would have caused trouble. One reason was possibly that the Vice-Chancellor, Sir Radha Krishnan, is ill in Calcutta and the Pro-Vice-Chancellor is weak, but I have full confidence in Nethersole who is Commissioner and feel sure that he will see that nothing serious occurs. The C.I.D. are getting on to the sabotage that occurred in the University.

[2] A character in a traditional English song who changed his professed belief four times to accord with the differing outlooks of successive monarchs.

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Sir H. Twynam (Central Provinces and Berar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/64

SECRET CAMP, *9 March 1943*

No. R.–138–G.C.P.

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

I was greatly interested in the comments contained in Your Excellency's letter dated 4th March,[1] on the outcome of Gandhi's fast. I feel that I should like, if I may with respect, to congratulate you on the firm stand taken, in the face of tremendous pressure from so many quarters, against this form of political coercion, as also on being the first Viceroy to defeat Gandhi at his own game. I think that the most noticeable feature of the reactions to the failure of the fast to produce any concession is astonishment that (*a*) the Government of India and His Majesty's Government were prepared to face the music if Gandhi had died, and that (*b*) an "epic fast" had for the first time failed in its effect. Your Excellency is aware how fully I agree that the line taken was the only possible line. I am glad to say that not only Dr. Khare but also Sir Moropant Joshi had the courage to denounce the fast publicly; the latter, in a letter to the local press, enquired what would be the position of the Hindus if Mr. Jinnah resorted to a fast in order to secure Pakistan. I have little doubt that the weapon of the political fast has, as Your Excellency suggests, been very considerably blunted by the defeat which it has suffered. I fancy that the Mahatma will think twice before embarking on another fast and I think that his capitalist friends will hesitate before encouraging another manœuvre of this kind because they know very well that they will lose a priceless asset if Gandhi is not available to represent them when the time for negotiation arrives. Everyone, of course, noticed and commented on the remarkable improvement in Gandhi's condition as soon as it became apparent that the Government did not intend to be coerced. I have little doubt that the Congress terms will be considerably lowered as a result of the failure of the fast. Some half-hearted condemnation of the violence of August last will probably be forthcoming and there will be general anxiety among those who are now in jail for a settlement because they certainly never expected to be made to pay in the way they are doing for their rash endorsement of the Congress resolution of 8th August last. Every possible means will be exhausted to get out of the impasse without losing face, but we have the satisfaction of knowing that we have nothing to gain, while the Congress has everything to gain, by an early settlement so that it does seem, now that the

[1] Not printed.

much dreaded fast has been squarely faced and defeated, that many of the bargaining counters are in our hands.

* * *

There is now a very general feeling—voiced lately by N. R. Sarker—that Congress committed an egregious blunder in turning down the Cripps proposals. Although the substance of those proposals—less the independence clause, which I have always disliked and which I should regard as a complete breach of our trust towards the inarticulate millions of India—still is the only basis on which political advancement seems possible, nevertheless, it is providential that Gandhi intervened, as he did, and secured their rejection, because nothing could be more fatal to our chances of bringing the war in the east to a speedy conclusion than the return to power of Congress Ministries before the struggle is completely over.

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Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/57

SECRET GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, *10 March 1943*

D.-o. No. 299-H.E.

My dear Linlithgow,

In a recent conversation which I had with Sir Frederick Stones, he remarked on the sinister influence exerted by Vallabhbhai Patel, and added that he had several reports of Patel's private conversations and private speeches, before the arrests, which revealed his attitude clearly. I asked him to send them to me in order that I might send them on to you if I thought it worth while. He has sent me two, which I enclose. The writer of the two documents is a Hindu, well known to me, who is employed by E. D. Sassoons as a kind of Intelligence Officer and who keeps them informed of political trends in Bombay. He is an erratic individual, whose judgment is never very reliable, but he gets about a great deal and is well in with political circles, and his information, as opposed to his judgments, is useful. There is no reason to believe that the conversation between him and Patel on the 11th of May, reported in the first of these documents, is not true: and although the second document[1] contains a second-hand account of a meeting addressed by Patel, it probably accurately represents the impression conveyed by Patel. I do not think it would be possible to use these documents as published evidence, and certainly Stones would have to be

consulted beforehand if that were desired: but they may be useful as additions to the private evidence about Congress intentions before the arrests.

Yours sincerely,

ROGER LUMLEY

P.S.V.—
Home Dept. & D.I.B. will be interested to see.

L.,—13. 3.

Enclosure to No. 573

CONFIDENTIAL BOMBAY, *8 May 1942*

Tricumdas and I saw Vallabhbhai yesterday evening. He was most cynical. I asked him about Gandhi's resolution about asking British to leave India, to declare India's neutrality and to ask Japan not to attack India. He said this was all implied in the non-violence non-co-operation resolution passed by the All-India Congress Committee.[2] He said it was absolutely impossible for England to defend India successfully and that the best thing that they could do for India was to leave straightaway. I asked him how that would improve matters for us, as the Japs, to put it mildly, would not be much better than the British. He said he disagreed with me. I put it to Vallabhbhai that some day sooner or later there would be a settlement between Great Britain and India. Was it not, therefore, worthwhile to start somewhere towards a settlement. He said there could not be any settlement between England and India, as England would be defeated and would not be able to defend India and added that Rajaji was a fool and cynically suggested why did not the Government of India take Rajaji on the Viceroy's Executive Council.

Vallabhbhai said that Japan would not want to rule over and run the whole country and England's defeat could not make our position worse.

When I asked about Jawaharlal and his earlier talks of guerilla warfare, &c., Vallabhbhai laughed and said: "that is all over now, Jawahar is silenced." Vallabhbhai would not give any indication of what Gandhi was going to do next. I asked him what would be Gandhi's next step. He said that that did not matter, Gandhi had to do nothing as the British were gradually losing hold on the war situation.

Vallabhbhai said that the moment there was the slightest trouble from the Japs in the remotest corner of India, everything would snap. There would be chaos and panic, train service, telegrams, posts, everything would be stopped because of the dislocation and the British would not fight the Japs. Business which was bad enough, Vallabhbhai added, would come to a standstill.

[1] Not printed. [2] See Vol. II, No. 43.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

L/E/8/2527: ff 194–5

INDIA OFFICE, *10 March 1943*

My dear Linlithgow,

In September last,[1] during a discussion on Indian matters in the War Cabinet, reference was made to the question of social and industrial policy in India. This arose I think from a sense that since, as a result of the failure of the offer made last March, we remain directly responsible for Indian administration at the Centre and in the Provinces where the constitution is suspended under S. 93 of the Act, it is important that we should be able to assert that our administration is progressive by the most modern standards and beneficial to the people as a whole. Moreover, such a progressive social and industrial policy is felt to be desirable in order to remove so far as possible all sources of discontent which may be exploited for political ends. The War Cabinet adopted as a result of this discussion two conclusions as follows:—

(1) The Governor-General's attention to be drawn to the general feeling of the War Cabinet that the Government of India might with advantage give early consideration to the development of a more progressive social and industrial policy.

(2) A report to be submitted to the War Cabinet on the possibility of giving the Government of India further expert assistance in the formulation of social and industrial policy.

2. I did not immediately communicate these conclusions to you for two reasons. Firstly, I felt that the Government of India and the Provincial Governments, which were then dealing with the most dangerous outbreak of violent agitation for many years, should not be asked in the midst of such difficulties to devote their attention to this aspect of policy. Secondly, I received from the Prime Minister a more detailed note[2] by the Lord Privy Seal (Sir S. Cripps) of his views on this subject with instructions[3] to discuss them with certain of my colleagues. I held a meeting[4] for this purpose at which Mudaliar and certain of my advisers—Chatterjee, Hubback and Woodhead were present and made useful contributions to the discussion. In subsequent discussions[5] between my staff and members of Cripps' and Bevin's staff I took advantage of Gregory's presence in this country to bring him into the discussion.

3. The discussion has continued for some time and has only recently reached a stage at which I am in a position to consult you upon the outcome. I send you with this letter a copy of a note[6] entitled "A Social and Economic Policy for India" drawn up jointly by the present Minister of Aircraft Production

when Lord Privy Seal, and the Minister of Labour, which outlines their views as to the kind of policy which, within the financial and constitutional limitations of existing circumstances, they feel might be pursued by the Government of India, and also two notes prepared in my department in one[7] of which I endeavoured to show, from the limited sources available here, what has been achieved in recent years in India in the sphere of social and industrial policy, and in the other[8] gave my comments on the proposals contained in the memorandum by the Minister of Labour and Minister of Aircraft Production.

4. I should be grateful if you would cause these documents to be examined by your advisers and if you would furnish me by the middle of June next, or sooner if you can manage it, with your views upon the suggestions made in them and with any suggestions or alternative proposals that you may wish to offer in order that the War Cabinet may consider whether it should give any special instructions to your successor on this aspect of policy.

I should also be grateful if you would at the same time furnish me with your views on the matter dealt with in the second War Cabinet Conclusion set out in the first paragraph of this letter, namely, whether and to what extent your Government and Provincial Governments require further expert assistance in the formulation of social and industrial policy.

L. S. AMERY

[1] In fact 31 August: Vol. II, No. 664. [2] Vol. II, No. 678. [3] Vol. II, No. 775.
[4] No. 46. [5] No. 210. [6] Enclosure to No. 276; see also No. 545, note 2.
[7] See No. 114, note 1. [8] Enclosure to No. 356.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2754: f 120

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *11 March 1943, 12.50 pm*
PERSONAL
MOST SECRET

4564. Your personal telegram 631–S.[1] Phillips. If accurate, as seems probable, this information is disturbing. I am authorised by Prime Minister who has seen your 631–S to say that he entirely approves line you propose to take in paragraph 2.

2. Foreign Secretary is now shortly leaving for U.S. and has been asked to use any opportunity which occurs to make it quite clear in the highest circles that we are in full agreement with the line you are taking. Prime Minister would always be ready to telegraph Hopkins or President direct if that becomes necessary.

[1] No. 567.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&J/8/512: ff 350–1

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *11 March 1943, 9.10 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 12 March*

4612. There will be an Indian Debate in the Commons probably on Tuesday 23rd. All aspects of Indian affairs will be in order but main interest is likely to be in political position.

2. I should be glad to have by Friday 19th March any suggestions you may wish to make as to line to be taken and in particular as regards (1) suggestion likely to be advanced by left wing that time is now ripe for us, having defeated the fast, to release Gandhi and other Congress leaders (2) suggestion that we should allow some outside persons such as Rajagopalachari or Sapru to visit Gandhi and Working Committee in detention to seek a basis of agreement (3) inquiries as to our intentions regarding vacancies on your Council.

3. I should also be glad to have officially short appreciation of internal situation, showing extent to which Congress subversive activities continue, numbers in jail, and whether releases of less important prisoners are taking place on any scale through expiration of sentences or otherwise. Also measures taken to strengthen instruments of law and order where weaknesses were revealed.

4. I hope that Govt. of India's case against Congress will have arrived and I shall if possible issue it as a White Paper, but in any event I am I think adequately briefed on that.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir R. Lumley (Bombay)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/57

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *11 March 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

My dear Lumley,

Many thanks for your confidential report No. 118[1] of 4th March, and for the most interesting review of events in connection with Gandhi's fast which it contains. There is nothing else of any special importance that I have to comment on except the food situation, and I will write to you separately on the point

you take in paragraph 7 of your letter. But, as you say, Gandhi's fast has been in its way so much of an event and the issues in connection with it have been of such importance that I would like to comment in some [greater?] detail than would otherwise be necessary on your very lucid description of what took place.

2. Let me in the first place say how sorry I am that you should have been so much bothered by the little man and how grateful I am to you, and to all your officers, for the trouble you have taken over this difficult situation and for the invaluable help that you have given. I well appreciate the strain falling on the Province in which Gandhi was held and on those who had to think out and to handle day by day the various aspects of a situation always potentially full of surprises and always capable of changing with kaleidoscopic rapidity.

3. I agree with you that we can be very well satisfied with the outcome, and that is certainly the view of the other Governors from whom I have heard. The decision was not an easy one; but from the beginning I felt no doubt myself, whatever doubts there may have been in the minds of certain of my colleagues, as to the wisdom of the course which we adopted or as to the essential necessity of facing whatever trouble and whatever consequences of a political character might be involved in holding Gandhi until he either survived his fast or called it off or paid the price of his decision to refrain from food.

4. I think it will be of interest to look back through the correspondence we have had on this business since August last. When I consulted Governors on August the 8th as to whether Gandhi, if he decided on a fast, should be detained until that fast, if not called off, resulted in his death, there was, broadly speaking, general agreement among them that he should be released when in danger: and you yourself, as you mention in your present letter, took the view that it would be the gravest blunder to hold him in such circumstances. Sind were on the whole in favour of holding him: Lewis' view was not too clear from his telegram—I think he would have been in favour of release: the North-West Frontier Province were not much concerned either way: the other Governors gave their view in favour of release with varying degree of emphasis and with qualifications that differed slightly.[2] My Council were almost unanimously in favour of release.

5. Thereafter I considered the position further with Amery in the light of what I knew to be the very strong view of the Cabinet[3] that Gandhi should be held: and in the result I reached the different conclusions which were set out in my circular telegram to Governors of 30th September No. 368–S.C. Personal.[4] The conclusions I embodied in that telegram were that the wise solution

[1] No. 560. [2] Vol. II, Nos. 480, 481, 486, 487, 489, 501, 502, and 504.
[3] Vol. II, No. 588. [4] Enclosure to No. 49.

would be, in the event of Gandhi starting a fast and making it clear that it was a fast to death, that we should, on the assumption that such fast was undertaken for the achievement of his inadmissible demands, warn him in the name of His Majesty's Government that we did not propose to interfere; that all facilities for medical treatment, &c. would be provided, but that the decision was one that he must take himself; ask Devadas Gandhi to join him at the Aga Khan's Palace and invite him to take charge of arrangements inside the Palace and of Gandhi's health, telling him that we would provide all possible facilities and that he had only to ask for anything he wanted; let Devadas know that there would be no objection to Gandhi seeing a reasonable number of visitors or friends from outside, the selection being left to him on the understanding that he would operate it in a reasonable sense, and exclude the Press; and warn him that we should continue to keep Gandhi under treatment in these conditions until he either abandoned his fast or it had had a fatal outcome.

6. I sent that telegram to all Governors. I had acknowledgments from one or two. But save from Bombay, I had no critical comment: and I inferred from that that Governors were content to accept this different procedure. You were of course directly affected, and in your[r] letter of 22nd October[5] you urged strongly the arguments on the other side, making it clear that the views which you held had the support of the officials with whom you had discussed the matter, though I need not say that you made it clear also that if the decision was in the event against release you would give me all possible help. Attaching, as I always had done, the greatest importance to your view in this business and knowing how great was the direct responsibility falling upon you, I felt bound to let the Secretary of State and the Cabinet have copies of your letter, and also of your further letter of 4th November[6] in which you expressed yourself as against deportation. I found that Maxwell, with whom I discussed your letters in close detail, felt that your arguments were conclusive: and in the light of your views and of his, I told Amery in December[7] that though with regret I must accept your objections as decisive and that I did not think it justifiable to force you to take the very grave risks that you anticipated. Before your letters and my recommendation were considered by the Cabinet, the situation had changed by the reopening of correspondence by Gandhi in his letter to me of 31st December[8] and when the matter as a whole came before the Cabinet they had also before them the earlier stages of that correspondence.[9]

7. We had the opportunity of discussing matters here at that time. I had not taken the other Governors into my confidence, though Maxwell was of course fully aware of the position and so far as other Governors were concerned, the matter therefore still stood at the point reached in my letter of 30th September. Meanwhile my correspondence with Gandhi continued. I had every hope that he might see sense and drop the idea of fasting. But I was disappointed in that,

and in his letter of 29th January[10] he definitely told me that he intended to indulge in this fast to capacity which was not, he hoped, to be a fast to death.

8. I had immediately to consider the position. I had had the advantage of discussion with Hallett with whom I was staying when I received Gandhi's letter, and he expressed himself as most strongly in favour of letting the fast take its natural course.[11] Your own view[12] remained unshaken that it would be wiser to release Gandhi when in imminent danger. But the view of the majority of Governors to whom I put the issue was in the opposite sense.[13] The Cabinet remained strongly averse from any weakening.[14] The general sense of my Council was in favour of release at the danger-point.[15] The next development was of course the suggestion that we should agree to release Gandhi for the purpose and the duration of the fast. For that I had the full support of my Council,[16] and when Gandhi rejected[17] that offer (which I had never very seriously anticipated that he would accept) I also had my Council behind me in the communiqué[18] which was issued on behalf of the Government of India, and I had the general support of Governors for standing firm.[19]

9. The developments after that stage are only too familiar to you. I had throughout made it clear in all my discussions in Council that I was in favour, even though I might be in a minority of one, of holding Gandhi until the fast was called off or had a fatal outcome. The pressure on certain of my colleagues became too great, and I lost three of them. There again the moment their resignations were tendered I accepted them and without argument, and I am glad to say that I was able to keep the balance (and the majority) of my colleagues, though one or two of them, I dare say, had some rather uncomfortable days.

10. I have thought it worth tracing the development of the policy for it has a certain historical interest. There was a development as is quite clear from what I have said above, for the situation itself developed. It was not the same in February even before our offer to Gandhi of release for the purpose and the duration of the fast was made, as it had been in August; and still less was it the same after his refusal of that offer. Throughout I was fully conscious, and made it clear to the Cabinet, of the possible dangers: but my own view became clear in face of his final decision to fast that those dangers must be faced at any price, however great the damage to future relations between India and England, and however great the damage to any prospect of a settlement or of constitutional progress in this country, for it emerged perfectly clearly from my correspondence with Gandhi that it was a case of live or die. No compromise with him could, in my judgment, have been accepted on this issue save at the cost of a humiliating surrender which would have had disastrous effects on all the other

[5] No. 111. [6] No. 143. [7] No. 289. [8] No. 305. [9] No. 314. [10] No. 369.
[11] No. 375. [12] No. 382. [13] No. 381. [14] No. 422. [15] No. 387.
[16] No. 389. [17] See No. 440. [18] No. 443. [19] See No. 403.

communities and parties in this country; would have damaged the morale of the services (service reactions in other Provinces seemed, broadly speaking, to have been more marked than in Bombay); and would have elevated the weapon of political fast into one against which no government of the future, whatever its composition, could hope to stand. For Gandhi and the Congress it would have represented a complete victory—without one word of repentance or apology for the events for which they had been responsible; and without calling off the August resolution, the references to "rebellion", or the advice to "do or die". Gandhi, the plenipotentiary and authorised spokesman of the Congress would have been set at liberty, and he would have been in a position thereafter again to bring about the surrender of government by the adoption of the method of fasting, since while if he broke the law (or in any event) we could have put him in prison again, he had but to try the same tactics to be able to hope to succeed. There could be no question in those circumstances in my view as to the balance of advantage, and even had I lost the whole of my Council and had I had to revert to government by officials I would not have hesitated.

11. In the event we have come out very well. We have blunted the weapon of the fast; Congress have suffered (and they know it) a significant defeat; the Muslims, the Scheduled Castes and the Services have been encouraged; the Government has gained a reputation for resolution and firmness of purpose which I fear it may not have enjoyed in the same degree before the fast. After 21 days fasting neither Gandhi nor the Congress are one whit better off than they were before the fast began save to the extent that they have got back some of the limelight of publicity. Inside the country the reactions have been encouraging. I have been profoundly impressed by the absence of any emotional wave in rural areas. Even in urban areas strong feeling seemed to have been confined to certain very obvious centres. There has been nothing like the tension that I can remember in connection even with the Rajkot fast, to say nothing of the Poona fast of ten years ago. Not the least public interest has been shown in the position of the Working Committee, and it has been clearly shown that Congress are without a programme and without a cry, while the wholly unreasonable nature of Gandhi's demands and the difficulty of deciding on which of them he was really taking his stand had not helped him. So far as public opinion at home is concerned, the fast in the first place caused no excitement and attracted relatively little attention. But I get the feeling from the tone of comment in papers such as the *Daily Telegraph*, &c. that people are beginning to be tired of this business and that there is a very definite hardening of public opinion so far as Indian political development goes and in the Right Wing direction. If I am right in that estimate Gandhi and the Congress are as responsible for it as they are responsible for building up Jinnah and Pakistan from a

pale shadow into a formidable and threatening substance. So far as world opinion generally is concerned, the only place that matters is the United States. My reports from Bajpai and Halifax as the fast went on were gratifying in a high degree, for they made it clear that (much to my surprise) no particular interest had been aroused in the United States where the fast indeed was attracting little attention. Both warned me that were Gandhi to die, one might look for a recrudescence of interest, but that of course I was quite prepared for.

12. No doubt we can now look for the usual pressure from the so-called Moderates who are now meeting at Bombay for a gesture, the release of Gandhi, contact with the Working Committee or the like. It would be a waste of time to speculate on the nature of any approach by the Moderates or to discuss what answer to give to hypothetical questions. But my view remains very strong that if they do make a move, and subject to what they may say, the answer must be that if Gandhi, as I told him in one of my letters, is prepared to call off and withdraw the August resolution, and give suitable assurances for the future (which I may add will include the withdrawal of terms such as "rebellion" and "do or die"), I shall then be prepared to consider the situation. But I am certain that we ought to take a firm line with the Moderates. None of them count for a row of pins. They stand for nothing in the country. I doubt very much many of them being able to win an election. They have done nothing to help us, and I am not a bit concerned about their feelings in the present circumstances. If they do ask me to receive a deputation and I agree to do so, I shall let them have it pretty straight: and as you and I of course realise only too well, they are wholly unrepresentative, while no one can suggest that Allah Bakhsh and Ghuznavi count for anything in the Muslim world and the Depressed Classes and the Princes are out of it altogether.

13. I have been greatly interested, to revert to Gandhi and the fast, in the medical evidence which you have been so kind as to send me. I am arranging to have Candy's enquiry sent on to Bradfield. Candy's own secret report[20] is a most revealing document, and certainly it confirms our feeling that glucose or some similar substance was administered by the non-official doctors, I dare say as he suggests Dr. Sushila Nair. Incidentally you will I think agree with me that we must be at pains to try to counter the suggestion that there is anything improper in administering glucose whether Gandhi liked it or not. Exactly the contrary is the case. It is the professional duty of a physician to keep his patient alive by any means in his power, and I was glad to see that Candy, in suggesting that Dr. Nair might have been responsible for feeding the old man, remarks that if that was so, she "did violence to her principles" which I take it means her view that Gandhi's wishes must be respected and that he should be left to starve; and that he says nothing about her professional duty.

[20] No. 568.

I will confess that I was rather surprised that Candy's estimate should have been so very far off the mark. Had we been guided by him (though I recognise of course that there was always the risk of a heart attack) we might have let Gandhi out in four or five days with the result that he would have been at the top of his form in ten days time, and our position would have been very far from easy. But these are medical matters and no layman can speak with authority about them. I am, I need not say, deeply grateful to Candy for all his help and advice, and the fact that he was there, whatever his estimate, throughout the period of Gandhi's fast was the greatest possible reassurance and source of confidence to me.

14. I think that is all that can be said. But I have been at pains to go over the ground in as much detail as I have partly by way of reminding myself of the various stages; and partly because I think, for our own personal record it may be of value to have an account of the line of development and of one's own reactions. I would like again to thank you most warmly, and also Irwin and all your people, for all your help and for the care and tact with which a most difficult situation was handled: and as I said before, I only wish that so heavy a burden with its great nervous strain had not had to be endured by you and by your officers. The only thing we can feel at the end of it is that that strain, great as it was, has been well worth while; and that while we have fortunately been spared the difficulties that would have arisen had Gandhi died, we have made our point and have not been driven off our resolution either by threats or by persuasions. I would not exclude the possibility of another fast later on, possibly even, as you suggest in paragraph 5, a real starvation fast. But a good deal of doubt has been thrown on the whole technique by the present fast which is all to the good. Apart from that Gandhi's behaviour during it leaves me rather under the impression that the idea of death is less palatable when it is imminent than it seemed some distance off. He may have had sufficient of a shaking up during his recent experience to make him cautious. His wise course, I would judge, would in the next two or three months be to lie back himself and let the Moderates, &c. raise the dust on his behalf. But he cannot I think leave matters at that; and whether the new move is to be a fast to death or a renewal of his correspondence or even, as you say, a sort of revelation that would enable him to forget the past and start afresh, we must be prepared for something as dramatic as he can wisely make it in due course. But if I can get support for the policy I have mentioned in paragraph 12 above from the Cabinet and from my Council and Governors, I have no intention of making things easy for him, and there will have to be a complete climb down before there can be further dealings with Gandhi or the Working Committee.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW

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Sir A. R. Mudaliar to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/130

INDIA OFFICE, *11 March 1943*

2. The threatened fast of Mr. Gandhi, which we anticipated in August and which he delayed for six months, has now come and gone. The threat fell flat in America where I was in the earlier stages of the fast and in this country also. Mr. Krishna Menon and the India League tried to whip up some agitation but without success. In fact through their posters they overdid it and covered themselves with ridicule. "Gandhi suffers for India and the World" was one of the posters. At a time particularly when young men of all creeds and stations of life, the flower of humanity, were every day making the supreme sacrifice for the sake of the future, a slogan like that would hardly be appreciated, especially when it concerns a man past the biblical period. I am aware that at the other end you have had grave anxieties and indeed a very hard time. I explained in the States and in Canada that no Government would release a prisoner who, as you aptly put it, was trying to blackmail you. I pointed out further that if India was to attain a democratic status at any time, these ideas of "fast unto death" which belonged to the Pre-Christian Era even in Hinduism should not be tolerated. The Hindu was trying to get away from these archaic ideas and the trouble in Indian politics has been in the last twenty years that Gandhi is trying to put him back into the period of the Dark Ages with its outworn creeds and ancient superstitions. I personally think that the result of the fast will be a considerable deflation of Gandhi's influence and he surely cannot try this weapon once more. I am sorry that my three colleagues resigned: they cannot be too comfortable now in the thought that they did not stand up to the test at a critical period. Perhaps it was a very vain thought but I had the feeling when I heard the news of their resignations that if I had been there I might have prevented the resignations of two of them at least and probably of all three and thereby have been of some help to you.

3. I hope I may be excused for inflicting this long letter on Your Excellency. I need hardly say how much I was concerned during all that period about the heavy responsibility resting with you and the anxious times that you were having and it must be a matter of supreme satisfaction to you that you have come out successful.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *11 March 1943*

[Para. 1, on proposed goodwill mission from British Churches to India, omitted.]

2. I have just telegraphed[1] to you to say that Winston is entirely with us over telling Phillips to keep off the grass in the matter of Gandhi or the internal Indian situation generally, and has told Eden to be quite firm on the point when he goes off to America, which I think he does tomorrow.

[Para. 3, on the future of air transport, omitted.]

4. We are still waiting for your case against Congress, because as soon as it is here and printed we have promised to have a debate and the Whips are very anxious to have it on Tuesday week if possible. There won't be much to say and I certainly cannot imagine that you would wish me to suggest that Gandhi's recovery by itself constitutes any argument for reopening negotiations or putting an end to his seclusion. The line I think I shall take is to say that neither his fast itself, nor its successful termination, have given any indication of any change of mind or heart on his part and that till that does come about there is nothing doing. I may also have to repeat past assurances about the Cripps offer standing in its essential features, though obviously the Sind resolution[2] and no doubt Jinnah's hopes of a similar Punjab resolution on Pakistan make mutual Indian agreement, even outside Congress, more remote than ever.

[Para. 5, on a laudatory reference to the Royal Indian Navy in a speech by the First Lord of the Admiralty, omitted.]

[1] No. 575.

[2] This resolution, the first of its kind passed in a Provincial Legislature, recommended the Government to convey to H.M.G. through the Viceroy the sentiment and wishes of Muslims in Sind that the Muslims of India were a separate nation and were entitled 'to have independent national states of their own, carved out in the zones where they are in a majority in the sub-continent of India'; that 'no constitution shall be acceptable to them that will place the Muslims under a Central Government dominated by another nation' and that any attempt to do so would result in 'disastrous and unhappy consequences'. It was carried by 24 votes to 3, the latter consisting of 2 Hindu Ministers and 1 Hindu Parliamentary Secretary. Seven non-official Hindu members walked out when the Speaker ruled against them following a debate on the admissibility of the resolution. *Proceedings of the Sind Legislative Assembly*, Official Report, vol. xvii, no. 6, 3 March 1943, pp. 17–43.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMPORTANT *12 March 1943*
PERSONAL
No. 678–S. Your personal telegram of 11th March No. 4564.[1] Phillips. I am most grateful to you and to Prime Minister.

[1] No. 575.

581

Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/57

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, *12 March 1943*
D.-o. No. 300/H.E.
My dear Linlithgow,
We have had Phillips here in Bombay during the last few days. He stayed with me during the first two days, and I had a good deal of conversation with him. The main point in his mind seemed to be that, however great the difficulties were, and however badly political parties have behaved, something more must be done. He viewed it, he told me, from the point of view of Anglo-American relations, the consolidation of which was his greatest concern. Even if any further step failed, its effect on America would be good. I pointed out to him that we had continually taken the initiative in the last few years, and that the last attempt, embodied in the Cripps proposals, had been on a very far-reaching scale, and that I did not see what more could be done. Any new step could only amount to some dressing-up of the Cripps proposals. If it were argued that the Cripps proposals had failed to settle the immediate problem of a Government for the duration of the war, the answer, in my opinion, was that no substantial change in the Central Government would be effective if either the Congress or the Muslim League did not come in, and that there was little chance of them both coming in unless the post-war constitution was clearly settled beforehand to the satisfaction of the Muslim League. It was clear, therefore, that the pre-requisite of any substantial change was an agreed settlement in the whole of the constitutional field. I added that, so far as Congress were concerned, we could not ignore its attitude to the war. It was obvious that India would be one of the bases from which Japan would be attacked, and it was therefore essential for all

the United Nations that a reliable Government should be functioning in India. Only a few months ago, Congress leadership had held the view that the Allies were unlikely to win the war and had decided to leave what they thought was the sinking ship, and had been ready to make terms with the Japanese. Events might have made them change their view, but how could we risk putting into power in India a Government dominated by a party which held such irresolute views about the war? It was surely clear that, with them, winning the war was not the thing which counted most. They would use what power they were given to consolidate their own position, and there might well come a time when they might refuse or obstruct further intensive effort by India to finish the war. That was a risk which the United Nations would surely not wish us to take.

2. That was the general line which I took. He had no doubt heard it all before, and did not disagree, but he appeared to remain of the opinion that something ought to be done. He went on to tell me that he very much wanted to see Gandhi at some time, and did I think that you would agree to this? I told him that I thought it most unlikely that you would find it possible to agree, at any rate at present, and he replied that he fully realised that the present was not a propitious time, but that the President wanted him to see the big leaders so that he could form an estimate of their views. I left it at that, but I formed the impression that he might raise this again. (At this point, while dictating this letter, I have received a copy of Laithwaite's telephone message of this morning, enquiring about Phillips' visit to Bombay, from which I see that Phillips had already asked to see Gandhi.[1] It is possible that I misinterpreted the way in which he put his question to me on this point, or that he was anxious not to divulge any confidential talk which he has had with you.)

3. While he stayed with me, Phillips was present at a farewell dinner which I gave to the I.C.S. Secretaries to my Government. He told me afterwards that he had been much impressed by their calibre. I also gave a small dinner to enable him to meet a fairly representative cross-section of Bombay opinion. It consisted of two Europeans, two Muslims, two Parsees and two Hindus. I gathered afterwards that Sir Chunilal V. Mehta put to him the Hindu point of view, that they did not believe that we intended to part with power and that Mr. Chandrigar, the President of the Provincial Muslim League, argued the League point of view. He found both of them difficult to understand.

4. Phillips then went to stay with the American Consul and saw a large number of others, and had an "off the record" conference with editors of the Press. I have not yet heard very much of what passed with those whom he saw, which included several who were present for this Leaders' Conference which has been held in Bombay. The general impression, however, appears to be that they were

disappointed and got very little out of him, and that his main line with them was the importance of looking to the future and of the danger of losing the sympathy of America if, owing to their internal dissensions, they could not present a united front by the time the Peace Conference came along.

5. I have had, from Low, some account of what transpired with the editors of the Press. Phillips appeared a good deal upset by the line they took. There had been one or two bad articles in the Press when he arrived in Bombay, criticising him for not being so forthcoming as Colonel Louis Johnson, which had annoyed him a good deal. At the Press conference, he was tackled on two main lines. The first was as to why America did not put more pressure on Great Britain to give freedom to India, and the Atlantic Charter was of course dragged in. They do not appear to have got much out of him, and Low thinks he was somewhat annoyed at their attempts to make an Ambassador declare himself on matters of internal policy. He told them that he was here to learn the facts of the situation and to keep the President informed, and not to declare his own views. It was, I understand, at his private suggestion to Low that the *Times of India* had a short leading article pointing out the unreasonableness of some sections of the Press in expecting him to give out his views about Indian politics. The other line they took was to try and get him to say that Dominion Status did not confer full freedom. With this, Low told me, he dealt very well, and told them that he knew all about Dominion Status in Canada, as he had been the first United States Minister to Canada, and that he could not conceive of more complete freedom than that enjoyed by Canada.

6. This Press conference, and his interviews while he was staying with the American Consul, were all made without consultation with me, and by his own arrangements. Personally, I doubt the wisdom of an Ambassador holding Press conferences, but my impression is, from what I have gathered, that his attitude was very correct, that he greatly disappointed those present by his refusal to declare his views, and that he himself has gone away from Bombay a good deal annoyed by the way he has been pestered. I shall possibly hear more about the interviews which he gave, since, in the next few days, I shall be seeing two or three of those whom he saw in order to say good-bye to them. It was a coincidence that he was here while this Leaders' Conference was on, but from the impressions which I have formed of his own general attitude, and from the general though somewhat vague reports of impressions made on his interviewers, I would not expect that he has done more than listen to a large number of views. I would not be surprised if his visit to Bombay has resulted in giving him a much better view of the difficulties with which we are faced, and of the unpractical attitude of Hindu politicians.

[1] See No. 455.

7. Laithwaite's telephone message added that you would like my impressions of the Leaders' Conference and of the local atmosphere. I may be in a better position to give you my impressions of the Leaders' Conference in a few days' time. At present, I know that non-League Muslims in Bombay are a good deal annoyed that they were not asked to take part in it. One, at least, has suggested that this kind of thing was driving them into the League. Low, who was present at one of the meetings, has told me that the atmosphere was very markedly Hindu. Those present are said to be in a chastened mood, though still bitter. I do not think they really expect that anything will come from their conference. Some of them are, no doubt, genuinely anxious to do something to resolve the deadlock, and I have heard at least one (Sir Ardeshir Dalal) say that some move is necessary in order to bring about a reconciliation between British and Indians. There are others, obviously, whose main object it is to try and get Congress out of its difficulties. It is being said that Gandhi, when he saw people like Rajagopalacharia and Munshi, led them to believe that he would condemn violence, and on this extremely flimsy basis they hope to make a move which will resolve the deadlock. Savarkar, I understand, at the one meeting which he attended, read a newspaper the whole time, and, when asked for his views at the end, remarked that he had always said that the British had no intention of parting with power and that the conference could achieve nothing. Now that he has definitely dissociated himself from the conference conclusion, they appear as nothing more than a number of leaders without any followers. I do not think that the conference has roused much interest in Bombay, or that anyone expects any results from it, though the nationalist Press will, of course, make the most of any refusal to grant their requests. I do not feel able to take this conference very seriously, but if I hear more about it I will let you know.

Yours sincerely,

ROGER LUMLEY

PS.—Since dictating the above, I have seen Sir Jagdish Prasad. He had asked to come and see me to say good-bye. I had not intended to indulge in more than the usual valedictory courtesies, but, in view of your enquiry about the Leaders' Conference, I gave him an opportunity of getting on to the subject. The following are the main points of what I gleaned from him:—

(1) He told me that he understood, from those who had seen Gandhi during his fast, that Gandhi intends to take up the point that he was prepared to make terms with the Japanese.[2] This would seem to be confirmed by Gandhi's enquiry in writing,[3] which you will have seen, as to whether the Government of India propose to favour him with a copy of their pamphlet about Congress responsibility for the disturbances.

(2) He made it pretty clear that he expected that the proposals of the Leaders' Conference would not be accepted. This emerged from his enquiry of me as to

what I thought of the conference resolution. I confess that I had not very clearly in my mind what was contained in the resolution, but I told him that what I assumed it meant was that Government and Congress should reconsider the situation and endeavour to come together. If that was their view, which he accepted, it would seem to me that it was certainly for Congress to climb down. He replied that he had really assumed that that would be the view taken, and that he did not therefore expect anything to come out of their proposals.

(3) He told me that there were two views in the conference. Some doubted whether Gandhi, if released, would begin to retrace his steps. Others, principally Rajagopalacharia and Munshi, thought that what Gandhi wanted was a way out without too much loss of face. I asked him whether those who had seen Gandhi had got anything definite from him. He replied that he did not really know, but that those who had seen him thought there was some hope. From his vague reply, I am inclined to think that Rajagopalacharia & Co. got very little out of Gandhi.

(4) Prasad's main argument, to which he continually returned, was that a choice had to be made between two evils. If we continued to keep Gandhi in jail he would never recant, for that would amount to unconditional surrender on his part, and he would never submit to the loss of prestige which that would involve. He was much more likely to fast again and die in jail than do that—and I gathered that Prasad fully expects another fast in a few months' time. The other alternative was to let him out. Was there any real danger in that course? I reminded him that Gandhi had started a rebellion and that he still commanded great influence, and that, so long as the rebellion remained the official policy of the Congress, it would hardly be said that there was no danger in releasing its leader. He said he realized that that must be the view which we took, but he still thought that it was a lesser evil than keeping him in, with the possibility that he might die—which was a situation which those Indians who were enemies of Britain, particularly the younger ones, would welcome. In any case, Gandhi thought he was innocent of the charges which had been made against him, and the proper course was to put him on trial. I told him that a State trial was hardly likely to lead to the reconciliation which Sir Jagdish had in view as the ultimate aim, and I went on to argue, most effectively I thought, that I could not understand how anybody could say that Gandhi was innocent. Nobody had suggested that Gandhi had himself planned all the details of the sabotage incidents which had occurred, but he was the author of the movement, in which everyone had been exhorted to act as he liked, and it was absurd to suggest that all that that meant was that there should be a few non-violent

[2] See No. 296.

[3] Letter of 5 March 1943 from Pyarelal Nayyar to Sir R. Tottenham: see *Correspondence with Mr. Gandhi August 1942–April 1944* (New Delhi, Government of India Press, 1944), p. 33.

tokens of protest. Sir Jagdish replied that he could understand how we must feel, but that he remained most apprehensive of the effect on an Oriental people if Gandhi made himself a martyr. However illogical it might appear, Gandhi probably thought himself innocent, though his mental processes were not easily understandable.

We parted the best of friends.

582

Sir F. Low to Sir G. Laithwaite

MSS. EUR. F. 125/138

CONFIDENTIAL *The Times of India*, BOMBAY, *12 March 1943*

My dear Laithwaite,

Last week at Jayakar's invitation I took part in an informal preliminary conference which preceded the Leaders' Conference this week. It consisted originally of a lunch party attended by Sapru, Mody and Haksar and after lunch there arrived Rajagopalachari, Munshi, Bhulabhai Desai and some others. The main idea was that an influential deputation should see the Viceroy and ask permission to see Gandhi on the strength of information supplied by Rajagopalachari and Munshi. This information was to the effect that Gandhi was prepared unequivocally to condemn violence and they thought they could persuade him to call off the movement. When they asked my opinion I said that, speaking entirely personally, I thought that nothing could be done about releasing Gandhi unless he called the whole movement off and gave assurances that it would not be revived at least during the period of the war. This did not go down very well. There was a good deal of disjointed talk about violence. Sapru expressed the opinion that Congressmen were undoubtedly mixed up with acts of violence, but both he and Jayakar seemed bitter against the Viceroy. The other side argued that the sabotage was due not to the Congress but to fifth columnists. Rajagopalachari seemed aggrieved because the Viceroy did not tell him during his interview in November[1] about Gandhi's letter of September 22nd[2] in which Gandhi reaffirmed his belief in non-violence. (This point of view has already been published in *The Hindu* of Madras.) The procedure suggested was that the deputation should ask the Viceroy's permission to see Gandhi with the object of persuading him to condemn violence and to recommend to the Working Committee—or directly—the calling off of the movement, and that it would report to His Excellency the result of its mission after seeing Gandhi.

I took no part in this week's discussions and I do not know whether the procedure which I have outlined was ultimately agreed to. Dr. McKenzie, who

attended the meetings, said the participants seemed to be much chastened but still bitter. Fazal Rahimtoola later came to see me and complained that even the non-League Muslims had been ignored in connection with the Conference.

Phillips, President Roosevelt's Envoy, had a tough time at a private conference with local Editors which I attended, but his attitude was very sound and in some cases even helpful. For example, he told one questioner that he could speak from knowledge of Canada and he could assure them that Canada under Dominion Status enjoyed as much freedom as any country. He complained privately about what was appearing in some of the newspapers about him and the editorial note which appeared in *The Times of India* of Wednesday, March 10th, was inspired by his views and he saw a proof before it appeared.

With kindest regards,

Yours sincerely,

FRANCIS LOW

[1] See No. 167. [2] Vol. II, No. 779; the date should be 21 September.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *13 March 1943, 4.15 pm*
Received: 13 March, 3.45 pm

No. 687–S. My immediately following telegram contains text of the resolution passed at Bombay in case you should not already have had it through Reuters. I have had no approach so far from leaders concerned. They include, as far as I am aware, no Muslim except Allah Bakhsh who is of no importance, and Ghuznavi who equally does not count. Nor have they any Scheduled Caste or State member. Savarkar, President of the Mahasabha, last night issued a statement in the following terms:—

Begins. I read in this morning's papers a report that I had signified my assent to the statement issued following the Conference of leaders last evening. The report is incorrect. I could not be a party to it as I did not attend the Conference on the second day and I attended on the first day in my individual capacity and not as the President of the Hindu Mahasabha and due to the pressure of some friends. *Ends.*

2. I will of course let you know if and when I receive formal request from the leaders to receive a deputation. My present information is that they are very apprehensive that I may refuse if they do apply, and I am taking pains to avoid disclosing my own attitude. If they do apply to see me I shall require them to put in their representations in writing with a view to publication and I shall

read them a written reply in which I have no intention of sparing them. My line will be that as I indicated in my correspondence with Gandhi if Gandhi is prepared to call off the resolution of last August and withdraw his reference to rebellion and his adjuration to "do or die" and to give suitable assurances as to the future, I shall then be ready to consider the matter. I shall bring out also as forcibly as I can continued absence of any effective condemnation of violence, &c. by the Congress leaders, and significance attaching to absence of any statement by Gandhi himself.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *13 March 1943, 7 pm*
Received: 13 March, 5.30 pm

No. 688–S. Following is text of resolution dated Bombay, 10th March:—

Begins. We are of opinion that the deplorable events of the last few months require a reconsideration of their policy both by the Government and the Congress. The recent talks which some of us have had with Gandhiji lead us to believe that a move for reconciliation at the present juncture will bear fruit. It is our conviction that if Gandhiji is set at liberty he will do his best to give guidance and assistance in the solution of the internal deadlock and that there need be no fear that there would be any danger to the successful prosecution of the war. The Viceroy may be approached on our behalf to permit a few representatives to meet Gandhiji to authoritatively ascertain his reaction to the recent events and to explore with him avenues for reconciliation. Thus says a statement issued by the All-India leaders who have been meeting in Bombay.

The following leaders were present at today's meeting held at Mr. Jayakar's residence: Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, Mr. M. R. Jayakar, Mr. C. Rajagopalachari, Mr. G. D. Birla, Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas, Mr. Bhulabhai J. Desai, Mr. K. M. Munshi, Sir Ardeshir Dalal, Mr. J. R. D. Tata, Mr. S. A. Brelvi, Mr. Walchand Hirachand, Sir Chunilal Bhaichand Mehta, Sir Homi Mody, Mr. Devadas Gandhi, Master Tara Singh, Mr. S. Ramanathan, Mr. G. L. Mehta, Mr. Allah Bux, Sir Jagdish Prasad, Mr. Kasturbhai Lalbhai and Dr. Mackenzie.

Mr. V. D. Savarkar, who was unable to be present at the meeting, has signified his assent to the statement issued. Besides, the following leaders who could not be present in Bombay are also stated to be in agreement with the statement, and copies of the statement are being posted to them to obtain their signatures. Mr. K. Srinivasan, Mr. C. R. Srinivasan, Mr. N. R. Sarker, Dr. Syamaprosad Mookerjee, Mr. Amritlal V. Thakkar, Raja Maheshwardayal Seth, Mr. P.

Subbarayan, Pandit Hirdaynath Kunzru, Sir Abdul Halim Ghuznavi, Mr. N. M. Joshi, Sardar Sant Singh and Mr. M. S. Aney. *Ends.*

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *13 March 1943, 7 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 692–S. My mind is now pretty clear after reviewing the field about the filling of the vacancies in Council, and my provisional ideas are as follows:—

(*a*) Sultan Ahmed to replace Mudaliar.

(*b*) Mudaliar to revert either as Commerce or as Defence Member.

(*c*) Begum Shah Nawaz for Information.

(*d*) Azizul Haque to hold a portfolio (I have not yet decided which but either Defence or Commerce) and to be relieved by Bijoy Prasad Singh Roy.

(*e*) For the Law Membership (which as you know requires technical qualifications) I would like to get a non-political lawyer and I am advised that Asoke Roy, Advocate-General, Bengal, might well fill that bill.

(*f*) I would also propose to offer a portfolio to Khare who is an ex-Prime Minister, and, though he has wobbled a little, is very highly spoken of by Twynam. I have considered Runganadhan, but think he might stay in reserve. I do not want to overdo this representation of the minor minorities, and think our wise tactics on that issue will be to avoid any suggestion that any particular interest has a vested right to representation, while indicating our sensitiveness to their claims by making appointments now and then.

2. But the first link in this chain is, of course, Sultan Ahmed. I must know whether you are prepared to accept him in substitution for Mudaliar before going any further. I particularly do not (repeat not) want anything said to Mudaliar at this stage. The Commerce Department needs a certain amount of strengthening and reorganisation and I want to get that through before I invite him or anyone else to accept the portfolio. I am getting on with it as quickly as possible.

3. I should welcome an early indication of your view; for I think the sooner we can announce the better.

4. As you know I have been rather inclined to make a service appointment —either Hydari or, if a Hindu, S. N. Roy. On the whole however I have

decided against, though I would like to leave that door open. I quite agree that it would be a pity to select Jenkins, though so far as competence and qualifications are concerned he is of course first class. I am telegraphing[1] separately to you about the arrangements in connection with him.

[1] Not printed.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *15 March 1943, 4.45 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 15 March, 7 pm*

No. 700–S. Following is a note dated 5th March recorded by Maxwell on Congress record during the war period. It is I think very telling and a good deal of it might admit of being used in forthcoming debate:—

Begins. If any overtures are made by or on behalf of the Congress with the object of securing for them fresh freedom of action during the war it may be well to recall the record of the Congress Party during the war period.

In August 1939, when war seemed certain, Congress withdrew all its members from the Central Legislature and they were absent when on September 4th the Assembly took cognisance of the outbreak of the war. They returned to the Assembly only in November 1940 in order to throw out the Supplementary Finance Bill which was intended to raise funds for the prosecution of the war. They opposed this Bill in a series of speeches which were sufficient in themselves to discredit Congress for ever as a body which could be expected to co-operate in the war effort.

In November 1939 Congress followed suit in the Provinces where Congress Ministries held office. All these Ministries were compelled to resign on the ground that Congress could not associate itself with the war.

In October 1939, and again in August 1940, the Congress rejected with contempt the offers made by His Excellency the Viceroy and His Majesty's Government which were intended to open to them opportunities of participating in the war administration of the country on terms honourable to themselves.

By the middle of 1940 the collapse of France and the overrunning of the Continent by the German armies had left Britain standing alone with her back to the wall. This was the moment (following the rejection of the offer of August 8th) chosen by Gandhi and the Congress to initiate a civil disobedience movement which lasted for more than a year and in the course of which tens of thousands of Congressmen went to prison for uttering the prescribed slogan that "it is wrong to assist the war with men or money".

In December 1941 Japan entered the war. The civil disobedience movement was then moribund and Government released the majority of civil disobedience prisoners, but the Congress responded only by reaffirming their resolution of September 1940 denying all assistance in the defence of the country unless the independence of India was immediately conceded.

In March 1942 the Cripps Mission came to India with the object once more of securing the co-operation of the Congress and other major parties in the war administration of the country. This object was again sabotaged by the Congress on the ground, scarcely[1] disguised, that the powers offered were not sufficient to enable a Congress Government to make a separate peace with Japan. This was the inner meaning of their demand that the national government must be a Cabinet Government with full powers and not subject to control from Whitehall.

By the middle of 1942 Japan was already in possession of Burma and was expected to open an attack on India in the following fair season. This was the moment again chosen by Gandhi and the Congress to launch an open rebellion clearly timed and planned with the object of paralysing the defence of India in the event of enemy attack.

In short, the record of the Congress during the war has been one of consistent and repeated refusal of all offers intended to secure their co-operation in the war administration and of two mass movements launched at the most critical moments of the war with the open and avowed object of obstructing the defence of the country. A party with such a record obviously can no longer claim to take any share in the administration of the country in war, nor, without complete and unconditional capitulation and the fullest guarantees of future conduct, can it safely be allowed freedom of action until the war is won. *Ends.*

[1] Deciphered as 'principally'.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/E/8/3297: f 157

IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, *15 March 1943, 6.35 pm*
Received: 16 March

4832. My personal telegram 4612[1] dated March 11th. Debate may range outside political situation and it is likely I shall be asked for statement on food situation. I should be glad to have by Saturday[2] appreciation of present situation and of measures taken to deal with it and your guidance as to degree of optimism it is possible or desirable for me to display.

[1] No. 576. [2] 20 March.

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Mr Bevin to Mr Amery

L/E/8/2527: f 190

MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND NATIONAL SERVICE,
ST. JAMES'S SQUARE, S.W.I, *15 March 1943*

Dear Amery,
Thank you for your letter of 1st March.[1] While I fully appreciate the point of view you express, I think that there are objections to asking the Viceroy to consider the memorandum only as representing the views of some members of the War Cabinet. It seems to me that it is necessary to have an indication of the Prime Minister's views and to give the proposals the greatest force possible. It is, of course, unfortunate that nothing is known of the lines upon which the authorities in India are formulating plans but, whatever they may be, it seems to me that action of the kind indicated in the memorandum is bound to occupy a foremost place. I feel that unless a firm indication is given from here of the objectives to be immediately aimed at, a great deal of time will be used in exchanges of views without real progress being made.

Yours sincerely,
ERNEST BEVIN

[1] No. 554.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Field Marshal Wavell

MSS. EUR. F. 125/125

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *15 March 1943*

SECRET AND PERSONAL
My dear Commander-in-Chief,
You will remember that you were kind enough in your letter of the 25th January[1] to discuss the question of a Committee to consider the future of the Indian Army. I sent a copy of it to Amery in my letter of the 26th January,[2] and I send you now copy of the comment apparently based on consideration of your note which I have had from him.[3] The points he raises in the earlier part of this paragraph of his letter bring us up hard against the naval and air position. As regards the future political problem I am not so sure as Amery that we can altogether ignore it, but I do agree that we can probably go in practice a considerable distance in examination independently of it. I am myself extremely doubtful (but that for your personal ear only) whether a post-war Cabinet

would be prepared to play the altruist either in India or elsewhere in the Empire, and to accept kicks without being regarded as eligible for any of the compensations, and we may very well find a strong disposition (for which I see every justification) for His Majesty's Government, if and when it comes to a settlement, to make clear that their assistance, and support in the military field, is available on certain terms only which it will be for them to lay down. I do not want for obvious reasons to go very far in speculations on these very high political issues, and what I have said about them I would like you to regard as for your own eye only.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

[1] No. 360. [2] No. 362. [3] No. 437, para. 9.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir R. Lumley (Bombay)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/57

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *15 March 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

My dear Lumley,

Very many thanks for your private and personal letter of 12th March No. 300/H.E.[1] I am most grateful for this very clear appreciation of the position both as regards Phillips and as regards the Leaders' Conference. It is exactly what I wanted and I am sending Amery a copy.

2. I have had a good deal of conversation with Phillips at various stages and I have done my best to keep him in touch with what is going on. The position is not an easy one. It was never contemplated when he came here that he should come in on the internal political business and while I readily accepted him on his personal record and took no exception to the retention by him of the personal rank of Ambassador (I have been at particular pains to avoid referring to him in any circumstances as "Ambassador" or "Ambassador Phillips"), there are very strong and obvious objections to any United States interference in our internal affairs. Those views, for your personal information, are entirely shared by the Home Government. While therefore I have been at pains to keep Phillips in general touch and to treat him with all possible courtesy (and he is indeed a most likeable person who has been very correct so far as I know in his contacts outside) I have also made it clear to him that there is no question as I understand it of his filling the role of a mediator or anything of that sort

[1] No. 581.

here. I have also told him quite categorically that in no circumstances would I agree to his seeing Gandhi while under restraint as at present. To that I intend to hold, and in doing so, I have the Prime Minister's authority behind me.

3. But I was anxious to get some appreciation of what was happening in Bombay because of the very large number of people whom Phillips is reported to have seen. As I have said earlier in this letter, I think he has been perfectly correct in his attitude towards the people he has seen and has refrained from committing himself, though he obviously was a little franker in his private conversations with you (as he might have been with me) than he would be with people outside. But your letter confirms my feeling that there is this anxiety to come in, and it confirms me also in my feeling of the unwisdom of having in this country a person of Phillips' standing unless he is prepared (as would be the normal technique for a diplomat of high rank) to keep entirely outside the internal affairs of the country in which he is serving. For it is obvious that the impression made by all these interviews, many of them with very prominent political figures, on the mind of the Indian public is first that the United States Government is closely interested in the internal Indian political situation (I have no doubt that that is true); and secondly that, if the cards are played in a certain way American intervention on behalf of the nationalist cause may be secured (I have very grave doubt myself of that anticipation being realised, and I think that there might be very awkward reactions at home, and not merely in Governmental circles, to any endeavour by the United States to come in, while I note with interest that a certain degree of suspicion seems to exist even in Congress circles as to the motives prompting the United States interest).

4. As you will see from what I have said, I quite share your own view as set out in paragraph 6 of your letter.

5. I am also most grateful for your impressions of the Leaders' Conference. Here again you and I are in entire agreement in our general appreciation. The Conference, so far as one can judge, has been very one-sided. It has had no Muslim representation except Allah Bakhsh, who is certainly not *persona grata* with the Muslim League; and Ghuznavi, who is of no special importance politically. Savarkar has formally dissociated himself,[2] and a statement[3] by Rajagopalachari, which issued yesterday and which I have just seen in the Press telegrams, suggests that he does not take too seriously the prospects of any business being done. That was clearly Jagdish Prasad's feeling; and indeed the questions which could be put to any deputation selected from the remainder of the persons are so awkward that it would not surprise me if we do not hear very much more about all this.

6. I gather from Amery that there is likely to be a general debate by about 23rd March (when incidentally they will deal with the resolutions extending

the Section 93 Proclamations). I propose to wait for another few days before advising on the line to be taken in case there should be any development so far as the "Leaders" are concerned. On the position generally my own feeling is still that we must take our stand on what I said to Gandhi in the course of my correspondence with him, viz. that if he is prepared to withdraw from the resolution of last August (which would of course include also the complete withdrawal of his references to "rebellion" and "do or die") and to give satisfactory assurances for the future, the matter can then be considered. I must say that I should be much surprised if he does in fact get himself to that point, though in dealing with the Mahatma one can never wholly exclude the possibility that with his long political experience he may decide that he has backed the wrong horse and announce for some more or less sufficient reason that he has seen the light and proposes to adopt a radically different policy in the result. Were he in fact to take that line I think he is quite strong enough to carry it. But you and I know only too well how incalculable the little man is: and I am still rather disposed to think, as I said in my letter to you of a few days ago, that he will lie back until his health is better and confront us with something tiresome a little later in the summer.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

[2] See No. 583, para. 1.

[3] Asked what were the chances of a favourable response to the Bombay Conference, Mr Rajagopalachari said that they were moved, not by hope, great or small, but by a sense of religious duty. Government repression of the recent movement had substantially damaged belief in non-violence. If the demands of the Bombay peacemakers were not met the damage would be complete and there would be nothing to tell those whose patience was exhausted. There was still one forlorn hope—international arbitration. America and China could not accept that India was solely a British affair. Madras, 14 March 1943. United Press of India. MSS. EUR. F. 125/138.

591

Mr Munshi to Sir G. Laithwaite

MSS. EUR. F. 125/125

26 RIDGE ROAD, BOMBAY, *15 March 1943*

Dear Sir Gilbert,
I am forwarding herewith a letter of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru which was left with me on 11th to be forwarded to you as soon as the list of signatories to the resolution was complete.

With kind regards,
Yours sincerely,
K. M. MUNSHI

Enclosure 1 to No. 591[1]

BOMBAY, *11 March 1943*

Dear Sir Gilbert,

I am enclosing herewith copy of a resolution which was adopted at the meeting held at Bombay on the 9th and 10th of March over which I presided. The names of the gentlemen who are parties to this resolution will appear from the copy which I am enclosing.

I shall request you kindly to lay it before His Excellency the Viceroy. If His Excellency should find it convenient to receive a delegation to explain or discuss anything in this resolution I shall arrange for such a delegation—not exceeding 4 in number. In that case, I shall request you kindly to fix a date giving sufficient time for the delegation to reach Delhi.

Reply to this may kindly be sent to me at my permanent address at Allahabad.

Yours sincerely,

TEJ BAHADUR SAPRU

Enclosure 2 to No. 591

RESOLUTION

[*There follows the text of the resolution as in the first para. of No. 584, with names and descriptions of these signatories: Sir T. B. Sapru, Dr M. R. Jayakar, Srinivasa Sastri, C. Rajagopalachari, Bhulabhai Desai, K. M. Munshi, Dr S. P. Mookerjee, Raja Narendra Nath, Raja Maheswar Dayal Seth, Sir Jagdish Prasad, Sir P. S. Sivaswami Ayyar, Master Tara Singh, Allah Bakhsh, Sir Maharaj Singh, the Bishop of Dhornakal,*[2] *K. Srinivasan, J. R. D. Tata, G. D. Birla, Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas, Seth Walchand Hirachand, Sir Chunilal B. Mehta, G. L. Mehta, P. C. Joshi, T. R. Venkatarama Sastri, S. A. Brelvi, the Reverend J. McKenzie, Sir Vijaya of Vizianagram, Sir A. H. Ghuznavi, Dr. P. N. Banerjee, Sardar Sant Singh, Pandit H. N. Kunzru, Dr Sachchidananda Sinha, N. M. Joshi, Mahomedbhoy I. M. Rawjee, Sir Chunilal V. Mehta, Kasturbhai Lalbhai, Sir Ardeshir R. Dalal, C. R. Srinivasan, Dr P. Subbarayan, S. Ramanathan, Sheth Haridas Madhavji, Qazi Mohammad Ahmad Kazmi, N. C. Chatterjee, and Tulsidas Kilachand.*][3]

[1] Lord Linlithgow transmitted the text of this letter and of the resolution to Mr Amery in telegram 734–S of 19 March. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

[2] The Right Reverend V. S. Azariah.

[3] Mr Munshi later forwarded the names of A. V. Thakkar, Sir Shri Ram, the Reverend J. Z. Hodge, V. V. Kalikar, Narain Mahata and K. C. Niyogi (MSS. EUR. F. 125/125). In telegram 739–S of 19 March Lord Linlithgow forwarded all the names to Mr Amery and in telegram 766–S of 22 March added that Mr Munshi had since forwarded the names of Aney and Sarker. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

592

Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/92

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL GOVT. HOUSE, LAHORE, *15 March 1943*

No. 442.

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

Nothing of any outstanding importance has been happening in the Punjab since I sent you my last report. Mr. Gandhi's fast gave rise to very little excitement in this Province, though Hindus in the towns were mostly in sympathy with his manœuvre and many of them were genuinely distressed by the thought that his demonstration might lead to fatal results. The rest of the population were either indifferent or in some cases derisive, and I think there is no doubt that, if Government had surrendered, their prestige would have been seriously impaired.

* * *

The position as regards law and order is on the whole satisfactory. Serious crime has been showing a distinct tendency to decrease and the Police have of late achieved some remarkable successes in the campaign against dacoity in the neighbourhood of Ferozepore.

The Premier has, as you are aware, been attending a Muslim League meeting at Delhi, where he had none too easy a time. Mr. Jinnah would like the Muslim League to have a much greater degree of control over Punjab politics, and he and his lieutenants complain that the Unionist Party in this Province have hitherto only been paying lip-service to the League. The Premier acknowledged the general leadership of the Qaid-i-Azam amongst the Muslims of India and referred him to the Jinnah–Sikander Pact[1]—a loosely worded document, the purport of which is to the effect that in all-India politics the League is to be regarded as supreme and that the Unionist Party is more or less free to take its own line in the Punjab. Khizar affirmed his adherence to this pact and for the time being this has been accepted. A proposed resolution advocating more active interference by the League in Punjab politics was withdrawn. The Premier has succeeded for the present in blocking the attack, but it seems evident that there are rocks ahead. Jinnah had also some kind words to say about the Punjab Governor's alleged violation of constitutional procedure in failing to consult Muslim Leaguers before taking steps for the appointment of a Premier, and he appears to have been disagreeably surprised when his attention was drawn to the text of the Governor's Instrument of Instructions.

[1] Concluded at a meeting of the All-India Muslim League at Lucknow, 15 October 1937.

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Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/57

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, *15 March 1943*

D.-o. No. 301/H.E.

My dear Linlithgow,

I write this in continuation of my private and personal letter No. 300/H.E., dated March the 12th.[1] In the course of my farewells during the last two or three days, I have seen Jayakar, McKenzie and Munshi, and though I do not think that there is anything of importance which I can add to my previous letter, it may be of interest if I complete the picture by mentioning the main points which each of them made.

2. Jayakar, clearly, did not expect that anything would come out of the Conference resolution. He placed more emphasis than did Sir Jagdish Prasad on a State trial, and it seems to me possible that this is one line which is likely to be developed. His view was that we could not keep Gandhi and others in prison indefinitely, and that we ought to try them. He did not commit himself to any opinion as to what the outcome of the trial might be, but said that, if they were found guilty of the charges made against them, he, for one, and he thought many others, would agree that Gandhi and the Congress were Public Enemies No. 1. This I very much doubt, as I learnt from McKenzie that throughout these talks, both in Delhi and in Bombay, Jayakar has wobbled from one point of the compass to the other.

3. McKenzie has no illusions about Gandhi, and has been doing something to get American Missionaries to counter the very false statements which have been appearing in America about British policy. His main concern is about the bitterness, which he describes as never worse than it is at the moment. He is, of course, surrounded by students and the intelligentsia, and must feel the pressure of the atmosphere in which he lives. I have heard very frequently, in recent months, this story of bitterness being so bad, but I cannot say that I have come across any signs of it personally, nor have most Europeans of whom I have enquired. That most educated Indians, when talking amongst themselves, express anti-British views when encouraged to do so, is probably true, but very little of it appears on the surface. McKenzie had very little to add about this Leaders' Conference, but appears to be thinking of the idea that we should lay down a time limit, within which they must compose their own differences and produce their own constitution. This same idea I have heard expressed by one or two European business people, who dislike the prospect of dragging

on in the present atmosphere and with the future uncertain. This, I think, is a product of overtiredness and of a feeling of being fed-up with India and its politicians.

4. Munshi was the most interesting, and he was the only one amongst the Indians who gave me the impression of being in a chastened mood. He made no attempt to exonerate Congress from blame, and deplored their many mistakes—all of which, in his view, dated back to their decision to resign in 1939. His thesis was that whereas moderates, like himself, could obtain no attention for their views some months ago because so many were spoiling for a fight, now that the fight was over and done with, he, and those who thought like him, were being listened to. He supported this by declaring that there was now a real prospect of reaching an understanding with Jinnah. He himself did not go so far as Rajagopalacharia, but he had become convinced that the Two Nations theory had bitten deep into the Muslim mind and could not be ignored. There was no prospect of a settlement in the future unless the Muslims were satisfied. This was a big admission from Munshi, the author of *Akhand Hindustan*.[2] If they reached agreement with Jinnah, he went on, Congress could be got, he felt sure, to acquiesce in, though probably not to take part in, some arrangement for the duration of the war. He suggested that it might be a good thing for some of the moderates to go to England, but that would be of little value unless they knew they would be welcomed by British statesmen. If this, as I suspected, was a fly thrown over me, I did not rise. The only other point of interest which Munshi mentioned was that those who had seen Gandhi during his fast were convinced that he was very much disturbed by the violence which has gone on. Gandhi had told them, according to Munshi, that he had never dreamt of it and had not expected it. They had let this be known, and there were already signs that the different factions, which had held together in carrying on the movement since the arrests, were breaking up, and he himself thought that what little was left of the movement would peter out, except for a few terrorists, in a few weeks. Gandhi's original idea—and this was a new one on me—was that Government should be notified about each incident which was to take place. For instance, that on a specified date, one thousand Congress followers should occupy Victoria Terminus, in Bombay, and risk being shot—but this had been turned down by the Working Committee as impracticable. What had been put in its place, he did not reveal. Munshi is always ingenious, but he is so extremely volatile, and now commands so insignificant a following, that it does not seem to me to matter very much what his ideas are at the moment.

5. I am afraid there is nothing much in this gossip of great value, but it may be of some use as indicating the different lines of propaganda which these individuals now want to put across. My general impression of them is that they

[1] No. 581. [2] Bombay 1942.

feel they must do something to justify their existence and to keep themselves before the public, but they dare not detach themselves far from the Congress, and they do not expect that their proposals will achieve anything.

Yours sincerely,

ROGER LUMLEY

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/11/5b: ff 114–16

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *16 March 1943, 1.10 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 17 March*

281. I have read your private and personal telegram[1] in the light of paragraph 3 of your private and personal letter of 2nd March[2] just received in which you say you have decided to move Firoz to Supply. My following observations on your final proposals are made solely with a view to strengthening your Executive in India which as you know I regard as our prime objective. As I said in telegram[3] to which you refer in your letter I feel that to secure this we should not tie ourselves too closely to communal balances, but are you sure that the change to four Hindus and five Moslems (which results from your present proposals) from the previous proportion of five Hindus (counting C. P. Aiyyar) and three Moslems might not be disturbing?

2. I recognise that this Moslem preponderance would be less striking if one were located in London instead of Delhi and I have no objection to Sultan Ahmed coming here. He will not of course contribute [as] much as Mudaliar has occasionally been able to do in his own line, but provided his reputed tendency to leak can be kept in check here he should be an adequate representative.

3. That would leave you Hindu–Moslem parity in Delhi. If you feel that that would be all right all we have to consider is their individual merits in posts proposed. I should myself think Mudaliar might be rather wasted in Defence and more value in his old portfolio of Commerce which is of great importance both currently and in regard to post-war problems beginning to loom large or alternatively perhaps in Supply? With Jenkins' departure that Department which is vital while war lasts and probably for some years after will need all the strength possible and I should doubt whether Hydari though good is up to Jenkins' level. In these circumstances are you sure that Firoz is up to the weight of that Department? Have you in this connection thought of Chetty who I suppose if taken into consideration would have to displace Khare from your list?

4. Your proposal of the Begum is striking and would be acclaimed in some quarters. Even if she is regarded as representing her sex rather than community would not her selection provoke agitation for Hindu lady? Apart from that are you confident that she is likely to make all that could be made of Information portfolio? Though I do not suggest it because it would bear on the question of communal balance nor because he would keep up representation of lesser minorities I should like to be assured that purely on consideration of capacity you regard Begum as to be preferred to Runganadhan, who will have acquired a considerable and helpful insight into modern methods of publicity as well as attitude taken outside India to Indian questions.

I hardly suppose you can complete your list by next Monday but if you could it would be useful material for me in debate which will probably but not certainly be next Tuesday.

[1] No. 585. [2] No. 555. [3] No. 532.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to all Provincial Governors

L/P&J/8/618: ff 62–4

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL NEW DELHI, *16 March 1943*

I am returning to the subject of my letter of the 2nd November[1] in which I drew attention to the importance of investigating thoroughly the relationship between "big business" and the Congress and asked you to enlist the help of your C.I.D. in these enquiries. Since then, I am glad to say, the Intelligence Bureau has received from Provincial C.I.Ds a number of items of information bearing on this subject which the Director, Intelligence Bureau, has compiled in a summary sent to Provincial Intelligence Branches with his circular Memorandum of the 13th March. I am enclosing a copy of this memorandum and summary for your personal information in order that you may see how the investigation is going and what further material is required.

2. The summary is, of course, only a collection of independent items of information and does not represent all that is known. But it is sufficient to show that this investigation is well worth pursuing and may lead to important results. Our end will not, however, be achieved—although it will certainly be furthered—by recording such information as comes to notice about individual financial transactions or payments made to the Congress. Our object is to discover all

[1] No. 132.

that there is to be known about the identity, aims, policy, contacts, ramifications and methods of the business groups which may be supposed to be at the centre of the plot and their exact relationship with Gandhi or the Congress.

3. If we are to obtain results of real value it is most necessary to pursue actively every kind of investigation that may lead to further discoveries. The Memorandum now sent out by the Intelligence Bureau is intended to give direction to these enquiries and, while thanking you for all the help given by your C.I.D. hitherto, I must ask you again to do whatever you can to maintain the interest of your C.I.D. in these enquiries. The field in which they have to take place is, of course, a peculiarly difficult one to penetrate and something in the way of a new technique may prove to be required. But the commercial attaché stationed in several important centres should be able to give a good deal of assistance to your officers and I hope that full use will be made of their services. When we have seen what information comes to light in reply to the Intelligence Bureau's Memorandum I will consider what further assistance, if any, is required for particular aspects of the enquiry. In the meanwhile I would particularly emphasise the need of full interprovincial co-operation in pursuing any item of information that may have wider ramifications. For instance, the disposal at death of the fortunes of wealthy sympathisers of the Congress is a matter which can only be unravelled by complete interaction between province and province; and even a province in which "big business" is not known to operate on a large scale may be able to give information to another province which may lead to valuable discoveries. I am most anxious that no pains should be spared in connection with these investigations, which may lead to results of very great importance, and I am sure that I can rely on your co-operation and that of your C.I.D. in bringing them to a successful conclusion.

LINLITHGOW

Enclosure to No. 595

STRICTLY SECRET
No. 3/Cong/43

INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, HOME DEPARTMENT, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, NEW DELHI, *13 March 1943*

CIRCULAR MEMORANDUM

Enclosed is a summary of information[2] received since October 1942, on the subject of Congress and Big Business and Congress funds generally. It will be seen from the summary that the picture of financial support enjoyed by Congress is still far from clear. Some reports suggest that powerful financial and commercial interests are according material assistance to Congress, while others convey the impression that Congress funds are by no means inexhaustible and must be supplemented by frequent *ad hoc* collections from sympathizers in as well as outside the Indian mercantile community. Further investigation into the sources of Congress income is clearly necessary and, in particular, it is impor-

tant to ascertain if a ring of Indian financiers is supporting Congress from personal, or more sinister, motives.

2. The following are some of the points which require clarification:—

(*a*) What personal funds are at Gandhi's disposal and where are they kept? In this connexion it may be stated that the Gandhi Seva Sangh's assets, which were valued at over eight lakhs at the end of 1938 included three items (in round figures) of Rs.3,35,000/-, Rs.1,15,500/- and Rs.1,13,500/- earmarked respectively as Gandhi Seva Sangh Reserve Fund, Gandhi Reserve Fund and Central Fund; the corresponding figures for 1939 were seven lakhs, Rs.3,05,000/-, Rs.77,000/- and Rs.1,05,000/-. Again, during his eight days' stay in Bombay in May 1942, Gandhi collected a sum of Rs.5 lakhs for the Andrews Memorial Fund. Has this sum been used for the purpose for which it was collected? If not, what has happened to this money? Is there any support for the suggestion made in report (16)[3] of the summary?

(*b*) Where are the Congress funds kept? What is the amount of such funds and how are they operated? The detention of all members of the Congress Working Committee, including the Congress treasurer, has rendered the normal operation of such funds impossible. Are they, therefore, frozen for the duration of the present movement or are they being operated secretly by some method devised to meet such an emergency? If the latter, how is this being done? If the funds are frozen, how is the movement being financed?

(*c*) Who constitute the firm of Bachhraj & Co. at Bombay, Nagpur and Karachi? Are there any other branches? (According to a Press report, the firm in Bombay filed an appeal on 28–1–43 against the forfeiture by the Bombay Government of a sum of Rs.72,000/- which stood at the credit of the A.-I.C.C. in the firm's books.)

(*d*) It has been suggested that the estates of the late Jamnalal Bajaj and other deceased financial and business magnates, who during their lifetime supported Congress, are probably being used to finance Congress activities secretly. Is there any evidence to support this? What part are Kamalnayan Bajaj and Jankidevi Bajaj, son and widow of Seth Jamnalal Bajaj, and other relatives of wealthy deceased Congress supporters playing in financing Congress?

[2] Not printed; see L/P&J/8/618. A further summary of information entitled 'Congress and "Big Business" ' was recorded by the D.I.B. on 28 February 1944.

[3] This read: 'S.B., Lucknow, report dated 2–12–42: according to a C.S.P. worker from Bombay, Gandhi handed over a sum of Rs.7 lakhs, collected from Bombay businessmen in May 1942 for the Tagore Memorial Fund, to Acharya Narendra Deo, Tricumchand Thakurdas (Purushotamdas Tricumdas is presumably meant) and other C.S.P. leaders for the nationalist movement; Tricumdas got a further sum of Rs.4 lakhs from the Maharaja's Association, Bombay.'

(*e*) What exactly is the relationship between Congress and Big Business? If Congress is receiving the support of powerful businessmen, what is the real motive behind this support? Are they backing Congress for personal, local or national reasons? If the suggestion that Congress and Big Business are working together is correct, is Congress making use of Big Business for its own ends, or is Big Business using Congress as a tool to further possible schemes for an ultimate capitalist hegemony?

(*f*) Who exactly are the financial and commercial magnates involved in this Big Business–Congress partnership, if it exists? Are the representatives of Big Business interests acting collectively in the furtherance of the suggested common aim? If so, what is the scope of the organization and who are its members?

NOTE: The implications of (*e*) and (*f*) above are regarded as of the highest importance in ascertaining the true role of Big Business in current Indian power politics.

3. It will obviously not be possible to find a complete answer to these questions through enquiries restricted to any one Province or through the medium of any single investigating agency; but in most Provinces material information regarding one or more of the points raised may be brought to light and we would be grateful for your fullest co-operation in this respect. The scope and means of investigation in any particular Province will naturally be governed by local resources and conditions, but we offer two suggestions for consideration. Firstly, we would suggest careful censorship of the correspondence of the financial backers of Congress included in the list forwarded with this Bureau's Circular Memorandum No. 56/Cong./41[4] dated 29–10–42 (a copy of which, and the earlier reference, will have been shown to you by the Central Intelligence Officer) and of any other person or concern suggested by local knowledge and experience. Secondly, it is recommended that the fullest use be made of the services, wherever available, of this Bureau's Commercial Attachés who are well qualified to assist you in the technical aspects of such enquiries as you may undertake.

G. AHMED
Deputy Director (A).

To:

C.I.Ds. Assam, Delhi, N.W.F.P., Sind.
S.Bs. Calcutta I, Bihar, U.P., Punjab I, Bombay I, Madras, C.P., Orissa.
I.Bs. Bengal, Poona I.
I.G.P., Ajmer-Merwara.

[4] Not printed.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *16 March 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Many thanks for your letters of the 16th[1] and 19th February[2] which arrived together. The main thing ahead of us at the moment is the debate on the 23rd.[3] I am glad that the opportunity is to be taken to deal with this Section 93 extension. I confess I had not quite realised that in addition to an annual bill of this nature while the constitution remains unchanged the decision about Legislative Councils[4] would necessitate going to Parliament in the summer or autumn of each year. If this is correct (as I have no doubt it is on the advice I have received) it is a great nuisance: but we are not of course our own masters.

2. As I write I have still no news from the Bombay leaders, and I suspect that they are not finding it quite so easy as they imagined, and that they are apprehensive of the damage that my reply might cause them were they in fact with no stronger case than they are in a position to put forward to lead a deputation to me. Savarkar abandoned them some days ago,[5] and a statement by Rajagopalachariar dated 14th March,[6] of which I send you a copy by this bag, suggests that he too is far from optimistic, and that he is beginning to think that the better drum to beat will be that of international arbitration, &c. The extremely interesting report[7] which I have had from Lumley brings out the irritation caused locally by the absence of non-Muslim League representation in the discussion, while his account of his conversations with Jagdish Prasad underlines the absence of any real hope in these people's minds. *Dawn* had a very telling article about the whole business a day or two ago of which I am sending you a copy. As for me I propose to lie back and wait for the leaders to make the move. It may of course be that I shall get something from them in the next few days, and I will in any event telegraph it to you well before the debate.

3. Thank you so much for your very helpful comment in your letter of the 19th February about Phillips, and for the assurance of support[8] which I have had from you and from Winston, and which is of course most valuable. I agree with you that we cannot have the Americans butting in. So far as I can judge Phillips has been very correct, and while he has probably heard a great deal of

[1] No. 477. [2] No. 499. [3] In fact postponed to 30 March.

[4] See No. 347, para. 10. It had been decided to proceed with the elections in Bengal and Assam and postpone them in the Section 93 Provinces.

[5] See No. 583, para. 1. [6] See No. 590, note 3. [7] No. 581. [8] No. 575.

stuff (some of it I hope cancelling out other some) from the various politicians he has seen, I would anticipate that he would have avoided showing his hand in any way. That assumption receives confirmation from the impressions of his visit to Bombay, and his conversations there which I asked Lumley to record[9] and from a letter[10] from Low of which I send you copy by this bag. While however it is a great help that Phillips should observe the appropriate conventions so far as committing himself publicly goes, and while he is an immense improvement in that respect on Johnson, I cannot regard the position as really satisfactory. I send you by this bag a list[11] of the people whom he is reported by the Press to have seen since the beginning of Gandhi's fast. The number is fairly formidable (so much so that hostile critics are now beginning to suggest that he is out [to] go one better than my 52 Leaders of 1939[12])! But you will observe also the number of occasions on which Rajagopalachariar has been in, and the style of visitor who in general has been anxious to make himself felt by Phillips. It is in my opinion wholly improper that a representative of a foreign power, whether he is a diplomatic representative or not, should go so near to interference in the internal political affairs of an allied country as to indulge in discussions of this nature at all. I can imagine what the reactions would be were the American Ambassador in London, or in peace-time, the German Ambassador to make himself a centre for discontented politicians representing a sectional point of view in English political life; and however cautious Phillips may be (and as I have mentioned above I have no reason to think that he has not been very cautious) the natural effect of his activities on the Indian mind is to make people feel here that the United States are most closely interested, and presumably anxious to give any assistance they can, and that it is legitimate for Indian politicians to try to bring pressure to bear on us, through the United States Representative and his staff, *via* Washington. I would differ a little from the position as you put it in paragraph 3 of your letter of the 19th February, in that regard. What matters, as I have just suggested, is the effect on the Indian mind of the new United States diplomatic machine in India. No Indian knew or cared what Wilson, the late United States Commissioner, did or said. But it is a very different business when, following on Johnson, and his known intrusions into the Indian political field, one has a man who has been an Ambassador, and still enjoys that personal rank, covering the country in the manner that Phillips is doing, and establishing political contacts such as those which are evident from the list of his interviews. Again, it is my view that we have been unwise to allow any strong Ambassadorial flavour to be injected into United States representation in India in the face of the constitutional position, and the international status of this country. Matters will become still more complicated if Phillips, after making all these contacts, goes back to Washington to report, and hopes will be built on any such move which I am certain cannot be realised, but the existence of which will add to our difficulties in the meantime.

4. I know that I have your full support, and that of the Prime Minister, and am most grateful for it. And while I shall of course be at the utmost pains to handle it as gently as may be, I do not propose to have any nonsense over this business. In no circumstances will I permit Phillips to see Gandhi while he is detained as at present. And, should that be necessary, I will again politely but firmly remind Phillips of the limits subject to which I accepted him. If Phillips is at any time relieved I feel strongly that we should not accept a man of corresponding status, and that we should revert to the Wilson level. Equally I hope I shall have your support on the question I referred to you by telegram of the strength, continually growing, and quite disproportionate to the position of the United States in relation to India, or to the work to be done, of the staff of this American Mission.[13]

5. Let me only add before I pass from the subject that I am of course doing my utmost to keep entirely secret here any idea of any strain or difficulty over Phillips' activities, and Maxwell is the only person whom I have taken into confidence on the subject (while Engert gave the information which I telegraphed you,[14] to Caroe, I have warned Caroe that the External Affairs Department in dealing with Phillips must confine themselves strictly to the field in which T. M. Wilson operated, and if higher issues of policy are raised, or any matter affecting the internal position, that they must refer Phillips to me about it, and must avoid discussing it). As I have repeatedly said in my telegrams I have nothing against Phillips personally—he is well-mannered, friendly and distinguished, and I am sure well-meaning. My complaint is against the situation in which he finds himself, with its reactions on our position here. I do hope that Anthony Eden will be able to get our point of view across in America. I am sometimes tempted, as I survey the wider horizon, to wonder whether Roosevelt is not at times afflicted with just a touch of exaltation!

6. I have telegraphed[15] to you my ideas about these vacancies in Council. I am rather attracted by your suggestion, since received, that Runganadhan might make a good High Commissioner, and I will turn it over in my mind. I did think quite seriously of putting him into Council, but on the whole, after doing an extremely difficult sum in communal balances, I came to the conclusion that the best thing would be to confine myself to Hindus and Muslims. In the result as you will see I have strengthened the Hindu *vote* by one, and it goes up from three to four. I have also strengthened the Muslim vote by one, from three to

[9] See No. 581. [10] No. 582. [11] L/P&S/12/2754: f 94.

[12] At the beginning of October 1939, Lord Linlithgow had discussions with a wide range of Indian political leaders including Gandhi, Jinnah, Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel and Rajendra Prasad. A subsequent statement showed that the chief subjects covered were: the British Government's war aims; its intentions as to the future status of India; and the closer association of India with the prosecution of the war.

[13] See No. 555, para. 5. [14] No. 567. [15] No. 585.

four. But in addition, if you agree to Sultan Ahmed, and he could be persuaded to go to London, they would have the non-voting seat at present held by Mudaliar. I should hope that none of the selections which I have made will be likely to cause trouble with Jinnah, and I think they give me a pretty competent team.

7. Before I make an appointment to Commerce Department I am very anxious to strengthen it. Indianisation has not been a success there. Under Mudaliar, and afterwards under Sarker, there was a determination to oust Europeans, and put in Indians without too much regard for their competence, and in the result a very important department is very lightly staffed (though not in point of numbers). I really must take the present opportunity to get a good man in, whether an Indian or an European. I have toyed with the idea, now that I do not propose to consider Hydari for Council, of using him either in Supply (if Jenkins leaves that Department) or as Secretary to Government on the Reconstruction side of the Commerce Department. In favour of the latter is the fact that the Muslims are dissatisfied at the Hindu character of the Supply Department, while Hydari is of very considerable competence, thoroughly acquainted with the Government of India and its working, of an age to be well placed for the post-war period, and familiar, through his experience on the Supply Council, with a variety of matters with a direct bearing on these aspects of reconstruction that will be of interest to the Commerce Department. And for political reasons I would rather have an Indian than an European Secretary in charge of the reconstruction side if I can find the right man, for the Reconstruction Committee of Council which I am about to set up will have Hutton as its Secretary, and Gregory as, for practical purposes, Additional Secretary; and there is always a great deal of suspicion in political circles here that we propose to subordinate India's commercial and industrial interests in the post-war world to those of Great Britain, a suspicion that may to some extent be offset by our putting in a really competent Indian Secretary in a key post such as that I have mentioned.

8. I am not, either, entirely satisfied even now with the organisation of the Food Department, and want to get it straight while responsibility for it rests in my hands in the absence of a Member. I think I can do so in the course of the next few days. Vigor made a very good impression on me, and I think he is just the man we want. He thinks we ought to have a rationing expert, and I am sure that any precaution of that nature will be wisely taken. We have, I think, now telegraphed[16] to ask for your help. My inclination is to put the operational side much more in Wood's hands—he has shown very exceptional qualities of imagination and leadership—possibly leaving the strictly secretarial aspects more exclusively to Holdsworth, but giving Wood a freer hand than he has now.

9. Maxwell's extension has gone well; and its political significance has not passed unnoticed.

* * *

12. I was much interested in the comment in paragraph 2 of your letter of the 16th February, about the future relations of Burma and India. I do not know about Indian Imperialism such as you suggest! The difficulty there, as through the whole Indian field, is that of getting India to speak with one voice. But I am increasingly certain that our successors will have to face very strong feeling and the strongest political pressure from here over the status of Burma. I of course have nothing to do with Burma now, and I shall have nothing to do with it in the future. But, regarding it in these circumstances with detachment, I should have thought that Crown colony status was the best that Burma was entitled to, or to look for, for many years to come; and that this was the right moment at which to prick the bubble of Burma's vanity, and make it clear that this was the basis on which their country was going to be run for them once it had been reconquered. We shall, I am quite certain, get India insistently demanding, if not a reversal of the Separation, at any rate that India, to the extent to which she has helped as a base, with troops, and with supplies, in the reconquest of Burma, and to the extent also that Burma's position on her flank affects the problem of India's defence, and that the failure of Burma to hold her own in the recent campaign showed the dangers her weaknesses constitute to India, is entitled and even bound to protect her own interests. Nor, if seven years' experience here give one any right to judge, need we anticipate that India's spokesmen will be in the least troubled by any inconsistency in the arguments they advance in that connection and the demands they put forward on behalf of India! They have, to a large extent, the whip hand. There is no other obvious source of supply of labour; they have solid financial interest in Burma which cannot be ignored, and they are a very obvious source from which to find the necessary capital if the necessary guarantees are forthcoming (and I doubt Burma being able to persuade either European or Indian interests to put their money into the reconstruction of Burma without solid guarantees). On my present judgment India will drive with Burma the hardest bargain which she can, and without any consideration of Burman interests or Burman feelings. Here, as I suspect will be the case elsewhere in the post-war period, the big battalions are what are going to count more than anything else; and His Majesty's Government will have to consider and have to face the risk of a row over Burma with an India which, in the event of her attaining the status for which she has been clamouring, will be in a far stronger position to go her own way *vis-à-vis* of Burma than ever in the past.

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[16] Not printed.

16. I confess that I found Kirkpatrick's story which you give me in paragraph 6 of your letter of the 16th February almost wildly unconvincing. I cannot believe (unless things in Burma have changed a great deal) that there could have been any question of a refusal in a rest house of all places to serve a high Chinese official and a British official because they had not got dinner jackets! The whole thing sounds to me fantastic, and I am quite sure that there is no need to take any precautions against such an incident arising in this country. I rather forget where Kirkpatrick spent his business time; but my recollection is that it was Calcutta. How much he knows of the mofussil I am not too sure. But he may of course well think that standards in the matter of dress in rest houses have gone up a good deal since his time!

* * *

25. Twynam has sent me a copy of a statement[17] to the Press by Khare about Gandhi's fast, and I am sending you a copy by the bag. I agree with him that coming as it does from an ex-Congress Chief Minister and the leading medical practitioner of Nagpur the statement is an amusing one. I think also that it shows some courage, and you will see that Khare's main conclusion is that Gandhi's fast really ended on 21st February and not on the 3rd March.

26. I have now had from Lumley, Candy's secret report[18] on the medical aspects of Gandhi's fast. A copy of it goes to you by this bag, together with a copy[19] of certain medical data which are being sent to Bradfield, and of a note[20] by my Surgeon. It seems pretty clear in the light of all this that Gandhi, whether with or without his knowledge was fed, and it looks also as though Dr. Nair was the responsible party; though I agree with Candy that we shall probably not be able to ascertain what exactly happened.

All the best!

[17] L/P&J/8/600: ff 173–6. [18] No. 568. [19] L/P&J/8/600: ff 160–1. [20] *Ibid.*, f 162.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *18 March 1943, 3.5 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 18 March, 3 pm*

No. 728–S. Your personal telegram of 11th March No. 4612[1] and 15th March No. 4832.[2] India Debate. I am arranging for material you desire about food situation and will let you have it in good time.

2. As regards paragraph 3 of your telegram of 11th March No. 4612, you will have seen Provinces' situation reports to which we have little to add. Recent

situation in Chief Commissioners' Provinces has been peaceful except for sporadic bomb outrages in Delhi so far with only slight casualties. Subversive activities have by no means ceased but there has been some decrease during last month. Midnapore in Bengal and parts of Bombay particularly Belgaum remain centres of trouble. Elsewhere isolated incidents occur from time to time. Only serious recent cases of rail sabotage have been derailment of Assam Mail on January 27th, derailment of goods train on Grand Chord in Bihar on February 13th, killing 4 I.O.Rs. and derailment of goods train near Rangiya in Assam on March 9th, two firemen being killed and driver injured. There have also been some attacks on isolated railway stations, in U.P. and elsewhere, and wire cutting and arson continue though on decreased scale. Outstanding feature remains use of bombs which shows little sign of declining. 152 bomb cases have been reported since January 1st to date, of which 134 were from Bombay. Casualties reported were 9 killed including 3 B.O.Rs. and 26 injured including 8 B.O.Rs. and 4 boys.

3. Latest available figures for persons in Jail both convicts and Security Prisoners were sent with our telegram No. 1971[3] dated 12th March. These show no signs of falling at present but we may anticipate that expiration of sentences will soon begin to make itself felt. We recently considered addressing Provinces regarding means of reducing numbers of Congress Security Prisoners by releasing unimportant persons, either unconditionally or subject to suitable restrictions, or by prosecuting those who might be convicted. We deferred action owing to Gandhi's fast, but will now re-examine. Meanwhile we believe some Provinces, notably C.P., have started action on above lines. We cannot indicate scale on which this has taken place, but do not believe it to be extensive.

4. We are satisfied that our legal powers are now sufficient to cope with any emergency; special measures adopted since beginning of disturbances include amendment of Special Criminal Courts Ordinance to enable its application to internal disorders;[4] amendment of Collective Fines Ordinance to enable its application for purposes of public safety and order and to enable Provincial Governments to regulate procedure;[5] amendment of Penalties (Enhancement) Ordinance to provide death penalty for attempt to sabotage and for certain

[1] No. 576. [2] No. 587.

[3] This gave figures only up to 1 January and did not include Orissa. A further enquiry from Mr Amery elicited the following figures for persons in jail on 1 February: (*a*) 22,725 convicted under political sections of ordinary law or Defence of India Rules, (*b*) 8,130 detained under Defence Rule 26, and (*c*) 4,184 temporarily detained under Defence Rule 129. It was suggested that the latter figure need not be given. Lord Linlithgow to Mr Amery, telegram 805–S of 26 March 1943. L/P&J/8/630 and MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

[4] Special Criminal Courts (Second Amendment) Ordinance, XLII of 1942. *Gazette of India Extraordinary*, 19 August 1942.

[5] Collective Fines (Amendment) and (Third Amendment) Ordinances, XLIII and LXIII of 1942. *Ibid.*, 19 August and 5 December 1942.

offences under Explosive Substances Act,[6] and amendment of Defence of India Rules or introduction of new rules to penalize no-rent campaigns, cutting of telegraph lines or posts, *hartals*, boycott of public servants and to provide for supersession of local authorities who assist the movement. Apart from this we have exhorted Provinces to increase their armed police forces and have done our best to help them with arms and equipment and, as you know, we have put before them a scheme for military Home Defence Force to take over responsibility for dealing with major disturbances. This scheme has so far met with little encouragement from Provinces but many of them are expanding their police and considerable progress, on different lines in different Provinces, has been made with organization of village patrols to protect railway lines. Formation of local village defence parties is also proceeding in some Provinces to bring home principle of collective responsibility. Bihar is considering a separate Act for this purpose.

5. Your paragraph 4. One copy of the Government of India pamphlet was sent by fast air mail of 23rd February and five more copies by mail of 2nd March. I hope these have arrived by now.

6. I am considering and will shortly telegraph my suggestions on points raised in paragraph 2 of your telegram of 11th March.

[6] Penalties (Enhancement) Third Amendment Ordinance, XLVI of 1942 and Penalties (Enhancement) Amendment Ordinance, III of 1943. *Gazette of India Extraordinary*, 26 August 1942 and 16 January 1943.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMPORTANT
PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, *18 March 1943, 3.5 pm*
Received: 18 March, 3 pm

No. 729-S. I telegraph the two following points in case course of debate should make it possible to use them:—

(*a*) Orissa.—Lewis' report of 13th March remarks: "The Congress attitude is absurd. All Congress Members of the Legislative Assembly now under detention have sent in demands to attend the Session and to move no-confidence motions. These have of course been withheld. On the other hand all Congress Members of the Legislative Assembly not under detention who can attend decline to attend."

(*b*) Assam.—United Press of India reports that Saadulla, in the Assam Assembly on the 15th, in response to an appeal for the release of security

prisoners who are definitely anti-Fascist and particularly those among them who are members of the Provincial Assembly and also those who are in ill-health and have suffered recent bereavements, "reiterated his counter-offer that if the detained leaders were just prepared to say that they did not sympathise or would not help the present disturbances Government would release them forthwith. He regretted that excepting Mr. Sarvesar Baruah who was in ill-health and who, he added, was shortly going to be released, nobody else had responded in the manner suggested by him."

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *18 March 1943, 11 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 18 March, 11.20 pm*

No. 732–S. Your personal telegram of 15th March No. 4832.[1] The food situation in India generally is at present much improved. This improvement is due mainly to increase of public confidence owing to the improved war situation, the abolition of the wheat price control, the promise of wheat from abroad, expectations based on the creation of the Food Department and the prospects of an excellent *rabi* harvest. Since wheat prices were decontrolled the Government purchasing agents have bought about 140,000 tons of wheat in the Punjab and Punjab States. On release of control the price shot up to Rs. 12–8–0 per maund but has fallen steadily to its present level of about Rs. 9. Government purchases have been effected mainly at prices between these levels. Quantity purchased in India *plus* that received and for which shipping has been provided from Australia likely to reach India by the end of May does no more, however, than provide about six weeks normal civil supply in addition to maintaining Army to end of May and rebuilding depleted Army reserves: but the prospect of a new harvest coupled with the freer movement of grain and the rise in price has brought out hidden stocks in many places. The general public have now little difficulty in obtaining reasonable wheat requirements, but naturally prices are high, though it is estimated that they are about 25 per cent. lower than the old black market rate. The prospects of the approaching *rabi* harvest (wheat, gram and barley) are extremely good in most areas. As for the *kharif* crops (rice, maize and millets) which have recently been harvested, the millet crop seems better than was previously expected while the final rice forecast is appreciably worse. Our production statistics are far from reliable and we have and can gain positively no idea of carry-over stocks that might

[1] No. 587.

exist from past harvest years. Therefore the present estimates of production and requirement cannot afford a complete guide to the eventual out-turn in the markets resulting from the play of a strong demand upon the supply available in the country. There does, however, seem a certainty that we shall have to face and overcome a considerable rice shortage in certain areas which we can only hope to offset partially by millets, unless hidden stocks prove to be substantially larger than can at present be foreseen. It has also to be remembered that one result of the recent wheat shortage has been an increased consumption of rice and millets. The situation in Bengal at present is disquieting. Although these are the rice harvest months the price of rice in that Province is abnormally high and continues rising and at the same time supplies are restricted. We are arranging to send substantial imports into the Province from adjacent Provinces of Assam, Bihar and Orissa where prices are much lower in the hope that the present difficulties are due to speculative holding and that these imports will again free movement and lower prices. These arrangements are, however, still strictly confidential and we should prefer that no reference be made to them. We are most anxious that morale should be maintained in India and that pessimistic views should not be given any support since an access of public apprehension would intensify the tendency to hoard and seriously aggravate the situation. On the other hand we must beware of too facile an optimism especially in view of the existing position in Bengal and the possibilities of increased difficulties in other rice consuming areas in the second half of this year. The food situation in India may therefore be treated with guarded optimism, with special reference to the recent improvement of the situation in India generally and the excellent prospects of the *rabi* harvest.

2. As to the measures being taken, the Food Department has drawn up a detailed scheme for the purchase of the greatest possible volume of grain by Government Agencies in the various Provinces and States. This scheme has recently been thrashed out with representatives of Provincial and State Governments at a three days' conference at Delhi and the scheme is now being carried into effect with local variations. All Provinces and as many States as will fall into line will set out to obtain control of as much of the foodgrains produced in their territories as possible. The intention is that these purchases will be held at the disposal of the Central Government who will arrange for their utilisation in the interests of the country as a whole. The export of grain from a Province would normally be done with the concurrence of the producing administration, but if necessary such export may have to be made regardless of wishes of producing Government. We do not, however, desire to stress this point at present as one or two administrations are not yet prepared to agree to this degree of central control. In the meantime considerable purchases and allotments of grain have been and are being made by Provinces in consultation

with the Centre. The case of Bombay is a striking example. Until recently there were long queues outside the Bombay grain shops from early in the morning. These queues no longer exist. Since December some 100,000 tons of grain have been purchased on behalf of Bombay in the Punjab, Central Provinces, Sind and the United Provinces, most of which has already reached that city. The Food Department are now about to appoint six Regional Food Commissioners who will be officers of considerable standing intended to ensure liaison between the Food Department and the administrations of their regions each consisting of certain Provinces and Indian States, to assist and guide them in working the purchase scheme and to smooth out small points of difficulty. As for other measures all administrations have been advised to take steps preparatory to rationing their main urban centres as a precautionary measure. Bombay is ready to introduce a rationing scheme early in April. Most Provinces have ordered the reduction of the bran percentage which wheat mills may extract. Madras have prohibited the polishing of rice and other administrations have been urged to follow their example. The Department of Education, Health and Lands planned a food production drive and has drawn up for the various administrations a scheme of foodgrains targets at which to aim. Provision has been made in the Budget for grants from the Centre in aid of schemes likely to increase the production of food-stuffs, particularly foodgrains.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *18 March 1943, 10 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 18 March, 10.30 pm*

No. 733–S. Leaders' Conference. My Private Secretary has now had letter dated 11th March[1] signed by Sapru text of which is contained in my immediately following telegram under letter dated Bombay 15th March from Munshi which says [*There follows the text of No. 591*]. On my instructions Laithwaite is today sending Sapru the reply[2] text of which is contained in my immediately following telegram. I do not propose to make any public announcement until we see what Sapru says.

2. Resolution, as you will see, is entirely unsupported by argument, and *Dawn* today in a telling article, while taking the line that "the continuance of the stalemate cannot appeal to the Muslim League nor the case for freedom going by default on the part of the Congress" says "The key has always been

[1] Enclosure 1 to No. 591. [2] No. 601.

with Mr. Gandhi and when the No-Party leaders offer to underwrite the future, the Government of India is within its rights in refusing to do business with them. None of these leaders have any authority to speak on behalf of anyone but themselves, and their assurances of Mr. Gandhi's good conduct after an unconditional release do not carry weight. Mr. Gandhi has had opportunities recently to declare his position, but the leaders who are so eager to secure his release have not secured from him any right to commit him for the future. Neither Lord Linlithgow nor Mr. Amery can accept any declaration made by wandering busybodies unless accompanied by an unequivocal declaration from Mr. Gandhi himself that he is prepared to revise his policy." *Dawn* continues as follows:—"While the release of Mr. Gandhi cannot be envisaged without the fulfilment of its pre-requisites, it is open to the Government of India to afford him the opportunity of meeting his colleagues in jail, if that were the only obstacle in the way. The Congress has always attempted to arrogate to itself the right to speak on behalf of India, and Mr. Gandhi, four-anna member or not, has always arrogated to himself the right to speak on behalf of the Congress. That the Congress has deliberately gone out into the wilderness is due to its acceptance of the Gandhian dictatorship and it is foolish to believe that a recantation by him will not be endorsed by the Congress Working Committee. The policy of negation has landed them nowhere and statesmanship demands change. If Mr. Gandhi asks for the formality of consulting the Working Committee, it is a concession that could be met by the Government. The No-Party leaders intent on passing repeated resolutions, could justify their meddling only by converting Mr. Gandhi to the plain prospects of peace. The fundamental need is to make a political advance by going back on the Bombay resolution[3] of the Congress, and without any indications of such a move all talk about solving the deadlock is meaningless and wasteful. The position of the Government of India is clear. It is for Mr. Gandhi to make his position clear. What he would do if released and what he might do are still dangerously vague, and assurances from busybodies cannot be accepted in lieu of an unambiguous declaration from Mr. Gandhi himself."

[3] Vol. II, No. 470.

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Sir G. Laithwaite to Sir T. B. Sapru[1]

MSS. EUR. F. 125/125

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *18 March 1943*

Dear Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru,

Thank you for your letter of the 11th March[2] enclosing copy of the Resolution adopted at the meeting held at Bombay on the 9th and 10th March over which

you presided, which I have just received from Mr. Munshi, and which I at once laid before His Excellency.

2. His Excellency asks me to say that the Resolution seems perfectly clear, but that if the signatories desire to amplify or emphasise particular points, or to indicate the arguments on which they base their suggestion, and if you will be so good as to send me in advance a copy of what the deputation you suggest would propose to say, His Excellency will be happy to receive them, and make reply. Given the public importance of the subject, he feels sure that you will appreciate the need for publicity.

3. There need be no difficulty in fixing a date to meet the convenience of the other members of the deputation and yourself. Perhaps in the event of your deciding that you desire to lead the deputation you suggest you will be kind enough to let me have your suggestions on that point.[3]

Yours sincerely,

J. G. LAITHWAITE

[1] Lord Linlithgow transmitted the text of this letter to Mr Amery in telegram 734–S of 19 March. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

[2] Enclosure 1 to No. 591.

[3] Sir T. B. Sapru replied on 20 March that he had wired to Mr Munshi and Mr Rajagopalachari asking them to prepare a memorandum indicating what the deputation's arguments would be. He thought it would be some time before the memorandum was ready and suggested that Sir G. Laithwaite might then fix a date for the deputation. MSS. EUR. F. 125/125. Lord Linlithgow transmitted this information to Mr Amery in telegram 771–S of 23 March adding that it seemed unlikely that the deputation would be received before the Commons debate. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

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Sir R. Lumley (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/57

CONFIDENTIAL GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, *18–23 March 1943*

REPORT NO. 119

My dear Linlithgow,

This report covers the first half of March and will bring the story up till about the time of Colville's arrival.

1. *Reactions from the Fast.*—In the Aga Khan's Palace, Gandhi is reported to be going on well, considering his age. He can sit up, but is not yet able to stand. Mrs. Gandhi, however, has had two severe attacks of angina in the last two days, and it looks as if she is in a very precarious condition.

There has been very little tangible reaction to the fast, as far as I can see. It is probably true that, for a time, Gandhi has regained some of his hold on the affections of the public. Before the fast, so little had been heard of him that he was almost forgotten; but the fast, I would judge, has brought home to Hindus, and to some extent to other communities, the great place which he has in their lives—and that, I think, will remain for some time.

The publication of the Government of India's pamphlet[1] on Congress responsibility for the disturbances has produced remarkably little comment. Personally, I thought it a most telling production, but I do not think it has had any effect on Hindu public opinion here. They do not want to believe in Congress responsibility and, with their usual aptitude for refusing to look facts in the face, they do not believe what the pamphlet says.

One interesting development, which I have heard of from more than one source, is that in the past few weeks, and possibly in the last few months, there has been a considerable swing-over, on the part of the Hindu public, to Pakistan, more out of despair than anything else—but it is a fact which is worth mentioning.

[1] Cmd. 6430.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *19 March 1943, 7.50 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 19 March, 9.30 pm*

No. 743–S. Your personal telegram of 11th March No. 4612[1] paragraph 2. There may be some developments between now and 30th, and if so I will telegraph further before debate. But my present view on points raised by you is as follows:—

2. I see no justification for release of Gandhi and other Congress leaders (it will have to be a general jail delivery and we could not discriminate in favour of Gandhi or in favour of Gandhi and the Working Committee) in the absence of any abandonment by Gandhi (authorized spokesman of the Congress) or the Working Committee of the resolution of last August[2] which is the reason for which they are under detention with the accompanying incitements to "do or die" and description of the position as "open rebellion" and as one in which there is "no room for compromise". Difficulty of making any concessions to Congress while that remains the position is only too obvious and I should have thought could be forcibly brought out in debate. You will I am sure at the same time be at pains to leave responsibility with the Government of India while

indicating obvious difficulties with which that Government is faced in the circumstances referred to above. Congress record during the war (cf. my telegram No. 700–S[3] of 15th March) is moreover such as to make it imperative to obtain guarantees for the future, and even therefore if Gandhi and the Congress should wish to call off the rebellion release would not follow as a matter of course, and we should have to satisfy ourselves that guarantees acceptable to us were forthcoming.

3. Paragraph 2 of my letter of 25th January[4] to Gandhi is relevant in that connection since I indicated in it that if he was anxious to dissociate himself from the resolution of 9th August and the policy that resolution represents, and if he could give me appropriate assurances as regards future I should be very ready to consider the matter further (as mentioned in paragraph 2 of my present telegram it would of course be for us to say what assurances are necessary). He made it perfectly clear that that was not his intention, and nothing has transpired since then to suggest that he has in the slightest degree changed his mind. Position of course in my judgment in those circumstances is clear. It may be worth pointing out that he and the Working Committee were jailed not for what happened after their arrest but for their action in launching mass civil disobedience. They claim incidentally that they can in no manner be held responsible for what happened after their arrest. We do not of course accept that contention. Our view is that while they were detained to prevent them from leading the rebellion which they had declared,[5] they had prepared it to a large extent beforehand, and on the terms of the resolution itself were responsible for all that occurred.

4. As for suggestion that visitors to Gandhi to seek basis of agreement should be allowed, I may have opportunity of dealing with that if leaders' delegation materialises and I receive it before debate. I would comment at this stage that although Rajagopalachari, Devadas Gandhi, Munshi, and numerous others had opportunity of discussion with him during his fast and though one of those interviews with Rajagopalachari is reported to have lasted for 45 minutes, none of them appear to be in a position to produce anything firm or positive as a result. All that the leaders' resolution[6] can suggest is that there is good hope in their opinion that if Gandhi is released, &c., there may be some hope of an improvement. That is not a firm basis for business. Nor, incidentally, does the resolution give any indication of the proposals which they wish to place before Gandhi and which they wish him to accept. Their suggestion is in effect that it should be for Gandhi to lay down his own terms. If they represent any volume of responsible opinion it is surely possible for them to state their convictions openly and so establish their own good faith. (Here again I would urge that

[1] No. 576. [2] Vol. II, No. 470. [3] No. 586. [4] No. 358.
[5] 'they had declared' omitted in decipher. [6] No. 584.

responsibility be left with the Government of India, but the attention of the House be drawn to obvious difficulties confronting that Government on the facts as stated.)

5. I trust also that pains will be taken to bring out wholly unsubstantial and unrepresentative character of the Leaders' Conference. It consists as usual of leaders without followers and leaders who, while individually important and respectable, do not stand for anything that really matters in the political life of this country. From the communal point of view, which is unhappily so vitally important in Indian politics, the gathering is quite unrepresentative. The only Muslim signatories are Allah Bakhsh, Mohammad Kazmi, M.L.A., one Rawjee, none of them important, and Ghuznavi (again not important politically). The Muslim League stand entirely aside, and comment in Muslim League Press has not only been highly critical but inclined to ridicule pretensions of leaders. Scheduled Castes are not represented: nor is there any representative of the Princes. So far as the Hindu community are concerned, the Hindu Mahasabha, an organization of substantial and growing importance, has stood aside (though S. P. Mookerjee and N. C. Chatterji are signatories) and Savarkar, its Working President, has in terms stated[7] that while he attended the conference at the persuasion of friends, he did so in an entirely personal capacity and dissociates himself from its conclusions. In other words the representation of parties, &c. at the conference affords no basis for doing business and carries things no further forward. The conference and its members have no responsibility for the consequences of the action that they recommend and can afford to be generous with suggestions at our expense.

6. It would not surprise me were you[8] also to be pressed, now that the Government of India pamphlet[9] is being circulated, for a judicial enquiry of some sort into the allegations that have been made against the Congress: while point might also be taken, I imagine, that high authority should be allowed to investigate in secret the supplementary material which we state that we hold or hope to put together. The point is a difficult one: but I trust sincerely that it will be possible to resist any suggestion of an enquiry. Certain of the material is obviously of a highly secret character such as we should be most reluctant to disclose. Even were we to disclose it and all other material to a suitable individual or tribunal, findings of that tribunal, so far as they were adverse to the nationalist cause, would carry no conviction to any nationalist supporter. Suggestion would be made that evidence had been cooked or not properly presented, and that without investigation of it by nationalist representatives case could not properly be put before tribunal. So far as they might be adverse to us, utmost possible play would be made with them. Effect on morale of services and of moderate supporters would be unfortunate in the highest degree and there would be apprehensions of a repetition of the Hunter Commission[10]

position. Point can also I think usefully be made that much of the material embodied in the pamphlet is based on investigations in Magistrates' Courts and in the provincial High Courts.[11] Thus the Ashti and Chimur cases[12] were not only tried in Courts of first instance, &c., but have been carefully reviewed and formed the subject of damaging comment so far as Congress is concerned by the reviewing High Court Judge appointed under the Special Criminal Courts[13] Ordinance. On this point however if there is further material or advice which you would like, I hope you will let me know as soon as possible.

7. Truth is that if we attempt any worthwhile settlement at the Centre we shall inevitably find ourselves up against major issues between communities such as all are agreed we cannot tackle till after the war. In this connection much play is made with the suggestion that so-called National Government at the Centre should be formed as an *ad interim* settlement. This specious proposal is worth debunking yet again. Essential of "National Government" is that it should contain in due proportion ingredients from all important political elements and thus stop party and communal warfare for the duration. But this is exactly that [what] we cannot hope to attain unless Congress and Muslim League will both come in of which there is at present no sign.

8. Are there any points on which you would like material?

[7] See No. 583, para. 1. [8] 'were you' was received corrupt. [9] Cmd. 6430.
[10] See No. 353, note 6. [11] 'High Courts' was received corrupt.
[12] On 16 August 1942 two magistrates, a police officer and a constable were murdered at Chimur and their bodies burnt. The police station and other Government buildings were also burnt. The murdered persons had been offered their lives if they would resign Government service and join the Congress (see also No. 305, note 2). The following day a similar incident occurred at Ashti when the police station was burnt down and a police officer and four constables were murdered. Both Chimur and Ashti are in the Central Provinces.
[13] 'Criminal Courts' deciphered as 'Provincial Government'.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMPORTANT *19 March 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 747–S. Your private and personal telegram of March 16th No. 281.[1] Council vacancies. I am grateful for your useful comments. I have since been thinking over the question further and have taken certain soundings here. In the result I contemplate the somewhat different arrangements discussed in paragraph 5 below.

[1] No. 594.

2. As regards communal balance I am satisfied with the change I recommend. It leaves Hindu and Muslim *voting* power the same as at present though each community gets one more seat. I had always had in mind the possibility (and indeed desirability) of giving the Muslims one more seat by appointing a Muslim in C.P.'s vacancy. It is only reasonable as regards the non-voting seat (i.e. the War Cabinet one) that a Muslim should be selected this time as a Hindu held it last. I note with satisfaction your readiness to accept Sultan Ahmed. I will sound him in the near future and hope that he may accept as most of our scheme turns on his doing so.

3. As regards the Begum, it would be quite unreasonable for Hindu community to demand a Hindu woman's seat. If and when Begum vacates, it would on the other hand be quite reasonable for my successor to consider putting in a Hindu, but that must turn on the circumstances of the time. I would only add that it would not be too easy to find a Hindu woman of prominence since most of those actively interested in politics are in the Congress camp. I had carefully weighed the pros and cons in the Begum's case before selecting her. But on the whole, taking the undoubted political value at home as well as here of putting in a woman, and given her good record in America, I think that she would do, and I would therefore prefer to hold to her. As regards Runganadhan while I quite accept your estimate of his possible value as Information Member, I cannot take him in from minor minorities without complication over my communal balance which I do not want to face. I have nothing against him on merits as to which I know nothing except what you have told me of his good work in London and in the United States.

4. I have, on the other hand, been rather attracted by the suggestion in your private letter of February 16th,[2] that we might make him High Commissioner in succession to Azizul Haque. Bijoy Prasad Singh Roy has just become Speaker of the Bengal Legislative Council. I have no doubt he would prefer to be High Commissioner. But there may well be something to be said for taking an Indian Christian for this post, more particularly as the minor minorities lose, at any rate for the present, a seat on my Council consequent on the disappearance of Mody on the communal set-up which I [am] now proposing. I note that the succession in the High Commissionership has been Meyer, Dalal (Parsi), Chatterjee and Mitra (both Hindus), Firoz and Azizul Haque (both Muslims). It is arguable therefore that there is a case for putting in a minor minority man again. I would like however to take some soundings here. If you could tactfully sound Mudaliar without indicating that I contemplate taking on Azizul Haque here or inviting Mudaliar himself to come back, I shall be interested in his reaction. At the moment I hold the Commerce portfolio myself and the appointment is therefore mine so far as this end is concerned: but naturally I should be reluctant to give rise to reasonable[3] criticism.

5. I now revert to the main set-up of the Council. I would not be prepared to consider Chetty. He did not do specially well in America and ran out very quickly. I would therefore hold to Khare and would send him to Indians Overseas. Asoke Roy still seems to be suitable Law Member when Sultan Ahmed goes. I have thought further about Commerce and Supply. My mind now leans to putting Azizul Haque into Commerce (where I think a new broom would do good); and (subject to my persuading Firoz to remain in Defence) Mudaliar into Supply. I recognise force of what you say on those points. I have little doubt that Azizul Haque would be an active and useful Commerce Member.

6. But it will be several days yet before we can reach final decisions. I am making a variety of Secretariat[4] adjustments, some of them of importance. Apart from that I have at first got to secure Sultan Ahmed's consent to going to London. Until I do so I cannot move about Asoke Roy. I propose however to take soundings now of Twynam as regards Khare. I shall not move about the Begum until I am clear as to the rest. I will discuss with Azizul Haque once he arrives here, which ought to be any day now. For the debate position is eased by postponement till 30th, and we may be able to announce by then. If we are not I think all that you can say therefore is that arrangements for filling the vacancies are being pushed forward with all urgency and that an early announcement may be expected. I do not think we ought to go beyond that. I am still most anxious that Mudaliar should not be told in terms that he is coming back here. It is essential that I should have an entirely free hand until I have got the set-up a little further forward than at present.

7. Let me only add as regards Supply that after consulting Jenkins I now propose to put in A. A. Waugh from the United Provinces as Supply Secretary when he goes home. I have a very high opinion of Waugh whose quality is extremely good, and if I can get him out of Hallett whom I have approached, I think he is the strongest candidate. I hope to find other suitable employment for Hydari.

[2] No. 477. [3] Deciphered as 'unavoidable'. [4] Deciphered as 'separate.'

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/E/8/2527: ff 179–81

INDIA OFFICE, *19 March 1943*

Prime Minister

1. By Cabinet Conclusions W.M. 119 (42) 9[1] I was invited to "draw the Governor-General's attention to the general feeling of the War Cabinet that the Government of India might with advantage give early consideration to the development of a more progressive social and industrial policy". A few days later I received a copy of a Note[2] on Indian Policy which Cripps sent to you on 2nd September and which you subsequently directed in your Minute of 20th September 1942[3] should be considered by Cripps, Bevin, myself and Kingsley Wood. The gist of Cripps' proposal was that we should seek to secure the support of the mass of Indian opinion by a positive programme of social improvement supported by a propaganda campaign designed to show that this improvement was due to a British initiative "which is working for the Indian workers and peasants against their oppressors". He hoped that this would produce a new alignment of political forces on class rather than on communal lines.

2. The Ministers concerned met in accordance with your directions on 29th September[4] and by common agreement some of my Advisers and Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar were present. At this meeting it became clear that to launch and maintain a social and economic policy which might achieve the political ends projected in Cripps' note of 2nd September would require a very large sum of money. Social policy in India has been in the hands of Indians for 25 years and a policy on the scale envisaged could only be initiated and directed from here if it were to a large extent financed by us. The sort of sum required to produce any substantial political effects would be of the order of £400 or £500 millions, spread over 10 years, and the effect of such payments would be to aggravate the already serious problem of the Indian sterling balances. Even if this could be contemplated some of my Advisers, Mudaliar in particular, thought that, politically, we should gain little or nothing as we should be attacked by all parties for attempting to bribe the population away from its political leaders. Emphasis was also laid on the fact that existing policies in this sphere were already much more progressive than is generally appreciated.

3. The meeting agreed that I should prepare a note showing the progress made in these matters in recent years. This was provided three weeks later.[5] Simultaneously I suggested that we were not qualified here to draw up specific

proposals and should put to the Viceroy the general proposition recorded in W.M. 119 (42) 9. Cripps, however, felt that we should draw up more specific proposals and eventually he and Bevin produced a note (Appendix 1)[6] setting out the lines upon which they feel that the Government of India should be urged by us through the Viceroy to proceed.

4. My views are contained in the note of which I attach a copy (Appendix II),[7] with which Kingsley Wood agrees, except that he is not willing to commit himself until after the war to expenditure even on the project I suggested for a cultural centre in this country, which would have been quite a small matter financially.

5. Shortly, my view is that before considering what instructions should be issued to the new Viceroy we should obtain through the present Viceroy the considered opinion of the Indian authorities on the proposals now put forward. Effective authority in matters of this kind has for so many years rested in India (and, indeed, it has since 1919 been for the most part within the ministerial sphere of the Provincial Governments and still more so since 1935) that a full appreciation of the possibilities is really not obtainable except from India. Further, to avoid overlapping, the proposals of Bevin and Cripps need to be correlated with the reconstruction discussions already taking place in India (a Committee of the Viceroy's Council has just recently been appointed to consider such matters). And finally, we should, I think, be in a position to form some idea of the extent to which the Indian Administration, already strained to the utmost by the requirements of the war effort, would be able to undertake extensive tasks in the field of social and economic reconstruction. To my mind, therefore, the most practical course before further consideration is given to the subject here, is to ask the Viceroy to supply us by, say, June next with his comments, and I have in fact recently sent him copies of the notes for that purpose. But Bevin does not agree, and I understand that he and Cripps wish their Memorandum (Appendix I) to be discussed with you at this stage. It is therefore at Bevin's request that I am putting the matter before you now without waiting for the Viceroy's comments.

6. I cannot myself see any advantage in troubling you with a meeting until we have not only the present Viceroy's views, but a prospective Viceroy with whom the matter can be discussed and who can then receive definite instructions before he leaves for India.

L. S. AMERY

[1] Vol. II, No. 664. [2] Vol. II, No. 678. [3] Vol. II, No. 775. [4] No. 46.
[5] See No. 114, note 1. [6] Enclosure to No. 276; see also No. 544.
[7] Enclosure to No. 356.

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Sir M. Gwyer to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)[1]

MSS. EUR. F. 125/125

CHIEF JUSTICE'S LODGINGS, NEW DELHI, *19 March 1943*

I agree entirely with the view of the British Council itself that a "British Institute" on the lines of those in other countries would be as inappropriate in India as the Council recognise it to be in the Dominions. I must, however, regretfully say that in my opinion the establishment of an Indian Institute would at the present time be quite impracticable. If such an organisation were set up by the Government of India, or through their instrumentality, it would of course be damned from the outset. In happier times possibly this might have been done, and possibly one day it might still be done; but the bitterness and suspicion today is so intense that it would not have a chance. It is sad that this should be so; but I think no one can deny that every act of the British Government, and even every act which can be imputed to them, however falsely, is regarded as inspired by malevolence and cunning and as part of a hedgehog system of fortification which Great Britain is supposed to be building round herself so as to avoid having to transfer the tiniest fragment of political power. Friends of my own, whom I have always supposed to be not only friendly to the British connection but rational human beings, are almost without exception infected with the same virus; and it seems to be quite hopeless even to attempt to persuade them that there is another side to the question. Whatever may be the cause of it, it is an inescapable fact; and therefore it must regrettably be admitted that the goodwill is wholly lacking which might have been an inducement to Indians once friendly to us to take the initiative themselves in the setting up of an institute such as your papers envisage.

* * *

The ordinary Indian comes in contact with the Englishman either as an official or as head of a business concern. There are English judges, but their influence, though often a most wholesome one, scarcely extends beyond Bench and Bar. He literally does not know what sort of person the average Englishman is, and still less an Englishman above the average. His ideas on the subject are quite incredible, as anyone will testify who has moved at all outside official circles; and all this time the new generation of Indian students is being allowed to grow up in an atmosphere of suspicion and hatred, which is having most disastrous results at this moment, and may easily lead to a real catastrophe a little later on. I do not think that there can be many countries in which personal contacts count for so much as in India; and I am quite sure that Englishmen of the finest quality who were willing to come out as professors or teachers would exercise an influence out

of all proportion to their numbers. If I might take an example again from my own University, the best College in Delhi is the Mission College of St. Stephen's, which has always had a strong European element on its Staff, principally from Cambridge. That element is not so strong at the present moment, mainly owing to the War, but there is no College in Delhi with standards like those of St. Stephen's and the contrast with the other Colleges is remarkable.

The above is a rough outline of some of the ideas which have occurred to me, and I hope it may be of some use to you. One cause of the present difficulty is that so many Englishmen in India have ceased to believe in themselves or indeed in anything else. I remember Lord Hailey saying to me once that the type of Englishman who was very well known in India [a] hundred year[s] ago, with a Bible in one hand and a revolver in the other, might have had disagreeable traits, but did at least possess faith and convictions and was respected accordingly. India has few chances of seeing men of a similar stamp nowadays; and if the British Council can produce them and bring them into contact with young India, it will have done a great work. I should like to add this, that in a self-governing India the lot of Englishmen is not likely to be a very pleasant one, generally speaking, but I think that I would make an exception of English teachers in Universities, if the right type of man is selected. They would of course have to identify themselves with their colleagues and not with Englishmen outside; but for that very reason I think that their position would be stronger and their influence greater. They will, in other words, have to be people with something like a vocation.

[1] The Chairman of the British Council had written to Mr Amery about the extension of British Council activities through association with an Indian Council or Institute. Mr Amery had informed Lord Linlithgow of this idea in a letter of 5 January 1943 and the latter had consulted Sir M. Gwyer. L/I/1/70.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/11/5b: f 94

IMPORTANT
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, *23 March 1943, 10.5 pm*
Received: 24 March

305. Your private and personal telegram 747–S[1] dated 19th March. Council vacancies.

2. I have sounded Mudaliar about Runganadhan. He warmly endorses idea of his appointment as High Commissioner and points out that he is specially qualified to carry on Azizul Huque's work in connexion with students.

[1] No. 604.

3. I agree with your revised proposals for distribution of portfolios and though I still feel some doubts about the Begum I am ready to accept your view.

4. When would you contemplate that Sultan Ahmed should come here? I should also like to know whether you intend to send another Prince with him. I think you have Bhopal in mind.

608

Mr Churchill to Mr Amery

L/E/8/2527: f 168

10 DOWNING STREET, WHITEHALL, *23 March 1943*

Reference: Mr. Amery's minute of 19.3.43[1] (social and industrial policy for India)

S. of S. for India.
Cabinet should discuss. Circulate your views meanwhile.

W. S. C.

[1] No. 605.

609

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *23 March 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

Many thanks for your letters of 26th February[1] and 2nd March,[2] the first of which actually arrived two or three days later than the second. Many thanks, too, for the kind words you have used about the termination of the fast in your letter of the 2nd March. I am glad that that stage of our troubles is over though as I think I have said already, we should be unwisely optimistic were we to think that we were by any means out of the wood yet. But we are round a very difficult corner, and I think one can say with credit, and that is of value for the future. I imagine that the Mahatma will lie back for a little while he recovers his strength. But we are bound to hear more of him before too long. Meanwhile as I write I await Sapru's reply to the letter[3] I caused to be sent to him about his suggested deputation of the Bombay leaders. I shall be interested to see what line he takes (I send you by this bag incidentally an article[4] by the Muhammadan

correspondent of the *Statesman* which contains some pretty hard hitting at the leaders). I shall be much interested, too, to see the course of the debate on the 30th March—I hope you will not too have much trouble, though I realise that the very tiny minority of critics can be quite disproportionately important on occasions such as these. I have sent you a good deal of material and only wait to hear from you as to whether it is sufficient, and of the type that you want.

2. Colville has arrived safely and to my very great regret I lose Lumley on Wednesday. I comment below on the report I have just had from Lumley on certain of his concluding conversations in Bombay. I am sure that Colville will pull his weight admirably: but Lumley's experience and balance will be a very great loss.

3. I send by this bag copy of an interesting private and personal letter of the 15th March[5] from Lumley commenting on his farewell talks with Jayakar, Dr. McKenzie and Munshi. I shall greatly miss these appreciations of Lumley's. He has been quite extraordinarily good and balanced, and it is obvious that a great deal of care must go to the preparation of these reports. You will I am sure be interested in his comments. As for the bitterness alleged to exist in this country, my own view, and my own experience, entirely accord with Lumley's. I have seen or heard singularly little evidence of its reality, or even of its existence; and my own judgment would be that while amongst the intelligentsia there *is* a good deal of jealousy and resentment of the place we occupy in India (fanned by the strong inferiority complex which is so noticeable out here), it does not exist, or exist in any marked degree, throughout the country as a whole. You may say that Lumley and I inevitably lead rather protected lives, and that our contacts may be so limited as to make us bad judges. I quite accept that there may be something in that. On the other hand we tour extensively, there is an unending stream of visitors of every type, and there are other means of testing feeling, and it is in the light of very careful testing that I have formed the conclusion that I have. I have little doubt that the anxiety of Congress is to build up the story that we are intensely unpopular, and that the country is seething with bitterness, as part of their campaign for getting us out; and I am sure that we should make a great mistake were we to allow them to make our flesh creep. On the other hand Gwyer, in a letter[6] which I shall be sending you in which he gives his comments on the suggestions of the British Council for a possible approach to India, takes a gloomy view of the position and the future. I doubt the justification for it, and remain unshaken in my opinion as set out above: and I think the answer lies in the close contacts which Gwyer has with Hindu Nationalist opinion, and in the sympathies of Hindu academic

[1] No. 548. [2] No. 556. [3] No. 601.
[4] In column headed 'Dar-el-Islam'; *Statesman*, 22 March. [5] No. 593. [6] No. 606.

bodies such as the Delhi University with which he is so closely associated, and for which he has done so much, with the Congress and Nationalist point of view. On other points mentioned by Lumley as arising out of his talks, the idea of a time-limit within which the Leaders must compose their own difference and produce their own constitution is of course familiar to you and to me, and I can quite understand the exasperated European business man in Bombay favouring it and feeling that we have had about enough of India! But the objections to it are real, and, however exasperating the Indian politician may be, the responsibility for steering the ship continues at this stage to rest with us, and while it does, we must be patient. In no circumstances can we give India over to chaos without grave hurt to the world; and the dangers of having our bluff called if we fixed a time-limit are more present to you and me than they may be to worried commercial magnates. As for Munshi's observations, it will be interesting to see if experience substantiates his suggestion that the different factions are breaking up, and that what little was left of the movement will peter out, except for a few terrorists, in a few weeks. He may be right, but there seems still to be enough sporadic trouble to make one rather doubtful. Munshi has been increasingly active of late, and I have no doubt that he is anxious to make his peace with Congress by advocating a policy that he imagines will commend itself to that organisation. I agree myself with Lumley's estimate that he is so extremely volatile and now commands so insignificant a following that it does not too much matter what his ideas are at the moment!

4. I cannot imagine what led Cripps to think that Maxwell was failing in mind as well as in body! Nothing further from the truth can well be imagined. The trouble is that his mind remains much too active for his body! I would of course never have dreamt of suggesting his name were I not satisfied after reference to Maxwell himself that his doctor saw no reason to worry about his staying on for a further period: and if he can keep his health, as I hope will be the case, he will be of the greatest possible value to my successor.

5. I do not trouble you with comment in this letter on the interesting suggestions in your letter of 26th February about the filling of the vacancies in my Council; but I have telegraphed[7] to you at length about all that, and await your reply. As you will see I contemplate using Azizul Haque, and my mind is open about your own suggestion, the attractiveness of which I recognise, of using Runganadhan as High Commissioner. Krishnamachari I am very fond of, but he is beginning to show his age and I do not think I could wisely give him a heavy portfolio or expect very much from him beyond general goodwill. Mudaliar, as you know, I hope to use again.

6. I was much interested in what you say in paragraphs 5 to 7 of your letter about your final talks with Zafrulla. The only complication I see about all this

is that he has already been shot at out here for combining the Bench and politics, and I very much doubt (though of course I must think it over further) to what extent it will be desirable that he should, if he is going to remain a Judge of the Federal Court, take up activities such as you describe, more particularly with official assistance. I feel myself that the difficulties are likely to be overwhelming.

7. Now that Colville has arrived I imagine that I may see Azizul Haque almost any day, and look forward very much to doing so. I quite agree with what you say about him in paragraph 3 of your letter of the 2nd March.

8. Many thanks for your interesting note of your talk with McGowan. If there was a little more disposition to co-operate on the part of "big business" here I should be more hopeful. But I fear their general anxiety is to get rid of all outside interests and run things themselves, and that does make progress rather difficult.

9. I am delighted that you are taking the line you mention in paragraph 5 about this programme of social regeneration. I wish Cripps and his young man would devote themselves to something a little more practical. But I will of course consider any proposals that are sent out whether (as I hope) they come direct through you or at long-range through Winston. There is a very definite limit to what can wisely, or at all, be done in this direction.

[Para. 10, on reports on evacuation from Burma; and para. 11, containing personal comments, omitted.]

12. My warmest congratulations on your success in keeping the House of Commons on the right lines through all this difficult period which we have been experiencing. I do hope you will be rewarded in the forthcoming debate.

Best luck.

[7] No. 604.

610

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

PRIVATE AND SECRET INDIA OFFICE, *23 March 1943*

There is very little news this week, at any rate of immediate interest to India, though I hope that the battle of Tunisia will have a big indirect effect. In this connection it is curious to think how little we, in considering the Cripps Mission, or at subsequent stages of the Indian trouble last year, ever thought of the matter in connection with our defeat in Burma.

I am not able to agree that this was so in my case.

L.

Your case against Congress brings that out very well, though even there the effect would have been greatly enhanced by actually giving corresponding dates of events in Burma with Congress action in India.

2. I am afraid it is rather typical that Winston, in his otherwise admirable broadcast the other night, never once even hinted at such a thing as a post-war Empire policy. The Commonwealth was once mentioned in passing and so were the Colonies, but India was not even mentioned. Possibly that was as well, for I always tremble at what he may say and am rather alarmed at this moment by a message which he has sent to James Stuart to say that he would like to wind up the debate on India next week. However, I hope that on grounds of consideration for his health, &c., we may be able to dissuade him.

* * *

6. In paragraph 7[1] of your letter of the 15th December you mentioned your view that the wise course is to have more European Dewans in States. At first sight this seemed somewhat paradoxical, since presumably our object is to see as many States as possible standing on their own feet, and I have had the back files looked up. I find that there has been a good deal of discussion in the past on this question both with your predecessor and with yourself, and that the view here has always been that employment by States of retired Political Department officers of high standing was an undesirable anomaly. Similar objection has not, however, been seen to advising Rulers who need a good Dewan to employ serving officers on deputation, except where their relatively higher pay *plus* the obligatory leave and pension contribution would make their imposition unduly burdensome. I take it from your letter that this is the type of Dewan you would like to see appointed in suitable cases if it could be obtained. But, as you say, there seems little immediate hope of moving on these lines in view of the present shortage. This being so, it seems worth while to consider what may be the best alternative sources available. For instance, may it not be possible although it may mean going outside the Political Service cadre, to find more men of the stamp of Menon, who seems to have done well in Bharatpur? I cannot help feeling myself that there is a great deal to be said for a really competent Indian Dewan, especially if he enjoys the independence involved in having a permanent post on which he can fall back—or has independent means, as Chhatari has. And I am impressed by Zetland's remarks, in paragraph 10 of a demi-official letter to you of the 3rd May 1939,[2] about future policy in the States, on the desirability of Rulers employing local talent. It must surely be easier, on the whole, for the right type of Indian to cope firmly with Congress activities in a State, and undesirable, if it can be avoided, for a Euro-

It is the shortage that worries us. If there were plenty of Menons there would be no problem.

L.

pean Dewan, especially an officer of the Political Department, to be brought into direct conflict with them. Apart from this, I should have thought it had now become our policy to make the States stand on their own legs, and that the days of direct tutelage are numbered. I do not suggest that we should institute any sort of rule which prevented the appointment of a European Dewan—the employment of Field in Jodhpur and Crofton in Bahawalpur has certainly proved beneficial—but in present-day conditions I would take a more conservative view than you do in regard to their employment. However, the question is academic at the present time, and I need not press the argument. As a practical proposition, I would suggest, as I have said, that efforts might be made to draw on Indian members of the I.C.S. for these jobs where they occur in any but the smaller States; and I would further suggest that we should always be satisfied, before advising a Ruler to look abroad, that no subject of the State itself is qualified and available. It may be true that in many of the smaller States the quality of those available is not very high, but I notice that Zetland, in his letter I have quoted, touched on the possibility of your offering from time to time administrative training in British India to selected State candidates.

* * *

9. Holburn's messages on the aftermath of Gandhi's fast have been excellent. More particularly, his message in the *Times* of the 13th, describing the rear-guard action of Gandhi's friends and their attempt to extract some little profit out of the miscarriage of his plan, was most effective. You might tell him so from me when you get a chance.

* * *

11. You have quite enough to occupy your mind with Indian problems to be bothered with all the unreal mechanical schemes for world reconstruction which appear in speeches and articles here and in America, not to speak of the no less unreal internationalist projects which are hatched by departmental committees here, mostly based on some plan which would be good for the world (though not necessarily for us) if the world could ever be persuaded of the fact, and relying for their execution upon international committees with no real powers either of finance or of execution or of legislation. I enclose a copy of an address[3] I gave in Birmingham the other day in which, in as polite language as I could, I brushed aside these mechanical schemes and suggested that the only line of world reconstruction was to begin with our own country at home and then the Empire, eventually using both the influence and the example of the Empire to help steady the world situation. It might amuse you to read it.

[1] Omitted from No. 277. [2] L/P&S/13/888: ff 125–9. [3] Not printed.

611

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *25 March 1943*

PERSONAL

No. 794–S. Your personal telegram No. 305[1] dated March 23rd. Council vacancies. I am most grateful for your comments and glad that we are in agreement. I have again weighed arguments for and against Begum but in the result think that the experiment is worth making.

2. My proposals are therefore as follows:—

Sultan Ahmed to succeed Mudaliar.
Mudaliar to be Supply Member.
Asoke Roy of Bengal to be Law Member.
Azizul Haque to be Commerce Member and to have in his portfolio to cover—

(*a*) department of Food;
(*b*) a new department of Industries and Civil Supplies, to be carved out of present Commerce Department; and
(*c*) department of Commerce, being balance of present Commerce Department.

Begum Shah Nawaz—Information.
Khare—Indians Overseas.

3. Azizul Haque has now arrived here and I will tell him that I propose to ask him to serve in my Council but cannot yet let him know in what portfolio. I will sound him also about Runganadhan for High Commissionership. I am glad to see from your telegram that Mudaliar thinks Runganadhan would be a good choice, and subject to anything that Azizul Haque may say I would be perfectly prepared to put his name forward for succession to Azizul.

4. I am consulting Herbert privately about Roy, and have informed Twynam confidentially of how matters stand about Khare. I do not propose to make forward [formal?] offers to anybody until I have obtained Sultan Ahmed's concurrence in respect of his appointment to be a representative on the War Cabinet, and will telegraph again without delay once I have done so. But you may take it that my formal recommendations to you are as stated above and I would be grateful for your formal approval of them. If some or any of those named are unwilling to serve we shall have to think again. Please do not say anything to Mudaliar at this stage or until I telegraph further.

[Paras. 5, 6, and 7, on secretariat arrangements, concluding 'I do not ignore that burden falling on Commerce Member will be very great, but we shall have to see how things go,' omitted.]

[1] No. 607.

612

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *25 March 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 795–S. Leaders conference. My telegram No. 771–S[1] of 23rd March. I have caused reply[2] to be sent to Sapru to the effect that my Private Secretary will wait to hear from him further, and making it clear that I shall expect an advance copy of the statement to be made by any delegation, so that I can make a written reply to it and publish both. Indications are that the leaders are far from easy. Correspondence seen in censorship shows that so long ago as 15th March Sapru was making it clear that, in his own words, he was "adamant" about not leading any deputation himself, and he has now taken to his bed with an illness which may be diplomatic. Correspondence in question shows that while highly critical of governmental attitude he is alive to the weaknesses in the Congress case and not optimistic about the outcome of any delegation.

2. Latest statements in press are to effect that possible leaders of any delegation are likely to ask permission to see Gandhi before they lead it. No such move has been made to me. But suggestion if it is true will reduce matters to a farce, for expressed desire of leaders conference was that delegation should wait upon me to urge case for contact with Gandhi and his enlargement. My general feeling is that the whole business need not be taken too seriously. But I propose to hit them hard if and when deputation does in fact materialise.

[1] See No. 601, note 3. [2] MSS. EUR. F. 125/125.

613

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/11/5b: ff 90–1

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *25 March 1943, 2.45 am*

310. My private and personal telegram 305[1] of 23rd March. As regards States representative at War Cabinet I am not sure what position is about Jam Sahib.

[1] No. 607.

If he wants to return we shall be pleased to have him, but he had, I think, become a little weary of his position here and I would not be disposed to press him. You will however no doubt wish to get a clear expression of his wishes unless already known to you.

2. Alternatively we shall be glad to have Bhopal if you regard him as the best choice. It may however not be easy to keep him suitably occupied during summer months when troops here are much engaged in manœuvres, etc. and it would I think be easier to keep him contented and to arrange suitable programmes of visits if he arrived in September or October. A visit to the U.S.A. might possibly follow early in 1944 if the omens are then propitious which would create a diversion if he were finding his very limited functions here tedious. The same as regards time would apply to Jam Sahib if he should wish to come.

614

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir A. Clow (Assam)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/36

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *25 March 1943*

My dear Clow,

I was much interested in your letter No. 60[1] of October 7th in which, replying to my invitation to amplify your views on the weakness of the Indian Services at times of political strain, you develop two suggestions—(1) that our propaganda should disseminate the idea that the power of Congress is on the wane, and (2) that safeguards should now be promised to the Services, especially an extension of the right to retire on proportionate pension when further changes are introduced. I sent a copy of it at the time to Amery, and I have had the advantage of the views on it of Maxwell and his officers in the Home Department,[2] and also of Thorne:[3] for, given the general importance of the issues raised, the opportunity seemed to me a convenient one to review them in their broad aspects. I thought it well to postpone any final answer until I could test the situation in the light of reactions to Gandhi's fast, or I would have sent you an earlier answer.

2. As regards the first suggestion, referred to in paragraph 1 above, it will not have escaped you that utterances in both Houses of Parliament have gone pretty far in representing the power of Congress as on the decline: for instance the statement (no doubt based on material supplied from India) that the membership of the Congress in recent years fell from 4½ millions to a million and a half has been made by more Speakers than one. The Prime Minister

himself in his pronouncement of September 10th,[4] and Amery and Attlee in the debate of October 8th[5] made it quite clear how His Majesty's Government regard the Congress after the declaration of war of August 8th last. In this country it is possible to doubt whether many people expect power in the Provinces and at the Centre to pass from the British to a Congress such as we have known in past. As you say, Congress hitherto has been held together mainly by hatred of British rule and may lose its cement when that comes to an end. According to a passage in the Working Committee's resolution of July 14th,[6] the Congress High Command itself professes to expect that with the departure of "the foreign power" the present political parties will cease to function. But the future of Congress must be a matter of speculation until we see more clearly the political pattern that will develop as constitution-making begins. In the meanwhile, as I have said, the attitude of His Majesty's Government has been made clear: and it seems to me that the only prescription that will hold the Services together and keep their hearts up is the action that we have in fact taken, and are taking, in accepting promptly and with energy the challenge which Congress threw out and in refusing to relax the firmness of our administration. I have little doubt that the firm stand taken by Government over recent months, in relation first to the Congress rebellion, and thereafter to Gandhi's fast, and the emphatic support lent to the policy of the Government of India by His Majesty's Government will have a very definite value from that point of view. It is wise, however, to bear in mind that Congress possesses the only effective vote-catching machine in India, and that a general election might well produce a position in which the Parliamentary strength of Congress might greatly exceed the measure of the hold which that organisation enjoys upon the confidence of the general public.

3. I have given a good deal of thought to your second suggestion. The question of safeguards against possible victimisation of Government Servants in the event of Congress returning to office in the Provinces has been in our minds ever since they went out more than three years ago. There was correspondence on the subject in 1940; the letter from my Public Secretariat of 24th July 1940 summarised the discussions that had taken place, and asked for the further views of Governors on certain points. About the same time I put the whole matter to Amery, and we have exchanged views about it since. An amendment of the Constitution Act so as to insert a provision which on the lines of Section 270 would protect Government Servants after the revocation of the Section 93 Proclamations from proceedings, civil or criminal, in respect of acts done or purporting to be done in the execution of their duty, while the Proclamations were in force, has been under consideration—though this effect

[1] No. 81. [2] No. 118. [3] Not printed.
[4] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 383, cols. 302–5. [5] *Ibid.*, cols. 1386–1456.
[6] Vol. II, No. 265.

might be obtained either in a concordat at the time of a fresh political understanding or in the making of the new constitution rather than by legislation. In the course of the discussions the question of giving an immediate assurance to Government Servants came up, but at that time it was held that the need had not arisen.

4. To fill in the background further one has to recall the Cripps Mission and the statements made since its failure. Certain safeguards for some members of the Services were no doubt among the matters which were to be covered by a treaty between His Majesty's Government and the constitution-making body.

5. Your suggestion is in fact that the classes now protected by the Premature Retirement Rules should be greatly extended by the inclusion of Provincial officers—perhaps of all members of the Provincial and Subordinate Services, though you may have in mind only such Services as have some direct concern with public order, such as magistrates, police officers, and jail officers. To be effective the promise should be made *now*: and, as you recognise, it should be precise and should convey a complete assurance of the safety of the promised pensions.

6. I quite appreciate the effect such an assurance might be expected to have on the Services. At the same time I cannot find that the necessity for this (as distinct from an Act of Indemnity) emerges from the Governors' letters dealing with the suppression of the disturbances; and it occurs to me that there would be one great difficulty in taking such a step, in that it would mean a wide departure from the treaty-making procedure which has been contemplated. A treaty would naturally cover the British members of the Services, and possibly a few classes of non-British members; but it would not cover classes such as those which you have in mind; and an assurance in those terms to be given now would therefore prejudge the issue. If there were a real necessity for the assurance, we should have to see what way out of the difficulty could be found; but, as I have said, the necessity has not been shown even in the Provinces where the troubles have been most acute.

7. In conclusion, let me say that I am glad—even if my conclusions are somewhat negative—that you have given me this opportunity of considering in a new light this important matter of keeping our officers in good heart.

Yours sincerely,

LINLITHGOW

615

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

26 March 1943
Received: 27 March

No. 5683. Prime Minister has decided briefly to wind up Tuesday's[1] debate general line being no dealing during the war with Congress which has proved itself defeatist and actively hostile, tribute to Indian Army and to our past record in India with reiteration of broad pledge embodied in Cripps proposals.

[1] 30 March.

616

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

PRIVATE AND SECRET INDIA OFFICE, *26 March 1943*

Winston has definitely decided to wind up the Debate on Tuesday.[1] What he wants to get off his chest is a vindication of our past work in India. That seems to me all to the good, providing he avoids saying some contentious things which will only upset the situation in India and in America. However, he has promised to let me see what he proposes to say. Naturally, I am a little bit nervous, but nothing like my Labour colleagues who are really alarmed lest he should say something that would still further estrange them from their party in the House.

2. As a matter of fact, I think Gandhi has pretty thoroughly cured most of the Labour Party of their affection for Congress. The White Paper[2] has been well endorsed by the press generally, though the *Manchester Guardian* follows the usual Congress line of saying that it is merely the case for the prosecution.

[Para. 3, on prompt execution of death sentences, omitted.]

[1] 30 March. [2] Cmd. 6430.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMPORTANT
PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, *27 March 1943, 9.50 pm*
Received: 28 March, 12.30 am

No. 820–S. Your telegram of 26th March No. 5683.[1] I am glad and I think it is better to face up to this now. Maxwell's note sent you in my telegram No. 700–S[2] of 15th March contains of course a most damning indictment of Congress attitude towards the war.

2. Pilditch's opinion is that the country is as quiet as it has been for the last 20 years save for sporadic troubles here and there, e.g. in Belgaum, Midnapore, &c.; that is my own impression. I set it down to our incarceration of the leaders of the Congress movement, and the fact that their removal and detention should cause no feeling whatever (save among small sections of the intelligentsia) and that the whole country should be in such good state brings out forcibly I think the factitious nature of anti-British and anti-war agitation such as they have been so concerned to work up in the past.

3. I telegraph separately[3] the text of the remarks made by Usman (entirely on his own initiative) in the Council of State yesterday. They were of course promptly criticised by P. N. Sapru and Kunzru. But Hossain Imam said that the Mussalmans did not believe in western form of democracy, and that he did not therefore find fault with Sir Mohammad Usman.

4. I have nothing further from Sapru, or the "Leaders" who, I get the impression, are far from certain what to do, or what line to take. It will cause me no surprise if they jump at Prime Minister's proposed declaration as an excuse for dropping the whole idea of a deputation to me.

[1] No. 615 [2] No. 586. [3] No. 618.

618

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *27 March 1943, 9.50 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 28 March, 12.15 am*

No. 821–S. Following is text of remarks made by Usman in Council of State yesterday:—

Begins. Some of the Hon'ble Members opposite have great faith in the democratic form of government. They find fault with the present Government of India for not being representative, as if India had enjoyed before the advent of the British in this country a democratic and representative form of government. Recently we have witnessed the fate of democracy in this country. The moment the Congress governments resigned in the Provinces, it was an occasion of great festivity throughout the whole country ending in the celebration of Deliverance Day. Parliamentary Democracy is not an indigenous institution. It has been imported from England to India and has been a thorough failure in some of the Provinces on account of the attitude of the Congress.

There is no use of finding fault with the British Government for not resolving the political deadlock. The solution is in the hands of the people. When there is no agreement between all the important communities and interests, the transfer of power into the hands of a very anti-British and Pro-Japanese party will land the country in utter confusion and chaos. Is this the time to try this experiment when the whole country is engaged in a life and death struggle? Six months after the rebellion of August last when Mr. Gandhi saw that there was no chance of Congress capturing the government of this country, and did not like the Allied victories, he began his fast with the object of coercing the Government to come to terms with him. When the Government of India stood firm and refused to yield, Mr. Gandhi recovered from his fast.

If some of our political leaders who believe in the Gandhian policy of quit India and indirectly carry on his work make statements and speeches which will not only go against the war effort of this country but will also directly help the enemy the censorship is thoroughly justified.

I very much regret to state that the opposition is now getting into the habit of constantly abusing and attacking the British Government. It does no good to anybody. Mr. Amery has rightly said that the British people need not be ashamed of the great services they have rendered to this country. To mention some of them they have introduced into this country British system of education, British system of justice and British Parliamentary institutions and maintained law and order in this country. The majority of the people of this country

realise and recognise the great work accomplished by Great Britain in India and are very grateful to them. *Ends.*

619

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/11/5b: ff 77–8

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *27 March 1943, 5.15 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 28 March*

318. Your personal telegram 25th March 794–S.[1] I have no criticism to offer on your proposals except on one point to which you allude yourself in paragraph 7, namely the weight falling on Azizul Huque with in effect three departments to be responsible for. I should warn you that despite or perhaps because of energy with which he threw himself into representative activities, speech making, broadcasting and such matters as seamen's hostels, I am told that he proved by no means rapid disposer of business in India House and that files accumulated. If you can see your way (even though it involved an additional selection which would presumably have to be Brahmin or at any rate Hindu) it might be prudent to re-distribute burden till you can see whether Azizul Huque is up to full weight now contemplated for Commerce Member. It would moreover be a pity if he had to become wholly tied to his desk and not free to speak, broadcast and move about.

Above was drafted before receipt of your 807–S.[2] It is a nuisance that Sultan Ahmed should be hesitant. I have of course said nothing at all to Mudaliar yet beyond sounding him as to Runganadhan, but it occurs to me that for one reason or another (e.g. growing attention here to post-war economic problems in relation to which he is and no doubt feels he is particularly equipped to put India's point of view) he may conversely hesitate about returning to India just yet. Would it be well to clear this point before pressing Sultan Ahmed further or trying to find replacement of him for succession to Mudaliar?

[1] No. 611.

[2] Reporting that Sir S. Ahmed had been invited to succeed Sir R. Mudaliar at the War Cabinet, but was reluctant to accept for health reasons. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

620

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir M. Gwyer (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/125

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *27 March 1943*

I think there is great force, if I may say so, in your review of the facts.[1] Without entering into any detailed discussion of your letter at this stage I was interested in your estimate of the degree of bitterness and disappointment that at present exists in political circles here. I should myself doubt (though I speak of course very much subject to correction) if things were really quite so bad as some of those whom both you and I see in the course of our contacts are disposed to try to make out. That does not mean, on the other hand, that I do not fully accept that in a certain stratum, and an important stratum, these feelings may exist. But I would not on my own information or in the light of the views I get from Governors, &c. feel justified in taking a really gloomy view. The time is so difficult; the situation we all of us have to handle is far from easy; and as you know so well, we get very little help from those whom we are most anxious to assist and to lead in the direction in which they would wish to go. One's only conclusion is that patience is the best, and indeed the only course, though I wish I felt a little more optimistic in the light of events over these last few months as to the capacity of certain of our friends to carry the burdens which they have asked to have put upon them and which we have been so ready to see them take up. When we next meet I shall look forward to having a word with you on the matter in its general aspects.

[1] See No. 606.

621

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMPORTANT *29 March 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 840–S. Your private and personal telegram of March 27th No. 318.[1] Many thanks. I appreciate force of what you say about Azizul Haque and am grateful for this warning. On the whole however I think I shall probably hold to my existing scheme. I shall probably continue to supervise Food myself though without letting that to be publicly known, and I shall urge on Azizul

[1] No. 619.

Haque great importance of giving his Secretaries a fairly free hand so far as Commerce and Industries are concerned, and will encourage him as you suggest to spend a certain amount of time touring around. I should be averse from adding another Member to Council at this stage.

2. I still await the result of Sultan Ahmed's cogitations, but if he continues to jib propose to tell him that I should have no objection to his returning to India for the winter (his presence will not I suspect be greatly missed in London) and that I regard it as quite essential that he should accept this invitation.

3. As for Mudaliar I think he is about due to come back now, and I would not be disposed to consider his personal feelings over much. The decision is not after all one for him, for if I judge that he would be better employed here in charge of Supply or the like, I should have to require him to conform.

4. I am sorry for these continued delays and hope we shall shortly be able to get the whole team fixed up.

622

Mr Rajagopalachari to Sir G. Laithwaite

MSS. EUR. F. 125/125

C/O MR. DEVADAS GANDHI, *The Hindustan Times*,
NEW DELHI, *29 March 1943*

Dear Sir Gilbert,

I am writing in continuation of Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru's correspondence with you on the subject of the deputation to the Viceroy.

Sir Tej is unfortunately too ill to come. He writes to me: "I am lying exhausted. Since Friday last, I have had some swelling on my feet and hands. If I were in a position to travel just now, I would have come, but in the present circumstances I cannot come. You can associate me with your memorandum and express regret to His Excellency on my behalf that in view of my present condition of health, I am unable to undertake a railway journey for the next few weeks."

I am enclosing a memorandum in terms of your communication[1] to Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru. I shall be grateful if His Excellency can receive the deputation on Wednesday, 31st March. The delegation will consist of Sir Purshotamdas Thakurdas, Mr. N. M. Joshi, Hon'ble Pandit H. N. Kunzru and Mr. K. M. Munshi besides myself.[2]

Yours sincerely,
C. RAJAGOPALACHARI

Enclosure to No. 622[3]

MEMORANDUM

We are submitting this memorandum in accordance with His Excellency's desire that he should have a written statement precisely explaining what we wish to say to which His Excellency proposes to give a written reply. While we do so, we hope that the helpful spirit in which we approach this matter also animates His Excellency and that it is with a completely open mind that he will receive the deputation.

2. We are glad that His Excellency has found the resolution[4] of the Bombay Conference of 9th and 10th March perfectly clear. We have therein expressed a desire that His Excellency should permit a few of us to meet Gandhiji, who is under detention, to ascertain authoritatively his reactions to the events which have happened since his arrest and to explore with him avenues for reconciliation. If His Excellency has no objection to this, we shall avail ourselves of the opportunity and discuss matters with Gandhiji. We will then go to His Excellency again and place our proposals before him. In case His Excellency has any objections to following this course, we should like to be informed of the objections so that we may try to answer them, and for this purpose we desire an interview with His Excellency.

3. We have carefully read the correspondence which has passed between His Excellency and Gandhiji and which has been published. We feel that Gandhiji has already expressed his disapproval of violence and sabotage, and we have no doubt that he will cast his influence on the side of internal harmony and reconciliation.

4. The correspondence and statements published in connection with the fast have themselves discouraged the disturbances and the contemplated meeting with Gandhiji will, in our view, further the same object.

5. We feel that though order might have been restored on the surface, every day that passes without a solution of the Indian problem intensifies the hostility between Britain and India, and renders any future solution more and more difficult to attain, until we apprehend it may become even impossible. We are convinced that Gandhiji's assistance is essential for the restoration of goodwill and for a solution of the problem even for the interim period, including an

[1] See No. 601.

[2] In telegram 843-S of 29 March Lord Linlithgow informed Mr Amery that Sir T. B. Sapru had told him that ill health would prevent him from coming to Delhi. He added that he was arranging to receive the deputation at 4 pm (Indian time) on 1 April, not 31 March. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

[3] Lord Linlithgow sent the text of this memorandum to Mr Amery in telegram 844-S of 29 March. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

[4] No. 584.

adjustment of Hindu–Muslim claims. On the other hand, unpleasant as it is, we cannot help feeling that refusing to permit us to have any contact with Gandhiji now would be equivalent to a determination on the part of Great Britain that there should be no attempt at a settlement of the problem and no reconciliation between Nationalist India and Britain. Whatever may be the immediate administrative convenience thereof, we hope that His Excellency will not take up this attitude. We feel that though there is no present danger of Axis aggression in India, the strained relation between Government and people is fraught with grave evil and all that is possible should be done to replace it by a better feeling.

623

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *29 March 1943, 11.55 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 29 March, 9 pm*

No. 845–S. Your telegram of March 26th No. 5683.[1] I have been thinking over Prime Minister's proposed statement again in the light of general attitude of Muslims and of probability that I shall have to reply to this Sapru delegation in the immediate future.

2. Only points that occur to me are that if we now say definitely and categorically that in no circumstances will we have anything to do with Congress until the end of the war—

(*a*) Prime Minister may be asked whether that would hold good even if Congress abandon their present policy and agree to co-operate;

(*b*) we may play into the hands of the Muslim League who are as good blackmailers as the Congress and who, with Congress out of the way, might concentrate on demand for reconstitution of Council for the period of the war on the basis of Muslim League *plus* the oddments; while

(*c*) I shall have to consider very carefully how to reconcile my reply to the Sapru delegation with Prime Minister's statement.

3. (*a*) is of course for Prime Minister. I do not take (*b*) too seriously, for the Muslim League are committed to acceptance by us of Pakistan as prior condition of co-operation and there can be no question of our accepting Pakistan. As for (*c*) it is of course most important that I should be in line with Prime Minister.

4. Prime Minister of course has the whole story in his mind, and will I know phrase whatever he says with his usual skill. I am inclined a little to suggest for

the reasons I have given that it would be just as effective if the line were to be taken that so far as His Majesty's Government is concerned (the less said about the Government of India the better as I have not warned or said anything to my Council) there will be no dealing with Congress unless and until they and Gandhi have formally and publicly withdrawn the resolution of last August; withdrawn Gandhi's references to rebellion and "do or die", and the like; and given binding assurances of a nature acceptable to Government for good conduct in the future, in which case the position could be considered further. I would not judge that there was the very slightest chance of their ever agreeing to this, and if I am right in that we could safely take the risk: while a formula of this type would protect us against demands by the Muslim League. From another point of view we have an easy peg to hang it on since it follows most closely what I said to Gandhi in paragraph 3 of my letter of January 13th[2] and paragraph 2 of my letter of January 25th,[3] both of which have been published.

5. If Prime Minister sees advantage in the suggestion I have made, well and good. I should then take my stand on his statement without qualification. If, on the other hand, he prefers to say as already suggested that we will have no dealings during the war with Congress, my line with the delegation would be that the Prime Minister has made the policy of His Majesty's Government abundantly clear in the House; that I have nothing to add to it; and that it goes without saying in any event that an essential preliminary to dealings with Congress must be satisfaction of the points set out in my paragraph 4 above.

[1] No. 615. [2] See No. 319; also No. 340, note 2. [3] No. 358.

624

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE *29 March 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 846–S. Please see my personal telegram[1] of today. It must be for Winston to decide, and I will of course fit in with whatever line he approves. But thinking over, I do think that the alternative I have suggested is quite as strong from our point of view and has a little less the appearance of closing doors so far as general opinion is concerned. I cannot believe that Congress would accept the terms I have indicated, and I am of course particularly anxious that Winston should not, having made a very strong and unqualified statement, thereafter

[1] No. 623.

have to qualify it in reply to questions in the House as to what we would do if Congress changed their tone and were prepared to lend us the fullest co-operation, &c.

625

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE — *29 March 1943*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL — *Received: 30 March*

No. 324. Prime Minister has decided after all to let Attlee wind up debate.

626

Mr Rajagopalachari to Sir G. Laithwaite

MSS. EUR. F. 125/125

C/O MR. DEVADAS GANDHI, *The Hindustan Times*,
NEW DELHI, *30 March 1943*

Dear Sir Gilbert,

I have your two letters of the 29th[1] and 30th[2] March and have shown them to my colleagues in the deputation. I am writing this to express our unanimous feeling in the matter.

In our Memorandum, paragraph (2), we have explained our desire to be informed of the objections, if any, that His Excellency has to granting our request for facilities to meet Gandhiji so that we may try to answer the objections; and we have, in the same paragraph, explained that it is for this purpose we desired an interview with His Excellency.

The terms of your second letter (dated 30th March) have caused disappointment and a degree of surprise. You state therein that when I conclude reading the statement submitted on behalf of the deputation, His Excellency will read his reply and the meeting will thereafter terminate. If this means that there can be no kind of exchange of views on the points raised, we feel that the deputation is reduced to a mere formality and we gain nothing by the personal interview over and above submitting the written Memorandum. If this interpretation is correct, which we hope it is not, I desire to point out on behalf of the deputation that it is extremely unsatisfactory. What we desired was to have some means of understanding His Excellency's point of view so that we may

be able to meet it. If, however, there can be no exchange of views whatsoever, and yet for taking action on our request, our actual presence is considered necessary, we shall certainly be present on Thursday at 4 p.m. at The Viceroy's House, as arranged. If our presence is not considered necessary, will His Excellency be pleased to take the statement as officially presented? Our memorandum as well as His Excellency's proposed reply may then be simultaneously published as stated in your letter without the formality of a deputation. I shall be grateful for an early reply.

Yours sincerely,

C. RAJAGOPALACHARI

[1] Acknowledging No. 622 and proposing that deputation should meet Lord Linlithgow on 1 April. MSS. EUR. F. 125/125.

[2] Asking him to confirm that he would read the statement (enclosure to No. 622) on behalf of the deputation, whereupon Lord Linlithgow would read his reply and the meeting would terminate; both the statement and the reply would be released for publication. MSS. EUR. F. 125/125.

627

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *30 March 1943*

PRIVATE AND SECRET

Many thanks for your private and secret letter of the 5th March[1] which reached me last night. It coincided more or less with this extremely tiresome constitutional crisis in Bengal arising out of Huq's resignation.[2] I am still as I write a little in the dark as to precisely what took place between Huq and Herbert. I sent Herbert a series of questions early this morning and asked him to answer them to you and to repeat his reply to me, and that may show us a little better

[1] No. 565.

[2] The position of Mr Fazlul Huq's ministry had become increasingly precarious. On 28 March during an interview of two hours with Sir J. Herbert, Mr Fazlul Huq tendered his resignation, which was accepted 'on the understanding that it would not be made public until the night of the 29th in order that the Budget should be finally passed today. At 9.30 am this morning Huq announced in the Assembly that he had been forced to resign', and the Speaker adjourned the Assembly until 12 April (Secretary to Governor of Bengal to P.S.V., telegram (by secraphone) of 29 March 1943). In telegrams 44 and 45 of 29 and 30 March 1943 to Lord Linlithgow Sir J. Herbert defended his action in persuading Mr Fazlul Huq to honour his previously announced promise to resign if this would facilitate the formation of a more broadly based ministry; noted that he had not faced him with the alternative of dismissal; and argued that 'crisis was not due to Huq's resignation but . . . to his unauthorised and premature announcement of it and mainly to Speaker's precipitate action in adjourning the Assembly which made completion of budget grants impossible'. On 31 March he assumed Section 93 powers in order to pass the budget in time to meet statutory requirements. MSS. EUR. F. 125/48.

where we stand. But I confess that at first sight it does not look to me as though it had been at all happily handled. From the accounts in the Press (I send you a copy of the *Hindustan Times* report) of the debate in the Bengal Assembly one gets the impression that Huq has been placed in a position in which he is able with some plausibility to contend that he has been dismissed (or forced to resign) by the Governor at a time when he is still prepared to claim publicly that he has a majority in the House; and Herbert's own telegram No. 44, which was repeated to you, contains a good many inconsistencies. In any event I should have thought that ordinary commonsense would have led a Governor to hold on to his Prime Minister until he had got his budget through, particularly when he was within 48 hours of the end of the financial year. Herbert may be able to throw some more light on all this, but I cannot say that my present disposition is to regard it as having sent up his stock at all, and very much the contrary may be the case. Fortunately as I write the Press does not seem to be making very much capital of the affair and its handling so far as he is concerned, and that is all to the good.

2. I am consulting my Reforms Office on the constitutional issues involved and will let Herbert have a further telegram when I have had their advice. But it looks to me very much as though we should (even if only for a few days) have to go into Section 93. Herbert has always had (as you will be aware from copies of correspondence) a hankering after Section 93, which I have done my very best to head him off. We all of us know of course that in certain circumstances there may be no alternative to operating the breakdown clauses of the constitution. But our policy is, and must be, to try to work the constitution in the Provinces by the normal machinery to the very greatest extent possible, and though one's patience may on occasion be very highly tried, and though I fully recognise that Huq can be a most exasperating person to work with, I should have thought that Herbert would have been far wiser to have sat tight and let the situation develop itself instead of (if that is what he did do) taking a hand.

3. I have just had your telegram[3] telling that Attlee and not Winston is to wind up the debate, and I dare say that is on the whole probably the best thing. I telegraphed yesterday[4] to suggest an alternative of my own to the formula which Winston had apparently been contemplating employing about future relations with the Congress. But I suppose that now the turn of the debate will be very different. I do not think that matters very much. I shall be able to employ my formula in dealing with Rajagopalachari and his friends when I see them on Thursday. I have telegraphed copy of the statement[5] they propose to put in, which is a singularly unconvincing document, though it contains one or two good propaganda points on their side. I am asking Rajagopalachari to confirm that he will read this statement on behalf of the deputation, and indicating that I will then reply to it, and will release both the statement and

my reply. I have no doubt that what he and his friends want is to have a round table discussion, but it must be my business to try to prevent any discussion at all. Past experience with Rajagopalachari shows that he is most unscrupulous in the use he makes of what he alleges to have been said or suggested in conversation, and I am not prepared to take any chances with him. Whether Sapru's illness is genuine or not is very hard to say—there is very substantial evidence to suggest that it is purely diplomatic and that the old man has no intention of burning his fingers in this business.

* * *

7. I fear you are right in what you say in paragraph 5 of your letter, though I am extremely sorry that it should be so. Time is beginning to run out. We shall be in April in a day or two, and I do hope that you will do all you can to ensure that we get an answer not later than early June. And despite the barrenness of the field I do beg you to do everything you can to get us a man with considerable political experience and first-hand knowledge of the Cabinet and its ways. It is quite vital to have that in present conditions here. Someone of the type of Lampson might conceivably have done in 1910, and I suppose at a pinch he might get through it even now. But he would be very far indeed from the ideal, and the post is so important that I am certain one cannot afford to take risks.

* * *

10. Many thanks for the comment in paragraph 8 of your letter about possible names for my Council. I did consider Jamnadas Mehta with some care, but I came down definitely in the outcome against him. I like him and he is intelligent and in many ways very stout-hearted: but he would I suspect be a most impracticable colleague, judging by what I have seen of him in many meetings of the National Defence Council: and I am sure that his presence would not contribute to speedy disposal of public business. As for the Diwan of Chharkhari, I have no particular opinion of Fisher who was in my experience a very average first-class Resident: but the Diwan of Chharkhari is certainly not of the level for high employment though I am putting him in for the O.B.E. in the forthcoming list, and that about represents his level. I think Shafa'at had better stay in South Africa for the present (that is unless the behaviour of the South Africans makes it impossible for him to do so!). He is a possible reserve, but not of particularly high quality. I am grateful for your comments on Azizul Haque's capacity for disposing of work and for this warning.[6] I think as I said in my telegram[7] that I should probably be able to help a little myself by continuing (with of course Azizul Haque's agreement) to supervise (though there would be no public indication of that) the work of the Food Department. So

[3] No. 625. [4] No. 623. [5] Enclosure to No. 622. [6] See No. 619.
[7] No. 621.

far as the other two departments are concerned, I shall strongly urge him to keep a pretty close eye on commerce and to be a little easier over industries and civil supplies. One of the troubles in Mudaliar's time, good workman that he is, was that he spent a great deal of time on conferences and so on with the result that the work of the Commerce Department was badly held up: while, as I mentioned in one of my earlier telegrams,[8] injudicious staffing, actuated to some extent by personal motives, of that department produced a team by no means well qualified to get through stuff quickly and accurately. But I hope very much that the reorganisation which I am now making will ease things. For the moment as regards Council, of course, my stumbling block is Sultan Ahmed, and until I can persuade him (if I can) to go home, I cannot get on with the rest of these appointments.

* * *

19. In paragraph 8 of my letter of the 21st November[9] I mentioned that I had had from Clow an interesting letter on the reactions of the Indian services to the present situation, and I sent you by the bag of that date not only Clow's letter[10] but the comment I had had from Maxwell, and from Conran-Smith and Tottenham.[11] I added that I proposed to ask Thorne for his views and to comment further on the general issue when I received them.

20. I have since had the advantage of seeing Thorne's comments,[12] and in the light of them and of the views earlier expressed by Maxwell, Conran-Smith and Tottenham, I am sending a reply[13] to Clow of which a copy goes to you by this bag. A good deal has happened since this matter was first raised. In the first place the rebellion of last autumn has been liquidated, and liquidated in a way that has made very clear indeed, I would judge, to all the services the attitude of His Majesty's Government and the extent to which full support can be looked for from them in difficult conditions such as those through which we have passed. The essential stability and solidity of the services in conditions of the utmost strain has equally been evidenced in a most encouraging manner by the course of events during the rebellion. Secondly Gandhi's fast of last month following as it did on the events of last autumn has enabled us to test service reactions under a strain of a very different character, and to evidence to the services the extent to which Government was prepared to stand firm even under the strongest Congress pressure. The firmness of the line taken by Government, the completeness and the emphatic character of the support given to that line by you, by the Prime Minister, and by His Majesty's Government cannot but have a very real significance from the service point of view. I recognise fully that the strain, for reasons partly no doubt of a nationalist, but partly also, I am sure, of a religious character, placed on the loyalty of certain Hindu officers by the declaration and the course of the fast has been considerable (I am asking Governors in my replies to their fortnightly letters to let me have their

appreciation of how great it was: but you will have seen the comments[14] on the point that have been made already by Twynam, Hallett and Rutherford). But I am well content that we should have survived it so well as we have. And the general impression, I would imagine, left on thinking men in the services as well as outside by the course of events since last August is likely to be in a marked degree that the prospects of a very early transfer of complete control to an Indian Government with the effects on the Service position that may be apprehended from it are less good than they were before the Congress rebellion. Taken with the declarations and public statements by leading Congressmen from which it emerged, that rebellion, organised to break out at a critical period in the war and at a time when India was, as she is still, in immediate danger from the Japanese, cannot but shake faith alike in the capacity of Congress for self-government and in its readiness to accept self-government within the Empire such as it has been the policy of His Majesty's Government to bring about. It has certainly had the effect of causing uneasiness to moderate elements in the nationalist camp. It has greatly aggravated the strain between the Congress and the Muslim League; and while the Muslim League for political purposes continue to demand "independence" quite as vociferously as the Congress have done, they realise very well, I believe, the practical objections to it. The minor minorities, and those sections of the population such as the Scheduled Castes, are even more uneasy than before at the thought of any relinquishment of control, while I do not believe the Princes, whatever individual spokesmen may on occasion have said, have ever had the very slightest desire, or have today, that there should be any transfer of power or relinquishment of control. The effect of any general review of the present position cannot, one would have thought, but be, as I have said above, to suggest to thinking and intelligent elements in the services, whether Central or Provincial, that the fears and doubts that they may have entertained a year or two ago, while not removed, are less immediate and less threatening; and to the extent that that is the case, one would hope that it would be reflected in an abatement of the anxieties for the future not unnaturally present to many members of the Services in recent years. We shall of course have to face the whole issue if and when we are able to bring the post-war constitutional conference into being, and if and when the requisite degree of agreement as to the future constitutional structure emerges from that body. But much may happen before then, and I doubt the wisdom of planning ahead in this matter save in the broadest outline. For the moment we can be well satisfied that over so testing a period as we have had, there should have been no deterioration that matters in the loyalty of the Indian services, and that the outcome of that

[8] Possibly Lord Linlithgow had in mind para. 7 of his private and personal letter of 16 March (No. 596).
[9] No. 205. [10] No. 81. [11] No. 118. [12] Not printed. [13] No. 614.
[14] See Nos. 564, 571, and 572.

testing period should have been such as, one would hope, to reduce service apprehensions of a landslide.

21. In paragraph 8 of my letter of the 9th November[15] I commented on the deterioration in the outward appearance of Delhi consequent on the special arrangements we have had to make for temporary hutments, &c. during the war. The position has not improved since then, and I am having another shot at the authorities, and send you by this bag copy of a letter[16] I have just had sent to Ambedkar. Not that I expect anything very material to come out of it, for we are tied by war requirements. But I would like very much if I could to try to safeguard the future, and to try to get a policy formally adopted by my Government at this stage which could be implemented at the end of the war, and which would hold out some hope of the restoration then of the amenities of Delhi.

[15] No. 157. [16] Of 27 March. MSS. EUR. F. 125/125.

628

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *31 March 1943*

No. 863–S. My warm congratulations on an excellent and most telling speech. I should judge that the whole debate[1] went very well. Would you please convey my thanks and felicitations to Attlee.

[1] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 388, 30 March 1943, cols. 69–140.

629

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *31 March 1943, 9.5 pm*
Received: 31 March, 8.15 pm

No. 868–S. Leaders deputation. I have throughout made it clear to Sapru that I expected these people to put in a written statement to which I would make a written reply. I always suspected that they would try to turn occasion into a talk across the table to which there are obvious objections, and I should be at great disadvantage when confronted by 5 highly intelligent and entirely irresponsible politicians whose one object would be to get as much propaganda

across as they could and probably to misrepresent what had happened thereafter.

2. I was therefore at pains to repeat my intentions to Rajagopalachari. He has now written to say that if the procedure in question means that there can be no question of exchange of views on the points raised "we feel [*the text continues the third para. of No. 626 but omits the last two sentences*]."

3. I have caused a reply[1] to be sent reminding them that I have throughout required a written statement to which a written reply could be made and emphasising that it is important in a matter of this kind that there should be no room for any misunderstanding of what has passed in conversation or discussion. I have added that I am quite ready to take their memorandum as presented if they do not want to present it in person, and have asked them whether they wish to amplify it in any way so as to bring out in it any point which they may have been intending to reserve for oral discussion. I have indicated that I would propose to release it and my reply (whether memorandum is presented personally or not) at 4.30 p.m. on Thursday afternoon, 1st April.

[1] Sir G. Laithwaite to Mr Rajagopalachari, 31 March 1943, MSS. EUR. F. 125/125.

630

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *31 March 1943, 8.5 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 31 March, 8 pm*

No. 869–S. Council vacancies. Sultan Ahmed has now definitely declined, telling me that he is advised by his doctors that given his blood pressure it would be most dangerous for him to go to London though he is perfectly fit to carry on his duties here. I fear we must accept this as final. On the other hand he has characteristically leaked and as a result I have had a considerable grumble from Firoz Khan Noon who is very anxious to go to London himself.

2. Sultan Ahmed's decision necessitates reconsideration of the details of these appointments. I will telegraph again in a day or two. But I think it may well prove that Firoz after all would be the best person to replace Mudaliar in present circumstances. I would be most reluctant to lose Ambedkar or Usman. I do not think Srivastava would want to go, and Jogendra Singh is too old. But as I say I will telegraph without delay.

631

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

31 March 1943
Received: 1 April

No. 331. Debate[1] went well and House practically unanimously in support of Government. A few criticisms of tone of White Paper[2] have not altered fact that it has made deep impression.

[1] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 388, 30 March 1943, cols. 69–140. [2] Cmd. 6430.

632

Mr Rajagopalachari to Sir G. Laithwaite[1]

MSS. EUR. F. 125/125

C/O DEVADAS GANDHI, ESQ., CONNAUGHT CIRCUS,
NEW DELHI, *31 March 1943*

Dear Sir Gilbert,

I acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 31st March[2] conveying His Excellency's decision in regard to the procedure to be followed in connection with our request to meet His Excellency.

I enclose an additional paragraph to be added to the Memorandum at the end as paragraph 6.

As exchange of views on the spot has been ruled out by His Excellency, we think it unnecessary to take up his time over formalities. Our statement, with the addition now made, may be treated as officially presented and released for publication with His Excellency's reply, as already proposed.

I shall be grateful if you will despatch reply so that it may reach me before it is released to the press.[3]

Yours sincerely,

C. RAJAGOPALACHARI

Enclosure to No. 632

6. As the war is getting long drawn out, measures to solve the economic problems arising out of it as well as plans for increasing production of food and other essential articles and improving transport and distribution as well as measures of control have to be evolved. Such measures can be organized and

regulated only by a national administration or a government that can reasonably claim to approach that character and is in a position to justify policies adopted from time to time although they may involve considerable hardships on all sections of people. The situation is growing more and more serious every day and we feel that a government commanding the loyal and affectionate co-operation of all the people can be constituted for the period of the war only if we are permitted to talk with Gandhiji, consult him and obtain his support. The request that we make is intended to achieve this object. It cannot hurt the Government or the war effort in the least and in our view is likely to lead to constructive results.

[1] Lord Linlithgow sent the gist of this letter and the full text of its enclosure to Mr Amery in telegrams 874-S and 875-S of 1 April. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

[2] See No. 629, para. 3.

[3] In another letter of 31 March, Sir G. Laithwaite informed Mr Rajagopalachari that Lord Linlithgow 'fears it will not be possible for him to communicate an advance copy of his reply'. MSS. EUR. F. 125/125. In his reply (transmitted by Reuter) Lord Linlithgow regretted that the Deputation's memorandum contained no fresh argument and no 'unequivocal condemnation of the Congress campaign of violence', and remarked on the unrepresentative composition of the Leaders Conference. He stated that in August 1942 the Government of India had finally been left with no option, in the interests of India's security and defence, but to detain Mr Gandhi and the Congress leaders; that the G. of I's paper (Cmd. 6430) 'clearly indicates the full responsibility of Congress and Mr Gandhi' for the 'shocking campaign of organised violence and crime' which followed; that neither Mr Gandhi nor the Working Committee had condemned that campaign despite access to reliable Press accounts; that while Mr Gandhi's advice to 'Do or die' still stood on record, India would be exposed to grave danger if Congress and its leaders were given full liberty of action; and that Mr Gandhi had not indicated a change of heart either in his correspondence with him, or in contacts with his friends during his fast. Lord Linlithgow went on to stress his and his Government's obligation to ensure peace and good order and to defend India from external aggression. They could not alter their attitude to Congress so long as that obligation lasted and Congress policy remained unchanged, nor could he give the Leaders' deputation special facilities for contact with Mr Gandhi and the Congress leaders. The Government would not be deflected from doing its duty by the suggestion that by so doing it would add to bitterness and ill-feeling. In conclusion, Lord Linlithgow stated that the essential preliminary to the formation of a national government was 'that agreement between parties, communities and interests, which I have been so anxious to foster but to which the excessive claims and totalitarian ambitions of Congress and its leaders have been so consistent an obstacle in the past'. L/P&J/8/512: ff 213-14.

633

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

PRIVATE AND SECRET INDIA OFFICE, *31 March 1943*

Winston told me after lunch on Monday[1] that having prepared some 1,500 words or so in the way of notes for his speech yesterday, he had decided that

[1] 29 March.

he simply could not afford the time to complete it and that anyhow the subject was difficult and controversial. So I agreed with him, I hope without too obviously showing my relief. I have always felt that at some time or other a speech from him might do real good, but not just now. He dislikes the whole subject so much that he cannot bring himself to strike the note of sympathy which is as much needed as the note of firmness.

Thank goodness!

L.

2. As it was, yesterday's debate[2] went off very well indeed. Except for one speech from a professional Congress extremist, Sloan, the House was practically unanimous in its support of the Government and suggestions that anything could be done were mostly very half-hearted. There was a certain amount of criticism of the White Paper[3] as being a vigorously stated case for the prosecution, but that does not alter the fact that the overwhelming strength of the case brought out profoundly affected the whole House. Ammon, who followed me, said practically nothing except to cross my t's and dot my i's, and even Schuster, who generally ends on a rather captious note, took a strong line and his only tailpiece was the suggestion that the Prime Minister or some other person of genius might somehow or other say the word that would alter the whole situation. Attlee ended up very well and is becoming a master at the art of winding up a debate effectively in the fewest possible minutes.

3. In my own speech, which I imagine will only annoy Sapru & Co. more than ever, I came out more strongly and explicitly than before with my personal conviction that a constitution on British parliamentary lines is impossible for India at the Centre. I believe that if we could once get agreement on the type of Central Executive and the method of its creation, a great deal of the rest of the Act of 1935 would be found to present the obvious commonsense way of adjusting central and provincial relations. In other words, my view is that, while the Federation might possibly be made looser, in form at any rate rather than in substance, it is not the division of powers which is the real trouble, but the idea that the central powers should be in the hands of a party, in other words, a communal government. If the Executive itself emanated from the units that would go a long way to meet them, though it might perhaps be necessary, in order to protect the Muslims and the States, to decide that only a two-thirds vote in the Executive should count for the purposes of a decision. Mere majority is, after all, quite an arbitrary convention.

4. Towards the end of my speech, I attempted to say something about which I feel very deeply, namely that our troubles in India and in world opinion are very largely the reflection of our own want of confidence in our mission and that of the British Commonwealth in the world. At the present moment

nobody here ever speaks of the Empire or even thinks of its future internal relations. The whole idea is of this or that quite unreal piece of international mechanism with no tradition behind it, which is bound to break down in practice. Meanwhile, we are not building up the real organic structure which we could build up if we wanted to. My one hope is that as the war goes on we shall gradually get rid of our illusions and begin to realise where our strength and our hopes lie.

[Para. 5, on future of international air transport; and para. 6, on Jaipur, omitted.]

7. I have been looking at a recent batch of papers about Hyderabad which seem to show that Sir Arthur Lothian has had a good deal on his hands since he took over there. However, as he has previously served as Secretary in Hyderabad and was one of the personal Representatives whom you sent round at the time of the Federal negotiations and in that capacity took part in discussions with the Hyderabad Government, he is not likely to be led up the garden by His Exalted Highness or his Ministers. The formal letter of the 20th December[4] from the President of the Council, about the place of Hyderabad in any constitutional scheme of the Cripps variety, is particularly interesting, and I note that, as Lothian points out,[5] its issue follows a good deal of agitation in favour of Hyderabad's "independence" by the notorious Bahadur Yar Jung, "with the tacit support of the Nizam". I see that I referred to the Nawab's manœuvres in paragraph 5 of my letter of the 30th October 1941. The Nizam's present attitude is, I suppose, a logical development of that adopted by him at the time of the Federal negotiations. I notice for instance, in our 1939 papers a comment by Sir Reginald Glancy on one of the Nizam's numerous letters of that period: "This is the Nizam's own drafting and I think he is more opposed to Federation than Sir Akbar Hydari and the Ministers. The people round him represent either the extreme Mulki point of view or Shiah fanaticism—both parties opposed to any co-operation with Hindus." No doubt Bahadur Yar Jung is a good example of the extreme Mulki point of view, and the Nizam's present reluctance to have anything to do with a British–Indian Union, or even with a States Union, is merely a hardening of his attitude towards Federation. It seems also that he has always been insistent on maintaining his present specific guarantees of protection in return for cession of territory, and this was certainly made clear in his letter to you of the 9th June 1939. Thus there is presumably no real change in the Hyderabad attitude in itself: but it certainly assumes a new significance, as Lothian points out, from the fact that instead of

Lunch.

L.

[2] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 388, cols. 69–140. [3] Cmd. 6430. [4] No. 286.
[5] No. 359.

a Federation which could hardly come into being at all without Hyderabad's adherence, we are now faced with the possibility of one or more Indian Unions which *might* leave Hyderabad in the splendid isolation which her present Ruler seems (I think mistakenly) to desire. In such circumstances Lothian suggests that she might become a distinct imperial asset; but must we not bear in mind that the population is overwhelmingly Hindu, and might be expected in times of stress to lean rather to its co-religionists outside than to a Muhammadan Government within?

8. I shall be interested to see the reply you send to the Hyderabad Government's letter—also that which I suppose has already been sent,[6] on the lines approved by the Cabinet to the letter of the 15th August 1942,[7] about Cripps' observations in the House of Commons on the subject of democratic institutions.[8]

[Para. 9, on India's representation on the Imperial War Graves Commission, omitted.]

[6] No. 313. [7] Vol. II, enclosure to No. 692.

[8] In para. 27 of his letter of 2–4 May, Lord Linlithgow informed Mr Amery that a copy of No. 313 had now been sent to him, and that a reply to No. 286 was being prepared. MSS. EUR. F. 125/12.

634

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/11/5b: f 73

IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *1 April 1943, 8.30 pm*

6217. Your personal telegram 869–S[1] of 31st March. Council vacancies. I will await your further views but should regard Firoz as a very acceptable choice to replace Mudaliar.

[1] No. 630.

635

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *2 April 1943, 11.40 am*
Received: 2 April, 10 am

No. 891–S. I sent you by the bag of 16th March Lumley's comments[1] on Phillips' contacts during his recent visit to Bombay. I asked Hope to let me

have a note of the persons whom he is reported according to press to have seen in Madras and any comments on his activities in the Presidency, and his report is contained in my immediately following telegram.

2. I note with interest that Hope evidently did not himself see Phillips when in Madras. I am sure that whether in the south or elsewhere Phillips has been discretion itself. But the fact remains that he has spent a large part of his time with opponents of the Government to which he is accredited, and has received a series of deputations from political bodies upon highly controversial internal political issues of the day. I am clear that he must have the hint from me before he returns to the United States (if that is possible) that there must soon come a term to this business. I am also concerned lest Phillips' actions and the liberty so far allowed him by me and by my Government might be held to be a precedent which it would be open to any successor of Phillips to follow. Phillips' successor might be a very different man.

3. I think I ought to have your approval before I speak to Phillips on the lines above and would be grateful if you would telegraph it.

[1] No. 581.

636

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMPORTANT NEW DELHI, *2 April 1943, 2.40 pm*
Received: 2 April, 12.30 pm

No. 892–S. I asked Hope for a note of the people seen by Phillips during his visit to Madras. He reports as follows:—

Begins. Your telegram No. 815–S[1] of 27th March. Phillips' visit. Phillips saw following (*a*) Deputation of Madras Hindu Mahasabha—Rao Bahadur U. Ramappa, R. M. Palat, Parasram Jethanand, S. Srinivasa Aiyar—which presented memorandum stating only solution to deadlock was international arbitration for Hindu–Muslim differences on League of Nations minorities principles. Memorandum said Hindus being 93% of population in Madras constituted nation and their demand national demand, and only obstacle to national democratic government in Madras was reluctance of British interests. Deputation alleged to have gained impression that Phillips was not favourably impressed with Pakistan scheme. (*b*) Deputation of Madras Presidency Muslim League—Ahmad Ibrahim, Jamal Mohideen, Abdul Lateef Farookhi, Allahpichai, Raza Khan—reiterated Pakistan demand but could gain no

[1] Not printed.

impression of Phillips' reactions. (*c*) Members of Justice Party—Muthiachettiar of Chettinad, P. Balasubramania Mudaliar, S. Muthia Mudaliar—former Minister. Muthia Mudaliar concluded Phillips attached no meaning to Dominion Status and thought Congress only representative political organisation capable of doing good to country. Deputation suggested Pakistan demand not improper but Phillips refused to be drawn. (*d*) Liberals—Right Hon'ble V. S. S. Sastri and G. A. Natesan—got impression that America would not intervene in political controversies between India and England and that Phillips definitely for preservation of unity of India and against Pakistan. Sastri told Phillips that provincial [provisional?] coalition governments at Centre and in Provinces only solution to deadlock. (*e*) C. R. Srinivasan, Editor of *Swadesamitram*, a nationalist Tamil daily counterpart of *Hindu*, S. Guruswami, Secretary All-India Railwaymen's Federation, E. V. Ramaswami Naicker, Leader of Justice Party, and C. Rajagopalachari, ex-Premier—no details of these meetings available.

2. Phillips stayed with Howard, Manager of Standard Oil Company, and was apparently most discreet. From my impression of Phillips when I met him in Delhi I think he is much too astute to give anything away and also has come to learn facts of Indian situation not to express opinion. *Ends.*

637

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL VICEROY'S CAMP, *2 April 1943*

I left Delhi this morning and have just arrived at Peshawar by air. I must dictate a hasty couple of words to you, as we go off tomorrow morning to visit various tribal areas, and I shall not have another opportunity of putting anything together before I leave here on Wednesday, 7th. Cunningham seems in excellent form and perfectly happy about conditions up here so far as I can judge from the short conversation I have had with him.

2. My warmest congratulations to you and also to Attlee on your handling of the debate.[1] It is obvious that it was a very great success, and if I may say so, I thought that both your speech and Attlee's, with their different backgrounds, could not have been better and were most valuable contributions to getting our case across. The debate too brings out very forcibly that while Sorensen and one or two others on the Labour Benches may be critical, the House as a whole including the official Labour Party is solidly behind our policy.

3. You will have seen my reply to Rajagopalachari and his deputation the text of which I arranged to have reutbucked.[2] I think that the Congress and the

Moderates were extremely unwise to expose themselves in the way that they did; and I am not surprised that Rajagopalachari has in his own words been made "so angry" by my answer to him as to be hardly able to think about the next step! Congress cannot have it all their own way, and must be prepared to take these hard knocks if they make a mistake as they unquestionably have done; and I personally am very glad to have had an opportunity of reaffirming quite politely, but in a manner that leaves no room for misunderstanding, our policy as regards facilities for seeing Gandhi, &c. I thought too that the deputation were most unwise to expose surface over the matter of a National Government in the way that they did.

4. I am very disturbed about this business of Herbert and his Ministry.[3] I dare say that he will get out of it more lightly than he might for the Muslim League detest Huq, and their anxiety to discredit him will divert attention a little from the Governor. But I am, I must say, dismayed at the light-hearted manner in which Herbert has handled this situation. I cannot imagine greater folly than to present someone of the type of Huq with a draft letter of resignation,[4] head him off from consulting his colleagues and his party on the ground that they will be certain to dissuade him from signing it; make him sign it as a result of an hour and a half's conversation, and all this with the Budget not yet through, and with full knowledge of the instability of Huq, and the risk that even if he had been a willing signatory of the letter of resignation he might well have changed his mind overnight. Other aspects that concern me very much are the suggestions that Huq at this time had a majority, and that Nazimuddin certainly had not, and has not. I am sure it is most dangerous for Governors to play politics, even if they are of outstanding capacity, and I fear that poor Herbert can hardly claim to be of the latter category. My confidence in him has never, as you know, been great, but this incident has administered a severe further

[1] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of C., vol. 388, 30 March 1943, cols. 69–140.

[2] See No. 632, note 3. [3] See No. 627, paras. 1 and 2.

[4] In secraphone telegram of 31 March 1943, Sir J. Herbert, responding to a request from Lord Linlithgow for 'intimate details' of his interview of 28 March with Mr Fazlul Huq, explained that 'Huq expressed a wish to consult his party. I did not prevent this, but merely told him that it was a foregone conclusion that his party would make him change his mind, and that if he really meant what he had promised he would do it, and not find excuses for avoiding it . . . it passes my understanding how any unprejudiced outsider could believe that he had to be compelled to do what he had openly undertaken to do the day before in the Legislative Assembly. Huq's tortuous habits can only be controlled by letting him see something tangible. In this case a draft letter was drawn up by Williams at my instructions and approved by me.' This was not shown to Huq 'until after he had resolved to resign. It was shown to him as an indication of how he might make his gesture with credit and was not intended for his signature—indeed it was prepared on common draft paper—and the services of a stenographer were offered to him for dictation to his own liking. Huq chose to sign the rough draft . . .' On the question whether Huq had had a majority in the Legislative Assembly when he resigned, the telegram added that in a division on 27 March he had won only by 10 votes of Congress members who normally did not vote at all; also the Opposition alleged that after the division up to 14 members seceded from Huq to them. MSS. EUR. F. 125/43.

shock to it, and I have as you will see felt obliged to send him a pretty stiff letter,[5] though of course I accept the necessity for protecting his position and saving his face.

[Para. 5, on co-ordinating publication of reports on evacuation from Burma; and para. 6, on administrative arrangements for Political Warfare Executive, omitted.]

[5] Of 2 April. MSS. EUR. F. 125/43.

638

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

PRIVATE AND SECRET INDIA OFFICE, *5 April 1943*

Your letters of March 16th[1] and 23rd[2] have just arrived, but the mail is off in a few hours and I am due at a Cabinet meeting in a few minutes, so this can only be a very brief note.

2. It seems to me quite wrong for Phillips to receive deputations from Indian political parties. It is one thing for him to meet individuals and talk over things in private, but receiving formal deputations from political parties is something that no diplomat ever does in any country to which he is accredited, except perhaps the Nazi diplomats in countries like Austria and Czechoslovakia! I do think you might somehow or other convey that to him. Meanwhile, Eden has just come back, but I haven't had a chance of a talk with him yet and have no idea how much he managed to say to the President or to other Americans about the necessity for keeping off the Indian grass.

3. In that connection Professor A. L. Goodhart, who runs the American Outpost, an organisation of staunchly pro-British Americans over here, has asked me to give a talk at a lunch on May 5th to the Outpost and the American Press generally. I hope that may do some good. I also cannot help thinking that, in spite of unpleasant articles in the *News Chronicle* and *New Statesman*, the general effect of last Tuesday's debate will have got through to the American Correspondents here.

4. Mudaliar approached me just now after lunch at our house to ask what your plans regarding him might be. He said quite frankly that for some reasons he would like to stay long enough to meet the new Viceroy whenever designated, but that on the other hand he was of course ready to go back at any time if you thought he could be more use at your end. I told him that that depended

a good deal on how you were filling up your Council and that I would let him know the moment I hear from you. Meanwhile, I said that my own feeling rather was that there were advantages in his going back, with all his impressions both from here and America fresh in his mind, and that I thought that you too might wish to have another member of tried experience in the work of the Council at a time when you are taking on some untried men. Anyhow, I don't think there is anything in the idea that he would go back with any reluctance.

[Para. 5, on delays in transmission of Press messages, omitted.]

[1] No. 596. [2] No. 609.

639

Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/106

SECRET *6 April 1943*

No. U.P.–182

3. With the recent debate in the House of Commons and Your Excellency's reply[1] to the "leaders" we have closed another chapter in the history of the fight with Congress. One of my police officers sums up the position as follows:—

> "Unbiassed opinion, even among Congress sympathisers, seems now to accept that Gandhi's 'rebellion' has set the clock of independence back by many years, and that his fast has not served to enhance his reputation, either at home or abroad. Outside the extremely limited circles in which the non-party or all-party 'leaders' move, there is no feeling whatever on the subject of the release of Gandhi and his followers, and the firm handling of the Congress campaign and of Gandhi's farcical fast on the part of Government has served to restore confidence in the minds of Government Servants and of the public."

I agree fully with that appreciation. The so-called "leaders" have no following and it is very right to use inverted commas when that expression is used. Another rather happy name for them which I saw somewhere was "the first cousins of Congress"! That these "leaders" have the same ideas as Congress is shown by a remark of Rajagopalachari's when he said the United Nations could never win the war in Asia unless India was free, or words to that effect.

4. The speeches by Amery and Attlee in the House of Commons have, as usual, been subjected to merely destructive criticism. One very significant point seems to me to be that no notice seems to have been taken of their remarks

[1] See No. 632, note 3.

about democracy and the necessity of modifying the British system to suit India. I have always had that idea at the back of my mind and I was particularly glad to read these portions of the speeches. In a recent reply to an address from the Lucknow District Board I quoted Attlee at some length on this point but the *Pioneer* does not reproduce any of that part of my speech. I shall continue to do what I can to rub in this point and hope that it may have some effect. Though Your Excellency is charged with closing the door to reconciliation, there is not I think any doubt that the events of the last few weeks have strengthened our position. We can now look forward, I hope, to a comparatively quiet time when we can get on with the war and also with a consideration of problems of post-war reconstruction.

Too good to be true!

L.

640

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/E/8/2527: f 148

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *7 April 1943, 1.35 am*

350. My private letter of 10th March.[1] Suggestions regarding social and economic policy. By Prime Minister's direction[2] matter is to be further considered by Cabinet after which I shall telegraph further.

[1] No. 574. [2] No. 608.

641

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *8 April 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 934–S. Council vacancies. I agree in the light of your telegram No. 6217[1] of 1st April that Firoz should replace Mudaliar. My final proposals are as follows, and I will go ahead on these lines with sounding people on hearing that you agree. Please say nothing yet to Mudaliar.

(*a*) Mudaliar—Supply.
(*b*) Begum Shah Nawaz—Information.
(*c*) Azizul Haque—Commerce (*plus* Food and new Secretaryship of Industries and Civil Supplies).

(*d*) Asoke Roy—Law.
(*e*) Dr. Khare—Indians Overseas.
(*f*) Sir S. Runganadhan—High Commissioner.
(*g*) Sir Sultan Ahmed—Defence.

2. I have still to square Sultan Ahmed as regards a portfolio as alternative to Law, probably Defence, but hope to do so today. If he agrees I will ask Herbert to make formal offer of Law Membership to Asoke Roy instructing him to keep it entirely confidential at this stage. If Roy refuses I may have some difficulty in finding a Hindu Law Member of the requisite quality, but I am prepared to take a slight risk over that.

[1] No. 634.

642

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *8 April 1943*

PRIVATE AND SECRET

2. Many thanks for what you say in paragraph 2[1] about Phillips. He is now due, I see from an inspired press communiqué here, to go off to the United States to "report" at the end of this month. He has just returned from his tour to the south about which I have already telegraphed[2] to you, and I hope to see him in the next few days. I gather that he is very anxious about a very early decision about this O.S.S. business and also about the use of the term "Counsellor" and "Secretary" in connection with his Mission. You have given me material[3] to answer him on the latter point. On the former I propose to continue to stone-wall and to let him know that the matter is still under consideration. I can quite understand his anxiety to get these outstanding points cleared up before he returns to Washington; but there are of course other factors to be taken into consideration. I rather wish that he had not given it to be understood that he was submitting a "report" to Roosevelt: for I do not in the first place think it the business of a foreign representative in a country to report formally on its internal condition and politics, though obviously in practice every accredited diplomat does so. But there is the risk in this delicate position here of still further encouraging people who are anxious to get something out of American intervention to imagine that we are as it were in the dock and that when the case against us has been properly put forward, there may be a move on the American side. However that cannot be helped and we must just take

[1] Of No. 579. [2] Nos. 635 and 636. [3] Not printed.

things as we find them and make the best of them. I gather from the inspired press communiqué which I have mentioned above that Phillips has it in mind to come back here about July. I propose to ask him to come and stay with me for two or three days before he goes back to the States.

* * *

5. The Lords Debate[4] seems to have gone just as well as the debate in the Commons, and I wish you would tell Munster how good I thought his presentation was. I dare say we shall hear more about this idea of an investigating commission,[5] especially now that the *Times* has apparently lent support in rather general terms to it.[6] At some stage or other, too, I dare say that it may be necessary to consider it: but I am in no hurry. One point that I do want to make (I had made it before but it is worth reiterating) is that in no circumstances would it be possible for the Governor-General of the day to have responsibility for such a body. If and when it came it is quite essential that it should have an independent chairman and work quite independently of the Governor-General and the Government of India in much the same way as the Simon Commission or any other Royal Commission did. But I hope we shall not let ourselves be rushed into accepting even the idea of a commission of this type (though as you say I think at some time or other it may prove to be the right way of easing strain) without the most careful preliminary examination of its methods of work, its personnel, the circumstances in which it is to be set going, &c. There will of course be a howl if it is (like the Simon Commission) predominantly or essentially European. There would equally be a howl if it does not contain appropriate communal representation, and the Muslim League and Congress, given the present Congress attitude, the representation of that point of view is not going to be too easy. What these people really ought to do is to get down to this business themselves. They have plenty of legal talent and experience in the field of constitutional law. But the task is an unattractive one. There is no publicity or glory to be secured from performing it, vital as it is, with the result that the prominent politicians here (and equally party machines) prefer to concentrate on somewhat windy speeches which lead one nowhere, and to avoid the solid and difficult task of trying to lay foundations for themselves.

* * *

11 April 1943

8. Many thanks for your private and personal telegram of the 5th April No. 345[7] about the Bengal situation. We are in complete agreement about it. I have since had two further letters dated 7th April[8] from Herbert (one is his fortnightly report, though it is almost entirely occupied with the Huq incident and is to some extent a personal apologia). I have repeated to you the telegram[9] I have sent him as regards commissioning Nazimuddin to try to form a

Ministry, and I send you by this bag copy of my reply[10] to his letters of the 7th April. I must say that the more I consider the handling of this business the more lighthearted and irresponsible it seems to me to have been. And Herbert may yet very well, unless he is very lucky, find himself in a position in which Nazimuddin is unable to get a Ministry together, while Huq is in a position to claim that he has a working majority behind him (I do not anticipate that Huq would feel any difficulty in giving assurances that he would support the war!). We should find it extremely difficult—indeed quite impossible—in the circumstances to justify carrying on under Section 93. But Herbert's position I would judge to be a most unhappy one if he were left with no alternative but to send again for Huq, even allowing for the fact that that experienced politician probably works to standards so elastic that he might feel no particular difficulty in resuming service under the present Governor despite what has passed! However, though I have felt bound to make very clear to Herbert my own view of his attitude, and though we may yet have a good deal of trouble, the only thing, as you and I both agree, is to continue to give him all possible support and hope for the best. Luckily the very complexity of the situation and the interest of the Muslim League in getting Nazimuddin into power and keeping Huq out, have both of them continued to tend to divert attention from the Governor. Let us hope that will continue. But I am not happy at the Caste Hindu side of the whole business. The last thing we want, with Bengal more or less in the front line, is an active increase in communal tension with possible reversions to terrorism; and a Ministry which was essentially Muslim League, Scheduled Caste, and Europeans, and which for practical purposes left the Caste Hindus in the cold, might well be a serious provocation to Caste Hindu feeling.

* * *

12 April 1943

11. I have been watching with a good deal of interest reactions in the press to the suggestion tentatively thrown out in the Debate and backed by the *Times* on which I have commented earlier in this letter, for a fact-finding commission. So far it would not, I think, be an exaggeration to say that no active support

4 *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of L., vol. 127, 6 April 1943, cols. 6–58.

5 i.e. an expert fact-finding committee to consider the Indian constitutional problem. The suggestion was made by Lord Samuel and supported by Lord Hailey. *Ibid.*, cols. 31, 49–50.

6 *The Times* of 7 April briefly reported Lord Samuel's suggestion and Lord Hailey's endorsement of it.

7 Agreeing that Sir J. Herbert's handling of the situation had been maladroit but that he must now be supported in clearing up the consequences. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

8 MSS. EUR. F. 125/43.

9 Stating that Bengal could not be left under Section 93 if a working majority willing to support a ministry existed in the Legislature; that if Sir Nazimuddin had the best chance of forming a ministry he should be invited to do so; and that if he failed other persons, not excluding Mr Fazlul Huq, must be tried. Telegram 946–S of 11 April 1943. *Ibid.*

10 *Ibid.*

has manifested itself for this suggestion, and that there is a good deal of quite frank criticism or hostility. The Muslim League, if their organ is to be believed, are not at all anxious for anything of the sort. The *Hindustan Times* is alarmed at the thought that the result of these investigations might be a breakaway from "democracy" (it ignores the fact that Congress is not prepared to work the democratic principle as embodied in the Act of 1935, and the inconsistency of refusal to work that Act and alarm at the thought of its being replaced by something of a different character); while other Hindu opinion, as voiced by a paper called *Roy's Weekly* which is not unrepresentative of a certain section, takes the line that our object is "to smash even the Government of India Act which contains the essential principle of responsible government". But what does begin to emerge in a very significant way over these last couple of months is a clear apprehension that democracy has in fact been tried and is failing or is likely to fail in this country. The Congress and Gandhi have hit it pretty hard, for no one forgets the extent to which the central Congress caucus dominated the work of the Congress Ministries in the Provinces while they were in power (today in the National Defence Council one member described Nazism as "an honest form of Gandhism"!), and it is equally clear that Jinnah, if he could, would establish just as close a stranglehold over the operations of Muslim Ministries. But it will take some time before these trends of opinion become sufficiently marked to enable us to draw any conclusions of value from their existence.

* * *

13 April 1943

13. I have been busy yesterday and today with the periodical meeting of the National Defence Council. It has gone extremely well, and I am more and more confirmed in my view of the real value of this body and of its representative character, while the discussions proceed on a definitely high level.

All fortune!

643

War Cabinet Paper W.P. (43) 150

L/E/8/2527: ff 137–41

Social and Economic Policy for India

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, *9 April 1943*

At the War Cabinet Meeting on the 31st August, 1942 (W.M. (42) 119th Conclusions, Minute 9)[1] I was invited to "draw the Governor-General's attention to the general feeling of the War Cabinet that the Government of India

might with advantage give early consideration to the development of a more progressive social and industrial policy." A few days later I received a copy of a Note on Indian Policy[2] by the present Minister of Aircraft Production, which advocated that we should seek to secure the support of the mass of Indian opinion during the war by a large-scale positive programme of social improvement, supported by a propaganda campaign designed to show that these benefits were due to British initiative. On the 20th September, 1942,[3] the Prime Minister directed that this Note should be considered by the Minister of Aircraft Production, the Minister of Labour, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and myself. As the proposals in the Note were obviously relevant to any communication to the Government of India of the War Cabinet Conclusion referred to above, I refrained from communicating it pending further consideration of the matter.

The Ministers concerned met in accordance with the Prime Minister's directions on the 29th September,[4] and Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar and some of my Advisers were present. The discussion at this meeting made it clear that to launch and maintain a social and economic policy which might achieve the political ends projected would require a very large sum of money. A policy on the scale envisaged could only be initiated and directed from here if it were to a large extent financed by this country, as the responsibility for matters of this kind was transferred to Indian hands some 25 years ago. The sort of sum required to produce any substantial political effects of the kind envisaged would be of the order of £400 or £500 million, spread over 10 years. The effect of such payments would be to aggravate the already serious problem of the Indian sterling balances. Moreover, some of my Advisers, and Sir Ramaswami Mudaliar in particular, considered that we should gain little or nothing politically, as all parties would allege that the policy was an attempt to bribe the population away from its political leaders. The meeting agreed that I should prepare a note showing progress made in these matters in recent years, and this was provided during October.[5] I then suggested that we should put to the Viceroy the general proposition recorded in W.M. (42) 119th Conclusions, Minute 9 but the Minister of Aircraft Production felt that we should draw up more specific proposals, and he and the Minister of Labour[6] have drawn up a memorandum setting out the lines upon which they feel that the Government of India should be urged through the Viceroy to proceed. This note forms Appendix I to this paper.

My views on the matter are contained in the note which forms Appendix II. Shortly, I consider that it would be undesirable to issue instructions to an outgoing Viceroy, without previous reference to the Indian authorities who are primarily responsible for matters in this field, and who are at present engaged

[1] Vol. II, No. 664. [2] Vol. II, No. 678. [3] Vol. II, No. 775. [4] No. 46.
[5] See No. 114, note 1. [6] See Nos. 544 and 545.

upon the consideration of social and reconstruction plans. The Minister of Labour and the Minister of Aircraft Production would prefer to dispense with this reference and the Prime Minister has directed that the matter should be considered by the War Cabinet.

L. S. A.

Appendix I to No. 643

[*There follows the enclosure to No. 276.*]

Appendix II to No. 643

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

The Note by the Minister of Labour and the Minister of Aircraft Production recognises in its first sentence that during the last 40 years great advances have been made in the social and economic life of India. In an earlier stage of our discussions I supplied some particulars of the developments which have taken place in recent times in regard to agriculture, labour, education, public health, &c. There has been a great awakening of practical interest which has shown itself in widespread activity, and it is certainly true to say that the progress of the last quarter of a century has greatly exceeded that of any previous period. Much of this is the outcome of the reports of the Royal Commissions on Labour and Agriculture, which between them covered practically the whole field of economic livelihood. Within the limited resources available (and here I would mention, as an instance of the active desire to promote welfare work, the funds placed at the disposal of the Provincial Government[s] for this purpose by the Centre at a time of great financial stringency while Sir James Grigg was Finance Member of the Government of India) the results have been notable, and the credit belongs both to the agencies for which we ourselves are responsible and to the Indian public men who have served in the various Governments and Legislatures. Progress has continued up to the present time, notwithstanding preoccupation with the war, and the meeting at Delhi in 1942 of the first Tripartite Indian Labour Conference, representing Government, employers and labour, is a significant example. Welfare work has also been maintained and extended, notwithstanding the political *impasse*, in those Provinces in which, owing to the policy of the Congress, responsible Ministries have been replaced by official Executive Governments.

[*There follows the text of the enclosure to No. 356 from the second sentence of the second para.* (*'It is important always to bear . . .'*), *except that the para. beginning 'There is nothing to be gained' on p. 532 and the last two paras. are omitted.*]

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

PRIVATE AND SECRET INDIA OFFICE, *9 April 1943*

[Paras. 1–5, on military–political issues involved in campaign for reconquest of Burma, omitted.]

6. I hope something will come of the belated idea of an Imperial Conference this summer. My own view is that so far as India is concerned, while that should affect the choice of Prince whom you would send, I should not let it interfere unduly with whatever decisions you have in mind for the most effective working of your Executive. As I telegraphed to you the other day, Mudaliar would no doubt be an abler representative, more particularly when it comes to economic questions, than Firoz. On the other hand, having been away from India for over a year now he cannot speak so directly for you and your Government as another, and Firoz would make in every other respect a successful representative. There is, of course, the question whether both representations [representatives?] should be Muslim, and in that case there might be something to be said for sending the Jam Saheb over again on the special ground that he, as Chancellor, would most fully represent the Princely Order, leaving Bhopal to replace him in the autumn.

[Para. 7, on the Kayyur executions; and para. 8, on the proposed scheme for an optional appeal to the Supreme Court in India in lieu of appeal to the Privy Council, omitted.]

9. In paragraph 6 of your letter of the 23rd March[1] you expressed doubts as to the possibility of Zafrullah, as Judge of the Federal Court, engaging in the quasi-political activities of getting people together to study the problem of the future constitution. That is exactly why I deprecated his idea of trying to form something in the nature of a moderate party, but on the contrary encouraged the idea that he should get people together for serious constitutional study. The active political leaders are precluded by their whole history and temperament, as well as by their manœuvrings for power, from being capable of studying the constitutional problem, at any rate at the present stage. I should have thought it was just the kind of thing that a judge could do without prejudice to his judicial character, to get together professors, publicists and other thoughtful people not too deeply committed to politics in order to collect the material facts which are essential to any understanding of the

One wonders what Gwyer would think of this.

L.

[1] No. 609.

constitutional problem. For the Government to set up such a body would at once arouse criticism as to its composition, terms of reference, &c. On the other hand, if such a body grows up of itself through the personal activities of someone outside active politics and remains underground or at any rate unpublicised in its earlier stages and then only publicised by such memoranda as it may issue, it will have a much better chance. I confess I can see no other way of preparing for a post-war solution.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/11/5b: f 64

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *11 April 1943, 1 am*

364. Your p. & p. telm. 934–S[1] of 8th April. Council vacancies. I agree to your going ahead on lines proposed. I conclude you are satisfied as to adequacy and acceptability of S. Ahmed in Defence. Runganadhan has not yet returned from U.S.A.

[1] No. 641.

646

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *13 April 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 961–S. A. K. Roy has accepted Law Membership.

2. Sultan Ahmed may not be very heroic in the Defence portfolio but he will be quite sufficiently competent for its work, which is not very trying.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *13 April 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 970–S. My telegram of 2nd April No. 891–S.[1] Phillips. I would be grateful for very early reply as my present intention is to see him on or about the

22nd of the month. I understand that he has just had a three and a half hour talk with Jinnah his theme being Congress–Muslim League understanding in the interests of the war effort. Jinnah I am informed replied that he was not willing to commit political suicide even in the interests of the principle that Phillips had in view. Jinnah is said to have got up thrice but Phillips to have stayed on despite that.

[1] No. 635.

648

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *15 April 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 986–S. I have now offered London to Firoz, but to my disappointment he has declined alleging: (*a*) domestic difficulties, and (*b*) that there is nothing to do in London. He may be influenced a little by pique that Sultan Ahmed was approached first, but I suspect that there are personal reasons which it may not be easy to get over. He is, I fear, quite impervious to argument on public grounds. I am asking Craik to do what he can but am not very sanguine.

2. This is another example of India's failing to produce public men to fill appointments for which she clamours. You will remember that I had some difficulty in getting Mudaliar to go to London in the first place; and I am by no means certain about the Jam Saheb returning.

3. If Firoz stands firm I could of course have another shot at Sultan Ahmed, but he bases himself on health grounds and so is in a strong position. Nor do I want to go outside my Council for this very important appointment. It must be filled by a Muslim this time, and I would not regard Usman as physically fit.

4. I see nothing for it in these circumstances if Firoz refuses to budge, but to recall Mudaliar, and to leave the post, at any rate temporarily, vacant. But that means that we shall have one extra Muslim here, and I see no way of getting round that corner save by dropping (which I should do with regret) my proposal to put in the Begum, and by sending Sultan Ahmed to Information.

5. This of course means further delay[1] in filling our vacancies but it cannot be helped. I hope to telegraph again tomorrow.

6. Present position as regards other vacancies is that Roy has accepted; letters of invitation are on their way to Khare and Azizul Haque; I have told Ahmed

[1] Deciphered as 'progress (sic)'.

that in view of his refusal of London he must leave himself in my hands (which he has agreed to do) and that I will do my best for him. Nothing has yet been said to the Begum, and in the events described above she may drop out altogether. I think approach to Mudaliar might wait until I have telegraphed tomorrow, when I shall know better where I stand as regards a candidate from here in succession to him.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *15 April 1943*

PRIVATE AND SECRET

I have just had on the same day no fewer than three letters from you, all of which I was delighted to get—your letters of the 26th[1] and 31st March,[2] and 5th April[3]—and I send you a line on the points arising out of them.

2. Like yourself,[4] I am glad that Winston dropped the idea of winding up the Debate, and I am amused by what you say in your letter of the 26th March about the earlier apprehensions (coupled with a full realisation that they could do nothing about it) of your Labour colleagues at what he might have decided to say! I was most interested in your account of the atmosphere of the Debate—you will have had my telegram conveying my very sincere congratulations on your handling of it, and, if I may say so, on your handling of members in the lobbies and elsewhere which must have contributed so materially to this very satisfactory result. Munster, too, did admirably, I think, in the House of Lords. You are perfectly right in what you say in paragraph 3 of your letter of the 31st March on the reactions of Sapru, &c.! The nationalist press is, as usual, dragged into [in two?] opposite directions—on the one hand they feel bound to say that Mr. Amery's speech was on reactionary lines by now so familiar that nobody pays the least attention to it and that it is not worth reading; on the other, they realise that they cannot let the very damaging material which the speech contains pass unanswered, and devote columns of acid criticism of it! I think we are pretty comfortable at the moment as regards the getting across of our case, and the debates, my reply[5] to Rajagopalachariar and his friends, and the two Home Department pamphlets,[6] have between them put us in a very strong position.

3. There is no sign of life from the Aga Khan's Palace. Intercepted correspondence shows that Sapru, Rajagopalachariar, the Metropolitan, and the like are much annoyed by the fate of the Deputation; that Sapru is becoming

thoroughly bored with the whole business, and feels that Rajagopalachariar let his zeal carry him to dangerous lengths; while Rajagopalachariar himself I would judge to feel that he is keeping the Congress flag flying: that he can lie back now for a month or so; but that it is of desperate importance to the Congress that they should keep in the limelight by some means or other. The technique, in a different way, is very much that which Gandhi adopted a couple of years ago over individual civil disobedience: If Congress cease to be in the papers they are done; they cannot on the other hand hope to do anything sensational without getting into serious trouble; the only hope in those circumstances is to keep up a trickle of incidents, protests, deputations, complaints, &c., which will ensure that they are not wholly forgotten. A whispering campaign is afoot at this moment to suggest that the Mahatma is planning a "fast unto death", and I have reason to think that Devadas, Gandhi's son, who edits the *Hindustan Times*, and Birla are among its promoters. The Mahatma himself will have to see what he can do on a slightly more important scale once he is physically fit. Meanwhile Congress interests from the point of view under discussion are pretty safe in Rajagopalachariar's skilful hands! But I notice that the sincerity of his support for the Pakistan theory is beginning to be queried in certain Muslim circles which find it difficult to reconcile the full support for Pakistan which Rajagopalachariar claims to give with certain of his remarks designed to comfort Congress and the Hindus.

4. I am much interested in your comments on the possibility of some alternative solution of the problem of Government in this country. I find it very significant that (as I think I have mentioned in earlier letters) there should on the one hand be so little interest here in any alternative, and, on the other, so much apprehension in certain quarters, essentially Hindu, of a change to a more autocratic, self-centred, and, shall I say, sensibly based system. My impression that public opinion regards independence or even Dominion Status as having receded a long way in the last two or three months continues to be confirmed.

5. I am so very glad that you took the line that you mention in paragraph 4 of your letter in your speech. I think we owe a very great deal to Winston for the pains at which he has been over the last year to take a stiffer line about the Empire and about our position in the world. What I, as you know, have been afraid of (as I tried to bring out in my telegram of last January about colonial policy)[7] is that we should be content to lie back and let ourselves be pushed off the map by the Americans and others at a time when we ought to be blowing our own trumpet pretty loudly, and making it clear to the world that we have

[1] No. 616. [2] No. 633. [3] No. 638. [4] See No. 633. [5] See No. 632, note 3.
[6] i.e. the pamphlet reprinted in England as Cmd. 6430 and presumably the Press release of the correspondence between Lord Linlithgow and Mr Gandhi.
[7] No. 310.

not the slightest intention of being bluffed by accusations of imperialism into giving up anything, or relinquishing any of our controls, save for very good reasons indeed. I hope that as the war goes on and as a satisfactory conclusion to it draws nearer, some increase in national self-confidence, which will lead to increased support for the point of view which you and I both favour, will manifest itself. But meanwhile I am certain that the public needs to be reminded continually of the facts, and that we can well afford to risk the accusation of jingoism: for the prizes at stake are far too great to justify us in taking any chances whatever.

6. Let me only say before I pass from politics that I was very glad to read what you say in paragraph 2 of your letter about the present Labour Party estimate of the Congress position.

7. You mentioned in paragraph 5 of your letter of the 31st March, this business of the internationalisation of aviation. I have just had, *via* Mudaliar, a copy of the papers, but have not had time to look at them. But I am greatly interested in this business, and am sure that its importance is real. I commented on it in a preliminary way in my letter of last week.[8] I was much amused to find from Mudaliar's letter that Cripps had made, in the discussion in committee, one of these characteristically unhappy contributions, and that the position had only been saved by Attlee, the Chancellor and yourself.[9] You may be certain that a remark such as Mudaliar quotes from Cripps will become widely known out here, and will still further confirm the general feeling that his approach last year was not an honest one. You and I know the good intentions behind that approach so far as that approach was on the lines indicated by Cabinet; but you and I know also that Cripps went far beyond what he was authorised to say, and that he would in all probability have gone further still if he had not been pulled up; and I still find it difficult to overestimate the amount of damage which the Mission has done both to the prospect of reconciliation between the parties and to general belief in the good faith of the Cabinet—a great pity.

* * *

9. As for Hyderabad, which you mention in paragraphs 7 and 8 of your letter of the 31st March, I will comment at greater leisure. As you know, I have not taken, and do not take, the possibility of one or more Indian unions at all seriously. You are right in thinking that the reply[10] to the Jam Sahib about Cripps' observations went off long ago. I cannot understand why you should not have had a copy of it, and I will ask the Department.

* * *

11. As you will have gathered from my telegrams, I am finding the filling of these three or four vacancies in my Council almost as difficult as forming a

whole coalition administration! and as I write I do not feel at all optimistic of getting Firoz Khan Noon to go to London, while Sultan Ahmed has run out for reasons that I may believe to be entirely without substance, but cannot refuse to accept. The fact is, as experience over these last few months has shown, that while Indians make it an immense grievance if they are not given all the best seats, their main anxiety (as in the case of admission to European clubs in this country) is to get the seats or get the entrée, use them if they can be turned to immediate, or nuisance, effect, and leave it at that. You know how hard we have found it to get Indians to take vacancies on your Council in these last few months (I recognise that London has not been an attractive spot but people must be prepared to take some chances). I have had just the same difficulty over the High Commissionership, and over the finding of an Indian of any competence or standing to go to the United States, either as Agent-General or on these purchasing missions, &c., while with Mudaliar, in whom we found a really useful man for the War Cabinet, I had, as you will remember, to press very hard before he accepted. Firoz, I gather, takes the line that he would be quite ready to go home if there was any work to be done, but that he understands there is no work; that he had much better remain until some work turns up; and that if I seriously imagine that any single member of my Council would be prepared to go to London at this moment I am sadly mistaken! What none of these people allow to enter into their minds for one moment is the thought of India's interest or their obligations to her. I must say that the longer I go on in close association with personnel at the highest level in this country the more pessimistic I become.

12. As I am saying to you by telegram, if Firoz does refuse to play and if I have to keep both him and Sultan Ahmed in my Council, then I see nothing for it but to leave the vacancy in London unfilled for the present and drop the Begum. I shall be sorry to drop the Begum for though neither you nor I ever anticipated that she would be outstandingly competent I feel sure that politically,

[8] Para. 3 of letter of 8–13 April (No. 642) not printed.

[9] Sir R. Mudaliar's letter of 2 April to Sir G. Laithwaite reported on a meeting of the Reconstruction Committee of the War Cabinet which he had attended on 29 March. He had asked what would be the position of India (which 'would find it difficult to forgo the building up of her internal services') if full internationalisation, which the Committee proposed should be suggested to the U.S. and U.S.S.R., was accepted. 'Before the Chairman [Mr Attlee] could reply, Cripps burst out with the extraordinary statement that His Majesty's Government would no doubt ask the Secretary of State to persuade India to accept the decision! The irony of it was obvious. I was even more struck by the irony of the situation that the gentleman who offered India "Dominion Status or even Independence" should make such a remark. Before I could retort however the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Attlee and Amery all said that India would be fully entitled to express disagreement if it so desired. And the words simmering on my tongue remained unuttered. Give me a good straightforward conservative every time to a "full-blooded Socialist or internationalist" who when scratched is found to be an autocrat!' MSS. EUR. F. 125/130.

[10] See No. 309, note 4.

both here and at home, her appointment to my Council would have gone very well, and I am anxious in any case to encourage Indian women, particularly that section of them which is prepared to co-operate with us. Sultan Ahmed has agreed to leave himself in my hands. If Firoz went home I would have sent him to Defence, as you know, but if Firoz will not go home I shall keep Firoz in Defence and put Sultan Ahmed in Information. How tiresome they all are! And how relieved I shall be when I have got this set of changes through—and still more when I hear from you the name of my successor!

13. I am glad to say that I have got this reorganisation of the Commerce Department[11] through in good time. I send you a copy of the communiqué[12] which was issued here about the new Department of Industries and Civil Supplies, and I will get them to send you an official telegram entering into rather more detail. I am telling Azizul Haque that I shall expect him to leave the handling of the Food Department to me for the present; and I will advise him not to try to do his Secretaries' work in Commerce, or Industries and Civil Supplies. We suffer here, as you have probably realised, from the inheritance of a tradition of Members of Council who were drawn from the Civil Service and accustomed to wandering through files, composing drafts &c. Into their chairs there have moved well-meaning non-officials with little or no administrative experience, who feel that it is up to them to adopt the procedure of their predecessors, whereas in fact what they ought to do is to keep policy in their hands and make the Services do the detailed work. I did try at an earlier stage to get them on to the right lines, but without much success; I hope my successor may be more fortunate.

* * *

VICEROY'S CAMP, DEHRA DUN, *16 April*

16. As I write I await a further report from Herbert about the Bengal position. Nazimuddin has now been invited to try to get the nucleus of a Ministry, backed by a stable majority, together. If he succeeds the Section 93 Proclamation can be withdrawn and Nazimuddin formally invited to assist in forming a Ministry. I saw one of the leaders of the Europeans in Calcutta yesterday, and he gave me a little more background. Herbert told him, he tells me, that he realised the moment he handed Fazlul Huq the draft letter of resignation that he had made a mistake, and my informant was critical of certain other aspects of the handling of this business which you will easily identify. But the Europeans appreciate fully the importance of trying to get if possible some Caste Hindu support, and my informant seemed to have some hope that Basu and Banerjee, the Forward Bloc Ministers in Huq's late government, would be willing to serve in Nazimuddin's Ministry. He touched on the impossible position in which the Governor would find himself were Huq to come back, and said without beating about the bush that he did not see how the

Governor could in such circumstances avoid going. Let us hope for the best. Herbert has been most unwise, but we may yet get round the corner. If we do there are great advantages in being rid of Huq; and a Ministry under Nazimuddin will, I would hope, lend much more effective support to war effort than we were ever able to get from Huq dominated by the somewhat sinister figure of S. P. Mukerji in the background.

[11] See No. 611, para. 2. [12] Not printed.

650

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE PERSONAL VICEROY'S CAMP, DEHRA DUN, *16 April 1943, 7.10 pm*
Received: 16 April, 9 pm

No. 63–S.C. Nationalist press splashes statement by Madame Chiang about importance of freedom of India and necessity of liberating Nehru. Nehru is under restraint for complicity in urging and organising a rebellion in this country in circumstances of which you are aware, and it is quite intolerable if report is correct, and occasion was public, which perhaps you would confirm that anyone in Madame Chiang's position should press for his release or try in this manner to intervene in the internal business of a foreign and allied country. Chinese reactions to our taking sides in Chinese internal politics need not be emphasised. I must ask that formal protest in strongest terms be made through Ambassador, Chungking, and an assurance asked for that there shall be no repetition of this indiscretion. My difficulties here are very great, and my position will become impossible if this type of thing is allowed to pass without rebuke. It is for consideration whether I should not be authorised to let it be known here (in view of reactions on Muslims, &c.) that a formal protest has been made at Chungking. Nothing could be better calculated to revive Congress hopes or to depress those elements which supported us in the rebellion and on whose help we must depend.

2. I should be grateful for earliest possible reply.

651

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *16 April 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 64–S.C. I have had another shot at Firoz but without success. I do not yet despair but my hopes are diminishing rapidly. If he refuses to budge then I see nothing for it but, as suggested in my telegram of yesterday,[1] to drop the Begum and send Ahmed to Information, bringing Mudaliar out as already planned to do Supply, and leaving the British India post in London vacant. I am glad to say that the Jam Saheb whom I saw yesterday told me he is quite ready to go back so far as the Princes are concerned.

2. You will be amused to hear that Firoz has now shifted his ground and bases his refusal on the precarious condition of his health. Were he to go home he would have to indulge in much public speaking and neither his throat nor his enfeebled general health could possibly stand this, though if there were a question of his going home as a representative of India on a Peace Conference it would be quite a different story. Comment is needless! He is as strong as a horse.

3. Khare has accepted Indians Overseas.

[1] No. 648.

652

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2754: f 59

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *16 April 1943, 12.15 am*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

384. Your private and personal telegram 970–S[1] of 13th April. Phillips. I have only recently been able to see Eden and ascertain what he did on this subject when he was in the U[nited] S[tates]. I have now done so and am consulting him on a draft reply to your 891–S,[2] which I hope will issue in the next few days. Eden says that Hull's attitude was entirely satisfactory.

[1] No. 647. [2] No. 635.

653

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/11/5b: f 49

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *16 April 1943, 7.30 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 17 April*

391. Your private and personal telegram 986–S.[1] Council. I see no objection to leaving India without representation here for the present. Conference of Dominion Premiers and Ministers may be in June, July, or later in the summer and in either case you could send representatives for that who might stay on as representatives at War Cabinet or go back on its conclusion as may be most convenient. Their presence at Conference will keep before the public eye fact that India is treated in this matter on par with Dominions.

[1] No. 648.

654

Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/8/9a: ff 116–18

INDIA OFFICE, *16 April 1943*

My dear Winston,

The Viceroyalty. It is really important that we should come to a decision soon. Whoever is appointed will want to do a lot of work in this office bringing himself up to date with the details of a complicated situation, not to speak of all the domestic arrangements involved, selection of personal staff, the shutting up of a household and putting on board ship for a two or three months' voyage of all the things that a new Viceroy will require under strange conditions. There is the further point that the sooner India generally knows that a new Viceroy is appointed, the more readily the Indian public will settle down to the immediate present situation and wait till he comes out.

To keep India within the Commonwealth during the next ten years is much the biggest thing before us. If we can keep her for ten years I am convinced we can keep her for good, even within the Dominion relationship. Almost everything will depend on the personality of the next Viceroy and his successor. The job is the biggest one in the whole Empire and intrinsically more important than any in the Government here. Next to winning the war, keeping India in the Empire should be the supreme goal of British policy.

Having said that, I should like to suggest to you, as my first choice, that you give me Anthony. I know all the obvious objections, from his point of view

as well as from yours, and have discussed them with him. With complete unselfishness he is prepared to put himself at your disposal and to go if you will send him. His knowledge of foreign affairs and the excellent relations he has created in America should be of enormous help to him—and consequently to us—not only from the point of view of American opinion about the Government of India, but also from the point of view of the increasing extent to which, as Anakim develops,[1] the Viceroy will perforce find himself obliged to carry out many of the functions of a Minister of State in dealing with Americans, Chinese, conquered Siamese, etc. So do not reject this suggestion of mine off-hand, however startling you may think it at first, and let us talk it over next week.

If you feel that to be an impossible solution, then I am more and more myself of the opinion that the next best choice is Sam Hoare. He knows the background of the Indian situation; he knows foreign affairs, and he has done a very good job in Madrid. In spite of a mincing manner he has got both courage and tenacity. You may have differed with him—as indeed you did with me—over the India Bill, but that was 8 years ago and the whole situation has altered. Events have confirmed your objection to the idea of a Federal Government for India based on the British Parliamentary model. On the other hand, events have also committed us far beyond the 1935 discussions to the conception of India as a Dominion in the fullest sense of the word. Your appointing him would be a signal recognition of the fact that old differences no longer count. I think he has still got plenty of good work in him, though he is only 5 or 6 years younger than you or me. From all I hear, she has risen very well to her duties in Madrid and would, I feel sure, be adequate in India.

There is the further advantage about his going that he could undoubtedly be spared from Madrid now, where the really critical period is passed, much more easily than you could spare any other possible candidate.

That brings me to John Anderson. Like Sam, he knows his Indian background; more intimately, indeed, in one sense, though mainly from the angle of one particular province which is by no means the whole of India. He would, I think, handle his Executive well—and that is going to become increasingly important—but not, I think, any better than Sam. On the other hand, I should have thought that at this end he was more difficult for you to spare than anyone, including even Anthony. He gets through an amazing amount of work as almost universal referee, and I don't see any of the others quite filling that bill. However, that is an aspect of the question for you, and not for myself, to judge. All I would say is that, as between him and Sam I do not believe he would be better or bring an equally wide range of experience. . . .[2]

Failing these, I would once again suggest serious consideration of Attlee. He knows the Indian problem and has no illusions about Congress. If he lacks personality he has at any rate ability and shrewd judgment and would, I think,

handle his Council effectively. The appointment would be well received here and in America. It would leave you with a fight in the Labour Party for the succession; but whether you got Morrison or Bevin as successor, the fight would not be very long and things would settle down. I cannot imagine any permanent danger to the stability of the Coalition being involved.

Archie Sinclair would make a very good Viceroy in ordinary times; but I doubt whether he has quite the gifts required to handle so critical a situation, and there is always the innate Liberal hankering after dealing with a situation by a phrase. Here, too, a question of succession to the leadership of his Party would be involved.

Lumley has recent and intimate Indian experience, though also only of one province, where he has done very well. But I confess his nervousness over seeing things through with Gandhi has somewhat shaken my own confidence in his capacity to face the kind of crisis we may very well have in the next few years. Also I get the impression that he isn't at all keen to go back to India.

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

[1] Codename for recapture of Burma. [2] Personal comment omitted.

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Mr Amery to Mr Eden

L/PO/8/9a: f 119

16 April 1943

My dear Anthony,

Just after you left this afternoon I asked Winston when he could have a talk with me about the Viceroyalty. He told me to send him a letter now dealing with various names and that he would then discuss it with me, I hope, next week. I have just sent him a letter[1] and I think, in view of our talks, you ought to see what I have said. Please let me have the copy back when you have looked at it.

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

[1] No. 654.

656

Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/92

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL GOVT. HOUSE, LAHORE, *17 April 1943*

No. 444

Dear Lord Linlithgow,

Gandhi's fast has receded ingloriously into the background so far as this Province is concerned and minor attempts to work up enthusiasm for Congress manœuvres have met with no success. I agree entirely with everything that Your Excellency has said on this subject in your private and personal letter of March the 19th.[1] There is no doubt that your firm handling of the situation has had the effect of markedly depressing the level of Congress shares and correspondingly strengthening those of Government. There have been no unfavourable service reactions in the Punjab as far as I am aware, and no difficulties with Hindu officers of the I.C.S. have been brought to my notice.

2. The main threat to our political tranquillity comes from Jinnah and the Muslim League. Shaukat tells me that you were good enough to see him at Delhi just after his interview with Jinnah, and he is most grateful for the encouragement you gave him. Jinnah appears, as you will have gathered, to have been extremely rough and overbearing in his dealings with Shaukat, whom he advised to return to the Army and give up the idea of a Muslim League ticket for the Punjab Assembly, which he could only hope to secure by means of cajolery and underground activities. Jinnah said that Shaukat's appointment as a Minister was an insult to democracy. He seems to have made one curious assertion and that was that according to his information the Governor had been anxious to refer this matter to the Muslim League, but that Khizar and his friends had objected. This balloon was obviously intended to draw Shaukat's fire, but Shaukat, so he tells me, was discreet enough to refrain from comment. Shaukat was not favourably impressed by Jinnah's tirade. He has decided now to stand for the constituency in his own district, Attock, vacated by his kinsman Nawab Muzaffar Khan on appointment to the Provincial Public Services Commission. Shaukat has accordingly applied, in accordance with the terms of the Sikander–Jinnah Pact,[2] for a Muslim League ticket for the constituency concerned. I doubt whether he has been wise in this decision, as the Khattar faction have many enemies in Attock and an election there is likely to be a costly and uncertain affair; he would have been more prudent in my opinion to have tried for a safer seat which could have been placed at his disposal. Jinnah would seem to have aroused his fighting spirit. The next question is whether the Muslim League Working Committee, to whom Shaukat has sent in his application,

will give him the ticket for which he has asked. This Committee, which has taken the place of the Parliamentary Board mentioned in the Sikander–Jinnah Pact, consists of the Nawab of Mamdot as President of the Provincial Muslim League and twenty others—largely men of no importance—whom he has nominated. Most people seem to think that Shaukat will secure his ticket from this strangely constituted body. If he does so, an appeal against the decision will, it appears, lie to Jinnah. The prevalent belief is that Jinnah would not go to the length of turning down a decision of the Committee in favour of Shaukat, but Jinnah's performances are never easy to predict. If Jinnah should take this step, it looks as though an open rupture would be unavoidable. Sir Chhotu Ram is convinced that in this case not more than about a dozen Muslim members would desert the Unionist Party and the position would still remain secure. Khizar is not so sanguine as to the result of a battle with Jinnah unless the point of difference can be narrowed down to a War issue. There is no doubt that the "Pakistan" slogan is gaining in volume, and I fear that there are a fair number of politicians in the Province who would sell the Unionist fort for their own personal advantage. One of the difficulties, as I have mentioned in my last letter, is the loose wording of the Sikander–Jinnah Pact; the more I study this document the less I like it. Unfortunately it is easier for Jinnah to twist the Pact to suit his own convenience than for the Unionist Party; it contains no satisfactory enunciation of the doctrine that the Central Muslim League authorities are expected to refrain from interference in Punjab politics.

[1] Not printed. [2] See No. 592.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/11/5b: ff 46–7

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *18 April 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

395. Your private and personal telegram 641–S.C.[1] has crossed my private and personal telegram 391[2] from which you will see that I do not feel that the position here makes it necessary to press Firoz if he is, as is evidently the case, very reluctant. I agree that in the circumstances the only course is to drop the Begum, but I cannot help wondering whether Sultan Ahmed is the best person for Information . . .[3] Is it worth considering possible variant of sending Usman to Information and Sultan Ahmed to Posts and Air?

[1] This should read 64–S.C., i.e. No. 651. [2] No. 653. [3] Personal comment omitted.

2. I am glad Jam Sahib is willing to come back here, but there is of course even less for States' representative to do than British Indian who generally has something to contribute on administrative questions arising, and if it can be managed I would be inclined to put him off until you send a British Indian for Dominion Premiers meeting whenever that is held.

658

The Marquess of Linlithgow to all Provincial Governors

MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL VICEROY'S CAMP, *18 April 1943*

My dear——,

Your Government will shortly be receiving from my Food Department a letter containing the decision of my Council as to the quantities of foodgrains which surplus areas are expected to surrender and deficit areas to receive, during the next 12 months. These figures have been very carefully worked out in the Department, and have been considered with great care by me and my colleagues in Council. They represent the targets at which Provinces should aim, both in confining their requirements to a minimum and to producing the maximum for export. The basis on which the calculations were made in respect of each Province were figures supplied by Provincial Government, but in some cases very considerable variations from the Provincial Government's figures have been adopted.

I am myself quite confident that with energy and goodwill these figures can be achieved and even surpassed. I hope that you yourself will be able to keep a watchful eye over the performance of your officers in carrying out the Scheme and, in particular, will be able to ensure that the earliest possible start is made in setting up the administrative and purchasing machinery, on which the whole Scheme pivots.

Regional Food Commissioners, who will be officers of high standing, representing the Food Department in six Regions into which the country will be divided for the purposes of the Scheme, will soon be proceeding to their posts, and I hope you will give them every encouragement in their responsible task of smoothing out local difficulties and ensuring the utmost co-operation between all administrative units.

On that, the whole success of this important Scheme depends, and I feel sure that I can rely on you to persuade your officers of the necessity of taking an all-India view of this difficult problem of food supply. An over-cautious attitude and a continuance of a policy of purely local self-sufficiency will lead us

into still greater difficulties than those which we have recently experienced; but a bold and imaginative handling of this problem will, I believe, immeasurably and permanently improve India's food position.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

659

War Cabinet Paper W.P. (43) 165

L/E/8/2527: f 136

Social and Economic Policy for India

MEMORANDUM BY THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

TREASURY CHAMBERS, *19 April 1943*

I agree generally with the views expressed by the Secretary of State for India in Appendix II to W.P. (43) 150.[1]

In paragraph 23 of Appendix I to that paper the Minister of Labour and Minister of Aircraft Production state that the fact that India by the end of the war will have wiped out her external debt and accumulated considerable sterling balances should make it possible to embark on an ambitious programme of capital development without recourse either to a high degree of forced saving or to heavy foreign borrowing. I think there may be some misapprehension on this point. The Indian Reserve Bank will certainly hold large sterling balances and will have no difficulty in selling sterling as against rupees. But the Government of India will have to produce the rupees either by additional taxation or by additional borrowing. Thus, from the internal point of view, there is no difference between the position of India and the position of Russia.

I note that in paragraph 30 of Appendix I to W.P. (43) 150 it is stated that considerable funds are now being set on one side by the Government of India for post-war reconstruction purposes. I was not aware of this, and possibly this refers to the accumulation of sterling balances which does not provide any means of overcoming the budget difficulties of the Indian Government.

K. W.

[1] No. 643.

660

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2754: ff 52–4

IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, *20 April 1943, 2.50 pm*
Received: 21 April

7892. Your telegram No. 891–S[1] of 2nd April. Phillips. I have seen Eden who tells me that he spoke to Hull in Halifax's presence about Phillips and found his attitude entirely satisfactory in regard to United States intervention.

2. As it was at our suggestion that appointment of representative of Phillips' calibre and qualifications was made in order to give his Government full but balanced information of political developments in India and as it is our hope that he will by constant contact with Indian problem come eventually to agree with our policy, we can hardly object to his seeing Indian politicians of all sorts provided of course that they are at liberty. Phillips will no doubt recognise misconception that in present Indian conditions may well arise if a foreign representative should concentrate on politicians hostile to the Government of India, or see at frequent intervals a prominent leader like Rajagopalachariar. For the same reason it is plainly undesirable that he should accord to any interviews that he may see fit to have the character of deputations. Eden and I agree that you might make friendly mention of these points to Phillips. You might also perhaps suggest that it is a pity he was not able to see Hope and balance his contacts with critics of Government by a talk with Governor and tell him that when he makes other tours after his return from U.S.A. you hope that he will give you opportunity to arrange for him to meet not only Governors of the Provinces which he visits but also District and Secretariat Officers and some of the substantial Indians who stand outside opposition parties since otherwise his picture of the situation is bound to be incomplete. I note that he met and was impressed by Secretariat Officers at Bombay.

3. I presume that he has already seen all the members of your Executive Council and people like Zafrullah. If not you might hint that he should do so.

4. Offer of facilities for further tours will give you opportunity to ascertain whether Phillips expects to return to India.

5. Halifax says he has reason to believe that some members of U.S. Administration seem not to find Government of India co-operative as they would hope on such matters as lend-lease in regard to American Forces. Nothing specific[2] is mentioned and it is difficult for Halifax to know how much there is in this but it might be a good thing to take opportunity of your talk with Phillips to ask whether in this sphere there are any particular matters on which he has

found difficulty and which he would like to mention. If Phillips has any such difficulties it would be worth while to give him chance to get them off his chest before he leaves for America for it would be most unfortunate if, once there, he had reason to feel reluctant to go back. In that case either we might get someone very much more difficult or even no one at all, which would be open to misconstruction.

[1] No. 635. [2] 'specific' omitted in decipher.

661

Mr Eden to Viscount Halifax

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 21

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN OFFICE, *20 April 1943, 8.15 pm*

No. 2601. According to press Madame Chiang Kai-shek stated in New York on April 14th that Nehru should be released, that he was a man of burning conviction and world vision, and that he was a true statesman.

Please telegraph urgently the full text of her remarks about India, and the occasion on which they were made.

Please repeat your reply to Chungking and Government of India.

Repeated to Chungking No. 376 and Government of India.

662

Viscount Halifax to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 19

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, *20 April 1943, 10.5 pm*

EN CLAIR *Received: 21 April, 6.45 am*

No. 1846. Your telegram No. 2601.[1]

Following are extracts from Associated Press account published in *New York Times* April 15th of remarks made by Madame Chiang in talk to three women representing American newspapers who accompanied her recent tour. *Begins.* She explained that many countries that have not kept pace with development of world civilisation might need transitional period of control between subjugation and freedom. These countries should have promise of definite date for freedom—and meanwhile their supervision for limited period should be by group council with disinterested motives. Pre-war plan of United States for

[1] No. 661.

independence of Philippines was example. If four great nations (United States, Britain, Russia, and China) took lead in such a plan less powerful members of United Nations would co-operate.

Question of India's freedom, said the first lady of neighbouring China, was current world problem of when and to what extent. She asserted however that Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Congress Party Leader, should be freed to throw India's released political weight into United Nations' cause because he was man with world vision. Nehru now is prisoner of British Imperial Government which controls India.

She said she thought Mohandas K. Gandhi, imprisoned leader, was somewhat cloudy in his thinking and had no world vision because he was overcome by his restricted obsession for India's freedom regardless of world conditions. *Ends.*

See my immediately following telegram.

Repeated to New Delhi 154, Chungking No. 11.

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Viscount Halifax to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 20

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, *20 April 1943, 11.24 pm*
Received: 21 April, 7.35 am

No. 1847. My immediately preceding telegram.

If fuller version of Madame Chiang Kai-shek's remarks should be obtained, I will telegraph it.

2. You will note that the second sentence about Nehru appears to be attributable to Delhi press rather than to her.

Repeated to Foreign, New Delhi 155, Chungking 12.

664

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/92

VICEROY'S CAMP, DEHRA DUN, *22 April 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

My dear Glancy,

Many thanks for your private and personal letter of the 17th April No. 444.[1] I am so glad that the Gandhi fast has gone so much into the background—that indeed seems to be the case everywhere. Twynam has just passed on to me a

rumour that the old man may be contemplating a "fast unto death" on the 9th August, possibly accompanied by organised marches on Government houses, public offices, &c. I do not take that all too seriously. It quite clearly at this stage can be only speculation, for I am entirely satisfied with the completeness of the arrangements that Bombay have made to keep the Mahatma out of touch with the world; and I should have thought myself that the explanation of it probably was that the 9th August is the 12 months' anniversary of his arrest. But it is just as well to be prepared, though I do not think we need concern ourselves too actively at this stage.

2. I was interested in your review of the Muslim League issue in its relation to the political tranquillity of the Punjab. I had a good talk with Shaukat, and did what I could to hearten him, though I had of course to take rather a cautious line, and to avoid ever giving him any guarantees, or positive statements, or going into what is properly the field of the Governor of the Province. But I think he went away in good heart, and I certainly, like you, get the very clear impression from him of the manner in which Jinnah had tried to bully him and his resentment at Jinnah's attitude. I see from the press that he has now got the Muslim League ticket for the constituency which he is fighting, and one fence is therefore taken. But I agree with you that the unpredictable Jinnah is perfectly capable, even at this stage, of making himself a nuisance, and I quite realise that no one in the Punjab probably wants to take him on unless it is quite necessary to do so.

[1] No. 656.

665

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

PRIVATE AND SECRET INDIA OFFICE, *22 April 1943*

Wavell has just blown in for tea, after a talk with Winston. I only had him for half-an-hour and didn't do more than extract a few non-committal monosyllables. However, he tells me that you are in good health and great form. I only skated round the fringe of the big problem raised in the long telegram[1] from you which reached me this morning, but I may have a further opportunity of talking to him over the Easter Week-end and we are dining together with the C.I.G.S. on Tuesday evening.

[1] In telegram 99–S.C. of 21 April Lord Linlithgow suggested creating the post of C.-in-C., Asia, under whose operational control the C.-in-C., India, would come except for purely local operations. He suggested the former post might be offered to Field Marshal Wavell and the latter to General Auchinleck. L/WS/1/1274: ff 1–5; *History of the Second World War: The War Against Japan*, vol. II (London, H.M.S.O., 1958), p. 370.

2. I think there is great force in your view that there will be so much to prepare on the material side that can only be done here or even at Washington, that Wavell, once entrusted in principle with the Asia Command, should be not only free of the duties of Commander-in-Chief in Delhi, but should also be free to spend a large part of his time over here. It isn't only that he will not be in a position to try and combine all he ought to be doing with his political and routine military duties in India, but also that the C.I.G.S. and his staff here will be absorbed in the development of the European second front. I shall have to consider carefully how to approach either Wavell or Winston on this subject and shall probably talk it over first with Brooke.

* * *

5. You referred in paragraph 26 of your letter of the 16th March[2] to certain notes on the medical aspects of Gandhi's fast. General Bradfield, after seeing the papers, says he does not think we can go further than the excellent reports of General Candy and Colonel Elliot, and their conclusion that Gandhi was fed, probably with glucose. I think we may leave it at that, recognising as you say that the whole truth may never be known. I do not propose to consult a physiologist as suggested by Candy to Bradfield. If an expert opinion is required it would be necessary to do this, but unless you tell me that you feel this would be useful I doubt if it is worth the expense.

Leave it alone!

L.

* * *

11. You may have noticed that my Office have not been able to agree to requests from your Department of Information to republish here the revised edition of a pamphlet called *Congress and the Axis*, in which I believe you have been personally interested, and one called *Some Facts about the disturbances in India 1942–43*. This is not due to any lack of enthusiasm for making widely known the true attitude of Congress. Publicity needs here are not quite the same as in India, and publications prepared in India have to be fitted into a field already partly filled by material written in this country. We have also to take serious account of the shortage of paper. I hope that your Department of Information will continue to send us immediately after publication—or, better still, as soon as the material is in final shape, so that it may be as "hot" as possible—copies of all pamphlets of this kind which your Government is bringing out. There are always ways of using the material which they contain, even if we judge that publication here would not be worth while.

I remain unconvinced. It is a mine of facts unobtainable elsewhere. I wonder if L. S. A. has read it. He ought to.

L.

12. I feel sure that the mass of opinion here now understands Congress defeatism and their attitude to the constitutional problem very much better than it has for a long time. The White Paper[3] publishing the Government of India's statement on Congress Responsibility completed the process of steadying public opinion and proved most effective in driving the points home. But I think it would be possible to oversell the market on that theme.

Iteration is the parent of truth!
L.

[2] No. 596. [3] Cmd. 6430.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *23 April 1943*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 109–S.C. Council. I am still held up over filling these vacancies. Latest developments are that Firoz has said that in deference to my insistence he will go to London, but that there is nothing whatever for him to do there; while he has even gone so far as to suggest that he thinks I may be anxious to be rid of him from India.

2. I am replying that this is not a matter for me only but for the Governor-General in Council; that I would take the general issue in Council on my return to Delhi on the 27th April on the basis of whether the Government of India wished to have a representative with the War Cabinet more or less permanently or whether the case would be met by sending people *ad hoc* now and then for special business; and that in the latter event there will of course be no need to require Firoz to proceed home now.

3. I do not propose to be unduly tender with Council over this. I realise that burden of work for India representatives is not heavy, but the value from the point of view of the Country of having these representatives is great. If however (and I would not be surprised if that were the position) Council were to think it quite sufficient to send home people *ad hoc* now and then, I imagine that there would be no difficulty from your point of view, and that you might indeed feel rather relieved. I do not suppose the Jam Saheb will be particularly anxious (though he is quite ready) to return to London in the immediate future; but I should of course have to clear the position of the States representative with him once I knew where I stand with my Council.

4. If Council favour the *ad hoc* solution then I shall have to drop the Begum (I might get a chance of putting her in to act for someone later on), and I would leave Firoz in Defence and put Sultan Ahmed into Information. Have you any news of Runganadhan? I think my invitation to Mudaliar might wait until I can let you have result of discussion in Council on the point taken above. I greatly regret delay but you will appreciate reasons for it. Would it be possible now to get the King's approval to appointment of Azizul Haque, Roy, and Khare? His approval is not I think necessary for changes of portfolio such as will be involved in the case of Sultan Ahmed. If by any chance we did have to fit in the Begum afterwards I do not imagine that a supplementary submission would give you great trouble.[1]

[1] In telegram 414 of 23 April, Mr Amery replied that there would be no objection to his obtaining the King's approval for three members now and a fourth subsequently, that approval for changes of portfolio was not necessary, and that he had heard nothing from Sir S. Runganadhan. L/PO/11/5b: f. 42.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE DEHRA DUN, *26 April 1943, 11.15 am*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 135-S.C. I have had Phillips to stay with me in camp at Dehra Dun for three days. He left yesterday, and I understand probably leaves for America today. We had full general discussions, and I was I think able to make some impression on him. Now that I have seen him at such close quarters for this period I am left with the impression that a possible weakness in his makeup is that his career has throughout been representational rather than administrative, and that he has the diplomat's very natural tendency to look for a compromise solution of any difficulty that may arise and to try to get across his instructions. Possible value of that I fully appreciate, and it is a technique that has obvious justification and advantage in normal circumstances. But circumstances arise (as in connection with the Indian problem) in which hard facts have to be faced which do not admit of a halfway house solution. Other impression I gained was that while personally charming and most friendly, I am a little doubtful whether he really gets down to the core of technical situations. But I think his visit to me here has been of real use, and may help to reduce risk of misconceptions.

2. Main issues that arose were as follows:—(*a*) *Gandhi.* He pressed me very strongly while here on two occasions to be allowed to go to see Gandhi. American newspaper opinion would certainly be interested and would ask him

why he had not visited Gandhi. He would be placed in a most embarrassing position by such enquiries. Nor could he feel that his task of collecting information, &c. for the President's help could be properly or completely performed when he had not met Gandhi. I said I fully appreciated his feeling, but that my answer must still be, as before, that I could not agree to a visit. Effect of any such visit would be disastrous in misunderstandings to which it would give rise in this country. There could be no justification for differentiating between Phillips and any other prominent person who wished to see Gandhi, and we had declined to allow Gandhi to make contact with anyone. Effect on Gandhi's prestige of personal visit by Roosevelt's Personal Representative would be exactly what Gandhi wanted, and a great score for him and a corresponding irritation to his political opponents here. Finally, Gandhi, as he was aware, was under detention because of his responsibility for a rebellion of a lamentable character, which had not only had most unhappy results internally here, but had seriously interfered with war effort. I was fully prepared to take all responsibility for refusal. If however he wished to help us with the American Press, I suggested that easiest line might be to try to divert them on to nature of circumstances in which Gandhi was detained and relevance of those circumstances to any suggestion of a request for an interview. If he proved unable to do that, then[1] he could put all the blame on me. But I could not, and would not, agree to an interview in present circumstances. I added a reference to the fact that my Government was directly concerned. Though disappointed Phillips did not press the point.

(*b*) As regards Gandhi's plans, he told me that Devadas Gandhi had given him to believe that he thought it likely that his father would stage another fast, this time to death. I asked what the reactions would be in the United States in that event. (Unless the old man told Devadas that that was his intention, I do not believe that he has had any means of communicating with the outside world since the fast, and he is far too astute to take a final decision months ahead.) Phillips thought it would be very difficult, both there and here. I said that I would of course regret it were Gandhi to die as a result of a self-imposed fast, but that once the business was over I thought that it would be a good thing that the old man should be dead, since I thought that while he remained alive he was a most definite obstacle to any form of progress. Phillips said that he would not disagree with that view, but thought that unquestionably his death would produce great complications in the United States. I told him that the decision as to what was to be done in the event of Gandhi deciding to fast to death was clearly a very delicate one, and that I could, for reasons that were obvious, express no view whatever, however tentative, myself in advance. I had to consider my Council, the Secretary of State, and the Cabinet. I might however comment that our objects in this country were to help to keep the Indian war

[1] 'then' deciphered as 'I do not think that'.

effort, and to maintain the availability of India as a platform for other war effort, at its highest point. That was the first and prime consideration, and if that consideration could best be secured, and internal trouble in addition best be avoided, by the holding of Gandhi to death then I would so hold him without the least hesitation. I could appreciate that in the event of such a decision, it might as suggested by Phillips, be awkward for the President and for opinion in the United States. But the matter was one in which we must follow our own judgment, and on which, if there was any question of the President wishing to express a view, that would properly be expressed to London and not to me (I thought it as well to make this last point given Phillips' approach to me at the time of the fast in February).

(*c*) I now turn to Phillips' general impression of the Indian problem and of what ought to be done. He has clearly gone through the beginnings of a considerable process of education over the last couple of months. He clearly begins to realise the immense complexity and intricacy of the problem, and a little more fully the delicacy of the considerations that have to be weighed and taken into account. He is now clear, I am glad to say, that the position is such that there could be no question of our handing over here for very many years, and that the situation is one that could not be hurried; while, pending a solution here, the veto (as he put it) required to keep India steady must remain in British hands. At the same time he urged very strongly that some *interim* solution should be found. When pressed I found he had no idea of what any such interim solution could be, and that he had not got near to thinking out the problem for himself. He suggested that there might be a Prime Minister, self-government, &c., but did not face up to what all that meant as a practical proposition, or to the difficulties inherent in Indian conditions in reconciling such a government with the statutory, constitutional, and communal difficulties with which you and I are so unhappily familiar. I put it to him that any responsible Ministerial Government must be responsible either to London or to India, and he accepted that and the necessity for responsibility remaining substantially as it is; but for all that harked back to the idea of an interim solution. I reminded him that the Cripps offer had been the very best type of interim solution that we could produce, and reminded him also of the reason for which it had failed and of the present unbridgeable divisions between those parties, &c. here whose co-operation with one another was an essential feature of any arrangement if chaos was not to result.

(*d*) Leading from that I thought it well to sound him on Pakistan, and reminded him of my own consistent advocacy of Indian unity. He expressed extreme satisfaction that I held to the idea of unity, which was, he thought, of the greatest possible importance; and he said quite spontaneously that any alternative solution on the basis of separation, unless Great Britain were to stay here to control the resultant position, would constitute in his judgment a most

serious threat not merely to the peace of India and the East, but probably to that of the world as a whole.

(*e*) We reverted to the question of a transitory experiment which, said Phillips, would be of great assistance to the President in the United States. I again pointed out to him the decisive practical difficulties and the fact that those had to be faced; and, touching again on his acceptance of the apparent necessity in present circumstances for retaining ultimate control in British hands, I asked him whether he had considered that in relation to the position: that it would of course mean that we must inevitably be the scapegoats for failure to get ahead. He said that that was of course possible, but that someone had to be here to keep the performance going, and he repeated that it was clear that Indians could not work a constitution themselves without us for a long time to come. In reply to his question as to what the end of it all was to be, I reminded him that there was no finality in dealing with any political problem anywhere, that I would fully agree with him if he said that the position I was holding was not a *constructive* one, but that it was for all that a practical one; and that I was perfectly satisfied that while, if and when the time for handing over came, some risks would have to be taken, he would recognise that while we were here we must carry on, and that the residual responsibility must rest with His Majesty's Government.

3. Phillips has got the idea of some sort of transitory solution, which would help to justify his own mission here, and no doubt ease matters for the President, very firmly fixed in his mind. I need not amplify to you or to Halifax the decisive practical difficulties which are only too obvious to all of us. But I think Halifax (to whom I suggest that you should repeat this telegram private and personal) should be warned of these, so that he, with his own great knowledge of the complexity of the Indian problem, the bitterness of communal division, the issue of defence, and (a factor that has emerged very sharply since his time) the swiftly emerging and decisive nature of Muslim objection to any form of majority rule or Hindu control, may be in a position to take advantage of his contacts with Phillips to support the general line that I have set out above. I am on the whole well satisfied with the outcome of our conversations. I do not at all suppose that Phillips is satisfied: I would not be surprised were he to move much more in the "progressive" direction as he gets geographically away from India, and he may be much less conservative in New York than he was when I spoke to him here. But I think he is beginning to realise a little that the solution is infinitely more difficult than he, or others of great goodwill, but little practical experience, may imagine. And I am entirely clear that *we* must stand firm and not compromise ourselves and the future in the hope of buying off well-intentioned, but irresponsible and uninformed, criticism in the U.S.A. or elsewhere; and that if we yield, where we are satisfied that we are right, we shall incur a grave and heavy responsibility.

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Mr Jenkins to Sir G. Laithwaite

MSS. EUR. F. 125/138

DEPARTMENT OF SUPPLY, NEW DELHI, *26 April 1943*

D-o. No. 469–43/S.

My dear Laithwaite,

Kindly refer to your d.-o. letter No. F.–6 (3)-G.G./43[1] dated the 23rd/25th April 1943 on the subject of a "forward social programme" for India. I enclose some rough notes which may be of use to you. The trouble will be money, and frankly I do not see where the money is coming from for the annual needs of any really massive programme.

Yours sincerely,

E. M. JENKINS

Enclosure to No. 668

It would be possible to fault the memorandum[2] of Mr. Ernest Bevin and Sir Stafford Cripps on several points of detail, but the broad conclusions reached in it are substantially correct.

2. There is no doubt about the main objectives of a sound social and economic policy for India. They are:—

A. *Rural*—

(1) Compulsory education for boys and girls up to the age of 13–14.
(2) Improved agricultural productivity (better use of land, better seed, better cattle, and better methods of cultivation).
(3) Improved medical and public health services.
(4) Improved veterinary services.
(5) Improved communications.

B. *Urban and Industrial*—

(1) Compulsory education for boys and girls up to the age of 13–14.
(2) Industrial development.
(3) Slum clearance and improved housing.
(4) Better medical and public health services.

3. Before examining these objectives individually it is wise to take stock of the background:—

(*a*) In terms both of the persons to be served and of the areas to be covered the scale of India's social and economic problems is enormous. The total population (1941) was 389 million. If, as is commonly said, 11 per cent. of the total

population should be at school, the number of children to be provided for in primary and secondary schools is of the order of 43 million. The number of villages to be reorganised and improved is perhaps 750,000, and the legitimate demands of any all-India programme both for trained personnel and for material of all kinds would be colossal. This trite observation leads to the conclusion that Colonial analogies and expedients such as the establishment of "model villages" do not help very much. The difficulty lies not in deciding what ought to be done, but in doing it on an adequate scale.

(*b*) India is a country of "subsistence" farmers. Her industrial future depends upon the extent to which the purchasing power of the "subsistence" farmer—whether owner or tenant—and of his landless labourers can be increased. That it could be increased by from 20 to 30 per cent. is, in my view, almost certain. But the increase would accrue only over a relatively long period—say 10–20 years—and would be reflected to a very limited extent in the yield of rural taxation.

(*c*) Political thought in India (which is up to 20th century standards) would be wholly in favour of reform. But religious and social thought (still in the 16th and 17th centuries) would in practice oppose it in certain respects. The villager welcomes and uses better seed, better cattle, better methods of cultivation, improved services, and improved communications provided these things are handed to him on a plate. But he denies the value of education except as a means to employment outside the village, and resents interference with land tenures and customary law. In the urban areas, there is no pricking of conscience about slum conditions, and almost every slum clearance scheme is a bitter struggle between authority and vested interests. A massive programme of reform could be carried through within a reasonable time only if the Governments responsible for it were prepared to disregard popular sentiment in certain important respects—notably co-education in the primary classes, and the consolidation of holdings. It takes a long time to coax 300 million odd people. In the Punjab it took 20 years for the people to ask for the compulsory consolidation of holdings.

(*d*) Little seems to be known in London of the very real rural awakening in the Punjab—the only Province of which I have first-hand knowledge—in the last 25 years. The Brayne experiments in Gurgaon[3] were important not for their practical results—Gurgaon remains a backward district—but because they focussed attention on the problem of the "rural slum". Better and more lasting work has been done in the more advanced districts. In particular, improved wheats, sugar-canes, and cotton have practically driven out the old indigenous varieties, the standards of cattle-breeding and the care of cattle have been greatly improved; irrigation has been extended; a chain of rural dispensaries has been established (in some districts there is a doctor within five miles of every home); and the public health services have been vastly improved. Education

[1] Not printed. [2] Enclosure to No. 276. [3] See enclosure to No. 276, para. 19 (iii).

has lagged behind, not for want of goodwill, but because of the extreme difficulty of making the primary classes effective. There has, in short, been something like a minor revolution in the rural Punjab the effects of which are not easy to judge from statistics. The work done has passed far beyond the experimental stage, and is inadequate only because for financial reasons it has been impossible to do enough of it.

(*e*) In any rural programme the advance towards the various objectives must be made simultaneously, and concentration upon one objective at the expense of the others must be avoided. A good road system is essential not only to the better use of land, but to the efficiency of rural institutions and services. Improvements in the medical and public health services must, for obvious reasons, be accompanied by increased agricultural productivity, and standards of cattle breeding and animal husbandry must keep pace with improved standards of seed and cultivation. Above all, education must be related to rural life, and rural conditions must not be such as to disgust the educated man. Similar considerations must be kept in mind in dealing with the urban areas. In particular any deliberate movement from village to town must be accompanied, and not followed, by the necessary improvements in living conditions and services. These facts are recognised in the papers, but I am not sure that their importance is fully appreciated. The admitted waste of money on education in India is due largely to our failure to observe that one aspect of social advancement cannot be isolated from the others.

(*f*) The real obstacle to progress is the lack of adequate finance. The initial expenditure on an all-India scheme would by Indian standards be very great—in the rural areas the main items would be buildings and roads, and in the urban areas slum clearance liabilities would be large. The recurrent expenditure appears, again by Indian standards, to be almost deterrent. In a Province like the Punjab, the development of the rural areas alone on comparatively simple lines might cost anything from Rs. 3 to Rs. 5 crores per annum, and the recurrent urban bill, though smaller, would be an unwelcome addition. If we assume that reform in the Punjab could be financed at from Rs. 4 to 6 crores per annum the all-India Bill, rural and urban, might be from Rs. 60 to Rs. 90 crores per annum; but as the Punjab ranks as one of the most advanced Provinces the all-India annual liability might well amount to Rs. 100 crores or more. These figures do not pretend to be estimates, but the expenditure will inevitably be very large in proportion to current revenue, and Land Revenue (the main prop of Provincial Governments) is not elastic.

4. I have the following comments to make on the various objectives:—

A. *Rural.* (1) *Compulsory education of boys and girls up to the age of 13–14.*—Administratively and financially, this is the most difficult of all the rural items. India cannot possibly provide duplicate schools for boys and girls, and

co-education up to the age of 13–14 is essential to success. But there will be considerable resistance over very substantial areas to co-education as such, and strong vested interests will also oppose the reorientation of High School Education that must necessarily follow reform. The four-class primary school is a farce; the best village school is the eight-class middle school, which should be adopted as standard, with the necessary corollary that the rush to the High Schools will be limited to children likely to benefit from High School education.

It would be necessary to train a very large number of women teachers and this should be the first step in any programme.

Adult schools and literacy campaigns have hitherto produced volumes of eye-wash and little else. For a time at least this job must be done professionally, e.g. by regular night classes at primary and secondary schools. There are limits to double shift working in village school buildings. Many of the existing buildings are inadequate, and when compulsion is introduced parents can demand reasonably hygienic conditions. A heavy building programme is therefore inevitable.

(2) *Improved agricultural productivity.*—With the exception of consolidation of holdings, all these subjects are administratively easy. Consolidation is at best a halfway house, but is the minimum necessary for progress. It has (so far as I know) succeeded only in the Punjab, and it may not be suited to conditions in other Provinces. The point is that all interference with land tenures is highly controversial, and that while success may be impossible without compulsion, compulsion itself may not be practical politics. Generally, except for consolidation, a straight agricultural programme is largely if not wholly a matter of money. Good seed, good cattle, and modern implements (to the extent to which they suit local conditions) are already available, and the problem would simply be to increase the flow. Most of the additional staff needed would be in the subordinate grades.

(3) *Improved medical and Public Health Services.*—These items are administratively easy (except that certain public health measures such as drainage commonly meet with opposition) but financially difficult. There are also problems of staff. In or adjoining the Delhi rural area (under 600 villages) we had 22 maternity and child welfare centres staffed by women, but it was difficult to get village girls to undergo training and the town nurses usually disliked village life. A big scheme would have to be built up on the mass training of suitable women. On the other hand, it is relatively easy to find male staff for the general dispensaries (qualified doctors and dispensers) and "outdoor" personnel for sanitary work.

(4) *Improved veterinary services.*—These, again, are administratively easy, but financially difficult. Given finance the veterinary services could be expanded very rapidly.

(5) *Improved communications.*—After compulsory primary education this is the biggest item in the rural programme. Metalled roads, with such drains, bridges and culverts as are required, cost before the war at least Rs. 10,000 per mile to make, and Rs. 1,000 a mile per annum to maintain. Unmetalled roads made with the grader outfits in use in the Punjab cost Rs. 400 a mile to make and Rs. 100 a mile per annum to maintain. Costs are probably now 33⅓ per cent. higher. Road programmes are always popular except among those whose land is acquired for their execution. In the long run there is no substitute for a framework of metalled roads. The "earth road" is essential as a "feeder" but unless planted with avenues (which are not popular with the neighbouring landowners) is commonly encroached upon in heavily cultivated areas.

5. B. *Urban & Industrial*—(1) *Compulsory education of boys and girls up to the age of 13–14.*—The difficulties are similar to those to be encountered in the rural areas, but prejudice will be stronger, and may be too strong for the reformers.

(2) *Industrial development.*—This is a vast subject, and, though it is very closely connected with rural prosperity can perhaps best be handled separately from the rest of the general programme. The short point is that if Indian industry is to grow, there must be a large increase in internal purchasing power and demand. Post-war export markets are, to say the least, problematical. Indian opinion favours the establishment of aircraft and automobile industries, whereas the economic facts may indicate agricultural implements, bicycles, typewriters, hurricane lanterns and so on. The pace and nature of industrialisation will depend mainly on what the villager wants and what he can afford to buy; and the villager's purchasing power will depend largely on the extent to which the State can raise him above the bare subsistence level. Industrialisation as a means of relieving the pressure on the land will not carry us very far—the numbers employed in agriculture are too large for any swing-over to industry to affect them materially. There is probably a case for the nationalisation of public utilities such as electric power undertakings, and for the development of certain basic industries (e.g. steel) under State control, but the industrial plan will need very careful attention which it is now beginning to receive.

(3) *Slum clearance and improved housing.*—Urban conditions are largely disgraceful. The tendency in India has been to neglect re-housing as a necessary adjunct to slum clearance, with the result that when slum clearance is effected the displaced residents behave like rabbits in a cornfield and hide themselves nearer the centre of their particular city. In other words, they disappear and make a new slum. There is no public conscience on this matter, and elected municipal bodies are more or less actively hostile to reform. It would be necessary to provide in any scheme (*a*) for the establishment of Statutory Improvement Trusts, and (*b*) for restrictions on new industrial development the promoters of which do not make adequate provision for their prospective workers.

The financial implications of re-housing are colossal; slum clearance *per se* is frequently a paying proposition.

(4) *Better Medical and Public Health Services.*—These are administratively easy items, and they are financially less difficult than the other ingredients of any urban plan. But the expenditure involved would none the less be very large.

6. The wisdom of holding an Eastern Regional Conference of the I.L.O. is open to doubt. During the past three years, few visiting experts have found it possible to refrain from announcing their findings on Indian problems before prosecuting their enquiries, and in present conditions the Conference would probably be a vehicle for violent anti-British propaganda. The best procedure for practical results would, I believe, be as follows:—

I. The objectives should be broadly stated in a secret document.

II. There should be three separate but connected programmes:—

(i) Rural.
(ii) Urban *less* industrial development.
(iii) Industrial development.

III. The cost of programmes (i) and (ii) should be estimated approximately with Provincial Governments—this could be done fairly quickly, as unit costs are generally known. Programme (iii) should be handled directly from the centre by a new Development Department which will in all probability replace the Department of Industries and Civil Supplies.

IV. The method of financing the programmes should then be considered at the centre, and the work to be done should be determined.

V. During stages II, III and IV the Services in India should be reinforced by experts from the United Kingdom (mainly on Public Health and Town Planning). Conversely, officers from India should be sent to the United Kingdom to study the social services there—especially in the towns.

VI. As soon as an adequate number of experts are available the programmes as provisionally settled under IV above should be launched. Diffusion of effort should be avoided, and compact blocks should be dealt with finally as far as possible, so that the experience of full-scale working gained in them may be employed elsewhere. Thus instead of giving an entire Province a scarcely perceptible benefit from the first year's expenditure on the *rural* programme, one or two districts should be forced up to the required standard as quickly as possible, and should be succeeded in the second and subsequent years by other districts until the whole Province is covered.

7. Given adequate finance and the assistance of experts from the United Kingdom, a very great difference in conditions in India could be made within

ten years. But I am far from certain that finance can be found for operations on the scale manifestly required. I am quite certain that no building or road-making can be done during the war.

E. M. JENKINS,—26.4.43

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Note on the proceedings of the session of the All-India Muslim League at Delhi, 24 to 26 April 1943[1]

MSS. EUR. F. 125/138

STRICTLY SECRET

1. Taken against previous reports, the proceedings of the All-India Muslim League Session have caused no surprise. Jinnah's speeches both in the meetings of the Working Committee and the Subjects Committee (held *in camera*) and in the Open Session have confirmed impressions that of late his mind has been passing through a certain process of change. He has become more aggressive, more challenging and more authoritative. The reason appears to be "consciousness of power lately acquired and of certain old injuries which can now be avenged therewith". It cannot be denied that he is today more powerful than he ever has been. Sir Sikander's death and the consequential disappearance of the fear of a strong rival Muslim organisation being created, the formation of League Ministries in various Provinces, the spinelessness of the new Punjab Premier which circumstance has for the first time exposed that vital part of the Pakistan organism to his direct encroachments, the recent successes in bye-elections and the deterioration of the Congress power constitute a set of circumstances which have lent an unusual lustre to Jinnah's leadership and augmented his strength and striking power to a degree never before attained. On the other hand four years of close study of the British attitude towards the Muslims appear to have forced on him the final conclusion that the British are not prepared to give to the Muslims anything material beyond the few barren references to the "greatness" of the Muslim community with which British Statesmen have lately been embellishing their speeches in [on?] India. "If", he argues, "the Congress has gone astray, why are the British not inviting us to form a government at the Centre? If the Congress did not accept the Cripps proposals, what then has prevented the British from conceding the Muslim right to self-determination immediately and independently of the Congress?" Jinnah was quiet so long as he lacked the power to assert himself and have this unpromising situation altered. But now he has developed the necessary power and sanctions.

2. These considerations have been uppermost in Jinnah's mind while he has been addressing the various Committees and the Open Session. He has clearly

indicated that he is determined no longer to take things lying down. As a matter of fact, he has tried to go through all the preliminaries with which the new storm of his making must be prefaced. He has finally warned the British; he has expressed his profound dissatisfaction with their attitude; he has urged Provincial Leagues now to place themselves on a war footing in preparation for what is to come; he has castigated the Capitalists and pampered the masses (on whose sympathy and goodwill he has to base his future struggle) by his references to "social justice" and "economic reorganisation"; he has tried to impress upon the Provincial Premiers the fact that their own future lies only in following his lead and above all he has, in order to show his *bona fides* to the neutral world, extended an open and almost final invitation to the Congress to approach him for a settlement if it so desires. Inevitably the next stage will be "preparation for the inevitable struggle" and after that the "struggle" itself.

3. In amplification of this point, Jinnah spoke to the Working Committee, where he was able to expose his mind more freely, something as follows:—

"About the future, there are two sets of suggestion[s]: (1) to take direct action here and now to force Britain to accept the Muslim demands, and (2) to wait and watch. The extremists would wish the League forthwith to declare war on Britain, and one of them Mr. G. M. Syed even recommends that as a token of Muslim resentment, members of the Working Committee should in the first instance court imprisonment and at the same time Muslim Leaguers should be called upon to withdraw from War Committees. Then there are the Moderates who maintain that the League should rest satisfied over the formation of Ministries in Bengal, Sind, Assam, and the Punjab. No one, however, takes a balanced and realistic view of the situation. The situation is this: the Congress is determined to defy the Muslims. But it has now paid the penalty. It has been crushed and it has ceased to claim that it also represents the Mussalmans. It may not act as we would wish, but at the same time it is no longer capable of substantially harming us. The wounds it has received will take some time to heal and so we are for the time being free from its terror. Besides it is not under the present circumstances in a position to give us anything. We want Pakistan and that commodity is available not in the Congress market but in the British market. In other words, the Congress danger has ceased to exist for the time being. Let us, therefore, not bother too much about it but maintain a watchful attitude. Then comes our second enemy, the Britisher. How do we stand in relation to him? Well, he is as useless for our purpose as the Congress and he is as callous and defiant as any enemy can be. His anxiety throughout has been to court the Congress, and he feels that his Imperialist interests demand that he should permanently keep the Mussalmans down. He is gravely suspicious of

[1] Enclosed in the letter of 11 May 1943 from the Deputy Private Secretary to the Viceroy to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State.

the Mussalmans. In the rise of the Muslim power, he sees the end of his own supremacy in the East. Therefore, beyond soft words, the Muslims can expect nothing from him. Nor can the Muslims associate any high hopes with the so-called Post-war New World Order. The end of this war is going to leave the Britisher so powerful that he will be able to defy the world opinion where it conflicts with his own Imperialistic designs. At the end of the war the Britisher will be more powerful than any of his Allies. And if he is really powerful and if he has successfully emerged at the expense of his Allies, why should he listen to the counsels of his weak Allies or even to the world? He has not been fighting this war to enable visionaries to advise him as to how he should liquidate his own power. Therefore, neither now nor henceforth is there any possibility of the British willingly conferring upon us the boon of Pakistan. On the contrary in the post-war period, there is every likelihood of a British–Muslim conflict on a grand scale. There are various issues which may give rise to such a conflict, e.g. Palestine or Syria, or the withdrawal of the British from Iran, Egypt and Baghdad. Collectively these issues form but a part of the general world problem and when it comes to the point, the Muslims of various countries will have to sink or swim together. It is impossible for British Imperialism to yield to Muslim opinion in all these fields. On one issue or the other, there is bound to be an open clash. We must prepare ourselves to play our part in that major clash. Naturally, we shall require elaborate arrangements. None of the small mercies shown to us recently by the Provincial Governors in Sind or Bengal can lull us into a false sense of security. These favours have not been granted because the British love us. It is in order to expose us before the masses to whom we have been making extravagant promises that we have been saddled with this responsibility. The same trick was played with the Congress when they were given a long rope in the shape of Ministries to hang themselves. Had this not been done, there would have been no Hindu–Muslim bitterness such as now exists. If Congress had not accepted office, it would not have lost its former hold over the agrarian and labour populations, or its former popularity with certain sections of the Muslims. The same trick is being played with the Muslims. The British have brought League Ministries into existence so that our promises to our people are put to the test, so that we feel and thereby stand self-condemned and so that there should arise local and internal complications within the League. I am genuinely afraid that the British will not allow the League to do anything substantial for the Muslim masses in order that the Muslim League shall stand discredited in the eyes of its own people. Therefore, let us not lay down our tools merely because seventeen or twenty of our men have been provided with seats in Provincial Cabinets. What are we to do? Are we to acquiesce or fight? As far as I am concerned, that we should fight is a foregone conclusion. All that remains is how and when. We cannot fight unless everything is placed on a perfect war footing. By giving us Ministries,

the enemy feels that he has sealed our doom. But let us seal his doom with the same instruments. Let us use this opportunity to consolidate our position in the Provinces. Let the Ministries function in such a manner that instead of discrediting themselves, they popularise the League among the masses from whom we are mainly to draw when we are on the war path. Collect funds. Consolidate the National Guards. Consider from what side we are going to launch our attack. Let us exploit these Ministries so that when we attack, the very fact that we are giving up our sets [seats?] in the Government in order to launch such an attack will add to our prestige. When should we attack? I think I should be ready with my plans by about next December.[2] Meanwhile, our Provincial Ministries and Leagues will have completed the work of organisation in the Provinces and prepared themselves for the fight. Also we will have seen how the war goes during the summer. In December we meet in Sind. In April we meet in the Punjab. There we decide when to strike, where to strike and how to strike. Personally I think that unless unforeseen circumstances force us to act otherwise, we should begin our offensive immediately on the termination of the war. Then everybody will be in a state of exhaustion and unwilling to face a new ordeal. It is true that the Britisher will by then be stronger than anyone else. But that strength of his will be confined only to this that he shall stand no dictation from his Allies who would be comparatively weaker than him. But for that reason alone he dare not court fresh trouble on a large scale. All we have to do to wrest our ideal from his unwilling hands will be to create trouble on a large scale, and thus compel him to surrender. How did Afghanistan win her independence? She declared war when the World War had just ended. England was exhausted and her pleasure-loving people would allow no new wars to be fought. We should, if necessary and if matters can be delayed till then, copy Afghanistan. That, however, does not mean that we should stay our hands if provocation comes earlier. In that event, we ought to be in a position to strike even earlier. We have already killed the Congress. Now it is the turn of the British. The war in my opinion may last another three years and we should use that period to put our house in order.

"In this connection, here are the few points which should be borne in mind—

(1) Now that we are in the Ministries, we should try to retain them as long as possible so that we are able to use them as an instrument for consolidating our position in the Provinces for the purposes of the impending fight.
(2) We should, if possible, avoid conflict with the British until the arrival of the psychological moment and until our preparations are completed.

[2] [Note in original]. The agent explains that the month of December is specifically stated because in the acceleration of League activity, December has been chosen as the month for the annual session which is usually held during Easter. By December also Jinnah will have judged more definitely how the war situation stands and the annual session will provide an opportunity for his plans to be reviewed. A special session will probably be convened in the Punjab in April for further consideration.

(3) In order to popularise the League with the masses, we should pass some good legislation in the Provinces where Ministries are functioning. This will stand us in good stead in due time.

(4) Meanwhile discourage anything that will create dissensions in the Muslim Camp. For instance, discussion or determination of fundamental rights for citizens in Pakistan, or production of a cut and dried scheme for Pakistan must create controversies and differences of opinion and should, therefore, be avoided for the present.

(5) The fight being inevitable, we must make our preparations flawless."

It was on account of this speech that the various resolutions of which notice had been given were withdrawn and the official resolution,[3] which was meant to serve only as a smoke-screen, was passed.

4. Other features of the Session were—

(1) Rs. 29,000 were contributed by Sind members and an equal sum by Punjab members towards the Jinnah fund. The Punjab Premier promised, on condition that his name would not be announced, a donation of Rs. 7,000, Shaukat Hayat Khan offered Rs. 3,000, but his offer was not accepted as it was thought that its acceptance at this stage, when he had just been given the League ticket, would create misunderstandings. Other donors were—

	Rs.
The Nawab of Mamdot in his own name, in the name of his brother, &c.	17,000
Mir Ghulam Ali of Sind	10,000
Mir Bundeh Ali of Sind	5,000
K. B. Khuro of Sind..	5,000
Sir Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah	1,000
Gazdar, Law Minister, Sind	1,000
K. B. Jalal-ud-din of Sind	1,000
Pir Ellahi Bux	1,000
Sir Maratab Ali of the Punjab..	5,000
Hassan Bux Shah of Sind	2,500

The rest paid lesser sums. The total amounted to some Rs. 60,000 (approx.). The Jinnah Fund now stands at rupees six lakhs.

(2) The Sind League quarrel, Jagirdars *versus* Jagirdar Tenants, had its echoes in Delhi. Both the parties tried to get the support of Jinnah. With a view to win Jinnah's sympathies, the Mirs of Sind, who are Jagirdars, were this time unusually generous in their contributions. G. M. Syed, the exponent of the other side is, however, unyielding. For the present, however, Qazi Isa and Nawab Ismail Khan are going to Sind to look into these matters.

(3) Shaukat Hayat has been given the League ticket for his bye-election by the Central League Parliamentary Committee on his placing his resignation in the hands of Jinnah to be used if and when necessary. Meanwhile, both sides have contracted to treat this matter with the utmost secrecy. Shaukat Hayat is believed to have made it clear to Jinnah that, if it comes to a fight with the British, Jinnah must release him from his obligations, because of his father's long connections with the British and because he is an Army officer, Shaukat Hayat will not go against the British. Jinnah has seen his point of view and agreed to let him out when necessary. For the present Jinnah appreciates that a combination of Shaukat's group with the Hindus and the Sikhs is a matter to be reckoned with.

(4) A resolution was passed urging the termination of Martial Law in Sind and the restoration of Pir Pagaro's property. Pir Ellahi Bux tried to oppose it but was hooted down, thanks to the excellent arrangements made by Yusif Haroon and G. M. Syed. It is most unlikely that the Sind League Ministry will resign on the Pir Pagaro issue or the issue of the lifting of Martial Law.

(5) Resolutions were passed on the food problem, the South African affair, Collective fines, Mr. Jinnah's emergency powers, &c., &c.

[3] See enclosure to No. 683.

670

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/11/5b: f 38

MOST IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, *27 April 1943, 6.30 pm*
Received: 28 April

429. Your private and personal telegram 141–S.C.[1] of 26th April. Council. I have submitted three names to Palace[2] and sent urgent reminder to Halifax.

2. I am myself increasingly doubtful of its being worth while sending a reluctant Firoz or indeed anybody here just now. There is not much to do and the prospect of anything in the nature of an Imperial Conference is receding into background. Might it not be best, unless special circumstances emerge meanwhile, to decide to send someone in the autumn with a Prince.

[1] Asking him to obtain the King's approval of appointments of Azizul Huque, Roy and Khare straight away (see No. 666, note 1) and to telegraph urgently to Halifax to contact Runganadhan. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

[2] In telegram 431 of 27 April, Mr Amery notified Lord Linlithgow of the King's approval. L/PO/11/5b: f 36.

3. I should like to inform Mudaliar of his position in your new arrangements at earliest possible moment. Though I do not anticipate difficulty I feel that his assent to taking over Supply ought now to be procured.

671

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2754: f 45

IMMEDIATE
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, *27 April 1943, 7 pm*
Received: 28 April

430. Many thanks for your most useful private and personal telegram No. 135–S.C.[1] about Phillips. I congratulate you on your handling of the conversations, and am glad to note your view that Phillips' visit has been of real use and may help to reduce risk of misconception. No doubt we shall hear more of the interim solution idea, but I entirely endorse your conclusion that we should be utterly wrong to yield to well-meaning but uninformed pressure over this.

I am sending a copy of your telegram to the Prime Minister and to Mr. Eden and asking the latter to repeat it to Halifax as you suggest.

As I understand that Phillips' announcement that he has been refused permission to see Gandhi has created some speculation in U.S.A., I suggest you consider telegraphing urgently to Halifax repeating to me your advice as to how publicity aspects be handled there. Joyce advises this should go to Ambassador and not to Bajpai.[2]

[1] No. 667.

[2] In telegram 1041–S of 29 April to Lord Halifax (repeated to Mr Amery), Lord Linlithgow did as Mr Amery suggested taking the same line as in No. 667, para. 2. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24. See also No. 676, para. 7.

672

Lieut.-Gen. Sir T. Hutton to Sir G. Laithwaite

MSS. EUR. F. 125/138

RECONSTRUCTION COMMITTEE OF COUNCIL

JAISALMER HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *27/8 April 1943*

Dear Gilbert,

Reference your d.-o. No. F.–6 (3)–G.G.–42[1] dated the 25th. I have been laid up for 24 hours and had not, therefore, had time to study the memorandum in

detail. I have, however, been thinking of this subject for some time, and I will send you before long a note which I already had in draft on the closely allied subject of the efficiency of Government Services.

I have seen Jenkins' able and well-informed memorandum,[2] and the comments I have made in the attached note are more or less supplementary to his.

As you will have seen from the Agenda, I am proposing to ask the Reconstruction Committee of Council to consider at their next meeting how they would propose to tackle the problem of what I may call "social reconstruction". My first inclination was to suggest it might be dealt with in two parts, one in connection with rural reconstruction problem, and the other in connection with labour problems generally. There is no doubt that the urban and rural aspects of the problem are very different, but I find there is a general consensus of opinion that it might be better to deal with the subject as a whole in one Committee. The problem will be to find somebody suitable to direct the activities of such a Committee. It ought to be the Secretary, Education, Health and Lands Department, but I doubt if he could do this in addition to his other activities.

Yours sincerely,
T. J. HUTTON

Enclosure to No. 672

COMMENTS ON A MEMORANDUM[3] OUTLINING SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICY FOR INDIA

1. I will not attempt to deal with any points of detail but there are certain fundamental factors which need to be considered. These are as follows:—

(*a*) We cannot be wrong in starting a programme of social reform in India, even if it entails taxation remaining at a high level after the war. This may be a case where strict financial canons should give way, as it has elsewhere, to political and social considerations.

(*b*) One of the most serious difficulties is that of personnel. The administration is too thin, in every sense of the word, both at the Centre and in the Provinces to take on any considerable measure of social reform without reinforcement from outside. Most of the good men at the top are already overburdened and are very tired and some of those lower down, especially in Provincial Services, are not worth their keep. Unless the Government machine is efficient, we can hardly embark on a policy of reform with any hope of success.

(*c*) The real impetus for reform and its realisation comes from individual effort. Failing that, it would be possible to spend vast sums and achieve very little. We must not only provide personnel of the right calibre but also supply enthusiasm by a bold declaration of our aims and intentions.

[1] Not printed. [2] Enclosure to No. 668. [3] Enclosure to No. 276.

(*d*) It is usual to relate all questions of social reform and education to questions of finance. This is sound up to a point but we must also ask whether existing expenditure, e.g. on the Medical and Education Services, is made to the best advantage? Until we are sure that it is, would it be wise to spend more, and ought we not first to consider whether radical measures of reorganisation are necessary?

Education is important for what it achieves rather [than?] for what it is and there is great scope for an improvement of system. What is more important is propaganda. In the totalitarian countries, they combine the two and that is why they have achieved such remarkable results. The democracies tend to regard the first as an aim in itself and the latter as derogatory. We have yet to realise that a country can be very largely governed, as well as educated and reformed, by propaganda alone.

(*e*) The success of government, as of individuals, depends more on what people think of their achievements than on what they have actually done. The people of India, as of other countries, know very little of what has been done in recent years or to what extent the ground has been prepared for further advance in the future. There is much scope for intelligent propaganda on these lines.

(*f*) Social reform inevitably entails strong Government as well as efficient Government and we shall not achieve very much if we are too tender of the susceptibilities of the various communities and classes.

2. To summarise, if we are to embark, as I think we must, on a programme of social reform, we must face up to—

(*a*) a loosening of the bonds of strict finance but only, I suggest, under Central Government control;
(*b*) a strong, though possibly temporary, reinforcement of the Government Services with expert British personnel, and of course Indian as well;
(*c*) a strong emphasis on propaganda as a permanent feature of Government activity;
(*d*) a thorough reorganisation of existing social services;
(*e*) a strong policy and a willingness to ignore ill-informed or unilateral criticism.

673

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *28 April 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 1034–S. I discussed in Council today the question of Indian representation with the War Cabinet. The meeting was a small one owing to absences on tour but some difference of view was disclosed, certain Members feeling that opportunity of maintaining this connection ought not to be missed. I finally said that there seemed no necessity for an immediate decision and that I would raise the matter again later at a fuller Council. We can therefore go ahead now with Mudaliar (about whom I am telegraphing[1] to you separately) and if we are pressed as to who is to succeed him, take the line that an announcement will be made in due course. I quite appreciate your own feeling that at the moment there is no very special necessity for a man and think that we can play for time. Mudaliar himself is not, I imagine, likely to be out here before some time in June.

2. If you can let me have Mudaliar's acceptance of the Supply Membership, we could then I think publish possibly on Saturday morning, 1st May, or else on Monday morning, 3rd May.

[1] In telegram 1033–S of 28 April Lord Linlithgow asked Mr Amery to invite Sir R. Mudaliar to return in order to serve as Supply Member of his Council. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

674

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 11

IMPORTANT INDIA OFFICE, *28 April 1943, 8.5 pm*

PERSONAL *Received: 29 April*

No. 8459. Your telegram 63–S.C.[1] of 16th April. I agree that Madame Chiang Kai-shek's intervention is most objectionable and you will see from Foreign Office telegram to Washington No. 2816[2] what action is proposed.

2. If Madame offends again we can consider further action including some public statement in India but it seems best to avoid latter at this stage for reasons stated in para. 2 of F.O. telegram.

[1] No. 650. [2] No. 675.

675

Mr Eden to Viscount Halifax

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 10

FOREIGN OFFICE, *29 April 1943, 3.45 am*

No. 2816. Viceroy of India's telegram No. 63 S.C.[1] repeated to Washington as Foreign Office telegram No. 2815 and your telegram No. 1846.[2]

We sympathise with the Viceroy's indignation and agree that every effort must be made to check these mischievous statements by Madame Chiang Kai-shek on Indian affairs.

2. We doubt, however, whether the best method is a protest to General Chiang Kai-shek at Chungking who would probably resent a direct complaint about his wife with the result that our relations with the Chiang family would be embittered at a time when we were trying to improve them by inducing Madame to visit this country. There is also the difficulty that so far as we are aware Madame Chiang does not hold an official position in the Chinese Government and a formal protest might be rejected on the ground that as a private individual she is free to express her personal views.

3. We should prefer, at all events in the first place, to try the effect of oral representations to her brother, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who would seem to be more understanding of and sympathetic to the difficulties of this country than other members of his family. If you agree, I shall be glad if you will approach Mr. T. V. Soong informally, pointing out the embarrassment caused to the Government of India by Madame Chiang's statements in their task of gearing up the country for a major offensive against the Japanese in Burma and the danger to the cause of the United Nations in provoking internal dissensions among Indians or between Indians and British at the present time. The above refers particularly to her comment on Nehru's detention, but if her remarks in the first paragraph of your telegram under reference were intended to apply to India we should take equal objection to them.

4. You might also emphasise the fact that we have hitherto scrupulously avoided public criticism of the deplorable internal dissensions in China between the nationalists and communists which in our opinion are militating against a united Chinese effort against the common enemy. We are still strongly of the opinion that a mutual abstention from interference in each other's domestic affairs is the best course for allies who are together facing an overriding external danger.

5. Pending the result of an approach on these lines the Viceroy is being asked to hold his hand in the matter of publicity. This telegram is being repeated to

His Majesty's Ambassador at Chungking with a request for any comments or suggestions. You should await these unless you see strong reason to act at once.

6. When you have taken action I suggest that you inform Mr. Hull confidentially.

Repeated to Chungking No. 404, and Governor-General of India.

[1] No. 650. [2] No. 662.

676

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE
MOST SECRET
PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, *29 April 1943, 5.35 pm*
Received: 29 April, 5.20 pm

No. 1038–S. Your personal telegram of 20th April No. 7892.[1] I have telegraphed[2] at length about my conversations with Phillips. While making as you will see, my own attitude on the general political issue clear, I thought it unnecessary at this stage to take up his contact with anti-Government politicians, and decided to leave things as they were for the time being, and I did not raise with him the various points in paragraph 2 of your telegram. As regards your paragraph 3, he has had so far as I know ample contact with Members of my Executive Council, &c.

2. On a small point in paragraph 2 of your telegram, you will remember that suggestion for a representative of Phillips' level did not come from me, and that what I wanted was a career representative of lower level of the Wilson type.

3. As regards your paragraph 4 Phillips' present intention is to return after hot weather and he does not wish to have to go to a hill station or to suffer the heat of Delhi.

4. Paragraph 5 of your telegram. I understand that reasons for complaint about lease-lend are all on our side, and that we have had great difficulty with the Americans. I will send you a fuller reply[3] on this point. Phillips has not touched on any such difficulties, and I am very doubtful of extent to which, here or in other parts of the more technical or administrative field, he is himself fully in the picture. As regards latter part of your paragraph 5, we had, as you will have seen from my separate report, a good general talk, and I get the impression that Phillips leaves India satisfied on the whole that he has had a fair

[1] No. 660. [2] No. 667. [3] Not printed.

deal and a successful mission even if in certain respects he has not been able to achieve all he wants.

[Paras. 5 and 6, on particular questions arising in relations between U.S. and Government of India, omitted.]

7. In reply to a question by press at Delhi before leaving as to whether he had asked to see Gandhi, Phillips replied that he had approached the proper authorities but had not been able to secure desired permission. This is all quite correct in its terms, and I think myself that it is probably much better that he should have made a frank statement of this nature before leaving India. I do not expect it to cause any undue fuss here; and the arguments against allowing any representative of a foreign country to see a person detained in circumstances in which Gandhi is under restraint would, one would hope, be obvious to any reasonable man.

677

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *29 April 1943, 8.45 pm*
Received: 29 April, 7.45 pm

No. 1048–S. Following is text of communiqué which if you concur I propose to release for simultaneous publication in the morning papers of Saturday 1st May, if I have by then received your confirmation of Mudaliar's acceptance of Supply Membership:

Begins. His Majesty the King has been pleased to approve the appointment of Sir Muhammad Azizul Haque, C.I.E., Dr. N. B. Khare, M.L.A., and Sir Asoke Kumar Roy, Advocate-General, Bengal, to the Executive Council of the Governor-General of India.

The following appointments to portfolios have been made by the Governor-General:—

To be Member for Supply: The Hon'ble Diwan Bahadur Sir A. Ramaswami Mudaliar, K.C.S.I., at present a Representative of India at the War Cabinet.

To be Commerce Member: Sir Muhammad Azizul Haque, C.I.E., at present High Commissioner for India in London.

To be Member in charge of Information and Broadcasting: The Hon'ble Sir Sultan Ahmed.

To be Law Member in succession to the Hon'ble Sir Sultan Ahmed: Sir Asoke Kumar Roy.

To be Member in charge of the Department of Indians Overseas: Dr. N. B. Khare, M.L.A. *Ends.*

2. Would you repeat to Bajpai if you concur and let him know date agreed for publication. As you will see, I have made no reference to filling of Mudaliar's post with War Cabinet or of High Commissionership in London.[1]

[1] In telegram 442 of 29 April (which crossed No. 677), Mr Amery communicated Sir R. Mudaliar's acceptance; proposed an announcement in morning papers of 3 May to give time for arrangements in U.S.A.; and suggested some reference either in communiqué or in press guidance to representation at War Cabinet. In telegram 445 of 30 April he concurred in the communiqué; adhered to 3 May as date of its issue; and asked whether Lord Linlithgow desired to add a reference to High Commissionership, Sir S. Runganadhan's acceptance of which he had just reported in telegram 444 of 29 April. L/PO/10/17: ff 382–3.

In telegram 1054–S of 30 April Lord Linlithgow agreed that the announcement, with an addition regarding Sir S. Runganadhan's appointment as High Commissioner in London, should appear on 3 May; and suggested that the question of the succession to Sir R. Mudaliar could best be dealt with by advising the Press that an announcement on this matter would be made in due course. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

678

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

PRIVATE AND SECRET INDIA OFFICE, *29 April 1943*

[Para. 1, on Sir Hassan Suhrawardy; and para. 2, on Advisers to the Secretary of State, omitted.]

3. I was much relieved to see that Nazimuddin has formed a Government, even though weak on the Caste Hindu side. It gets Herbert out of a situation awkward not only for himself, but also for both you and me, and I think he fully deserved the rebuke you administered to him. No doubt Huq had driven him to the limits of his patience, but one of the first things a constitutional Governor has to learn is infinite patience
and a capacity for suffering not only fools, *You're telling me!*
but rascals, with at any rate a modicum *L.*
of assumed gladness. Curiously enough—
or perhaps I should say symptomatically—the House of Commons has treated the matter with entire unconcern, and by the time it reassembles next week I don't imagine anyone will wish to raise it. The only thing, indeed, I may have to deal with in actual debate, i.e. on the Adjournment, is the case of the Kayyur executions,[1] though no doubt I shall have questions about Gwyer's judgment and the amending ordinance.[2]

[1] On the afternoon of 28 March 1941 a police constable intending to arrest a member of the *Karshaka Sangam* (a Communist, anti-war 'Peasants' Union') at Kayyur in the South Kanara District of Madras was surrounded by a mob of some hundred volunteers from the Union. He was subsequently

[*Footnotes 1 and 2 continued on next page*

[Para. 4, on Bahawalpur, omitted.]

5. I am putting up to Winston a minute[3] on the subject of giving you the necessary powers outside your immediate Province as Governor-General, in order to deal with Political Warfare and other Resident Minister questions that may arise as things develop.

P.S.V.—
Didn't I make clear that the R.M. must have a due share in military operation?

L.

6. The whole Anakim business is being studied over afresh here and may be greatly modified. I had a long talk at dinner the other night with C.I.G.S. and Wavell on the question of how his duties as future C.-in-C. South-East Asia, can be combined with those of C.-in-C. India, and Wavell quite agreed that it was too much for one man and instanced his sitting through a long discussion in Council on Delhi University as evidence. I am also putting that up to the P.M.[4] and should like to get an early decision from him, but I fear somewhat that he may say that the present situation should continue for another year.

No time for more.

When are you going to get Winston to name my successor?

L.

forced to parade with a red flag and, on attempting to escape, was beaten with *lathis*, thrown into a nearby river, and pelted with stones until he drowned. Sixty persons were prosecuted in connection with the incident and twenty-two were convicted, the majority being sentenced to imprisonment. The four ringleaders were sentenced to death. All those convicted maintained their innocence and the four sentenced to death denied their responsibility for the fatal injuries. An account of the Kayyur executions was enclosed in a letter of 18 May 1943 from the Private Secretary to the Viceroy to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State. MSS. EUR. F. 125/138.

[2] On 22 April 1943 Sir M. Gwyer ruled in the Federal Court that Defence of India Rule 26 (under which Gandhi and the members of the Congress Working Committee were detained) was invalid as it went beyond the provisions of the enabling legislation—clause (x) of Section 2 (2) of the Defence of India Act. On 28 April an Ordinance promulgated by the Governor-General substituted a new, and retrospectively effective, clause (x) thus validating orders made under Rule 26.

[3] Not printed.

[4] Minute P. 17/43 of 27 April suggesting the appointment of 'a supreme Commander-in-Chief for the South-East Asia campaign, and, under his operational control, of a separate Commander-in-Chief, India, able to give his whole time to the task of getting the most both materially and in morale out of India and the Indian Army'. L/WS/1/1274: ff 10–11; *History of the Second World War: The War against Japan*, vol. II, pp. 370–1.

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Sir H. Seymour to Mr Eden

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 9

IMPORTANT CHUNGKING, *30 April 1943, 4 pm*
Received: 30 April, 9.30 pm

No. 480. Your telegram No. 405[1] and your telegram No. 2816[2] to Washington.

I think best chance of curbing Madame Chiang Kai-shek would be by dealing with matters through T. W. (sic) Soong on lines you suggest. I also think that we have more chance of satisfactory results if representations can be kept private and I regard this as hopeless[3] if action is taken here.

(2) According to Chinese [Central] news of April 29th some comment has been caused in American press by inability of Mr. Phillips to visit Gandhi and Nehru. If this is correct Madame Chiang Kai-shek is, I suppose, likely to be asked for her views and earliest possible approach to T. V. Soong seems desirable.

(3) Madame Chiang Kai-shek has no official position in Chinese Government. I agree with view of T. V. Soong given in your paragraph 3 but while his influence would I believe be used in the right direction, the views of Chiang Kai-shek and Madame Chiang Kai-shek on India are not likely to be affected by any appeal to reason. But I think it quite possible that Chiang Kai-shek could be brought to see, by arguments suggested, that expression (grp. undec.) views at present time presents real dangers.

Repeated to Washington and Viceroy of India.

[1] Not printed. [2] No. 675. [3] 'hopeless' deciphered as 'essential' in repetition to Viceroy.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

L/P&S/13/998: ff 186–7

SECRET THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *30 April 1943*

No. 14–H.E./43.

My dear Amery,

You will remember that in your letter of the 12th January[1] you gave me an interesting account of your talks with the Jam Sahib before he left London. I do not think there is very much to say, save to thank you for putting me so

[1] No. 341.

fully in the picture, for it has been of much assistance to me in my conversations with the Jam Sahib to know exactly what passed between you and him. But there are one or two points that I might touch on in the light of discussions I have had with Craik and Fitze.

2. It is true enough, of course, to say that in conversations with officials His Highness is profuse in agreeing that the condition of many Indian States requires drastic action, and indeed in recent conversation with Fitze he reiterated his opinion that all States smaller than the Chief Commissionership, Coorg, might well be abolished. He took the same example in his discussions with me. But in his conversation with Fitze, he went on to say that it was quite impossible for him to voice such opinions to the Rulers concerned, to whom he was indebted, as Chancellor of the Chamber (that argument, I am sure, will lose none of its validity whoever the Chancellor of the day might be). I am not disposed to place too much reliance in his co-operation over this issue, in the circumstances, and I anticipate that we shall find precisely the same sort of reaction whoever may occupy his present position. You will remember that he gave a thoroughly unsatisfactory reply in the Chamber in 1941 to that portion of my speech which dealt with the necessity for co-operative administration.

3. The points you take in the conclusion of paragraph 3 of your letter, and also in the last sentence of paragraph 7, give a valuable lead, and I will bear them in mind in connection with any farewell address that I made to the Princes before leaving India.

4. I am a little puzzled at Cripps' alleged commendation of Indore, which you mention in paragraph 4. I have been unable to lay my hands on it here; nor can the Political Department help me. I do not want to ask the Jam Sahib specifically about it, but if you can throw any further light on the point I shall be grateful.

5. In paragraph 5 of your letter you mention that you told the Jam Sahib that even if the Cripps method of constitution forming were adopted and, say, Assam and Orissa decided to stand out, we should not regard the arrangement between them as constituting a dominion or an independent union outside the Empire. But the declaration in fact shows that His Majesty's Government accepted the right of any Province of British India to retain its present constitutional position if it did not wish to join the new Union, and that if any such non-acceding Province so desired His Majesty's Government would be prepared to agree upon a new constitution giving the same full status as the Indian Union. I think the argument could fairly be taken that, as it was clearly laid down that the new Union would constitute a dominion, it would be difficult to hold to the suggestion that dominion status would be beyond the grasp of other unions formed by non-acceding Provinces; and you will remember the

statement in paragraph 2 of my telegram of the 15th October 1942,[2] that any assurance to the States that there was no intention to discriminate between them and the Provinces in this matter would be interpreted by them as opening up the way for a Union of States to attain the status of a dominion "in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external forms [affairs]". However, I am not unduly fussed about all this because, as you know, I regard the idea of a series of separate unions or separate dominions inside this country as chimerical; and indeed the whole idea of dominion status begins to lose its value and significance if any minor area can claim equal but independent status, etc. like the really major portions of the Empire (though I suppose one must make an exception as regards Newfoundland). The point is one that is continually present to me in connection with guarantees to Burma, given the very small population, and the complete inability to stand on its own, of that area. But I need not develop it.

Yours sincerely,
LINLITHGOW

[2] No. 96.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *2–4 May 1943*

PRIVATE AND SECRET

I have two letters to thank you for, dated 23rd March[1] and the 9th April.[2] The first was seriously delayed, and arrived later than letters which I have already acknowledged to you.

2. Before I go on to deal with points in those letters, let me just say a word on the reconstitution of my Council. I am so relieved that we have at last got a team, though I am sorry that owing to the reluctance of one of the Muslims to relieve Mudaliar in London we should have had to drop the Begum. But I think that the people I have got will do us very well; and I hear that the comment has been made in press circles that the Governor-General has little to fear from their running out for political reasons! I hope that is true, as one does not want the sort of experience that I had earlier in the spring with Mody, Sarker and Aney, repeated too often. I hear very good reports of Roy, who apparently combines a very high degree of legal eminence with a complete distaste for politics—no bad recommendation! Khare, I think, ought to be all right in the light of what Twynam has said about him. As for Azizul Haque, I am very grateful to you for your estimate of his strengths and weaknesses, and I fully

[1] No. 610. [2] No. 644.

accept it. I saw him yesterday and gave him a talking to. I told him I would run the Food Department myself, though not publicly, for the time being, and he readily accepts that—public responsibility will of course be entirely with him, and he will have to defend the action of the Department in public, and of course keep in touch with what is going on inside it. As regards Commerce, and Industries and Civil Supplies, I begged him not to make the mistake of immersing himself in a great deal of detail that was properly to be handled by the Secretaries; that the wise thing would be to keep control of the policy; do the representational work; be fully seized at all times of what was going on, &c.; and not to overload himself, or to slow down action by frequent interference from his high level. I went on to tell him how valuable I knew his contribution by way of broadcasting, &c. at home to have been, and to say how much I hoped that he would leave himself time from his departmental preoccupations to continue to render valuable service of that type now that he was back in India. He took all this very well, and expressed himself as ready to play. Sultan Ahmed, I think, is quite pleased at the idea of taking over Information, and I dare say he will do it well enough. It badly needs a Member. I have had a further conversation with Firoz (I revert below to the question of filling the London vacancy) and I think he has now settled down again and is quite content to carry on in Defence. I am trying to arrange to let him go off on some tours abroad, which he will do very well and which will not mean too long a separation from India.

3. Now for Mudaliar and the London vacancy. I sent you a brief account[3] of the discussion in Council on the filling of that vacancy. There were so few Members present (Sultan Ahmed, Firoz, Benthall, Ambedkar, Usman) that I did not feel that I could get a really representative reaction. But it was clear that there was some feeling that the post ought not to be left unfilled. Firoz (I thought unwisely) made a long personal statement in which he pointed out the substantial periods for which he had been away from India since 1937, and the burden which they had represented for him. Sultan Ahmed was silent. It was clear finally that the best thing was to postpone a decision until later, and to play for time in connection with any announcement to be made as regards Mudaliar. I have now had Mudaliar's suggestion[4] that he should remain our representative with the War Cabinet, and I have telegraphed my views about that. To be quite frank with you, I do not like it a bit, and would not be prepared to support it here. Any suggestion that Mudaliar has a continuing claim to be one of our representatives with the Cabinet would create grave personal and communal jealousies here. Apart from that, I think it entirely unsound in principle that a Member of my Council, present and holding a portfolio in this country, should also have any position in relation to the War Cabinet. I would not either put it beyond Mudaliar to try to use such a position to ensure that he

was supplied with Cabinet information papers such as he may get at the moment from London; or, apart from that, to urge that I should take him into greater confidence over matters on which he may have been in the secret in London, but on which he would certainly not be in the secret here. My own view is still that given the degree of reluctance that has begun to manifest itself to serve in this important (if not very onerous) capacity, the wise course would be to send people *ad hoc*, but to try not to give too much publicity to any break in the continuity of our representation.

4. As regards Mudaliar himself, with any luck I think we might not see him here until the end of June or even the beginning of July. I am so glad that he is agreeable to wait for Jenkins, for that means he is committed to waiting at any rate till the end of May. He seems to me the obvious man to select as one of the representatives of India in connection with these food and economic discussions, and I would have thought that that might very well take him to the middle of June. I can manage perfectly well without him here, and he will be gratified, I imagine, at being in on work of such importance and of such interest to India; while in his absence the Supply Department will be able to settle down under Waugh.

* * *

6. The third main business that has happened since I last wrote to you has been Phillips' visit to Dehra Dun and our conversations there; and I have sent you a full account of these by telegram.[5] I do not think there is really a great deal that I need add. I think the visit was of value (one's way of life at Dehra is very informal and easy) as improving personal relations between us and facilitating frank and informal conversation. I was left with the impression at the end of our time, which I had not had before, that his intellectual quality is a good deal lower than his personal charm, and that he does not really completely grasp or get to the bottom of certain of these major issues. That is, I dare say, natural enough. He is now pretty senior in his service. He is accustomed to putting across briefs and *aides-mémoire* embodying the views of his Government or of the Departments, without necessarily finding himself responsible for detailed discussion of them, &c. I thought him, in particular, very woolly over this highly technical O.S.S. business, though he professed to have a complete grasp of it. In the general political field, on the other hand, I felt pretty well satisfied. He is naturally somewhat sentimental, I should say, by disposition; sympathetic to the sort of point of view represented by Congress; anxious to see some sort of modus arrived at; and disposed to underestimate the difficulties; and in such circumstances his mind naturally looks to a compromise. What he does not quite understand is the extreme practical difficulty here of reaching a

[3] No. 673. [4] Transmitted in Mr Amery's telegram 447 of 30 April. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.
[5] No. 667.

compromise, and the fact that were a compromise so easily to be obtained, you and I would have done our very best to attain it long since. But what was satisfactory was that he obviously begins to appreciate a little more fully the obstacles represented by the intransigence of the Muslim League and the almost equal intransigence of the Congress; and I am not ill-pleased with the way things have gone. I thought on the whole, given the atmosphere that had been created, that I would leave him alone as regards undue contact with political figures in this country, and left that in reserve. (I fear that means that it may be for my successor, if the trouble continues, to handle it, since I should be surprised if Phillips comes back here before the end of the hot weather. If that is so, and I, as I hope, am relieved in October, I shall do no more than shake hands with him on his return.)

7. Now for a word on points arising out of your letters. In justice to myself, though with no desire to say "I told you so", I think I ought to make it clear, on paragraph 1 of your letter of the 23rd March, that I throughout took exception to any move in the constitutional field, such as was represented by the Cripps Mission, or anything else, on the ground that it would certainly be misunderstood as due to our apprehension of the Japanese. My recollection is that I took that point so early as my telegram of 18th January 1942,[6] in which, as you will remember, I most strongly urge the case against any move of any sort, and the arguments for standing fast—arguments unfortunately not accepted at the time by the Cabinet.

* * *

9. And I will also comment further on this business of European demands [dewans]. On that I fear I do not altogether share your view. It is exceedingly difficult to get a good Indian of any standing, and the ordinary type sent to these States tends to be a retired and somewhat comatose officer. I would not regard Chhatari, though he can no doubt hold his own in Hyderabad, as being really an ideal choice. Indians of the type of Menon are very few and far between. As for local talent, you may take it from me that is negligible. And while it may be our policy to make the States stand on their own legs and to regard the days of strict tutelage as numbered, I should be astonished if in practice that proves to be the case. From the point of view of India and of the States themselves, I am certain that an increase in the number of European dewans has everything to commend it, and there is the danger (obvious even at the present time) of having as dewans (when the man has any competence) in major States, Hindus with strong Congress leanings of the type of Gopalaswami Aiyengar of Kashmir. We are moving into a world of much greater realities so far as India is concerned, and rapidly moving away, I think, from the position in which we have been so anxious to say that the Indian is the better man, into one in which we admit, when facing the facts frankly, that he is nothing

like so good as the European for the great majority of the posts that fall to be filled in this country. That is as true of the States as it is of other parts of the country, and we shall have to face up to it. My own view, with much regret after all that has happened, is that we are beginning to move into a position in which, for very many years to come, our position in India will be the dominating position, and I shall not be at all surprised if we do not have to reconsider this whole matter of European recruitment with a view to maintaining it at least at its present level if not to increasing it; for the results of Indianisation, though we may say that India must be prepared to pay the price, are so far very far from encouraging from the point of view of the country as a whole.

* * *

17. As regards paragraph 6 of your letter,[7] I have since had the further information as to the attitude in this matter of the Dominions which was contained in Monteath's telegram to Laithwaite of 24th April No. 416.[8] It looks as though the prospect of an early Conference is not yet quite firm. So far as representation from here is concerned, it is all rather tied up with these discussions that have just been going on about Indian representation at the War Cabinet. We can count on the Jam Saheb, if we want to send him, from the Princely side. From the British India side Mudaliar would unquestionably be the most competent representative, but we shall have to get other people to have a look in on this sort of business, and I dare say that Firoz's hesitations about leaving India would not apply were it for a short visit only.

* * *

4 May 1943

19. You have had I think a copy of Jinnah's address to the annual meeting of the Muslim League a few days ago.[9] He dealt out full justice to us all, though I am told that the strain of a speech lasting 3 hours and starting at midnight was thought by the correspondents present to be a heavy one and hardly justified by the substance of the Qaid-e-Azam's oration! And now I am sorry to say that he apparently feels that insufficient publicity has been given by the Indian Press and insufficient sympathy by the Press at home to what he said, for he has come out this afternoon with a long and damnatory statement in the course of which His Majesty's Government, the Viceroy, and those citizens of India who fail to recognise that the flag of progress is hoisted only over the Muslim League headquarters, all come in for their share of vituperation. Not that I blame him —this is all politics and Jinnah has shown himself to be a really first-class politician. But to turn for a moment to the more serious aspects of his speech, it has a certain value as bringing out again perfectly clearly (not that there was any necessity for that) the growing intransigence of the Muslims, and the

[6] Vol. I, No. 23; the date should be 21 January 1942. [7] No. 644. [8] Not printed.
[9] Cf. No. 669.

exceedingly small prospect of any sort of accommodation being reached between them and the Congress, who of course are if anything more intransigent on their own side. All that is closely related to the post-war discussion, and all of it goes to confirm my own fear that there can be no post-war discussions on a basis of agreement; while equally we must take it for granted that there can be no imposing of a settlement on this country against the will of the majority, or of a very substantial minority such as the Muslims.

20. As you know I have never believed in the sincerity of Jinnah's public claims, and my own feeling continues to be that it suits the Muslims so well to have His Majesty's Government in charge of law, order, defence, foreign relations, commerce, &c. in this country, charged in addition with responsibility for seeing justice done between the Muslim minority and the Hindu majority in every area of the field and the like, that they have nothing to gain by any change. For any change must mean that they will have to face up themselves to an adjustment with the majority in respect of tariffs, income-tax, defence expenditure, communal proportions, the safeguarding of Muslim minorities in Hindu majority provinces and the rest—and that with a team in intellectual capacity much below that of the sort of team that the Hindu majority can at any time produce. But there it is—we have to face the facts in this business unpleasant though it may be, and what I am sure is true is that Pakistan, that simple slogan which the meanest intelligence can understand, is taking very deep root among Muslims. Khizar Hayat, the new Premier of the Punjab, who came down to see me a couple of days ago was clearly profoundly uneasy at the Punjab position so far as Pakistan is concerned, and told me that he felt that Pakistan, deeply tinged as it was with religious prejudice, was getting to a point at which it could not be resisted. Khizar of course has not either the standing or the experience of Sikander, who by methods which did not always commend themselves to you or to me, managed to hold his own against Jinnah, and I suspect that his life is not going to be too happy a one; while a trial of strength may come at any time if Jinnah supports the opposition to the young Shaukat Hayat Khan, who is now standing (on the Muslim League ticket it is true) for a Punjab constituency against three opponents. Khizar was so depressed that he said to me that he did not quite know how they were going to carry on in face of the growing appeal of Pakistan in the Punjab, and that the only proposal he could put to me was that His Majesty's Government should ask Jinnah to define exactly what Pakistan was, so that if his proposals were unreasonable they should be on strong ground to turn them down. I told him that I did not see any prospect of advance on those lines; that our attitude was that we must keep entirely out of this business, and take the line that while Pakistan or any other solution was a matter for consideration by Indians themselves at the post-war conference, His Majesty's Government were entirely

unbiased one way or the other. Were we to act as he had suggested, we should play right into Jinnah's hands. And indeed I could imagine no greater encouragement to Jinnah (and no greater discouragement to the Mahasabha and Hindu opinion generally, and particularly in the Punjab) than that we should lead Jinnah to think that we were taking him so seriously that we wanted him to define his proposition more precisely. From his own point of view half the strength of his position is that he has refused to define it: and I am quite certain that he would refuse to define it now if asked to, save on quite unacceptable conditions! while in any event if he were to define in response to a request from us, he would be bound to pitch his claims preposterously high. Thus I have no doubt that the famous corridor by which he proposes to link north-west Pakistan with north-east Pakistan, a corridor which would presumably run via Delhi, Lucknow, Allahabad and Patna, cutting off the area north of the corridor from the Hindu majorities in the south of it would almost inevitably figure; and he would be a fool if he did not make all sorts of excessive demands in respect of tariffs, defence, the use of ports, and the like. I fear that Khizar and his friends will have trouble with the Muslim League, and Khizar may be, as I have said above, much less well qualified to deal with it than Sikander. But they will have to take their chance about that.

* * *

22. I send you by this bag a letter[10] which will no doubt cause you as much surprise as it caused me from C. P. Ramaswami Aiyar, in which he suggests that despite the events of last autumn and before he finally retires from public life it might be possible for me to turn his services to advantage for a period not exceeding say twelve months! I am quite fond of C. P. in his own way, but he really does sometimes put up the most unexpected propositions, and this is one of them. I am not quite certain what he can have in his mind. A period of a year would clearly exclude him from an Executive Councillorship (unless of course one was prepared to put him in on the understanding that he would resign within a specified number of months) but it is I suppose conceivable that he may think that he could be used in connection with the Peace settlement or the representation of India at the War Cabinet. As you know I have the greatest admiration for his capacity and I like him very much personally. But there is clearly nothing doing on the lines he suggests after the business of last autumn, for we should have no guarantee that he might not run out again if we did charge him with some responsible and delicate office. So I shall merely reply thanking him for his offer, saying how deeply I appreciate it and adding that I have mentioned it privately to you, but that I fear I see little prospect in present circumstances of our being able to take advantage of it.

* * *

[10] MSS. EUR. F. 125/125.

24. I think the wheat situation is now not too bad, though the Punjab has just been trying to get guarantees out of us as regards price for the next crop. But I am still very uneasy about the rice position, and the Bengal position in particular is most unsatisfactory. I do not think that it has been at all well handled by their Civil servants or for that matter, it goes without saying, by their Ministers in the past. They have been extremely slow in getting any sort of organisation together for dealing with it; and I am quite definitely worried about the immediate future there. I propose to take the matter in Council on Wednesday, the 5th, and I will send Wood down immediately afterwards to see what he can do. That all of course is directly relevant to the extent to which we can help Ceylon and Saudi Arabia, and the Arab Shaikdoms, about which I have just telegraphed[11] to you. It is far too early yet for us to think that we are on firm ground so far as rice is concerned.

* * *

26. You will have noticed in Governors' letters references to strain on Hindu personnel of the I.C.S., &c. imposed by Gandhi's fast, the repression of Congress, &c. I have little doubt that there is a good deal of pretty strong pro-Congress feeling among them, and inevitable as that may be we have got to take account of it. I had no hesitation in approving (subject to your final approval) Twynam's action in accepting Mr. Patil's resignation, and I sent Twynam a letter, dated the 23rd April,[12] of which a copy goes to you by this bag, making clear to him that he will have my fullest support in getting rid of any officers of whose soundness in relation to Congress he may have any doubt.

* * *

31. You will remember the papers which you sent me out in connection with reconstruction in this country, &c. I have postponed any action upon them as desired in your telegram[13] until the result of further consideration in the Cabinet is available. But I thought that it would be a good thing to let Raisman, Jenkins, and Hutton (as Secretary of my War Resources Committee) see them in advance with a warning that the whole business might come to nothing, so that they could let me have their preliminary impressions. I hope to have a talk with Raisman in the next couple of days. I have had a very lucid note from Jenkins,[14] and a shorter, but useful, note from Hutton.[15] I am sending you copy of both of these by the bag. The business is one which you will probably find it worth discussing with Jenkins when he gets home. As you will see the difficulties are likely to be very substantial and, other difficulties apart, I am very conscious of the problem which personnel is going to present us. I shall probably tackle you on that latter question, though I do not overlook, first that people at home of quality are now beginning to tire after 4 years of war; secondly, that the Home Government have a nastier problem of reconstruction before them than

we have; and thirdly, that India, in present uncertain conditions, is not so attractive a proposition, even if she is prepared to pay high rates of salary, as she might have been in the past.

[11] Not printed. [12] MSS. EUR. F. 125/64. [13] No. 640. [14] No. 668.
[15] No. 672.

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/8/9a: ff 115

4 May 1943

My dear Winston,
What about James Stuart? He knows no more about India than Oliver [Lyttelton] but he has a very shrewd instinctive judgment of politics and of politicians and is capable of sizing up Indian politicians as well as our homebred variety. He has got all the distinction of appearance and manner which Indians, and not Princes only, are so sensitive to, and which Oliver I fear completely lacks. Lastly, I have no doubt that he has a quiet courage and a power of decision which is not the least important of the things wanted out there. Do consider him carefully before we are finally committed. May I sound him informally?[1]

Yours ever,
L. S. AMERY

[1] The same day Mr Turnbull noted on the file that Mr Churchill had sent word that he would prefer Mr Amery not to sound Mr Stuart.

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Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan to Sir G. Laithwaite

MSS. EUR. F. 125/138

CENTRAL OFFICE, ALL-INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE,
DARYAGANJ, DELHI, *4 May 1943*

No. 6737.
Sir,
I am herewith enclosing copies of resolutions Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 12[1]

[1] Only resolutions 3, 4, and 9 are printed here. Resolutions 2, 5, 6, 7, and 12 were on the position of Indians in South Africa, the Pir Pagaro's Court Martial, the disposal of the Pir Pagaro's property, Martial Law in Sind, and Palestine.

and shall be obliged if you will kindly place them before His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General of India for his consideration.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient servant,
LIAQUAT ALI KHAN
Honorary Secretary
All-India Muslim League

Enclosure to No. 683

Resolution No. 3

Whereas the Government is responsible for the supply of the necessities of life to the people of India—especially during the war time when the movements of merchandise are controlled entirely by the Government—whereas the marked disparity between the prices fixed by the Government for their own purchases and the prices at which the Civil population is forced to buy the same articles is against all sound theories of economics and leads to corruption, black markets and exploitation of the people, whereas the policy of the control as devised and practised by the capitalists, traders and manufacturers in the name of the Government has failed to achieve its purpose, is encouraging hoarding and abnormal profiteering and causing miseries to the people in general and the poorer classes in particular, the Muslim League urges on the Government of India the necessity of framing their policy of control and distribution of the necessities of life not so much in consultation with the capitalists and officials as in consultation with the representatives of the people and of ensuring that (1) the necessities of life are made available to the people and not locked up by the distributors, (2) they are sold at reasonable prices providing economic profit to the producers, (3) distributors are selected from all classes of the people, (4) retail shops are opened in every quarter of a town. The Muslim League further demands that the representatives of the people—especially of the Muslim League—should be associated with the officials and the capitalists at every stage in the planning and execution of the scheme of purchase and distribution.

Resolution No. 4

This session of the All-India Muslim League records its most emphatic protest against—

1. The imposition of collective fines on Muslims notwithstanding Government's clear declaration that the Muslims have kept strictly aloof from the subversive movement launched by the Congress.

2. Non-exemption of Muslims from collective security orders which have been passed as a punitive measure.

3. The policy of issuing licences for sale and distribution of foodstuff and other necessaries of life to overwhelming non-Muslim dealers and demands that the collective fines realised from Mussalmans be remitted and they may be exempted from the operation of the orders regarding collective security and watch and ward and urges to issue licences to Muslim dealers in due proportion.

Resolution No. 9

The Session of the All-India Muslim League views with concern and grave apprehension the failure of the British Government to make an explicit declaration asked for in the resolution passed by the Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League, in Bombay on the 20th of August 1942, which *inter alia* says:—

[*There follows the text of Vol. II, No. 598 from 'The Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League note with dissatisfaction' (p. 772, 8th line from foot) to 'are conceded unequivocally' (p. 774, 10th line from foot).*]

Since that resolution was passed, the speeches and statements made by responsible British statesmen, both in England and in India lead to the conviction that not only the declaration such as was asked for, will not be forthcoming, but that some kind of Federal Constitution, not necessarily on the model embodied in the Act of 1935 is under contemplation. This Session, therefore, warns the British Government in all earnestness that the imposition of such a Federal Constitution will be resisted by Muslim India with all its might, which will inevitably result in strife, bloodshed and misery, the responsibility of which will rest on the British Government alone.

That this session of the All-India Muslim League is convinced that the attainment of the cherished goal of Pakistan is only possible by the untiring effort, willing sacrifices and grim determination of the Muslims, and they should therefore do their utmost to acquire the strength requisite for such an undertaking.

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Viscount Halifax to Mr Amery (via Foreign Office)

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 8

WASHINGTON, *5 May 1943, 4.26 pm*
Received: 5 May, 11.15 pm

No. 2101. Following personal for Secretary of State for India.

1. I happened to be lunching with the President today and took the opportunity of speaking to him about the Viceroy's refusal to let Phillips see Gandhi.

I said that it might have been very natural for Phillips to make the request, but that I was quite certain the Viceroy had been absolutely right to refuse. Nothing would so have resuscitated Gandhi's position as to be waited upon by representative of President of the United States.

2. The President did not dissent, and indeed appeared to agree. I then told him that I had had a report that might possibly have emanated from Phillips that Gandhi was going to have another fast, this time unto death. President said he had had this too, but thought he would find it difficult to stage his death in a setting so dramatic as he might have had a few months ago.

President did not seem at all excited about the possibility.

3. I also told him that the Viceroy[1] had complained very strongly of alleged remarks of Madame Chiang Kai-shek. I said I proposed to draw her attention in appropriate fashion to the impropriety of which she had been guilty. Again the President took the point and appeared agreeable.

4. President also told me that he had advised Madame Chiang Kai-shek, if she went back to China by India, not to stop there and ask to see Gandhi.

Repeated to Viceroy, New Delhi telegram No. 15.

[1] See No. 650.

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Sir H. Dow (Sind) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/99

D.-o. No. 199–F.R. *5 May 1943*

2. I notice that Jinnah threatened extension of his control over the provincial Muslim League governments, and asserted that 99 per cent. of the Sind Muslims were with the League. There has undoubtedly been a great extension of League membership in Sind since the discomfiture of Allah Bakhsh. But I still think that Jinnah would find, if he attempted to put pressure on the Sind Ministry in a matter in which they wished to resist, that his new membership in Sind would fall away as easily as it has been gathered. Neither of his two new converts in the Ministry, and very few outside, would be staunch; and it is quite possible that all the Ministry would resign from the League rather than give up office. I should think it likely that Jinnah himself is aware of this, and that he is not likely to issue any of his ukases to the Sind Ministry in present circumstances.

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Sir J. Colville (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/57

CONFIDENTIAL GOVT. HOUSE, BOMBAY, *6 May 1943*

REPORT NO. I

3. *General Political Situation.*—Interest has focussed mainly on Jinnah's speech, and the general opinion seems to be that, as he has made Pakistan, total and complete, a *sine qua non* of any understanding with Congress, the prospects of a rapprochement are remote. The gathering strength of the Muslim League may be making Congressmen think with misgiving about their past policy, as they realise that they are losing the stage. In general, I get the impression that the excitement which the Press tries to whip up, at every opportunity, is not shared by the majority of people, who want to live their lives in peace and, if possible, make money. There is no indication of what Gandhi's next move may be, other than his letter[1] to Jinnah, which will have reached you before this does, in which he replies to Jinnah's invitation to write to him by suggesting an interview.

Much annoyance has been expressed over the South African Pegging Bill.[2] I have heard this from many quarters, and find it is very real.

[1] See No. 691.

[2] Namely, the South African legislation passed on 26 April which restricted the acquisition and occupation of land by Indians in Natal and extended, until 1946, similar legislation relating to the Transvaal.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

PRIVATE AND SECRET INDIA OFFICE, *6 May 1943*

I have been reading with the greatest interest the last few reports to the National Defence Council on the progress of the National War Front. It seems to me that you have there a plant which, though still at present tender, might grow into a really vigorous tree. Not only does it seem to me that the development of the National War Front might do a lot to keep India steady during the next two or three years which must still be years of war, but also that, by bringing all the saner elements in the community together, it might become a real National

N.D.C. will be O.K. so long as you resist the temptation (to which you have already succumbed once) to try to use it to help you out of the constitutional tangle.[1]

L.

[1] See Vol. I, Nos. 101, 103, 111–12, 121, 129, etc.

Post-War Front and as such exercise a steadying influence against the party extremists on both sides. From that point of view I am all for encouraging the formation of study groups as part of the National War Front movement, providing always that they can be persuaded to concentrate most on social, economic and defence problems and leave the discussion on the constitutional problem to emerge, as it were, as a by-product of the other discussions, and not to swallow them up.

2. From all those points of view I hope that the movement will be given all the effective help in money for paid staff as well as in really good men to run it. As the Begum Shah Nawaz is now not coming on to the Council I should think there was much to be said for magnifying her position as woman leader of the National War Front, especially if you could get some really good Hindu on the men's side.

3. Continuing that line of thought, there may be much to be said for approaching the whole constitutional problem indirectly through your reconstruction committees. The more the various aspects of India's future are authoritatively examined at the Centre, and the more the main conclusions thus arrived at are made public, the more difficult will it be for extremists to go on advocating their incompatible conclusions. The practical case, indeed, against Pakistan seems to me overwhelming. On the other hand, the pledge we have given of liberty of non-accession should be a powerful lever in favour of compromise.

* * *

7 May 1943

7. Winston has dashed off again, taking Wavell, Peirse and Somerville with him, and I imagine the whole question of the Burma and Beyond campaign will be considered over again in consultation with the Americans.[2] I have pressed him strongly,[3] on the lines of your telegram,[4] to realise that whoever is to be in chief command of this big undertaking must be free, not only to inspect troops while in training, but also to make frequent visits to London and Washington in connection with all the equipment and preparations required, and that that cannot be combined with the many duties, political as well as administrative, of the Commander-in-Chief, India. I have urged that the decision should be taken now. Failing that, my suggestion is that there should be something in the nature of an Inspector-General, Indian Army, free to go about and report on the morale and training of the troops.[5] Whichever it is, that should give an opening for making use of Auchinleck. I had a letter[6] from him the other day, but am putting off an answer until Winston comes back and I have some idea as to what he means to do with Wavell and indeed with the whole South-East Asia campaign.

8. On the Minister of State point, he has asked me to discuss this with Eden and Bracken and I hope to do so next week. I have no doubt that while the Commander-in-Chief of South East Asia is still in India, the Viceroy is the best person to fulfil the functions of Minister of State. Once the Commander-in-Chief is outside India he will obviously have to have someone more or less continuously by his side. Whether that should be a separate Minister of State, as was temporarily the case with Duff Cooper, or whether he should in some sense be a Deputy of the Viceroy, will depend a great deal on circumstances and personalities when the time comes.

P.M. or who?
L.

[2] On 4 May, Mr Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff left for Washington to attend 'Trident', the Anglo-American conference to consider plans for the defeat of Germany, Italy and Japan. At the suggestion of the United States Chiefs of Staff, the three British commanders in the Eastern theatre went with them in order to have an opportunity of discussing operations in that theatre with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and Generals Stilwell and Chennault.

[3] See No. 678, note 4. [4] See No. 665, note 1. [5] See No. 701, paras. 8 and 9.

[6] Not printed.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMPORTANT *7 May 1943*

PERSONAL

No. 1117–S. Time is about to arrive at which I must consider the future of the existing Council of State and Legislative Assembly. I see nothing for it myself but to extend them both for a further year. They are of course quite out of date. But it would be out of the question in present circumstances to face the disorganization and trouble of a General Election, and I should certainly expect that to be the view of my Council. Before I go to them however I would welcome any comment you may care to let me have.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

L/PO/8/9a: ff 112–13

MOST SECRET AND PRIVATE INDIA OFFICE, *7 May 1943*

My dear Linlithgow,

Winston has gone off into the blue and that postpones a definite settlement of the succession to yourself for another three weeks.

Before Eden went to Washington I had some talk with him as to the possibility of his going to India and found him very receptive to the idea, though very conscious of the difficulties of disentangling at this end. Immediately after Easter I tackled Winston on the problem. At first he entirely scouted the idea of Eden. Then, just over a week ago, he swung round to it vigorously and told me that unless Eden strongly objected he had decided on it. He did in fact write a letter to the King, warmly urging the proposal. The King replied expressing grave misgivings on the ground that Winston could not spare so essential a lieutenant at this moment. I know also that the King feels—and has been told so by Winston—that Eden is the natural successor if anything happens to Winston himself. Eden in turn, though personally immensely attracted by the idea, also began to have doubts as to whether he really could leave Winston, and on this side Cranborne has been strongly urging him that his duty is to stay. I was not altogether surprised, then, when three days ago Winston told me that he did not think that Eden could be spared and that his mind was now set on Oliver Lyttelton. Nothing has been absolutely settled, or will be till Winston returns, and meanwhile Anthony is still wrestling with himself, I fear, however, with a growing sense of the difficulties of leaving the situation here.

I confess I feel some doubts about Lyttelton. His hearty manner would do very well with the soldiers and his knowledge of production would certainly be helpful on the military side. But he has no experience on the political side and I doubt whether his hearty manner and rather confused method of exposition, would go down with your Council. Also, in spite of his origins, his general manner, appearance and ways are very much those of the City man, and I am not sure that either Princes or Indian politicians will appreciate that. Still, he has got considerable ability and might very well grow to the job. It would be a more popular appointment here and in America, and I daresay also in India, than John Anderson, who seems the only other alternative. . . .[1] There is the further advantage on Lyttelton's part that he is decidedly younger, and Anderson, though pretty fit, is likely to show his years before long.

That is really all the field at present. Nothing will induce Winston to look at Sam Hoare, whom he regards as an arrant appeaser, and the same applies to the suggestion of sending Edward Halifax back to Delhi from Washington. There was a moment a few weeks ago when Gwilym Lloyd George was in the picture, but he very soon dropped out. . . .[2] I had thought of the possibility of James Stuart, who has got the qualities of personal distinction and quiet dignity and a very shrewd political judgment, but of course no knowledge of India or of administration. Also, I fear that, with two not over-brilliant Presidency Governors chosen from the Whips' Office, India and the public would look askance at yet another horse from the same stable!

So there we are, all of us puzzling our heads sorely as to who can be found really adequate to so critical a task. You can at any rate take our perplexities as

no little compliment to yourself. By the time you get this Winston will I hope be back and then a decision will have to be made.

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

1 and 2 Personal comment omitted.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to all Provincial Governors

MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

MOST SECRET THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *7 May 1943*

My dear——,

There have been indications for some time that the Japanese intend to intensify their political warfare against India and especially against the Indian Army. They will work primarily through troops in contact, especially on the Arakan front. The so-called "Indian National Army" (a name, incidentally, to which we are anxious to deny publicity so far as possible) has recently been reinforced by a few new recruits from units in the forward area and there have been signs that their influence is being cleverly exploited. Already "contact" parties have included men captured on the Arakan front. An increase has been noted in propaganda by whispering and rumour, while propaganda by pamphlets both dropped from aircraft and distributed by hand has increased and includes direct appeals by name from deserters and genuine prisoners to individuals in the forward units. The disappearance recently of a platoon of the 1/15th Punjab Regiment was followed within a few days by the appearance of leaflets giving the names of the V.C.Os. and N.C.Os. concerned, stating that they had deserted with arms and exhorting others to do likewise.

2. You see regularly the G.H.Q. Weekly Summaries and are therefore in possession of most of our information about the so-called Indian National Army. I now send a copy of a most secret circular issued from G.H.Q. on May the 3rd[1] which indicates the general policy adopted for counter-measures.

3. In paragraph 13 of the circular it is stated that the question of general publicity measures is under reference to Provincial Governments, but I have decided to substitute for the official reference to Governments a letter addressed to Governors personally and I am asking you and other Governors to be good enough to give me advice on certain specific points. I have no objection to your consulting your Chief Minister and one or two other Ministers if you think fit

[1] L/WS/1/1576: ff 134–6.

to do so.[2] It may also be necessary to consult a few officials, but you will understand that the need for secrecy must strictly limit the number.

4. You will see that in paragraph 14 (*c*) (iii) of the circular it is stated that steps are now being taken to confiscate the property of individuals known to be helping the enemy. In actual fact this letter of mine is the first step that has been taken in this direction and I do not propose to pass any such ordinance until I have had the benefit of Governors' advice on its feasibility and probable effect. The effect we aim at is of course a weakening of the I.N.A. and the chances of success are difficult to estimate. Against our hopes in this direction we have to weigh the disadvantages of giving publicity in recruiting areas to the I.N.A. and to treacherous activities generally, as well as the difficulty of upholding any penalties against the subsequent protests of the alleged traitors who when they come into our hands will of course maintain that they intended merely to deceive the enemy and to collect information for our benefit. Again, I realise that the landed property of most of our soldiers is very limited in extent, but even so I imagine that the value attached to even the minutest share in a joint holding of thirsty land is far greater than any cash appraisement would suggest, and it may be that news of confiscations would create considerable despondency in the ranks of the I.N.A. Such news could presumably be conveyed by broadcasting.

5. I would welcome your opinion also on the proposal to stop payment of family allotments and allowances to dependents in India of men believed to be traitors.

6. There are three further points on which I am afraid I must trouble you for your views:—

(*a*) Whether it is expedient to enhance the penalty for tampering with the loyalty of members of the Services. The present maximum is five years rigorous imprisonment (Defence of India Rule 38 (5)) whereas at home the extreme penalty is death;

(*b*) whether we should arrange to give publicity outside the Services in recruiting areas particularly and in India generally to punishments inflicted on members of the Services convicted of traitorous conduct;

(*c*) whether we should undertake a general publicity campaign among the public as opposed to the Services on the whole question of traitorous activities in support of the Japanese.

7. I should be most grateful for your advice on these various points and hope you will be able to let me have it without much delay.[3]

Yours——,

LINLITHGOW

[2] This sentence and the word 'also' in the next sentence were omitted in the letter sent to Section 93 Provinces.

[3] See MSS. EUR. F. 125/111 for Governors' replies.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *8 May 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 1127–S. My Home Department have had letter from Gandhi to Jinnah text of which is repeated in my immediately following telegram. I am clear that it ought to be sent on, and have so instructed Home Department.

2. Letter is as ingenious an approach as usual. I shall raise no objection if Jinnah wants to see Gandhi in jail. But either party is capable of attaching conditions to a meeting which might require consideration. I doubt the Mahatma's move being wholly palatable to Jinnah. I shall be interested in the latter's reaction to the penultimate paragraph of Gandhi's letter.

3. I read the old man's letter as a significant indication of the present weakness of his position. I doubt if either party underestimates (*a*) the tactical skill of the other, (*b*) the desirability of having His Majesty's Government on the mat. I trust they will not succeed in passing back the burden to us, but we must see how things go.

4. I am treating this correspondence as most secret and saying nothing to anyone. If you have any comment please telegraph urgently. I shall be away from Delhi till about 12th May.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *8 May 1943*

No. 1128–S. Reference my immediately preceding telegram No. 1127–S. Following is letter dated 4th May from Gandhi to Jinnah:—

Begins. Dear Qaid-e-Azam. When some time after my incarceration, the Government asked me for a list of newspapers I would like to have, I included the *Dawn* in my list. I have been receiving it with more or less regularity. Whenever it comes to me, I read it carefully.[1] I have followed the proceedings

1 'comes to me, I read it carefully' deciphered as 'come (sic) to me, I was (corrupt group) careful'.

of the League as reported in the *Dawn* columns. I noted your invitation to me to write to you.[2] Hence this letter.

I welcome your invitation. I suggest our meeting face to face rather than talking through correspondence. But I am in your hands.

I hope that this letter will be sent to you and if you agree to my proposal, that the Government will let you visit me.

One thing I had better mention. There seems to be an "if" about your invitation. Do you say I should write only if I have changed my heart? God alone knows men's hearts. I would like you to take me as I am.

Why should not both you and I approach the great question of communal unity as men determined on finding a common solution and work together to make our solution acceptable to all who are concerned with it or are interested in it? Yours sincerely, M. K. Gandhi. *Ends.*

[2] See Appendix II to No. 709.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: f 195

IMMEDIATE — INDIA OFFICE, *8 May 1943, 11.45 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL — *Received: 9 May*

481. Your 1127–S.[1] I have no special comment at this stage. No doubt you will consider possible effect in America of conceding to Jinnah what you refused to Phillips.

[1] No. 691.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: ff 187–91

MOST IMMEDIATE — *9 May 1943, 3 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

484. If Gandhi's letter has not already been forwarded I should on further reflection be glad if you would have it held up while I consult my colleagues. In view of challenging statement[1] regarding withholding of such a letter in Jinnah's speech to Moslem League Conference, and of our general position that we regard communal settlement as a matter for Indians, I agree that it would be difficult to stop it, but the fact is that once this letter is delivered and Jinnah

has replied (his reply may of course amount to request to see Gandhi as to which see para. 3 below), a request from Gandhi for discussion with Working Committee will probably follow, leading to rapid invasion of position we have previously stood by. That position is well put in closing paragraph of 3591 weekly appreciation 32,[2] namely that, so long as Gandhi refuses to recognise that disturbances flowed from Congress Resolution and so long as he stands by it we cannot allow him concessions suggesting that he is free to discuss Indian problem. I am very anxious to know why you feel that we should now depart from it and make no objection to Jinnah visiting Gandhi in jail. I feel I should not be committed to a step which is likely to lead to abandonment of that position without Cabinet having opportunity to consider question.

2. If letter has been delivered would it be well to inform Jinnah that Government will keep matter wholly confidential and that we assume neither party will make matter public without consent of the other?

3. I must make it clear, that while I agree that if and when letter is delivered we must be ready to transmit reply, I must not be committed to Jinnah being allowed to visit Gandhi without Cabinet being consulted. We have refused Rajagopalachari and Phillips and although Jinnah is a different case in some respects, refusal has hitherto been based on Gandhi's past behaviour and if we once abandon principle that he is kept incommunicado because of his responsibility for rebellion and must remain so until he disassociates himself from that policy, I feel that we may be driven out of our whole position, which is of course Gandhi's object.

[1] See Appendix II to No. 709.

[2] i.e. the Government of India, External Affairs Department's telegram 3591 of 6 May 1943 to Secretary of State (repeated to Washington and Canberra) transmitting its weekly appreciation No. 32. L/PO/6/102b: f 192.

695

Mr Amery to Mr Eden

L/PO/8/9a: ff 109–11

BAILIFF'S COURT, *9 May 1943*

My dear Anthony,
I have been thinking further over our talk with Bobbety [Lord Cranborne] and, as we cannot meet over this week-end, feel it may be useful to both of us to jot down a few points.

The next five years in India are going to be critical, not only for India, but for the whole Empire and indeed for the world. If, during those years, Indians,

without agreeing among themselves, also continue increasingly hostile to the existing system and to the British connexion in any stage or form, India may well become ungovernable and, in one way or another, probably by weak concession on our part to the most troublesome elements, break away for good and all.

The loss of India will, of itself, disastrously weaken our whole position in the Middle East and in all the British countries round the Indian Ocean. More than that. An India seceding under those conditions will inevitably break up in civil war and offer an irresistible invitation to foreign intrigue and eventually invasion. Asia will anyhow be the danger zone of the future, and I can think of nothing more likely to bring about a third world war than an Indian Empire in dissolution.

All this is possible. It is not inevitable. I believe that with the right combination of firmness against the really irreconcilable, with sympathy and trust in those who have a saner outlook, India can be steered on to a more hopeful course. If once Indians are persuaded that we mean what we say about their future status, and can be induced to sit down together and try and work out a constitution under which they can not only live together but face the outside world, the battle will be more than half won. Once they get down to the need for working with each other they will also realise the practical advantage of retaining the British connexion at any rate for the time being. Once on that course the advantages of remaining on it will become increasingly obvious and the psychological motives for secession become increasingly weaker. India, though still needing support from the rest of the Commonwealth against major dangers, will equally be in a position to make her contribution to meet them. The stronger she grows the more effective will she be as a bulwark of peace for ourselves and for the world.

In all this the individual influence may well be decisive. A Viceroy who can win the confidence and affection as well as the respect of his Indian Councillors, who can extend Indianisation without losing personal control, who can make India feel that there is a genuine intention and practical preparation for future self-government, and who can interest them in the idea that there is an intellectual and moral problem to be solved by themselves, and, at the same time, maintain the unquestioned authority of Government, might in much less than five years transform the whole situation. A blunderer, a reactionary or a weakling, might wreck everything. There can be no guarantee of success for you if you do go. Events, or the powers of unreason, may be too strong for you. You will be running the risk of being written down a failure, as well as other risks to your position here. All I can say is to quote the title of Herbert Agar's book, that this is *A Time for Greatness*.[1]

You will certainly have a good start. Everybody, here, in America and in India, will recognise the importance attached to the appointment and see in it

a desire for a sympathetic and liberal solution. Once there you will have all the advantage of the contrast between your own personality and Linlithgow's. Hopie has done a great piece of work in all essentials. He has broken the Congress attempt to force us into a disastrous surrender. He has handled his Council with great skill. But his manner is not easy and he has in recent months become increasingly sceptical and negative. You will be helped both by the ground which he has broken and by your own fresh approach in manner and in outlook.

Now for the other side of the picture. First, the Foreign Office side. You have accumulated great experience and made many valuable personal contacts. It will take Bobbety time to go near to filling your place, able and sympathetic as he is. But so much of the foreign situation is going to be governed by the sheer course of the war and by the inevitable interplay of the interests and ambitions of the different nations, that no individual statesman in any one country can altogether change the set up and sequence of things. Personality will count for a great deal, but not as decisively as in India.

Next, the House of Commons. There can be no doubt as to your success there and your going will undoubtedly add to Winston's burdens. This must be weighed seriously by both of you. I will only say that Winston did manage somehow before, and in a more difficult situation with a restive House, also things going well in India will also ease things for him and for the whole Government in the country and abroad as well as in the House.

Third, Bobbety's point about your going not leaving anyone who will stand up to Winston and whom he will listen to. There is some force in that. But on Foreign Affairs he will inevitably after a bit have to listen to your successor, and Bobbety does carry weight with him. On the whole I think this a less formidable objection to your going.

Last, and most difficult, what would happen if Winston crashed in an aeroplane—and we must think of every eventuality. You are in present circumstances the man whom both parties and the nation generally would look to and most readily accept as successor. If that happened while you were in India there might well be real difficulties about getting you back quickly and you might yourself be torn between duty at home and loyalty to your immediate task in India.

All I would say as to that is that it would after all only be re-opening the present problem of whom to send out, but let us hope with a more favourable situation in India, while as Prime Minister you would still have—and India would know it—no small say in the Indian business, be better able, in fact, to see through your ideas of a solution than in Delhi itself. To leave your work in India for any other job might be impossible. To leave it for the Prime Ministership, with immediate Indian experience behind you, might indeed be

[1] London, Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1943.

the supremely effective way of solving the Indian problem. If a few weeks of interim government under Attlee or John Anderson were inevitable that would only be a slight extension of what is happening at this moment![2] In any case India is immediate and the other is a hypothetical possibility which, we may hope, will not arise.

I have put all this strictly on public grounds. There remains the more personal side. There is the danger of losing touch here, the danger of new stars arising in the political firmament (I wish there were more of them!), of being away just when critical domestic decisions are taken. There is, for instance, the possibility that if Germany collapses next year and another two years or more of war in the Far East confront us, that the public, and above all the Labour Party, will insist on a new Parliament to deal with the many problems of partial demobilisation, initiation of post war social reform etc. which will then be urgent. If so the coalition may break up and the election result in a Socialist victory. From one point of view you might hate to be away at a moment when your personal influence might help to swing things one way or another. From another point of view, of course, you would be better occupied keeping India going than on the Opposition front bench!

Against all that I would set the hope that, from a new field of experience and responsibility, you would come back the bigger and broader man, and so play a part you might otherwise never play, whether in or out of office. Cæsar would never have become what he was, but for his years in Gaul! And as for loss of touch that is much less so than it used to be, and [we] would certainly have to get rid of the out-of-date restriction that a Viceroy can only come home on leave once during his term of office!

So there we are. I have set out the case, not weighting the argument unduly, I hope, in the direction of the decision which I should wish. It remains for you and Winston to reach the final difficult conclusion. My feeling is that he will be decided by your own wish. He will not send you if you are very much of two minds. He will send you if you definitely believe you should go. So it all comes back to you.

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

[2] Mr Churchill was out of the country; see No. 687, note 2.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *10 May 1943, 11 pm*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 1150–S. Your telegram dated 9th May No. 484.[1] Letter has not (repeat not) yet been forwarded as I have been anxious to consider certain points further. I will telegraph again after my return to Delhi on 12th May.[2]

[1] No. 694.

[2] In telegram 497 of 11 May, Mr Amery asked for Lord Linlithgow's views by morning of 13 May, otherwise Cabinet might not be able to take matter until 17th or 18th. As letter was dated 4 May, Mr Amery felt that decision should not be delayed much longer. In telegram 1158–S of 12 May, Lord Linlithgow replied that he feared it would not be possible to meet this deadline, that Mr Amery might wish to discuss certain points further before Cabinet met, and that he was 'not unduly fussed at possibility of delay until 17th so long as we get a final decision then'. L/PO/6/102b: f 156; MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

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Mr Churchill to Mr Eden (Extract)[1]

Telegram, L/PO/8/9a: f 108

MOST SECRET *10 May 1943*

Is your mind working on choice between O[liver] L[yttelton] and J[ohn] A[nderson]. My own tendency is still more towards former because the importance of military aspect and evident need for energy. I am also contemplating detaching office of Member for Defence in India from C.-in-C. and vesting it in Viceroy. I am increasingly dissatisfied with Indian war Picture.

[1] Only this extract is on the India Office file.

698

Mr Turnbull to Captain Clifford

L/PO/8/9a: ff 102–6

10 May 1943

Dear Clifford,

I enclose, in triplicate, two most secret and very confidential telegrams which my Secretary of State wishes to be sent to the Prime Minister. One of them is from the Foreign Secretary and was handed by Mr. Eden to Mr. Amery

personally. I understand that Mr. Eden does not wish the text of this telegram to go through the Foreign Office. Further Mr. Eden does not wish any copies of this telegram to be made and I should be grateful therefore if you could return to me either or both of the two spare copies if they can be spared. Mr. Amery would like the same procedure adopted with his own telegram.

Yours sincerely,

F. F. T[URNBULL]

Enclosure 1 to No. 698

Alcove No. . Following for Prime Minister from Secretary of State for India.

Personal and Most Secret.

Have discussed your telegram[1] with Eden and have seen his reply.[2] The Indian military situation depends so much on the political situation that capacity to handle latter is more important even from point of view of immediate operational future not to speak of the future of the Empire. I have no doubt whatever who best combines the two qualifications and still hope you will not rule him out till you have given me another opportunity for discussion.

2. As regards position of C.-in-C. there is already an Indian Defence Member. It would be very difficult to separate administrative from operational duties of C.-in-C. without raising demand that Indian Defence Member should take over former. On other hand Viceroy's duties are far too heavy already to add burden to him. Best solution to my mind is to separate C.-in-C. India from C.-in-C. South-East Asia operations but putting him operationally under the latter. This would give him time to concentrate on the organisation and morale of the Army in India and leave C.-in-C. South-East Asia free not only to supervise plans locally but also to visit London and Washington to press forward all the many preparations which will be required. Viceroy could still as he does now keep in closest touch and give general impulsion and might if thought necessary create a special Defence Committee over which he would preside.

Your Pencil 24.[3] My paper[4] is being circulated. It is of nature of warning as to possible dangers not a statement of any bad situation which has actually arisen. I should doubt if it warranted more than now limiting expansion and concentrating on quality.

Enclosure 2 to No. 698

Alcove No. . Following for Prime Minister from Foreign Secretary.

Personal and Most Secret.

I agree as to increasing seriousness of Indian military situation. Have talked to Amery and latter has spoken to Lyttelton. Amery has impression that Lyttelton is ready but not keen to go. In view of growing responsibility of charge

he urges strongly that possibility of my going should not be ruled out. We are continuing discussions but am sure no final decision can be taken before you return.

[1] No. 697. [2] See Enclosure 2. [3] Not printed. [4] See No. 701, paras. 8–9.

699

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *10 May 1943*

PRIVATE AND SECRET

2. You may care to see a copy of a circular letter[1] which I have sent to Governors, on the subject of counter-measures against Japanese political propaganda. There are some difficult problems involved and I will keep you informed of any further action taken.

* * *

17 May 1943

14. I took the opportunity of my visit to Calcutta to have two long talks with Herbert. He seems to have settled in pretty well with his new team, and I quite agree with you that we may all of us regard him as having got away a great deal more easily over the Huq business than might have been the case. He recognises I think that everything is not necessarily plain sailing even at this stage, and in particular he seems rather to anticipate an attempt by Nazimuddin (in the hope of holding his more left wing Forward Bloc supporters) to secure some concession over the release of prisoners. I gathered from other sources that Nazimuddin had indeed gone so far as to suggest to a third party that the Governor, having just had a first class row over the removal of Huq, would probably be very unlikely to welcome the risk of a second row, and the disappearance of a second Chief Minister! I thought it well in those circumstances to hearten Herbert, and tell him that he could look for my full support in resisting any attempt to make him agree to the release of prisoners in any greater number than he thought entirely consistent with local security, and I have since sent him a telegram[2] to the same effect in which I have asked him to keep in very close touch with all developments. I need not say that I wholly agree with what you say on his handling of the matter generally in paragraph 3 of your letter of the 29th April.[3]

15. Thank you very much for your telegram[4] informing me about Wavell's visit to the United States. It will be most interesting to know what comes out

[1] No. 690. [2] MSS. EUR. F. 125/43. [3] No. 678.
[4] Not printed; but see No. 687, note 2.

of these most important discussions. I think incidentally that it is probably just as well that Phillips' arrival in Washington should more or less have coincided with that of Winston and his team, and I have no doubt that if, as I suppose is almost certain to happen, Winston and Phillips have a word with one another about the Indian problem, Phillips will get a pretty clear idea of Winston's attitude towards it!

16. I am amused from your letter of the 22nd April[5] to find that Wavell is as monosyllabic at home as he tends to be here. He is excellent company and most interesting once he starts to talk. But it is not always easy to get him started. I was greatly interested, I need not say, in what you say in paragraph 2 of your letter of the 22nd April, and in paragraph 6 of your letter of the 29th April, about the future organisation of defence and of civil control in these eastern areas. I do not think it is worth my while saying anything more in this letter for you should know my mind fully: but I shall much look forward to any comment you may let me have in the light of your further discussion with Wavell or with Winston. Many thanks, incidentally, for your recommendation, which you mention in paragraph 5 of your letter of the 29th April, to Winston about powers for the Governor-General to deal with these various matters, civil and military, that may arise as things develop outside the Governor-General's normal field.

17. I fear that I have given you a good deal of trouble over Gandhi's letter to Jinnah! As it is to be taken in the Cabinet tomorrow, which is the date on which the bag closes, I shall not know how things have gone till after this bag has gone off. I think in my long telegram[6] I have given you a full analysis of the position as I see it, and a full statement of my reasons for favouring the despatch of the letter. Since I sent that telegram Colville has let me know that all the other inmates of the Aga Khan's palace are aware that Gandhi has indited this composition, and that fact makes the importance of getting it off to Jinnah without delay greater in my judgment than ever. I have sent you a short telegram[7] to let you know. As always I admire the Mahatma's skill, and he has turned to the fullest advantage Jinnah's mistake in exposing rather more surface than was wise; while as I have said in my telegram, Gandhi is the only one who, having started this ball rolling, can look to the outcome with entire equanimity!

18. In paragraph 5 of your letter of the 22nd April you mention the notes which I sent you on the medical aspects of his fast. I quite agree with you, and I do not think that there is any need to ask for a further expert opinion, or to trouble about consulting a physiologist.

19. As we are on the Congress, I confess that while I note what you say in paragraphs 11 and 12 of your letter of 22nd April, I am still not convinced that there would not be value in publishing at home *Congress and the Axis* and *Some*

facts about the disturbances in India 1942–43. Those two pamphlets are a mine of facts unobtainable elsewhere, and very telling facts, too, as I am sure if you have time to glance through them you will agree; and I should have thought here again that it would be your own view that iteration or reiteration is the parent of truth!

[5] No. 665. [6] No. 702. [7] No. 713.

700

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2315: f 3

PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *12 May 1943, 2.30 pm*
Received: 13 May

10561. My telegram 8459[1] of 28th April. Following is repetition of Washington telegram No. 2145 of 6th May. *Begins*. Your telegram No. 2816.[2]

1. I spoke to T. V. Soong this morning in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of your telegram.

2. I said that we certainly did not want to make unnecessary trouble but that His Majesty's Government had felt very definitely that Viceroy had legitimate grounds of complaint.

3. Soong said that he would take an opportunity of speaking to Madame and readily agreed that whatever we might say to each other in private about our respective internal problems, it was not good to say the same thing in public. I hope we shall have no further trouble. *Ends*.

[1] No. 674. [2] No. 675.

701

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

PRIVATE AND SECRET INDIA OFFICE, *12 May 1943*

Your letter of 2nd/4th May[1] has just come in and I must answer as much of it as I can in view of the mails going out tomorrow morning. I have not yet had time to read the enclosures.

[1] No. 681.

2. It looks as if your new Council has gone down well. I am sure Azizul Haque will do his best to play up to the general line you have given him and I hope you will find him really helpful. As for Mudaliar, I see no reason why he should not stay on for the economic discussions here providing they are not postponed too long. The question of an Imperial gathering seems to have rather faded out for the time being. If nothing comes of it, it might still be worth while your sending a representative over in the Autumn together with either the Jam Saheb or Bhopal. The Jam Saheb enjoyed himself here and was very popular and I am still hoping that he might be able to do a visit to Canada and the States.

So do I.

L.

3. As regards Phillips, you will have had Halifax's account of his talk with the President.[2] Also of his talk with Soong,[3] both very satisfactory. Meanwhile Phillips will have gone to Washington and told his story. I am very much inclined to agree with you that he has more charm and general goodwill than grasp of a complicated situation.

4. In that connection I am wondering whether we were right in discouraging Willkie from visiting India last year.[4] I have been reading chapters of his book[5] as reproduced by the *Daily Telegraph*. They confirm what a number of people have told me, that Willkie is a very impressionable person and very susceptible to courtesy and might very well have given quite a helpful account of the India situation. I am told there is a prospect of his visiting Australia this summer, and I wonder whether in the circumstances it might not be a good thing for you to send him a personal invitation to come on to India if he can find the time. He will certainly appreciate the invitation and I should think you might very well be able, if by any chance he accepted it, to help him to understand the real nature of the problem.

5. This letter will have to go off before I get your promised telegram about Gandhi's letter to Jinnah. I must confess that I feel very great misgivings at the idea of our departing in any way from the general principles we have laid down and which we have applied rigidly against Rajagopalachari, the Liberal leaders and Phillips. I feel it all the more because Jinnah is evidently getting rather too big for his boots and has actually dared the Indian Government to stop his corresponding with Gandhi. I am sure it is essential that we should stand up to Jinnah no less firmly than we stand up to Congress. In any case I cannot see what could come out of such correspondence and a consequent interview, but some inconclusive demand for Jinnah to meet the other Congress leaders. All this would again magnify the importance of Congress and of Gandhi. Otherwise it would lead to no conclusion except to justify Jinnah in

the eyes of his own people by showing the Congress rejected Pakistan. Or—though I consider that an unlikely alternative—some sort of agreement by Congress to accept Pakistan after the war if the British Government would here and now hand India over to a Congress–Muslim League Cabinet. My own feeling at the moment, unless your telegram persuades me otherwise, is that we should for the present stick to our policy of keeping the Congress leaders disconnected. If Jinnah wants to have agreement with other Indian parties or individuals he is perfectly free to do so.

6. The situation might be somewhat different, in spite of the general objection on grounds of principle, if Gandhi had sent a businesslike letter suggesting a basis of agreement and compromise or even attempting to elicit one from Jinnah. As it is there may no doubt be some criticism later on when it emerges that a letter was sent and stopped. But I am quite prepared myself to face that. However I will say no more on this matter at the moment. But I do think it of sufficient importance to enable you to have the view of the Cabinet on it.

7. I think I told you in my last letter[6] that I put the substance of your long telegram about separating the Commander-in-Chief, South-East Asia, from Commander-in-Chief, India, in a strong minute to Winston accompanied by a parallel minute on the question of Minister of State powers for the Viceroy. The latter point he left for me to discuss with Bracken and Eden but we have not had an opportunity to do so yet. As regards the former, I had a telegram[7] from him yesterday in which, *à propos* of his general disquiet about the Indian Army, he said he was thinking of separating the Commandership-in-Chief, India, from the Defence Member and giving the latter portfolio to the Viceroy. I had to remind him[8] that an Indian Defence Member already exists and that, at this moment, suggesting a separation between the administrative and operational functions of the Commander-in-Chief would certainly lead to the suggestion that the existing Defence Member should take over the former. I also pointed out that in any case it would be impossible to add that administrative burden to your already overloaded shoulders but that in fact you yourself did take the closest interest in all military matters and could always convene a special Defence Committee over which you would preside. That gave me an opportunity of again urging the right solution, namely, that of separation between Commander-in-Chief, India, and Commander-in-Chief, South-East Asia, the former being operationally under the general control of the latter. I know Brooke shares that view and I think Wavell is in agreement with it, so I hope that something of that sort may emerge.

8. Winston's disquiet about India arises partially from the failure of the

[2] No. 684. [3] No. 700. [4] See Vol. II.
[5] W. L. Willkie, *One World* (London, Cassell & Co., 1943). [6] No. 687, paras. 7–8.
[7] See No. 697. [8] Enclosure 1 to No. 698.

Arakan campaign,[9] but also from a memorandum[10] I have put in, with Wavell's approval, giving warning of the kind of influences both of enemy propaganda and of cost of living, &c. which may affect an Army which has been so enormously diluted both on the Indian and on the European side. The paper was purely one to suggest the need of care for the future and not to suggest that anything has gone wrong with the Army so far and to urge that we should now concentrate on improving the quality of the present establishment and not attempt to go on increasing. Winston has, I think, taken it a little too seriously and has talked about actually cutting down the present strength.

9. In my paper I also suggested that it might be useful to have an Inspector-General free to go visiting the Indian Army everywhere. That might afford an opening for Auchinleck if the other idea of a separation of the commands is not carried out. As regards Winston's opinion of Auchinleck, I fear that Montgomery rather prejudiced him so far as an operational command is concerned though I think Wavell has done something to set that right. But I believe he and certainly Brooke fully realise his value as enjoying the confidence of the Indian Army, and I do not think you need be afraid on that score.

10. In paragraph 7 of your letter you quite justly say that you did deprecate moves in the constitutional field at the beginning of last year—as indeed I did myself—and took the ground among other reasons that it would be misunderstood as due to our apprehension of the Japanese. When I said that we never had that point in mind I confess I was thinking of the Cabinet and the Committee that framed the Cripps proposals. You have every right to say "I told you so".

11. As regards the question of European Diwans on which I wrote to you on the 23rd[11] and which you deal with in your paragraph 9, it may well be that you are right and that the period immediately before us may see renewed strengthening of the European element, and that possibly in the States more than in British India. In fact it seems to me a not inconceivable position that the States may become increasingly British, not only in administration, but also by British commerce and industry resorting there, while British India becomes increasingly Indian. I have often wondered what would be the position today if we had created a certain number of States with hereditary British Rulers chosen from our aristocracy!

[Para. 12, on Secretary of State's Advisers; para. 13, on Mr H. S. L. Polak; para. 14, on leave arrangements for Sir A. Clow; and para. 15, on establishment of a Joint High Court for the Eastern States, omitted.]

14 May 1943

16. After all, the mail did not go off yesterday morning so I can continue is letter.

Your long telegram[12] on the Gandhi–Jinnah subject has come in since I began it, but I must confess that it has not altered my own doubts as to the unwisdom of departing from our general policy of keeping Gandhi and the Congress leaders disconnected, unless and until they show some sign of a change of heart or at any rate until they have become in effect incapable of making the kind of mischief they made last year. After all trouble is still going on in a good many places, especially in Bengal, and may be accentuated by our lack of success in Arakan. Meanwhile all the letters I have had from you and their enclosures from Governors show that our firmness over Gandhi's fast, and indeed the general seclusion of the Congress leaders has steadily improved the situation.

17. I cannot see how breaking our rule would not inevitably weaken the whole position. You could not reasonably prevent Gandhi and Jinnah agreeing to ask for conversation with the other Congress leaders on the ground that nothing could really be decided without them. Nor in that case could you prevent Jinnah bringing in Members of his Muslim League or even Provincial Prime Ministers or prevent Gandhi asking to see Rajagopalachari or anyone else who takes his fancy. All this will, of course, advertise Gandhi and Jinnah, which is the one thing both of them want and strengthen their hold over their respective parties, which is one thing we both of us deplore. On the other hand there is not in fact the slightest probability of their coming to any sort of agreement, least of all to an agreement which would be helpful from the point of view of the efficient conduct of the war.

18. After all the only kind of thing they might agree upon would be some vague half promise of Gandhi's on Pakistan for the future coupled with the demand for an immediate Congress–Muslim League Cabinet on the terms denied to Cripps. What that would mean for the conduct of the war, you know well enough. On the other hand, I know how difficult it would be to persuade the House of Commons to support us in rejecting such a proposal. In America it would be even more difficult.

19. My own feeling for a long time has been that the one chance of keeping India united, however loosely, and

In holding that on balance it would pay us to send the letter in order (1) to let them put heads together, (2) to show the world there was no sign of any real move on G.'s part, I undervalued Jinnah's skill. But if S./S.'s purpose was to prevent Jinnah getting advertisement, I can assure him that that gent has had bigger and better advertisement by the way things have worked out than he could have obtained if we had sent the letter. In the course I

[9] In October 1942 the British began a campaign to recapture Akyab in the Arakan area of Burma. By May 1943 they had been repulsed. See *History of the Second World War: The War against Japan*, vol. II, pp. 253–68, 331–59.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp. 383–5. [11] No. 610. [12] No. 702.

making any progress is getting away from the highly centralised dictator-controlled parties as the basis of a conception of an India governed by a Parliamentary Executive. If the real solution lies in an Executive nominated by the Provincial and State Governments or Parliaments and independent of the Central Legislature, then clearly we should work towards the strengthening and the authority and independence *vis-à-vis* this country of the present Executive, nominated no doubt in the first instance, but well distributed geographically and perhaps presently modified by informally consulting Provincial Governments on appointment. If that is to be the broad line of approach, then the less importance we attach and are known to attach to the Party leaders, the better. From that point of view I confess I do not share the distinction you draw between Rajagopalachari and the Liberal leaders as representing nobody and Jinnah as representing the Muslims. I should on the contrary be rather inclined, whenever I had the opportunity, not only in connection with your Executive, but otherwise, to emphasise our recognition of the importance of men of ability and character, however small their party following, and correspondingly emphasise the view that the party leaders may no doubt play their part in the Legislature some day, but are not regarded by us as necessarily playing any important part in the future Government of India.

took I was more solicitous for what I feared might follow in the H. of C. than for any anxiety about ourselves here in India. So when I saw that Cabinet was set, I did not come back a 2nd time, which I certainly should have done if I had felt strongly that the point was a vital one.

L.

20. All this is I know contrary to the ordinary convention and traditions of this country and indeed to current Indian opinion. But I see no other way out of the deadlock. Mere continuance of the existing system after the war will I fear become increasingly impossible and the various parties, while becoming increasingly hostile to each other, will become even more hostile to ourselves, with a real danger of a complete breakdown of Government with incalculable consequences for peace not only to India but of the world.

21. I am also very definitely of the opinion that conceding to Jinnah what has been refused to Phillips will create a very bad impression in America. The distinction you draw is one which cannot possibly be defended in public here. Still less would it appeal to Americans who think that the President's trusted representative is at least as entitled to see the leader of the biggest Indian party as anybody else, and who can only be kept quiet by our taking the line that nobody is allowed to see the Congress leaders. In any case you could hardly refuse Phillips permission to see Gandhi & Co. when he comes back in the Autumn or before once you have given way on principle.

22. An incidental, though to my mind very grave objection to giving way

in this particular instance, is Jinnah's threat of what would happen if we did stop a letter from Gandhi to him. If in face of that threat the letter goes on, all India will think that it is due to the threat that we have yielded and that will only add to Jinnah's already undue vanity and self-importance, and to his mischievous attempt to exercise dictatorial control over Muslim League Provinces. That you should ignore his threat may annoy him a good deal, and I fully realise the possible risks involved. On the other hand, it may be of real help to Khizar and Nazimuddin in maintaining a reasonable measure of independence against his dictation. In any case it would be further evidence of the fact that the Government of India means to govern and is not subject to dictation by party leaders on either side. I would of course let Jinnah have a letter from yourself, telling him why he was not forwarded Gandhi's invitation to a talk, before you actually make public the fact, as I think you must.

On the contrary—he's more than delighted!

L.

23. The advice which I propose giving to the Cabinet therefore is that you should simply tell your Council that you have stopped the letter in pursuance of the general principle agreed upon and that you propose to make the fact known on that basis. I cannot myself think, after the strong line you have been able to persuade them to take on the actual arrests and on the fast, that you will have any real difficulty. Such difficulty as there may be is more likely to be in Parliament here on the ground that our action is inconsistent with our profession that we want Indians to come together. So far as I am concerned, however, I am not afraid of that, though it may possibly somewhat shake the present unanimity of the House. However the whole matter will be coming before the Cabinet early next week and it is quite possible they may take a different line from the one I shall advise. All this will indeed be an old story by the time you get this but I have nevertheless thought it worth while putting to you the position as it strikes me at this end.

24. In connection with constitutional problems I was interested to see Edwards' report on Aundh State.[13] I have so often heard it suggested that the village panchayat should be the basis of democracy by indirect election in India, and here the experience seems to be actually working and on the whole not unsuccessfully. Indirect election in a live democracy like the United States became a farce almost from the outset, a mere piece of mechanism interposed but not really interfering with the direct appeal of parties to the electorate. In India, however, it may well be different and the personal choice of the illiterate villagers be something far more valuable as an electoral basis than their dropping of yellow tickets into what they are told is the Mahatma's box. After

[13] Enclosed in Lt.-Col. Edwards' letter d.o. No. C–98/41 of 3 April 1943 to Sir K. Fitze. L/P&S/13/1592.

all the greatest danger to all parliamentary government everywhere, and particularly in India, is the highly centralised party machine, the efficiency of which increases in a direct ratio to the numbers and ignorance of the electorate. Looking back it might have been wise, if it had been possible, to develop Indian self-government on a very narrow franchise, taking all the risk that the Parliament and Government so emerging would govern in a narrow class sense and that the system could not last indefinitely. As it is, there is much to be said for anything that can interpose between the machine and fodder for the ballot box. Panchayats might serve for that purpose at the bottom, just as nomination by Provincial and State Governments to the Central Executive might serve a similar purpose at the top.

Post prandial.

L.,—31.5.

702

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *13 May 1943, 2.10 am*
PERSONAL *Received: 13 May, 12.30 am*

No. 1159–S. I have telegraphed separately[1] text of letter received from Gandhi for forwarding to Jinnah. It has been received under covering letter from Gandhi to my Home Department, and it has been forwarded through the Government of Bombay. "Invitation" from Jinnah to which it purports to reply is contained in my immediately following telegram.[2]

2. Our present policy *vis-à-vis* of Congress is (as was made clear to Rajagopalachari) that Gandhi and Congress must resile from their attitude of last year and give satisfactory assurances before business can be done with them. Our present *general* policy is, as exemplified by our attitude towards provincial Ministries, that it is a pre-condition of invitation to any individual to assist a Governor in forming a Provincial Ministry that any Ministry so formed must be prepared to give fullest support to war effort.

3. In the case of Gandhi there have been at least three recent attempts to make contact with him.

(*a*) Rajagopalachari's attempt of last November.[3]
(*b*) The approaches that [have] been made to me by Phillips.[4]
(*c*) The recent deputation from Rajagopalachari and other persons on behalf of the No-Parties Conference.[5]

4. In the case of (*a*) I declined (informing my Council subsequently)[6] on the ground substantially that Rajagopalachari represented nobody but himself.

5. In the case of (*b*) I declined since it was in my judgment quite impossible to discriminate in favour of the Representative of a foreign country when we had declined to allow Indians themselves to contact Gandhi, and undesirable to give Gandhi the advertisement involved; and since in any event I regarded it as highly improper that the Personal Representative of the head of a foreign country should be given special facilities to interview a man who was in detention for endeavouring to organise rebellion. Phillips has now of course stated publicly that he has been refused permission to see Gandhi.[7] Matter has not been mentioned to, or discussed in, my Council which showed no interest in it with the exception of Srivastava who has expressed personal doubts to me but did not pursue them.

6. In the case of (*c*) I made it clear that it was open to Gandhi to express his regret and repentance for what had taken place, and to give suitable assurances for the future, and that in that event matter could be considered further. But it was made clear that the initiative rested with Gandhi and that if he wanted to make such a communication to me there was nothing to prevent him from doing so. I made it clear also that the persons who had approached me on behalf of the No-Parties Conference represented nobody but themselves, were in no sense generally representative, and did not represent a solid platform on which to work.[8] I did not consult my Council before replying to the deputation, since my reply was in line with policy to which my Council and I have been working.

7. I review below position arising out of Gandhi's new approach to Jinnah.

8. I would premise that there is, in my judgment, no analogy between the forwarding to Jinnah of a reply from Gandhi himself to a public challenge or invitation by Jinnah, and a request by irresponsible individuals such as Rajagopalachari or the members of the Bombay Conference to be allowed to see Gandhi and discuss the future with him; or again an approach by a person such as Phillips who is not directly concerned, and who represents a foreign country. Jinnah is after all the leader of the second most important party in India. Our settled policy has been not to stand in the way of anything that should reasonably facilitate advance towards a settlement, and you have yourself repeatedly indicated in Parliament the anxiety of His Majesty's Government to see a settlement. I would not myself have anticipated any difficulty in such circumstances in justifying the forwarding of this communication and of any reply from Jinnah. And I regard it as of great importance that we should avoid being

[1] No. 692. [2] See No. 709, note 1. [3] See Nos. 167 and 168.
[4] See Nos. 455 and 667, para. 2. [5] See enclosure to No. 622. [6] See No. 180.
[7] See No. 671. [8] See No. 632, note 3.

manœuvred into a position in which responsibility for continuance of the deadlock can with any plausibility be laid at our door.

9. I now proceed to analyse the position. So far as Gandhi is concerned, Jinnah may prove to have exposed an uncomfortable amount of surface by his speech of 24th April, and Gandhi characteristically has been swift to seize the opportunity offered to him by Jinnah's challenge. That challenge is the more welcome to Gandhi because the stock of Gandhi and Congress is at present so low, the fall in their popularity has been so rapid, and the damage done to them by our handling of the rebellion, of Gandhi's fast, and of the deputation from the No-Parties Conference, has been so great, that it is essential from Gandhi's point of view to do something to get back into the limelight; and he is of course on very comfortable ground as regards Jinnah on the one hand, and Government on the other, in his present approach. If Government decline to forward his letter to Jinnah they expose themselves to the charge that they are standing in the way of a settlement. It is relevant that while I could decline to forward his letter to Jinnah without consulting my Council as to my decision on the ground that I was merely applying the policy to which they and I have been working, I would not regard it as wise or desirable to do so; but in any event they will have to be brought in very early, and I comment further on this in paragraph 15 (*g*) below.

10. Gandhi hopes no doubt also that if we decide not to forward the letter we shall play into Jinnah's hands and make ourselves a target for Jinnah. If on the other hand we do forward it, it may place Jinnah in an awkward position, and it is certainly likely to present Government with difficult questions of tactics whether Jinnah responds to it or not. If Jinnah were to show signs of responding, Gandhi no doubt hopes to be in a position to bring pressure on us to let him out on conditions such as he could not otherwise have hoped for. He has nothing to lose in any circumstances by the move he has made, and he will be fully alive to the possible advantage he can derive as a result of that move from—

(*a*) an arrangement with the Muslims to take office;
(*b*) placing, without any question arising of taking office, Government and the Muslim League alike in a difficult position with progressive opinion here, at home, and in the United States;
(*c*) a scrap with Jinnah before the public;
(*d*) even a snub from Jinnah and the chance thereafter, once the facts become known, of dubbing Jinnah a die-hard.

And as usual he has been at particular pains not to commit himself on any point of substance, and in particular on Pakistan, despite the fact that Jinnah's "invitation" is to come to a settlement with the Muslim League "on the basis

of Pakistan". Gandhi in a word is in much the most comfortable position of any of the parties to this problem.

11. As for Jinnah, I should have thought that he and the Muslim League probably in their hearts would prefer things to stay as they are. They have nothing to gain by assuming any responsibilities for war effort, or for the Government of the country. They have everything to gain by leaving the present Government to carry that responsibility (including liability for protecting Muslim interests, for imposing taxation, for running the war effort, &c.), while avoiding a definition of Pakistan or the facing of the practical difficulties in the implementing of a Pakistan scheme. Gandhi's letter, particularly as it does not commit itself about Pakistan, is most unlikely to be acceptable to Jinnah, though it may result, once its existence becomes known, in a certain amount of pressure on him from followers who see in it a chance to take office. On the other hand, were we to hold up the letter, we should, I am sure, play into Jinnah's hands just as much as we should play into Gandhi's. He would certainly resent the loss of face involved in our accepting his public challenge to suppress a communication from Gandhi to himself.

12. Jinnah will in any event, I anticipate, be found anxious to abuse Government, as a shield against the charge of being pro-British. My own feeling is that the likelihood of any arrangement between him and Gandhi is negligible. Pakistan is now fundamental with the Muslims, and I should be greatly surprised if Gandhi himself were prepared to agree to any formula that Jinnah would accept. Even if he did there would be a serious risk of a split in the Hindu camp, in which the Hindu Mahasabha are already showing signs of much uneasiness at the possibility of a deal between Gandhi and Jinnah. As for the possibility of any intermediate solution, such as an agreement between Gandhi and Jinnah to shelve Pakistan until the end of the war, and to ask for a Government in which Jinnah and the Congress would divide their seats 50 : 50 (possibly with an understanding as regards the minorities that Jinnah would have a say as regards the selection of representatives) I would expect Jinnah to be very nervous of the repercussions of any such arrangements on the Provinces where his wicket is not particularly good. Any serious disturbance of mind among Muslims in the Muslim minority provinces would stress their impending fate under Pakistan and might gravely prejudice Jinnah's long term tactics. And while Jinnah might, for all that, find it difficult flatly to reject[9] any scheme which had the look of Swaraj without undue risk to Muslim interests, he knows quite well that an arrangement with Congress, whatever its nature, must in the end be fatal to his own ascendancy and to Pakistan, and the rest of his present creed and platform. I would anticipate therefore that he would try to keep clear and leave the baby to be carried by Government.

[9] Decipher has 'find that I (? could not) flatly (? omission) to reject'.

13. So far as Government are concerned, Congress at the moment are beaten and disheartened. Jinnah and the Muslim League are free with their criticisms: but I would anticipate no difficulty in holding the position so far as they are concerned. I am clear myself that it would suit us best to preserve the *status quo* here until the war with Japan is won, and the post-war discussions, to which we are already committed, can take place. But our hand is not an easy one, and we must play it with great care. In particular it is essential to avoid allowing so-called "progressive" opinion (including at this stage the *Times*) at home, and in the U.S.A., to fix on us, however unjustly, responsibility for the continuance of the deadlock, or to suggest that we are deliberately sabotaging constructive effort by one or other of the principal Indian parties.

14. Finally we must give full weight to the position and attitude of my Council. At one stage or other they will have to be brought in on this business. I cannot be quite certain what their reaction will be. I should be surprised if in their hearts any of them wanted to make way for a Congress–Muslim League Government. They are sharply divided communally, and I suspect that the Hindu element is as hostile to the Muslim League as the Muslim element is to Congress or to what they call "Hindu Raj". They are all of course (omitting the Europeans) politicians; they have their political futures to safeguard: and while I have no doubt that they would be ready to take a lead from me, I would expect that they would, human nature being what it is, be anxious to safeguard their own personal positions *vis-à-vis* of the public,[10] and be anxious if possible to avoid shouldering responsibility for a decision which could be misinterpreted.

15. My own view on a reassessment of the whole position is as follows:—

(*a*) I would let Jinnah have Gandhi's letter, under an official covering letter from Home Department to the effect that this had been received from Gandhi and was being passed to him; and that if he wished to send a reply to Gandhi, arrangements would be made to forward it, but that no publicity had been given to the receipt of the letter, or would be given to its receipt or to the receipt of any reply from Jinnah, unless in the outcome that was the wish of both parties.

(*b*) I would give Jinnah no hint of what our response would be to a request from him to be allowed to see Gandhi.

(*c*) If and when Jinnah were to reply asking if he could see Gandhi, I would myself be prepared to let him see him.

(*d*) If (which I think unlikely) there were to be any likelihood of business being done between Gandhi and Jinnah, we should have to make it clear at the appropriate time that we could consider no arrangement which did not involve the participants in any Government giving fullest support to the war. Equally it would have to be made clear by Congress that they had abandoned their

policy of last year. This latter point is to some extent covered by the former. If Congress were parties to an arrangement all parties to which were committed to 100 per cent. active support for the war, it would in effect be a recantation, though we should probably wish to make the recantation specific. But I doubt the advantage of elaborating that point at this stage, since it looks to me like being a very long way ahead, if indeed it ever arises.

(*e*) In justifying allowing Jinnah to communicate with Gandhi when Phillips, Rajagopalachari, &c. have been kept out, I would take the line suggested in paragraph 8 above.

(*f*) If this correspondence between Jinnah and Gandhi comes to nothing, I would continue to keep Gandhi (and the Working Committee) *incommunicado*. (I do not overlook that if the war with Japan were to last another 3 years a situation might so develop as to make it difficult or undesirable to keep them shut up and cut off from the world for all that time. But here again I see no point in trying to take fences before we have reached them. Everything will turn on the circumstances of the time).

(*g*) I have carefully considered, and have discussed with Maxwell, at what point my Council should be put in the picture. In the result, I think the right answer will be to take them into confidence once I have the Cabinet's decision; and, on the assumption that that decision accepts my recommendations, *before* letter is sent on to Jinnah. There are serious risks of leakage once I tell Council, and leakage would play into Gandhi's hands by giving him the advance publicity he wants. It might also give Jinnah an excuse for breaking off discussions with Gandhi on the ground that he had been placed in an impossible position. Nor can we exclude the possibility that if Jinnah decides to return a negative reply to Gandhi he might be anxious to keep the existence of the correspondence secret as long as possible. On the whole, however, I think we had better take our chance, and I would do all I could to impress on my colleagues importance from every point of view, and not least their own, of complete secrecy while the situation develops. We must accept it that it will be almost impossible to ensure secrecy as regards Gandhi's move for any material length of time and leakage from any source, or disclosure by Jinnah once the letter reaches him (and I would not exclude that possibility if he thought it suited his book), might create a very embarrassing situation for us and give me a much more difficult Council to handle. I think therefore that we had better face up to it at once. I think I can probably in that event keep Council on the right lines, and I will of course do my best.

16. To sum up, there are certain risks in passing this letter on. But I think they should be taken, and that is my advice to the Cabinet. In my judgment there are far more risks involved in suppression. There are also certain

[10] Deciphered as 'of publication'.

illogicalities in the position that results if we do pass the letter on. But they do not worry me, and I am quite prepared to accept them. We may have some embarrassing questions of tactics to handle if things go better between Jinnah and Gandhi than I myself expect them to go. But it is no good trying to settle those in advance, and we must wait and do our best in the light of the situation as it develops.

17. I should be grateful for earliest possible reply as I do not want to delay this business unnecessarily. But I do not think another week need make any special difference.

703

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: ff 149–50

IMMEDIATE PERSONAL — INDIA OFFICE, *13 May 1943, 8.20 pm* *Received: 14 May*

10714. Your personal telegram 1159–S.[1] Many thanks. Matter will be taken in Cabinet probably on Tuesday morning.

2. I should be grateful if in the meantime you would let me know what you would propose to do if Gandhi asks to see the Working Committee either on receiving a reply from Jinnah laying down prior conditions subject to which he is prepared to come and see him or after seeing Jinnah on ground that conversation gives hope of settlement which can only be pursued after consultations with Working Committee.

3. It seems to me that this development is bound to occur at some stage and when it does you will be very much pressed by representatives of other interests, the Hindu Mahasabha, the Sikhs, Depressed Classes, etc. to be allowed to see Gandhi to obtain voice in such critical discussions. Would it not be most difficult to refuse this if discussion with Working Committee were allowed? I feel that we might well be pushed to this point without Jinnah making any concessions at all which give ground for hope of a settlement, as to probability of which I entirely agree with your estimate.

[1] No. 702.

704

Mr Turnbull to Mr Rowan (via Air Ministry)

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: f 167

IMMEDIATE *13 May 1943, 8.50 pm*

ALCOVE 212. Following for Rowan from Turnbull. Personal and Most Secret. Reference ALCOVE 196.[1]

The Prime Minister should know that the delivery of Gandhi's letter to Jinnah has been held up pending consideration of matter by War Cabinet.

[1] See No. 708, note 2.

705

Mr Amery to Mr Attlee

L/PO/6/102b: f 151

INDIA OFFICE, *13 May 1943*

My dear Clem,

I have now received the Viceroy's views about Gandhi's letter to Jinnah. I enclose a copy of the telegram.[1]

I cannot be ready for a Cabinet tomorrow, but we ought not to delay too long and I hope you will agree to it being taken in the Cabinet on Tuesday morning.[2] I shall circulate a memorandum before the weekend.

Meanwhile I am asking[3] the Viceroy what he would propose to do if, on the line of action he proposes, Gandhi were to ask to see the Working Committee either on receiving a reply from Jinnah laying down prior conditions for an interview or after seeing Jinnah It seems to me that this is bound to happen at some stage unless Jinnah refuses the invitation point-blank, which is very unlikely.

Yours ever,

L. S. A[MERY]

[1] No. 702. [2] 18 May. [3] No. 703.

706

Sir G. Laithwaite to Mr Turnbull

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *14 May 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 1166–S. Turnbull from Laithwaite. Would you give following from me to Coupland:—

Begins. His Excellency has been reading Part II[1] with the greatest interest. He notices two important points of fact which he suggests might be corrected in the second edition, and, if you agree, in the edition which is being printed off for publication in India. We are asking the agents to postpone type-setting till your instructions are forthcoming.

(*a*) Page 282, lines 29–30. His Excellency was *not* in fact consulted about the association of Johnson with these discussions and himself thought the arrangement most unwise. He suggests omission of any reference to himself or his attitude in this connection. Arrangements were made entirely by Cripps and His Excellency had no part in them: nor was he asked to approve them, Cripps acting here, as throughout his negotiations, entirely independently of the Viceroy.

(*b*) Page 298, lines 12 and 13. Commander-in-Chief was absent (overseas) from the beginning of August till about 24th August, and so through the critical discussions bearing on the arrest of Gandhi and the action to be taken to deal with the rebellion. Only a verbal correction is involved, and your argument is of course strengthened by this fact. *Ends.*

[1] Of Professor R. Coupland: *A Report on the Constitutional Problem in India.* Part II *Indian Politics 1936–1942* (London, Oxford University Press, 1943).

707

Mr Churchill to Mr Attlee and Mr Amery (via Air Ministry)

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: f 165

IMPORTANT WASHINGTON, *14 May 1943, 3.40 pm*

Received: 14 May, 6.14 pm

PENCIL 86. Prime Minister to Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for India. Personal and Most Secret. Reference ALCOVE 212.[1]

Surely a letter from an interned person seeking conference for the purpose of "uniting and driving the British out" should not be delivered while war-time conditions prevail. If you deliver the letter you will certainly be dragged into endless conferences.

[1] No. 704.

708

Mr Amery to Mr Churchill[1]

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: ff 142–5

14 May 1943

ALCOVE No. 218. Following Secret and Personal for Prime Minister from Secretary of State for India. *Begins.* My Alcove No. 196.[2] Gandhi.

1. Fuller text now received shows Jinnah's offer was specifically conditional on acceptance of Pakistan.

2. Following is abbreviation of appreciation and views submitted by Viceroy.

[*There follows a summary of No. 702.*]

3. I doubt myself whether the distinction which the Viceroy draws between his refusal to break the general rule against contact in the case of Phillips and of other Indian leaders and the proposed concession to Jinnah will appeal either to American or to home public. Nor do I see how if this concession is made Viceroy can refuse permission for further meetings with Congress Working Committee or anyone else whom Gandhi might wish to see. Subject to your view and that of Cabinet my advice to Viceroy would be to stick to our general rule and refuse to forward Gandhi's letter. If this course were adopted I recognise that it would be necessary at once to make our action public (in order to forestall inevitable disclosure sooner or later) and in doing so justify it to public in India, U.K. and U.S.A.

4. Cabinet will take this probably Tuesday morning.[3]

[1] Mr Turnbull sent this telegram for despatch on 14 May at 12.40 pm asking in his covering letter to Captain Clifford that it should be marked 'Immediate'.

[2] In telegram Alcove 196 of 13 May 1943 Mr Amery sent Mr Churchill a brief summary of Mr Jinnah's invitation to Mr Gandhi to write to him and of his further remarks (see Appendix II to No. 709), and the substance of Mr Gandhi's letter. L/PO/6/102b: ff 168–9.

[3] 18 May.

709

War Cabinet Paper W.P. (43) 203

L/P&J/8/517: ff 54–7

India

MR. GANDHI'S REQUEST TO SEE MR. JINNAH

MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

INDIA OFFICE, *14 May 1943*

I circulate herewith the text of a letter which Mr. Gandhi has asked the Government of India to forward to Mr. Jinnah (Appendix I). It purports to respond to an "invitation" made in the latter's speech to the Moslem League Conference on the 24th April. The relevant extract is given in Appendix II, together with further points from the speech as reported by Reuter. The Viceroy's appreciation of the issues raised and his proposals for dealing with the matter is given in Appendix III.

2. The Viceroy's main point is that we cannot afford to allow ourselves, in face of repeated expressions of our desire for a settlement, to be fixed with responsibility for the continuance of the present deadlock or accused of deliberately sabotaging constructive efforts to end it by one or other of the principal parties. Gandhi occupies the most comfortable position in this matter; he has nothing to lose and will be quick to take advantage of the consequences whether we withhold or forward the letter. If we refuse to forward it, both Gandhi and Jinnah will fasten the blame on us. If we send it on, it is likely to be an embarrassment to Jinnah, for it is non-committal on Pakistan. He may not be able to ignore it, but he must see the danger to his own ascendancy and to the principles of Pakistan which any settlement with Congress would involve. The Viceroy, in short, thinks it very improbable that Gandhi's move will result within any measurable time in a Congress–Moslem League settlement, though there may be consequences causing embarrassment to Government. These, he thinks, must be faced, and is prepared to face them. But his main point is that, believing as he does that the negotiations which might result from allowing Gandhi and Jinnah to meet would be quite infructuous, it would at once serve our present purpose of maintaining the *status quo* until the war with Japan is won and post-war constitution making can begin, and save us from the odium of wrecking in advance an attempt to bridge the Congress–Moslem League gulf, to let the letter be delivered. His Council have not yet been informed of the matter but must be taken into confidence very shortly, and he expects that the Indian members will be disinclined to face the consequences of refusing to

forward Gandhi's letter. The Viceroy thinks the present issue can be readily distinguished from the recent unsuccessful requests to make contact with Gandhi, which were declined either because the persons concerned had no political following (Rajagopalachari, &c.), or because it was impossible to discriminate in favour of a foreign representative (Mr. Phillips).

3. Paragraph 15 of the Viceroy's telegram summarises his conclusions.

4. As I see it, we have decided, for the time being at any rate, that Gandhi and the Congress leaders have put themselves out of court by their action, and that, unless and until they show some sign of a change of heart, or at least of a recognition that their own policy has failed, they should be kept entirely disconnected, and that any political negotiations that may take place must take place without them.

5. If Gandhi is allowed to write to, and consequently see, Jinnah that decision is, in fact, reversed. There can be no resisting the obviously reasonable further demand that the Congress Working Committee should also join in the discussion, or, indeed, anyone else whom Gandhi might wish to see. Nothing in Jinnah's speech or in Gandhi's reply would suggest that there is any prospect of any sort of agreement or that the discussions could lead to anything except advertising Gandhi and Jinnah.

6. I am not impressed by the distinction which the Viceroy draws between his proposed concession in the case of Jinnah and his refusal in the case of Phillips or of other Indian politicians. I think the American public will almost certainly be annoyed and our own public puzzled. I am strengthened in my reluctance to make this concession to Jinnah in view of the truculent tone of his speech, in which he says that the Government will not "have the daring to stop such a letter if it is sent to me. It will be a most serious thing if such a letter is stopped."

7. My own advice to the Viceroy would be to stop the letter and to tell his Council that he has done so in pursuance of the general policy approved of by them. The fact that this has been done should at the same time be made public and justified by reference to the Government of India's general policy and to the action taken in previous cases.

L. S. A.

Appendix I to No. 709

MR. GANDHI'S LETTER TO MR. JINNAH, DATED MAY 4

[*There follows the text of No. 692.*]

Appendix II to No. 709

MR. JINNAH'S INVITATION IN HIS SPEECH OF APRIL 24

"Nobody would welcome it more than myself if Mr. Gandhi is even now really willing to come to a settlement with the Moslem League on the basis of Pakistan. Let me tell you that it will be the greatest day both for the Hindus and the Mussulmans. If he has made up his mind, what is there to prevent Mr. Gandhi from writing direct to me? He is writing letters to the Viceroy. Why does he not write to me direct? Who is there that can prevent him from doing so? What is the use of going to the Viceroy and leading deputations and carrying on correspondence? Who is to prevent Mr. Gandhi to-day? I cannot believe for a single moment—strong as this Government may be in this country—you may say anything you like against this Government—I cannot believe that they will have the daring to stop such a letter if it is sent to me.

"It will be a very serious thing indeed if such a thing is done by the Government. But I do not see evidence of any kind of change of policy on the part of Mr. Gandhi or Congress or Hindu leadership."[1]

Further points from the speech as reported by Reuter were:—

"Mr. Gandhi gets all information and knows what is going on.

"If there is any change of heart on his part, and he informs me, the Moslem League will not fail, whatever may have been our controversy in the past.

"Let us sit as two equals and come to a settlement. That is now the problem of problems.

"How can you keep on saying that it is the British who have kept us apart. Of course I grant that the British take advantage of our folly. But we have devices of our own which are better than any devices the British Government can fashion to keep us disunited.

"Why should not the country say: 'Unite and drive the British out.' It is of no use appealing to the other nations of the world.

"Whatever may be our views, there is no doubt that India is in the war. Is it more in the interests of the British and the United Nations, or, is it more in our interest that we should be reduced to the position of helpless spectators? Who is more likely than we Indians to suffer from defeat?

"It is therefore dishonest on the part of the British Government to say that we are not co-operating in the war effort."

Mr. Jinnah argued that the British Government had declared Congress a rebel organisation, but had done nothing as regards the rest of India, despite the fact that they said they were anxious to move in the direction of handing over power to the people.

"That means you are successfully being held up by Congress. It is a confession of failure on your part.

"People in India either back Congress or not. If the overwhelming majority do not—and one hundred million Moslems certainly do not—then what is your answer?

"The British say that in resisting Congress they are protecting us, but we do not agree, because we do not believe they love us so much. If there is agreement between Moslems and Hindus, then the British Government know that the net result will be that they will have to part with power.

"If we cannot secure power as a United India, let us get it as a divided India."

With regard to the war effort, Mr. Jinnah said: "We are accused of not helping the war effort, and are threatened by the Government that 'those who are not with us are against us.'

"I say that as far as Moslem India and the Moslem League are concerned, our cup of bitterness is nearly full.

"Once more I draw the British Government's attention to the situation, which is very serious. I inform them from this platform that the bitterness and disappointment and shabby treatment meted out to Muslim India is a danger to them.

"Therefore reconsider your position; guarantee the Moslem right to self-determination; and pledge yourselves to abide by the plebiscite of Moslems for Pakistan."

Referring to Mr. Gandhi's civil disobedience movement, Mr. Jinnah said: "If it had been our own Government, I would have put these people in gaol in order to prevent a powerful organisation from letting loose an anti-war campaign.

"Pakistan was imperative, and it was no good having a loose federation," he said. "There is no such thing as a loose federation; when the Central Government is established, it will tighten until the units are reduced to the same status as the Indian States have now.

"We are opposed to any such scheme, which is bound eventually to lead to the emasculation of the entire Moslem nation, socially, educationally, culturally, economically and politically, and to the establishment of a Hindu Government in this sub-continent. Therefore dismiss from your minds any idea of this kind which might lure you."

Appendix III to No. 709

TELEGRAM FROM VICEROY TO SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, DATED MAY 13, 1943

[*There follows the text of No. 702.*]

[1] Lord Linlithgow transmitted the text of this invitation to Mr Amery in telegram 1160–S of 13 May. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

710

Mr Gandhi to Viscount Samuel[1]

MSS. EUR. F. 125/138

DETENTION CAMP, *15 May 1943*

Dear Lord Samuel,

I enclose herewith a cutting[2] from the *Hindu*, dated 8th April last containing Reuter's summary of your speech in the House of Lords[3] during the recent debate. Assuming the correctness of the summary I feel impelled to write this letter.

The report distressed me. I was wholly unprepared for your unqualified association with the one-sided and unsifted statement of the Government of India against the Congress and me.

You are a philosopher and a liberal. A philosophic mind has always meant for me a detached mind, and liberalism a sympathetic understanding of men and things.

As it seems to me, there is nothing in what the Government has said to warrant the conclusions to which you are reported to have come.

From the summary I select below a few of the items which, in my opinion, are inconsistent with facts.

1. "The Congress Party has to a great extent thrown over democratic philosophy."

The Congress Party has never "thrown over democratic philosophy". Its career has been one progressive march towards democracy. Everyone who subscribes to the attainment of the goal of Independence through peaceful and legitimate means and pays four annas per year can become its member.

2. "It shows signs of turning towards totalitarianism."

You have based your charge on the fact that the Working Committee of the Congress had control over the late Congress Ministries. Does not the successful party in the House of Commons do likewise? I am afraid even when democracy has come to full maturity, parties will be running elections and their managing committees will be controlling the actions and policies of their members. Individual Congressmen did not run elections independently of the party machinery. Candidates were officially chosen and they were helped by All-India leaders. "Totalitarian", according to the Oxford Pocket Dictionary means "designating a party that permits no rival loyalties or parties". "Totalitarian State" means "with only one governing party". It must have violence as its sanction for keeping control. A Congress member, on the contrary, enjoys the same freedom as the Congress President, or any member of the Working

Committee. There are parties within the Congress itself. Above all, the Congress eschews violence. Members render voluntary obedience. The All-India Congress Committee can at any moment unseat the members of the Working Committee and elect others.

3. "They (Congress ministers) resigned (not?) because they had not the support of their Assemblies. They resigned because *de jure* they were responsible to their electorates, *de facto* they were responsible to the Working Committee of the Congress and the Higher Command. That is not democracy. That is totalitarianism."

You would not have said this, if you had known the full fact [*sic*]. The *de jure* responsibility of the ministers to the electorate was not diminished in any way by their *de facto* responsibility to the Congress Working Committee, for the very simple and valid reason that the Working Committee derives its power and prestige from the very electorate to whom the ministers were responsible. The prestige that the Congress enjoys is due solely to its service of the people. As a matter of fact the ministers conferred with the members of their parties in their respective Assemblies and they tendered their resignations with their approval. But totalitarianism is fully represented by the Government of India which is responsible to no one in India. It is a tragic irony that a Government which is steeped in totalitarianism brings that very charge against the most democratic body in India.

4. "India is unhappy in that the line of party division is the worst any country can have—it is a division according to religious communities."

Political parties in India are not divided according to religious communities. From its very commencement the Congress has deliberately remained a purely political organisation. It has had Britishers and Indians, including Christians, Parsis, Muslims, and Hindus as Presidents. The Liberal Party of India is another political organisation, not to mention others that are wholly non-sectarian. That there are also communal organisations based on religion and that they take part in politics is undoubtedly true. But that fact cannot sustain the categorical statement made by you. I do not wish in any way to minimise the importance of these organisations or the considerable part they play in the politics of the country. But I do assert that they do not represent the political mind of India. It can be shown that historically the politico-religious organisations are the result of the deliberate application by the alien government of

[1] This letter was not delivered: see No. 731, para. 2. Sir G. Laithwaite's telegram 1284-S of 29 May 1943 to Mr Turnbull stated that 'we suggest nothing be said to addressee about it. No publicity is being given to fact of its receipt here.' MSS. EUR. F. 125/24. It was later published in *Correspondence with Mr Gandhi August 1942–April 1944* (New Delhi, Government of India Press, 1944), pp. 25–31, where the correspondence between Mr Gandhi and the Home Department on the Government of India's refusal to forward the letter can also be found.

[2] Not printed. [3] *Parl. Debs.*, 5th ser., H. of L., vol. 127, 6 April 1943, cols. 23–32.

their "divide and rule" policy. When the British Imperial influence is totally withdrawn, India will probably be represented solely by political parties drawn from all classes and creeds.

5. "The Congress can claim at best barely more than half the population of India. Yet in their totalitarian spirit they claim to speak for the whole."

If you measure the representative character of the Congress by the number of members on the official roll, then it does not represent even half the population. The official membership is infinitesimal compared to India's vast population of nearly four hundred millions. The enrolled membership began only in 1920. Before that the Congress was represented by its All-India Committee whose members were mainly elected by various political associations. Nevertheless the Congress has, so far as I know, always claimed to speak the mind of India, not even excluding the Princes. A country under alien subjection can only have one political goal namely its freedom from that subjection. And considering that the Congress has always and predominantly exhibited that spirit of freedom, its claim to represent All India can hardly be denied. That some parties repudiate the Congress, does not derogate from the claim in the sense in which it has been advanced.

6. "When Mr. Gandhi called upon the British Government to quit India, he said it would be for the Congress to take delivery."

I never said that when the British quitted India, "the Congress would take delivery". This is what I said in my letter to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated 29th January last.[4] "The Government have evidently ignored or overlooked the very material fact that the Congress by its August resolution asked nothing for itself. All its demands were for the whole people. As you should be aware the Congress was willing and prepared for the Government inviting Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah to form a National Government subject to such agreed adjustments as may be necessary for the duration of the war, such Government being responsible to a duly elected Assembly. Being isolated from the Working Committee except Shrimati Sarojini Devi I do not know its present mind. But the Committee is not likely to have changed its mind."

7. "If this country or Canada, Australia, New Zealand, or South Africa or the United States had abstained from action as the Congress in India abstained . . . then perhaps the cause of freedom everywhere would have gone under . . . It is a pity that the leaders of the Congress do not realise that glory is not to be won in India by abandoning the cause of mankind."

How can you compare India with Canada and other dominions which are virtually independent entities, let alone Great Britain or the United States wholly independent countries? Has India a spark of the freedom of the type enjoyed by the countries named by you? India has yet to attain her freedom.

Supposing the allied powers were to lose, and supposing further that the allied forces were to withdraw from India under military necessity, which I do not expect, the countries you name may lose their independence. But unhappy India will be obliged to change masters, if she is even then in her defenceless state. The Congress does not abstain out of cussedness. Neither the Congress, nor any other organisation can possibly kindle mass enthusiasm for the Allied cause without the present possession of Independence, to use your own expression either *de jure* or *de facto*. Mere promise of future Independence cannot work that miracle. The cry of "Quit India" has arisen from a realisation of the fact that if India is to shoulder the burden of representing, or fighting for the "cause of mankind", she must have the glow of freedom now. Has a freezing man ever been warmed by the promise of the warmth of sunshine coming at some future date?

The great pity is that the ruling power distrust[s] everything that the Congress does or says under my influence which it has suddenly discovered is wholly evil. It is necessary for a clear understanding that you should know my connection with the Congress and Congressmen. It was in 1935 that I was successful in my attempt to sever all formal connection with the Congress. There was no coolness between the Congress Working Committee members and myself. But I realised that [I] was cramped and so were the members whilst I was officially connected with the Congress. The growing restraints which my conception of non-violence required from time to time were proving too hard to bear. I felt therefore that my influence should be strictly moral. I had no political ambition. My politics were subservient to the demands of truth and non-violence as I had defined and practised [them?] for practically the whole of my life. And so I was permitted by the fellow members to sever the official connection even to the extent of giving up the four-anna membership. It was understood between us that I should attend meetings of the Working Committee only when the members required my presence for consultation in matters involving the application of non-violence or affecting communal unity. Since that time I have been wholly unconnected with the routine work of the Congress. Many meetings of the Working Committee have therefore taken place without me. Their proceedings I have often seen only when they have been published in the newspapers. The members of the Working Committee are independent-minded men. They engage me often in prolonged discussions before they accept my advice on the interpretation of non-violence as applied to the problems arising from new situations. It will be therefore unjust to them and to me to say that I exercise any influence over them beyond what reason commands. The public know how even until quite recently in matters of moment the majority of the members of the Working Committee have on several occasions rejected my advice.

[4] No. 369.

8. "They have not merely abstained from action, but the Congress has deliberately proclaimed the formula that it is wrong to help the British war effort by men or money and that the only worthy effort is to resist all war with non-violent resistance. In the name of non-violence they have led a movement which was characterised in many places by the utmost violence and the White Paper[5] gives clear proof of the complicity of the Indian Congress leaders in the disorders."

This charge shows to what extent the British public has been misled by imaginary stories, as in the Government of India publication on the disturbances statements have been torn from their context and put together as if they were made at one time or in the same context. The Congress is committed to non-violence so far as the attainment of freedom is concerned. And to that end the Congress has been struggling all these twenty years, however imperfectly it may be, to express non-violence in action, and I think it has succeeded to a great extent. But it has never made any pretence of war resistance through non-violence. Could it have made that claim and lived up to it, the face of India would have been changed and the world would have witnessed the miracle of organised violence being successfully met by organised non-violence. But human nature has nowhere risen to the height which full non-violence demands. The disturbances that took place after the 8th of August were not due to any action on the part of the Congress. They were due entirely to the inflammatory action of the Government in arresting Congress leaders throughout India and that at a time which was psychologically wholly wrong. The utmost that can be said is that Congressmen or others had not risen high enough in non-violence to be proof against all provocation.

It surprises me that although you have admitted that "this White Paper may be good journalism but it is not so good as a state document", you have based your sweeping judgment on the strength of that paper. If you would read the very speeches to which the paper makes reference, you will find there ample material to show that the Government of India had not the slightest justification in making those unfortunate arrests on August 9th last and after, or in making the charges they have brought against the arrested leaders after their incarceration—charges which have never been sifted in any court of law.

9. "Mr. Gandhi faced us with an utterly illegitimate method of political controversy, levying blackmail on the best of human emotions, pity and sympathy, by his fast. The only creditable thing to Mr. Gandhi about the fast was ending it."

You have used a strong word to characterise my fast. His Excellency the Viceroy has also allowed himself to use the same word. You have perhaps the excuse of ignorance. He had no such excuse, for he had my letters before him.

All I can tell you is that fasting is an integral part of Satyagraha. It is a Satyagrahi's ultimate weapon. Why should it be blackmail when a man under a sense of wrong crucifies his flesh? You may not know that Satyagrahi prisoners fasted in South Africa for the removal of their wrongs; so they have done in India. One fast of mine you know, as I think you were then a Cabinet Minister, I refer to the fast which resulted in the alteration of the decision of His Majesty's Government. If the decision had stood, it would have perpetuated the curse of untouchability.[6] The alteration prevented the disaster.

The Government of India communiqué[7] announcing my recent fast, issued after it had commenced, accused me of having undertaken the fast to secure my release. It was a wholly false accusation. It was based on a distortion of the letter I had written in answer to that of the Government. That letter, dated the 8th February was suppressed at the time when the communiqué was issued. If you will study the question, I refer you to the following which were published in the newspapers:—

My letter to His Excellency the Viceroy, dated New Year's Eve, 1942.[8]
His Excellency's reply, dated January 13th, 1943.[9]
My letter, dated January 19th, 1943.[10]
His Excellency's reply, dated January 25th, 1943.[11]
My letter, dated January 29th, 1943.[12]
His Excellency's reply, dated February 5th, 1943.[13]
My letter, dated February 7th, 1943.[14]
Sir R. Tottenham's letter, dated February 7th, 1943.[15]
My reply, dated February 8th, 1943.[16]

I do not know from where you got the impression that I ended the fast, for which supposed act you give me credit. If you mean by it that I ended the fast before its time, I would call such an ending a discredit to me. As it was, the fast ended on its due date, for which I can claim no credit.

10. "He (Lord Samuel) considered that the negotiations broke down on points on which they would not have broken down, had there been any real desire on the part of the Congress to come to a settlement."

[5] Cmd. 6430.

[6] See No. 218, note 1. Mr Gandhi disliked those provisions of the Communal Award affecting the Depressed Classes whom he regarded as members of the Hindu community and for whom he opposed separate electorates. He threatened a fast (begun on 20 September) 'unto death' unless the Communal Award was altered. The result was the Poona Pact, agreed on 24 September between Caste Hindu and Depressed Classes leaders, which provided for a system of joint election (by Caste Hindu as well as by Depressed Classes voters) of the Depressed Classes representatives. On 26 September His Majesty's Government announced their willingness to modify the Communal Award on the basis of the Poona Pact.

[7] See Nos. 407, 410, and 443. [8] No. 305. [9] See No. 340, note 2. [10] No. 353.
[11] No. 358. [12] No. 369. [13] No. 395. [14] No. 421. [15] See No. 412.
[16] See No. 440.

The statements made by the President of the Congress, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, and Pandit Nehru, who carried on the prolonged negotiations, I ventured to think, make it quite clear that no true man could have shown more real or greater desire for a settlement. In this connection it is well to remember that Pandit Nehru was, and I have no doubt still remains, an intimate personal friend of Sir Stafford Cripps at whose invitation he had come down from Allahabad. He could therefore leave no stone unturned to bring the negotiations to a successful issue. The history of the failure has yet to be written; when it is, it will be found that the cause lay elsewhere than with the Congress.

I hope my letter has not wearied you. Truth has been overlaid with much untruth. If not justice to a great organisation, the cause of Truth, which is Humanity, demands an impartial investigation of the present distemper.

Yours sincerely,

M. K. GANDHI

711

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Sir H. Dow (Sind) (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/99

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *15 May 1943*

3. I was much interested in your estimate[1] of the Muslim League position in Sind. I think that Jinnah's position is likely to be strengthened if, as now seems possible, a Muslim League Government is formed in the North-West Frontier Province, for he can then claim to have got Bengal, the North-West Frontier Province and Sind under his wing, while the Punjab, though they are doing their best to maintain their independence and though they are much assisted in doing so by the very delicate nature of the balance in that Province, are clearly under very strong pressure from him. I dare say you are right in your judgment that his new membership is not too solid in its attachment. But so long as they have nothing to gain by throwing Jinnah over, one would expect him to be able to count on their submission.

[1] No. 685.

712

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *16 May 1943, 3 pm*
PERSONAL

No. 1180–S. Your personal telegram of 13th May No. 10714.[1] Gandhi. I would prefer to suspend judgment on this matter until we see Jinnah's reaction. But the short answer seems to be (*a*) that Gandhi still is the authorised spokesman of the Congress since the powers vested in him last August have never been withdrawn; (*b*) that Jinnah's "invitation" to which he is responding is an invitation by Jinnah to Gandhi personally, that Gandhi responded to it personally without so much as mentioning the Working Committee or anyone else in the Congress, and that he can reasonably be held to that.

2. On paragraph 2 [3?] of your telegram I do not myself for a moment believe that we are going to get into a Round Table discussion as a result of this business, though I may be wrong. I do feel strongly that we shall make a mistake if we start to legislate for the various hypothetical situations that may arise. These can only wisely be dealt with, in my judgment, as and when they arise in the light of the circumstances then prevailing.

[1] No. 703.

713

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *17 May 1943, 4.30 pm*
PERSONAL

No. 1191–S. My personal telegram of 16th May No. 1180–S.[1] Gandhi's letter to Jinnah. Colville tells me that fact that Gandhi has written to Jinnah is well known to various members of Gandhi's entourage in the Aga Khan's palace. That is relevant to our decision, for risk that news may get out through, e.g. doctor called in to attend or the like is clearly greatly increased, and it further confirms me in my view that wise course will be to let Jinnah have the letter as I have already proposed.

[1] No. 712.

714

Mr Churchill to Mr Amery (via Air Ministry)[1]

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: f 140

IMPORTANT WASHINGTON, *17 May 1943, 3.45 am*
Received: 17 May, 6.40 am

PENCIL 112. Prime Minister to Secretary of State for India. Your ALCOVE No. 218,[2] para. 3.

I entirely agree with your view on the main question and trust Cabinet will endorse it. I do not see why it is necessary to make our action public at once. This will only lead to needless controversy. I hope this point may be carefully considered by our colleagues.

[1] Circulated for consideration in connection with No. 709. L/P&J/8/517: f 62. [2] No. 708.

715

Viscount Halifax to Mr Amery (via Foreign Office)

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2754: f 25

WASHINGTON, *17 May 1943, 1.15 am*
Received: 17 May, 9.45 am

No. 2312. Following for Secretary of State for India.

I saw Phillips on Friday May 14th. He spoke gloomily of the Indian situation which he described as one of increasing bitterness and total loss of confidence in British purpose. He had done his best to observe the implications of his own constitutional position and to avoid causing embarrassment to the Viceroy and the Government of India. This the Viceroy had readily admitted. He recognised all our difficulties and the intractability of the problem. None the less he thought it of great and growing importance that the deadlock should be broken both from the point of view of the present reaction of India on the war situation and also for future Anglo-American relations. From both these angles the United States of America could not but be interested in Indian developments.

2. He had seen large numbers of people of all sorts: and on the Indian side [found] rather surprising unanimity for something like the following:—

(1) That an Indian leader should be invited by the Viceroy to form a government that would be charged with responsibility for Indian affairs.

(2) That leader to be selected should be Jinnah. Hindu leaders would accept this and they thought it would appeal to Jinnah's vanity. Phillips and those with

whom he had talked all thought it important that an Indian, and not the Viceroy, should be charged with the unenviable task of getting a government together.

(3) The government could be constituted on a basis of 50–50 as between Hindus and Moslems with a few additional seats for other minor groups.

(4) It was accepted that there must be reservation to Parliament of the responsibility for certain matters, anyhow for the war period, and for everything affecting defence. To give Indian opinion confidence in the fairness of interpretation as to what "defence" covered, the suggestion had been made for an advisory military committee composed of a British, Indian, United States and Chinese officer. This was justified on the ground of United States and Chinese interest in the Indian defence problem.

3. He thought it most important that the new Viceroy should be prepared to make some such effort as the above to break the log-jam and that it would have great effect if accompanied by message from the King-Emperor. But no message unless accompanied by concrete proposal for action would do much good.

4. I pass this on because he spoke with complete frankness and it is no doubt what he has been saying to the President and the State Department.

5. He emphasised the importance if anything of the sort were to be attempted, (? grp. omitted: ? of) the Government being represented as provisional, without prejudice to Pakistan or any other scheme pending agreement on permanent constitution.

6. I encouraged him to talk but left him in no doubt as to the wide gulf that in India invariably lies between a paper sketch of constitutional ideals and translation into practical shape. Incidentally I told him that I thought the Viceroy could not have acted differently about refusing him permission to see Gandhi. This he appeared to accept pretty readily.

Repeated to Viceroy New Delhi No. 18.[1]

[1] In telegram 1212 of 19 May 1943 to Lord Halifax (repeated to Secretary of State) Lord Linlithgow said that Mr Phillips was 'genuine' but completely misunderstood the Indian situation and had not got down to the practical difficulties of his suggested solution; that, as they all (including substantial sections of Indian opinion) agreed, there would be the strongest objection to associating U.S. or China with handling of the problem; and that he was glad Lord Halifax had given Mr Phillips the warning reported in para. 6 of this telegram. MSS. EUR. F. 125/130.

716

War Cabinet W.M. (43) 70th Conclusions, Minute 3

L/PO/6/102b: f 134

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 18 May 1943 at 5 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Mr Anthony Eden, Sir John Anderson, Mr Ernest Bevin, Mr Oliver Lyttelton, Mr Herbert Morrison

Also present during discussion of item 3 were: Sir Kingsley Wood, Viscount Simon, Viscount Cranborne, Mr Amery, Colonel Stanley, Sir James Grigg, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Sir Stafford Cripps

INDIA

Gandhi's request to see Jinnah

The War Cabinet considered a Memorandum by the S/S for India (W.P. (43) 203)[1] regarding a letter which Gandhi desired to be forwarded to Jinnah. This purported to respond to a suggestion which the latter had made in a speech to the Moslem League Conference on 24th April, and proposed that Jinnah should visit him for the purpose of discussing "the question of communal unity as men determined on finding a common solution."

For the reasons set out in a telegram reproduced as Appendix III of the Memorandum, the Viceroy recommended that the Government of India should forward this letter to Jinnah and, if the latter subsequently asked to see Gandhi, should allow such a meeting to take place. The S/S for India, for the reasons given in his covering Memorandum, took the view that the letter should not be forwarded and that no meeting between Gandhi and Jinnah should be allowed so long as Gandhi and the Congress Party maintained their present policy.

The War Cabinet agreed that in present circumstances it would be inexpedient to allow Gandhi's letter to go forward, or a meeting to take place between Gandhi and Jinnah. They recognised, however, that it was likely to become known in India that Gandhi had extended this invitation to Jinnah; and that, as a refusal to allow such a meeting was open to misinterpretation, it was important that the Government of India should issue a considered statement of their reasons for stopping Gandhi's letter and not allowing the meeting to take place.

Discussion centred on the grounds on which the decision should be based. On the one hand, it was suggested that it would be enough to take the line that Gandhi was detained on security grounds and that it was impossible to allow a person so detained to conduct political discussions while under detention. On the other hand, it was urged that the preferable course would be to make it clear that Gandhi, having embarked on a policy of promoting mass disobedience, and having shown no intention of abandoning it, could not be allowed to carry on political activities.

"X"

The War Cabinet:—

(1) Agreed that the Viceroy should be advised to stop Gandhi's letter to Jinnah, and to tell his Council that this had been done in pursuance of the general policy approved by them. The Government of India should at the same time publish a considered statement, giving the reasons for the action taken, on the lines indicated at "X".

(2) Invited the S/S for India to submit, for consideration at their meeting on the following day, the draft of a telegram to the Viceroy embodying this advice.

[1] No. 709.

717

War Cabinet Paper W.P. (43) 212

R/30/1/3: f 1

INDIA

MR. GANDHI'S REQUEST TO SEE MR. JINNAH

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY

OFFICES OF THE WAR CABINET, S.W.1, *19 May 1943*

The annexed draft telegram from the Secretary of State for India to the Viceroy is circulated, in accordance with W.M. (43) 70th Conclusions, Minute 3,[1] for the consideration of the War Cabinet.

E. E. BRIDGES

Annex to No. 717

[*There follows the text of No. 719, except that* (*a*) *the second sentence reads: 'The ground given should be the simple one that the Government are not prepared to give facilities for political correspondence or contact to one who is in detention for promoting an illegal mass movement and thus gravely embarrassing India's war effort at a critical time and who has shown no intention of abandoning the methods and policy which he has hitherto pursued or given any assurances in that sense'; and* (*b*) *the third sentence begins at the words 'The Cabinet consider . . .'*]

[1] No. 716.

718

War Cabinet W.M. (43) 71st Conclusions, Minute 2

L/PO/6/102b: f 119

Those present at this meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on 19 May 1943 at 5 pm were: Mr Attlee (in the Chair), Sir John Anderson, Mr Ernest Bevin, Mr Oliver Lyttelton, Mr Herbert Morrison

Also present during discussion of item 2 were: Sir Kingsley Wood, Viscount Simon, Viscount Cranborne, Mr Amery, Mr A. V. Alexander, Sir James Grigg, Sir Archibald Sinclair, Mr Ernest Brown

INDIA

Mr. Gandhi's request to see Mr. Jinnah[1]

The War Cabinet had before them a draft telegram from the Secretary of State to the Viceroy (W.P. (43) 212)[2] prepared in accordance with the Conclusions reached by the War Cabinet on the previous day.

The War Cabinet—

Approved the draft telegram, subject to certain drafting amendments agreed to in discussion. (The text of the telegram as approved is set out in the Annex to these Minutes.)[3]

[1] Previous reference: No. 716. [2] No. 717. [3] See No. 719.

719

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: f 133

MOST IMMEDIATE
PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, *19 May 1943, 5.35 pm*
Received: 20 May

11208. Gandhi. War Cabinet have considered your telegram 1159-S[1] and are very definitely of opinion, shared by the Prime Minister, that Gandhi's letter should not go forward. The ground given should be the simple one that the Government, while most anxious to promote agreement between Hindus and Moslems and other political elements, are not prepared to give facilities for political correspondence or contact to a person in detention for promoting an illegal mass movement which he has not disavowed, thus gravely embarrassing India's war effort at a critical time. In view of the indications contained in your latest telegram[2] that leakage may well already be taking place, the Cabinet consider that the fact that a letter has been written and withheld should be made

public and should be justified in substantially the above terms in such manner as you think most suitable, after communication to your Council as well as to Jinnah and Gandhi.

[1] No. 702. [2] No. 713.

720

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: ff 128–31

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *19 May 1943, 6.30 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 20 May*

531. My personal telegram No. 11208[1] dated 19 May. Cabinet were unanimous in their view that Gandhi's letter should not go forward. I am convinced myself that we should be letting ourselves in for every kind of undesirable development if we at this stage departed from the single principle we have effectively sustained as against Hindu leaders and Phillips, and have no fear myself of trouble in Parliament. I regard this as just one more try-on by Gandhi to bring himself into the centre of the picture and its failure will I trust lower his stock yet further. As for Jinnah it may be good for him to realise that his threatening language has been ignored and for his stock to fall a bit as well, which may possibly help Moslem premiers to stand up better against him. As for Government its stock should rise still further, a point you might possibly make with your colleagues. I should be inclined simply to tell them what you have done as in pursuance of policy already agreed upon by them. If they should be prepared, even by a majority, to accept a more direct responsibility, so much the better, but you can best judge whether it is worth while trying that on. Anyhow Cabinet while recognising that handling of this with your Council may have its difficulties and of course ready, subject to their decision on the main issue, to accept your judgment as to best way of dealing with them, feel that this decision is essentially a matter of principle on which you must stand firm. The reasons given to Gandhi and Jinnah must in view of possibility of later publication, clearly be in substantially same terms and follow those of the public statement. Manner of putting matter to your Council will no doubt depend on your judgment whether just to inform them that you have decided in pursuance of policy agreed upon by them and enforced in other cases, to withhold letter, or whether to try to get them to take responsibility for withholding letter. In former case it is clearly desirable in view of danger of leakage to adhere to same general line as will be used publicly, but in latter I should

[1] No. 719.

imagine it would be worth taking the risk of leakage, if you judge that better chance of success would result from broader treatment which might no doubt produce demand to be shown Gandhi's letter.

If possible, we should be glad to have 48 hours after text of announcement is available, to prepare press here and, what is perhaps even more important just now, in U.S.A.

721

Mr Amery to Mr Churchill (via Air Ministry)

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: f 127

IMPORTANT *19 May 1943, 10.55 pm*

ALCOVE 312. Following secret and personal for Prime Minister from Secretary of State for India.

Your Pencil 112.[1]

Cabinet decided that letter should not be delivered and I am telegraphing Viceroy accordingly. They carefully considered whether existence of letter should be made public and decided that this was necessary. Viceroy has advised that fact that Gandhi has written to Jinnah is known to those interned with him and that sooner or later fact will become known through visitors, for example doctor called in to attend Gandhi, or otherwise. It was therefore decided that fact that letter had been written and withheld should be made public after Viceroy's Council and Gandhi and Jinnah had been notified. Withholding of letter should be publicly justified on ground that Government while most anxious to promote agreement between Hindus and Moslems and other political elements in India are not prepared to give facilities for political correspondence and contact to a person in detention for promoting an illegal mass movement which he has not disavowed thus gravely embarrassing India's war effort at a critical time.

It is very likely that U.S. opinion may react unfavourably to this decision and if Halifax agrees I suggest you might consider possibility of speaking to President in confidence about it before you leave.

[1] No 714

722

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE *20 May 1943*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 1222–S. Your private and personal telegram of 19th May No. 531.[1] I am much obliged for the Cabinet background. I think the decision a mistake, but I shall of course loyally try to do what I can to get it across. If I cannot I shall have to come back to you. I am not sure whether Daniel had the advantage of Cabinet advice before entering the lion's den,[2] but like him I am concerned to get out alive, and have some little hope of doing so. It would be quite impossible to carry this through without prior discussion in my Council, and I shall have to ask them to accept responsibility for the decision. I will do my best. I should probably find it extremely difficult however to refuse pressure from them to be shown or told contents of Gandhi's letter: and as you will see from my personal telegram of today[3] we shall in any case have to face a very awkward position as regards publicity for content of such a letter once we let it be known that we are refusing to forward it. If you have any comment on that point, please let me have it urgently. I shall probably not take this matter in Council until tomorrow or conceivably Saturday. Position is not eased by absence on tour of Benthall and absence of Commander-in-Chief (this is a further example of difficulty in which these lengthy absences of the Commander-in-Chief place the Head of the executive Government here).

[1] No. 720. [2] Daniel vi, 16–23. [3] No. 723.

723

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

MOST IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *20 May 1943, 9.55 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 20 May, 10.45 pm*

No. 1223–S. Your personal telegram of 19th May No. 11208,[1] Gandhi letter. I of course give fullest weight to feeling of Cabinet in this matter though I remain of opinion that course recommended by me (which has the support of everyone here competent to express an opinion whom I have been able to take

[1] No. 719.

into confidence or on whose advice I can rely) is the right one. But I do not feel so strongly as to wish to ask Cabinet to reconsider, and I will now take the matter in my Council and thereafter communicate with you further.

2. It would be out of the question for me on a matter such as this to by-pass my Council and take the decision myself. While, too, I will of course try to secure the Cabinet desiderata without disclosing that I have consulted them, it would not be fair to my Council to expect them to carry the whole burden of a decision such as this, and it will probably be necessary in any announcement (if I am able to take them with me) to say "the Government of India with the full support of His Majesty's Government".

3. I am assuming that Cabinet have given full weight to adverse repercussions in the United Kingdom and in the United States, and will be prepared to deal with them. As you will remember the point is one which I emphasised in my telegram No. 1159-S.[2]

4. As for India the really important thing is, if I can, to get my Council to support this policy, and if they do I shall try to make the best of it. One very difficult question which arises is as to what we are to say about the content of the letter. If we suppress the letter altogether while letting it be known that there is such a letter, immense public curiosity will be aroused not only here but I suspect in the United States. Gandhi will have all the benefit of the assumption that he has really gone decisively far to meet Jinnah, and we shall be in a still weaker position to deal with suggestions that it is we who are standing in the way of a settlement. I shall have to think this over further. It is arguable that we should do best to publish the letter which makes it clear at once that Gandhi has not moved an inch about Pakistan or towards Jinnah, declining thereafter to forward any correspondence from each to the other unless and until Gandhi and the Congress abandon their present attitude; but there is an untidiness about that solution of which I am fully conscious.

[2] No. 702. In telegram 544 of 24 May, Mr Joyce informed Sir G. Laithwaite that the G. of I.'s communiqué (see No. 729) had been telegraphed for advance information of British Information Services, U.S.A. and of Indian Agent-General, together with points for guidance. Advance information of the G. of I.'s decision was also sent by the Dominions Office in telegram Z. No. 58 of 25 May to British High Commissioners in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa who were asked to inform the Dominion Governments and, provided there was no objection, to give guidance to the Press. L/I/1/755.

724

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: ff 113–15

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *21 May 1943, 7.10 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 22 May*

536. Your private and personal telegram 1222–S.[1] I am circulating your personal telegram 1223[2] to the Cabinet. There is not time to put to them the point you raise about possibility of publishing the text of letter. Ideal course would obviously be to suppress the fact that letter exists and also its contents, but since you advise (your 1191–S[3] of 17th May) that leakage is likely before long, it may well be best to anticipate leakage. I also feel that it would be courteous to Jinnah to let him know position ahead of leakage. What I would therefore recommend as the best course would be (*a*) to send a letter or telegram to Jinnah informing him that Gandhi had written in response to his speech expressing a wish to meet him but that on grounds substantially as given in my personal telegram 11208[4] it was not possible to forward the letter or arrange a meeting. Gandhi would no doubt be similarly informed at same time. (*b*) to issue at the same time brief and unobtrusive communiqué to the effect that Jinnah has been informed that, etc., etc.

2. I am personally all against publication of contents of letter. For one thing that amounts in effect to letting Jinnah have the letter. For another it leaves you in weaker position to refuse publication of further elucidatory or explanatory correspondence with Jinnah or indeed with others and if that follows Gandhi will have succeeded in his try-on. No doubt there will be some guesswork as to contents but it will have nothing to feed on whereas published letter will be theme of endless discussion, exegesis and further questioning. Our whole policy is to see to it not only that that particular telephone remains disconnected but that the public in India and outside should realise that it is disconnected and that it is no use ringing up. We should stick to that unless and until Gandhi tells you that his attitude has changed and that he therefore wishes to have your permission to communicate with others.

3. As regards your Council they are I think entitled to have the letter read to them on the clear understanding that there must be no leakage. I should have thought it would not be impossible to convince them of the disadvantages and dangers of once departing from the general policy which they have themselves hitherto supported, and of the strengthening of their own authority which would result from taking a consistent and firm line.

[1] No. 722. [2] No. 723. [3] No. 713. [4] No. 719.

4. From that same point of view of your Council's authority I would deprecate anything being said in India about the full support of H.M.G. here unless they ask for it. I shall of course be asked question in Parliament and that will enable me to make that point abundantly clear at this end with whatever emphasis you or your Council may wish.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *23 May 1943, 2.55 pm*
PERSONAL *Received: 23 May, 3.45 pm*

No. 1241–S. Your personal telegram of 19th May No. 11208.[1] Gandhi's letter to Jinnah. Matter was discussed in Council at great length at two meetings yesterday. Commander-in-Chief, Firoz, Ambedkar, Jogendra Singh, and A. K. Roy absent.

2. After very considerable argument in which sharp difference of opinion was disclosed, I managed to get Council to agree that (*a*) the letter should not be forwarded, (*b*) Gandhi and Jinnah should be so informed, (*c*) a communiqué (over text of which again there was very considerable discussion before agreement was secured) contained in my immediately following telegram[2] should be issued once Home Department had been able to inform Gandhi and Jinnah.

3. I made text of Gandhi's letter available to my Council and impressed on them importance of secrecy which I think they realise. There was a strong feeling that sooner or later we shall have to publish the letter, and Muslim Members displayed some uneasiness lest the course that we were adopting should lead to the conclusion that Gandhi had accepted Jinnah's Pakistan demand whereas in fact he had not done so. I urged that we could take the risks involved in this and see how things went. There was general anticipation that we should find ourselves under a good deal of fire as the result of the tactics we had adopted, but as I say Council in the outcome were persuaded to adopt them.

4. I avoided raising question of His Majesty's Government, but once this decision has been published I think it would be very desirable that His Majesty's Government in reply to an arranged question should say that they are in entire agreement with the decision of the Government of India which has their full support. This is important not merely on general grounds, but because it is His Majesty's Government primarily who will have to face left wing United

Kingdom and also United States' criticisms, and it is of course most desirable that there should be no room for any suggestion of any gap between the Government of India and His Majesty's Government.

5. For myself my view remains that on balancing of arguments course originally recommended would have been the wiser one, and likely in the long run to give us least trouble, though I quite see the logical basis and force of the counter course advocated by His Majesty's Government, acceptance of which I have now secured. We must see how things go.

[1] No. 719. [2] See No. 729, note 3.

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Mr Churchill to Mr Attlee and Mr Amery (via Air Ministry)

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: f 108

IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON, *23 May 1943, 9.5 pm*
Received: 23 May, 11.55 pm

PENCIL No. 213. Prime Minister to Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for India. Most Secret and Personal.

Your ALCOVE 312.[1]

1. If the principle of incommunicado is adopted, I cannot see why special justification is required about withholding any particular letter. I fear that we may get the worst of both worlds, neither showing confidence in our policy of incommunicado nor facilitating conferences that may be alleged to make for Indian unity. *Qui s'excuse s'accuse.* I recommend therefore simply stop the letter and see what happens. However the Cabinet must decide.

2. I do not think it would be desirable for me to raise the question with the President. He has limited any references to India to asking me to see Phillips. I saw him to-day and, of course, had a most depressing and unsatisfactory interview with him. He is a weak agreeable man who has had all the grievances of India poured into his ears and appears to be very ill-informed about the enormous advances in self-government that have been made, especially in the Provinces. His two points were, first, the desirability of a proclamation by the King-Emperor to the effect that we really did mean to keep our word about being kicked out in due course, and secondly, to form an Indian Ministry now, giving them power to manage their own Home Affairs, especially, apparently, education. I pointed out that the Provinces had not only education but police.

[1] No. 721.

He said they wanted power at the centre. I replied that while we were responsible for the defence of India we could not mar the integrity of control. Mr. Phillips is a friend of the President and I have no doubt he will do a certain amount of harm. He does not think he will return to India. I hope he is right.

3. It is very remarkable that no other person has mentioned the subject to me, and I do not think it is an issue of any consequence here at the present time. Far more serious is the impression that our Burma Campaign lacks drive and skill. It will be indispensable to appoint a young soldier commander-in-chief of the East Asian front.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: f 93

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL INDIA OFFICE, *24 May 1943, 7.30 pm*
Received: 25 May

545. Congratulations on your successful handling of your team. As for next stage there may be much trouble or there may be very little. We can only wait and see.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: f 92

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *24 May 1943, 7.30 pm*
PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *Received: 25 May*

547. Gandhi–Jinnah letter. It has been suggested to me that possibly situation might be eased if you invited Jinnah to come and see you. It may be too late for that now even if it had been worth while doing earlier, but I pass suggestion on for your consideration.

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill (via Air Ministry)

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: ff 90–1

IMPORTANT *24 May 1943, 3.21 pm*

ALCOVE No. 378. Following secret and personal from Secretary of State for India to Prime Minister.

Your PENCIL 213.[1]

Governor-General succeeded not without difficulty on Saturday in getting his Council to agree (*a*) that letter should not be forwarded; (*b*) that Gandhi and Jinnah should be so informed; (*c*) that once Gandhi and Jinnah have been informed following communiqué should be issued.[2]

Begins. The Government of India have received a request from Mr. Gandhi to forward a short letter from himself to Mr. Jinnah expressing a wish to meet him.

In accordance with their known policy in regard to correspondence or interviews with Mr. Gandhi the Government of India have decided that this letter cannot be forwarded and have so informed Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah. They are not prepared to give facilities for political correspondence or contact to a person detained for promoting an illegal mass-movement which he has not disavowed and thus gravely embarrassing India's war effort at a critical time. It rests with Mr. Gandhi to satisfy the Government of India that he can safely be allowed once more to participate in the public affairs of the country, and until he does so the disabilities from which he suffers are of his own choice. *Ends.*[3]

You will see that this is not a special justification but a reaffirmation of the general principle and a notification to all concerned that the Gandhi telephone is disconnected. Cabinet were unanimous in feeling that it was better to be in first with such reaffirmation than to have to make it somewhat lamely after fact had leaked out as it inevitably would and Jinnah and others had asked questions and demanded to see the letter. In any case it would probably be too late now to stop letter referred to in (*b*) reaching Jinnah with consequent publicity even if matter could be reopened in Council and Council persuaded to change its view. I have discussed with Deputy Prime Minister who agrees.

[1] No. 726. [2] See No. 725.

[3] Lord Linlithgow had sent Mr Amery the text of this communiqué in telegram 1242–S of 23 May 1943; MSS. EUR. F. 125/24. It was issued for publication on 27 May.

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Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/78

CONFIDENTIAL

NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE GOVERNOR'S REPORT NO. 10, DATED THE 24TH MAY 1943

As I have already reported, I asked Sardar Aurangzeb Khan on 13th May to assist me in forming a Ministry. Although his party had at that time only a very narrow majority, I had noticed during the preceding few weeks a distinct trend of opinion in his favour among the Khans and other people of standing. I felt fairly certain that, once Aurangzeb Khan was actually commissioned to form a Ministry, some of the waverers would throw in their lot with him. This expectation seems to have been fulfilled, and my information is that increased public support is now being openly shown to Aurangzeb and his colleagues. Congress are doing their best to close their own ranks, but are, I gather, not too happy about the position; though in the past their party cohesion has always been immeasurably better than that of the Muslim League, I think the tables are being gradually turned in this respect. They are at present unable to agree among themselves as to the line they should adopt, and have not yet decided whether or not to fight the seven pending bye-elections.

I had some preliminary talk with Aurangzeb about his general programme. He agreed in the first place to include in his first public statement an assurance that he would wholeheartedly support the war effort of the Province. He also promised to accept the budget already authorised, and said that, on general administrative questions, his desire would be to do nothing embarrassing to the Governor or his officers, and to rely for technical advice on the Government Secretaries.[1]

[1] Sardar Aurangzeb Khan's Ministry took office on 25 May 1943.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *24 May 1943*

PRIVATE AND SECRET

Many thanks for your letter of the 6th May,[1] which reached me yesterday. The most important business since I last wrote to you has, of course, been this

discussion over the handling of Gandhi's letter to Jinnah. I have not had too easy a time over it here and (though I did not on this occasion wish to press my point of view on the Cabinet) I still think that if they are to get business done at this end they will have to be prepared to take the judgment of the man on the spot as to what is likely to be the right tactic and the right technique. As it is I have accepted their view on this occasion and, as I informed you by telegram,[2] I have managed to get it across with my Council, but not without difficulty; while I am by no means certain that we are not in fact letting ourselves in for trouble, and I have always, too, to keep in mind in dealing with all this the possibility of another fast on ground more difficult for us to deal with. However, I will of course do my best to try to keep things straight, and equally the Cabinet will have to be prepared, as I imagine they are, to stand up to any criticism that there may be in the United Kingdom or in the United States. It is because of the possibility of such criticism that I think it important that His Majesty's Government should in some way associate themselves with the decision that has been taken here without delay. I attach the more weight to that consideration since Colville, whose familiarity with the House of Commons and with the atmosphere at home is of course very recent, clearly thinks that the course that has been adopted is not a wise one.

2. I send you by this bag copy of a further letter[3] from Gandhi, addressed on this occasion to Samuel. This of course we are withholding; but the letter is of interest as showing that Gandhi has not budged one inch from his previous contentions.

3. I quite agree with what you say in paragraphs 1 and 2 of your letter of the 6th May about the potential importance of the National War Front. It has in fact (I think the reports about its progress to the National Defence Council bring that out) varied a great deal in quality and in usefulness in different Provinces. Thus it has never been much of a success in Bihar, and you will be only too familiar from Lewis' fortnightly letters with the difficulties which he has had to face in Orissa. And it took a long time to get under way in Bengal. I confess that I am a little sceptical as to its taking root so deeply as to admit of being used for the purposes or on the scale that you have in mind. But as time goes on (and as you know my own fear is that the war, so far as India is concerned, has probably two or three years yet to run) its roots may grow deeper and the chances of something on these lines developing may improve.

4. I doubt the prospect of any advance on the constitutional question through the reconstruction committees—and indeed there are many occasions when I doubt the prospect of any advance in this region by any means that we can devise! There has been not the very slightest reaction to Stanley Reed's

[1] No. 687. [2] No. 725. [3] No. 710.

suggestion for preparatory work here[4]—and any comment there has been has tended to be critical rather than otherwise. I think that is a point that might be worth getting across to the *Times* which, here as elsewhere, in the business of the handling of the Indian problem tends at present to be guided by wishful thinking rather than by any real appreciation of the facts of the matter. In the constitutional field there is I fear every prospect of a complete deadlock, a deadlock that can only be resolved either by our taking sides with one of the parties against the others or by announcing if and when the post-war discussions take place and come to nothing that we propose to carry on on the present lines. It is of course lamentable that this should be the case: and apart from one's general regret, the probability that no progress will ultimately be made has a very definite reaction on the handling of certain questions, and in particular the question of service recruitment on which I touch later in this letter.

* * *

8. I do not think that I need comment on paragraphs 7 and 8 of your letter since with Winston's return any day now I imagine that some progress may be likely as regards these major issues.

* * *

10. I sent you on 27th April copy of a letter dated the 20th April[5] from Rutherford in which he suggests, given the extreme pressure on his Services, I.C.S. and Police, the possibility of borrowing a few men from the Army. The local military authorities are apparently quite willing to help him over this. I have discussed with Maxwell, and I send you a copy of Maxwell's letter[6] by this bag. The general point in issue is one of substantial importance. So far as Rutherford is concerned, I shall be perfectly ready to let him have the people he wants. But what I have been asking myself is whether we ought not to go a little further and, even at the risk of depriving the Army of say forty or fifty competent officers at a time when officer shortage is important, give the Provinces an opportunity of taking a few men of appropriate qualifications on a temporary basis into the Civil Service or the Police. The strain on the Provinces is great. The war in the eastern sphere is not likely to be over before 1945 or 1946. Recruitment has closed down. The only source from which we can get men now other than the Army is the Provincial Service, and that is not a source that I think it wise to rely on for anything much beyond the well-established percentages. The strain on all personnel will increase with time, and we may well have to face the possibility of a situation at the end of the war in which cadres will be depleted by deaths and retirements at the top, in which the remainder of the men in the Services, whether European or Indian, will be exceedingly war weary, and in which we shall have to deal with the extremely acute problems of demobilisation and reconstruction in the Provinces and in

the Centre, and in the Centre as well with the big constitutional problem. My own present judgment (but I am consulting Maxwell and will write to you further) is that there is a great deal to be said in these circumstances for extending the principle now suggested by Rutherford in the case of Bihar to such other Provinces as may feel the need either immediately or between now and the end of the war, thus working in effect on the basis of the old mixed Commissions[7] in such Provinces between now and the end of the war. Military personnel to be borrowed for use in such mixed Commissions might be either European or Indian: but in principle I would myself prefer, given the heavy gaps in the European side of the service, to use European personnel for the most part, though the Army might be able to spare an occasional good Indian officer. If anything were to be done on these lines, I would make no public announcement, as this might suggest that we were starting to work to a new policy; and would confine myself after discussion with the Commander-in-Chief, to informing Governors, and authorising them to take on, in agreement with the military authorities, a specific number of men with certain qualifications or of a certain standard, either European or Indian, but preferably, so as to fill temporarily the gaps in the European cadre, European. I would make no formal commitment as regards the post-war position of men so borrowed. On the other hand you and I ought, I think, if anything were to come of this scheme, to have in mind the possibility of absorbing men so taken on in the I.C.S. and the Police after the war (that principle, if we work to it, would involve the fixing of reasonably low age limits for men so taken in) assuming that is that those services remain in being, and assuming also that whatever selection board is set up for recruitment to them accepts as suitable the standard of education and achievement of the people concerned. There are bound to be some misfits: but one would expect that a fairly substantial percentage of people now taken into civil employment in this way would probably be suitable for permanent retention if they were willing to stay on.

11. Something on these lines would, it seems to me, help us to bring for the balance of the war the European percentages which, as a result of under-recruitment, are much below their proper figure, up to the mark. It might give us a nucleus for employment in the services if they are retained on their present basis at the end of the war. It would bring in men who have already had some experience of discipline and military training, and some experience of the

[4] Letter, dated 2 April 1943, published in *The Times* of 5 April. [5] MSS. EUR. F. 125/50.

[6] MSS. EUR. F. 125/138.

[7] During the nineteenth century the administration of the British Indian Provinces was frequently undertaken by military officers working together with civilians in bodies known as 'mixed commissions'. This employment of military officers met with the disfavour of the civilian element and, in the latter part of the century, measures were taken to limit their numbers. The system had largely died out by 1914.

country, men, too, who were familiar, even if in a relatively small degree, with its languages and its customs. An element of this type might well give us much of the material which will certainly be necessary if we are to carry through the very difficult period until the post-war constitutional discussions either reach some conclusion which would enable us to give effect to our proclaimed policy, or come to nothing and necessitate our carrying on for a considerable period very much as at present. We might well, were we to take any action on these lines, turn the I.C.S. Training Camp at Dehra Dun to further advantage and send some of the men borrowed from the Army for a six or eight months' probationary course so that they could get some knowledge of revenue and legal work. I do not for a moment pretend that people so recruited will be able to pull their weight at once—that would be equally true, even more true, were we recruiting direct. But by the end of the war a good many of them ought to be definitely rather useful men, able to give material assistance to a hardly tried administration.

12. My own fear in this whole business is lest His Majesty's Government should pursue a policy in regard to the Civil Services in India appropriate to a scheme of constitutional evolution of the order of that in the Act of 1935, only to discover—after the services have ceased to look to the future and their numbers have been substantially reduced—that the political plan will not work, and that somehow we must go back. That is to my mind a very real danger. And those of us on whom the responsibility for the good government of India rests cannot allow ourselves lightly to be satisfied by the familiar argument that it is none of our business, and that if India wants to be badly governed she must have her own way! We cannot, and must not, betray the whole post-war world, even though that world may be profoundly wrong-headed about Britain in India.

13. With reference to your private and personal telegram of 18th May No. 527:[8] I am sorry for the delay in letting you have my final views about the proposal that a British Council should operate in India: but I have been anxious to have Sargent's comments and I received them only a day or two ago. I send you a copy of them and of his covering letter by this bag.[9] As you will see his conclusion (and his familiarity with the general Indian set-up is now considerable) is that it is difficult to envisage any official or semi-official scheme for improving cultural relations which would be likely to succeed at the moment, though he thinks there might be some chance of such a scheme being launched with some hope of success in connection with any general plan for developing the Social Services in this country in connection with post-war reconstruction. The arguments in support of Sargent's first contention which are given in his note must carry a considerable weight. I do not however, it is only fair to say, entirely follow him on all points. Thus while like Gwyer he talks of a

progressive deterioration of feeling, his suggestion on that point is not borne out by evidence from other quarters, and I suspect that as with Gwyer, Sargent's work and contacts are essentially in intelligentsia circles where undoubtedly that sort of feeling exists; and that he is inclined in consequence to regard it as more widely spread than in fact I believe it to be. On a second point, I am extremely doubtful as to the practicability of an exchange of professors or lecturers with universities at home, at any rate with universities of any standing. The general level here is, I suspect, very low, and not rising (you will note incidentally Sargent's suggestion, which is interesting, that the standard of spoken and written English in Indian universities is steadily falling owing to the progressive decline in the number of English educationists); and we might indeed do more harm than good by advertising that fact. Equally I suspect that there is relatively little temptation to anyone who is not thoroughly imbued with the missionary spirit (or attracted by very liberal conditions of service) to abandon work at home and the handling of heavy problems of the post-war period in order to take up teaching work in an Indian university in the conditions of today. Finally I would qualify what Sargent says in paragraph 6 of his note about the inevitability of a large influx of Indian students into Great Britain immediately after the war. The desirability from the point of view of India of sending home large numbers of young men sometimes without any very deep academic training and in a very great many cases without money or the background that enables them to lead any sort of happy existence in England is an old subject of controversy, and you will remember the very depressing reports which Sir Azizul Haque as High Commissioner, and your own advisers, have made on the general question of Indian students in the United Kingdom. But apart from that, I gravely doubt there being in the immediate post-war period any great anxiety on the part of universities to welcome any substantial number of students whether from India or abroad. Pressure on the universities for short courses for British personnel who have been in the war and have missed the whole or part of their university courses will be very great indeed and the difficulty of finding room for anyone from abroad substantial. Apart from that the immediate post-war period will politically be a period of flux in this country, a state of things that may well influence the attitude of academic institutions if at the same time they are under very strong pressure to find space for their own nationals.

14. In these circumstances, and after balancing the views expressed by Gwyer and by Sargent, I am bound to say that I am driven to the conclusion that it would be unwise to develop the idea of a "British Institute" or an "Indian Institute" at the present time. I do not think that I need enter into any

[8] Referring to No. 315, para. 8 and to No. 606, and asking for views on proposal that British Council should operate in India. L/I/1/70: f 233.

[9] *Ibid.*, ff 222–4.

very detailed analysis of the reasons which lead me to that conclusion. But I shall of course be delighted to comment further if there is any specific point on which you would like me to do so and if you will send me a telegram.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE *25 May 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 1256–S. Your private and personal telegram of May 24th No. 547.[1] Gandhi–Jinnah letter. I am sure it would be a mistake to make any move towards Jinnah. We had better let things take their course.

[1] No. 728.

733

Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/8/9a: f 99

25 May 1943

My dear Winston,

The enclosed cartoon[1] from the *Daily Worker* (now enjoying Dominion status by the grace of the Comintern Presidium) is one of several which have appeared recently in that paper, one also I think in the *News Chronicle*, all with the implication that the delay in appointing a Viceroy is due to general reluctance on the part of men good enough for the post to take it. I have heard echoes of this from elsewhere and no doubt it adds to the importance of sending someone of whose quality there can be no doubt.

Meanwhile, I would ask you to note the appealing look on the face of your poor little colleague, the Secretary of State for India, and relieve his anxieties!

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

[1] Between pp. 568 and 569.

734

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

PRIVATE AND SECRET INDIA OFFICE, *25 May 1943*

My congratulations on your successful handling of the Council over the Jinnah letter, a task made all the more difficult, I imagine, by the absence of stalwarts like Benthall and Ambedkar. I know you are still doubtful about the wisdom of the course we have taken and we can only judge by the result. My own feeling still remains that we can treat the whole thing as the natural continuance of a settled policy, namely, that Gandhi & Co. are off the telephone until they come to terms with the Post Office and are prepared to behave like ordinary subscribers. Winston, I may say, telegraphed from America urging that there should be no communiqué and the letter simply suppressed.[1] I have pointed out to him the difficulty of letting the facts leak out, as they would, and then having to issue a rather lame statement.[2] After all, what you are doing is not making a special justification for suppressing this letter, but using it as an opportunity for notifying the world at large that the Gandhi telephone is disconnected.

2. I am indeed less anxious about repercussions here and in America, which I think I can deal with all right, than with Jinnah, who seems to be in a dangerously inflated and truculent mood. I was reading the inside story, which came in your last letter, of what Jinnah said to the Muslim League.[3] If that is his attitude, then I think it was even more important that the Government of India should not have appeared to give way to his menacing language about a letter from Gandhi. At the same time, I did think it worth while passing on to you a suggestion, Mudaliar's in fact, that it might be worth while speaking personally to Jinnah over the Gandhi letter business.[4] I expect you have come to the conclusion that it is not worth while doing so,[5] though it might give you an opportunity of making it quite clear that there was no question of accepting Pakistan on Gandhi's part.

3. Winston has asked me and the other Ministers concerned, to prepare a plan for the reorganisation of Far Eastern defence arrangements to discuss with him when he gets back. What I have advocated, as I think I wrote in my last letter,[6] is the scheme on which we are both agreed, namely, that there should be a supreme Commander-in-Chief, South-East Asia, separate from and outside the whole machinery of the Government of India, but with whose operational instructions the Commander-in-Chief, India should conform. From his latest

[1] Nos. 714 and 726. [2] No. 729. [3] No. 669. [4] See No. 728. [5] See No. 732.
[6] No. 701, para. 7.

telegrams[7] I think Winston is now inclined to accept that solution. What, however, are his ideas about who is to fill the different places, is not quite clear to my mind. In one telegram he suggested that Auchinleck should be Deputy Commander-in-Chief and do most of the Indian Army work, while Wavell, nominally retaining the Indian Commander-in-Chiefship, should do the East Asia operations. Later telegrams however make me wonder whether he is not thinking of appointing a younger man to the East Asia Command and possibly leaving Wavell where he is with his powers somewhat diminished. In that case there would be nothing for Auchinleck, except perhaps as Deputy and Inspector-General, a post which may be worth while creating from the point of view of keeping up the morale of the Indian Army. Anyhow, so far as your anxiety about Winston's opinion of Auchinleck is concerned, it is clear from the telegrams that he certainly thinks well of him from the point of view of the Indian Army and indeed has contemplated his eventual resumption of the Commander-in-Chiefship. But I shall know better about all this by the time this letter reaches you.

4. Closely connected with this problem is one which the Air Ministry has raised, urging that the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief in India should be given the same independence of the Commander-in-Chief as is enjoyed by the A.O.C.-in-C., Middle East. I think I have brought them round to realise the extreme difficulty of altering anything in the internal constitutional arrangements of India and of accepting the view that if there is an A.O.C.-in-C., Far Eastern operations, whether under a supreme Chief, or as part of a Trinity, as in the Middle East, the A.O.C., India, could be operationally under his orders without upsetting the Indian constitutional structure. Personally, I believe in a single supreme Commander; and in spite of the eventual success, after much shaking down together, of the Trinity in the Middle East, still believe that that particular arrangement works better in Heaven than on earth.

5. I confess to being somewhat disturbed about the continuance of Congress troubles in Western Bengal and can only hope that Nazimuddin's Government will tackle the Congress miscreants in the Midnapore District with greater vigour than its predecessor. All I have seen in the correspondence of Herbert's handling of that situation has made me feel a little anxious as to what he might do if a new critical situation came about later on, e.g. through Jinnah's trying to mobilise the Muslim League Ministries against us in the same way as Congress did in the Congress Provinces. I certainly do not like the idea of our being reduced to Section 93 all over India, and no doubt Jinnah knows it, but it is obvious that we may possibly have to face such a contingency if his head goes on swelling as it has lately, and if the Muslim League Premiers do not combine to apply some cold water to it.

[7] Not printed.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to all Provincial Governors

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

IMMEDIATE *26 May 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 1260–S. Following on Jinnah's speech last month to Muslim League Gandhi has sent Home Department a letter to Jinnah saying that he has noted his speech and inviting Jinnah to come and see him. Letter is entirely non-committal as regards Pakistan and expresses the hope that Jinnah will take Gandhi as he finds him.

2. After discussion in Council (and also consideration by Cabinet) it has been decided that we must stick to our policy of refusing to facilitate any contacts between Gandhi and the outside world unless and until he resiles from policy for which he is at present under detention and that he must himself bear disabilities of refusing so to resile. Letter is accordingly not being forwarded and Gandhi and Jinnah are being so informed. A brief communiqué approved by the Government of India will be issued to the press here and at home probably on Thursday morning, but you will wish to have this early information.

3. No indication is being given to Jinnah as to contents of letter. Please therefore treat reference to its contents as most secret. I should be grateful if fact that matter has been discussed in Cabinet could also be treated as entirely for your personal information. We must expect to be shot at over this decision, and I fully appreciate that it is a nicely balanced one and that much can be said on both sides. But we are prepared to face the music and I know that we shall have the support of His Majesty's Government.

4. I am sending a similar telegram to other Governors. I should welcome brief telegraphic indication of any reactions in your Province.

5.[1] As you know I should myself have been very ready to see a different course adopted, but I found my Council pretty solid; and Gandhi's letter to Samuel,[2] which makes it still more clear that he has not budged an inch, is I think an additional argument for standing firm now. But I am very alive to the capital that can be made out of this decision. Secretary of State has briefed Bajpai and I understand is doing all he can to keep press comment, &c. at home on the right lines.

[1] To Bombay only. [2] No. 710.

736

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMPORTANT
PERSONAL

NEW DELHI, *27 May 1943, 4.30 pm*
Received: 27 May, 7.30 pm

No. 1268–S. As a result of prolonged discussions with my Advisers, I feel constrained, in continuance of my previous telegram No. 1161–S[1] of May 13th to draw your urgent attention, and indeed that of the Cabinet as a whole, to the economic situation in India, present and prospective. In spite of the assurances contained in your No. 11033[2] of the 17th May I am by no means certain that the importance of maintaining the economic front intact in India is sufficiently appreciated at home, still less that the Government of the U.S. has had brought home to it, as fully as the urgency of the situation demands, the inescapable fact that military operations of any magnitude based on India presuppose a measure of economic stability in India which we are unable to guarantee unless certain conditions are satisfied.

2. India, never a rich country—since the majority of the population is at or near the margin of subsistence—could not hope to escape the major influence of the war on the economic side, namely an increasing scarcity of consumers' goods of all kinds. The fact is that as regards the ordinary necessities of life such as cotton piecegoods, fuel, kerosene, iron, drugs, even foodstuffs, we are approaching the scarcity limit. I need not go into the causes of these scarcities beyond pointing out that shipping shortages, the loss of territories which provided us with goods in the past, the insistent demands for the diversion of productive capacity to war needs, wear and tear of plant, have combined to make it impossible to maintain the flow of consumers' goods.

3. This is a general world phenomenon, although loose talk on the subject of India's vast untapped economic resources has prevented the Indian public—which is in general unable to understand the world position—from realising the nature of the Indian situation. But it is important to appreciate the nature of the process which has made it possible to divert resources to the war effort. In all countries there has been an expansion of purchasing power and, as a consequence of increased employment, of the use of currency by those sections of the population which have no banking accounts. In India the mechanism by which the rising volume of purchasing power has been passed on to the public has been the sterling resources of the Central Bank. The direct expenditure of the Government of India has been financed by taxation and by loan, but the total expenditure of the United Nations in India has for the last two years

[been] much greater than the direct expenditure of the Government of India. Sterling and Dollars (though at second remove Dollar resources have led to further sterling accretions) have been tendered to the Reserve Bank, and as a consequence (except to the extent that the total borrowing of the Government of India, *plus* their tax receipts, have exceeded total expenditure by Government) there has been an expansion of bank deposits and of currency.

4. Since Indian incomes must have increased by more than the additional currency and bank deposits it might be argued that the whole of the extra cash expenditure incurred could have been met out of borrowing to an extent equal to the excess of the total expenditure over the Government of India's own expenditure, whether this was financed by taxation or by loan. Our recent financial measures are, indeed, an attempt to improve the ways and means position, as I point out in more detail below; but it must be recognised that under Indian conditions it is not easy, indeed it is impossible, to secure that additional purchasing power generated should be largely neutralised by a borrowing programme. The vast majority of the population is poor and if it saves at all is accustomed to add to its stock of the precious metals. The middle classes are traditionally burdened with family obligations and are finding it in any case difficult to adjust themselves to the rapidly rising cost of living. The manufacturing and trading classes who are largely untouched by considerations of patriotism and sentiment, see nothing reprehensible in hedging against inflationary risks by a flight into commodities. Congress at the same time has been conducting a subterranean campaign against Government addressed to the fears, the greed and the political prejudices of large sections of the population. Under these circumstances the surprising thing is not that the situation is dangerous, but that the danger point was not reached earlier. In fact, the Government of India has succeeded in holding the fort: in producing the men and material needed for the war and in keeping the vast majority of the population quiescent.

5. Nevertheless, it would be folly to pretend that the dynamic factors in the situation are moving to our advantage. Recently, in spite of splendid news from the war fronts, and despite a record wheat crop, there are ominous signs that the ryot is refusing to sell wheat, with the result that wheat prices have risen alarmingly. An anti-seasonal movement of prices of this kind requires

[1] Saying that the demi-official telegraphic correspondence on the silver situation gave him the impression that the Treasury failed to realize the extreme seriousness of the position. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

[2] Stating that both the India Office and the Treasury fully appreciated the urgency of the problem; that the difficulties arose on the American side because of the opposition of Senators from silver-producing States to anything likely to lower the price of silver; and that he was hoping to arrange a joint message from Sir Kingsley Wood and himself to Lord Halifax suggesting that the latter might represent the position to Mr Morgenthau personally. L/F/7/448: ff 147–8.

explanation. My advisers and I do not find that explanation in a distrust of paper currency as such, though no doubt in such areas as have been peculiarly subject to underground Congress propaganda, this distrust has played a rôle. We find the ultimate explanation in a perfectly natural series of phenomena unconnected with propaganda on the subject of the currency. It is difficult for the ryot to store paper money; he naturally prefers a store of value of a more tangible kind. He can pay his land revenue with one-half to one-third of the goods that he did before, and yet he finds that the larger remnant of his income cannot be exchanged into the kinds of goods that he has been in the habit of demanding and consuming. In these circumstances, he prefers to hoard his wheat and his rice, and if need be, to consume more than he did before. Ministers in the self-governing Provinces encourage him to hold out for still higher prices: the Congress intelligentsia warn him that his paper currency will be worthless. Meanwhile, the refusal of the ryot to sell aggravates the food problems in the cities, and *there*, where the population is more accessible to literate propaganda, the rising price and the growing shortage provide an *ex post facto* justification for Congress propaganda.

6. We must now look ahead and ask ourselves how this sufficiently difficult situation will be affected by the apparent intention of the United Nations to use India as an active base for major operations against Japan. The real resources of the country are already strained almost to breaking point: on the psychological side, we are within sight of a collective refusal to accept further paper currency. It is not sufficiently realised that in this country of vast population but yet low *per capita* purchasing power, the intrusion of modern armies in itself involves great and disproportionate expansions of currency. The total European Forces of pre-war days was in the neighbourhood of 35,000 souls. The course of the war has already increased this to about 250,000, a figure which may well be greatly exceeded in the light of future developments. It would be impossible to prevent troops—especially Americans—drawing pay, and this must be given them in cash. This has in itself produced a very considerable expansion of the currency which is still increasing. If, at the same time, India is expected to provide additional supplies of food, housing, equipment, transport facilities and aerodromes, over and above the facilities already provided, a strain will be imposed on the economy of the country which is bound to make the task of my successor a highly intractable one. Nor does it really relieve the position if these offensive operations are postponed: on the contrary the deterioration of the situation may make the impact of the new adverse factors even worse than they would otherwise be. It is not possible to dissociate economic distress from political discredit in this country; any aggravation of the economic situation leads inevitably to a worsening of the political situation and this will, in its turn, worsen the economic situation. It is hardly to be expected that the

enemy will be so ignorant of the course of development as not to be able to exploit the adverse elements in the situation. Indeed, the worse his own situation becomes, the more anxious he will be to advertise our own distresses to our own disadvantage.

7. My advisers and I are being forced to the conclusion that the time has come when the United Nations will have to choose between utilising India as a base for operations and utilising India as a source of supply for overseas theatres and countries. My advisers and I do not think she can stand the strain of both rôles. Arrangements are well in train for the former rôle and must go forward. We are satisfied however that we must now face the problem of reducing the activities of the Supply Department particularly on its non-munitions side and particularly in its services to overseas theatres.

We are examining this question further but in the meantime the immediate short-term problem, to put it in its simplest terms, is to provide a sponge which will soak up the excess purchasing power which the exigencies of the war make it inevitable will be created. No belligerent nation appears to have succeeded in stopping the creation of additional purchasing power (though some of them have been more successful than others) but the democratic solution lies in the neutralisation or deferment of additional purchasing power. So far as India is concerned we hope that the measures recently enacted by the Finance Department will help us considerably in the short run. By impounding excess profits by summary assessment, it is hoped to improve the ways and means position by some 100 crores. This will enable current expenditure by His Majesty's Government to be financed without any additions to the currency, and a temporary cessation of currency expansion should produce beneficial psychological consequences. The supplementary measures which the Finance Department has taken powers to implement should work in the same direction. We are I hope in sight of a control scheme for the textile industry which will give us much needed supplies of cloth at controlled prices and I am asking my officers energetically to pursue the possibility of the mass production of utility articles for general consumption, even if that involves, for the time being, some check to the supply of goods for military purposes.

8. Nevertheless, I am convinced, even if we succeed in all these measures, that something more is needed to restore confidence. The first need is to check the expansion of paper currency. The most effective way of doing this [is] to increase the output of quaternary rupees to the maximum extent possible. For that we need the new Mint equipment which, though ordered long ago, has been seriously held up, but above all ample supplies of silver. The public resents being forced to take paper currency (hence the large scale hoarding of small coin which is causing the most acute inconvenience) and needs to be satisfied that if it desires to obtain metallic coins they are available. It is the feeling that

there is nothing behind the note and that neither bullion nor goods can be obtained with the note which is our greatest danger. It can only be overcome by vigorous and immediate action.

9. It is at the same time very important that the Government of India should possess a free reserve of silver for sale to the population generally. Bullion as a store of value has an age-long sanctity attached to it, and it is scarcely to be wondered at if the ryot, who is in terms of currency income better off today than at any other time in recent history, should desire to hold silver in larger quantities, especially as the available supply of alternative goods is so limited. In any case, whether he is justified in his attitude or not, the non-availability of supply encourages him to hold (and consume) that which he himself has grown, namely his current output of foodstuffs. My advisers are absolutely opposed to any direct sales of silver by Government to the cultivator against foodstuffs, as most dangerous to the future of the currency. But an increased supply of silver in the hands of the bullion trade they regard as an absolute necessity not only on the grounds described above, but for another reason also which I have now to explain.

10. Apart from the outstanding balance of the demonetised standard silver coin, which has all gone underground, the existing silver currency (rupees, half-rupees and quarter-rupees) is made of quaternary alloy, the melting point of which is in the region of Rs. 200 per 100 tolas. The whole mass of silver currency would become frozen, in anticipation, long before the market price reached this figure. Recent price tendencies which carried the price to Rs. 136 are definitely dangerous. Under pressure from the Government of India the bullion market has for the time being closed down on future transactions and this action by checking speculation has for the moment had a beneficial effect on the price of silver. Nevertheless, the danger that bar silver will rise again is an ever present one, and with it the danger that the existing silver coinage will disappear. This would be a disaster of the first magnitude, which must be avoided at all costs. It would inflict incalculable hardship on the country and virtually paralyse the administration. Neither my advisers nor I can see any effective way of avoiding the danger except an ample supply of silver both for coinage purposes (to mitigate the increase in the note issue) and for purposes of sale (to enable us to control the market).

11. It is because silver is so directly linked with the stability of the currency that my advisers have attributed greater importance to the possibility of large silver supplies than to increasing the supply of gold. But it is now five months since the possibility of increasing our gold supplies was first raised, and naturally the gold situation has deteriorated *pari passu* with the silver situation. It was therefore with great relief that I heard of the proposals put forward in Washington by Strakosch. We need both gold and silver but I have no doubt whatever

that if we have to choose at the moment which is the more urgent need to be satisfied, it is an increase in the silver supplies.

12. It is in my judgment imperative that every effort should now be made to convince the U.S.A. Government at the highest level, that to furnish India with a large and if necessary continuing supply of silver is an organic element in the war effort of the United Nations, without which it will be impossible either to use India as an operational base or to guarantee the continued stability of the country and therefore its vital contribution to the war effort, both in men, materials, and finished products.

737

Sir H. Dow (Sind) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

28 May 1943

No. 238–C. Your private and personal telegram No. 1260–S[1] of May 26th. Gandhi's letter to Jinnah. As usual with important news Sind papers made no comment on day of publication. Today they join chorus of outside Hindu papers in hoping to embroil Jinnah with Government. In discussing with Ministers yesterday Premier and Gazdar took the view that Jinnah had felt sure that Gandhi would not respond and that his challenge to Government was mere rhetorical flourish.

2. Jinnah is expected here in a few days' time and will stay with Yusif Haroon. I shall probably have opportunity of conversation with him and if there is any particular line you wish me to take I shall be grateful for advice.

[1] No. 735.

738

Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/I/1/755: f 270

IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *28 May 1943, 1.35 pm*

PERSONAL

11973. Many thanks for your telegram No. 1264–S[1] of the 26th May. So far the reaction here to the announcement has been better than we might have expected.

[1] From Sir G. Laithwaite to Mr Joyce (repeated to Sir G. S. Bajpai) referring to the telegram mentioned in note 2 to No. 723 and discussing lines of guidance to be given to the Press. MSS. EUR. F. 125/24.

Of the London papers *The Times* is the only one to comment so far, and it has taken a line of approval embroidered with a plea for what it calls "a new endeavour and a new leadership". *The Times* despatch from Delhi, which was published on the main news page, was a model of realism and forthrightness. The only other editorials which we have seen so far appear in the *Manchester Guardian*, *Yorkshire Post*, and *Birmingham Post*. The first is critical as one would have anticipated, but the others entirely support the Government of India's action. The silence at the moment, at any rate, of the remainder of the Press, including particularly the *Daily Herald* and *News Chronicle*, is satisfactory. Whether or not they eventually show their hand there is no doubt whatever that in editorial circles generally in this country there is a more realistic and informed attitude towards the problem now than at any time. This is due to the consistency of policy towards the Congress and the sheer weight of the facts. I will report any developments of interest.

739

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/24

IMMEDIATE NEW DELHI, *29 May 1943, 8.50 pm*
Received: 29 May, 11 pm

No. 1283–S. Your telegram of May 28th No. 11973.[1] Many thanks. You will now have seen via Reuter Jinnah's reply to Gandhi.[2] It is wholly satisfactory from our point of view and does much credit to Jinnah's political capacity. I am the more relieved by it since Nazimuddin, who has just been here, had taken very seriously our refusal to forward Gandhi's letter and had been suggesting that all Muslim League Ministries might have to come out on the issue. I had not taken that too seriously, but naturally one has been anxious to keep the temperature as low as possible.

2. Jinnah's reply is the more satisfactory in that he now definitely places himself in the position that he as well as Government require that Gandhi and the Congress shall come off their policy of last August before there can be any dealings between Gandhi and the Muslim League. While I have had some uncomfortable moments over this business, in the outcome it could not have worked better, and the reply which Jinnah has given has probably been more helpful even than if the letter had been sent on to him. Congress press, which has been starting agitation against us, is now badly deflated and I hope that things will go quietly.

[1] No. 738.

[2] On 28 May 1943 Mr Jinnah commented to Reuter on Mr Gandhi's wish to invite him to visit him. He said that Gandhi's letter could only be construed as a move to embroil the Muslim League

with the British Government as a means of helping his release. Jinnah was always willing to meet Gandhi or any other Hindu leader, 'yet merely expressing his desire to meet me isn't the kind of ephemeral letter that I suggested in my speech that Gandhi should write'. His suggestions were a response to appeals by Hindu leaders for the Muslim League to do something to break the deadlock. He himself saw no change of policy on Gandhi's part and the latter's correspondence with the Viceroy bore out this view. But responsible Hindu leaders impressed upon him that Gandhi was prepared to reconsider and was willing to settle on the basis of Pakistan, but that the British Government were preventing a Hindu–Muslim settlement by refusing to allow contact with Gandhi. He had therefore suggested that if Gandhi was prepared to write a letter and abandon his policy culminating in revolution and was willing to settle on the basis of Pakistan, the Muslim League were prepared to bury the past. He still believed the British Government would not stop such a letter. He regretted that the Congress Press was 'indulging in cheap gibes and slogans' based on isolated and mutilated passages from his speech. This would not help to create the friendly atmosphere which was essential. L/PO/6/102b: f 80.

740

Mr Churchill to Mr Attlee (via Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean[1] and Air Ministry)

Telegram, L/PO/8/9a: ff 7–8

IMMEDIATE *29 May 1943, 8.42 pm*
Received: 29 May, 10.41 pm

PENCIL No. 417. Prime Minister to Deputy Prime Minister and Dominions Secretary.

1. In opinion of Brooke and Ismay, Wavell has aged considerably under the many strains he has borne during this war, and I am sure that he would not be the best man to command the East Asia front which it is urgent to establish. On the other hand, Auchinleck would seem far better qualified to deal with the much magnified Indian Army. I should be very sorry to leave Wavell unemployed, as he has justly acquired a high reputation. It would be best for all interests if Wavell could succeed Gowrie as Governor-General of Australia. He would discharge this work admirably and would probably establish very good relations with MacArthur. I should like therefore to sound Curtin on this. It might be well in the first instance to enlist Evatt, who is in the most friendly mood, behind the proposition. Unless you see any strong objection, I will cable the suggestion to him and see how he takes it, and thereafter I would address myself to Curtin. I understand that Gowrie's term, unless renewed,

[1] Mr Churchill left Washington on 26 May to fly (via Gibraltar) to North Africa where he arrived on 28 May. He returned to England on 5 June.

expires at the end of the year, which would give time to Wavell to wind up his affairs and prepare himself for his new task.

2. Opinions out here point to Oliver Leese as being the best youngish fighting man for the East Asia front. Auchinleck could then become statutory Commander-in-Chief and Wavell would be provided for as above. This would be a good arrangement and probably the best in view. Pray consult Eden and Amery and let me have your views at earliest.

[Paras. 3 and 4, printed in Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, vol. IV (London, Cassell & Co. 1951), pp. 729–30, on forthcoming developments in North Africa, omitted.]

741

Sir J. Colville (Bombay) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

IMMEDIATE *29 May 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 19-C. Your private and personal telegram No. 1260-S.[1] Gandhi–Jinnah letter. Press generally unfavourable. *Times of India* considers Government decision may accentuate growing sense of frustration and deplores insistence on prestige as not calculated to solve deadlock but adds that remedy is in Gandhi's own hands. *Bombay Chronicle* condemns decision and blames Executive Councillors from whom however nothing better can be expected as they are constitutionally irresponsible. Same paper alleges decision due to Government fear that meeting would result in communal settlement and united front.

2. *Chronicle* view probably represents reactions of majority of Hindus, but Jinnah's statement[2] must have exploded any hope that Gandhi's letter might have led to communal rapprochement. Muslim opinion will be doubtless acceptable [*sic*] to Jinnah's views though the statement may have surprised some of his followers. Hindu Mahasabha generally pleased as they fear meeting might further Pakistan. Liberals and Independents critical. Though it is too early yet to say definitely indications are that decision while resulting in some hardening of feeling will not produce any sensational reactions.

[1] No. 735. [2] See No. 739, note 2.

742

Sir G. Cunningham (North-West Frontier Province) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

IMPORTANT *29 May 1943*

No. C.A.–40. Your Excellency's No. 1260–S,[1] May 26th. Gandhi's letter to Jinnah. First reaction was feeling of apprehension among Muslim Leaguers that Jinnah might resent stoppage of letter and order Muslim League Ministries to come out. Jinnah's statement published yesterday[2] has reassured them. Little interest has been taken otherwise.

[1] No. 735. [2] See No. 739, note 2.

743

Viscount Halifax to Mr Amery (via Foreign Office)

Telegram, L/P&S/12/2634: f 165

WASHINGTON, *29 May 1943, 10.16 am*
Received: 29 May, 5.40 pm

No. 2472. Following for Secretary of State for India.

The President told me two days ago that Phillips would not be returning to India unless and until something happened.

By this I understand him to mean until there were some signs of movement through the present deadlock.

Repeated to Viceroy, New Delhi No. 21.[1]

[1] MSS. EUR. F. 125/130 gives the number as 47228.

744

Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/92

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL BARNES COURT, SIMLA, *29 May 1943*

D.–o. No. 451

The Muslim League has done nothing sensational during the last month by way of bringing further pressure on the Punjab Ministry. But the "Pakistan" slogan is gaining momentum and there is a general feeling of uneasiness abroad. There

has been a considerable amount of discussion in the Press as to whether Jinnah was justified in suggesting that the Punjab Cabinet is a League Ministry. The Nawab of Mamdot (the Provincial Muslim League Leader) has sought to improve the occasion by a Press statement that the Sikander–Jinnah Pact[1] has come to an end, the implication being that more active interference by the Muslim League in Punjab politics is to be expected. As the Punjab Premier announced recently in Delhi that he adhered to the Sikander–Jinnah Pact, and this announcement drew no criticism from Jinnah, the justification for the Nawab's statement is not apparent. He gives out, I am told, that he wrote to the Press entirely on his own initiative, but it seems very doubtful whether this is the truth. The withholding of Gandhi's letter to Jinnah has not caused any great sensation in the Punjab, nor, in view of Jinnah's statement,[2] is this to be expected. Papers like the *Tribune* have naturally done their best to incite Jinnah to regard Government's action as an insult and a direct challenge; they must be disappointed by the results which have attended these manœuvres up to date. Shaukat, as Your Excellency will have seen, has just been declared successful in the Attock election. He won by a little over 3,000 votes, which coincides almost exactly with his anticipations. It is almost certain that there will be an election petition.

[1] See No. 592, note 1. [2] See No. 739, note 2.

745

Mr Stephenson to Mr Abell

MSS. EUR. F. 125/106

SECRET CAMP, *29 May 1943*

My dear Abell,

Please refer to the correspondence[1] resting with my letter dated the 24th May on the subject of Mrs. Pandit and Mrs. Gandhi. In my letter of the 7th May, I reported that His Excellency had decided to cancel the warrants of detention under D.I.R. 26 and substitute for them orders permitting Mrs. Pandit and her niece Mrs. Gandhi to live in Mrs. Pandit's house at Binsar in the Almora district to which they would be restricted under the D.I.R. The restriction orders merely provided that the two ladies should reside at Mrs. Pandit's house, should confine their movements to the house and grounds, and should not receive visitors except with the written permission of the Deputy Commissioner. I reported to you in that letter that the two ladies had, however, refused to accept the conditions of restriction as they considered that to abide by the restrictions will be contrary to the practice of the members of the Congress party.

Subsequently, however, the two ladies thought better of their decision when it was pointed out to them that no question of giving an undertaking arose since they would be subject to D.I.R. orders, and they were released on the 13th May and proceeded to Anand Bhavan where they began to make arrangements to open up a house in Almora. It was expected that they would go to Almora in about a week's time. In the meanwhile Mrs. Pandit wrote to Government asking whether she could be permitted to interview her husband detained in the Bareilly jail in order to fix up family finances to enable her to live in her house in Almora. This permission was given to her, and you probably saw mention of it in the papers.

Thereafter, however, it appears that both the ladies were got at, for on the 22nd May in an interview with the Commissioner Mrs. Pandit explained that she and her niece for reasons of party loyalty had decided that it would be impossible for them to comply with the terms of the Government orders. She incidentally also wrote to Government to thank them for the courtesy extended to her. Mrs. Gandhi in the meantime was suffering from fever and it appears that she is at the present time in the Kamla Nehru Hospital, Allahabad. She also wrote to the Commissioner expressing her regret that it was not possible for her to comply with the terms of the Government order.

Orders have therefore been passed that Mrs. Pandit should return to the Central Jail at Allahabad and Mrs. Gandhi will also return to that Jail when her health permits. In the meanwhile His Excellency is considering moving both these ladies to the Almora Jail.[2]

Yours sincerely,

H. S. STEPHENSON

[1] Not printed.

[2] On 18 June, Mr Stephenson wrote to Sir G. Laithwaite informing him that Sir M. Hallett had eventually decided to release both ladies unconditionally. MSS. EUR. F. 125/106.

746

Sir H. Lewis (Orissa) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

IMPORTANT *30 May 1943*

No. 112–S.G.C. Reference your telegram No. 1260[1] of May 26th. Decision to withhold Gandhi's letter has in general been well received. In particular it is welcome to all those sections which continue to give their support to Prime Minister and his anti-Congress Coalition Ministry.

[1] No. 735.

747

Mr Attlee to Mr Churchill (via Air Ministry and Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean)

Telegram, L/PO/8/9a: ff 5–6

IMMEDIATE *30 May 1943, 1.50 pm*

ALCOVE No. 430. For Prime Minister from Deputy Prime Minister.

Your PENCIL No. 417.[1]

I have spoken to Eden. Amery is away. I will see him to-morrow.

I thought Wavell looked tired, but it is not easy to judge in his case. Auchinleck would be good for C.-in-C. India.

I am doubtful about advisability of sending Wavell to Australia. As you know, Dominion Prime Ministers nowadays advise on appointments to post of Governor-General. I know that Curtin has a very high opinion of Gowrie and has leaned much on his support. I fear that the introduction into Australia of a general from active employment might cause difficulty with MacArthur. You will know the trouble we have had about our military mission. Wavell's position would of course be that of a figure-head but it might be thought that this was an attempt to infringe the American control in that sphere of operations. It would also in effect be a shelving of Wavell from active service in the war.

If you go on with this, I would advise that you should approach Curtin and intimate to Evatt that you are doing so and invite his support, rather than approach Evatt in the first instance.

I am glad you are taking a few more days in North Africa. Eden and I would like to know about any announcement as questions as to your whereabouts are likely to be put when the House meets on Tuesday.

[1] No. 740.

748

Sir B. Glancy (Punjab) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

IMMEDIATE *31 May 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 21–G. Your private and personal telegram No. 1260–S,[1] May 26th. Withholding of Gandhi's letter to Jinnah has aroused no unfavourable reactions in this Province apart from Congress-minded press which has tried unsuccessfully to stir Jinnah to take offensive. In certain quarters the action taken is welcomed as likely to deflate Jinnah.

[1] No. 735.

749

Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

IMPORTANT *31 May 1943*

No. G.–335. Your telegram No. 1260–S[1] dated 26th May. I have little to report except press reactions. *Pioneer* prior to Jinnah's statement[2] condemned decision and *Leader*, representing Sapru, indulged in personal attack on Your Excellency. Early report stated Khaliq Uzzaman was bitterly critical and felt that Jinnah was placed in awkward position. Later report shows that Jinnah's statement quietened the Muslim League critics. Not probable that the man in the street will worry over the position as he is tired of Gandhi and Jinnah. Government officers welcome decision as showing no (word omitted) to rebel party and welcome also Jinnah's sarcastic reply.

[1] No. 735. [2] See No. 739, note 2.

750

Sir A. Hope (Madras) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

IMMEDIATE *31 May 1943*

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL

No. 41–M. Your telegram No. 1260–S[1] of May 26th. Gandhi's letter to Jinnah.

Interest in the matter is as usual largely confined to leaders and letters in newspapers. No newspaper has supported refusal. Papers of Congress and semi-Congress views condemned refusal and said that it proved that Government did not wish to solve the deadlock or promote communal harmony. Muslim press outside this Province was at first reported as saying that refusal was an affront to Muslim League. Jinnah's statement[2] that letter was not the sort he meant and was designed to embroil him with Government has reduced Muslim press to silence and drawn fire of Congress press which now says that Jinnah is trying to get out of his statement at Delhi Conference and is not prepared for open breach with Government. Non-Congress press is defending Jinnah against Congress misrepresentations. Whole matter is now tending to develop into abuse and defence of Jinnah. Government's refusal to forward letter has receded into the background.

[1] No. 735. [2] See No. 739, note 2.

751

Mr Amery to Mr Churchill (via Air Ministry and Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean)

Telegram, L/PO/8/9a: ff 3–4

IMMEDIATE *31 May 1943, 4 pm*

ALCOVE No. 438. Following personal and most secret for Prime Minister from Secretary of State for India. Your Pencil 417.[1] I hope you will still give careful consideration to the desirability of having a single Supreme Commander separate from Commander-in-Chief India for the preparation as well as the execution of the South East Asia Campaign. For one thing it will I fancy be much easier to induce Americans, Chinese and later on Dutch to fit in under a single command on the Eisenhower or MacArthur model than under a trinity of separate service chiefs of less seniority. For another it would be much easier both from the service and the political point of view for the C-in-C India, and for the Government of India, to accept operational instructions or agree to have them sent direct to his subordinates from a senior supreme chief.

2. Moreover I doubt very much if the system of a co-equal trinity is really the best for working purposes in the terrestrial sphere. It may have ended by working well between Alamein and Tripoli after some two years shaking down and where geographical conditions left little room for divergent policies within the trinity, but it seems to me that possibilities of differences in the conditions of the South East Asia campaign may be much greater. However that is a personal opinion on a point on which you can get better guidance from C.I.G.S. Appointment of a supreme chief would not of course exclude appointment of a young and vigorous commander in immediate control of training and operations of the whole army side of the South East Asia campaign. You mention Leese but you may also I imagine be considering Giffard whose appointment as G.O.C. Eastern Army in India *vice* Irwin has been recommended by C-in-C India, and is already acting as such but not confirmed pending elucidation of future arrangements.

3. While no very big combined operations are likely till after Monsoon of 1944 much preparation will be involved and Supreme C-in-C should be free leaving training and operational command of troops to his subordinates to visit U.K. or Washington to press on the many requirements which cannot be provided from India. The emphasis during the next year will be on preparation rather than on higher strategy.

4. For all these purposes I should have thought Wavell with his world wide reputation, local knowledge and general planning ability might still be the

best man for the Supreme Command at any rate in order to get it agreed and to get it going. If during the next year your doubts as to his driving power are confirmed you may have available to replace him someone who by then will have made a world reputation on European battlefields. If however you are really convinced that he is a spent force I would still urge finding a Supreme Commander South East operations now separate from C-in-C India. Would Mountbatten fill the bill of what in its later stages will be largely an amphibious and air transport campaign?

5. As regards C-in-C India I am myself very glad you are thinking of re-instating Auchinleck who has had a good rest and who should be really good value both in perfecting the organisation and sustaining the morale of the Indian Army and as a colleague to the new Viceroy.

[1] No. 740.

752

Mr Amery to Mr Churchill (via Air Ministry and Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean)

Telegram, L/PO/6/102b: f 73

IMPORTANT *1 June 1943, 1.50 pm*

ALCOVE No. 450. Following for Prime Minister from Secretary of State for India.

There has been hardly any adverse comment here on decision to withhold Gandhi's letter and not much interest in U.S.A. The notification of the fact that the Gandhi telephone is disconnected seems to have served its purpose. As for Jinnah he has now said publicly[1] that letter was only move to embroil Moslem League with Government. He has also made it clear that before he can do business with Gandhi latter must abandon revolutionary policy and programme culminating in resolution of last August, as well as accept Pakistan.

[1] See No. 739, note 2.

753

Sir T. Rutherford (Bihar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

IMPORTANT *1 June 1943*

No. 42. Your telegram No. 1260–S.[1] Gandhi's letter to Jinnah. Reactions in this Province have been unexpectedly mild, and apart from comments in Press

[1] No. 735.

the incident has (group omitted) little interest. Congress paper *Searchlight* of course condemned Government but concentrated more on asking how Jinnah would respond to such a challenge. Gossip writer in Darbhanga's paper at first described Government's action as ill-advised and unjustified but later admitted that with the appearance of Jinnah's statement[2] the "Political Ripple had subsided". Before Jinnah had declared himself, Ismail of the Provincial Muslim League rashly committed himself to pronouncements that Government had blundered and their decision would cause irritation in the country. He has doubtless repented of this since, and there has been no further indication of Muslim reactions.

[2] See No. 739, note 2.

754

Sir A. Clow (Assam) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

1 June 1943

No. 259–C. Your telegram No. 1260–S[1] of 26th May. Gandhi's letter has evoked no noticeable reaction. Even if public opinion were not completely absorbed by food prices Jinnah's comment[2] would have deflated critics.

[1] No. 735. [2] See No. 739, note 2.

755

The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *1 June 1943*

PRIVATE AND SECRET

Many thanks for your letter of 12th/14th May[1] which has just arrived and which covers a number of interesting topics.

2. First of all for a word about our position here. The Gandhi–Jinnah business has gone off very well indeed. It is clear that as things stand, by adopting your technique and that of the Cabinet we are in a better position than we should have been had we followed my original proposals, for we remain intact on the principle of keeping Gandhi shut off from the world, while, thanks to the statesmanlike and courageous attitude which Jinnah has adopted, we find ourselves in the position which I hoped we would have attained by the procedure which I had orginally recommended. In holding that on balance it would pay us to send the letter in order, first, to let them run their heads together, and secondly, to show the world that there was no sign of any real move on Gandhi's

part, I undervalued Jinnah's skill. So far as advertisement goes Jinnah has had bigger and better advertisement as things have worked out than he could have obtained had we sent the letter. I was myself more concerned about House of Commons reactions than about possible reactions here, and when I found that the Cabinet was set, and apparently happy about Parliament and the U.S.A., I did not come back a second time as I should have had I regarded the point as vital. But that is now all over. Meanwhile the fact that Jinnah has wholly associated himself in his public statement[2] on Gandhi's letter with the principle that there can be no communication with Gandhi so long as the Mahatma does not call off the policy of August last is a very valuable advance; and valuable, too, from another point of view since it puts us on perfectly firm ground as regards the content of Gandhi's letter to Jinnah. Whatever Gandhi may have meant by his sibylline utterances in that letter about a change of heart, if those utterances were to be read as referring to Pakistan, one thing that is perfectly clear from his letter (particularly in view of his letter to Samuel which followed it)[3] is that he has not made any move whatever from the political position which he adopted last year and as a result of which he has been in confinement since August last.

3. The first disposition of the Muslim Press and of Muslim politicians was to take a serious view of our action in withholding Gandhi's letter. Nazimuddin, who had been up here to see me on Bengal's problems, and to discuss certain aspects of those problems with the departments, was so unwise apparently as to let the press know that we had in his opinion committed a fatal blunder, and that all the Muslim League Ministries might now have to support Jinnah even to the extent of resignation, and this attitude on the part of so important a Muslim Prime Minister was very disturbing to certain of my colleagues. The Hindu Press, on the other hand, while annoyed that Gandhi had been refused his opportunity to communicate with Jinnah, were full of hope that Jinnah would take up the challenge which had, they suggested, been thrown down by Government. Both parties were in the outcome disappointed. *Dawn* found itself obliged to make a somewhat exhausting *volte-face* and to come out in support of Jinnah and in criticism of the Hindu nationalist press which suggested that the Qaid-e-Azam had been caught out by us and that he was obliged to acquiesce in our refusal to forward Gandhi's communication to him. The *Hindustan Times* and the nationalist press were furious, and divided their abuse between Jinnah, His Majesty's Government and myself. Jinnah will have a roughish passage I suspect for a few days yet: but he is in complete control o his own side, and I would anticipate (and the Governors' reports of which I send you copies by this bag, of reactions to our decision, confirm this) that everything will settle down quietly before very long.

[1] No. 701. [2] See No. 739, note 2. [3] No. 710.

4. I am bound to say that while I have little personal affection for Jinnah and while as a politician I think he can on occasion be disastrous, he has, in my judgment, on this occasion shown statesmanship and balance, and emerges as a much bigger man than one would have been prepared to anticipate.

* * *

6. I have telegraphed to you at some length on this business of command in connection with the Japanese operations,[4] and I hope that what I have said may be of some use to you in your discussions. There is nothing I think that I need add here. My own judgment is that so far as India and the training and improvement of the morale of the Indian Army is concerned, Auchinleck is much the best man we can get. I do not regard him as probably as wise or as experienced in the political field as Wavell, or as Chetwode may have been in the past—his excellent qualities are primarily the qualities of the fighting soldier, and a soldier's general. But the Governor-General ought to be able to keep him on the right lines in Council when political issues come up, and his fighting qualities are those that we stand most in need of at this moment. I fully appreciate the difficulty we may have in working the triumvirate if it is set up, and the numerous possibilities for friction that its co-existence with the Commander-in-Chief in India and his staffs provides. But on the whole I think the risks can be taken if His Majesty's Government decide, after a review of the position, that something of that nature is the right answer. In recommending it in substitution for my own original proposal, I was very greatly influenced, I need not say, by my strong feeling first that we cannot afford to have a third American Commander-in-Chief in addition to Eisenhower and MacArthur;[5] secondly, that for political and international reasons, and because of the problems that will arise at the peace table, it is of the first importance that this show should, at any rate so far as Burma, Malaya and probably the Dutch East Indies are concerned, be primarily British, and not an American show. And I quite realise the relevance and the importance of the point you take as regards an American A.O.C.-in-C. In that connection I do not for a moment overlook the criticisms that can be levelled at the rather revolutionary suggestion which I put to you as regards the position of the Air Force and A.O.C. in this country, or the difficulties that may be experienced (and that may possibly even prove to be insuperable) in giving effect to it. But my instinct is that this, or something like it, is the right answer, and I shall look forward with profound interest to your reaction to my suggestion.

7. We are hard at it over the problem of inflation and connected issues such as standard cloth. After considerable tussling in Council I managed last week to get them to agree that we must apply control to the cotton industry (a view, as you may imagine, actively contested by Srivastava); and I hope very much that with that behind us Hydari, who has gone to negotiate at Bombay this week-

end over standard cloth, will be able to bring back satisfactory results. On the whole business of inflation, the silver problem, the relation of all these matters to the possibility of using India as a base for operations in the East and the like, I have sent you a long and I think a very well expressed telegram[6] prepared for me by Raisman and his advisers. I feel myself that the case made in it is a very telling one; and I am sure that I can look for your support and sympathy.

8. I have been very glad to get Halifax's telegram[7] suggesting that Phillips is not likely to return. I am telegraphing[8] to you to say how much I welcome the possibility, because, though I like Phillips personally very much indeed, I think it of great political importance that he should in fact *not* return since the inference will at once (and correctly) be drawn that the second attempt at interference by the Americans in Indian politics (Colonel Johnson's having been the first) has failed, and that there is nothing doing from that side of the Atlantic. That is all

[4] In telegram 557 of 27 May (referring to the telegram mentioned in No. 665, note 1) Mr Amery had again raised the subject of the S.E. Asia command structure which was shortly to be discussed at home. He suggested that there were four possible set-ups for the S.E. Asian command: in descending order of preference, (i) a single supreme command over all Allied forces, (ii) a single British supreme command leaving the Americans and Chinese to act in independent co-ordination, (iii) a triumvirate of the three services, each service under a single C.-in-C., and (iv) a triumvirate of the three British services with such co-ordination as might be achieved with the Allies. A criticism of (i), which also affected (iii), was that, assuming the Supreme Commander would be British, it might be difficult to resist an American demand for an American A.O.C.-in-C. over all forces or at least for an American A.O.C.-in-C. of equal status with the British A.O.C.-in-C. Mr Churchill apparently favoured some sort of triumvirate. Mr Amery went on to discuss how the issue of orders by the S.E. Asian war directorate (whether military or trinitarian) could best be reconciled with the C.-in-C., India's constitutional responsibility for all H.M. forces in India, especially with regard to the Air Ministry's wish for the A.O.C., S.E. Asia, to exercise independent control over a substantial part of the air forces in India (see No. 734, para. 4). Lord Linlithgow replied in telegram 1298–S of 31 May that though he had previously favoured a single command for S.E. Asia, he had now changed his mind. While he was 'anxious to fit in with U.S.A. as much and as smoothly as possible', he assumed 'that this campaign will be primarily a British effort, whether by land, sea or air'. He regarded it as 'extremely important that it should be so since otherwise we may have to face very awkward political and international repercussions over Burma, Malaya and possibly the Netherlands East Indies at the peace discussions if the Americans are the senior partner. Taking that consideration into account together with criticism . . . [of set-up (i) noted by Mr Amery] . . . I would now myself definitely prefer' a triumvirate as in Mr Amery's set-up (iv). The triumvirate would work under 'a Minister of State who in the early stages should be the Viceroy' and who had the authority of the Cabinet. Lord Linlithgow went on to discuss the tasks of the triumvirate and its relation to the C.-in-C., India, envisaging that it would be independent of but not in a position to issue orders to the latter. He suggested that the A.O.C.-in-C., India should be the Air Member of the triumvirate and that he should be independent of the C.-in-C., India, not only in his capacity as a triumvir, but also as regards India. L/WS/1/1274: ff 129–34, 154–6.

[5] In telegram 603 of 9 June 1943 Mr Amery telegraphed: 'your letter of June 1st just received makes me think that your objections to a single Supreme Commander South-East Asia may have been based on the idea that he might be an American. That has never been contemplated but at most possibility of American deputy Commander if Americans come in under the scheme.' Lord Linlithgow replied in telegram 165–S.C. of 12 June: 'I can assure you your supposition is without foundation.' L/WS/1/1274: ff 180, 182.

[6] No. 736. [7] No. 743. [8] No. 756.

the more important as there can be no question but that the decision will be related to Winston's recent visit to the United States and to the fact that he saw Phillips during it.

9. Now for a word on points arising out of your letter of the 12th. The new Council is settling in well. Khare has so far been clear and stout-hearted. A. K. Roy does not join till next week, but I have good hopes of him. Azizul Haque I find discursive and slightly volatile: but he is obviously an extremely pleasant person to work with, and I shall do my best to prevent him from trying to do his Department's work as well as his own. He has so heavy a portfolio that the wise course for him is beyond any question to lie back, keep out of detail and content himself with handling the policy and grasping the major questions. I propose to let the question of representation at the War Cabinet lie for the moment. You know my own view as to the undesirability of allowing Mudaliar (or anyone else) to claim to double representation in London with active membership of my Council here, and I shall try to get my Council when the time comes to adopt the proposition that all that is needed is *ad hoc* representation when a particular situation arises. The Jam Saheb has not said anything more to me about his return to England beyond indicating that he is ready to go if that is thought necessary. Here again I do not propose to rush things.

10. I have read what you say in paragraph 4 of your letter about Wendell Willkie: but you may take it from me that in no circumstances will I be prepared to send an invitation to him or to encourage any other American public man to come here! We have nothing to gain from such visits, and in practice we almost invariably lose something. After my experience first with Johnson, then in a very different way with Phillips, and with these various publicists such as Louis Fisher [Fischer] whom we have been begged to assist, I have not the least intention of burning my fingers again if I can help it, and I do not believe that any kind words which we might conceivably get from a passing American are likely to be of such importance as to offset the almost certain bad effects and embarrassments which a visit would cause.

11. As for paragraph 7 of your letter, I could not help smiling as I read Winston's proposition for separating the Commander-in-Chief from the Defence Membership and giving the latter portfolio to the Viceroy! Of course he has so much in his mind that details of a position such as this cannot possibly be present to him. But apart from any misunderstanding on that point, you are of course entirely right in your feeling that there are limits to what the Viceroy can take on. I think that I and my successor can manage the Minister of State business, at any rate in the earlier stages, and of course it would always be possible for us to preside over a special Defence Committee. But that is not quite the same as what Winston had in mind.

12. I am glad that you have put in the memorandum which you mention in paragraph 8. I have just had your telegram about a cost of living increase for the Army. The point is already being examined here as you know, and I am sending your telegram to the departments with my full support. I am not easy myself as to the quality of the recruits that we are now getting in, and I find myself asking occasionally whether we are really wise to go on recruiting at this rate when the material is not what it was and when the problem of officering, particularly of finding E.C.Os., is so serious.

13. Many thanks for what you say in paragraph 11 about European Dewans.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/25

PRIVATE AND PERSONAL *2 June 1943*

No. 1311–S. Halifax's telegram of 29th May, No. 47228.[1] Phillips. I shall not be sorry if he decides to stay at home, for while I like him very much personally, and he has done his best to avoid causing embarrassment, I am pretty clear in the light of experience with him and with Johnson (a very different and much more difficult type) that the dangers of having a personal representative of the President in India greatly outweigh any possible advantages, and that all that is needed is a career diplomat of no higher rank or wider experience than T. M. Wilson. And, awkward as the presence of a personal representative on the Phillips level may be for us, his own position is ambiguous to a degree that I would judge unlikely to make the post palatable for long to a man of high standing. I much hope therefore that events may result in its being allowed to lapse.

Repeated to Ambassador, Washington.

[1] No. 743.

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Sir H. Twynam (Central Provinces and Berar) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

IMPORTANT *2 June 1943*

Your Excellency's private and personal telegram No. 1260–S,[1] dated May 26th:

Begins. Reactions to withholding of Gandhi's letter. Local press, preponderantly Congress or nationalist in tone, generally strongly disapproved

[1] No. 735.

withholding of letter. Jubilation was expressed at Gandhi being able to "defeat Government from behind bars" and appeals were made to Jinnah to co-operate for this purpose. Jinnah's statement[2] completely changed this tone and resulted in chorus of vituperation switching from Government to Jinnah.

Individual reactions were not marked but were generally disapproving. Consistency and logic are not accepted as a justification for Government's action; another illustration of Government's unwillingness to end the impasse or part with power. The Hindu Mahasabha is probably relieved that Gandhi has not been able to compromise the Hindu position further and thinks that Hindus without material loss have scored point over Jinnah. *Ends.*

[2] See No. 739, note 2.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

PRIVATE AND SECRET INDIA OFFICE, *2 June 1943*

It looks as if we had come very well out of the Gandhi–Jinnah correspondence. I confess I admire the skill with which Jinnah has taken advantage of your deflation of Gandhi over this business by deflating him one further, while at the same time adroitly saving his own face by making it clear that the only letter which would have satisfied him, and which he dared you not to forward, was one abandoning the whole Congress policy (i.e. to that extent making his condition identical with yours) and also accepting Pakistan. Over here and in America the reaction seems to have been almost negligible. The fact is that Gandhi has for the time being ceased to be news; indeed, someone said to me the other day that he can now only get back into the news by dying. Such agitation as there has been in the Hindu press will, I imagine, die down, and I don't suppose anyone will now press, for some little time at any rate, for the Gandhi telephone to be reconnected.

2. Your trip to the Eastern front[1] seems to have been most useful, both in cheering the troops and as guidance to yourself. What you felt about Irwin has obviously been confirmed by his subsequent supersession by Giffard, though the actual confirmation of that is still waiting for the settlement of the issue of the military command.

3. On that subject we have been busy exchanging telegrams[2] while I have also been in telegraphic correspondence with Winston in North Africa. I won't go over that ground again, for the whole matter will I trust have been settled before this reaches you. But, as I have explained in my telegrams I feel that a single Commander is the only right way of securing effective strategy. A trio

will always compromise and compromise strategy is inherently weak. A Minister of State can settle on his own many political issues and can help sometimes to secure a compromise between Service chiefs; but he is not really qualified to dictate strategy, which is what is wanted. Again, it is only a single chief who can come home and press upon the Cabinet and departments what he wants by way of provision for all three Services in accordance with the priorities of his own strategy. Three Service chiefs, if they could get away, would each be trying to get the maximum for himself for his own strategy.

4. My own advice[3] to Winston, which, however, he may not be willing to accept, is to make Wavell the Supreme Commander at any rate for the present preparatory stage, which may last over most of 1944. If by the middle of 1944 he feels that Wavell is tired, he may have at his disposal more than one commander who may have made a great reputation on European battlefields. My own suggestion in that connection would be Mountbatten, for the more I think of the Eastern campaign, the more I feel it is going to depend mainly on sea and air transport and on relatively small bodies, mainly of infantry, supplied by air or sea, and not by road or rail. In that connection, I may say that I agree heartily with what you say about infantry, which certainly is the deciding weapon almost everywhere, but above all in the kind of country we shall be dealing with.

5. I need not tell you that I share fully your anxieties about inflation and about the impossibility of asking too much of India simultaneously as a base and as a source of supply. The sooner Indian armies can be moved out of India into the new theatre of operations the better from that point of view. Once we can get the Mediterranean clear it may also be possible to send more supplies from other sources to relieve the demand upon India, or, alternatively, to supply customer goods to ease the inflation. Meanwhile I hope Strakosch and Phillips between them may get real help from America over silver.

[1] Paras. 8–13 of No. 699, on Lord Linlithgow's visit to the Eastern Front, omitted.

[2] See No. 755, note 4. Mr Amery had continued the debate in telegram 575 of 1 June the substance of which is summarised above except that it added (in para. 5) that 'as regards the effect on possible Allied meddling in Burma or Malaya at the peace discussions, I should have thought that a single command under a Supreme Commander would minimise that at any rate if set-up (i) is secured'. Lord Linlithgow replied in telegram 1346–S of 6 June that he saw the strategic advantage of a single command but that the point at issue was 'not the theoretical one but rather which arrangement will work best in the circumstances' and he did not regard the practical difficulties of a triumvirate as in any way insuperable. He did not contemplate any Minister of State overriding a service chief in technical matters or strategy and realized that he would deal largely with questions outside the military field, but felt there was 'a decisive case for a Minister of State to operate in respect of this Eastern campaign.' He felt that the triumvirs could go home to press for their requirements though he admitted that the ability of a Supreme Commander to decide priorities would be lost. He did not accept Mr Amery's para. 5: 'a non-British Commander-in-Chief would in my judgment be a source of real danger.' L/WS/1/1274: ff 161–2, 167.

[3] See No. 751.

6. In spite of the difficulties of that problem, I have still felt it necessary to urge you to consider the question whether the Indian soldier's pay is sufficient, looking to the effect on morale produced by letters about dearness from home. I imagine there are serious administrative difficulties about family allowances for soldiers, but they would certainly to some extent diminish the inflationary effect as compared with a general increase of pay—that is so far as troops stationed in India are concerned. In that connection I must say that I should have thought that there was at any rate a case for bringing up the pay of troops stationed in Assam and Chittagong to the level of that paid to troops in the much pleasanter conditions of Persia or Egypt.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

Telegram, MSS. EUR. F. 125/25

PERSONAL NEW DELHI, *3 June 1943, 10.5 pm*
Received: 4 June, 11 am

No. 1328–S. Following reply has been received by Home Department from Gandhi, to Home Department letter[1] informing him of our decision about his letter to Jinnah:—

Begins. Detention Camp, 27th May 1943. Dear Sir Richard Tottenham, I received last evening your letter of the 24th instant refusing my request to forward my letter[2] addressed to Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah. I wrote only yesterday to the Superintendent of this camp asking him kindly to enquire whether my letter to Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah, and later, one dated the 15th instant,[3] to Right Honourable Lord Samuel had been forwarded to the respective addressees.

I am sorry for the Government's decision. For, my letter to the Quaid-e-Azam was sent in reply to his public invitation to me to write to him, and I was especially encouraged to do so because his language had led me to think that if I wrote to him, my letter would be forwarded to him. The public too are anxious that the Quaid-e-Azam and I should meet or at least establish contact. I have always been anxious to meet the Quaid-e-Azam, if perchance we could devise some solution of the communal tangle which might be generally acceptable. Therefore the disability in the present instance is much more that of the public than mine. As a Satyagrahi I may not regard as disabilities the restrictions which the Government have imposed upon me. As the Government are aware,[4] I have denied myself even the pleasure of writing to my relatives as I am not allowed to perform the service of writing to my co-workers who are in a sense more to me than my relatives.

The advance copy of the contemplated communiqué[5] with which you have considerately favoured me requires emendation in more places than one. For, as it stands, it does not square with facts.

As to the disavowal referred to in the proposed communiqué, the Government are aware that I regard the non-violent mass movement, for the launching of which the Congress gave me authority on the 8th of August last, as perfectly legitimate and in the interest both of the Government and the public. As it is, the Government left me no time to start the movement. Therefore how could a movement, which was never started, embarrass "India's" war effort? If then, there was any embarrassment by reason of the popular resentment of the Government's action in resorting to the wholesale arrests of principal Congressmen, the responsibility was solely that of the Government. The mass movement, as the resolution sanctioning it said in so many words, was sanctioned in order to promote India-wide effort on behalf of the Allied cause, including the causes of Russia and China, whose danger was very great in August last and from which, in my opinion, they are by no means free even now. I hope the Government will not feel offended when I say that all the war effort that is being put forth in India is not India's but the alien Government's. I submit that if the Government had complied with the request of the Congress as embodied in its August resolution, there would have been a mass effort without parallel, for winning the battle for human freedom and ridding the world of the menace that Fascism, Nazism, Japanism and Imperialism are. I may be wholly wrong; anyway this is my deliberate and honest opinion.

In order to make the communiqué accord with facts, I suggest the following alteration in the first paragraph: After "Mr. Jinnah", add "in response to his public invitation to Mr. Gandhi to write to him, stating that he (Mr. Gandhi) would be willing to correspond with or meet him according as he wished".

I hope that the remaining portion of the communiqué too will be suitably amended in the light of my submission. I am Yours sincerely, M. K. Gandhi. *Ends.*

2. Acknowledgment is being sent informing him that his letter has been received and considered, and that Government sees no reason to modify their communiqué already published.[6] Copies will be sent to you officially by fast air mail by Home Department.

[1] L/P&J/8/517: f 34. [2] No. 692. [3] No. 710. [4] See Vol. II, No. 638.

[5] See No. 729.

[6] In a letter of 28 May to Sir Richard Tottenham, Mr Gandhi said that he had handed his letter to the Superintendent at about one o'clock on 27 May, having hurried its writing and despatch in the hope that it might arrive before publication of the communiqué. He was therefore 'astonished and grieved' to find the communiqué and Reuter's report of reactions in London in the papers received in the afternoon. 'Evidently there was no meaning' in an advance copy being sent him. He regarded the communiqué 'not only to be inconsistent with facts, but unfair' to himself. He therefore

[*Note 6 cont. overleaf*

[*Note 6 to No. 759 cont.*]
requested publication of his correspondence with the Home Department about it as 'the only way partial redress' could be given to him. In reply, in a letter of 7 June, Mr Conran-Smith told Mr Gandhi that the advance copy of the communiqué was furnished to him for his personal information and that 'Government regret they see no reason to publish the correspondence'. L/P&J/8/517; also *Correspondence with Mr Gandhi August 1942–April 1944* (New Delhi, Government of India Press, 1944), pp. 15–16.

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Sir M. Hallett (United Provinces) to the Marquess of Linlithgow

MSS. EUR. F. 125/111

SECRET *3 June 1943*

No. U.P.–194.

My dear Lord Linlithgow,

Some information has come to my knowledge which I think it desirable to pass on to you in continuation of my telegram No. G/335[1] of May 31st about reactions to the withholding of Gandhi's letter to Jinnah. I had also referred to the position in my last fortnightly.[2]

2. The report that Chaudhri Khaliq-uz-zaman was bitterly critical was obviously wrong, for Mudie has recently had an interview with the Chaudhri and has sent me the following note:—

"We first talked about the withholding by the Government of India of the letter of Mr. Gandhi to Mr. Jinnah and Mr. Jinnah's statement.[3] I asked Khaliq-uz-zaman whether the latter surprised him. He said not. That the League was not to be embroiled with the British Government was the agreement at the discussions at the last meeting of the Working Committee. He did not think that Jinnah would ever come to an agreement with the Congress to which the British Government were not also a party. Khaliq did not agree with the attitude taken up by Lari in an article in the *Leader*."

3. A somewhat similar report comes from my C.I.D. who tell me that though Muslim League supporters at first feared that this was an affront to their leader, they were cautioned by the Chaudhri Sahib to reserve opinion pending Jinnah's reception of the Government action. The report goes on:—

"In an interview with a friend today he (Ch. Khaliq-uz-zaman) expressed his joy at Mr. Jinnah's reply which he said was welcomed by the League. With Muslim League Ministries now in several Provinces the League felt itself in a strong position. He considered that their relations with the British Government were good and response over the Pakistan issue was encouraging. This being so it was most undesirable at this juncture to enter into conflict with the British Government particularly over an issue of gain to the Congress, when Mr. Gandhi's letter was itself so vague and inconsequential."

4. There is little doubt in my view that these two corroborative reports represent the correct state of affairs. Jinnah and the League are obviously happy over securing the Muslim League Ministries and do not want to fall out with Government. After all Jinnah did regard Gandhi's fast as an attack [more?] on the Muslims than on Government and his recent statement shows that he still hates him.

5. I think it right to include a further extract from Mudie's note of this interview:—

"He said that one thing that rankled with Jinnah and was apt now and again to make him bitter was the exclusion of the League from the Central administration when there were a certain number of League Ministries in the Provinces. I gathered that the present Muslim members of the Viceroy's Council would probably be acceptable as League representatives except Sir Sultan Ahmed. The Viceroy's telegram to condole Sir Sikander's death apparently still rankles and Jinnah appears to think that the Viceroy will not send for him before he goes which also rather rankles. Khaliq thought something might be done if the new Viceroy, when he arrives, sends for Jinnah as the representative of the party which controls a number of provincial administrations."

There is probably also a good deal of truth in this; Jinnah like all Indians is all out for prestige. It will enhance his position as against Gandhi.

6. The final paragraph of Mudie's note is also interesting. It is as follows:—

"Khaliq then talked about the anti-League propaganda which is going on in America. He has spoken about this to Mr. Mathews, American journalist, who was recently in Lucknow and had mentioned the matter to me before. There is still, I gather, danger that the League might express their resentment about this propaganda openly. Khaliq also told me that he had intended to go to London about next April."

I do not know much about anti-League propaganda in the U.S.A. I should have thought that it was more pro-Congress propaganda. Twynam in a recent letter referred to a very misleading article of an American journalist (I think Fischer) and I saw a recent article by Mrs. Gunther which was very bad.

Yours sincerely,

M. G. HALLETT

[1] No. 749. [2] Not printed. [3] See No. 739, note 2.

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Mr Churchill to Mr Curtin

Telegram, R/30/1/3: f 66

MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL *4 June 1943, 1.45 pm*

WINCH No. 10. I contemplate dividing the Indian Command into—

(*a*) the East Asia front against Japan and
(*b*) the statutory Commander-in-Chiefship of India.

For the first I am choosing a young General with the latest experience and for the second a man is needed like Auchinleck with profound knowledge of the Indian Army. Wavell therefore might become spare and I wonder whether in these circumstances, you would care to consider him as successor to Gowrie. I have not of course mentioned the matter to Wavell but I should be obliged if you would let me know your views.[1]

[1] In the event, the Prime Minister of Australia recommended that Lord Gowrie's term of office as Governor-General should be extended.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

THE VICEROY'S HOUSE, NEW DELHI, *6 June 1943*

PRIVATE AND SECRET

I have no letter from you to answer, and there is nothing of very great importance happening at the moment. But I propose to move up to Simla tonight, for two or three weeks if all goes well, and take the opportunity to dictate a few words to you before leaving Delhi. We have had a rather exhausting couple of months since the hot weather began, with very high temperatures here, and a certain amount of dust, and I look forward to getting a breather in the hills. Most of my Council are going up about the same time, and I have been encouraging the Government of India to try to send Secretaries and members of the Secretariat staff up to the hills at any rate for a month or so during the summer in the interests of trying to maintain or improve their reserves, for the strain is beginning to tell, and we are a long way yet from the end.

2. I send you by this bag copies of the latest correspondence between the Mahatma and the Home Department[1] (copies will go forward to the India

Office in the usual way). The old man is a tenacious controversialist; but so far he has got no change out of us, though of course in dealing with him one always has to bear in mind the possibility that he may, in his irritation, take some foolish step. But we must take our chance on that and deal with the situation if it arises. Hindu indignation with Jinnah is greater than ever. Jinnah himself is well pleased, so far as one can judge, and there is no question that he has sent his stock up still higher.

3. I repeated to you a telegram[2] I had had from Rutherford about the suggestions of a possible Ministry in Bihar, and I send you by this bag copy of a letter[3] I have had from him and of a telegram[4] I have sent him. I think he would probably have been wiser to have let me know at once the moment these overtures started to be made; but I am entirely content with his handling of the business, and quite prepared to accept that if he did not give me any earlier warning it was because he (rightly) judged that nothing much was likely to come out of it all, and because he was confident of his own capacity to deal with the situation. Yunus has clearly behaved with extreme indiscretion: for he even got so far as to discuss with the press the salaries of the Chief Minister and the various Ministers! But since Rutherford spoke to him there has been complete silence from Bihar. I would not myself put the chances of any arrangement there high, but we must of course be ready to accept a Ministry if and when we are satisfied that one is available with a stable majority behind it. There are a great many rumblings in the Central Provinces of the same type. But where Khare failed to get a Ministry together I do not believe that Dr. Kedar is going to succeed; and both here and in Bihar the question of the price to be paid to the Muslim League for their support in a coalition ministry is not unnaturally exercising Hindu elements given the relatively very small Muslim population in either Province. There are rumours that something may be happening in Bombay, but I do not believe they represent anything more than wishful thinking. I think we shall probably not be far wrong in ascribing these mild signs of activity, unfruitful as they are likely to be in the event, to the confidence given to the moderate elements and the Muslim League by the Gandhi–Jinnah correspondence, and the fact that Jinnah is now solidly aligned with Government on the policy of requiring a recantation from the Mahatma before any business can be done.

[Para. 4, on Lady Herbert's passage home, omitted.]

5. Much to my relief we have, as you will have heard, got an agreement with the millowners about standard cloth. I think it reflects much credit on Hydari, by whom the negotiation was handled, and I hope to see him today, on his return from Bombay, to get the full background of the discussions.

1 See No. 759. 2, 3 and 4 MSS. EUR. F. 125/50.

6. What is bothering me principally at the moment is the food position, which has again taken a turn for the worse. We have had lengthy discussions in Council, and in the result have decided that the wise course will be to break away from the basic plan which we recently introduced, and to revert to a policy very broadly speaking of free trade, the Punjab and North-Western India being, however, segregated in a free trade zone of its own. Whether this is the right or the final answer it is impossible to say. It is about as difficult to judge how to handle food in a country like this as it is to deal with a currency crisis. All I feel is that we must go on trying, and if experience shows that one course of action is not on the whole likely to give us the results that we had hoped for we must be prepared to experiment on another which may hold out a better prospect. One difficulty here, apart from the circumstances peculiar to India, is the lack not only of experience but of enough men of sufficient quality to handle the situation.

All luck.

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Mr Amery to Mr Churchill

L/PO/8/9a: ff 96–8

INDIA OFFICE, *8 June 1943*

My dear Winston,

Forgive me if I inflict yet another letter on you over this anxious business of the Viceroyalty. But I do want to impress on you the very special difficulties of the task which a new Viceroy will have to handle.

He will not go out, as in old days, to preside over a small Council of seasoned and trustworthy British administrators whose guidance he could be content to follow till he had himself learned his job. The whole situation in India to-day depends on the Viceroy's ability from the outset to manage and impose his personality upon a Council composed mainly of Indians, men of individual ability and goodwill, but easily rattled or turned sour by hesitant or clumsy handling. They are like the Indian elephant who, with a good mahout, will face a charging tiger; if the mahout is stupid, or loses his nerve for a second, nothing can stop the beast stampeding in terror. And in this case a stampede may wreck the whole fabric of government in India.

Linlithgow has handled his elephant with great skill on the whole, thanks to his long experience and shrewdness—he is rather like a wise old elephant himself. A new man must have either outstanding personality, wide general political experience and sensitive hands, even if he hasn't special Indian experience, or

he must have that special knowledge of Indian affairs and of Indians which will enable him to take up the reins—I should say the Mahout's spike—with confidence and from the word "go".

In the first category there is only Anthony. He would go out with general approval here, in America, and in India. Add to that start the easy, sincere and ready manner which has made him so good a leader in the House, and his wide experience of Cabinets and offices, not to speak of some background of Oriental studies; he could, I believe, take effective command at the start, keep his team together and even inspire them to see things through with him unflinchingly out of personal loyalty as well as out of persuasion. In that case he might well change the whole Indian atmosphere and make possible the only solution which does not mean chaos in India and the danger of a new world war, that is to say a stable Indian system of government within the Commonwealth.

I fully realise the objections from your point of view to letting him go. So far as his own interests are concerned he obviously runs the risk of failing in what may be an impossible task or one revealing some unsuspected weakness in him. On the other hand he may also come back, with twenty years and more of active political life here before him, a much bigger man than he could become staying at home. I still feel very strongly that, difficult as the choice must be for you, it would be right to send him.

Oliver is, I fear, not in that category. I have known him from boyhood and like him. He has got good practical ability and the manner that goes down with business men here and across the Atlantic—but not with Indians. He has no general political experience, no gift of public speech or even of clear exposition across the table. His Indian colleagues will be only too quick to realise his general inexperience, quite apart from his ignorance of Indian affairs. Nor would I feel certain myself that he might not through inexperience jump to hasty conclusions.

If we cannot have personality and general experience we must fall back on more direct knowledge of India. In that category I still feel, in spite of all your misgivings, that Sam Hoare has not only the knowledge but also courage and, in his own way, personality. He could be more easily spared than John Anderson and his appointment would not be regarded as so "diehard". Nor would it now be viewed critically in the House where it is generally appreciated that he has done well in Madrid. But if you won't have him then Jehovah will at any rate not let you or India down. As a last resort I have already offered you myself, and I have the advantage of being nearly as young as our youngest Prime Minister since Pitt. But I have never given up my hopes of seeing through Joseph Chamberlain's Empire policy and I want to be here for that. So I come back to my starting point: send Anthony.

Yours ever,

L. S. AMERY

PS. I think you should read the following extract from a letter seen in censorship from Holburn, the *Times* Correspondent in India, who is a very shrewd observer:

> "I have a great admiration for the Viceroy. He has great courage and patience, two qualities indispensable in this country. His grasp of the political situation is complete. Political India holds him in high respect. If his actions are challenged the honesty of his motives is never impugned. It is a pity that he does not have the flair for personal contacts which Willingdon had, and which are so important here. But one cannot have everything. You must give us an absolutely first class man to succeed him or the consequences will be disastrous. The revolutionary spirit is running high in this country and the Indian politicians are as clever as monkeys."

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

L/WS/1/1274: f 179[1]

PRIVATE AND MOST SECRET INDIA OFFICE, *8 June 1943*

3. We have not yet had the Defence Committee meeting at which the organisation of the Command for South-East Asia is to be settled. The General Staff, I think, are definitely for a single Supreme Commander, and you know my view on that subject. On the other hand, I have the impression that Winston is for the Triumvirate, not so much perhaps with any strong view as to the nature of the best organisation, as from a desire to dispense with Wavell, who he thinks is tired and lacking drive. I think he greatly underestimates a man who has not got the gift of fluent speech and does not try to put his ideas across vigorously enough. Whichever the actual solution, I have no doubt that you and your successor will be able to work it happily so far as relations between British Commanders and the Government of India are concerned. What I am more anxious about are relations with the Americans who, if they are outside the picture, will tend more and more to play for their own hand, to criticise us and in the end to demand a much bigger say than if they were dovetailed into the organisation now.

[1] MSS. EUR. F. 125/12 prints para. 3 only as far as the word 'Triumvirate' in the third sentence. It completely omits para. 4 and no copy of that para. has been found on L/WS/1/1274 ('Organisation of the High Command in India and S.E. Asia') or L/PO/8/9a ('Appointment of F.M. Sir A. Wavell as Viceroy'). The remainder of the letter (MSS. EUR. F. 125/12) discusses the war situation, and post-war financial assistance for the reconstruction of Burma.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/F/7/448: f 89

IMPORTANT
PERSONAL

INDIA OFFICE, *8 June 1943, 11 pm*
Received: 9 June

12878. Your personal telegram No. 1268–S.[1] Silver. It was unnecessary to bring question up before Cabinet as a whole, as this would probably have entailed some delay and in any case Eden, Kingsley Wood and myself were in full agreement as to action to be taken which accorded with your own desires. Upshot has been that on our joint behalf Eden has addressed to Halifax urgent personal message, for text of which see my immediately following telegram.[2] The statement[3] mentioned in it which was telegraphed simultaneously was modelled closely on your 1268.

[1] No. 736.

[2] This stressed the importance of the matter and passed on the suggestion in the final para. of No. 736 of an approach by Lord Halifax to Mr Hull, subject to the former's judgement of the stage at which any such additional reinforcement of efforts already being made could best be brought into play. L/F/7/448: f 90.

[3] Mr Eden's message informed Lord Halifax that he could of course make the fullest use of this statement (L/F/7/448: ff 93–5), 'though obviously there is much in it which is not suitable for publication to the world at large'.

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Sir J. Herbert (Bengal) to the Marquess of Linlithgow (Extract)

MSS. EUR. F. 125/43

GOVT. HOUSE, DARJEELING, *8 June 1943*

Dear Linlithgow,
This is my report for the second half of May. I enclose the Home Department report[1] for that period.

2. *Food Supplies.*—You will have received my telegrams[2] on the subject of import of rice. As they indicate, my visit to Calcutta has made me more certain than ever of the potential dangers of the present situation. Nazimuddin and Braund had just returned from Assam, while Suhrawardy had met the Bihar officials in Patna. Although both these Provinces have expressed willingness to assist, supplies are very slow in coming in. From what I heard, in each of these

[1] and [2] Not printed.

Provinces the Governor himself was ready to support free trade in principle: opposition is apprehended from the local officials whose influence, it is feared, may prove conclusive against real Free Trade. Reports from Orissa continue to be really disquieting, and Suhrawardy has gone there in an attempt to arrive at some satisfactory solution. It would appear that the officer-in-charge of rice supplies there has expressed his personal unwillingness to permit any quantity of rice to leave the Province. Whatever be the reason, no rice has so far reached us from Orissa for some time, and Braund does not disguise his apprehension at the situation.

3. I feel strongly that our drive to dig out hoards and improve distribution within Bengal should have coincided with stocks coming in in large quantities under free trade. The drive was timed for this, and the whole thing should have gone with a "bang". As it is, there is now the possibility that our drive will lower prices within the Province, external prices will rise as a result of speculative and Government buying, and the inducement to send rice into Bengal will disappear. Should this occur we should be worse off than ever, having consumed our own rice and having none coming in. In such an event, there must be serious riots within two months. It was for this reason that I felt obliged to send you what may have seemed an alarmist telegram urging that, if a really serious situation is to be averted, free trade must at once be made real and "total", so that rice and paddy will move freely through the normal trade channels. I believe that we both are agreed that Sleeman's theory of free movement[3] is the only possible solution: but at present we have got the exact opposite. I fear, as stated in my telegrams, that a time must shortly arrive (if it has not already arrived) when conflict between the requirements of Bengal and those of our neighbours will become irreconcilable. At that stage the decision must be taken by the only authority with power to enforce its decision on dissenting parties—the Central Government.

4. There are already signs that fear of future scarcity will affect labour. So far we have managed to keep industrial undertakings going, but the failure of free trade has driven us to reductions in rations which have naturally caused a general feeling of uneasiness. We are in the greater fix as, when there is not enough to go round, continued supplies to the Bengal Chamber are cried down as racial and class preference.

[3] Maj.-Gen. Sir W. H. Sleeman, *Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official*, vol. 1 (London, Constable and Co., 1893), pp. 186–96.

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Mr Churchill to the Marquess of Linlithgow (via India Office)

Telegram, L/PO/8/9a: ff 94–5

MOST IMMEDIATE *9 June 1943, 10.45 pm*

11–U. Personal and most secret from Prime Minister for your eye alone.

1. Naturally I have been considering all these anxious months the question of your successor. I have never in my life had to solve a more puzzling appointment. I am loth to disturb the smooth-running poise of the War Cabinet. Eden, Lyttelton and Anderson can none of them be spared. I am sure that Sam Hoare would not be well received in an atmosphere which condemns so severely the Hoare–Laval pact and the Munich treaty. I could not have confidence in him. After many inquiries and cogitations I am inclined towards either (a) Sir Miles Lampson now Lord Killearn, or (b) Wavell.

2. It seems to me after reading your various messages that Wavell would be far the better man. We want younger men in the field but he has a great name, knows the situation on your Council, and has a much broader outlook than most soldiers.

3. Proceeding on another path I have reached a definite conclusion that the statutory Commander-in-Chief in India must be separate from the active Command of the East Asia front. Auchinleck would surely be far and away the best man to administer and sustain this vast new Indian Army which now requires vigilant and experienced care.

4. I am therefore about to propose to the King that Wavell should be your successor as Viceroy, and Auchinleck Commander-in-Chief in India, with the clear intention of forming a separate East Asia Command of the highest importance. On this last I will cable you later.

5. I should be grateful if you would let me have your views on these proposals at the earliest moment as I feel I have delayed too long already.

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Mr Amery to the Marquess of Linlithgow

Telegram, L/PO/8/9a: f 93

MOST IMMEDIATE INDIA OFFICE, *10 June 1943, 1 am*

12–U. Prime Minister has definitely decided that he cannot spare Eden in view of peace conference, etc. He feels Anderson who is very useful here has aged

latterly and would be regarded as a rather negative appointment. Lyttelton who also would be difficult to spare has not got the right kind of personality for India and might be erratic. Nothing will induce him to look at Sam Hoare. There is nobody else in the political stud who is either big size in himself or in public estimation. Wavell is not only a great soldier but a man of broad culture and I gather from your letters that he has impressed and gone down well with both your Council and the National [Defence] Council. He is moreover familiar with the working of your Council and knows the personal quality of its members. It is a bold experiment but anything would be better than a colourless or weak appointment. No doubt the Hindu nationalist press will say that this shows that we are abandoning all idea of political advance and are for ruling with the strong hand and that may have its echoes here. But I am not sure that that would not be a good preparatory dose to induce a more realistic attitude towards the constitutional future.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Amery

MSS. EUR. F. 125/12

PRIVATE AND SECRET VICEROY'S CAMP, SIMLA, *10 June 1943*

Many thanks for your letter of the 25th May[1] which has just arrived. The Gandhi–Jinnah correspondence is now becoming old history, and I do not think I have a great deal to add to what I said about it in my last letter,[2] though I need not say how interested I have been to have this additional background from you. Hallett, as you will see from his last fortnightly letter,[3] was thinking on the same lines as Winston! and would have preferred the letter suppressed. Whatever my views may have been as to the wisdom of sending it on, or not sending it on I, like you, never for a moment thought that it would be possible, for any long period, to keep entirely secret the fact that such a letter had been despatched by Gandhi, and on that assumption the case was clear for facing up to the issue at the beginning.

2. In paragraph 2 of your letter you comment on Jinnah's attitude. I think he probably looks a little more alarming from London than he does here. I do not however think he wants a row with Government, though on the other hand (like unfortunately all these Indian leaders) he exists on being as rude to Government (and to his political opponents) as he thinks he dares. I doubt if anyone takes it very seriously, and his threats do not cause me any sleepless nights! As I have consistently felt and said both to Zetland and to you, Jinnah would be quite as bad a master as Gandhi. But Jinnah is not in as strong a position

as Gandhi and Congress, and he is never likely to be, in the near future, since he represents a minority, and a minority that can only effectively hold its own with our assistance. Nor, of course, is his organisation anything like as deep-rooted as is that of Congress. I would expect him to be likely to continue to be not merely non-constructive, but positively destructive, and to endeavour to play his hand so as to get the maximum in the way of commitments favourable to his community, and the maximum in the way of hurdles to be taken by Hindus, but without facing a show-down with Government, unless they had managed their business so very badly as to put him in a position from which he could take the risks which it involves.

3. As for Mudaliar's suggestion that I should have sent for Jinnah; I think it would have been the greatest mistake to have done so. It would have inflated Jinnah, who is, incidentally, quite capable of refusing to accept an invitation to come and talk, and we should also probably have alarmed Hindu opinion substantially.

4. I have been much interested in paragraphs 3 and 4 of your letter. You will have had the telegram[4] I sent you on this giving my comments on the points you raised in connection with a possible triumvirate solution, and there is nothing much which I can usefully add at this stage—I must await the result of these discussions in London; but you know my mind fully even though you may not feel convinced by my latest arguments. The personal side of all this thing is, as you pointed out in a recent private telegram,[5] very important, but here, as with everything else, we are substantially dependent on Winston, and everything is bound to turn on his reaction. But I doubt very much, for reasons that you and I have canvassed at earlier stages in our correspondence, the wisdom of asking Auchinleck to serve in this country as one of Wavell's Deputies, even with a roving commission with such limits as an Inspector-General might expect to have. His real value, as you and I both recognise, is in terms of the effect of his employment on Indian Army morale, and of our being able to use his great experience with the Indian soldier in connection with training, &c.

[Para. 5, on the non-receipt of an India Office note on the position of the A.O.C., omitted.]

6. I have sent you copies of my letter[6] to Herbert in which I described my conversation with Nazimuddin, and I send you by this bag copy of a letter[7]

[1] No. 734. [2] No. 762; see also No. 755. [3] Not printed. [4] See No. 758, note 2.

[5] Telegram 560 of 28 May suggesting that Lord Linlithgow should send any comments on personalities separately from his main telegram on S.E. Asia command structure (see No. 755, note 4). Lord Linlithgow replied in telegram 1296-S of 31 May reiterating his view that General Auchinleck should become C.-in-C., India. L/WS/1/1274: ff 139, 157.

[6] MSS. EUR. F. 125/43. [7] MSS. EUR. F. 125/138.

from Maxwell to Herbert on the same subject. Nazimuddin is a nice little man, but not outstandingly resolute or strong, and he is obviously very anxious in the first place to be able to let some of the more innocuous prisoners out. For that there may be something to be said so long as the criterion is a pretty severe one. But he is also pressing very hard that his Hindu Ministers should be allowed to go and see Sarat Bose, and that I confess, I do not feel so enthusiastic about. The position is complicated by the fact that when Fazlul Huq was Prime Minister the Nawab of Dacca and Mr. Banerji were allowed to visit Sarat Bose, and Nazimuddin is inclined to suggest that if the same concession is not made to Goswami and Pain, he may lose Hindu support altogether. I doubt the Hindu support that he has in fact being worth a very great deal, but one is anxious always, in Bengal, to try to keep Hindu feeling reasonably sweet if possible. For all that my own instinct is, at this stage, against allowing any move of this nature.

[Para. 7, on Lord Swinton's impressions of Mr. Phillips; para. 8, on Manipur; para. 9, on small savings in India; and para. 10, on the Royal Indian Naval Benevolent Association, omitted.]

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr Churchill (via India Office)

Telegram, L/PO/8/9a: f 88

MOST IMMEDIATE *12 June 1943*
PRIVATE

11–U. Your private telegram 11–U.[1] Following for Prime Minister. *Begins.*

(1) Thank you very much for letting me know your mind about the difficult matter of my successor.

(2) Of two men you mention I think Wavell would be best.

(3) I agree that Auchinleck is by far the best appointment for Commander-in-Chief India.

I agree also that C.-in-C. India should have no part in East Asia operations other than training (corrupt group) and duty of collecting war material. I have given Amery my reasons for preferring triumvirate type of direction under Minister of State for East Asia operations.[2] I await your decision on this with the utmost interest. *Ends.*

[1] No. 767. [2] See No. 755, note 4, and No. 758, note 2.

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The Marquess of Linlithgow to Mr. Amery

Telegram, L/PO/8/9a: f 86

MOST IMMEDIATE *12 June 1943*

12–U. Your telegram of the 10th instant.[1] Many thanks for letting me know background of Prime Minister's proposal. I do not think that I can usefully comment on proposed appointment.

2. I feel that appointment reinforces strongly case for securing Jenkins as Private Secretary if Wavell can be persuaded to accept him.

3. Will you please at right moment give Wavell following from me. *Begins.* Please accept my warmest congratulations and best wishes. *Ends.*

4. If Triumvirate under Minister of State is being considered for East Asia Command I can see difficulty in Wavell acting as Minister of State even during first phase unless he were whole-heartedly in agreement with plan. But now that he himself is to wear the bowler hat he may change his mind.[2]

5. Please let me have warning of date of announcement. I hope I may let Auchinleck know in advance of Wavell's and his own.

[1] No. 768.

[2] In telegram 562 of 29 May, Mr Amery had informed Lord Linlithgow that Field Marshal Wavell thought set-up (i) (see No. 755, note 4) 'the only right arrangement on merits as well as the only one the Americans would understand and be willing to come in under' (L/WS/1/1274: f 143). In telegram 575 of 1 June (see No. 758, note 2) Mr Amery noted that F. M. Wavell had found that the triumvirate system worked badly in the Middle East.

Glossary

AHIMSA Hindu (also Buddhist and Jain) doctrine of non-violence.
AKALI *Lit.:* Worshipper of the eternal one. Particularly strict devotee of the SIKH faith. In modern usage, the principal SIKH political party.
ANNA Unit of money of the value of $\frac{1}{16}$th of a rupee.
ARRACK Liquor distilled from the fermented sap of the coco-palm, or from rice and sugar, fermented with coconut juice.
ASHRAM Hermitage; retreat for research and study.
BAHADUR *Lit.:* champion, hero. Formerly a military title following the name usually after KHAN; later conferred by the Viceroy in the name of the British sovereign in conjunction with DIWAN, KHAN, RAI, RAO, and SARDAR.
BAI (BEN) Sister; a title of affection and respect, often added to a Hindu lady's forename.
BAJRA The bulrush millet, a common food-grain.
BANIA Grocer, trader.
BAPU Father.
BEGUM A feminine Muslim title, originally of princesses and noblewomen.
BEN See BAI.
BHIL Tribe in west-central India noted as bowmen and bandits.
BOHRA (BOHORA) A sect of western India mainly composed of SHIA Muslims.
BRAHMAN (BRAHMIN) The highest caste of the Hindu world. Originally a priestly caste.
CIRCAR: *see* SARKAR
CRORE 100 LAKHS or 10 million.
DACOIT Member of a gang of robbers.
DACOITY Robbery with violence committed by a gang.
DARBAR (DURBAR) Court, ceremonial assembly; government of a Princely State.
DARSHAN Sight of venerated person or deity.
DETENU Person detained in custody; specifically a political prisoner in India (1918). *O.E.D.*
DEVI *Lit.:* Goddess. Used often as a title of respect, and also as a name.
DIWALI Hindu festival: the festival of lights, held on the fourteenth day of the waning moon of Kartika (September–October).
DIWAN (DEWAN) Minister; in Princely States, chief Minister; also Council of State. The titles DIWAN SAHIB and DIWAN BAHADUR were conferred by the Viceroy in the name of the British sovereign on distinguished south Indians.
DRAVIDIAN Name of a race of south India and Ceylon and of group of languages spoken by them. The Dravidians formed the bulk of the first inhabitants of the Indian peninsula.

GADI *Lit.:* Cushion; hence throne.
GONDS Widespread tribe in central India.
GOONDA Hooligan.
GRAM Kind of pea.
GURU See SIKH.
HARIJAN *Lit.:* the people of God. Term coined by Gandhi for untouchables. Title of Gandhi's newspaper.
HARTAL Strike, picketing, shopkeepers' strike.
HIMSA Violence.
HUR *Lit.:* free man. Member of group of guerrillas, or bandits, with a quasi-religious background, operating in Sind under the leadership of the Pir Pagaro.
ID A Muslim religious festival or holy observance. The *Id al-fitr*, 'festival of breaking the fast' (after Ramadan), fell on 12 October in 1942.
IZZAT Honour, credit, reputation, character.
JAGIRDAR Holder of a *Jagir*, a tenure under which public revenues of the land were assigned to the tenant either in return for services or unconditionally. The tenure frequently became an hereditary property.
JAM Chief; part of the title of the ruler of Nawanagar.
JAWAR (JOWAR, JUAR). Millet.
-JI *Lit.:* Life, soul. As a suffix to a name denotes affectionate and deep respect.
KACHAH Crude, of imperfect construction. A 'Kachah' road is an unmetalled road.
KARNAM A village accountant, Madras.
KHAN *Lit.:* ruler, sovereign. Muslim title; commonly an adjunct to Afghan or PATHAN names. The titles KHAN SAHIB and KHAN BAHADUR were conferred by the Viceroy in the name of the British sovereign.
KHARIF Autumn; autumn harvest.
KHATTAR A Muslim tribe influential along the Kala Chitta Range in the Attock and Fatehjang tahsils.
KI JAI Long live.
KISAN Peasant.
LAKH (LAC) 100,000; 100,000 rupees.
LASCAR Indian sailor.
LATHI Stick, usually bamboo, sometimes bound with iron rings.
MAHAJAN Merchant, dealer, banker, money-changer, creditor.
MAHARAJA *Lit.:* Great King, Prince. A Hindu title.
MAHASABHA *Lit.:* Great Assembly. Political party based on militant Hinduism.
MAHATMA Great Soul.
MAIDAN An open space in or near a town; the park at Calcutta.
MALIK Muslim title inferior to KHAN and Amir. Chief man of one of the kinship groups into which PATHAN tribes are divided.

MANDI Market; special market for any particular commodity.
MARWARI Strictly, a native of Marwar in Rajputana; often settled elsewhere in India; usually a banker or merchant; loosely used for BANIA.
MAULANA *Lit.:* our Master. Title of respect accorded to Muslim judges, heads of religious orders, and persons of great learning.
MAUND A measure of weight varying in different localities; the standard maund is 82·28 lbs.
MOFUSSIL Outlying parts of district, province, or presidency, as distinct from chief station or town.
MUGWUMP (*U.S.*) An independent; one who holds aloof from political parties.
MULKI Relating to a kingdom or a country; native, domestic, provincial.
MUNSIFF Judge of lowest court with civil jurisdiction; summary civil court of first instance.
NAWAB Originally a Governor under the Moghul Empire; thence a title of rank conferred on Muslim nobles.
NAWABZADA Son of a NAWAB.
PANCHAYAT Court of arbitration (properly of five persons) for determination of petty disputes.
PANDIT A Hindu title. In its strict sense applied to those versed in the Scriptures, but used commonly to denote a member of the BRAHMAN community.
PARSEE Descendant of Zoroastrian refugees who fled from Persia on its conquest by Muslims in the eighth century A.D.; chiefly settled in western India and distinguished as merchants, shipbuilders, and traders.
PATHAN Generic name given to Pushtu-speaking people inhabiting North-West Frontier of India and Afghanistan.
PIE Unit of money of the value of $\frac{1}{12}$th of an ANNA.
PIR *Lit.:* an old man. Thence founder of a religious or mystical sect. The Pir Pagaro was the hereditary leader of the HURS.
POOJA (PUJA) Hindu religious ceremony; hence almost any kind of rite. The *Doorga Pooja* (*Durga Puja*), 'Worship of Durga', is a Hindu festival and holiday period (*esp.* in Bengal) lasting for 10 days in October.
QUA'ID I A'ZAM, QAID-E-AZAM The Supreme Leader.
RABI Spring Harvest.
RAI Prince; Hindu title derived from RAJA. The titles RAI SAHIB and RAO BAHADUR were conferred by the Viceroy in the name of the British sovereign.
RAIYAT See RYOT.
RAJ Kingdom, rule, sovereignty.
RAJA *Lit.:* King, Prince; a Hindu title.
RAO Prince; Hindu title derived from RAJA. The titles RAO SAHIB and RAO BAHADUR were conferred by the Viceroy in the name of the British sovereign.
RUPEE Unit of money of the value of 1*s.* 6*d.* in 1942.
RYOT Peasant, cultivating tenant.

RYOTWARI System of tenure in which land revenue is imposed on the actual occupants of holdings.
SAHIB (SAHEB) *Lit.:* master. Respectful form of address.
SAIYID (SAYYID, SYED) *Lit.:* lord, chief, master. Title of descendants of the Prophet.
SANAD Grant, charter; certificate awarded for meritorious service.
SANTHAL A tribe of Chota Nagpur, Bengal, and Bihar.
SARDAR (SIRDAR) *Lit.:* chief, leader. Title borne by SIKHS, also by Hindus and Muslims; the titles SARDAR SAHIB and SARDAR BAHADUR were conferred by the Viceroy in the name of the British sovereign.
SARKAR State, Government. Originally a treasury, revenue district, or territorial division; in the latter sense often spelt CIRCAR.
SATYAGRAHA *Lit.:* holding on to truth. Total self-giving; integral to Mahatma Gandhi's concept of victory achieved through non-violent resistance.
SATYAGRAHI Participant in SATYAGRAHA.
SEVA SANGH *Lit.:* service league, association, or society. The Gandhi Seva Sangh was an all-India organisation intended to apply Gandhian principles to industrial problems.
SHI'AH (SHIA) *Lit.:* party, sect. The name given by other Muslims to those who believe that Ali, cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, was his rightful successor.
SHRI Sanskrit term used by Hindus to denote 'Mr'.
SHRIMATI Sanskrit term used by Hindus to denote 'Mrs'.
SIKH *Lit.:* disciple. Follower of Guru Nanak (1469–1538), the first of the line of ten leaders (*Gurus*) who formulated the Sikh faith and welded the Sikhs into an independent community. In the face of religious persecution, the Sikhs under the last of the Gurus, Gobind Singh (1666–1708), acquired a formidable military reputation.
SUNNI From *sunnah*: 'way', 'practice'. One who follows the practice of the Prophet; the term generally applied to Muslims who acknowledge the first four Caliphs equally as his rightful successors.
SWARAJ (SWARAJYA) Self-rule, independence.
TAHSIL (TEHSIL) A revenue sub-division (approximately 150 villages) of a district.
THANA Police station, and hence area of its jurisdiction.
TODA Primitive matrilineal polyandrous tribe of the Nilgiri hills in Madras; buffalo herdsmen and dairymen. The toda may represent a very ancient migration of cattle-keepers from Iran; their culture perhaps embodies traditions going back to prehistoric times when dairying was a new invention.
TODDY Liquor distilled from coconut.
TOLA Weight equivalent to 180 grains (troy).
ZEMINDAR (ZAMINDAR) One holding land as an actual proprietor but paying a fixed annual sum to the Government.

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INDIA 1942-3

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